The author/Fouad Mussed Fouad Mussed Dhaifallah Muthanna is a researcher at the Abaad Center for Studies and Research, born in 1977 in al-Dhale governorate, southern Yemen. He also works as a correspondent for the Turkish Anadolu News Agency. He got a bachelor in the English Literature from Aden University. He worked as a representative for al- Dhale governorate between 2012 and 2013 in the program of “Promoting Electoral Reforms”, which was implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). He won the second place in the competition for the best article on "Civil Society after the Arab Spring", in "Freedom Forum" - Kingdom of Morocco 2012. He managed the editorial of Al-Watani newspaper between 208 and 2013. Abaad Studies & Research Center : About Us Abaad Studies & Research Center (Abaad) is a non-profit organization that has مركز أبعاد للدراسات والبحوث a license from Yemen's Social Affairs Ministry No. (436) issued on October 18 Abaad Studies & Research Center 2010. focuses on politics, intellect, democracy, election, political parties, terrorism, freedoms as well as economic and social issues. Index Research Summary and Methodology:...... 5 Preface:...... 7 First topic: The Emergence and Establishment:...... 11 The definition:...... 16 Ideology and Intellectual Tributaries:...... 17 Islah’s Relationship with Muslim Brotherhood:...... 18 The Second Topic: Moving from Mobilization to Partisan and Political Work...... 21 The Third Topic: Islah … Issues and Positions:...... 25 The Republican System in the Face of Dynastic Thought...... 25 Shura and Democracy...... 26 Violence and Terror...... 28 Under penalty of indictment...... 31 The Southern Issue...... 34 Women Issue...... 37 Tribal Community...... 39 The Palestinian Issue...... 40 The Fourth Topic: Prominent Stations in the reform process...... 43 First: Participation in Power...... 43

3 Second: Leaving the power, Launching the "Joint Meeting" and Peaceful Struggle...... 46 Third: The Yemeni Popular Revolution 2011...... 50 Fourth: Houthi Coup and War...... 53 The Fifth Topic: Islah at Times of War...... 59 The Islah’s Vision towards War with Houthis...... 60 War against Islah...... 61 Islah and Regional and International Tensions...... 65 The Conclusion: Challenges to Islah...... 67 Scenarios for the Future of Islah...... 70 References...... 73

4 Research Summary and Methodology:

The research deals with the Islah party and its future, as the largest Yemeni party at the present time, and the general conditions that Yemen has been going through since the outbreak of the popular revolution in 2011, and the current war, which has entered its sixth year, between the legitimate government and the Houthi group, which led an armed coup against the state and the political process in September 2014. The research sheds light on the first emergence of the Yemeni Islamic movement, which became known after the declaration of political pluralism in the country as the “Yemeni Congregation for Reform”, with the most important and prominent circumstances and factors that contributed to the emergence, whether historical and political factors or intellectual and ideological tributaries, as well as the conditions of the local Yemeni reality and external interweaving. The research focuses on the most important transformations in the path of the Islah party during the past 30 years, since its establishment in 1990, beginning with its active and influential presence in the political opposition during the transitional period after the Yemeni unity, through its participation in power after it won the second place in the first general parliamentary elections in April 1993, and then its return to the opposition square following the parliamentary elections in 1997, and the developments that resulted from that after the Ali Saleh regime won power in the wake of the 1999 presidential elections, the local elections in 2001 and the parliamentary elections in 2003. The research deals with the role of the Islah party and its partners in the "Joint Meeting Parties" in the last decade of Saleh's rule, then the popular revolution in 2011, and finally the Houthi coup, and the all-out war. The research also sheds light - briefly - on the Islah’s positions towards a number of issues, including women, democracy, violence and terrorism, and the republican system.

5 It concludes with brief references to the main challenges that the Islah party currently faces, and tries to answer a question whether the party will continue its political journey as a single bloc, with its ability to distinguish between the political and military performance during war? Or will be divided and fragmented due to challenges it faces and dangers that threaten the Yemeni State? It also provides some recommendations based on some findings. It consists of five main topics. The first topic deals with the emergence of the Yemeni Islamic movement from which the Islah party was formed later. The second topic focuses on the transition of the Islah party from the popular mobilization to the partisan action, while the third topic discusses the Islah positions towards the issues of democracy, the republican system and the imamate ideology, in addition to the Islah’s position towards violence and terrorism. As for the fourth topic, it deals with the most important historical and political stages that the Islah party processed. The final topic discusses the status of the Islah party in light of the current war that has been raging for almost six years, in addition to the political and media campaigns by local and external forces that target the party’s existence. The researcher adopted the historical approach to study the events and facts of the recent past related to the subject of the research in order to better understand the present, and to anticipate the future in a closest manner to reality and its implications. He also adopted the descriptive analytical approach to study the current situation of the Islah party - the subject of the research- in terms of its most important characteristics and features, and its relationships between its components, and analyzing its most important contents, developments and connections, and the factors that affect it, positively or negatively. The researcher also used the (interviewing) tool that includes a number of the party’s leaders, in addition to politicians, academics, researchers and interested persons from outside the party, with the aim of enriching the study with various contents, ideas and opinions under several themes.

6 Preface:

By September 2020, 30 years have passed since the founding of the Islah party, as it was officially announced on September 13, 1990, after the declaration of the unity between the north and south of Yemen, and the establishment of the Republic of Yemen and the announcement of the political and party pluralism in the country for the first time, as the partisanship was banned in both north and south. A few months after its establishment, the Islah party became the third political force after the two ruling parties, the General People’s Congress party, led by president of the united Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the Socialist Party, led by Vice President at the time Ali Salem al-Baidh. Then the party became the strongest and most present voice in the political opposition, following the first parliamentary elections. The Islah won 63 seats to become the second after the GPC, which won 123 out of the total number of 301 seats in the House of Representatives. Accordingly, the party moved from the opposition to the power. It joined the GPC and the Socialist Party, which came in third place with 56 seats, to form a tripartite alliance to rule the country. When the new coalition just began to grope its way, several obstacles appeared in front of it. It found itself in front of a stormy political crisis that stormed the alliance. All efforts to end the tension and resume the political life failed, leading to a comprehensive war between north and south that lasted for nearly two months, May through July 1994.

7 It ended with the victory of President Ali including the Socialist Party, the Abdullah Saleh and his allies, including Nasserites Organization party, the Islah, and the defeat of Ali Salem al- National Baath Party, the Union of Baidh and his Socialist Party, who left Popular Forces and the Al-Haq Party. power after that. So Saleh’s party and The dialogue resulted in the formation the Islah began a bilateral alliance that of the “Joint Meeting Parties” (JMP). formed a new government. With the establishment of the JMP, the The Islah party has only eight ministerial Yemeni political parties moved to a new portfolios in the government, in phase of peaceful opposition against the addition to the presidency of the House ruling regime, which has been working of Representatives, which was assumed with all its power, through legal and illegal by the party’s head Sheikh Abdullah bin means, to empower itself and exploit the Hussein al-Ahmar, and the position of state’s capabilities and resources to keep the second deputy prime minister, which President Ali Abdullah Saleh in power was assumed by Abdul Wahhab al-Ansi, for ever. After the political horizon in the Secretary-General of the Islah party. Yemen was blocked, in addition to the The relationship between the GPC and economic deterioration, insecurity, the Islah party, which was described as successive crises in the country, and “strategic”, receded when the GPC began then the Arab spring revolutions in to exclude its ally and restrict its cadres several Arab countries, the popular and members in most of ministries revolutionary wave started and it was the and government institutions in various path of salvation for the Yemeni people governorates. After the parliamentary and the political and social forces, as elections in 1997, the Islah party the ruling regime blocked all ways to withdrew from the ruling power and peaceful change. engaged in dialogue with other political Although the Arab Gulf States interfered parties that were included in the with an initiative to make a peaceful (Supreme Coordination Council for the transfer of power in Yemen, Opposition Parties),

8 they granted President Saleh and explicitly and implicitly stated that their his followers an immunity from any target is only the Islah party, Saleh’s prosecution for what they had committed opponent that was the most prominent during the GPC’s reign for three component of the popular revolution decades. They also offered the GPC a against him. The Houthi group then saw big partnership in the new government, that it does not need to have a political its share exceeded the half of portfolios. dispute with the Islah party, but rather However, Saleh chose to fight the new considered it as an ideological opponent, president [AbdRabbo Mansour Hadi] given that the Islamic party’s reference and the new government, in which his is Sunnah, while the Houthis adopt an party was included. He decided to take opposing ideology, based on the faded revenge against all his opponents through Zaydi legacy and the revolutionary ideas, establishing an alliance with the Houthi driven from the Iranian regime’s (Wilayat group, against which Saleh launched six al-Faqih), which has the Twelver Shiite wars between 2004 and 2009. authority. This approach was a kind The cooperation between Saleh and of transforming the conflict in Yemen the Houthis resulted in the complete from a political conflict into a sectarian fall of the state into the Houthis’ grip, one. The approach was adopted by Iran, especially after the Houthis took control the Houthis’ ally, in Lebanon and Iraq, of the capital, Sana’a, in September 2014. where it succeeded in tightening the grip The two parties, Saleh and the Houthi on the governance in the two countries. group,

9 In the first three months of 2015, the represented by President Hadi, and Houthis besieged the president and rejecting the Houthi-Saleh coup and the government, and placed them supporting the popular resistance under house arrest. They announced a against it. constitutional statement according to Although the Houthis mainly targeted which they installed themselves as rulers the Islah party’s leaders and members over Yemen. They sent their forces to with killing, abusing and kidnapping in south and east to complete their control various governorates under their control, over the rest of the country and subjugate the Islah party was also targeted by the whole people by force. forces affiliated with the Arab Coalition But President AbdRabbo Mansour in the liberated governorates, especially Hadi fled Sana’a secretly to Aden, so the in the temporary capital, Aden, where Houthi-Saleh plot was spoiled, especially hundreds of people and Islah’s members since President Hadi succeeded in and leaders joined in the liberation battles holding meetings and making deals with against the Houthis. Dozens of Islah’s the countries of the region and a number members were killed and wounded in the of ambassadors. After the first vanguards battles, but their award after liberation of the Houthi invasion reached the was murder, assassinations, incursions, outskirts of Aden, the Kingdom of Saudi burning the party’s headquarters, Arabia announced the launch of the pursuing their activists, and launching Decisive Storm and the formation of an security and media campaigns against Arab military coalition in support of the them. This situation increased the Yemeni legitimacy against the Houthi- suffering of the Islah party’s leaders Saleh coup by the end of March 2015. and members, who are often divided At the time, the Islah party rushed to into three groups: refugees in other issue a political statement in support of countries, or hostages with the Houthis, the Decisive Storm and the legitimacy, or displaced in liberated and safe areas, even if relatively.

