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An Iranian Jurisprudential Campaign: To Silence Grand al-Haydari

Rasheed Al-Khayoun

December, 2020

Statements were recently issued by Iranian jurists of the Seminary repudiating Grand Ayatollah Kamal al-Haydari. Born and raised in to a “fervent and pious” Arab family, al-Haydari studied in , , and then in Qom, according to his official website.(1) He rose to prominence through his lectures, which were broadcast on the Iranian public television channel Al-Kawthar TV. The channel stopped broadcasting his lectures, however, due to concerns over dubious research and messaging that was inconsistent with widely held public and private legal knowledge, including legal precedents that serve as a foundation for many major issues of law. Reinterpreting well-established and widely accepted legal precedents was, according to the channel, tantamount to invalidating these sources, and was, overall, destabilizing. After the cancellation of his lectures on Al-Kawthar TV, al-Haydari’s students began publishing them on YouTube, where they became even more popular than before.

In both his writings and speeches, al-Haydari openly references materials, providing the volume and page number to his audience, before offering his opinion. While many Imami jurists claim that Ayatollah al-Haydari is attempting to cast doubt on established doctrines of the Imamate, al-Haydari views himself as an impartial scholar of religious doctrines, seeking only to improve their veracity. In taking such a stance, he is emulating the likes of the founder of Imami authority, bin Muhammad bin Nuʿman al-ʿUkbari, also known as al-Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 413 AH/1022 CE), who corrected his teacher,

(1) From the website of the Grand Ayatollah Kamal Al-Haydari, “An Overview of His Life,” http://alhaydari.com/ar/about/.

An Iranian Jurisprudential Campaign: Commentaries To Silence Grand Ayatollah al-Haydari 1 al-Shaykh al-Saduq al-Qummi (d. 381 AH/991 CE), a scholar known as one of the few approved by the Imamate to narrate . Al-Shaykh al-Mufid’s bookTashih ʿAqaʾid al-Imamiyya challenged the hadith and opinions included in his teacher’s book al-Iʿtiqadat. Thus, there is precedent within the Imami school for a student to challenge the work of a predecessor, even though it might provoke anger.

Al-Haydari’s essential proposition is to return to the written word of the , as opposed to subsequent legal interpretations, as some of these interpretations deviate from the meaning of the original text. Take for example the verse, “And [remember] when his Lord tried Abraham with [certain] words, and he fulfilled them. Allah said, ‘I am making you an for mankind.’ Abraham asked, ‘And of my offspring?’ Allah said, ‘My covenant does not include the wrongdoers’” (Quran 2: 124). The jurists interpreted this verse as pertaining to the divinely-ordained Guardianship or the Imamate that was entrusted to Ali bin Abi Talib and his 11 children and grandchildren, the last of whom is in . While the last Imam is in Occultation, the Guardian Jurist, a Grand Ayatollah called the al-faqih, serves in his stead. The Guardian serves as a Custodian, exercising not legal but political power in the name of the last Imam, while the other Grand uphold the legal mantle of jurisprudence. The exercise of political power in the name of the last Imam is called Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, and includes a mandate to govern of the country.(2) This is similar to the Sunni Islamist view of governance, except the Islamists rule directly in the name of God, not in the name of the last Imam.(3) However, in al-Haydari’s exegesis, the verse does not establish the role of the Imamate, but specifically of Abraham: When Abraham asked, “And of my offspring?”, The Quran clearly answered with, “My covenant does not include the wrongdoers.” Thus, the offspring of Abraham are not included in the mandate.

