Nuba Mountains Land and Natural Resources Study

Part I – Land Study

Prepared By:

Simon Harragin

December 2003

Supported by the USAID-USDA PASA in collaboration with the University of Missouri, Tuskegee University and the University of Maryland Eastern Shore

This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

International Agriculture Programs University of Missouri

Acknowledgements:

This cross-line study into land and natural resource issues in South Kordofan was carried out between September and December 2003 by Simon Harragin (land) and Caroline Gullick (natural resources). It was funded by USAID, with UNDP (NMPACT) also funding the Northern Sector part. We acknowledge the generous assistance from these donors. Also we are grateful for the support and approval from local and State authorities in South Kordofan and from the administration of the SPLM-controlled areas. Much help was received in the field, Nairobi and Khartoum from NGO’s and other agencies. In particular we would like to thank Concern Worldwide for hosting us in Nairobi and Kauda, IFAD for an enormous amount of support in Kadugli, the JMC for their logistical help in moving us around by helicopter and for those other NGO’s (FAR, NRRDO, UNICEF, IRC especially) and individuals who assisted us with accommodation, information and hospitality. Finally we would like to thank the 4 research assistants who helped us overcome so many technical and logistical difficulties on both sides with humour and patience. The following report, though, reflects the views of its authors not the individuals or organisations that contributed.

2 Contents:

Introduction 4

Agricultural Background 4 a) Soil Types 4 b) Land Use 7

Ethnographic Background 7 a) Customary Law Regulations 7 b) Land Inheritance 8 c) Nuba Tribal Boundaries 8 d) Baggara Tribal Lands 11

Government Policy 13

Conflict between Mechanised and Traditional Farming 15

Addressing the Problem 17 a) Concession 18 b) Compromise 19 i) Who owns the land? 19 ii) Confiscation of Land 20 iii) Reassigning of Land 20 iv) The Baggara Question 21

Conclusion 21

3 Introduction

The following report describes the land-use component of the Land Use and Natural Resources Study carried out in the State of South Kordofan and Lagawa province from September to December 2003. The study was completed at an important stage of the peace process for Sudan. It aimed to provide findings that were relevant to that process and make recommendations to the political leadership concerning land use. The objective of the study was to gain an understanding of the main land-access issues concerning people living in the Nuba Mountains by an extended piece of fieldwork. This followed up the desk study that had been carried out in March 2003. By looking at people’s perceptions of land issues, the study also aimed to suggest strategies to alleviate the contribution that land disputes make to conflict in the region and provide strategies to halt the arbitrary expropriation of indigenous land for mechanised farming.

Access to land and its use can be seen to be constrained by four major factors: fertility, security, supply of water and labour availability. In this analysis, it is argued that without adequate security, access to the most fertile areas of the Nuba Mountains has not been possible for the Nuba people, and they have subsequently found themselves constrained to the most infertile areas while the most productive parts of South Kordofan have been taken over by others. This has been one of the main factors that encouraged the Nuba to take up arms, and without a recognition of and resolution to this grievance, it will be impossible to find lasting peace in the Nuba Mountains. Government policy in South Kordofan has favoured large-scale mechanised farming with the ethos, begun under Nimeiri that land should go to those who will make use of it. Mechanised farming has sought to minimise the labour constraints inherent in traditional farming systems, but has had a much greater environmental impact than traditional farming and fails to achieve consistently greater yields. Its environmental sustainability and politico- economic rationale is put into question by examining the agricultural practices prevalent in South Kordofan, the ethnographic context and the policy background to paint a picture of how conflict over land has arisen and how it could potentially be resolved.

Agricultural Background:

South Kordofan, with an approximate area of 88,000 km2 seems to have plenty of land. Figures for the year 2000 show that over 70% is grazing land with only between 14-22% of the area is either cultivated or under fallow (the remaining 10% being bare rocks and sand) (IFAD Annex II 2000:12)1. It therefore seems, as the government claims, that the agricultural resources of South Kordofan are under-utilised and that a policy of encouraging outside investment is the right one. However, with the distribution of soil types and the agricultural methods used, the argument below explains how the area under mechanised and traditional cultivation has already reached saturation, and with increasing population a clash between the two types of farming has become inevitable.

a) Soil Types:

Soils suitable for the cultivation of the basic food staples of the Nuba Mountains are limited. They are divided broadly by local people into the fertile clay soils of the plains (known as

1 AACM (1993:178) figures refer to 9% of South Kordofan being under cultivation annually

4 hadaba in Arabic), the sandy/clay pediment soils found at the foot of the mountains (known as gardud) and the rocky soils found in the mountains (karkar). None of these soil types is able to sustain uninterrupted cultivation without a fallow period unless fertilisers are used, and not even major commercial farmers in the area are able to afford to use artificial fertiliser. As a result the land has to be left fallow after a few years to recover and a different plot cleared under a ‘shifting agriculture’ regime. Clay soils need to be left fallow for at least the same length of time for which they have been cultivated, and sandy soils need three times as long under fallow as under crop. In other words, if a farmer cultivates for 7 years on clay he must leave the land for 7 years to recover, while this figure is over 20 years for sandy soil. Small plots of rocky mountain soils are cultivated every year but this is only possible due to the application of household waste and manure. It is therefore the clay soil on which most of cultivation takes place (90% in the case of the Central Valleys area – HTS Annex 7 1981:18).

