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A Case Study of the Lebanese Civil War

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A Case Study of the Lebanese Civil War Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2016-06 Civil wars hijacked: a case study of the Lebanese Civil War Greenheck, Kyle L. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/49473 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS CIVIL WARS HIJACKED: A CASE STUDY OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR by Kyle L. Greenheck June 2016 Thesis Advisor: Sean Everton Co-Advisor: Doowan Lee Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) June 2016 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS CIVIL WARS HIJACKED: A CASE STUDY OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR 6. AUTHOR(S) Kyle L. Greenheck 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The United States continues to be drawn into complex conflict environments where multiple internal and external state and non-state actors (NSAs) compete for influence. This thesis seeks to address how an external state actor can establish influence in a civil war environment through effective support of non- state actors. The research question is addressed through an in-depth analysis of the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1990, using both qualitative and social network analysis to assess the strategies of three state actors in that conflict: Israel, Syria, and Iran. This study suggests that external state actors can increase influence in a civil war environment through a variety of strategies. However, the most dominant state actors are typically those that pursue a limited objective through a combination of direct and indirect support to a heterogeneous coalition of non-state actors employing a combination of violent and non- violent techniques. The lessons obtained from this analysis may provide valuable insights to planners tasked with the development of influence within a civil war through external support to NSAs. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Israel, non-state actor, surrogate warfare, proxy warfare, longitudinal PAGES social network analysis, civil war 143 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited CIVIL WARS HIJACKED: A CASE STUDY OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR Kyle L. Greenheck Major, United States Army B.S., United States Military Academy, 2005 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2016 Approved by: Sean Everton, Ph.D. Thesis Advisor Doowan Lee Co-Advisor John Arquilla, Ph.D. Chair, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT The United States continues to be drawn into complex conflict environments where multiple internal and external state and non-state actors (NSAs) compete for influence. This thesis seeks to address how an external state actor can establish influence in a civil war environment through effective support of non-state actors. The research question is addressed through an in-depth analysis of the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1990, using both qualitative and social network analysis to assess the strategies of three state actors in that conflict: Israel, Syria, and Iran. This study suggests that external state actors can increase influence in a civil war environment through a variety of strategies. However, the most dominant state actors are typically those that pursue a limited objective through a combination of direct and indirect support to a heterogeneous coalition of non-state actors employing a combination of violent and non-violent techniques. The lessons obtained from this analysis may provide valuable insights to planners tasked with the development of influence within a civil war through external support to NSAs. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE .......................................................................... 1 B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...................................................................... 1 C. HYPOTHESIS ........................................................................................... 2 D. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 2 II. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................... 5 A. DEFINING THE INTERVENING STATE’S OBJECTIVE ................ 5 B. SELECTING A NON-STATE ACTOR .................................................. 7 C. SELECTION OF STATE ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT NSA ........... 11 D. DETERMINING HOW TO CHANNEL SUPPORT TO THE NSA ........................................................................................................... 13 III. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: 1975-1976 ..................................................... 15 A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1975-1976 ....................................... 16 B. SYRIAN STRATEGY ............................................................................ 19 1. Objective ...................................................................................... 19 2. Allied Agents in Lebanon ........................................................... 21 3. Methods of Supporting Allies .................................................... 23 4. Assessment of Strategy ............................................................... 26 C. ISRAELI STRATEGY ........................................................................... 29 1. Objective ...................................................................................... 29 2. Allied Agents in Lebanon ........................................................... 30 3. Methods of Supporting Allies .................................................... 31 4. Assessment of Strategy ............................................................... 33 D. COMPARISON OF STATE STRATEGIES ........................................ 37 1. Qualitative Analysis .................................................................... 37 2. Social Network Analysis ............................................................. 39 E. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 44 IV. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: 1977–1983 .................................................... 47 A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1977-1983 ....................................... 48 B. ISRAELI STRATEGY ........................................................................... 51 1. Objective ...................................................................................... 51 2. Allied Agents in Lebanon ........................................................... 52 3. Methods of Supporting Allies .................................................... 54 4. Assessment of Strategy ............................................................... 57 vii C. SYRIAN STRATEGY ............................................................................ 60 1. Objective ...................................................................................... 60 2. Allied Agents in Lebanon ........................................................... 60 3. Methods of Supporting Allies .................................................... 62 4. Assessment of Strategy ............................................................... 63 D. IRANIAN STRATEGY .......................................................................... 65 1. Objective ...................................................................................... 65 2. Allied Agents in Lebanon ........................................................... 65 3. Methods of Supporting Allies ...................................................
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