Ayatollah al-Haydari also reexamined the notions of religious authority known respectively as explicit designation (that is, the divinely sanctioned rule of the Imam) and obscure designation (that is, the obscurity of Ali’s designation as successor to Muhammad). The notion of explicit designation is rooted in the Prophet Muhammad’s sermon (Dhu al-Hijja 18, 10 AH/March 19, 632 CE) which took place after the Farewell , and the exact meaning was perceived differently by those in attendance and those who heard it through subsequent retellings. At stake here is what was directly heard and what was inferred. Whatever was heard directly creates a necessity in , and whatever is inferred does not. Naturally, discussing or debating the foundational precedent of explicit designation, as al-Haydari has done, is problematic for the Imamate because it calls into question the concept of Guardianship. Al- Haydari also challenged the methods by which the precedents were transmitted, such as by soliciting money (alms), as noted in Ibn al-Jawzi’s (d. 597 AH/1201 CE) book Fabrications (Al-Mawduʿat), in which Ibn al-Jawzi claimed some were fabricated. Al-Haydari also revealed to the public that the jurists use a procedure of the law called talfiq—something that was not supposed to be revealed—in which they weigh the rulings of different legal schools and adopt the one most beneficial to religion.

(2) See Ruhollah Musavi al-Khomeini, (: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1979). (3) See, for example, Abdul al-Mawdudi, The Islamic Government, trans. Ahmad Idris (Jeddah: al-Dar al-Saʿudiyya lil-Nashr wa-l-Tawziyyaʿ, 1984).

An Iranian Jurisprudential Campaign: 2 To Silence Grand Ayatollah al-Haydari Commentaries This is an instrumentality undertaken with a religious or sectarian agenda, and is completely refuted by other scholars.

As a result, al-Haydari’s lectures were met with harsh criticism. After each lecture was published on the internet—either on his official website or on YouTube—various respondents, including Shiʿi jurists, hurled insults, calling him a fraud or a liar or accusing him of hosting a pay-for-play scheme. But criticisms of his work are undercut by the burden of proof and evidence he offers, which testify that he is not fabricating his legal opinions. Those who respond to him try to refute him by interpreting the sources to fit their purposes in a way that supports their argument, but ultimately provide weak arguments against the veracity of his interpretation.

How did al-Haydari attract the ire of the jurists of , even more so than Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlalla (d. 2010) did in the 1990s? Fadlalla, after retiring from a career as a jurist for Hezbollah in , established his own school after the death of Khomeini, challenging the authority of Khomeini’s successor, the new Guardian Jurist Khamanei, and denying the suffering of Fatima al-Zahra (11 AH/632 CE). Al-Haydari’s position is even more controversial, as he challenges precedents foundational to the Imamate, such as the necessity to pay , the infallibility of the Imamate, and other things that are not viewed as inherent truths. In other words, al-Haydari’s critiques threaten the foundation of the Imamate and its validity.

Al-Haydari, as we know, criticized Sunni scholars long before turning his gaze to the Imamate. He had been especially critical of the Umayyad period in Islamic history and the , such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728 AH/1328 CE). According to al-Haydari, no precedent is above criticism, since the men who transmit them are fallible.

The reason for the recent explosion of backlash against al-Haydari from the Qom Seminary is his criticism of the fatawa and precedents set by early Imami jurists. At dispute here is al-Haydari’s claim that the Sunnis need not believe in the Imamate of Ali bin Abi Talib (d. 40 AH/661 CE), the succession of his mantle though the succeeding 11 , or the return of the last Imam. The twelfth Imam, Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Askari, is said by the Shiʿi Imamate to be in Occultation. He went into in 260 AH/843 CE and then Major Occultation in 329 AH/941 CE, which is still in effect. The doctrine of the Occultation established the theory of governance by which has been ruled since 1979, namely the Limited and Absolute Guardianships. This doctrine has also led to proclamations of takfir—a concept of calling a Muslim an unbeliever or apostate—which was applied to Zaydis, Ismaʿilis, and all other Shiʿi sects other than the Imamis. Thus, the harshness of the denunciation of al-Haydari’s position by Iran’s jurists is not because of his view of the Imamate, but because of his view on the unity (sometimes called proximity) of Muslim sects. Al-Haydari grew up during a time of benign relations between Ayatollah (d. 1961), a Shiʿi, and Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1963), a Sunni. In the past, their unity, despite being of different sects, served beneficial ends. But now any rapprochement between the sects, according to al-Haydari, is being exploited for political gain by the Guardianship. His comments have angered the Iranian religious establishment, particularly ’s associate Mohsen Araki.