5 Table - Soil types of South Kordofan Name of soil (following 1975 USDA Soil Taxonomy) Local Name Area (ha) % of Area

PD2 - Severely dissected peneplains Gardud 115 820 PD1 - Slightly dissected peneplains Gardud 291 970 PSF - Ferruginised Nubian sandstone plains & ferricretes Gardud 412 840 QFO - Baggara pattern medium soils (Naga'a) Gardud 460 720 Q2E - Eroded consolidated sandsheets & dunes Gardud 595 990 FSX - Regeba systems of the Bahr el Arab Gardud 632 960 P - Pediments Gardud 1 100 350 Sub-total 3 610 650 27%

QL - Longitudinal dunes Goz 5 320 PS - Sandsheets on Nubian sandstones Goz 75 630 Q1 - Unconsolidated sandsheets and dunes Goz 107 460 Q1E - Eroded unconsolidated sandsheets & dunes Goz 138 460 QFS - Baggara pattern sandsheets & ridges Goz 236 700 FSO - Sand & silt outwash plains and fans Goz 441 280 PSD - Dissected sand plain Goz 696 230 Q2 - Partially consolidated sandsheets & dunes (Shagg) Goz 1 142 610 Sub-total 2 843 690 21%

WC - Broad Wadi Systems Bataha 113 760 W - Waddies Bataha 1 012 860 Sub-total 1 126 620 9%

QFC - Baggara pattern clay depressions (Buta) Hadaba 290 020 PC4 - Wadi basins and sumps Fawa 330 580 PC2 - Undulating clay plains Hadaba 379 420 PCD - Dissected clay plains Hadaba 438 340 PC1 - Nuba Mountain intermontane clay plain Hadaba 628 780 PC3 - Clay basins Hadaba 650 890 Sub-total 2 718 030 21%

F2 - Floodplains of White Nile/Bahr el Arab Hadaba 443 640 F1 - Former flood plains of the White Nile/Bahr el Arab Hadaba 988 450 Sub-total 1 432 090 11%

H1 - Mountains and Hills Karkar 112 750 H2 - Rocky Hills Karkar 241 000 H3 - Low Hills Karkar 1 165 340 Sub-total 1 519 090 11%

TOTAL 13 250 170

1. Based on AACM (1993) figures which used SKADP definition of 'southern Kordofan including Abyei/Muglad (141,000km²)

The above figures are for ‘greater South Kordofan’ including the floodplains of the Bahr el Arab and Nile which lie outside our area of interest. However, they illustrate the all-important coverage of hadaba soils. They should be read together with the map of clay cover in Annex 4.

6 The main areas which concern this study are the PC1 soils that cover the Habila and Umm Lubia plain areas, as well as the Tash, Umm Derafi, Karkaraya, El Dorot, Murafayeen, Shashandel, Wodai, Bukhas, Tosi and Karandel. PC2 soils are found around Korthala and Umm Burembeita in the North, El Beida and other areas in the East. Most of the clay pockets in the Southern Jebels are PC3 or PC2 including El Azraq, Umm Shauran, Kanga, Abu Sinun and Abu Hashim as well as Maflul, Doleibaya and most of the small clay areas of the North West (PC3). PC4 is found at Lakes Abyad and Keilak. These clay areas cover 21% of the area – about the same as the figure for cultivated land in total (whether under fallow or currently cropped). Already in the area of Teis in the Southern Jebels in1981, 51% of the clay area was being cultivated in that year (HTS Annex 7 1981). It can also be seen clearly if clay cover is compared using the map in Annex 4, that the areas under control of the SPLM in the ceasefire contained almost no areas of maximum potential farming land. The ceasefire map should therefore not be used as the basis for dividing up the agricultural resources of South Kordofan in an equitable way.

b) Land Use:

When land has been cleared sesame (simsim) is often the crop which is grown for the first year due to its perceived ability to clean the land of weeds. On commercial farms and on far farms in the plains sesame and sorghum (durra) are usually grown and they are sometimes intercropped. Only on two very small plots near Teis in the southern jebels was there any cotton being grown – and this is mainly due to the current low market price of cotton. Millet is grown more commonly in the lower rainfall areas to the north and west of the region. Maize is found in near farms and house farms – particularly in mountainous areas of the south. Groundnuts are also grown widely on the pediment (gardud) soils as a cashcrop particularly successfully, it seems, in the SPLM areas.

In most areas land tends to be divided between house farms (jubraka), near or hillside farms and far farms (zera kabir). However, in some upland areas (especially those that have been subject to insecurity such as the Acirun areas of the Nugurban or the Heiban and Otoro areas) farming is restricted to the house and near farms, while in other areas (e.g. peace villages such as Reika and Al Buram in the southern jebels) only far farms are cultivated. Roden (1971) writes that the Korongo, Messakin and Shatt never had much upland agriculture. In Otoro, however, some farmers might have 5 different plots – all up in the hills.

Ethnographic Background:

a) Customary Land regulations:

‘Customary law’ is still the governing factor affecting access to land. Such rules are widely respected by local people if not by outside authorities. Land that has once been cleared by a family continues to belong to that family even if they have been displaced. One informant made it clear that newly returned people could simply ask where the land belonging to their clan was located (if they did not know) and begin cultivating. It is now no longer common for people to be able to find virgin land (ardh giffar) over which they can stake their ownership claims simply by clearing it. In most areas such claims have already been made in previous years. Land is owned

7 by individuals by virtue of membership of a wider tribe within whose territory the land is situated, though outsiders can also be allocated land by tribal chiefs.

b) Land Inheritance:

Land inheritance practises have been influenced by both Shari’a Law and by policy on the SPLM side, such that in almost all areas of the Nuba Mountains, land is handed down from father to son. In many areas of the southern jebels inheritance used to be matrilineal – in other words, land would be passed through the female line to the Mother’s Brother’s son. Shari’a law advocates inheritance directly from father to son, and this form of inheritance was also recommended by the SPLM to standardize inheritance between the northern and southern jebels, which used to have different practices. People thus speak of matrilineal inheritance as what they used to do especially amongst Korongo and Messakin, and sometimes claim that they themselves inherited from their maternal uncles, but will allow their own children to inherit from them.

c) Nuba Tribal Boundaries:

Tribal territory has become clearer as populations have increased and the members of one tribe backed up against the territory of another. Assembled groups of chiefs amongst all tribes were able to recount without hesitation where their boundaries lay with all the neighbouring groups [see Koalib case study in Annex 3]. It was constantly repeated that ‘there is no problem of land between the Nuba groups’. While this is not strictly true, it is important that Nuba see any competition amongst them as being marginal compared to the more-important competition with the mechanised schemes and with the Baggara. Many referred to agreements made in the 1920’s whereby tribes cleared the bush to make roads up to a point defined by the British where responsibility was handed over to the adjacent tribe, and this point, often deep in unoccupied territory, became the de facto boundary, sometimes marked by a concrete post2. These boundaries are the ones chosen by Nuba informants to divide up their territory, and they believe that a map is available that shows the boundaries. However, the most used map during colonial times – the 1936/7 Map issued by the Survey Office in Khartoum (1:250,000 scale – see Annex 4) - shows only tribal names and not boundaries, and a 1941 map of the tribal ‘dars’ is not on a scale that is usable (Kamal el-Din Osman Salih 1982:96).

