The Multigenerational Effect of Prestige on Patrilineage Survival in Korea 1400-1940

Home , Jeong (surname), Joseon, Mo (Korean surname)

Won-tak Joo Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin-Madison [email protected]

Jason Fletcher La Follette School of Public Affairs and Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin-Madison [email protected]

ABSTRACT

In this study, we aim to answer three questions using extensive information about genealogies during 1400-1940 from 8 clan books in Korea. First, does the social prestige of ancestors affect the expansion and survival of patrilineage? Second, does the ancestry matter for all descendants or only selected groups? Third, is there any change in prestige effects when there is a disruption in the governmental system? The results suggest that the patrilineage from prestigious ancestry is more likely to survive and the effect is sustained across 10 generations for about 300 years, whereas prestige has little impact on the size and growth of patrilineage. Further analyses show that the prestige selectively matters, especially for the eldest sons’ lineage. As for time trends of prestige effects, we observe that there was a steep decrease in advantage when Joseon Dynasty was going through governmental disorders in the early 1600s and the late 1800s. The results implicate that the linkage between family formation strategy and macro social change is a key to explaining patrilineage survival in pre-industrial periods.

INTRODUCTION

The reproductive success of families and lineage has been considered as a part of social stratification process in previous studies (Maralani, 2013; Mare, 1997). While scholars are trying to examine social stratification as a multigenerational process rather than an interplay within single or two generations (Mare, 2011; Mare & Song, 2014; Sharkey & Elwert, 2011), many studies have been focused on the transmission of fertility schedule across multiple generations (Danziger & Neuman, 1989; Kolk, 2014; M. Murphy, 1999; M. Murphy & Knudsen, 2002). Recently, genealogical data with extensive information about male offspring became publicly available which enables researchers to deal with a longer period of social stratification (Song & Campbell, 2017). In this study, we aim to answer three questions using patrilineal offspring data from 8 clan books in Korea. First, does the social prestige of ancestors affect the expansion and survival of patrilineage? Second, does the ancestry matter for all descendants or only selected groups? Third, is there any change in prestige effects when there is a disruption in the governmental system?

PRESTIGE AND PATRILINEAGE SURVIVAL

Many pre-industrial societies are reported to have a strong social hierarchy based on a patrilineal kinship system. Economic and social resources are monopolized by the small elite who are holding formal positions in a highly centralized government, while the chances for occupying those positions are dispro- portionately taken and perpetuated by male members in closed kinship networks (Sjoberg, 1955). For in- dicating this concentrated advantage of high socioeconomic status, we use the term “prestige” in this study.

The relationship between prestige and patrilineage size can be partly explained by prestigious families’ abundant resources, which might directly help families to breed their children and sustain the descendant lines. The relationship between resources and demographic changes at a population level was firstly theorized by Malthus (1798). In pre-industrial societies, the population is largely dependent on food and raw materials, which results in a certain level of equilibrium between its size and the number of natural resources they have. Assuming an exponential growth of population and linear growth of food supply, the decrease in real wages due to the overpopulation of laborers relative to the food production leads to the reduction in population growth until the population size finds equilibrium with the level of real wages. While studies considering Malthus’s equilibrium theory find that the increase in grain prices predict the reduction in fertility in European countries (Galloway, 1988) and Japan (Feeney & Kiyoshi, 1990), studies on a more micro-level dynamics show that the family-level income and wealth are posi- tively related to the level of fertility in European societies (Clark & Hamilton, 2006; Hadeishi, 2003; Weir, 1995). The advantage of prestige would include much more than just economic resources since prestigious individuals may exert social power to mobilize resources and control the distribution of them, which may result in a high potential for managing their families.

The patrilineage size itself has an important meaning in the perspective of families themselves. While the survival is a very first goal of all organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), families also internal- ize the norm of patrilineage continuation and strengthen it over time through closed social networks of kinship system (Peng, 2010). Patrilineage survival is, on the other hand, particularly important for those with prestige due to the role of patrilineal kinship in social stratification and mobility in pre-industrial countries. For example, Campbell and Lee (2011) show that the kin groups are more important for explaining social stratification than geographic regions, and the social status had been maintained for about a century through descendants in the 1800s of Liaoning, China. Since prestigious individuals could pre- serve and perpetuate their social positions only through their families, they may set a higher value on childbirths and descending lines than those from low social class.