10 First topic: The Emergence and Establishment:

All studies that dealt with the history the two views of the two sides (the of the Islah party almost agree that the Yemeni opposition and the Brotherhood Islah party is an extension of the Yemeni movement) to the fact that the first is renewal and reform movement that a religious reform movement and most emerged in the last three centuries and of its members and senior leaders like was led by a number of scholars, thinkers, the founder Hassan al-Banna and other and reformers, including Muhammad founders got their Islamic intellectual bin Ismail al-Amir (1688-1769), Saleh from the symbols of the Islamic thought, Mahdi al-Muqbili (1720-1788), and including Jamal al-Din al-Afghani Muhammad bin Ali Al Shawkani (1760- (1739-1897) and Muhammad Abdo 1834). (1849-1905). This rapprochement was Since the thirties of the twentieth later strengthened by several factors, century, a renewal movement with an including the Brotherhood’s support Islamic intellectual dimension began to for the Yemeni national movement crystallize within the Yemeni opposition through media coverage and political movement after some of its members support for the Yemeni constitution left Yemen to study in Egypt, where revolution in 1948 against Imam Yahya they met with several intellectuals and Hamid al-Din. This is what made some political currents, including members sources consider the Yemeni opposition of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement – especially in its early movement that was founded in 1928 beginnings - represents an intellectual by Hassan al-Banna. Some historical and organizational extension of the sources attribute the convergence of Muslim Brotherhood Movement.1

11 In the fifties of the 20th century, the the imamate rule in northern Yemen, and Yemeni opposition movement expanded, the revolution of October 1963 against especially in the Republic of Egypt, the British colony in southern Yemen, where the majority of the opposition several currents emerged in north and were placed, whether those who left south, while young people, who were Yemen to escape the oppression of Imam mostly neutral about the intellectual Ahmed Hamid al-Din, after the failure conflicts between the Nationalists, of the 1948 revolution, or those who Nasserits, Marxists and Baathists at went to study in Egyptian universities. the time, gathered under the banner of The revolution of July 23, 1952, led by the Islamic work. The beginning was Jamal Abdel Nasser, contributed to through Yemeni students in Egypt and strengthening that relationship between then the renewal of work in Yemen took the Egyptian government and the several forms. Yemeni opposition. Egypt showed its In Aden, the activities of the Islamic support for the opposition against the movement were manifested through British colonialism in southern Yemen the Islamic Center, founded by Sheikh and the imamate rule in the north. The Muhammad bin Salem al-Bayhani. opposition began to interact with the Young members of the center were Arab and international environment influenced by the ideas of the Islamic and it was influenced by different renewal leaders, including Omar Salem currents, parties and forces, as well as by Tarmom, the Center’s President, and thoughts that were widely spread at the Muhammad Ali al-Bar, the Center’s time. The Yemeni opposition established General Secretary. Some senior scholars relations with intellectual and political had close relations with youth of the currents like Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Movement, such as Sheikh Ali Arab nationalists, the Nasserites and the Bahamish. The youth also were able to Baathists. weave wide relations outside the Islamic After the Yemeni revolution in September Center, 1962 against

12 one of the most prominent figures of who were fighting against the revolution them was Brigadier General Hussein in favor of the remnants of the Imamate Othman Ashal, Commander of the rule, to give up and join the revolution. federal Army in southern Yemen.2 In the city of Taiz, the young Abdo In Sana’a, a group of people with Muhammad al-Mikhlafi, one of the most Islamic intellectual inclinations, led prominent founders of the Islamic move by Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Zubairi, in Yemen, began to gather a number of one of the most prominent historical young people, who formed the nucleus leaders of the Yemeni opposition of the Islamic work, and their work was and revolutionaries, had begun to closer to the activity of the Islamic Center communicate with members of tribes and in Aden, awareness and education. tribal leaders with the aim of coordinating Although the city was full of different positions to confront campaigns by currents, al-Mikhlafi, along with Saeed remnants of the imamate rule that were Farhan and Abdul-Salam Karman3, still fighting the revolutionaries and the succeeded in establishing a strong base republican system, and were misleading for the Yemeni Islamic Movement. their followers by using religion to arouse The Islamic movement suffered a heavy the religious sentiments of the Yemenis. loss following the assassination of Al- The campaigns by the Imamates were Zubairi in 1965, after which efforts based on accusing the revolutionaries of began to consolidate the Islamic work infidelity and working for the benefit of under one leadership in three work areas: the Jews and Christians. The religiously Sana'a, Aden and Taiz, and because of the conservative youth had an effective role characteristics and abilities that Abdo in the tribal community. They foiled the al-Mikhlafi enjoyed, he was chosen as campaigns of the revolution’s opponents. a public official until his death in 1969. Al-Zubeiry along with tribal leaders and His successor in the leadership of the intellectuals succeeded in convincing movement was Sheikh Abdul Majeed Al- sons of tribes, Zindani. Since 1979,

13 the leadership was transferred to one The movement allied with President of the most prominent founders of Saleh to confront his opponents in the the movement, Yassin Abdul Aziz al- nationalist and leftist currents. They Qabati, who remained in position until stood by him against the coup by the the announcement of the political Nasserite organization three months pluralism in 1990. In the late sixties and after he came to power. They also early seventies, the Islamic Movement allied with him against those who were witnessed notable expansion in northern working to bring down his regime with Yemen, while the Marxists in southern support from the ruling regime in Aden Yemen were able to tighten their control . On the ground, the alliance between on the power and practiced all forms of Saleh and the Islamists became more oppression and abuse against opposing evident at the beginning of the eighties currents and ideologies, especially the through armed confrontations against Islamic trend, which suspended its the National Front in the central regions, activities and many of its members fled which included elements of the left, and the country, or moved to the north, where politically through the establishment of they resumed their activities within the the General People's Congress, which framework of the Islamic Movement included various political currents, and there. had al-Methaq al-Watany (National It can be said that the decade of the Pact), which included Islamic texts. seventies witnessed the evolution of the In July 1988, the first parliamentary Islamic Movement and the expansion of elections were held. Most of the its members, especially in the education intellectual and political currents sector. The Association of Scholars, the participated, but in an undisclosed Guidance Office, and then the scientific manner, because partisan pluralism institutes became a platform for the was prohibited at the time. The Islamic Islamic Movement. When the era of Movement won a remarkable victory President Ali Abdullah Saleh began in represented in obtaining 36 seats out of July 1978, the Islamic Movement became the total of 128 seats nationwide. more present. 14 Upon the achievement of the Yemeni This team was represented by unity in 1990, and despite the presence Sheikh Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, of the Islamic Movement and its wide who seemed to be influenced by his expansion, the movement remained professor al-Zubairi in this aspect, mostly limited to the elite, for two and the other team predominantly reasons. The first is related to the nature focused on strengthening the internal of the stage as the multi-partisan was organizational work, represented by prohibited, and the second one is related Yassin Abdel Aziz and Omar Tarmoum to the work and polarization mechanism And Abdulmalik Mansour, Ali Hood of the movement. Despite the expansion Baabad and Muhammad Al-Yadoumi. of the movement, it witnessed The French researcher Francois Borgia disagreements among its leaders during distinguished between the two currents the sixties and seventies over its modus as a Wahhabi movement,4 led by Sheikh operandi. One team saw the importance Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, and a Muslim of maintaining the public action through Brotherhood movement, led by Abdo various means. Al-Mikhlafi and Omar Tarmom. 5 ,, After the achievement of the Yemeni Unity in 1990, the Islamic Movement emerged, but it was limited to the elites, and the Islah party believes that it presented its credentials to the people, not as an Islamic party, but as an extension of the Yemeni reform and renewal movement, led by clerics al- Shawkani, Ibn al-Amir al-Sana’ani, al- Bayhani, al-Hakimi and al-Zubairi. ,,

15 When the Islamic movement announced The definition: that it joined the political scene as a political party, under the name of (the Al-Islah defines itself as a political Yemeni Congregation for Reform), organization that adopts the Yemeni the polarization was not limited to people’s thoughts and values based on the movement’s cadres only, but it was the Islamic religion, and represents "the expanded to include tribal sheikhs, extension of the modern Yemeni reform religious scholars, academics, merchants movement, led by the Yemeni advocates and others. The leader of Hashid tribes of reform and renewal." Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar was Dr. Nageeb Ghanem, a leader in the elected as head of the Islah party, and party itself, believes that Islah presented leader of Bakil tribes Naji AbdulAziz its credentials to the Yemeni people not al-Shayef6 and Sheikh Awad Banjar, one as an Islamic party, of the religious scholars in Hadramout governorate, were elected as deputy head of the party. 7

16 but as an extension of the Yemeni it is worthwhile to look at the most renewal and reform movement that important intellectual streams that have Imam Al-Shawkani and the son of Al- contributed - in one way or another - to Amir Al-San`ani, Sheikh Muhammad the intellectual, cultural and educational bin Salem Al-Bayhani, Sheikh Abdullah formation of the Islamic Movement Al-Hakimi and Muhammad Mahmoud represented by the Islah party since 1990. Al-Zubairi8 drew its path way. He Depending on so far background, it is pointed out that the Islah party has clear that the founders of the movement attracted various segments and groups relied mainly on the intellectual heritage of the Yemeni society,9 and that it of Yemeni scholars and innovators, chose Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al- whose reform visions were based on the Ahmar as its president in appreciation Islamic ideology. This was evident in the for his historical role in supporting and first generation of the Yemeni national defending the Yemeni revolution, and movement that was crystallized in the for his social prestige. 10 thirties of the twentieth century and took Ideology and upon itself the task of confronting the Intellectual Tributaries: Imamate rule that was based on claims After a brief presentation of the of entitlement to power only because historical background that preceded the its rulers are descended from the noble announcement of the establishment of Prophet’s house, and they call themselves the Islah party, “Al al-Beit”.

17 Islah’s Relationship with Muslim Brotherhood: In a later stage, the Yemeni national It was mentioned so far that the Yemeni movement was affected by the intellectual Islamic movement, represented today by and ideological conflict on the Arab the Islah Party, came as an extension of the arena at the time. Some people were Yemeni reform and renewal movement, affected by ideas of symbols of the Islamic which was initiated by Yemeni scholars renewal movement, such as Jamal al- and thinkers, who contributed to the Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abdo, and enrichment of the reformist thought and Rashid Rida, so some of them, including religious renewal at the level of Yemen the founders of the Yemeni Islamic and the Arab region. movement, liked thoughts and writings In several statements, the Islah of the Muslim Brotherhood. It could party denied “any organizational or be considered the second intellectual political relations linking it to the tributary of the Islamic movement in international organization of the Yemen. Muslim Brotherhood,”12 stressing that The third tributary was the Salafi its “priorities as a political party are "Wahhabi" ideology. Many elements of national priorities.”13 In this context, the the Islamic movement headed to the party points out to its documents (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where they party’s statute, its political program and were enrolled in Saudi schools and its internal regulations), as references universities. They were influenced by that clarify the party’s identity and the growth of the Salafi discourse in the principles, and explain its ideas, visions, seventies. 11 perspectives and goals.

18 The Islah’s documents do not show any During the period of founding the link between the party and the Muslim contemporary Islamic trend, many of the Brotherhood. Rather, they define Islah founders - most of whom were students as “Yemeni reform movement that in Egypt, were influenced by the Muslim embodies the aspirations of the Yemeni Brotherhood Movement. people, and takes it upon itself to meet After the establishment of the Yemeni the demands of the people of freedom, Islamic Movement in the 1960s, students justice and consultation,” as stated in the returned from Cairo were the main Main Regulation. Regarding the party’s component within the movement, but political program, it is mentioned that they soon melted away within the social the party came "to be a living extension of and political balances. This strategic the modern Yemeni reform movement, strength of the Islah Party has become and a framework that includes all those more linked to the Yemeni people, the seeking to reform the reality and change same social structure and the same it for the better." political role. 14 According to some researchers in the According to some researchers, the ideology of the Islamic movement field, relationship between the Yemeni the Muslim Brotherhood movement Islamic movement and the Muslim was established as an extension of the Brotherhood is a voluntary coordination religious reform movement, led by Jamal and cooperation, similar to the case of al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Brotherhood organization in Sudan. Abdo, and an extension of the Yemeni The Islamic movement in Yemen entered School of Reform and Renewal, its in reconciliation with its geography, most prominent founders are Imam and it did not retreat or abandon its al-Shawkani and the Ibn al-Amir al- affiliation to the nation. Sana`ani.