The problem with this account of the position of tribal boundaries is that it leaves little room for non-Nuba. Also, in many cases, the actual territory claimed has nothing to do with reality on the ground, for example the area around Habila is claimed by the Koalib but is leased to outsiders and farmed by labourers from all over Nuba3. In this case, there is historical evidence that the Koalib were once resident on the plains much further west than their current position (Sagar 1922:138). Together with the Nyimang, the Koalib occupied the area around Dilling before Ghulfan and Kadaru drove a wedge between them. The oral traditions and claims to ownership of these areas by the Nuba are strongly felt, and seeing outside traders profit from resources that

2 When pressed on this point, we were told that concrete posts have mainly been destroyed but that some still exist in the hills and between Koalib and Keiga Tummero, but other Nuba insisted they had never once seen one. Baggara groups were invited to take part in the road building but were considered too mobile with their cattle to assist. 3 The saying goes ‘a madi gabila ee Habila’ – a rootless/tribeless man comes to Habila.

8 they feel belong to them created real antagonism. However, the historical claim mainly relies on oral history.

In the western part of Habila Mechanised Scheme at Semasim, an absentee landlord from the Gawama’a tribe who lives in Umm Ruwaba in North Kordofan has a 1000 feddan farm on land where in 1775 it is said the Baggara found ‘vast piles of Simsim stored’ when they drove out the Ghulfan Nuba from the area. This provides evidence that before their arrival there had been a thriving Nuba agriculture out on the plains far from the hills (Sagar 1922:140). It is only logical to conclude that, given the agricultural system practised by the Nuba and given adequate security, large areas of the fertile clay plains were used and would even have been more widely used if population pressure had been greater and if water had been more easily available. As proof of this argument, it is only necessary to look at the clay areas in the Southern Jebels, where there is sufficient population density (up to 33.6 people/km2 HTS Annex 7 1981:11), relative security and fertile soil close to the available water supplies at the Jebel springline. In this case, there were fewer opportunities for outsiders to move in and grab land in the no-man’s land between the Nuba tribes, as the boundary areas between the tribes were within easy walking distance of the jebels – and some degree of security was available. However, this was not the case for the northern plains which were abandoned after the Baggara arrived.

Table - Nuba Tribal Ranking for Land Problems:

Ranking Name of Tribe Comment

1 Otoro First to suffer famine – haven’t colonised other areas 2 Heiban Mainly hill farms 3 Abol Confined to the hills 4 Alleira Confined to the hills 5 Acirun Highly efficient farmers but little land in the plains 6 Nyimang Big popn dependent on Solara area – other Nyimang have left and moved to towns/army 7 Koko Limon/Turun Have stayed on Limon hills while plains used by Moro 8 Shweiya In dispute with Sheibun & Otoro around Eiri/Debi 9 Moro Have colonised good land but fast-growing popn 10 Kadugli Most land under scheme 11 Temein Blocked in by Ghulfan and Julud 12 Ligori/Saburi Competition with Baggara around Tillo 13 Ghulfan Will have problems in future – scheme encroachment 14 Messakin Restricted by other tribes – use Umm Shauran 15 Shatt/Fama/Teis Use almost all available hadaba but open to SWest 16 Miri Reasonable hadaba in Kiddi/Berdab/Harazaya/Kanga. Many Miri people in towns 17 Tabaq Share Zabagha (3hrs walk) with Tima and Wali 18 Tullishi Surrounded by good land but effected by war 19 Tima Use land around Umm Doroto and Zabagha 20 Daju/Kamdang Land plentiful but infertile except along K.Shalengo 21 Keiga Surrounded by clay plains but leased to outsiders

9 22 Wali/Ajang Good hadaba but Ajang (Dilling, Kadaru, Dair etc) land leased 23 Tira Land to the east; have colonised other areas; Longhan section have land disputes with Kawalha 24 Talodi Good land but Maflul and El Beida leased out 25 Korongo Mostly farm on the plains 26 Lira Plenty of hadaba, but many undemarcated farms 27 Koalib Have most land – but much taken by Habila Scheme

As can be seen from the table above, the Otoro have the greatest problem with land shortage. Together with other upland peoples such as the Acirun, Heiban and Alleira they farm mainly in the hills and have few far farms in the plains. Together with the Nyimang, the Otoro have a large population, but unlike the Nyimang have not seen large amounts of out-migration. As a result the hills of Otoro are still very densely populated with extensive terracing and diminishing tree cover. Those tribes bordering the southern edge of the Nuba mountains have extensive lands to the south and west but they are highly exposed to insecurity because their hills offer little protection.

Having a large reserve of potential ‘expansion land’ is an important part of shifting cultivation, especially given the growing population. Beyond the agricultural argument, such a reserve represents the ‘future’ and taking away such land in a time of expanding population can be perceived as a threat to that future. Things are perceived to be alright as long as there are new areas to move into – this gives the impression that there is ‘enough’ land. Places like Habila represent more than just ‘land’ – they are seen as the ‘homeland’ of tribal groups, the tribal territory within which members of that corporate unit have rights with all the historical and sentimental attachment that entails. The handover of ownership to the government in 19704 and the abolition of the Native Administration in 1971 (the meks and sheikhs were the institutional memory of where families had ownership rights) can all be perceived as taking away the power people have to plan a better

Case Study - Moro

The far-farms between Kurci Market and Tangal are about 45 minutes walk from settlements at the foot of the hills. However, along the way are deserted houses, abandoned due to insecurity, indicating that previously people lived further out in the plains. In fact, these ‘far farms’ are nothing of the sort. They are on gardud soils, whereas the real hadaba begins a further hour’s walk away at Lopa. Other Moro hadaba could be found at Bajayea – 4 hours walk after Lopa – and this formed the Moro’s border with the Koalib. One farmer had been born at Lopa, and his family had moved further into the plains to Koram 35 years ago. Here the land was flooded annually by the Khor Umm Derafi, and so maintains its fertility. Lopa was now part of the government garrison of Karkaria and many farmers had fled from there to SPLM territory.