Given the importance of patrilineage survival, there has been a debate on appropriate models for assessing the relationship between prestige and patrilineage. Prestigious individuals may try to find the optimal reproduction strategies for maximizing the probabilities of patrilineage continuation, which can be either having more children or having less but healthier and more intelligent children. According to Becker and Lewis (1973), however, the quantity and quality of children have a trade-off relationship, which induces a greater cost to maintain the quality for an additional child. In this perspective, we can expect that prestige and child quantity have a blurred relationship, and the models assuming a linear relationship between patrilineage size and prestige may not fully capture the prestige effect. For this reason, Song and colleagues (2015) proposed mixture models which separately assess patrilineage expansion and survival, and show that the founder’s socioeconomic status exerts a positive and durable effect on the survival of lineages over 150 years. Following song and colleagues’ analytic strategies, we adopt distinctive models for patrilineage expansion and survival for assessing the prestige effect on descending lines.

MULTIGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF ADVANTAGE AS A SELECTIVE PROCESS How does the ancestor’s prestige affect his or her descendants over multiple generations? Ac- cording to the demand function for children proposed by Becker and Tomes (1976, 1986), the intergenerational effect of prestige would directly come through parents’ economic resources or indirectly through children’s endowment (e.g., genetic inheritance, family’s culture). As for the model, better-endowed children may get more investment from their parents, but this inequality among siblings does not make big differences in intergenerational in the long run due to the regression to the mean. According to Becker and Tomes, the intergenerational effects would disappear in three generations.

Easterlin (1975) is more directly considering the intergenerational relationship between economic resources and fertility. He insists that the effect of economic resources on fertility is determined by a relative relationship with the economic conditions at childhood: parents’ economic resources determine one’s level of consumption at childhood, which results in the decrease in fertility when one’s earnings are less than those of their parents. According to this model, more economic resources at earlier generations could induce the decrease in the level of fertility (Danziger & Neuman, 1989; Hill, 2015).

In this study, we expect a different story from theories proposed by Becker or Easterlin. First, we consider pre-industrial societies where social positions are monopolized by kin groups and social mobility is minimal. Since the intergenerational transmission of parental resources is expected to be much stronger than that assumed in models above, the ancestry effect may be observed for a longer period. Second, prestigious families in pre-industrial societies set their first goal as maintaining their patrilineal lines. In this perspective, a strong preference for sons and the rule of primogeniture can be effective strategies for con- tinuing their lines through the eldest son’s descending line (R. Murphy, Tao, & Lu, 2011). In pre-industrial eras of Korea, polygamy was common for having more kids and prestigious heads usually chose adoption or took their sibling’s children if they have no male descendants (Son, 2010). This highly-une- qual inheriting rules may induce a strong multigenerational effect of social prestige on patrilineage expansion and survival.

EXOGENOUS SHOCK ON MULTIGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION

The concentrated advantages in social prestige are highly based on the governmental system of pre-industrial societies. When there is a drastic change or a sudden disorder in government, the prestige effect may be largely hindered. While there are little studies considering changes in prestige effect and political regime, several studies are focused on the change in an intergenerational relationship at a time of upheaval. Kraaykamp and Nieuwbeerta (2000) examine the intergenerational transmission of cultural values and lifestyles in five Eastern European countries, two years after the dissolution of Soviet Union. De- spite a dramatic change in a social system, the results show that parents’ cultural values largely affect children’s lifestyles. According to the results, the transmission process of values and norms seems to be relatively stable since it is taking place within private relationships between parents and children. The study by Bearman and Deane (1992) is about the change in the social mobility during 1548-1639 in Nor- wich, England. They show that upward mobility was only possible based on the stability of political system from 1548 to 1589, whereas downward mobility was observed during the period of 1590-1639 when the politics went through instability and no change in mobility after 1640 due to the decoupling of mobility and politics due to severe political conflicts.

In this study, we consider two events which had a drastic influence on Joseon Dynasty (1392-

1897). First, Joseon Dynasty had a war named Byngjahoran (丙子胡亂) with Qing Dynasty in China from 1636 to 1637. More than 30,000 people died and 600,000 were sold as servants. Joseon became a vassal state of Qing Dynasty after the defeat but enjoyed relative autonomy due to a long geographic dis- tance from the mainland in China. Second, Joseon fell in 1897. While Japan already started to interfere in national issues in Korea since 1876, Japan’s official colonial era started in 1910. In both events, the function of Joseon Dynasty had almost stopped for a while, which might have resulted in the decrease in prestige effect in those periods.

