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Dec 1977 - Fighting in South - Increased Israeli Involvement - Diplomatic Exchanges Culminating in Chtaura Peace Agreement - Subsequent Developments

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Dec 1977 - Fighting in South - Increased Israeli Involvement - Diplomatic Exchanges Culminating in Chtaura Peace Agreement - Subsequent Developments Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 23, December, 1977 Lebanon, Page 28734 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Dec 1977 - Fighting in South - Increased Israeli Involvement - Diplomatic Exchanges culminating in Chtaura Peace Agreement - Subsequent Developments Particularly severe fighting began in the south on Sept. 16 around Khiam after further discussions between Lebanese and US officials at which the former failed to obtain a firm assurance that Israel would not invade southern Lebanon. Fighting continued as Christian forces in Marjayoun and Koleya exchanged fire with Palestinians in Khiam and the nearby crusader castle of Beaufort, while there were violent clashes around the Al Khardali bridge between Nabatiyah and Marjayoun and heavy artillery fire at Bennt Jbail. While the Palestinians maintained control of Khiam itself, they lost the surrounding villages of Ibl el Saki, Blat, Kawkaba and Mari. With the apparent approval of Syrian deterrent force troops, Palestinian reinforcements were moved down from the Bekaa valley, north of the Arqoub, to the enclave near Mount Hermon Syrian troops did not intervene in the fighting although there were reports that several Israeli howitzer shells had fallen close to Syrian positions in overnight bombardments of nearby Palestinian positions. As soon as the new fighting had broken out Mr Arafat went to the front and was understood to have directed Palestinian forces there. The PLO central council, meeting on Sept. 18, accused Israel of “aggression under cover of the isolationists “ and appealed to the Arab world to support the Palestinians who “did not have at their disposal the same means as the enemy”, while Mr Arafat claimed that the Israeli Army was equipped with US military weapons-“probably” including nuclear warheads-and intended eventually to occupy the south of Lebanon. As the fighting intensified Israel closed the “open fence” at Metoula, which was the target of bombardments on Sept. 16–18, but the border crossings at Dovev and Hanita remained open. Later reports stated that the northern Israeli town of Safed had been hit by Soviet-made Katyusha rockets and that a similar attack had been made on Kiryat Shemona (Chmoneh) on Sept. 23, when three people were injured. Israeli units stationed near the Golan Heights had earlier, on Sept. 19, been put on a state of alert following reports of Syrian troop movements north of the Litani river. Officials in Jerusalem continued to deny direct Israeli military engagement in the conflict, and on Sept. 19 President Sarkis received assurances that Israel would nut intervene but was warned against permitting the deployment of Syrian troops in the border area. Christian sources, however, confirmed that Israeli tanks had been supportive in their recent attempts to drive Palestinians from their bases along the border and that Israeli long-range guns had provided them with cover while spotter aircraft flew over the battle zones to guide the rightist forces. Furthermore, Israeli gunboats were said to have sailed into Lebanese territorial waters on Sept. 20 near Tyre and Sidon, where Palestinians had in the past received supplies, and were later reported to have expanded their patrol area to Tripoli in the north and Naqoura in the south; on Sept. 20 Palestinian guerrillas directed artillery fire at Israeli boats off Tyre. Israeli helicopters were reportedly continuing to transfer the wounded to hospitals in Israel, and PLO officials said that Israeli tanks and aircraft had taken part in the battles around Marjayoun. Moreover, military authorities in Beirut said that units of the Israeli Army had set up bridgeheads on Sept. 21 in the villages of Hourra and Deir Mimass about two miles from Israeli territory and the day before had installed three artillery positions in the village of Kfar Kela about 5OO yards from the border. Also on Sept. 21 President Sarkis made his first open accusation that Israel had intervened and was establishing positions in the south. It was also reported that evidence had been received of US-built tanks being used in Lebanon; although these were said to be unmarked, it was claimed that they were in fact Israeli M-68s. While the fighting continued there were a number of diplomatic exchanges in an effort to defuse the crisis. The intensification of the battles and alleged Israeli participation (which was not confirmed by the United States) was one of the main topics of discussions between President Carter and the Egyptian Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Ismail Fahmi, on the latter's visit to Washington on Sept. 21. Mr Fahmi also had talks with the US Secretary of State, Mr Cyrus Vance, who, at the end of their meeting, made an appeal for an “immediate ceasefire”, adding: “We will do all we can-in conjunction with the parties concerned to try and prevent a deterioration of the situation.” The Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr Moshe Dayan, was in Washington at the same time for the opening of the 32nd UN General Assembly on Sept. 20 I, and it was believed that he too had discussed the situation in southern Lebanon with President Carter and Mr Vance. According to a Beirut radio report on Sept. 26 the Governments of Lebanon and Israel and Mr Arafat had agreed to adhere to a ceasefire arranged by the United States and which was formally announced by the US ambassador to Lebanon, Mr Parker, on that day. On the previous day both rightist and leftist forces were reported to have declared their agreement in principle to an immediate ceasefire, a rightist official stating that the truce awaited only the approval of Israel. Following the announcement of the ceasefire, observers in southern Lebanon said that shelling had stopped at Khiam and Nabatiyah and that Israeli tanks and armoured vehicles were leaving the battle area, although it was understood that some Israeli troops remained entrenched in the six positions which they had taken up near the border earlier in the month. The ceasefire was at first observed by all the factions, although Christian forces claimed that they had not agreed to the ceasefire terms but would continue to negotiate on the matter. PLO sources stated that Palestinian troops were not opposed to the truce but would not retreat until units of the Lebanese Army had been deployed in the border zones in accordance with the Chtaura agre by some 15 kilometres up the Hasbani river. Major Saadi Haddad, the commander of the Christian forces in southern Lebanon, however, subsequently claimed that the number of Palestinian personnel had in fact been increased from 6,000 to 10,000 since the ceasefire on Sept. 26 and that they had brought more arms into the area and had also taken possession of more positions near the Christian enclave. Under the ceasefire agreement units of the Lebanese Army were to be sent to the south at the beginning of October in co-ordination with a Palestinian withdrawal and. according to a report in L „Orient-Le-Jour on Sept. 29, this operation would begin with the stationing of at least 1,000 troops in Tyre and Nabatiyah. To this end, 1,500–1,800 soldiers of the then 6,000-strung regular Lebanese Army were being prepared fur deployment in the south under the command of Major Adib Saad and army officers at the beginning of October took over barracks from the leftist Lebanese Arab Army (which had split from the Lebanese Army during the civil war). By mid-October, however. the Lebanese Army had still not moved to the south. It was thought that the delay was caused by the renewal of tension in the area following a series of violations of the ceasefire, particularly after Oct. 5, which included exchanges of heavy artillery and machine- gun fire between Christian and Palestinian-Lebanese leftist forces. Lebanese and Palestinian officials on Oct. 6 began a new round of talks to discuss ways of stabilizing the situation, and Israeli and Lebanese officers met on Oct. 5 for talks on the ceasefire arrangements. A second meeting between the latter parties planned for the following week was, however, postponed after Israel had announced that it would not negotiate further until Palestinian guerrillas had ceased their bombardment of Christian positions in the south. Furthermore, a report in The Financial Times of Oct. 18 said that Israel had, through the United States, warned that it would “take any action it deemed necessary” if the Palestinians did not withdraw immediately to about 1 2 miles from the border, but the Israeli Ministry of Defence subsequently, on Oct. 21, declared its readiness to resume negotiations with the Lebanese Army. .
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