All farmers interviewed had inherited land from their families. They farmed plots of between 1-3 feddans depending on the amount of labour they had managed to mobilise though group labour (nafir). One

4 In the 1970 Unregistered Land Act ownership of all unregistered land was transferred to the government, and in the 1971 Native Administration Act the authority of tribal chiefs was greatly diminished (though it was practically restored in 1998)

10 crippled farmer had managed to cultivate 3 feddans by this method, while an able-bodied man without the resources or the social status to organise a successful nafir was struggling with a mediocre 1 feddan plot. Other plots were cultivated by teenage girls on land belonging to their fathers growing sesame as a cashcrop or to use for cosmetic purposes.

In Moro areas, one informant said that certain Moro individuals had claimed far more land than they could actually farm by clearing a huge area initially, and then leasing the land to other people. This was on a ‘first-come-first-served’ system and the Moro have developed a particular reputation as ‘colonisers’ of new areas, to the detriment of the neighbours. For example, the Acirun remained in the hills while the best land around them was taken by the Moro. It is important, though, not to exaggerate the conflict between Nuba groups for land, as these pales into insignificance against the wider conflict over land. Local chiefs consistently stated that intra-Nuba disputes over land, where they did exist, were easily resolved and that there would be little problem finding land for Nuba returnees if they came back.

d) Baggara Tribal Lands:

The Baggara moved into the area of the Nuba Mountains over 200 years ago. There was a brief struggle amongst them after which the Hawazma (meaning bundle because they were a loose grouping of tribes) settled in what is now South Kordofan. The Misseriya Zurg occupied the area to the West of South Kordofan and the Humr the South-West. With their military superiority, the Baggara drove the Nuba from the plains, and took part in raiding the jebels for slaves for the next hundred years. Following the overthrow of the Khalifa in 1898, the British interpreted the spatial distribution of tribes in the Nuba Mountains as being the norm, rather than as an anomaly brought about by violence, and proceeded to assign the Baggara their ‘tribal dar5’ in the fertile plains. Thus the pattern was set that saw the jebels as belonging to the Nuba and the plains as belonging to the Baggara and later to the government, even though the Baggara only wanted passage rights for their animals rather than land rights.

A small number of Baggara started to cultivate cotton in the late 1920’s when cotton prices were good and cattle prices were low. However, the objective was to buy more cattle with the profit rather than to adopt agriculture as an alternative to pastoralism. Since then Baggara have practised hariq cultivation (burning the bush and sowing crops before leaving the land alone until harvest), while others have been given land by Nuba groups. For example in the Kiddi area, some Misseriya Zurg from the Aulad Enaynat section cultivates land given to them by Keiga Luban Nuba. They can combine this with pastoralism because they cultivate by tractor rather than by hand. They can pay for this through selling a few animals which means they are not tied down by the availability of credit, unlike most Nuba. The Dar Gamai have an agreement with the Keiga Tummero whereby the grandfathers of the present Keiga gave land to the Dar Gamai – but it was not expected that they would inherit; it is currently interpreted as a mutual respect/ co- operation agreement by Nuba chiefs rather than a fully-fledged agreement to share land. At Hamra, Hawazma have been returning for many years to the same dry season areas and they claim these for themselves. In Lagawa province there were communities of settled Misseriya

5 The Rowawga were given the area Northeast of Kadugli, while the Abd el’Ali were given the area around Dilling and Halalfa the area West and Southwest of Rashad.

11 Zurg who were cultivating on the land around Umm Shaura and El Arak. In general though, Baggara were more interested in cattle than crops6.

The Nuba and Daju communities in Lagawa were put under the overlordship of the Misseriya chief by the British and the area was known as ‘Dar Misseriya’ (Kamal el-Din Osman Salih 1982:157)7. Other cases where Nuba groups were put under the suzerainty of Hawazma groups include the Rowawga (Dar Gamai) omda’s overlordship of the Keiga, and other Rowawga chiefs ruling the Liguri ,Saburi, Umm Heitan, Hadra and Lebu as well as Umm Dorein in the Moro Hills. By 1930 most of these groups were complaining that they were being overtaxed by their Arab overlords. Despite the fact that some of these grievances were addressed, there are still issues today between the Hawazma and Nuba of these areas8. In Lado, as well as in other areas, people talked of the problem of the Shenabla camel herders raping women. In addition children were used by the Misseriya Humr for herding but never received the amual compensation cow, and instead it was said that some were given a new name and taken up to Muglad and Keilak. Baggara cattle are also in competition with Nuba cattle around Lake Abyad;However, it shows there is a history of contact and negotiation between the two groups and such mechanisms through the chiefs must be utilised today if peace is to come.

The British implemented a system of stock-routes for the transhumant migration, and had set dates for the beginning of the migration, timed to coincide with the end of the harvest. There were water points along the way and stock-holding areas. Farmers were not allowed to grow crops on the stock-routes or holding areas, and those that did had their crops destroyed. In the years after independence, poor maintenance led to siltation in many of the water reservoirs (hafir) and the policing of the stock routes was less strict so Baggara often wandered into farming areas in search of water. Deteriorating conditions in North Kordofan during the 1970’s meant that the stock was coming south sooner and in greater numbers. Four stock routes converged on Jebel Habila where the land of Habila was cleared to make way for mechanised farming in the 1970’s. Inadequate provisions were made to accommodate the pastoralists. As a result of all these things pastoralists started to encroach more and more on the land of farmers. To this day herders are assumed to be in the wrong, and have to pay heavy fines to the standing committees that adjudicate the cases (mainly in mechanised farming areas) and they are ill- placed to object as they must continue moving with their cattle. They pass Habila in the middle of the growing season and it is almost impossible to keep crops and cattle apart.

Most of the Baggara are supporters of the Umma party, and when Sadiq al-Mahdi was in power many of them were armed and became members of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF). These militia are considered to have been the most brutal of all the fighting forces, and the divisions between the Baggara and the Nuba have become almost irreparable. Since the ceasefire Baggara groups have attempted to negotiate for access to SPLM Nuba-controlled areas for their cattle, but have often been refused (in Wali and Koalib areas for example). In government-held areas they have more political power – for example the Shifr Nuba farmers, just outside South Kordofan proper, complain about being under the control of the Misseriya who control the administration.