An Iranian Jurisprudential Campaign: Commentaries To Silence Grand Ayatollah al-Haydari 3 Al-Haydari was a guest speaker on the fifth episode of the television program entitled al-Murajaʿa [Review on Religion and Secularism], which was broadcast on Iraqi television on October 18, 2020.(4) The angry reception to the episode resulted in the show’s cancellation, as many accused al-Haydari of trying to spread discord () among by mentioning the Shiʿi fatawa denouncing Sunnis, although the protestors themselves made sure to mention how Sunnis themselves declare that Shiʿis are not Muslims!

As it happens, I was also one of the guests on this program, at which point no one had spoken out against the Iranian regime. Thus, I could feel the host’s reticence as I discussed Sunni and Shiʿi political : I brought up the failure of the Islamists in governance from Iran to Sudan, Egypt, and Afghanistan. I mentioned how Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari (d. 1985) was subjected to cruelty at the hands of his own students, students who joined the launched by Khomeini. Shariatmadari had previously designated Khomeini an Ayatollah in 1963 in order to protect him from execution, because in Iranian law, Ayatollahs are mujtahids who cannot be executed.(5) Despite this, Shariatmadari was later imprisoned, denied outside health care, and was buried in secret upon his death.(6) I say: It is the right of the who sees a kidnapped person disappear, that whoever kills his killer is blameless. Besides what al-Haydari said, my segment was the most blasphemous.

Al-Haydari’s mention of the fatawa was brought about by the host Saadoun Mohsen Damad’s question about unity between Islamic sects. Damad was a Qom seminary student and as such had firsthand experience of the work in support of the Guardianship before later changing his focus and becoming one of the most prominent critics of political Islam and politics in general.

Here is what happened: Damad asked al-Haydari about sectarian unity and doing away with the concept of takfir. Al-Haydari responded by saying that the concept of takfir is not open to discussion, because the notion is claimed by both Sunni and Shiʿi jurists. Al-Haydari explained that the main problem among jurists is whether certainty can be reached from precedents. By contrast, seeking to understand God’s will is, according to al-Haydari, about striving to arrive at a probability of the truth. It is not about ascertaining absolute certitude. Thus, he said, understanding this notion of probability versus certitude must come before any rapprochement can take place. The question must be asked, he said, about whether legal precedents line up with the Quran; that which does not correspond must be abandoned. The Quran, after all, does not speak from the point of view of a sect, but in a clear language for the community of God (). Yet legal scholars speak to one another in terms of fidelity to a sect, not to the community. Thus, how can there be discussion and faith in fatawa if this is the status quo being adopted?

According to al-Haydari, the trouble with the belief in the Imamate among the Shiʿa is the certitude with which its doctrines are presented—so that it does not require inference () or conformity to legal

(4) For the first episode, see Kamal al-Haydari, “Dialogue on Religion and Secularism” [Hiwar al-Din wa Almaniyya], You- Tube video, 55:14, September 28, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TzNqt3JWxEA. (5) Ayatollah Abu al-Fazl Burqei, Sawanih al-Ayyam, trans. Saad Rustom (n.p.: Dar al-Aqeedah, 2013), 103. (6) Ayatollah Reza Sadr, Fi Sijn Wilayat al-Faqih, trans. Ali (n.p.: Fajr al-wilaya, n.d.), 19 ff.

An Iranian Jurisprudential Campaign: 4 To Silence Grand Ayatollah al-Haydari Commentaries precedent ()—making it much like the indisputable truths of monotheism or prophethood. While Sunnis believe that governance is a secondary matter of shariʿa as opposed to a foundational one, Shiʿis believe it is a question of religion and , and anyone who denies the Imamate denies monotheism. In offering the Sunni point of view, al-Haydari cited al-Qurtubi’s al-Mufhim li-ma Ashkala Talkhis Kitab Muslim, which says, in al-Haydari’s interpretation, that Shiʿis deny the necessity of the legitimacy of the mandate to establish a , and that accordingly their status as believers is different.(7) For Shiʿi jurists, the Imamate is a fundamental pillar of religion, and is even among the most important religious beliefs; whoever does not recognize it has no iman.