DATA AND METHODS

Korean Clan Book

The data come from 8 Korean clan books (Jokbo 族譜) which contain the extensive information about patrilineal offspring in Korea (Baek, Kiet, & Kim, 2007). The members of each clan share one common first ancestor who is treated as a founder of the subsequent descendant trees. Each clan is named the combination of the first ancestor’s surname and his or her origin place. For example, Gimhae Kim, the largest clan in South Korea now, was founded by Suro Kim (金首露 ) who was born in AD 42 in Gimhae, a city in the Southeastern region of Korea. Clan books include names, demographic histories (e.g., date of birth, date of death, information about their spouses), and short notes about formal positions of patrilineal members. As Hiroshi (2010) pointed out, the clan in Korea is not a fixed entity but has been through a complex construction process over time. Clans are usually made up of several subgroups (pa 派) with different first ancestors and separate clan books, and sometimes diverged into separate clans with different origin places when a descendant with high social position and power wants to form a distinctive group of his family members (for this reason, Hiroshi uses a unique term “surname/ancestral seat descent group” instead of “clan”, but we will use “clan” hereafter for simplicity). Compiling a clan book, in this sense, is an important way of forming and maintaining each clan’s identity and social boundaries, and only afford- able and manageable for highly prestigious clans which have resources to follow up their descendants and have reasons to do those tedious tasks. 8 clan books in this study are from Yeosan Song (礪山宋)

Wonyoongong pa (元尹公派) and Jungagong pa (正嘉公派), Jeonju Ryu (全州柳), Jinju Jeong (晋州

鄭), Hamyang Park (咸陽朴), Hamyang Yeo (咸陽呂), Hampyeong Mo (咸平牟), and Hangju Ki

(幸州奇). All clan books are publicly available through online websites or paper books, which were digi- talized into analyzable data. The time points when the genealogy started to be collected vary by clan book, and we limit our study sample to clan members who were born between 1400-1900 when the Jo- seon (朝鮮) Dynasty (1392-1897) flourished in Korea.

Clan books follow up male clan members’ genealogical trees: if a male clan member (A) and his wife (B) have a son (C) and a daughter (D), the book includes names, date of birth and death of all A, B, C, and D. If C and D get married to E to F respectively, the information about E and F is also added to the book. After that, the book follows only male clan member C’s offspring. In this study, we only consider male clan members and their male descendants since the information about female descendants is limited to the direct daughters of male clan members. Additionally, even though clan books should include the information about both sons and daughters and their demographics in principle, it seems that the information was more thoroughly collected for males than for females. As seen in Table 1, the average number of daughters stays around 0.5 over the study periods, whereas the number of sons is about 1.5. This may be the mixed results from two behaviors related to family formation and clan book management. First, the Joseon Dynasty has based on strong patriarchy and Confucianism by which people set the high value on the prosperity of patrilineal families and literary arts. Due to this reason, clans prefer sons who can study literary arts in educational institutions, take governmental positions, and carry on a family line. Second, since clan books are intrinsically for following up the patrilineal descendant trees, editors are inclined to include those who are more likely to continue a patrilineal line, who are male and survived till age 20. In other words, clan books may underestimate the total number of births and exclude those who are female and unhealthy. According to the study on four clan books in Korea (Jeonju Lee, Hamyang Park, and Gangneung Kim) by Cha (2009), the completed fertility rate corrected for data attrition was 6.81 between 1700 and 1899, which implicates that our clan book measurements may be from highly selective samples in clans. With this limitation in mind, we focus on the data from male descendants, which may be of better quality than female descendant data.

[Table 1 about here]

The Joseon Dynasty has a caste system consisting of yangin (良人). Even though all people ex- cluding children of a concubine or people from the lowest class called cheonin (賤人, people from this class are slaves, butchers, entertainers or gisaeng – women who entertain aristocrats with dancing, sing- ing, or playing musical instruments) could take an examination, candidates and successful examinees for civil servant exam are usually from prestigious clans.

Patrilineage

We focus on the total number of d-degree descendants in clan books. While sons are 1-degree descendants, we extend our attention up to 10-degree male descendants. Using those measures, we consider how patrilineage expands and survives over time. We did not consider the number of descendants alive in each period as Song and colleagues (2015) did since our clan book data have many missing values in the date of birth and death (64.4%) which makes it hard to estimate the number of people alive in a certain period. Due to this reason, the analyses on the expansion of patrilineage cannot directly be generalized to the growth rate of population. However, we can get a sense of increase or decrease in the total number of male child quantity over time.