6 Baggara means cattle-keeper, so this makes sense. 7 This included the Nuba groups of Abu Junuk, Tullishi, Katcha, Shifr, Tabaq, Tima and Kamdang 8 For example Umm Heitan still has an ambiguous status as a SPLA/GoS controlled area. Even though they speak a Koalib dialect, they are more than 30km from the main Koalib massif.

12 Baggara are seen by the Nuba as Arabs, and it is true that they have much better connections with the jellaba and have been able to keep a wider portfolio of economic activities because of their ability to link with the external economy and realise cash through animal and milk sales. However, there is a sense that they have not been party to the negotiations between SPLM and the Government, and risk being ignored in the peace process. Also they were seriously affected by the mechanised schemes and by the war. It is for these reasons, and because they have a recognised chief-structure with a history of negotiating agreements with Nuba chiefs9, that it is felt by the political leadership of the SPLM that it should be possible to find common ground between the Nuba and Baggara.

Government Policy:

The 1968 Mechanised Farming Corporation Act, began the government policy of encouraging mechanised farming. Large scale mechanised farms were to allocated in lots of between 500- 1500 feddans. Under the act, 60% of land was to be allocated to local people and no-one was to have more than one farm10. However, in practice, this was ignored and some outside landowners ended up with more than 20 farms. Leases were for 15 years, with the right to cancel leases immediately for non-payment. According to O’Brien [ref?], 50% of Habila leaseholders were merchants and only 11% had previously been farmers. Farms allocated by the MFC are known as demarcated, and those allocated by the local authorities are ‘undemarcated’. In 1993, large-scale mechanised farming covered 2.5 million feddans (of which 1 million were undemarcated). The figure now for both undemarcated and demarcated schemes is in the range of 3-4 million feddans – in other words between 9-12% of the surface of South Kordofan. These are all in the clay plains (21% of the area of South Kordofan), so around half of the area of the plains is taken up by schemes.

Nimeiri used the slogan ‘land should be given to those who will make use of it’ in order to explain why it was in the national interest when land ended up in the hands of wealthy merchants. The argument is still used today – one government minister adding that it was the role of the government to apportion land to investors because all land belongs to the government11. Land is an easy way of earning income for the government, as well as a way of handing out political favours which costs the government nothing in the short term12. The government is intent on making sure, as Nimeiri would have put it, that all the resources of the country are used for the sake of nation-building. The ‘national good’ is made out to be above petty regional policking when in fact some of the mechanised schemes have involved privatising local resources for the benefit of a few politically-connected individuals. The argument that only these individuals can afford to invest in the land is belied by the fact that investors only invest enough to reap a short-term profit. In environmental terms, little is reinvested in improving the land. Nor can the mechanised sector be justified by its consistently superior yields and its contribution to total production as the following figures illustrate (although the declining trend is

9 Negotiations with the Shenabla could be more difficult because of the perception amongst the Nuba that they are marauding bandits without a political structure that talks on their behalf. 10 The MFC was replaced in 1995 by the Department of Rainfed Agriculture in the Ministry of Agriculture. 11 The Minister also noted that there was plenty of land, and if there was conflict over land with local villagers, he could just move the investors to places where there were no villages. 12 For example in territory belonging to the Tima and Wali Nuba groups.

13 over an insufficient number of years to be statistically significant, it appears to support the qualitative evidence heard in interviews):

Table – Productivity of Traditional and Modernised Farming

Cropping Season13 Yield (% Mech/Trad) Production (% Mech/Total)

1983/4 – 1987/8 Average 150% 63% 1988/9 120% 88% 1989/90 133% 56% 1990/91 100% 47% 1992/93 67% 42%

Another argument, put forward by the Manager of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) in Dilling was that merchant investors were simply a more reliable bet when it came to issuing loans. Set up in 1957 as a Federal rather than State Investment Bank, the ABS is heavily subsidised by central government, so was able to continue functioning in South Kordofan even during the civil war. However, as a bank, it concentrates its loans on investors likely to repay their loans. The size of the loan is tailored to the area that will be cultivated and checks are made on the land before further credit is given. Loans are usually divided into 25% seedbed/ploughing credit, 25% credit to pay for weeding and 50% for harvesting. However, there is restricted availability of tractors for ploughing, and these will plough the land of their owners first and often not arrive at the plots of smaller investors until late in the planting season – often resulting in a failed crop. This produces a vicious cycle of debt where farmers cannot repay loans with the proceeds of the harvest – exacerbated by the fact that many small investors (often Nuba) grouped together to apply for loans but were often unused to farming in groups and management problems arose over the money14. In Koalib this meant that all 11 schemes that were meant for the Nuba communities ended up being rented back to merchants in order to keep up loan repayments.

Under the rules of the ABS, it was not obligatory that land was registered, but a license was necessary which needed to be renewed every year to avoid being pushed off the land by the Committee of the Mechanised Farming Department. This was thus another trap that local people could fall into, that would result in their losing their land if they were unable to manage their credit. These many pitfalls could only be negotiated with a certain buffer of existing capital. It also required connections and a good knowledge of the system. It is unsurprising that local people often stayed away from investing. This exclusion process could be presented by the government as a simple factor of economics, but it was considered by locals to be ethnic and political rather economic.

13 Source: AACM 1993:183 – the trend could also, in part, be due to deteriorating security but this would presumably also affect the traditional sector. 14 Galbraith asks: ‘when is credit in agriculture an instrument of progress and when is it an instrument of stagnation and regression?’ quoted in Mohammed Hasim Awad (1985:51). In addition to formal loans through the ABS, the sheil system of obtaining loans from the local merchant is very common

14 Table - Major Schemes in South Kordofan (see Annex 4 Map)15:

Number Name Size (feddans) Comment

1 Habila 400,000 Not including Korthala 2 Sarajiya/Jadeid 360,000 Abu Jubeiha Province 3 Tiara 300,000 Abu Jubeiha Province 4 Mitaimir/Haluf 280,000 Abu Jubeiha Province 5 Abbasiya 230,000 Rashad Province 6 Korthala Extension 200,000 Abu Jubeiha Province 7 El Beida 200,000 Talodi Province 8 Umm Lubia/ El Azraq/Karandel 170,000 Part Rashad/Part Abu J 9 Garada 140,000 Abu Jubeiha Province 10 Tosi 9,000 Talodi Province 11 Umm Shara 3,000 Lagawa Province 12 Durangas 3,000 Lagawa Province 13 Nabagaya 3,000 Lagawa Province 14 Abash 3,000 Lagawa Province 15 Gangaro Tiwal 2,500 Lagawa Province 16 Zabagha 1,500 Lagawa Province 17 El Arak 1,000 Lagawa Province

