Lebanon Border Enigma

72 Articles Section THE ISRAEL – LEBANON BORDER ENIGMA David Eshel INTRODUCTION On 24 May 2000 the last Israeli troops deployed in south Lebanon pulled back into Israel, closing and padlocking the border gate behind them. Less than a month later the UN Security Council endorsed UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s assertion that Israel had “withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with Resolution 425” – bringing to an end Israel’s 22 year presence in south Lebanon. These events have focused worldwide attention on a hitherto relatively insignificant issue – the definition of the Lebanese-Israeli boundary. The legacy of political and strategic problems associated with this border, the result of short-sighted decisions and compromises prompted by colonial concerns some eighty years ago, means that to date this border is neither properly defined along its full length nor fully accepted by To date this border the nations either side of it. is neither properly defined along its full The Israeli withdrawal in May was to a line defined by the UN and designated as the length nor fully “Blue Border Line”, which is more or less consistent with the Anglo-French 1923 accepted by the accord. However, disagreements between Lebanon, Israel and the UN as to the exact nations either side line of the border and the consequent refusal of Lebanon to deploy troops to southern of it Lebanon and allow the UN to deploy to the border created a dangerous void along the border. Hezbullah, which had been instrumental in speeding up the Israeli withdrawal were still in place in the area and the existence of several controversial issues along the border meant that the border region could be a major flash point in the volatile Middle East. The aim of this article is to examine this border region from a geopolitical and military viewpoint and to highlight the various flash points, which could become the next battleground, if peace should elude this unfortunate region once again. THE HISTORICAL The story of the border between Lebanon and Israel, delineated between French BACKGROUND Syria and British Palestine between 1916 and 1923 is regarded as one of the strangest enigmas of modern times. The result of high handed colonial politics undertaken in ignorance of the realities on the ground, it has already led to years of dangerous confrontation and may yet be the cause of more in the near future. During the First World War, when it became evident that the Ottoman Empire was crumbling to pieces, the then world powers, France and Britain discussed future plans to share the spoils in the Middle East. France, which had historic ties with the Maronite Catholic community in the Levant focused its attention on northern territories in Lebanon and Syria, while Great Britain sought contacts with the Arabs becoming increasingly important due to the recently discovered oil in the Persian Gulf. There were also other groups interested in Palestine, apart from the Arabs – the Jewish Zionists, who had been promised a national home in Palestine in 1917, by the then British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour. But the roots of the Lebanon- Israel border lie in the May 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, the outcome of secret negotiations between Sir Mark Sykes MP and the French Arabist, François Georges Picot, former consul general in Beirut.1 The spheres of influence created by the agreement would have left the watersheds in the region divided in a particularly convoluted manner: the Litani (otherwise known as Quasimiya) river and the Jordan headwaters would be under French control, while the Sea of Galilee would be divided between Britain and France. The reasons for this oversight, a tragic one for a future state of Palestine, were the strategic locations of railway and oil lines, which British negotiators at the time viewed as of utmost importance to their imperial IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin Winter 2000-2001© Articles Section 73 BEIRUT Final (Newcombe - Paulet) boundary 7 March 1923 (operative border until June 1967) Plate 34 of Adam Smith’s Atlas Berthelot proposal, March 1920 Mediterranean Millerand Line, June 1920 Anglo - French Convention border, 23 December 1920 Sea Zionist proposal to Versailles Conference, February 1919 Railway LEBANON i a n Mountains i t L r R i v e l i Jebel Libnan w a R i v e r Aw Jeb Jenin Sidon R i v e r Z a Rasheya ha r a i n i n a DAMASCUS b s a H e r i v R Hasbeiya Mt. Hermon Nabatiye Sasa R Marjayoun i v i Shebaa ( Q e r L i t a n a s i m i y a h ) Tyre Metulla Majdal Shams