Prestige

We measure social prestige using the information about official position records in clan books. If an individual has a record of any official position in the government of Joseon Dynasty, we take that information and make an indicator of whether the individual is socially prestigious or not. Official positions in Joseon Dynasty are differentiated in three types – civil service, military service, and technical service – and each type has its governmental examination for selecting new civil servants. Among three types of positions, civil service is considered the most important and prestigious field. Even though all people ex- cluding children of a concubine or people from the cheonin class could take an examination, candidates and successful examinees for civil servant examination are usually from yangban class (Won, 2007). Analytic Strategy

We conduct three types of analyses. First, we consider lineage-level regression models for assessing the effect of prestigious positions on the subsequent patrilineage size and growth. In these models, an individual is assumed as a “founder” of his lineage. We examine how the founder’s prestige affects the size of subsequent patrilineal descendants from 1-degree (i.e., sons), 2-degree (i.e., grandsons), 3-degree (i.e., great-grandsons) to 10-degree in sequential models. We examine the effect of founder’s prestige on the patrilineage size and growth separately: the size is for the number of male descendants at each degree, while the growth is measured by the rate of the size at d-degree relative to the size at (d-1)-degree. Whereas models for size would capture the cumulative effect of prestige over generations, models for growth would show the effect which remains at each degree of descent. The following equation is for a Poisson regression of founder i’s d-degree patrilineage size where c is for a clan, t for founder’s birth year (we consider 30-year periods):

( ) = exp( + + + + )

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 In the Poisson regression,𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑 the patrilineage𝑃𝑃 𝛽𝛽 𝐸𝐸size𝛾𝛾 is assumed𝑀𝑀 𝛿𝛿 to𝐹𝐹 have𝛼𝛼 an𝜀𝜀 exponential relationship with founder’s prestige P, eldest brother E, and the number of male siblings M. Since all models are con- trolled for clan-by-time (30 years) fixed effects F, we compare the effect of prestige among founders from the same clan in the same 30-year period. We also allow error terms ε are correlated among across founders in the same clan in the same 30-year period. If we add the log-transformed term for (d-1)-degree patrilineage size in the right side and constrain the coefficient to 1, we can move the term to the left and assess the effect of prestige on the growth rate as a patrilineage as follows:

( ) = exp(log ( 1) + + + + + )

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑 ( ) �𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑 − � 𝑃𝑃 𝛽𝛽 𝐸𝐸 𝛾𝛾 𝑀𝑀 𝛿𝛿 𝐹𝐹 𝛼𝛼 𝜀𝜀 ( 1) = exp( + + + + ) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃 𝛽𝛽 𝐸𝐸 𝛾𝛾 𝑀𝑀 𝛿𝛿 𝐹𝐹 𝛼𝛼 𝜀𝜀 In these regression models𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑, the − patrilineage size or growth is capturing both survivals (i.e., the patrilineage size is greater than zero) and expansion (i.e., the size or growth given the survival) together. However, it is plausible to expect that the survival and expansion are based on different mechanisms and thus follow different distributions conditional on covariates (Song & Mare, 2015). For this reason, we examined survival and expansion separately using a mixture of logistic regression and truncated Poisson regression (Song et al., 2015). As for patrilineage size, the survival at each degree (i.e., N(d)>0) is predicted from a logistic regression analysis, and the size given the survival (i.e., N(d) | N(d)>0) is from a truncated Poisson regression. In models for patrilineage growth, the survival is assessed only when a patrilineage survived at (d-1)-degree (i.e., N(d)>0 | N(d-1)>0), while growth-only models are examined given the survival at both degree d and d-1 (i.e., N(d)-N(d-1) | N(d)>0, N(d-1)>0).

Second, for assessing the multigenerational effect of prestige in detail, we adopt dyadic-level models. In these models, we consider how the founder i’s prestige affects each d-degree descendant j’s direct patrilineage size S(d) (i.e., the number of sons). For example, when considering a model for 3-degree descendants, we measure the effect of founder’s prestige on great-grandsons’ number of sons. The equations are as follows:

( ) = exp( + + + + )

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ( 𝑆𝑆) = exp𝑑𝑑 ( +𝑃𝑃 𝛽𝛽 +𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾 𝑀𝑀+ 𝛿𝛿 𝐹𝐹 𝛼𝛼+ 𝜀𝜀 + )

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 In these models,𝑆𝑆 we𝑑𝑑 consider𝑃𝑃 an𝛽𝛽 indicator𝐿𝐿 𝛾𝛾 of 𝑀𝑀“main𝛿𝛿 line”𝑃𝑃 L𝐿𝐿 – 𝜃𝜃only𝐹𝐹 eldest𝛼𝛼 -sons’𝜀𝜀 lineal line – instead of founder’s birth order. For example, a male descendant belongs to the main line of his great-grandfather if he, his father, and his grandfather are all eldest brothers among siblings of each. We consider the interaction between main line and founder’s prestige to examine if the ancestry matters selectively for descendants on the main line. While clan-by-time fixed effects are also considered, we measure time fixed effects based on descendant’s birth year rather than founder’s birth year. Since we measure the number of sons at each degree of descent, there is no distinction between size and growth in these models. However, we examine models for survival (i.e., S(d)>0) and size only (i.e., S(d) | S(d)>0) separately.