Habila is by far the biggest scheme, followed by the big schemes set up in the east of the State. Those in Lagawa province were set up under the Nuba Mountains Agricultural Production Corporation (which became the Rainfed Cotton Unit in 1990 after becoming heavily indebted) but most have now closed or are farmed by local people. Other NMAPC schemes not mentioned in this list include Semma/Ifein/Tilo around Kadugli, Abu Sinun/Kanga/Mashaisha/Kiddi /Berdab/Zileitaya/Tash/Keiga Luban North and West of Kadulgli and Kerkaraya/Bukhas/El Dorot NorthEast of Kadugli and Wafi/Rugol el Murafayeen/Shashandel/Wodai in Dilling Province. Most of these have now been taken over by local people. The Nuba Mountains Rural Development Project, which ran from 1979 to 1992 with EU funding, tried to encourage the use of animal draught and other appropriate technology, while GTZ conducted on farm trials of optimum crop rotation and land preparation strategies at El Afein near Kadugli (AACM 1993:199).

Conflict between Mechanised Farming and Traditional Farming:

Land conflict is by no means new. Vicars Miles wrote in 1934 that ‘unless a very considerable area which is now waterless is opened up there will be no surplus land in ten years’ time’ (Vicars Miles 1934:vii.5p.38). The Nuba Mountains General Union stated as one of its main aims in

15 Sources: State Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Wealth, Dilling & Lagawa; AACM 1993:180); other schemes include Umdual (Talodi), Salamat (Talodi), Maflul (Talodi), Umm Shaura (Buram) El Azraq (Buram – allegedly shared with Aulad Heiban Misseriya) Chaika (Buram – under Ibrahim el Dukhari from El Obeid) in GoS areas and Al ferish (Tira–300 feddans), Kudi (Kauda–130f), Dunger (Heiban-400f), Sennar (Koalib-300f), Lado (600f), Kurci (100f-Nogorban), Zabagha (300f-Wali) in SPLM areas

15 1965 the ‘implementation of a land reform policy for the benefit of indigenous farmers’ (Abdalla El Tom El Imam & Omer Egemi n.d:1). However, it was really after the 1968 Mechanised Farming Corporation Act and the 1970 Unregistered Land Act16 that conflict between indigenous traditional farmers and scheme owners began. Under these two acts, all land not registered prior to 1970 belonged to the government, which assumed broad powers of eviction in order to clear land for schemes. There was no recognition of the rights of those who, although not having legal title, had been using land for generations17. Compensation for those displaced was discretionary rather than mandatory – often consisting of a choice between inferior land outside the scheme or keeping the existing plot but having to pay rent for it. It is understandable that few people were prepared to pay rent for the land that they considered to be theirs, even if they could have afforded it.

Land conflict was most obvious in the main demarcated areas, but over 1 million feddans was taken under undemarcated schemes, especially in eastern areas of South Kordofan. This practise found legal authority in Section 560 (1) of the 1984 Civil Transactions Act, that ruled that the person who developed the land by tilling it is entitled to such land and acquired legal title (AACM 1993:246). A tractor cultivator could get permission from a local chief or the president of the Local Council, and would attach a ‘no dispute’ certificate to his registration application to the regional Ministry of Agriculture. If this was approved, he would receive a lease for three years renewable for to periods of 6 years each. There was frequently dispute between the Regional Ministry of Agriculture and the central Mechanised Farming Corporation when the same land had been allocated by both to different farmers.

Land was also appropriated in almost every single village when land was given by local leaders to merchants in an arrangement known as ‘ukul gum’ , for example around Korongo and Teis in the southern jebels. This was done when land was still plentiful and relations were close with merchants who often spent their whole lives among particular Nuba groups. However, ukul gum (literally ‘eat and run’) is supposed to be a short term arrangement and it is certainly not intended that such land should stay in the hands of individuals for a lifetime or even be inherited.

Case Study – Southern Jebels

In Reika, the Omda revealed confidentially that he had issued an ultimatum to a trader from Umm Dorein who had used his ukul gum land in Tadoro for 40 years. In another case, a jellaba trader from Liri who had moved to the Korongo area obtained land in the 1950’s from local leaders at a place called Chaika. He cultivated by tractor, and with the profits from this was able to cultivate an increasingly large area, pushing out local people and then employing them to weed the land. In 1969 he became Chairman of the Buram Local Council, with the right to rubber stamp land applications that had been approved by the local omda. This produced a long running feud with the omda over who controlled access to land including his ‘own’ land at Chaika. The trader is now retired, and the land that he was farming became too insecure to farm during the war. However, he took the opportunity while he was in power to register the land with the authorities in Kadugli even though he had been given the land as ‘ukul gum’, and

16 1970 Unregistered Land Act was repealed by the 1984 Civil Transactions Act (part of the infamous September Laws). However, the government - as the entity responsible to God for his land under Article 559 - was retained as the owner of land (DeWaal/Justice Africa Ch 6:p.18). 17 amara – use rights.

16 continued to pay the nominal rent during this period. He is now encouraging his son to reclaim this land, but the local people are not showing the ‘hospitality and politeness’ which they showed first-time around.

The SPLM were displaced in 1993, and garrisons established throughout the area. There is a strong feeling that traders have managed to move in and cultivate under protection of the garrisons. In Torogi one ‘Arab’ trader was reputed to have been able to buy a lorry and a grinding mill out of the proceeds of his mechanised cultivation there. In Shatt Daman the same trader as in Reika from Umm Dorein moved in and grew groundnuts for the 2001 season. However, in Toro soldiers farm beside local farmers (though the soldiers get the closest plots) and most of the soldiers are actually from the local area and are married to local women. Reality is therefore far more complex than easy stereotypes – with a certain amount of Nuba complicity and government officials being aware of the land problem in word if not need. Some of the cases of land grabbing took place many years ago. However, it is ‘perception’ that is all important and land is perceived to be a running sore in the pride of the Nuba and a threat to their future.

