INTRODUCTION Humboldt – Universität zu Berlin Dissertation MILITIA POLITICS THE FORMATION AND ORGANISATION OF IRREGULAR ARMED FORCES IN SUDAN (1985-2001) AND LEBANON (1975-1991) Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades doctor philosophiae (Dr. phil) Philosophische Fakultät III der Humbold – Universität zu Berlin (M.A. B.A.) Jago Salmon; 9 Juli 1978; Canberra, Australia Dekan: Prof. Dr. Gert-Joachim Glaeßner Gutachter: 1. Dr. Klaus Schlichte 2. Prof. Joel Migdal Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 18.07.2006 INTRODUCTION You have to know that there are two kinds of captain praised. One is those who have done great things with an army ordered by its own natural discipline, as were the greater part of Roman citizens and others who have guided armies. These have had no other trouble than to keep them good and see to guiding them securely. The other is those who not only have had to overcome the enemy, but, before they arrive at that, have been necessitated to make their army good and well ordered. These without doubt merit much more praise… Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War (2003, 161) INTRODUCTION Abstract This thesis provides an analysis of the organizational politics of state supporting armed groups, and demonstrates how group cohesion and institutionalization impact on the patterns of violence witnessed within civil wars. Using an historical comparative method, strategies of leadership control are examined in the processes of organizational evolution of the Popular Defence Forces, an Islamist Nationalist militia, and the allied Lebanese Forces, a Christian Nationalist militia. The first group was a centrally coordinated network of irregular forces which fielded ill-disciplined and semi-autonomous military units, and was responsible for severe war crimes. Equally responsible for war crimes, such as the Sabra and Shatila massacre of Shi'a and Palestinian civilians in 1982, the second group, nonetheless, became an autonomous military formation with an established territorial canton with a high degree of control over military units. After first analysing the political and institutional context of formation of these two groups, detailed case study analysis illustrates how political-military leaderships consolidated internal authority over combat units. At first, this authority relied on a bricolage of norms, motivations and institutions, as highly diverse, loosely coordinated actors mobilised in response to insecurity. As key leadership figures emerged, these groups evolved into hybrid organisations, divided between central organisations and locally embedded units operating according to localised security arenas decoupled from central military or political strategy. Central authority was then consolidated through a process of progressive institutionalisation and expansion, as centralised control was established, often violently, over resources, recruitment and discipline. This thesis shows, how militias, formed in allegiance with the state evolved into organizations rivalling state sovereignty and exploiting the communities which they claimed to defend. Sudan Lebanon armed forces formation organisaition militia politics civil war armed conflict violence state guerrilla warfare tribal mobilisation INTRODUCTION Abstract (German) Die vorliegende Arbeit zielt darauf ab, zwei Forschungslücken in der Literatur über Bürgerkriege zu schließen. Erstens, die Analyse der Strukturen nicht-staatlicher bewaffneter Gruppen. Zweitens, die Untersuchung der Politik von Milizen, als Form nicht-staatlicher Gruppen, denen in gegenwärtigen Bürgerkriegen eine zunehmende Bedeutung zukommt. Diese beiden Bereiche werden mit Hilfe einer historisch vergleichenden Analyse am Beispiel von zwei Milizen, die im sudanesischen und libanesischen Bürgerkrieg kämpften, untersucht. Die "Popular Defense Forces", 1989 von der Regierung des Sudan mobilisiert, wurden zum Sammelbecken für undisziplinierte und teilautonome militärische Einheiten, die schwerste Kriegsverbrechen begingen. Die "Lebanese Forces", eine maronitisch-nationalistische Miliz, wurde von einer Koalition konservativer christlicher Parteien gegründet. Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Staates 1975-6 wurde diese Miliz zu einer autonomen politischen Einheit mit einem territorial abgegrenzten Kanton im Osten von Beirut. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Prozesse und Strategien, die diesen Milizen die Etablierung von Herrschaft ermöglichte. Die beiden Gruppen entwickelten sich zu Organisationen, die die zu verteidigenden Gebiete beherrschten und mit staatlichen Geldgebern verbündet waren, aber auch in Konkurrenz zu ihnen standen. Diese Arbeit identifiziert drei Mechanismen, die die Entwicklungen von Milizen im Laufe ihrer Zeit bestimmen. Der Erste erklärt die Formierung von Milizen als ein Bricolage von politischen und nicht-politischen Antworten auf Unsicherheit. Der Zweite erklärt, wie sich Milizen in hybride Organisationen, von zentraler Mobilisierungseinheit und lokal eingebettete Organisationen, entwickeln. Der Dritte führt die Kontrolle des Zentrums über die lokalen Organisationen auf die Macht über Ressourcen zurück. Die Arbeit schließt mit dem Entwurf eines alternativen analytischen Modells für die Untersuchung von Bürgerkriegen. Sudan Lebanon bewaffnete Einheiten Entwicklung Organisation Miliz Bürgerkrieg Konflikt Gewalt Staat Guerilla Stamm INTRODUCTION TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................3 ABSTRACT (GERMAN) ...................................................................................................4 TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................................................8 NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION ........................................................................................9 ABBREVIATIONS ..........................................................................................................10 FIGURES .......................................................................................................................11 TABLES ........................................................................................................................11 MAPS............................................................................................................................11 PICTURES .....................................................................................................................11 1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................12 1.1 Armed Conflict and Organisations .........................................................................................13 1.2 Methodology...........................................................................................................................14 1.3 Case Selection ........................................................................................................................15 1.4 Definitions ..............................................................................................................................16 1.5 Structure of the Thesis............................................................................................................18 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................19 2.1 Militias....................................................................................................................................19 2.2 ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Wars:...........................................................................................................24 2.3 The Economy and the Econometry of War.............................................................................25 2.4 Response.................................................................................................................................28 2.5 Conclusion..............................................................................................................................32 3 DELEGATED VIOLENCE: BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY................................33 3.1 Militia Formation....................................................................................................................34 3.1.1 The State in Society.........................................................................................................34 3.1.2 The Privatisation of the State..........................................................................................35 3.1.3 The Informalisation of the State......................................................................................36 3.1.4 Two Ideal Types of Militia Formation............................................................................37 3.1.5 Intermediaries and Militia Formation............................................................................38 3.2 Militia Organisation................................................................................................................39 3.2.1 Violence in Civil War......................................................................................................39 3.2.2 The Organisation of Violence.........................................................................................42 3.3 Conclusion..............................................................................................................................44