Third, for assessing the effects of exogenous shocks, we examine time trends in the relationship between founder’s prestige and patrilineage size. We do not consider models for discontinuity by exogenous factors such as interrupted time series models since it is hard to specify the timing from which exogenous shocks matters for the population. For example, an event at 1500 may influence people who were born in 1500 and the subsequent cohorts, but also those who were born before 1500 since they are also exposed to the event at some point during their life courses. For this reason, instead of a sudden discontinuity, we expect a gradual change in the effect of prestige which is centered on the outbreak of an event we are interested in. We consider dyadic-level models above at each 30-year period to show how the ratio of prestigious to non-prestigious founder’s patrilineage size varies especially when there was a drastic decrease in Joseon Dynasty’s power in 1637 (the defeat by Qing dynasty) and 1897 (the dissolution of Jo- seon Dynasty).

RESULTS [Table 2 about here]

[Figure 1 about here]

[Figure 2 about here]

Table 2 shows how the founder’s prestige measured by official position records in clan books affects all 1-degree to 10-degree patrilineage size and growth. According to Model 1s, prestigious founders are likely to have 1.7 (=e0.508) times bigger 1-degree patrilineage, 2.8 (=e1.024) times bigger 5-degree patrilineage, and 3.2 (=e1.161) times bigger 10-degree patrilineage than non-prestigious founders on average. Overall, the ratio of prestigious to non-prestigious patrilineage size is increasing across generations. Since a bigger patrilineage at d-degree increases chances to have more descendants at (d+1)-degree, the advantage cumulates over time and results in increasing ratios. Model 2s and 3s consider the effect of prestige on survival and only size separately. According to Model 2s from logistic regression analyses, the ratio of prestigious to non-prestigious founder’s survival probability is 21.3 (=e3.057) at 1-degree of descent, which decreases to 7.2 (=e1.980) till 6-degree and stays stable till 10-degree. Model 3s from truncated Poisson regression analyses examine the patrilineage size only when the patrilineage survive at each degree of descent and show that the advantage of prestige largely decreases comparing with Models 1s which do not differentiate survival and size. The ratio of prestigious to non-prestigious founder’s patrilineage size is 1.6 (=e0.464) at 1-degree, which fluctuates little across generations. As seen in Model 2s and 3s, the advantage of prestige works much stronger for survival than size down to 10-degree descendants.

Model 4s to 6s examine the growth of patrilineage across generations. As seen in Model 4s, the ratio steadily decreases and stays around 1.1 (=e0.130) from 4-degree. When considering the patrilineage survival at d-degree given the survival at (d-1)-degree in Model 5s, the ratio decreases to 1.6 (=e0.511) till 6-degree, increases again to 2.7 (=e1.003) till 8-degree, and decreases to 2.3 (=e0.834). Model 6s for growth only show a more dramatic decrease in prestige effects across generations relative to those from Model 4s, where the ratio decreases to nearly 1 (=e0.041) at 5-degree and becomes statistically insignificant till 6- degree.

Figure 1 and 2 show the changes in prestige effects for size and growth across 10 generations. Since growth models capture the advantage of prestige arising at each degree of descent, the ratios for patrilineage growth are always smaller than the ratios for size. However, despite some decrease in advantage at low degrees of descent, we could observe that the advantage for survival remains down to 10- degree descendants over about 300 years, whereas the advantage for growth largely dissipates from 5-degree. Before moving to the next topic, we want to focus on the coefficients for the number of male siblings.

[Table 3 about here]

[Figure 3 about here]

Now we turn to the results from dyadic-level analyses in Table 3. In Model 7s, 8s, and 9s, we examine the effect of prestige on d-degree descendants’ 1-degree patrilineage size (i.e., the number of sons), survival, and only size each. In these models, we add the term for the main line (i.e., eldest sons’ lineage) and assess the interaction effect with founder’s prestige. The prestige exerts a statistically-significant influence on descendants’ patrilineage size down to 4-degree, but the size of ratios was not large (1.3 (=e0.265) at 1-degree, and nearly 1 (=e0.048) on 4-degree). Descendants from main lines have consistently bigger patrilineage size across generations, with the ratio of 1.2 (=e0.165) at 10-degree. The interaction with prestige and the main line was statistically significant only at 2- and 3-degree, but the size of a ratio is so small to have any practical importance (close to 1 (=e0.044) at 3-degree).