19 It is the product of its society with the Islamic reference is an extension its culture, identity, traditions, of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology. transgressions, delinquencies and But it includes other groups of society, civilization.15 making it closer to a political coalition Some people believe that the Islah party than to an organized party. 16 which adopts

20 The Second Topic: Moving from Mobilization to Partisan and Political Work

After the establishment of the unity and the conflict between the two forces the declaration of political pluralism, allowed other political forces to play Yemen entered into the transitional more effective and important roles by phase set by the agreement on unity in making use of the resources controlled two years and a half, after which general by one of the parties.18 Of course, the parliamentary elections were held, tools and means that the GPC possessed so the Islah found itself in the face of were closer to the Islah party. accelerating events at the political and Early after the announcement of economic levels internally and externally, Yemeni unity, the Islah party fought especially since it has become the largest its first political, media and public opposition party17 against the two ruling battles in the "referendum on the parties (the General People's Congress constitution of the unity state" in May and the Yemeni Socialist Party). 1991, where it announced its rejection That period (1990-1993) - according of the constitution in that formula, and to Yemeni researchers and politicians demanded amendments to a number of - was characterized as the best period articles the party considered a violation of democracy and political openness. to the principles and rulings of the Although the two ruling parties did not Islamic religion. Among those articles allow citizens and other political forces was the third article, which recognizes to have their own media outlets, the Islamic law as the main source of legislation,

21 while Islah wanted to be “the Islamic law And its possession of a widespread is the source of all legislations. In return, educational organization, and the the two ruling parties confronted Islah social and cultural services it provided, 20 with a wide media campaign accusing it according to others But it was suffering of standing against the Yemeni unity. from a problem resulting from the mixing During the conflict over the constitution, of the political struggle with the fighting the Islah’s disagreements with President for the sake of religion and defending 21 Saleh appeared publicly for the first time it, according to Mohamed al-Sabri, a after coordination and understanding leader in the Nasserite organization. between the two parties continued to The term Jihad was prevalent in the prevail for a long period. eighties and nineties due to what was Although the media conflict between the known then as the "Afghan Jihad" against Socialist Party and Islah was more intense the Soviet Union - the main supporter of due to the ideological struggle between the idea of socialism - in Afghanistan. them, each party found an opportunity When some Yemenis, who participated through the issue of the constitution to in the fighting against the Soviets, present itself to the people and attack its returned home in the early 1990s, they opponents. found that the Soviet ally, the "Socialist The Islah party succeeded in gaining a Party", was a partner in power, and then wide audience during (1990-1993) for some of them were used by opponents several reasons: the strength of the media of the socialism, on top of them was Ali discourse and its political positions Abdullah Saleh and his regime, so the according to some researchers. 19 conflict between the two ruling parties was exacerbated.

22 Hence, the religious dimension seemed The crisis broke out shortly after to be more present in the Islah’s discourse achieving the unity, and resulted in and methods, which often included the return of about a million Yemeni speeches, lectures, celebrations and expatriates from Saudi Arabia and other public conferences, including a massive Gulf states. This situation had negative rally in the capital Sana'a in mid-May repercussions to the government and 1991, and its success in late 1992 in increased the state of discontent with its organizing a wide public meeting called performance. “Conference for Unity and Peace.” The lack of trust between the two ruling Islah was able to draw the attention of the partners, as each of them was seeking Yemeni street in various governorates, to monopolize power and marginalize and its "role was increasingly important the other, the wave of assassinations as the main opposition party against and bombings that targeted members of the ruling alliance that shares power,"22 the Socialist Party, and the occurrence according to (Michael Hudson),23 in of riots in northern cities only, not in addition to its presence outside the circle the south, has intensified the conflict of the ruling authority, which made it safe between the GPC and the Socialist Party from waves of discontent in the Yemeni in favor of the Islah Party. street, because of deterioration in the At the organizational level, the documents economic and living conditionsespecially of the First General Conference for Islah during the Gulf crisis that broke out due state that the party leadership tried to to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (August quickly accomplish preparations for 1990). holding the conference

23 "to approve the system and programs on which is the highest leadership which the Islah is based, and elect its component in the party’s hierarchy that leading bodies to launch the process of emerged from the “Supreme Preparatory work according to stable and organized Committee.” The party’s branches in 24 rules. districts and governorates were managed However, when the leadership began its by preparatory committees that are like work, it found itself obliged to direct the executive offices. The character of the efforts of the party and its capabilities to Islah party was not clearly crystalized confront the successive and accelerating during the transitional period, even 25 events and crises "that have followed though the party had a parliamentary the establishment of the party. The caucus in the House of Representatives, events and crises at the time prevented the Parliament that was formed after the party from holding the conference. the unity and included the People's The first conference for the party was Council in southern Yemen, and the in September 1994, four years after its Shura Council in the north. It has been foundation. indicated so far that the Islamic trend - Therefore, Islah’s leadership continued the core of the Islah party - won more to manage its organizational and than 30 seats in the Shura Council political activities through the “Supreme elections in 1988. Commission”,

24 The Third Topic: Islah … Issues and Positions:

The Republican System in the Face of Dynastic Thought: The Islah party considers “working the national values established by the to achieve the goals of the Yemeni revolution and the republican system. revolution and preserving the republican On contrary, the arguments between the 26 system” at the forefront of its goals, parties opened the way for the Imami because the revolution that ended the ideological and political current to imamate tyranny in northern Yemen return to the forefront and try a new and the foreign presence in its south round. The Yemeni parties and the represented - in Islah’s opinion - “a cultural, political and social elites wake victory for the values of liberation and up after the Houthi group, the armed emancipation from sectarian shackles, wing of the Imamate, tightened their 27 the Imami dynasty." That was the most control over the capital, Sana’a, and prominent feature of the Imamate rule other governorates. against which the Yemeni revolution in In June 2020, the Islah Party issued a strong the 1960s was launched. statement against the Houthi group,29 While Islah affirms that it “fought which some politicians considered a the battle to liberate the popular "historical statement", because it "came consciousness from the sediments of the more powerful and clear, and attacked - past and the ideas of dynastic tyranny, for the first time - Yahya bin Al-Hussein, 28 extremism and superstition,” the founder of the Imamate, the Zaydi State, party’s performance towards the Imami and demanded the criminalization thought in the past period was not of all forms of racism and everything without criticism, as it failed - like other that conflicts with the values of justice, political parties - to promote equality and citizenship." 30

25 The most prominent point in the Islah’s and every idea contradicts with these statement - according to Yemeni writer values will be confronted with firm, and researcher Thabet al-Ahmadi – decisive and uncompromising stance."32 was that it emphasized the major and The Islahi leader concludes that the fundamental strategic importance of popular echo of the Islah’s statement the republican system, and the collective against the dynasty came as a natural Yemeni identity with its long-standing expression of the harmony between Islah cultural and civilizational heritage.31 and the values for which the people is The statement that carried an intellectual striving, and the congruence between the and political conflict between Islah and positions of the party and the aspirations the Imami thought, which is represented of the Yemeni people.33 in the current situation by the Houthi group. The Islah’s statement did not discuss the points of political controversy Shura and Democracy: and the military conflict, but rather The Islah Party devoted an item in its targeted the intellectual foundations political program about the foundations and historical roots on which the Imami and principles of Shura and democracy, movement was based, and this is why the considering that “the ideal embodiment statement was praised by many people of the concepts of Shura in our current outside the party. era requires the adoption of the best All other statements by Islahi officials, that human societies have reached in in this context, confirmed that the their democratic practices, in terms party’s position in the statement was of forms, rules and procedural and not new, because the roots of the party - technical methods to organize the according to the deputy head of its media extraction of consensus and improve the department - “are pure republican, and exercise of power, and ensuring peaceful the republic, democracy, popular will exchange of power, expanding the circle and political pluralism firmly represent of popular participation, and activating foundational values in the reference of the supervision." 34 the Islah organization, 26 On the other hand, some observers Since announcing its foundation in 1990, believe that the Islah includes anti- Islah’s rhetoric has emphasized “the democratic elements. The writer and continuation in deepening the Shura politician Abdel Bari Taher says: “Islah as and democracy, and the acceptance of bases and an organization has a popular the election results in order to enrich the extension so there is no doubt that it has experience.” 35 a real interest in democracy. Many of In all of its literature, Islah confirms its bases are concerned with democracy. its commitment to consultation and However, Islah has dual elements, as it democracy, the acceptance of other is with and against democracy at the opinion, and commitment to the opinion same time. Its rhetoric is double and of the majority, but on the ground ambiguous."38 it appears to be relatively different, The Islah Party - like other Yemeni parties according to the time, place, and - is struggling for a comprehensive leadership positions. Shura is apparent transition to democratic practice and in super leadership position, and it is its full implementation, whether at gradually weakening in grassroots. 36 the country level in general or within While some observers consider Islah as a the party’s framework due to factors conservative party, in the Western sense related to the general conditions and of the word, they see it as a contributor to circumstances, and the political and the democratic experience in the country military conflicts and successive crises through its support for the democratic that the country has lived and still system. This support practically stopped live. Some opponents of Islah see that argument over the religious legitimacy democracy, which it advocates, is not among a wide range of audience. They very different from what is prevalent in think that the Islah party mixed a the Arab region. 39 religious statement with a largely public, free and open one. 37

27 Nevertheless, observers note that and its chronic implementation peaceful struggle has become the Islah’s mechanisms and accept partnership and strategy that integrates with political political settlement through choosing partnership. It has also become a culture a consensual president for Yemen, and for its members and cadres, and a method a government of national accord to for demanding rights and freedoms. 40 conduct the transitional period. 42 Islah believes that the scourges resulting Violence and Terror: from extremism, such as terrorism, The Islah Party stresses on building violence, exclusion, oppression, a member’s personality on “dialogue bypassing laws, the spread of corruption, and moderation in speech and action, favoritism and others, will be rooted out and opposing all forms of extremism only through the culture of dialogue, and terrorism, whatever its source and accepting other opinions, defending its color”.41 Therefore, the Islah Party rights and adopting the peaceful, - and its partners in the Joint Meeting democratic and civil political action by Parties - pursued a peaceful struggle all parties, in power and opposition, as a rejecting all forms of violence, and the principle for resolving disputes.43 Yemeni peaceful revolution in 2011 was There is no doubt that the ruling regimes an evidence of the dynamics of Islah in the Arab region, including the regime and its partners in the path of peaceful of former President Ali Saleh, took struggle. They adopted the peaceful advantage of the war on terror after option and rejected all forms of violence the events of September 11, 2001, and and militarization in their revolution, worked to strengthen the security grip which made the Islah Party and its allies and distribute accusations to the political sign the Gulf initiative actors and influencers in the opposition.

28 So accusations began to find their way affirming the firm position of Islah “in against the Islamic-oriented Islah party, defending the right of every citizen which became the largest opposition to express and reject any terrorism or party, while Islah preferred the peaceful treason.” 44 political action along with its partners Islah considered that "the issue of in the Joint Meeting Parties. The Islah terrorism can no longer be used for broad activity and its active presence blackmail or for killing the society's in civil society made the ruling party's dreams of moving towards fair and propaganda and accusations lose their rational governance," calling on the credibility. Yemeni authority to benefit from efforts According to some researchers, terrorism of other countries that claim partnership accusation, after the events of September in combating this human scourge, and 11th , was a prominent feature of the from the relationship of governments political conflict, especially against the in other countries with opposition, but opposition, represented by Islah, the even with efforts by the West to reach most important force of the opposition a common understanding of the reasons on the scene. So the Islah decided to behind the imbalances between East and confront such accusations with more West. 45 "patriotic actions and political openness" In its third general conference (2002), and exerted more efforts to advise and Islah renewed its rejection of terrorism evaluate the political experience in the in all its forms and manifestations from country whose sons must defend the any party and under any name, freedom of each other, regardless their different visions or positions,

29 and affirmed its rejection of “the use in the period prior to the attacks of violence in political action, and of September 11, 2001, and the US denounced all sabotage operations that invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and harm the public security and tranquility, the subsequent approach of combating and affect the innocent." 46 terrorism and draining its resources, and The Islah party announced early its the growing call for political reforms in position rejecting assassinations, the Arab region. 48 kidnappings, bombings and armed It is noted that accusing opponents of clashes, and considered them to be terrorism is not limited to one party. inconsistent with "the values, history Like Ali Abdullah Saleh, who accused his and ancient traditions of Yemeni society, opponents of terrorism, the Houthi group which require everyone's cooperation to also launched its propaganda against the get rid of them." 47 Islah Party and the government, which It is clear that in many of its statements, includes a political spectrum. The group Islah still expresses its rejection of launched its war under the slogan of violence, extremism and terrorism. fighting terrorism, Takfiris, al-Qaeda However, observers of the Yemeni political and Daesh (ISIS). During the war, new affairs see the party’s rhetoric toward opponents of Islah appeared and used democracy and against extremism as a the same accusation of terror against the sign of the extent to which the political party that confronts non-stop attempts developments in the region affected the of eradication. political forces, especially