Deir Ali Banias Dan W a d n n n i a a a M d d d u g r r r h a Rosh Hanikra o Quneitra n i Mesmiye (Ras an-Naqura) J r e Hanita v i i Achzeib i R R R Hulatah S N IA C NI S Rosh Pinah Lejja OE N Safed PH TA RI Acre A ISRAEL SAM Haifa Lake Tiberias Tiberias Ein Gev R Samekh i v Nazareth e r Deganya Ya r m u k Afikim El-Hamme Ashdot Yaakov Naharayim Der’a N Afulah n a d r o J r r r e e e v v v i i i R R 0 kilometres 20 R strategy. Water resources were regarded as of marginal importance in the border demarcation process, but British strategists were to regret their short sighted benevolence only a few years later when attention became focused on vital practical aspects of Palestine’s northern borders. The British deviated In December 1918, following General Sir Edmund Allenby’s conquest of Palestine from the Sykes-Picot and Syria, the British Government no longer felt obligated to defer to French political line and adopted the interests and during preliminary negotiations on the delineation of the boundaries, Biblical “Dan to signalled a more determined attitude. The British were also prepared to consider Beersheba” concept Zionist requests in a more positive way. The British deviated from the Sykes-Picot for Palestine line and adopted the Biblical “Dan to Beersheba” concept for Palestine, as based on a map of ancient Erez Yisrael under Kings David and Solomon.2 The French did not agree. In the ongoing negotiations over the temporary boundaries of the “Occupied Enemy Territorial Administrations” (OETA) the British persisted in their demand to stretch the northern border line of Palestine up to the Litani River and across to the Banias springs on the slopes of Mount Hermon,3 an attitude that was more than welcomed by the Zionists, who regarded their water requirements as a vital issue. The British negotiators, mostly military veterans of the late war, considered Britain’s strategy from a purely security oriented point of view. They realised that the Litani IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Winter 2000-2001© 74 Articles Section BEIRUT Final (Newcombe - Paulet) boundary 7 March 1923 (operative border until June 1967) Northern Palestine according to Sykes - Picot, 1916 Zionist proposal to Versailles Conference, February 1919 Mediterranean Meinertzhagen Line, 1919 O.E.T.A. South / North / East divisions, September 1918 Sea Deauville Line, September 1919 Railway LEBANON i a n Mountain i t O.E.T.A. L r NORTH R i v e l i Jebel Libnan w a R i v e r Aw Jeb Jenin Sidon R i v e r Z a Rasheya ha r a i n i n a DAMASCUS b s a H O.E.T.A. e r i v EAST R Hasbeiya Mt. Hermon Nabatiye Sasa R Marjayoun i v i Shebaa ( Q e r L i t a n a s i m i y a h ) Tyre Metulla Majdal Shams Deir Ali Banias Dan W a d i n n n M a a a u g d d d h r r r a n Rosh Hanikra o Quneitra i Mesmiye (Ras an-Naqura) J r e Hanita v i i Achzeib i R R R Hulatah O.E.T.A. Lejja SOUTH Safed Rosh Pinah Acre ISRAEL Haifa Lake Tiberias Tiberias Ein Gev R Samekh i v Nazareth e r Deganya Ya r m u k Afikim El-Hamme Ashdot Yaakov Naharayim Der’a N Afulah n a d r o J r r r e e e v v v i i i R R 0 kilometres 20 R gorge presented the only natural border between Palestine and Lebanon. It is unfortunate, in view of subsequent events, that this viewpoint with its far-reaching strategic implications was a casualty of lengthy political haggling and was ignored. The resultant ‘impossible’ geopolitical situation has haunted Middle Eastern politics ever since. During the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the Arab delegation headed by Emir Feisal of Hejaz actually supported the Jewish demands in Palestine and tried to assist Zionist leader Chaim Weizman’s position against the French policies in Lebanon. During the discussions the two parties agreed that all water and boundary issues should be settled directly through direct bilateral negotiations, the first, and sadly last time that such a proposal was officially aired by an Arab leader.4 It could have become an important turning point, but shortsighted colonial considerations soon rendered this proposal null and void. At the Versailles conference in February 1919, the final decisions over the demarcation of the Palestine-Lebanese border were left to British and French negotiators, for them to hammer out their differences and find a mutually acceptable solution. The talks continued without reaching a result, until the decision at San IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin Winter 2000-2001© Articles Section 75 Remo in 1920 as to where the final boundaries between the two spheres of interest should be drawn.

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