As for Model 8s for patrilineage survival, the advantage of prestige is observed. The main effect of prestige is not large: the ratio is 2.0 (=e0.675) at 1-degree and decreases to 1.1 (=e0.092) at 4-degree. How- ever, the advantage of main line is large and stable across generations: the ratio is 2.3 (=e0.838) at 1-degree and steadily increases to 3.0 (=e1.100) till 10-degree. We could also observe significant interaction effects between prestige and the main line: the ratio at 1-degree (1.4=e0.323) is sustained till 10-degree (1.4=e0.305). In the meanwhile, Model 9s for size only show smaller effects of prestige and main line than those from Model 7s.

Figure 3 illustrates the advantage of main line and prestige for patrilineage survival. The models for this figure is the same as Model 8s in Table 3 except that I consider, rather than the interaction between prestige and main line, three dummy variables for descendants from main lines but not from prestigious founders, descendants from prestigious founders but not from main lines, and descendants from both prestigious founders and main lines. The ratio is to the reference group whose members are neither from prestigious founders nor main lines. As shown in the figure, the ratio of prestigious main line to the reference group is maintained at about 3 across 10 generations, while the advantage of prestige is not transmitted to members outside of main lines. Summing up, when considering the role of prestige within each founder-descendant dyadic pair, the prestige effect is strong for only survival, and its advantage is selectively transmitted through main-line descendants over about 270 years.

[Figure 4 about here] [Figure 5 about here]

How do those prestige effects change over time? Was there a dramatic decrease in prestige effects around 1637 and 1897? Figure 4 and 5 are from Model 8s (as for interaction effects, we consider three dummies as explained in the previous paragraph) at each 30-year period. While the patterns in prestige effects become blurred as we go down to further generations, the figures show that there are steep decreases in prestige effects during 1610-1640, and around 1910, especially for 1- to 3-degree descendants. The patterns show that prestigious families can take advantage of their social power when the governmental system works well, whereas the advantage largely decreases when the government goes through disorders during colonial eras or the process of its dissolution.

DISCUSSION

In this study, using extensive information about genealogies from 8 clan books, we consider the effect of social prestige on patrilineage expansion and survival in Korea during 1400-1940. We observe that founder’s prestige consistently fosters on patrilineage survival across 10 generations, which accounts for about 300 years. When considering descendants’ number of sons separately, the transmission of advantage is selectively applied for those from prestigious founder’s eldest sons. We also check the time trends and find that there were drastic decreases in prestige effects when Joseon Dynasty was experienc- ing governmental disorders due to the defeat in the war with Qing Dynasty in 1637 and the dissolution of itself right before the start of Japan’s colonial rule in 1897.

There are two limitations in this study. First, we consider the number of d-degree descendants rather than the number of surviving descendants at each time point due to low data quality in the death years. Due to this reason, the results of this study cannot be extended to the growth rate of the population but can only be interpreted as the size and growth of d-degree descendants. While it is unclear how the death schedule is related to the expansion and survival of patrilineage, it is plausible to propose a hypoth- esis that people with high prestige would live longer using abundant economic resources and high standard of living, which makes the prestige effects bigger than those from this study. However, contrary to common expectations, one study on lifespan in the early 1900s in Korea shows that people with low socioeconomic status live longer than those from higher social class due to rural residence (Lee & Yoo, 2017). The advantage in life expectancy for people with higher social positions seems to emerge since the late 1900s when modern medical technologies started to be adopted. From this point of view, the survival benefits of prestigious founders may decrease when considering death rates together. Second, it is not clear how people from different social classes manage their lineages. As we noted above, only clans with high social status edited clan books in the past, and our analyses take the variation in governmental positions among those from only high-status families. Whereas families with low socioeconomic status may have weaker inclination to continue their family lines, they may need more children to increase their productive force and maintain their farming industry. Future studies may be able to examine the demographic behaviors of people from low socioeconomic status in detail.

Despite those limitations, this study contributes to the lines of studies on intergenerational effects of socioeconomic status on offspring. While studies using genealogical data started to find that there was a long-term effect of social prestige in pre-industrial societies, we do know little about the change in processes during the revolutionary periods. This study implicates that governmental stability is a key to intergenerational effects of social prestige, and future studies are expected to clarify mechanisms by which transmission processes are disrupted during a time of upheaval.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was supported by core grants to the Center for Demography and Ecology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (P2C HD047873) and to the Center for Demography of Health and Ag- ing at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (P30 AG017266).