30 Under penalty of indictment Sheikh Mohamed al-Moayad (1948- some observers saw that Islah’s position 2017), one of the prominent leaders in towards the issue was weak. But the the Islah party, was the first to be charged Islahi leader Hamoud al-Tharehi, who with "terrorism" by the Americans, after was the head of the National Authority he was arrested by German intelligence for Defending Sheikh Al-Moayad (non- at Frankfurt Airport in 2003. He was governmental), denied that and said in transferred to the United States at the one of his press interviews, “Islah wanted end of the same year amid Yemeni calls not to be alone in defending Sheikh Al- for his release. He was convicted by a Moayad, because he is a Yemeni citizen, US federal court with "supporting the the responsibility to defend him and Palestinian Hamas movement and Al- follow up on his case is the responsibility Qaeda organization". He remained of the government and the President of in US prisons until a US Court of the Republic.” 49 Appeals overturned his conviction in In May 2017, the US Treasury 2008, revoking the first ruling. He was Department issued a statement in which sentenced to time served and deported it included the Islahi leader Khaled Al- to Yemen in 2009. Arada (from Marib governorate), on In its statements and calls for the release a list of penalties for alleged links to of Sheikh Al-Moayad, the Islah party terrorist groups. The accusation that the was keen to ward off the accusation of Islah party denounced in a statement: terrorism, praising al-Moayad for his “The US administration receives false charitable and humanitarian work, information from entities targeting and supporting and caring of orphans. national figures known in the circles However, of Yemeni society for their moderate ideology.” 50

31 At the end of 2016, the US Treasury to which he belongs.” 51 Observers Department had included the Islahi believe that there was a weakness shown leader Al-Hassan Abkar in the same by Islah in defending its affiliates, who list. He is a well-known leader in Al- are accused of terrorism. They saw that Jawf (northeast of Yemen), where he the Islah leadership was satisfied with was leading a popular resistance against issuing statements, and demanding the the Houthis, who have been fighting a presidency and government “to take a continuous war since 2011 to control the clear position on these decisions that governorate that locates on the southern affect Yemeni citizens, who stood by border with Saudi Arabia. the legitimacy and sacrificed their lives The Islah Party condemned the US for the sake of defending the right of decision at the time, and considered it Yemenis to build a state that can protect "clear evidence of targeting national them and meet their aspirations for figures with moderate ideology, without freedom, dignity, equality and a decent relying on any tangible evidence," life.” 52 adding in a statement: "Al-Hassan is the Sheikh Al-Moayad was supported by a earliest national figure who believes in wide popular interaction and evident coexistence and peaceful political work continuous follow-up of his case since as a way to reach power. Yemenis knew his arrest in Germany until his transfer him as an inclusive social figure, who to the United States, through his trial and spent his life reforming and resolving discharge, and ending with his reception armed tribal conflicts and revenge by thousands of citizens, who celebrated phenomenon that spreads in the tribal his return after spending years in US areas, including Al-Jawf, prisons.

32 But the matter seemed to be different by the Islah’s support for President Hadi's regarding the two Islahi leaders Al- legitimacy are involved in misleading Hassan Abkar and Khaled Al-Arada, the Americans with false information who are far from physical targeting by about them to achieve their own goals the Americans. They are also known for through incriminating their opponents their social presence in their areas of a with terrorism, the accusation which the cohesive tribal structure (Al-Jawf and Iranian-backed Houthi group and the Marib), and they enjoy a prominent UAE-backed Transitional Council have social and political position, and each been using against opponents of the one of them maintains a large record Houthi coup in the north in September of fighting against the Houthi group. 21, 2014, and the Transitional Council’s This makes it likely that the Houthis and declaration of “self-administration” in regional parties affected the south in April 2020.

33 in the dialogue agreed on the importance The Southern Issue: of the southern issue, and the urgent The southern issue witnessed a need to resolve it. noticeable escalation in the political This is what we observe in the Islah’s and media aspects after the launch stance towards the southern issue, which of the Southern Movement in 2007 began timidly in the closing statement of through the associations of the forcibly its first general conference in September retired military personnel as one of 1994, almost two months after the consequences of the 1994 war, which led end of the war, when it called on the to the exclusion of southerners affiliated government, in which the party had with the Socialist party that lost the nearly a third of the ministerial seats, war. While the authority kept ignoring to "address the effects of war, remove its the protests in the south, the political remnants, and reconstruct the affected parties did not expect that protests areas.” 53 would proceed to reach a far extent In its Fourth General Conference, after a few years, especially after the the Islah devoted a special part of the popular revolution in 2011. Although conference to address the southern issue. the opposition parties did not comply “The conference called for stopping the with the demands of the leaders of the dangerous conditions in the southern movement regarding the secession of governorates and their catastrophic the south from the north, the southern consequences, mainly those resulted issue was their priority in the National from the policy of exclusion against Dialogue Conference. All parties and political partners and the absence of political components participating equal citizenship.”

34 The Islah accused the authority of and the solid foundation on which the turning its back to the foundations of pillars of the modern civil state will be political pluralism and the national built. 56 partnership upon which the Yemeni The vision stated that "the first step begins unity was based. It insisted on dealing with confidence-building measures and with the post-war situations and creating the appropriate atmosphere in challenges transcendently.54It called on preparation for resolving the southern the Yemeni society, with all its political issue fairly and comprehensively to and social powers and components, and preserve the entity of the state, and civil organizations to bear their national restore the peaceful contents of the unity responsibilities and find serious solutions of May 1990, and to put the south in and remedies, using the southern issue its natural national equation, as a true as an entry point for comprehensive partner in power and wealth. " political and national reform. 55 With the Islah’s stress on the need to With regard to the Islah’s vision to end the security imbalances occurring solve the southern issue, it included in some southern governorates, and to it in the documents it had submitted quickly address the absence and lack to the National Dialogue Conference of public services. It called for "the (March 2013 - January 2014) as all provision of all necessary resources for other participating political forces the judicial committee formed by the did. The Islah’s vision emphasized that presidency to handle the issues of retirees “the southern issue is at the top of the and lands, obliging the government national issues presented to the agenda to implement its decisions and return of the dialogue conference, suggesting the properties that were confiscated, that solving the southern issue will whether those belong to individuals, or constitute the correct entry point for parties, or trade unions or the state with comprehensive national reform, fair compensations for the last period."

35 It also stressed on "dealing with because Islah was partner of the regime of the conditions of civil and military Ali Saleh under the slogan of defending employees, the people displaced aboard, the Yemeni unity and confronting those forcibly arrested and transferred secession. At the present time, the to retirement, and returning them to extremists in the Southern Movement their work and paying their legal dues. - particularly the Transitional Council Treating and settling the conditions of faction, supported by the United Arab deportees and missing civilians due to Emirates, do not hide their hostility various political conflicts in the southern against the Islah Party for two main arena and settling the pensions of those reasons. The first is related to their who were not included in the inventory preconceptions about Islah as a strong of the deportees." 57 and coherent political organization that The Islah’s position towards the southern stands against the secession project, issue remains tainted with ambiguity supports the federal state project, led and suspicions that arise around it from by President Hadi. The second reason is some factions of the southern movement related to Abu Dhabi's position against calling for secession, the Islamic political currents, including the Islah party.

36 Women Issue: Despite the importance of the role that was characterized with vitality, especially women play in the Yemeni political life in the latest parliamentary elections within the political parties or outside in 2003. The percentage of women them, many obstacles still stand in participated in the elections was 42% of the way of women, and prevent their the total number of voters, but only 11 participation as required. The women women ran for office, and only one won, participation is different from one party because of the gap between advanced to another and from one governorate to the legislation and the society's negative another. perception towards women.58 However, In the Yemeni tribal community, women the injustice that women suffer is not are seen in the second order after men, related to legal texts, but rather to the as women in many Yemeni regions are economic, social and cultural conditions deprived from their right of education, of the Yemeni society. 59 especially secondary and university The presence of women in the Islah education, not to mention women’s party noticeable began marginally participation in elections, but political and then grew up. The second session competition between influential parties of the Fourth General Conference of - in the forefront of which is the Islah Islah witnessed a wide debate between Party, that is influential in many tribal members and leaders of the party on areas and rural areas, had a major role in the issue of women. After discussions engaging women in the elections, mostly that consumed a lot of time and effort, as voters, not as candidates. the conferees approved with majority to Women's political participation in expand the scope of women's work in Yemen the party,

37 transforming women’s office in the party which represents the party's parliament. to a circle60 According to supporters of Before receiving the Nobel Prize, Karman this change, the amendment aims "to was one of the most prominent human develop Islah’s structures and regulations, rights activists in Yemen for defending and to improve and strengthen work in human rights in various activities the women's sector." 61 and events, particularly the rights of However, the status of women within journalists and freedom of opinion and the Islah party is still lower than the expression, through Women Journalists desirable level, because of the fact that Without Chains organization, which "the prevailing heritage in the region is she founded in 2005. The organization still at a late stage, and this leads to the actively monitors the reality of the Yemeni lack of full integration of women, and press and violations against media. After that the party is not able to amend this the Arab Coalition started its operations legacy." 62 in Yemen, Karman continued to criticize During the past period, the Islah’s women the coalition’s war in Yemen. Karman's members have emerged in the political relationship with the leadership of her activities, media outlets and civil society party, which supports the coalition, organizations, including the human worsened and the party issued a decision rights activist Tawakkol Abdul Salam to freeze her membership in the party Karman, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for her continuous criticism of the Arab in 2011, and she is a member of the Islah coalition that supports the Yemeni Shura Council, legitimacy.

38 Tribal Community: Some observers see the diversity of the The presence of tribal and social leaders Islah party as a weakness, while it is and symbols in the leadership ranks - from the point of view of others - a of the Islah party had pushed a lot of reflection of Yemeni society, because members of tribes to join the party, the presence of tribal figures, various either through disciplined membership religious currents such as the Muslim or through establishing some kind of Brotherhood, Salafism, Sufism and understanding and coordination in Zaydism, in addition to youth, students some situations. and women, from across the country, Regarding the party’s association with within the party preserved this party society, Muhammad Qahtan, one of the to be the son of its environment, rather reform leaders, says: “The announcement than an elite, factional or ideological of the establishment of the Yemeni movement. 63 Congregation for Reform was a sincere As a popular party – not an elitist party- expression and a natural extension of the Islah party was able to deepen its the modern Yemeni reform movement, presence in the tribal society, which as it came as a natural response to the remained almost closed to political Yemeni society’s intellectual values. That parties, especially those with external was a big push in the path of the political, ideology and strict organizational social and cultural development of the restrictions. Yemeni society. 64

39 The Palestinian Issue: The Palestinian issue is at the forefront of the concerns of the Yemeni Islah ,, party. The party summarizes its Islah considers position towards the Palestinian issue by “supporting the Palestinian people that achieving until they obtain their right to self- the goals of the determination and the establishment Yemeni revolution of their independent state,” according to the political program of the party. and preserving the Many members and leaders of the party republican system participated in several events in support is at the forefront of the Palestinian people. President of the party, Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein of other goals it al-Ahmar, was known for his stances seeks to achieve in support of the Palestinians, and he in its political presided over many committees and bodies - Yemeni and Arab - in support program. It calls of the Palestinian cause. for supporting the It is noted that the position of Islah Palestinian people towards the Palestinian issue came mostly in harmony with the official and until they attain popular position in Yemen in support their rights to self- of Palestine. The Yemeni political forces determination and are unanimous in this position "towards establishing their the Palestinian cause and supporting the Palestinian people until they achieve independent state. all their legitimate rights and establish ,, their independent state on the entire Palestinian national soil." 65 40 and called "all countries of the world,