The Government is currently encouraging tribes to register their land collectively, but registration under the current conditions exposes such groups to the danger that their land is used as collateral on loans from the ABS and could be reclaimed if groups default on loans. They have also demarcated 120,000 feddans of land around Kadugli, though it has not yet been allocated, indicating that the vogue for land demarcation by the government is still current. The fact that some groups have taken interest in registering their land indicates both a desire to protect their land from encroachment, and the fact that local people desperately need credit if they are to take over any of the large-scale mechanised farming areas currently farmed by outsiders.

Addressing the problem:

It is important not to seek an over-legislated solution to land problems, as there is a strongly-held perception amongst Nuba that government (hakuma) laws rarely work to protect their interests18. For this, it would be better to have a common-sense formula that can be understood by local people and managed by local chiefs in a transparent way. By advocating the idea of customary tenure and ownership of land by local people rather than the existing legislation where land belongs to the government, one must genuinely hand over control to the grass-roots once an equitable process of allocating the land between the tribes has been agreed upon. One locally- comprehensible solution is to support the tribal territorial boundaries as people currently understand them. This would cause dispute between Nuba and non-Nuba groups as the Nuba effectively claim the whole of the Nuba Mountains. However, local informants believed that this could be resolved peacefully by tribal conferences amongst the tribes living in the Nuba Mountains and subsequent allocation of some land to those who wanted it. It would be much more difficult, though, to resolve the problem of land claimed by the government after 1970, demarcated under mechanised schemes and leased to people from outside South Kordofan. The solution to the schemes, it seems, can be divided into two scenarios – one where the government concedes, and another where there is compromise between the two parties:

18 Suliman Musa Rahad (n.d. p.46) describes the case of the Mugeinis scheme in Rashad district in 1984, where ‘more than 80 Nuba refused to hand [over] their lands to the company formed by rich merchants and government ministers…. They were rounded up and after being brought before an emergency court in Kadugli were flogged and imprisoned’

17 a) Concession:

One solution would be for the government to revoke its claim to own the land of South Kordofan and pass it back to tribal control together with control over the demarcated and undemarcated areas under mechanised farming. This would involve, at least in part, removing the legitimacy of the 1984 Civil Transactions Act in South Kordofan especially the clauses whereby it revokes the 1970 Unregistered Land Act (a good thing) but then under Article 559 reinstates the idea that all unregistered land to deemed to be registered under the name of the State (De Waal n.d:19). It seems that the government would only agree to this if it had actually ‘lost’ the war, whereas in fact it had become a stalemate. It would imply an exception for South Kordofan to the laws that applied to other states in Northern Sudan and could set a precedent for other states (e.g. Darfur, Blue Nile) who would seek to replicate it for themselves. However, South Kordofan has been at war for 18 years and a special status will be needed in order to bring about peace. It also seems that GoS is more prepared to negotiate on the land issue than it is on, for example sharia’h law. The government would probably not suffer a great loss financially as the efficiency and profitability of the schemes is questionable. The annual rent that the government gets on land under mechanised farming (both demarcated and undemarcated) is less than $180,00019. Yields on mechanised farms are usually no better than those in the traditional sector, while environmental damage is much greater20. Renting schemes to outside tenants who are more interested in short-term profit than the long-term fertility of the soil is neither in the national nor local interest. It is true that the land is currently being ‘used’ and that it would take years for local people to adopt the same levels of mechanisation. Also the government derives political capital by allocating land to its allies. However, there is little justification for the government owning the land, especially if a solution can be found for a phased transfer from outside tenants to local landowners while local people build up their capacity.

Relinquishing all rights to land ownership by the government and returning responsibility to the native administration would be well-received by the Nuba, would be understood locally and would be relatively easy to administer, with a Land Commission adjudicating only on cases where there was disputed ownership between two tribes. However, it has the disadvantage that the tribal boundaries, while local people all claim they know where they are, would have to be written down and mapped, and the status of Baggara, Fellata, Jellaba and other peoples’ rights to specific farming land resolved. All this would take some time, and it is likely that land would lie idle while its status was established, and that groups from inside the Nuba Mountains would take many years to build up the capital to take over the mechanised farms. The GoS negotiating strategy on this point will probably be that it is prepared to discuss transfer of ownership of land ‘as long as the land will be utilised’, and insist on the right to repossess unused land. However, a genuine concession by the government on the issue of land ownership would be the most important step it could take on the road to a lasting peace agreement in the Nuba Mountains.

19 Calculated on the basis of 3 million feddans rented out at 150 Sudanese Pounds per feddan per year. The government also gets 1 million Sudanese pounds ($400) for the registration of a 1000 feddan plot but this is a one- off payment that has to pay for the cadastral survey as well. 20 Figures for 1980 (HTS Annex 7 1981:27) show that more than 75% of the area was under crop – an unsustainable figure assuming 50% of land had to be under fallow to ensure adequate recovery of the soil

18 b) Compromise:

All other solutions involve ‘compromise’. They therefore lack the political clarity of the above and are less comprehensible and transparent to local people (with the danger that they are seen as a capitulation by the Nuba leadership and mean they might decide to return to war). Approximately 65% of the population of South Kordofan are Nuba and they are claiming the land as their birthright as first comers and the payoff for their lives lost in the war. It has to be noted at the moment that their expectations are uncompromising. They argue that the remaining non-Nuba population are either pastoralists (17%) who need only passage rights, fellata (5%) who are either town dwellers or in two cases have been given their own land21, jellaba (7%) who mainly live in towns or nilotic groups who are temporary migratory wage labourers. They therefore do not understand why they should not have the right to claim 100% of the land. However if specific solutions are found which are sensible and which can be ‘sold’ to local people then the likelihood of rejection will be reduced. Acceptance by local people depends on retaining some key elements from the formula above:

i) Who owns the land?