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TABLES

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Year Son Daughter Son>1 Son|Son>1 Prestige Eldest Number of N brother male siblings 1400-1430 1.717 0.747 0.848 2.024 0.737 0.626 2.333 99 1430-1460 1.360 0.522 0.770 1.766 0.579 0.472 2.657 178 1460-1490 1.667 0.517 0.884 1.885 0.580 0.546 2.464 207 1490-1520 1.385 0.519 0.787 1.760 0.505 0.516 2.648 366 1520-1550 1.316 0.510 0.701 1.877 0.404 0.573 2.452 522 1550-1580 1.467 0.473 0.774 1.897 0.402 0.537 2.530 676 1580-1610 1.452 0.555 0.745 1.950 0.338 0.520 2.689 1,073 1610-1640 1.620 0.636 0.823 1.967 0.324 0.522 2.809 1,467 1640-1670 1.436 0.628 0.793 1.812 0.214 0.503 2.759 2,325 1670-1700 1.318 0.488 0.759 1.736 0.168 0.550 2.519 3,231 1700-1730 1.323 0.459 0.774 1.710 0.133 0.579 2.322 4,246 1730-1760 1.301 0.447 0.768 1.694 0.103 0.582 2.344 5,813 1760-1790 1.353 0.456 0.808 1.675 0.078 0.604 2.258 7,477 1790-1820 1.341 0.447 0.802 1.671 0.069 0.601 2.248 10,062 1820-1850 1.344 0.485 0.802 1.675 0.075 0.598 2.232 13,606 1850-1880 1.448 0.613 0.808 1.793 0.064 0.608 2.198 17,961 1880-1910 1.762 0.965 0.825 2.136 0.025 0.573 2.332 24,396 1910-1940 1.908 1.252 0.804 2.371 0.042 0.470 2.805 44,432 Total 1.617 0.831 0.804 2.011 0.072 0.548 2.469 138,137 Source: 8 clan books from Yeosan Song (Wonyoongong pa, Jungagong pa), Jeonju Ryu, Jinju Jeong, Hamyang Park, Hamyang Yeo, Hampyeong Mo, and Hangju Ki in Korea.

Table 2. Lineage-level Regression of Patrilineage Size and Growth

Degree of descent (d) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Model 1: Size, N(d) Founder's prestige 0.508*** 0.741*** 0.875*** 0.942*** 1.024*** 1.056*** 1.075*** 1.088*** 1.115*** 1.161*** (0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.040) (0.052) (0.054) (0.064) N 51348 51348 51348 51348 37742 27680 20203 14390 10144 6913 Model 2: Survival, N(d)>0 Founder's prestige 3.057*** 2.580*** 2.318*** 2.131*** 2.058*** 1.980*** 2.002*** 2.042*** 2.051*** 2.065*** (0.132) (0.081) (0.074) (0.078) (0.075) (0.072) (0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.089) N 51300 51300 51308 51308 37706 27644 20167 14354 10108 6877 Model 3: Size only, N(d) | N(d)>0 Founder's prestige 0.464*** 0.477*** 0.492*** 0.508*** 0.536*** 0.527*** 0.479*** 0.436*** 0.420*** 0.426*** (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.044) (0.055) (0.065) N 40666 36421 33653 31433 21770 15126 10558 7332 5143 3519

Model 4: Growth, N(d)-N(d-1) Founder's prestige 0.508*** 0.304*** 0.205*** 0.130*** 0.096*** 0.072*** 0.059*** 0.052** 0.059*** 0.057** (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) N 51348 51348 51348 51348 37742 27680 20203 14390 10144 6913 Model 5: Survival, N(d)>0 | N(d-1)>0 Founder's prestige 3.057*** 1.708*** 1.280*** 1.010*** 0.761*** 0.511*** 0.771*** 1.003*** 0.907*** 0.834*** (0.132) (0.082) (0.105) (0.117) (0.118) (0.120) (0.169) (0.175) (0.197) (0.230) N 51300 40461 36166 33090 22424 15390 10221 6694 4555 2858 Model 6: Growth only, N(d)-N(d-1) | N(d)>0, N(d-1)>0 Founder's prestige 0.464*** 0.249*** 0.136*** 0.068*** 0.041*** 0.023 0.011 0.010 0.024 0.029 (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) N 40666 36421 33653 31433 21770 15126 10558 7332 5143 3519 Source: 8 clan books from Yeosan Song (Wonyoongong pa, Jungagong pa), Jeonju Ryu, Jinju Jeong, Hamyang Park, Hamyang Yeo, Hampyeong Mo, and Hangju Ki in Korea. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the clan-by-time (50 years) level. All models control for clan-by-time (50 years) fixed effects. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table 3. Dyadic-level Regression of Patrilineage Size