In its first public conference in 1994, to exert pressure on the Zionist the Islah’s statement said, "The progress government to stop aggressive practices." that the Zionist entity is achieving at 68 the expense of the legitimate rights of When the second Palestinian uprising the Palestinian people and the Arab and (Al-Aqsa Intifada) erupted in the Islamic nation is due to the deteriorating year 2000, the Islah party praised “the state of the nation,"66 calling on "the uprising against the Zionist occupation, leaders of Arab and Islamic countries the jihad of the Palestinian people, their to correct the course and reconsider sacrifices and their steadfastness,”69 and all issues, on all political, cultural and praised the “cohesion of the Palestinian economic levels, and adopting new people and all its factions and political methods in dealing with the Zionist forces on the basis of national unity in enemy, which guarantee the restoration the face of the aggressive Zionist attacks of legitimate rights to their owners and and attempts to desecrate the Islamic deter the aggressors. " 67 sanctities." 70 After nearly two years, Islah denounced In its latest conference, Islah praised "the the Israeli "settlement and aggressive steadfastness of the Palestinian people policies," and called "all countries of in Gaza and other resistance forces in the world, led by the United States of the face of the brutal aggression by the America and European countries, Zionist entity."71

41 The most important and the Islah affiliates believe that determinants of the Islah’s normalization makes Arabs "give up position towards the everything in exchange for engaging in a Palestinian issue can be new Middle East to be established on the concluded as follows: ruins of Arabs as a nation and an entity 1. Emphasis on the Palestinian-Arab that it is able to determine its fate and right to restore the occupied lands, address its own issues." the right of return for Palestinian Although the party’s stance was refugees, and the right of the consistently beside the official position of Palestinian people to face the Israeli the Yemeni government and the popular occupation until they liberate their stance towards the Palestinian cause, this land. 72 did not push Islah as a political party 2. The necessity of "dialogue between to conclude agreements, partnerships, the Palestinian factions to restore or even relations, far from the Yemeni unity and cohesion of the Palestinian government, with any of the Palestinian people, as that will enable them to factions, including Hamas, as a resistance resist occupation." movement. It let the decision-makers in 3. Rejecting normalization with Israel, the official bodies lead the Yemeni public considering it a "historical crime opinion towards the Palestinian issue, against the peoples".73 The Arabs provide official aid to the Palestinian who normalized relations with Israel people and its leadership, and supervise did not get any benefit that serves the popular humanitarian efforts in support Palestinian issue, of the Palestinian issue.

42 The Fourth Topic: Prominent Stations in the reform process

The Islah gave up the second position First: Participation in it got in the new government for the Power Socialist Party" in favor of the national In the parliamentary elections in April interest and to show goodwill towards 1993, the Islah party came in the second its partner, the Socialist Party." 77 place as it won 63 seats, 21% of the total The results of the 1993 elections ended number of, after the General People’s the two-parties system that lasted during Congress, which won 123 seats, 40%, the transitional period for several and then the Socialist Party, which reasons: The first one is the presence of won 56 seats, 18%.75 The result is that a new partner in power, the Islah party. the three parties agreed to enter into a The second one is the modest result of tripartite alliance, which includes the the Socialist Party in the elections. And formation of an alliance government and the third reason is the General People's parliamentary coordination between the Congress’s control of nearly half of the three parliamentary blocs. parliament. The Islah party’s concession The Islah party believed that its allowed the Socialist Party to retain participation in power - at the time - a reasonable share of power beyond "came as a natural result and an objective its representation in the Parliament. necessity, after it ran, with honor However, the elections were one of the and integrity, the first parliamentary axes of the new conflict that led to the elections after the establishment of the 1993 political crisis and then the 1994 Republic of Yemen." 76 war.

43 When the Socialist feared that the GPC, May through July of the same year. The with support from the Islah party, would Socialist Party lost the war and left reduce its influence and power under the power. After the war, a bilateral alliance name of the legitimacy of the elections, was formed between the GPC and the so it bullied with the legitimacy of unity Islah party. and its agreement against the bullying The Islah party saw "the nature with the parliamentary majority. The two of its relations with the General sides continued to bet on what they were People's Congress and their common relying on in their confrontations, and denominators that bind them together each party worked to exclude the other. as an incentive to enter the bilateral But the Islah party's support for the alliance, and it was expected that the General People's Congress Party made alliance would have success factors that their voice greater than the Socialist would enable it to seriously address all Party, so the latter began to ally with imbalances."78 Hence, its participation in small parties. the government, "despite the qualitative Despite this, the relationship between imbalance in the distribution of the Islah and the Socialist witnessed portfolios, as it bears the responsibility a significant improvement after the of the service ministries that were formation of the alliance government, suffering from stifling problems that put and after several meetings between them on the verge of collapse."79 As for the leaderships of the two parties. The the legislative and constitutional level, experience of alliance did not continue, the Islah achieved a legislative victory and it was quickly hindered by the represented in amending the Article political crisis that ravaged the country (III) of the Constitution. It stipulates for eight months during the period of that the Islamic law is the only source August 1993 - April 1994, and then the of all legislations, after it was previously outbreak of war, “the main source.” 80

44 Disagreements quickly erupted between noting that the most prominent the two partners of the Yemeni unity developments occurred after the 1994 war, agreement, the GPC and the Socialist under the regime of Ali Saleh, included Party, to disrupt the mechanism of the campaigns of repression, increase of alliance between them. The new bilateral corruption, narrowing the democratic alliance (the GPC and Islah) soon began margin, mounting the tendency of to face an obstacle that blocked its way. looting and plundering, and more The GPC adopted a policy of getting insecurity and administrative chaos. The rid of Islah’s participation, and began repression and marginalization targeted fighting the Islah-affiliated ministers even the regime's partners in the war, 81 by reducing their powers.” This was southern leaders and the Islah party, confirmed by the Yemeni politicians which suffered a lot of defamation and outside the Islah party, harassment. 82

45 Second: Leaving the (the Islah Party and the parties of power, Launching the the Supreme Council of Opposition) «Joint Meeting» and signed an executive program for “the Peaceful Struggle Joint Meeting” to ensure free and fair elections.83The meeting was the first The differences between the two partners nucleus of the formation of the Joint in the ruling alliance widened day after Meeting Parties’ bloc that was announced day, and President Saleh's meetings with later. the leadership of Islah were no longer The parliamentary elections were held able to address and contain them, so the and the GPC won 187 seats, while the Islah began its first move towards the Islah party won 64 seats. Although the main opposition parties affiliated with Islah party saw that the result “does not the (Supreme Coordination Council for reflect the real weights of the political Opposition Parties), namely the Socialist forces in the arena, as it was just a result Party, the Nasserite Organization and the of illegal arrangements and procedures Baath Party, in addition to the Al-Haq for which the state’s mechanisms were Party and the Popular Forces Union. frantically used,”84 it made Islah breathe The meeting that took place in late a sigh of relief by announcing that they August 1996 discussed preparations for would leave the ruling alliance and join parliamentary elections (April 1997) in the ranks of opposition. 85 light of accusation against the Congress The Islah's meetings with other Party of managing the electoral process opposition parties continued under the in a single way that excludes the other banner of the Joint Meeting, and since parties and depriving them from their 2001 the political conflict between the right to participate. At the time, the two GPC and the Islah Party has reached at parties a difficult stage,

46 and Islah strengthened its presence received generous support from the within the Joint Meeting Bloc, and it has Saleh’s regime, which included regular become the largest party in the Yemeni and seasonal financial resources, political scene during the last decade of projects, and overlooking their illegal President Saleh’s reign, in the period of control over branches of ministries 2001 and 2011. and government institutions in Sa’ada For its part, Saleh began to take new governorate, which led to their ability measures to fight the Islah Party as a to set up their own institutions, expand punishment for its withdrawal from the their control, attract members and alliance with his regime and engaging in supporters, arm their elements and wage an alliance with the opposition. Saleh war against Saleh’s regime later. 86 canceled the scientific institutes system The Islah believed that “the democratic in which the Islah’s members constitute margin is being narrowed day after day a large proportion as administrators, through targeting and weakening the teachers and students. The regime also unions. The ruling party tried to control began to encourage Islamic groups unions, organizations and associations, opposed to the Islah party, such as and to abort any independent trade Salafis, Sufis and others, and provided union action. The regime also cloned them with various aspects of support in some political parties. The press was order to crack down the Islah party. The harassed by the government, and this organization of “Believing Youth”, based aroused internal and external public in Sa’ada and affiliated with the Zaydi opinion. 87 Shiite,

47 In light of the general conditions in from the methods of the forces that seek the country, the position of Islah in the change . At the time, some observers opposition began to change according attributed the Islah’s stance to its desire to the change in its vision. Islah had to return to the power. Therefore, they been drawing up its own position in the saw that “Islah’s desire to return to opposition since it left power in 1997. power weakened its performance in the It began to meet with the opposition opposition.” 89 parties within the framework of the Joint This continued for a period of time, Meeting, but it re-allied with President during which the situation worsened Saleh and supported his candidacy in and the relationship between Islah and the 1999 presidential elections, but that its allies in the Joint Meeting Parties was was the last connection point between strengthened, especially between the two Islah and Saleh. Immediately after the major parties, the Islah party and the local elections and the referendum on Socialist Party. Observers considered the constitution were held in 2001, Islah "their acceptance to meet, engage in took a position opposing the ruling dialogue and build an alliance after the party, but its position was not integrated war, was a very important issue.” 90 with other opposition parties. During time, the Islah was satisfied The Islah’s position was a controversy that “the ruling regime is leading the and raised questions. It was sometimes country to abyss,”91 after it managed accused of putting one leg in power to win in the electoral rounds - the and another one in the opposition. The local elections in 2001 and 2006, the Islahis attribute this to the fact that parliamentary elections in 2003, and their party has been influencing “the the presidential elections in 2006, so it approach of reform - not change - and controlled everything, so the opposition what the reform jurisprudence requires parties (the Joint Meeting) could not in dealing with issues,”88 in a manner do anything in favor of democracy and that differs political pluralism.92

48 At the same time, the vision of Islah began by the Carnegie Middle East Center- to move towards change after attempts that the legislative priorities for the to reform the system failed. The Islah’s Islah have changed. It was seeking positions were consistent with the rest constitutional amendments in favor of of the Joint Meeting parties, especially more equitable distribution of power, since “the political space within the reforms in electoral laws, political rights Islah party has widened at the expense laws, and improving the Parliament’s of the religious space,” according to some controlling over the government researchers.93 Other researchers see social and economic policies, reducing that “Islah integrated a religious speech corruption. Moreover, the Islah sought, with a widely open political one.”94 The to a lesser extent, to add the religious political researcher Amr Hamzawy notes legislations to the list. 95 - in a study issued

49 Third: The Yemeni and to justify his rejection of reforms Popular Revolution 2011 and the need for economic restrictions because the country lives in war. The Yemeni popular revolution erupted The government was incredibly weak in in February 2011 for major factors: terms of inefficiency. The bureaucracy The first was the political deadlock and collapsed, and the government was accusations by the opposition parties unable to manage the country, in against Saleh of breaking all agreements addition to the deterioration of the that resulted from dialogue between currency and most food subsidies were the authority and the opposition (2007- lifted. Demonstrations continued in the 2011), the last one of which was the main cities, and repression was rampant February agreement 2009 to carry out in light of Ali Saleh’s plans to inherit the parliamentary elections but the power to his eldest son, Ahmed, who was Parliament’s term was extended until appointed as commander of the Yemeni today - and the July 2010 agreement, elite forces in 1999. which refers to a government of national The Third Factor: the wave of the Arab unity. Spring that launched from Tunisia and The Second Factor: the economic and Egypt and overthrew the two regimes. societal blockage, as the government The Islamists had an influential role imposed economic restrictions on the in the Arab Spring. A revolution was middle class, and the political conflict looming against the Saleh’s regime, so intensified when Saleh completely the Arab Spring came to crystallize a seized the power and the three state’s Yemeni revolution in the same direction institutions. Then wide discontent raged, that the Tunisian and Egyptian Spring and Saleh used the six wars against had set. the Houthis as a cover to confront the The Yemeni popular revolution began in political opposition that became stronger February 2011.