Technical decisions about land could be left in the hands of a Land Commission as long as some preliminary groundwork is done in the peace talks. As a Land Commission was already under discussion at Machakos, it seems likely it will remain on the table. However, there is a danger that such political decisions taken out of the hands of the main political actors would leave the commission overly exposed to political manipulation. The side with the best resources for dominating or even simply delaying the commission would be the GoS, who, in the case of Nuba, will remain the de facto locus of power. There is a danger too that the Land Commission will take too long to be constituted.

Given the difficulties of negotiating the future of land away from the main political actors (not least the fact that the SPLM in Nuba lacks sufficient experienced civilian personnel outside its main leadership structure to assign high calibre staff to this single issue), it would be advantageous to have the thorny political compromises made at the peace talks, leaving the Commission as a technocratic body working within established parameters. However, the current time-frame of the talks seems too tight to tackle any of the main issues, let alone establish a sufficiently robust legal status for the commission to make sure that it can act independent of the government.

An acknowledgement of the customary tribal rights of Nuba to be the owners of their own land (even if the land is then leased to outsiders) would have enormous symbolic significance (particularly if the rent was paid to the tribal authorities who owned the land rather than the government); however the boundaries of tribal ownership would have to be broadly mapped out and ownership parameters set out to the satisfaction of both parties by the main political actors at the talks. The kind of parameters that will probably be on the table could involve ‘one-size-fits- all’ solutions that have been suggested and failed in the past: for example 60% of land being

21 In this case the Daju/Shatt are recognised as a Nuba group despite their different language and origins; the fellata have some recognised rights at Farshaia near Dilling and Umm Alawa, as well as at Berdab where they were given land by Miri and Kadugli chiefs in the 1930’s after they were displaced by a fire from Kadugli.

19 given to locals and 40% going to outsiders; all land within a 3km radius of a village belonging to villagers even when that land is the least fertile. In the past such rules have never been implemented and would be meaningless if implemented.

If the parameters are broadly mapped out such that local leaders regain control over land allocation, with checks and balances to avoid profiteering, the work of the Land Commission could be limited to fire-fighting and addressing the most urgent disputes. The solution to the land problems are probably more related to how representative the local political structure is than the existence of rules and regulations on the statute book. However, it would be a good start to acknowledge customary land rights and then register the territorial area of tribal groups to give them ownership and prevent encroachment. Emphasis should be put on usufruct rights and ownership should go to those who have used land over the generations rather than those with all the right papers. New demarcation (including the 120,000 feddans around Kadugli) should be immediately suspended.

ii) Confiscation of land

The 1996 Presidential Commission that sat to review the licences in Habila confiscated 149 schemes totalling 25,000 feddans where the licenses had expired (Abdalla & Omer n.d:3). In the 7 years since then other licenses will have expired and more land can be confiscated. This could be carried out by the Land Commission if the conditions for confiscation are set out including the question of compensation. It is possible to stipulate that land in South Kordofan should be leased to people actually resident in Kordofan (though outside traders could potentially get round this by registering the land in the name of a local agent). There should also be a review of post 1985 allocations, but starting with the most egregious cases. The compensation issue depends on the willingness of the government to pay. If they were unwilling to compensate evicted tenants but wanted to be legally covered, clauses in contractual agreements with the recipients could be invoked. For example the agreement between tenants and South Kordofan State’s Rainfed Agriculture Department states that trees should not be removed from lowland areas, forestry strips should be left as windbreaks and certain crop rotation and soil treatment directives should be followed. The rules of the Mechanised Farming Corporation stipulated that land could not be sublet – a practice that takes place in many cases22.

iii) Reassigning of land:

If a sufficient amount of land can be confiscated and reassigned within a short timeframe, then a compromise agreement would be better received by the Nuba. The reallocation process is at least as important as the confiscation process. The Redistribution Committee of the 1996 Presidential Committee is said to have reassigned farms from one trader to another without making any great change. Without any political changes it is difficult to imagine this being different now. In addition the problem needs to be addressed whereby traditional Nuba cultivators are not seen to have the ‘financial ability to meet the running costs of cultivation’ (Abdalla & Omer n.d:3). This could be an important role that the international community should play, but it would also be important to advocate for credit rights not being dependent on having land registered as many Nuba have not registered their land. The re-allocation process will involve a close co-operation

22 In Semasim, two adjacent plots of 1000 feddans were sublet to the tax office and traders from Dilling respectively

20 between the Land Commission and Local Chiefs to avoid a new round of land-grabbing. Priority must be given to those who farmed the land before the schemes were demarcated.

iv) The Baggara question:

While it seems that the chances of finding common ground on the land issue are small, the leadership of the SPLM seem keen to make some kind of agreement with the Baggara. Perhaps the SPLM realise that the general population of Baggara are not really a threat in terms of wanting land, and that a tribal conference between the chiefs of both groups could probably come to some agreements over passage rights for Baggara cattle. The Nuba population are extremely wary of the Baggara given their role in the militias, but the Nuba leadership seems to have realised that they need to negotiate with the Baggara. They too have been affected by this war as well as by the mechanised schemes. They are also, it seems, worried about the fact that they are not a party to the current peace talks and risk being left out if they do not start talking to the SPLM.

Conclusion:

Nuba want a clear and tangible benefit to derive from the peace talks not just a cessation of hostilities. At present they have won nothing and only control the least fertile areas of South Kordofan. It is recommended that observer embassy groups exert pressure on the GoS to make concessions on the land issue including an acknowledgement of the customary rights of Nuba to farm in the areas claimed by individual tribal groups and for access to land to be controlled by local chiefs rather than government departments. However, given that the Nuba lay claim to all areas of the Nuba mountains as well as the plains, and appear unwilling to compromise (despite their weak negotiating position) it seems that there might be little common ground between the two parties unless the government is to make some fairly big exceptions for South Kordofan23. Any kind of agreement will take time to negotiate, but the time will be well spent if the parameters for the work of a Land Commission can be mapped out in as much detail as possible and terms of reference prepared. It is therefore recommended that foreign governments reduce the pressure on negotiating partners to get an agreement signed in double-quick time and search instead for solutions to the difficult issues in the ‘disputed’ areas that will stand the test of time.

23 The Nuba seem to think the justice of their case is so self-evident that they rarely go into detail to justify their case. Similarly the government thinks that it has acted within the law and that its case can prosper using legal mechanisms and procedure.

21