Degree of descent (d) 1 2 3 4 5 Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction effect effect effect effect effect effect effect effect effect effect Model 7: Size, S(d) Founder's prestige 0.265*** 0.258*** 0.160*** 0.149*** 0.089*** 0.081*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.021 0.021 (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) Main line 0.172*** 0.169*** 0.143*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.126*** 0.136*** 0.130*** 0.134*** 0.134*** (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) Founder's prestige 0.013 0.035** 0.044*** 0.025 -0.001 x main line (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) N 69510 69510 95309 95309 128385 128385 136109 136109 136325 136325

Model 8: Survival, S(d)>0 Founder's prestige 0.675*** 0.567*** 0.405*** 0.362*** 0.212*** 0.175*** 0.092*** 0.078** 0.044 0.033 (0.037) (0.043) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.031) Main line 0.838*** 0.797*** 0.876*** 0.839*** 0.787*** 0.731*** 0.775*** 0.734*** 0.776*** 0.723*** (0.049) (0.053) (0.047) (0.051) (0.056) (0.056) (0.053) (0.058) (0.059) (0.062) Founder's prestige 0.323*** 0.262*** 0.367*** 0.207** 0.227** x main line (0.065) (0.061) (0.062) (0.069) (0.076) N 69470 69470 95266 95266 128341 128341 136069 136069 136257 136257

Model 9: Size only, S(d) | S(d)>0 Founder's prestige 0.278*** 0.233*** 0.157*** 0.130*** 0.088*** 0.080*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.024* 0.027** (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) Main line -0.001 -0.023 -0.015 -0.035*** 0.019* 0.010 0.033*** 0.029* 0.037*** 0.044*** (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) Founder's prestige 0.080*** 0.087*** 0.044** 0.021 -0.032 x main line (0.023) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) N 55143 55143 76062 76062 103007 103007 109394 109394 109635 109635

(continued)

Degree of descent (d) 6 7 8 9 10 Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction effect effect effect effect effect effect effect effect effect effect Model 7: Size, S(d) Founder's prestige 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) Main line 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.146*** 0.151*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.165*** 0.184*** (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) Founder's prestige -0.003 0.000 -0.013 0.002 -0.034 x main line (0.016) (0.020) (0.029) (0.025) (0.037) N 135686 135686 134549 134549 132942 132942 130423 130423 126844 126844

Model 8: Survival, S(d)>0 Founder's prestige 0.015 0.005 0.074 0.067 0.064 0.058 0.054 0.050 0.022 0.022 (0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) Main line 0.766*** 0.682*** 0.834*** 0.727*** 0.837*** 0.696*** 0.920*** 0.781*** 1.100*** 1.120*** (0.066) (0.075) (0.076) (0.090) (0.074) (0.087) (0.107) (0.127) (0.127) (0.150) Founder's prestige 0.303** 0.332** 0.368** 0.305* -0.035 x main line (0.094) (0.104) (0.116) (0.124) (0.159) N 135640 135640 134508 134508 132915 132915 130397 130397 126802 126802

Model 9: Size only, S(d) | S(d)>0 Founder's prestige 0.016* 0.019** 0.006 0.008 -0.014* -0.012* -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) Main line 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.081*** 0.068*** 0.079** 0.051* 0.071 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.039) Founder's prestige -0.050* -0.039 -0.066 -0.024 -0.039 x main line (0.025) (0.028) (0.042) (0.032) (0.053) N 109145 109145 108325 108325 107104 107104 105159 105159 102382 102382 Source: 8 clan books from Yeosan Song (Wonyoongong pa, Jungagong pa), Jeonju Ryu, Jinju Jeong, Hamyang Park, Hamyang Yeo, Hampyeong Mo, and Hangju Ki in Korea. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the clan-by-time (25 years) level. All models control for clan-by-time (25 years) fixed effects. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. FIGURES

Figure 1. Lineage-level Analysis: Ratio of Prestigious to Non-prestigious Founder’s Patrilineage Size and Growth

Figure 2. Lineage-level Analysis: Ratio of Prestigious to Non-prestigious Founder’s Patrilineage Survival

Figure 3. Dyadic-level Analysis: Ratio of Prestigious Main Line’s to Others’ Patrilineage Survival

Figure 4. Dyadic-level Analysis: Ratio of Prestigious to Non-prestigious Founder’s Patrilineage Survival, Time Trends 1400-1940

Figure 5. Dyadic-level Analysis: Ratio of Prestigious Main Line’s to Others’ Patrilineage Survival, Time Trends 1400-1940