50 It was linked to two main factors, the and the material capabilities, expertise wave of the Arab Spring that launched and experiences it has in the field work from Tunisia and Egypt and overthrew and media activity. the two regimes, and the deterioration The Islah and its allies in the Joint of economy and living conditions and Meeting took the lead and active services, the expansion of wars and force in the revolution, preserving its armed confrontations. In addition, the peacefulness and sparing Yemen from ruling party’s solo management of the civil wars and other dangers. They also political process that reached a dead end. approved the Gulf initiative and its Although the protests began chronic implementation mechanisms, spontaneously, away from the opposition and accepted partnership and political parties (the Joint Meeting), the members settlement in choosing a consensual of these parties, including Islah, joined president for Yemen and a government the revolution since its inception, and of national accord to run the transitional then the Joint Meeting parties declared phase."96 However, the opponents of their support for the revolution. The Islah - some of them affiliated with the Islah’s presence was strong in all squares revolution - accused it of controlling of the revolution in the capital, Sana’a, the revolution's squares by forming and other governorates, because of its organizational and security committees large base of fans, from people most of them belong to Islah.97 51 104

Two years before the end of the transitional in which all national forces participated period, the counter-revolutionary forces as the best way to build the new Yemeni in more than one country began plans state and challenge the counter- to bring down the revolutions and the revolution plots.99 According to the governments that resulted from them. Gulf initiative, the ruling GPC had half Internal and external forces allied to of seats in the new government and the confront the popular revolutions in the other half was distributed among the Arab Spring countries, including Yemen. parties of the Joint Meeting and its allies. These forces succeeded in achieving their The Islah received four ministries, goals in Egypt in mid-2013. including Interior, Justice, Planning The Islah Party had absorbed the danger and Education. Therefore, the Islah of being alone in governance and was not alone in bearing responsibility administration, no matter how strong and confronting what the counter- its popular base was. It realized that revolutionary forces were planning, the rise of the Islamic movement to the especially since the remnants of forefront of the revolutionary political the former regime had reorganized scene, as one of the results of the Arab themselves in new locations, betting Spring revolutions, does not necessarily on stirring up disputes and rivalries mean that the Islamists took a popular between the forces of the revolution, and mandate to decide the fate of these creating cracks in the revolution’s wall." revolutions and lead the people alone.98 Some revolutionary forces realized the The course of events demonstrated danger, including the Islah party. So the without any doubt the impossibility most important challenge facing the of managing a popular revolution by revolutionary forces was their ability a single political party or a particular to set aside their ideological affiliations current. Therefore, Islah adhered to the while they were moving towards the political settlement building of the new state. 100

52 104

Fourth: Houthi Coup and War As soon as the term of the new president In addition to the Houthi group, former AbdRabbo Mansour Hadi started in President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his 2012, several obstacles appeared. Some supporters in the GPC and in the state’s of them were related to the crises and institutions did not hide their desire to problems that the country was going thwart the government and obstruct the through in terms of mismanagement political process as the best way for them and the failure of previous governments to return to power. So the two parties to secure basic needs and public services, (Houthi and Saleh) began to coordinate and other obstacles were related to their efforts, despite six rounds of war practices by some parties that exerted between them, 2004 through 2009. It efforts to thwart the new government seemed that they overlooked all of that and obstruct the political transition in order to align the present moment, as process and its theoretical framework a necessity in order to get rid of common (the Gulf Initiative). At the forefront opponents, especially the Islah Party, of those parties was the armed Houthi which is the number one opponent for group that has Zaydi sectarian roots. It the two sides. is based in Sa’ada in northern Yemen. The Islah was the most prominent The leader of the group, Abdul-Malik political opposition force within the Al-Houthi, who took over the leadership framework of the Joint Meeting Parties, of the group after death of the group’s and it was also the most important founder Hussein Badraddin al-Houthi in political and social force that participated armed confrontations with government in the revolution against Saleh and used forces in early September 2004. all their capabilities to bring him down.

53 104

Differences between the Houthi group preventing Yemeni youth and the and the Islah party appeared since the political Islam movement (the Islah first days of the revolution, as they party) in particular from taking power.103 have different ideologies and different Although the Houthi group has focused projects. The Houthi movement, which on targeting the Islahis and their allies calls itself the (Ansarullah), 101 is based in all areas they control or seek to on the Zaydi Shiite reference, and control, the Islah Party has chosen not the Islah party is based on the Sunni to be alone in taking the decision of reference, it stands on the opposite line confrontations. It has been keen to to the Houthis ideologically, doctrinally deal with the Houthis hostilities within and politically, in addition to the desire the framework of the general political of each party to lead the political scene. system that includes all parties or within While Islah emerged to lead the forces the framework of the official government of the revolution, the Houthi movement approach, considering the Houthis an has sought, since the signing of the outlaw armed movement. However, this Gulf Initiative, to lead the political did not happen, as the political forces opposition. 102 were divided over the Houthi expansion, In 2013 and 2014, the Houthi movement and the state was weak and unable to seized villages, districts, and governorates take a position towards the risks of the one after another, with direct support Houthi expansion at the expense of the from the former president Ali Saleh, state, its institutions and its powers, with and the pillars of his party, and the the exception of some military units that traditional tribal clans in order to abort continued to defend themselves against the Yemeni revolution and destroy the Houthi hostility from time to time. entire political process,

54 104

In September 2014, the Houthis seized (the Peace and Partnership Agreement). the capital, Sana’a, and quickly stormed The Islah party said that it “signed the the institutions of the Islah party and agreement despite all its disadvantages, its allies and supporters, especially the injecting the blood of Yemenis, party’s headquarters and media outlets strengthening the culture of dialogue that support it. This was not surprising, and framing the foundations of civil as the Houthi media - throughout the work.” 104 previous period - threatened the Islah The Houthis blew up everything that was party, and its allies, including the army agreed upon, and later besieged President and security officers, tribal sheikhs, Hadi and placed him under house arrest activists, media professionals and others. in January 2015, two days after the After the Houthis invaded the capital, kidnapping of his office manager, and the political components - including the then forced the government, which was Houthi group - signed a new agreement formed according to their wish,

,, In September 2014, the Houthis seized the capital, Sana’a, and quickly stormed the institutions of the Islah party and its allies and supporters, prompting Islah to declare its support for the “Decisive Storm” to restore the legitimate authority, represented by President Hadi, and ending the coup. ,,

55 104

to resign as they placed prime minister and from there to the Kingdom of Saudi and most of ministers under house Arabia, which announced on March arrest. 26, 2015, on the eve of the Houthi In February of the same year, the Houthis seizure of parts of the city of Aden, the saw that their chance to formally seize military intervention in Yemen, and the power had become favorable, after the formation of an Arab military coalition President of the Republic submitted his that included about ten Arab countries, resignation, and so did the government. to support the legitimate president, They announced the “Constitutional Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and to Declaration” through which they counter the Houthi coup supported by formed the “Supreme Revolutionary Iran. The Saudi-led coalition launched Committee” to run the country, led by the “Decisive Storm”, and then the Mohamed Ali Al-Houthi, the cousin “Operation Restoring Hope”. of the group›s leader, Abdul-Malik Al- The Islah Party announced its support Houthi. for the “Decisive Storm”, with the aim Secretly, President Hadi left his house in of restoring the legitimate authority, the capital, Sana›a, to the city of Aden represented by President Hadi. The party to announce the resumption of his work, said - in a statement issued by its General while the Houthis - and their ally, former Secretariat - that "the intransigence President Saleh - began preparing to of the Houthis and their coup against pursue President Hadi to Aden and dialogue, imposing house arrest on complete their control over the rest the elected legitimate president and of the governorates in the center and members of the government, disrupting south of the country. When their forces official state institutions and invading reached Aden, President Hadi headed the regions, prompted President Hadi to east towards the Sultanate of Oman, seek support and assistance." 105

56 104

The result was that the Houthi group ,, One day after Islah announced the dissolution of the Islah announced support Party, and began a campaign of abuse for the “Decisive against the party’s leaders, members, Storm,” the Houthi headquarters and infrastructure. The group kidnapped 122 campaign included murder, kidnapping, party leaders, and disappearance and storming houses and signs of war on Islah institutions in Sana’a and other areas of appeared after the the Houthi control. 106 liberation of Aden. The According to a statistic issued by a assassinations targeted Yemeni non-governmental human rights about 30 preachers, center, the Houthi group kidnapped some of them affiliated 122 leaders and members of the Islah with Islah, kidnapped other leaders and party in the capital, Sana’a, one day after burned the party’s announcing support for the Decisive headquarters, and Storm, and 17 houses of Islah leaders excluded affiliates with and activists were stormed, and nine of Islah from all important the party's headquarters • were subjected administrative to widespread looting, according to the positions in the Center's report. 107 state’s institutions While the state of weakness and and replaced them fragmentation continued to dominate the with Salafi and other state and the parties,a societal rejection followers of the and resistance movement emerged in separatist movement various regions and governorates, affiliated with the UAE ,,

57 104

especially after the Arab Coalition by the Arab Coalition warplanes. The announced military intervention in Islah party lost many of its leaders in Yemen to support legitimacy and the war against the Houthis, whether confront the Houthi coup. The Islah’s by torturing in prisons and detention leaders and members fully supported centers, or in the battlefields, or in the popular resistance in many regions. bombing by the Houthis, which affected Islahi prominent leaders led several institutions, buildings and homes fronts of confrontations against the located in residential neighborhoods Houthis, so Houthis were very anger in several cities and villages. In al-Jawf with Islah’s members in the areas under governorate - north of Yemen on the their control. They launched a campaign border with Saudi Arabia - more than of detention against them and put some half of members of the executive office of Islahi activists in weapons depots that of the Islah party were killed during were targeted confrontations with the Houthis.

58 104 The Fifth Topic: Islah at Times of War

The Islah party is currently experiencing was political and media in the period extremely complex conditions. Although 2011-2014. While the second wave came its members and leaders are in the roughly with the claws of military force battlefields to restore the state from and armed militia. This wave is still the Iran-supported Houthis, it suffers going on, as members of Islah believe. from another war, different from the They believe that the first wave sought to general war in the country. The party demonize Islah and hold it responsible members believe that a war against it is for what the situation has turned into waged by the United Arab Emirates, and after the revolution, as well as attempts by all local forces that receive Emirati to isolate it politically and socially. funds and support, including political While the second wave seeks to liquidate organizations and armed formations, Islah’s presence by discrediting it and some of which follow the (functional) eliminating its elements. religious Salafi trend, and some of them Many parties participate in the political are regional factions. and media campaign against the Islah Some observers believe that the Islahis are Party, whether leaders affiliated with paying a heavy price in the war launched the GPC, or with some small parties. by the Houthis, who announced from But they do not link their position with the beginning that they are targeting the Emirati agenda, but rather they Islah, its members and its allies. Indeed, sometimes accuse Islah of controlling the their goals coincided with what some legitimate government, and sometimes followers of former president sought in accuse it of following the agendas of the fight against Islah. The first wave of Qatar and Turkey. war against Islah

59 104

Adel Al-Shuja, a leader in the GPC, The head of the Islah Party, Muhammad revealed at the beginning of this year al-Yadoumi, denies accusations directed that the Emirati support for a Yemeni against his party, and classifications alliance, which includes leaders in the that take it out of context, stressing that GPC and others in the Transitional Islah is part of the Yemeni structure and Council, aims to "bring down the Islah shares its destiny with the Gulf and Arab party." 108 nations. He says that any classification The brave leader, who is considered one of Islah, by false media outlets, will not of the most prominent GPC’s leaders deter Islah from its exclusive battle to criticizing the Islah party, considered the resist the coup and restore the state." 110 two parties campaign against Islah as a The Islah’s Vision “shock”. From his point of view “the two towards War with parties do not only share punishment Houthis: against Islah, but they help the Houthis The Islah party considers war as a to confiscate the republic forever. They "contradiction to politics", and holds did not take lessons from the past, when the Houthis responsible for it as they Al-Houthi was able to swallow them all ignited it and rebelled against the state." because of their differences.” 109 It sees that the best way to put an end to So he calls on the GPC and the Islah the conflict is to tackle its reasons. It sees party to overcome their differences and that the Houthis must “give up the tools to stand beside the homeland, not to be of war by canceling the coup, handing dragged by the tools of regional conflict over the state's weapons, withdrawing at the expense of the "national cause". from cities, and stopping attacks on neighbor countries." 111

60 104

This is also the content of the But Islah can build a relationship with government's vision, and the Security the Houthis, if they decide to “transform Council’s resolutions, particularly into a political entity that works in resolution (2216), issued in April 2015. accordance with the Yemeni constitution This indicates that Islah’s position goes and law, owe allegiance to the Yemeni in line with the official position that the state, and to be affiliated with the dialogue with the Houthis must be based country’s geography and citizenship, not on the national references, including the with the cross-border sect or illusions Gulf initiative, the results of the National of the Iranian revolution." 113 Dialogue Conference and the UNSC’s resolutions related to Yemen. War against Islah: When Islah stresses on obligating While the Islahis were participating the Houthis to "handover the state's along with the rest of the political and weapons," it seeks to "secure the future social forces and independents in the of Yemenis and protect them from wars, battles to liberate the provinces from the because there are many experiences in Houthis, there was a party in the Arab Yemen that prove that the failure to solve Coalition, the United Arab Emirates, the arms problem keeps the political preparing to launch a new war against process under threat, as happened in Islah. The United Arab Emirates is the the National Dialogue Conference." most influential party in the coalition When the Houthis participated in the after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. dialogue, and the weapons were still in The coalition and the local forces their hands, and the result was placing supporting the legitimacy almost politics hostage to the militants. 112 succeeded in liberating some governorates Accordingly, the Islah party determined in mid-2015, including Aden, Lahj and its position against the Houthi group Abyan, until signs of war against Islah coup. began to appear in those areas.