There was a whirlwind of reactions to al-Haydari’scomments. Some quoted al-Hilli (d. 726 AH/1325 CE) who, in his Muntaha al-Talab, said: “The Imamate is a pillar and cornerstone of religion, and its certitude has been established as a necessity.”(8) Others quoted Shaykh al-Mufid in his book Awaʾil al-Maqalat: “Denying the leadership of the Imams is a denial of what God has deemed necessary for them, so the one who denies it is an .” Then came the opinions of the author of Bahar al- Anwar and the author of al-Hadaʾiq al-Nadira, and among the contemporaries, Ayatollah Abi al-Qasim al-Khawʾi (d. 1992). The critics explained the different Shiʿi jurists’ rulings on takfir, saying that they have, across the centuries, consistently engaged it, calling some Muslims only Muslims outwardly and in name but not true believers internally in their hearts.

This notion of takfir was extended not only to the Sunnis, but to Shiʿis who do not believe in , as mentioned above. As for the opinion of Al-Haydari himself, he distanced himself from this position, on grounds of not believing in the epistemic root or the narrative or informative evidence. In other words, al-Haydari’s claim is that since he, as a jurist, cannot attain absolute certainty, he cannot tell the difference between a nominal Muslim and a true believer (except for those who would deny the Prophet, and who is thus not a Muslim at all). As a result, he argues that neither Muslims who deviate from Islam and become apostates nor non-Muslims should be put to death, with the exception of those who take up weapons. Al-Haydari’s view deviates from that of his teachers, but is informed by his research.

When questioned about the Sunni and Shiʿi jurists who extend takfir to all but those who believe in the Imamate, Ayatollah Al-Haydari responded that he is not adequately learned in the juristic opinions of those who view Shiʿism as illegitimate. As for the Shiʿi jurists, however, he cited a maxim used when seeking to reach certitude: “In no uncertain terms, there is no Shiʿi jurist who doesn’t declare Muslims to be internally unbelievers.” Thus, al-Haydari does not see the benefit in bringing the sects together to resolve the notion of takfir but, rather, it is part of scholarly discourse between students and their teachers. The explicit meaning, he said, is that belief in the Imamate “is firmly established in religion; one cannot have iman without belief in the Imamate; it is not enough to simply imitate parents, relatives or teachers, regardless of their wisdom or age. But it is necessary to subject them to the same treatment

(7) Abu al Abbas al-Qurtubi, al-Mufhim li-ma Ashkala Talkhis Kitab Muslim, vol. 6 (Damascus: Dar Ibn Kathir, 1996), 249. (8) Allamah al-Hilli, Muntaha al-Talab, vol. 8, (Meshad, Iran: Islamic Research Building, 1993), 360, http://lfile.ir/feqhi- library/book105.pdf

An Iranian Jurisprudential Campaign: Commentaries To Silence Grand Ayatollah al-Haydari 5 as monotheism and prophethood.”(9) Did al-Haydari mean that one who lacks iman is then an unbeliever, and thus a non-Muslim? What he seems to have done is present the discussion on takfir, and allow the burden of evidence to fall on the different sects to determine a ruling about takfir. In doing so, he distances himself from scrutiny, challenging others to examine the evidence.

