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The Dependent Origination of Skepticism in Classical India: an Experiment in Cross-Cultural Philosophy

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The Dependent Origination of Skepticism in Classical India: an Experiment in Cross-Cultural Philosophy University of New Mexico UNM Digital Repository Philosophy ETDs Electronic Theses and Dissertations 7-11-2013 The epD endent Origination of Skepticism in Classical India: An Experiment in Cross-Cultural Philosophy Ethan Mills Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/phil_etds Recommended Citation Mills, Ethan. "The eD pendent Origination of Skepticism in Classical India: An Experiment in Cross-Cultural Philosophy." (2013). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/phil_etds/2 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy ETDs by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ethan Mills_______________________ Candidate Philosophy________________________ Department This dissertation is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication: Approved by the Dissertation Committee: _________________________________________________ John Taber, Chairperson __________________________________________________________ Richard Hayes ___________________________________________________________ Mary Domski ____________________________________________________________ Kelly Becker ____________________________________________________ Arindam Chakrabarti i THE DEPENDENT ORIGINATION OF SKEPTICISM IN CLASSICAL INDIA: AN EXPERIMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PHILOSOPHY BY ETHAN MILLS B.A., Philosophy, Hamline University, 1999 M.A., Philosophy, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, 2003 DISSERTATION Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy The University of New Mexico Albuquerque, New Mexico May, 2013 ii DEDICATION To the memory of my mother, Linda Mills (1949-2000), who instilled in me the love of life and learning that brought me this far. Thanks, Mom. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I’d like to thank my dissertation committee: Arindam Chakrabarti, for putting me on the right track during my MA program at the University of Hawai’i and for agreeing to serve on my committee, Kelly Becker, for his enthusiastic support and for sharing his expertise in contemporary epistemology, Mary Domski, for sharing her extensive understanding of the history of Western philosophy and for her professional help and encouragement. Richard Hayes and John Taber are the bedrock of the Indian philosophy concentration at UNM. I’d like to thank them both for their many hours of patience in seminars and meeting to read Sanskrit during my years at UNM. Richard’s humor and vast knowledge of the Indian Buddhist tradition have been a great help and an inspiration. As a fellow resident of the sparsely populated realm of those who think there are real skeptics in the Buddhist tradition, Richard makes my skeptical endeavors a little less lonely. Lastly, I am extremely grateful to John Taber for serving as my chair – his patience, encouragement, expansive knowledge of philosophy (Indian and otherwise), intellectual curiosity, and his willingness to disagree with me have been instrumental in making this dissertation what it is. I’d like to thank my UNM colleagues for their friendship and conversation, especially Laura Guerrero, Stephen Harris, Krupa Patel, Phil Schoenberg, Jeremy Martin, and Will Barnes. Colleagues elsewhere who have been helpful are Amy Donahue, Jeremy Henkel, Matt McKenzie, and Chris Framarin. I’d also like to thank other UNM personnel: John Bussanich, Barbara Hannan Cooke, Iain Thomson, Paul Livingston, Theresa López, Sandy Robbins, Rikk Murphy, Shannon Kindilien, and Mercedes Nysus. The libraries at the University of New Mexico and the University of Arizona made my research possible, in their own holdings and in inter-library loan services. I am extremely grateful to the UNM Department of Philosophy for awarding me the Barrett Dissertation Fellowship in the fall of 2011, which gave me the time and breathing room I needed to come within striking distance of finishing this thing. I have presented portions of this dissertation at the American Philosophical Association Pacific, Eastern, and Central Division Conferences, the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Annual Conferences, and the 2011 East-West Philosophers’ Conference. I thank the scholars I’ve met at these conferences who have provided helpful feedback, especially Jonathan Stoltz, Mark Siderits, Don Levi, Amod Lele, Thill Raghunath, Jonardon Ganeri, Gordon Davis, Jay Garfield, and Purushottama Bilimoria. My cat, Elsie, has been a good “research assistant” who has provided a calming and often amusing influence during much of my writing process. I’d like to thank all of my family and friends for accepting and supporting my academic pursuits, no matter how strange they may seem. My father, Bob Mills, has been especially encouraging. My sister, Amanda Mills, was a close childhood friend who grew up to be a close adulthood friend. She also provided concrete support in the early stages of my research while she pursued her Masters in Library and Information Science. Hume once wrote, “Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.” I would like to thank my wife, Beth Leahy, for doing more than anyone else to keep me human through the sometimes inhuman process of writing a dissertation. I hope I can return the favor as she pursues her PhD. iv THE DEPENDENT ORIGINATION OF SKEPTICISM IN CLASSICAL INDIA: AN EXPERIMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PHILOSOPHY BY ETHAN MILLS B.A., Philosophy, Hamline University, 1999 M.A., Philosophy, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, 2003 Ph.D., Philosophy, University of New Mexico, 2013 ABSTRACT I begin with the question of whether the problem of philosophical skepticism is inevitable, a question that was answered affirmatively by Hume and has come to be a source of debate in contemporary epistemology. If skepticism is an inevitable problem, then it should arise in any sufficiently sophisticated tradition of epistemology such as the tradition found in classical India. The Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu gives arguments from ignorance based on dreams that are quite similar to the dream argument of Descartes. However, while Vasubandhu’s arguments give an invitation to skeptical concerns (especially if he is a phenomenalist, rather than an idealist), this invitation was not accepted in quite the same way as it has been by Western philosophers. Yet there is another form of skepticism in Indian philosophy, which is more like Pyrrhonian skepticism. I call this metaphilosophical skepticism, which consists of doubts about the possibility of philosophy itself. Reading the Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna as a metaphilosophical skeptic solves the puzzle of how to reconcile his arguments for the view of emptiness with his injunctions against holding any view whatsoever. Jayarāśi, a skeptical member of the irreligious Cārvāka school, refutes any positive epistemological theory and embodies a contextualism that makes room to enjoy everyday practice. Thus, skeptical concerns in classical India invite us to question what we think we know about issues of philosophical skepticism. I conclude by considering what it is that allows concerns about metaphilosophical skepticism to arise in a philosophical tradition, arguing that it is this type of skeptical concern, rather than the problem of external world skepticism, that may be inevitable. v TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................... ix CHAPTER ONE: Is Skepticism an Intuitive Problem? .................................... 1 1.1 The intuitive thesis and diagnosing skepticism................................................. 2 1.2 Some Western discussions of the intuitive nature of skepticism ....................... 7 1.3 Looking to classical Indian epistemology: Conducting an experiment in cross-cultural philosophy ................................................................ 17 1.4 On blending historical/interpretive and problem-centered approaches.............. 22 1.5 Preview of the upcoming chapters ................................................................... 23 1.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 25 CHAPTER TWO: External-World Skepticism and Indian Philosophy: The Case of Vasubandhu.................................................... 27 2.1 Skeptical issues in Indian philosophy?............................................................. 30 2.2 Vasubandhu and arguments from ignorance..................................................... 33 2.3 Idealism or phenomenalism?............................................................................ 41 2.4 Evidence for idealism ...................................................................................... 52 2.5 Evidence for phenomenalism........................................................................... 65 2.6 A tentative answer ........................................................................................... 88 2.7 Vasubandhu and the intuitive thesis................................................................. 90 2.8 Epistemological skepticism and metaphilosophical skepticism ........................ 99 2.9 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 110 CHAPTER THREE: Madhyamaka: From Emptiness to Metaphilosophical Skepticism .......................................................................
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