61 104

Among these signs was the exclusion of liberated areas through closing its of Islah’s affiliates from all important headquarters and targeting its leaders administrative positions in the state and activists with assassinations and institutions, and replacing them with kidnappings.”114 He considers that as elements loyal to the UAE, which “heavy price that the Islahis pay in managed, within a short period of time, return for their rejection to agree with to absorb thousands of the followers of projects that seek to drag the country the Salafi religious trend and supporters into small conflicts that distract everyone of the Southern Movement, who from confronting the Houthis, obstruct demand secession from the north. It the state-building efforts, and bring established military formations outside society into a state of internal wars.” 115 the government’s army. It provided them Assassinations targeted almost 30 Imams with arms and funds, so they have become and preachers in Aden, including Islah predominantly the de facto authority in and moderate Salafis who participated in Aden and neighboring governorates. the war to liberate Aden from the Houthis. Mohammed al-Yadoumi, head of the Storming and burning targeted a number Islah party, says that his party “faces a of Islah’s headquarters. The security forces campaign of liquidation in a number raided homes of leaders and activists, and arrested dozens of them.

62 104

All coincided with media campaigns by and regional powers, because they Emirati and other local media outlets. decided in advance to stand against it or The campaigns focus on attacking Islah because they have their own reasons. and accusing its members of terrorism, The media campaigns waged by Islah’s or coordination with the Houthis. opponents are still continuing, accusing In October 2018, BuzzFeed News it of dealing with the Houthis, either published an investigative report with complicity or coordination and confirming that the UAE had hired agreement with them at the expense of former soldiers in the US Army, the legitimate government and the Arab currently working for a private security coalition. It is an accusation that did not company called the "Spear Operation" base on any evidence or proof, especially group, have been recruited by the UAE. since the accusation was issued by internal The report included a video record for and external parties that supported the the company’s founder, Abraham Golan, Houthis with the aim of aborting the Israeli nationality, confessing that they Yemeni revolution and destroying the carried out assassinations in Yemen entire political process, and preventing in favor of the UAE. The website also Yemeni youth and the political Islam broadcast videos documenting one of movement(the Islah party)in particular the operations carried out by foreigners, from gaining power116 when they attacked Islah’s headquarters The UAE and its loyalists are working to in Aden in late December 2015. remove the Islah party from the scene. The Islah’s intellectual and political Reuters quoted a Yemeni official in elements and its support for legitimacy, August 2019 as saying that the separatists in addition to its popular presence and ’control of Aden had been approved by active participation, make it a target of the UAE, and that its goal was to drive accusations from the local the Islah party forces away, 117

63 104

because they see that the problem have also appeared in the last two years lies in the fact that "Islah infiltrated (2019 and 2020), which are attributed by or controlled the government,"118 as observers to the feeling of many of the they announce from time to time, that party’s youth of political and military the failure to complete the liberation failures as a result of the delay in the of regions" is mainly due to the Islah process of resolving against the Houthis. party."119 All this raises concerns among the The most prominent obstacles facing followers of Islah that this will lead to Islah are now evident, including the the eradication of the party or at least media campaigns that demonize it (in weaken it, especially after the war stops, the media), exert pressure on it and and Islah finds itself at the forefront blackmail it (politically), leading to its of losing powers, but the leadership of exclusion, marginalization, liquidation Islah shows a measure of cohesion and of its elements, and assassination of its confidence, and the deputy media officer leaders and symbols. In addition to the of the party affirms that "the status of fact that Islah is in a state of paralysis Islah after the war, and far from fears, because it is busy with military action, is determined by the popular will, the and the completion of the liberation of weight of the party, its presence, its field the provinces from Houthi control, at activities and its effectiveness. These the expense of the party's intellectual elements determine the status of any agenda, political actions, and its social, party or political organization." 120 economic and cultural roles. Some internal imbalances

64 104

Islah and Regional and as Islah realizes the depth of fateful International Tensions: intertwining between Saudi Arabia and When the Gulf crisis erupted in 2017, Yemen, two states that cannot ignore the 122 the Yemeni government announced that depth of overlap between them. it stood on the side of the Kingdom of Between the media campaigns accusing Saudi Arabia at the expense of the State Islah of working with new opponents of Qatar. Accordingly, Islah declared of Saudi Arabia, or the so-called Qatar- its commitment to the Yemeni official Turkey axis, and the voices of Islah- position, lining up alongside Riyadh. affiliated activists and media figures The Islah’s statements flowed in the criticizing the Saudi-led Arab Coalition same direction, expressing the depth and the leadership of the party as well, the leadership of Islah always confirms of relationship with Saudi Arabia. The that its relationship with Saudi Arabia Islah’s position was not surprising, as it is undoubtedly stable and no deviation has consistently affirmed the strategic from it. The Islah underestimates the relationship with Saudi Arabia, as impact of both cases (accusations by Yemen’s relationship with Saudi Arabia its opponents and criticisms by its is in general a “deep-rooted historical supporters) on its cohesion. relationship.” 121 According to the deputy head of the Islah Media Office, the party “looks at its relationship with Saudi Arabia from the point of common interests of the two countries, so it adheres to its relationship with Saudi Arabia, and it is keen to give it the value of strategic stability from this standpoint,

65 104

It considers accusations by its opponents in the Arab peninsula and the Gulf, and as "bunk”,123 as the party leader says, or then with Arab and Islamic atmosphere, "propaganda for a fabricated case, which and with the international community, does include malicious desires attributed the Republic of Iran, which supports to a kind of political jealousy by those the Houthis, represents a rare case who have been deprived from the gift of dominated by isolation. Islah believes complete alignment with the people, and that "relationship with Iran is determined been exposed to clear divisions, while the by Iran's relationship with the state of Islah party remained intact." 124 Yemen," and that "if it stops interference As for criticism by some of its elements, in Yemen’s affairs, revises its aggressive the Islah’s leadership sees they do not go policy against Arab countries, first and beyond the fact that they are just "individual foremost Yemen, and begins to establish positions” and “personal opinions” that political relations that respect the national “have no weight or influence within sovereignty and avoid interlocking with the Islah bodies and decision-making internal groups trespassing the state, circles inside it, and do not constitute then Islah’s relationship with it will be divisive features in the organization, and harmonious with its relationship with do not affect its cohesion."125 While the the Yemeni state, according to legal Islah literature confirms its keenness to regulations that regulate relationship strengthen its foreign relations with its between national parties and any country regional neighborhood in the world.” 126 66 104 ,, The Conclusion: The Yemeni Islah Party Challenges to Islah faces at the present time - as well as in the The Yemeni Islah Party is facing and near future - several expected to face several challenges, the challenges, the most most prominent of which is that it is prominent of which targeted by two armed parties, the first the two armed parties, of which is the Houthi group, which is the first of which is the fighting its war against the legitimate Houthi group, which government, and the second is the UAE is fighting its war and its armed formations in southern against the legitimate Yemen, led by the Southern Transitional government and Islah, Council. and the second is the Although the UAE and Islah stand UAE and its armed together in the face of the Houthi group, formations in southern the Houthis see the Islah party as a key Yemen. component on fronts against them. Abu ,, Dhabi, which has undertaken the task Islah is also facing the desire of some of confronting the Arab Spring and local forces and parties, who believe its components, especially the Islamic that their future will be better if Islah is trend, places Islah at the top of the list of removed and forced to leave the scene. political forces to be liquidated. Some forces build their hostility against The Islah party is also facing attempts Islah on previous enmities, or motivated to remove it from the political scene in by searching for special interests, when various ways and forms, with support they present themselves as an alternative from regional powers, most notably the to Islah and demand its shares and UAE. privileges.

67 104

The Islah party depends upon legitimacy or Islah came to a closed road to just in fighting against the country’s division, avoid any future strikes against the to defend itself from strikes by local and party and against the remnants of the regional opponents, but the legitimacy legitimacy. bets on the continued support from the On the internal and organizational level, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the leader Islah suffers from war consequences of the Arab coalition. However, the and a status of division in its structure Riyadh’s support is currently ambiguous, due to the dispersal of its members at especially after the rebellion of the home and abroad, and because many of Southern Transitional Council in the them were killed on fronts against the southern liberated areas and the control Houthis or assassinated and attacked by of Abu Dhabi on the Socotra Island, and certain forces in some liberated areas, in its promises about an Israeli presence on addition to the detainees and kidnapped. the island that overlooks Bab al-Mandab. This was a big cost for the Islah party, so This means that Islah should quickly its leadership should work hard to swiftly review and evaluate its relationship reorganize its ranks and fill the gaps that with Saudi Arabia, whether it is a real are widening from time to time. partnership through the legitimacy, ,, Islah has suffered from consequences of the ongoing war and a vacuum in its structure as a result of the dispersal of its members and the loss of many of them, whether on the battle fronts against the Houthis or intentionally targeted in some liberated areas, in addition to detained and kidnapped members of Islah. The Islah should pave the way for a wider participation of women and youth within the leadership of the party. ,,

68 104

Regarding the intellectual and cultural the national identity, the Yemeni state aspects, the Islah party is facing the and the national project confronting the problem of moving from one side of the scourges of intolerance and racism in all duality (group / party) and to the duality its forms. (the nation / the country), because The Islah Party must make more political transformations have brought widely space for the participation of about a qualitative development in the women to play their role and assume Islah discourse, as the party integrated their responsibilities, giving them its religious discourse into a public the opportunity to assume leadership one. The political space is gaining more positions and tasks commensurate with prominence in the Islah discourse. The their competence and experience. The Islah party must translate this in its same thing must be done for the youth, intellectual approach, and the cultural as the Islah leadership must make a structure of its members, especially change that empower women and youth since Islah, in its statement against the within the leadership of the party in Houthi’s action to gain money through line with the size of the party and the what is known as al-Khumus (the fifth) active presence of its women and youth revealed a positive development towards members in the society.

69 104

Scenarios for the Future of Islah:

The conflicting countries in Yemen The First Scenario: the will seek to attract some components disintegration of the party of the party and form currents loyal to This scenario is difficult to be achieved them, but the most dangerous point is because it assumes a great victory for Iran the party’s members, who are involved in Yemen, and the occurrence of a Saudi- in the fighting within the legitimate backed division in the country. A split government and resistance forces, may within the Islah party may happen only if turn into an armed trend that is not the Iranian-backed Houthis managed to subject to a political leadership. control the north, and the UAE-backed Transitional Council control the south, The Second Scenario: flexibility and if Saudi Arabia accepts to deal with of the party that allows some the reality of division and support it currents opposing the political in exchange for ending its support for leadership›s decisions regarding legitimacy. war alliances to leave the party If all these factors occur, they will be a and form new currents, with justification for the party’s disintegration the possibility of organizational and its leaders abroad should move to coordination between the establish a new political current, while political leadership of the party the tribal current and the religious and the leaderships of the new trend in the party, in particular the Islah members who are in areas subject currents. This scenario is weak, even if it is to the Houthi group or the Transitional possible, especially after the decisions to Council, each one will announce its own freeze some leaders in the party, such as political current that is compatible with Tawakkol Karman, this stage.