It is important to note here that Islamic sects adopt the title of the “saved sect” (al-furqa al-najiyya), reflecting the fact that every sect claims to know the truth, and that a review of the source material (for example, hadith) of other communities or sects supports their claim. The Imamis are no different, adopting this title after it was transmitted by Muhammad ibn Yaʿqub al-Kulayni (d. 329 AH/941 CE). He was one of the most prominent transmitters of hadith for the Imamis. He wrote: “The Jews, after Moses died, split into 71 sects, one of which is in Paradise, and the others in Hell. The Christians, after Jesus, split into 72 sects, one of which is in Paradise, and the others in Hell. This umma, after the death of our prophet, will split into 73 sects, one of which belongs in Paradise, and the rest in hell. Of the 73 sects, 13 resemble the saved sect, but one will go to Heaven while the other 12 join the 60 sects in Hell.”(10) The Imamis believe that they are the saved sect; all other Muslims who do not belong to this sect are subject to takfir, either directly or implicitly.

Based on what al-Haydari claimed on the show al-Murajiʿa, Ayatollah Mohsen Habib Araki issued statements of condemnation against him. Araki, who is close to the Guardian Jurist Ali Khamenei, served as the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Court in Abadan, Khorramshahr and the Khuzestan Province (1981–1984 CE) at age 26. He went on to represent Khomeini in Dezful in Khuzestan Province, and for many years he was also his representative in the Badr Brigade for the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). He sat as a member of the Assembly of Experts, represented Khomeini in Britain, was a member of the Supreme Council of Qom , and was the President of the World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought.(11) In his last capacity, he found that Kamal al-Haydari’s statements completely contradict the opinions of the Forum.

Since Araki is a close confidant of the Guardian Jurist, his statement against al-Haydari appears to reflect the Guardian’s stance. To paraphrase his words, al-Araki said that al-Haydari is a false heretic and slanderer of Islam and Muslims who lies to the Shiʿi jurists. Araki also called him a corrupt imposter who has fallen into the trap of vain arrogance, a Western Zionist who supports conspiracies against Palestine, rooted in . Finally, Araki said that younger Muslims reject al-Haydari’s teachings and diminish his influence.(12)

Furthermore, the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom made similar remarks, denouncing him as a liar and slanderer. To paraphrase their comments signed by Muhammad Yazdi, the leader of the Society,

(9) Sheikh Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar, ʿAqaʾid al-Imāmiyya (Beirut: Dar al-Murtada, 2005), 59. (10) Al-Kulayni, al-Furuʿ min al-Kafi, vol. 8 (Beirut: Dar al-Taʿarrufm 1401 AH), 224 (no. 837). (11) From the website of Ayatollah Mohsen Habib Araki. (12) Hawza News Agency, “Ayatollah Araki’s Statement on to Kamal al-Haydari’s Views on Takfir,” October 20, 2020,https:// ar.hawzahnews.com/news/361683.

An Iranian Jurisprudential Campaign: 6 To Silence Grand Ayatollah al-Haydari Commentaries they claimed the following: al-Haydari makes false claims about Islam and Shiʿism; he does not exercise discipline or assiduity in his work; his work contains contradictory analyses and inferences; he generalizes and misconstrues the work of past scholars; he stirs up strife (fitna) on Mawlid, the eve of the Prophet’s birthday; and he has gone astray, and is misled.(13)

Moreover, Mohsen al-Haydari, a member of the Assembly of Experts, issued a statement on Kamal al- Haydari, paraphrased as follows: al-Haydari weakens the efforts to achieve unity among the sects of the Muslim community (ummah). He is a highly suspect person whose words are outright lies and unmistakable slander which serve the interests of Zionism and Wahhabism and fuel the fire of strife (fitna).(14)

In response to these statements of Araki and others from the Society, a group who consider themselves modernists pushed back against them. Among the group is Muhammad Javad Akbarin, Abdolali Bazargan, Muhammad Burqei, Reza Bahshati Mu’iz, Soroush Dabbagh, Abdolkarim Soroush, Reza Alijani, Mehdi Mumkin, Sedigheh Vasmaghi, and Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari. Calling them “seminary police,” the modernists denounced Araki and the jurists of the Qom Seminary for their declarations of takfir on al-Haydari. A paraphrase of their statement is as follows: Araki has adopted new ways to exacerbate and escalate criticism of al-Haydari. Al-Haydari did not, the modernists said, believe in the intrinsic apostasy of those who question the Imamate. He called upon the religious establishment to re-examine the jurisprudential and theological foundation of Imamism, particularly as it relates to sectarianism. Al-Haydari, the modernists went on, called for following the commandments of the Quran. The irony, the modernists said, is that those who condemn al-Haydari have done so on grounds of takfir in order to prove that Shiʿi jurisprudence does not engage in takfir! How can the Imamate, the modernists asked, promote rapprochement or unity with other Muslim sects and engage in discourse with other or even atheists, when they cannot do so among their own jurists without issuing declarations of takfir and tadlil? The modernists went on to note that the Qom Seminary jurists have a long history of issuing condemnations against thought leaders, such as Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlalla, and they suggest that the condemnation of al-Haydari will continue to happen to others. The signatories of the modernists’ statement challenged the Shiʿi jurists who deny takfir to speak out about the recent surge of claiming takfir against Muslims (Wednesday, October 28, 2020).

I think that instead of criticizing and threatening Ayatollah Kamal Al-Haydari, the jurists should directly address his argument that precedents or their transmission remain an obstacle for unity between sects, and that civil discourse—within the “Brotherhood of Shiʿis and Sunnis” — cannot coexist with the insurmountable number of fatawa that have been issued in jurist’s letters and books. But these texts are nonetheless taught in seminaries, including Hawza, and teach about takfir. In order to promote unity, the very scholars who condemned al-Haydari would have to remove the practice of takfir from their teachings. The need to discuss these issues is exposed by the backlash against al-Haydari. He was

(13) Hawza News Agency, “Society of Seminary Teachers Announce Their Opinion on Kamal al-Haydari,” October 29, 2020, https://ar.hawzahnews.com/news/361745. (14) Hawza News Agency, “The Statement by Member of the Assembly of Experts against Kamal al-Haydari’s Views of Tak- fir,” October 23, 2020, https://ar.hawzahnews.com/news/361707.

An Iranian Jurisprudential Campaign: Commentaries To Silence Grand Ayatollah al-Haydari 7 removed from the scholarly community by Araki for discussing the challenges to unity between the sects in Iran; Araki mobilized a group known as “The Young Believers” against al-Haydari, endangering him by opening him up to proclamations of takfir or even murder.

The Hawza jurists of Qom and other jurists calling al-Haydari to account have the duty to re-examine the juristic corpus and respond to him. They need to take him to task on the issues he brought up. If he has fabricated their doctrines, then they should prove it. If he did not, then they should not accuse him of lying and slander. His citations of the sources were proclaimed publicly, and with full transparency.

Al-Haydari has ultimately shed light on the miserable reality of our situation, and has presented the transformation of his own positions based on his life experiences. He, like other non-sectarians, has noticed that the attempts to reconcile sects have been insufficient; it is not enough simply to intend to bring the sects together when books containing fatawas are still read, not just by religious experts but by the general public. Al-Haydari anticipated the backlash, even including declarations of takfir that have been been directed against him, since the issues he addresses are at the heart of sectarianism.

I will end with this: if religiosity had not been mixed with history, it would be possible to keep some of these opinions as historical legacies; however, the confluence of history and religiosity has meant that, to this day, historical fatawa are mistakenly viewed as relevant to the present sectarian issues. What Ayatollah Kamal al-Haydari and a growing number of others are facing is the challenge of fighting for renewal and enlightenment. Al-Haydari was not the first to present the critiques that he did, although he has become the most infamous, and he joins the ranks of other Imami Shiʿi jurists including Ayatollah Allama Abu al-Fazl Burqei Qomi (d. 1992 CE), who was close to Shariatmararih and Khomeini. Ayatollah Burqei was imprisoned during the revolution after his objection to the Guardianship, and he and his students called for a return to the Quran instead of the contentious precedents, as detailed in his autobiographical book, Sawanih al-Ayyam.

An Iranian Jurisprudential Campaign: 8 To Silence Grand Ayatollah al-Haydari Commentaries