70 104 and the expectation of a bang within the The Third Scenario: The party party as a result of pressures of the war and reviews its performance and the Islah’s stalemate against strikes by its evaluates the previous phase opponents and allies. The advantage of such a decision is that it reduces pressure to build a new strategy based on the party by local and regional allies on balance in internal and because of opinions of some members of external alliances, in addition Islah about the failure of the legitimacy to finding new local, regional and the Arab Coalition to achieve and international friends and the announced goals of the “Decisive allies, and maintaining good Storm,” the restoring of the state and relations with former national ending the Houthi coup. What makes and regional allies to create this scenario weak is the extent to which balances. the party’s leadership is able to control This scenario is likely to happen, but the the course of its internal affairs because party needs to hold a general conference such a situation requires relatively through which fundamental changes political stability, strong leadership, and should be made in the party’s structure at high coordination between the party’s the leadership level or bylaws level. One components. However, these factors of its benefits will be the rejuvenation are not usually available during wars, of the party and updating its political because the sensitivity of the situation thought to be fit with a national identity, on the ground does not allow the party independent from transnational ideas. to divide, because this will negatively The party should pay attention to affect it in the post-war phase, as the building a national belief that considers party will seek to return to the political the imamate as the first enemy of the work, strong and unified. Yemeni people.

71 104

But the war remains a potential obstacle such as the media, politics and to holding the party’s conference and international relations files, as well as making broad changes, in addition to the some organizational files that are highly local and regional Islah’s partners, who related to the party’s youth members, may consider any openness of the party who are involved in the popular to new partners at home and abroad as resistance areas under the control of an action against them. the Yemeni government, or files related to the intellectual interest of the party’s The Fourth Scenario: The party’s youth in areas under the control of the current internal situation Houthis in the north or the Southern remains and the party keeps Transitional Council in the south. the same internal and external alliances with some reforms. This scenario seems to be the strongest for Islah, maintaining the local alliances linked to legitimacy and political parties, and those related to Saudi Arabia, the leader of the Arab Coalition, along with some reforms in relationships. The party leadership may push some of its youth members to take part in holding some files, especially those related to the party’s international reputation,

72 104

References:

1-Nasser Al-Taweel, The Islamic Movement and the Political System in Yemen from Alliance to Rivalry, 1st Edition (Sana'a: Khalid bin Al-Walid Library 2009), p. 51. 2-Same reference, P. 60. 3-The father of Yemeni activist Tawakkol Karman, winner of the 2011 Nobel Prize 4-Wahhabism: a Sunni Islamic movement that was established in the Najd region in the middle of the Arabian Peninsula in the late eighteenth century AD by Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abd al- Wahhab. 5-Fuad Al-Salahi and others, The Yemeni Revolution, Background and Prospects, 1st Edition, (Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2012), p. 172. 6-The Hashid and Bakil tribes are the largest of the Yemeni tribes, and "Sheikh Al-Ahmar" was the leader of the Hashid tribes, to which former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh belongs, and he remained the head of the High Authority for Islah until his death in December 2007. 7-Documents of the First General Conference of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform - First Session, September 1994. 8-Nagib Ghanem, The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, Stands for Sacrifices, 2020 (without publication data), p.6. 9-Same reference, p. 7. 10-Same reference, p.6. 11-Seen: Abdul Qawi Hassan, The Islamic Movement in Yemen (A Study in Thought and Practice), The Yemeni Reform Group, as an example, The Arab Future magazine published by the Center for Arab Unity Studies (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies), p. 47. 12-The Islah party's statement on its 26th anniversary, published on Al-Masdar Online, September 2016, (seen on September 6, 2020) at the link: https://almasdaronline.com/article/84536. 13-Adnan Al-Odaini, deputy head of the media department of the Islah party, in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, published in London, published in issue (151961), on: July 6, 2020. 14-An interview with Abdo Muhammad Salem - member of the political department of the Islah party

73 104

15-Abdul Qawi Hassan, The Islamic Movement in Yemen, previous reference, p.52. 16-A report on the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, published on the "Al-Jazeera Net" website, December 2014, viewed on August 31, 2020 at the link: https://cutt.us/BHb3k 17-Jihad Abdulrahman Ahmed Saleh, Yemeni opposition parties and their role in political and democratic development, (London: East Future Center for Studies 2016), p.6. 18-Abdullah Al-Faqih, Political Development in the Republic of Yemen (1990-2009), published in "Dr. Abdullah Al-Faqih's Blog", March / March 2009, (viewed on September 1, 2020) at the link: http://dralfaqih.blogspot.com/2009/ 03 / 1990-2009.html. 19-Abdul Qawi Hassan, The Islamic Movement in Yemen, Previous Reference, pg. 45. 20-Adel Jarallah Moazab and Omar Saif Radman, Islamists in Yemen, issued by the Strategic Fikr Center for Studies - (Istanbul: 2014), p. 4. 21-Abdul Qawi Hassan, The Islamic Movement in Yemen, Previous Reference, pg. 45. 22-Michael Hudson, Bilateral Attraction, Logical Thinking, and the War in Yemen, in: Jamal Al- Suwaidi and others, The Yemen War 1994, Causes and Consequences, (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1995), p. 32. 23-Dr. Michael Hudson is a former director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. From 2010 to 2014, he was the first director of the Middle East Institute, and a professor of political science at the National University of Singapore. He also held the position of Visiting Professor of the Kuwait Foundation at the Belfer Center›s Middle East Initiative at Harvard University in the spring semester of 2015. 24-Documents of the First General Conference of the Yemeni Assembly for Reform, previous reference. 25-Same reference 26-Islah’s Political System Document, Chapter Four: The Goals, p. 5. 27-The statement of the Islah party’s president on the 28th anniversary of its founding, published on the Islah website (seen on September 1, 2020), at the link: http://alislah-ye.net/news_details. php?lang=arabic&sid=1865. 28-Same reference 29-The Reform Party announces its official position on the Houthi (five) law, published on the Ma›rib Press website, in June 2020, (seen on September 5, 2020) at the link: https://marebpress.net/ news_details.php?lang=arabic&sid=164464. 30-A report entitled “Politicians, Journalists and Writers Describing the“ Statement of the Islah Party as historic ”, published on the Sahwa Net, June 2020, (viewed on September 2, 2020) at the link: https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-40179. 74 104

31-Same reference 32-Interview conducted by the researcher with Adnan Al-Odaini, deputy head of the Islah media department, in August 2020. 33-Same reference 34-Abdul Qawi Hassan, The Islamic Movement in Yemen, Previous Reference, pg. 53. 35-Hassan Mansour, Al-Islah in the Face of Violence and Despotism, A Study in Islah’s Documents and Literature 1990-2007, (without publication data), p. 2. 36-Abdul Qawi Hassan, The Islamic Movement in Yemen, Previous Reference, pg. 49. 37-See: Fuad Al-Salahi and others, previous reference, p. 180. 38-Abdul Karim Salam, a report on the third general conference of the Islah party, published on "swissinfo", (viewed on August 27, 2020) at the link: https://cutt.us/e4mxd. 39-Fuad Al-Salahi and others, previous reference, p. 190. 40-Adel Jarallah Moazab and Omar Saif Radman, Islamists in Yemen, previous reference, page 5 41-From the final statement of the second session of the Local Islah Shura Authority in Aden Governorate, January 2004, quoted from: Hassan Mansour, Islah in the face of violence and tyranny, previous reference, p. 19. 42-Adel Jarallah and Omar Seif, Islamists in Yemen, previous reference, p. 6. 43-Hassan Mansour, Reform in the Face of Violence and Tyranny, previous reference, p. 19. 44-Ahmed Muhammad Abdul-Ghani, The Yemeni Congregation for Reform ... History and Positions, a study published on Marib Press, March 2009, (viewed on August 26, 2020) at https:// marebpress.net/articles.php?id=4991. 45-Same reference 46-Hassan Mansour, Islah in the Face of Violence and Tyranny, previous reference, p.20. 47-Same reference, p. 33. 48-Abdul Karim Salam, previous reference. 49-Hammoud Hashem Al-Dharhi in a press interview with the Emirati newspaper Al-Khaleej, conducted by the journalist Sadiq, and published in October 2005. 50-A statement issued by the Yemeni Congregation for Islah - Marib Governorate Branch, May 2017. 51-Islah Condemns the US Treasury's Inclusion of "Abkar" and Al-Ahdal in the List of Those Included with Punishment for Allegations of Their Relationships with Terrorist Groups. https:// alsahwa-yemen.net/p-1151

75 104

52-Same reference 53-The closing statement of the first general conference of the Yemeni assembly for reform - the first session, September 1994. 54-The closing statement of the Fourth General Conference of the Yemeni Gathering for Reform, Second Session, March 2009. 55-Same reference 56-Islah’s vision for the southern issue "Solutions and Guarantees", published on the party's official website, "Islah Net," (viewed on August 28, 2020) at http://alislah-ye.net/lib_details.php?id =16, and on the website of the National Dialogue Conference on the Internet, (viewed August 28, 2020) at http://ndc.ye/ar-issue.aspx?show=1. 57-Same reference 58-See: Ziyad Majed and others, Democratic Development in Yemen, a report issued by the International IDEA and the Arab Non-Governmental Organizations Network (ANND), 2005, p.9. 59-Same reference, P. 29. 60-Abbas Al-Nahari, Women's Department in the General Secretariat for Islah and its executive offices, Sharia-rootedness, issued by Islah, 2009, p.6. 61-Same reference, P. 12. 62-An interview conducted by the Abaad Center with Abdo Muhammad Salem - member of the political department of the Islah party, in 2013, previous reference. 63-Interview with Abdo Muhammad Salem, a former source. 64-From a study by a member of the Islah Commission, Muhammad Qahtan, within the studies published in the book The Islah March, issued by the Yemeni Center for Strategic Studies, September 2012. 65-Yemeni parties condemn normalization with Israel, a statement posted on the "Islah Net" website, August 2020, (Viewed September 1, 2020) at the link: http://alislah-ye.net/news_details. php?lng=arabic&sid=6657. 66-The closing statement of the first general conference of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform - the first session, previous reference. 67-Same reference 68-Statement of the Second Session of the First General Conference, September 1996. 69-Final Statement of the Second General Conference of Islah - Second Session, November 2000. 70-Same reference

76 104

71-Final Statement of the Fourth Conference - Second Session, March 2009. 72-Same reference 73-Islah Party: Normalization with Israel is a “historic crime” against the peoples, statements by Adnan Al-Odaini, Vice President of the Media Department of the Islah Party, published on the “Yemen Shabab Net” website, commenting on the UAE's declaration of normalization with Israel, August 2020, (seen On September 1, 2020) in the link: https://www.yemen-shabab.com/news/58792. 74-Same reference 75-Ziad Majed and others, Democratic Development in Yemen, Previous Reference, pg. 63. 76-Documents of the First General Conference of the Reform Party, previous reference. 77-Same reference 78-Documents of the Second General Conference on Reform - First Period, October 1998. 79-Same reference. 80-Seen: Amr Hamzawy, Between the Government and the Opposition: The Model of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2009), p. 22. 81-Memoirs of Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, 2nd Edition (Sana'a: Horizons for Printing and Publishing, 2008), p.307. 82-Fuad Al-Salahi and others, The Yemeni Revolution in Back and Prospects, Previous Reference, pg. 207. 83-Jihad Abdul-Rahman, Yemeni opposition parties ..., previous reference, page 14. 84-Documents of the Second General Conference of Reform, previous reference. 85-Memoirs of Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar, previous reference, p. 294. 86-See: Nasser Al-Tawil, the Islamic Movement and the Political System in Yemen, Previous Reference, pg. 151. 87-Documents of the Second General Conference of the Yemeni Assembly for Islah - Second Session, November 2000. 88-From the responses of the former Secretary-General of Islah, Muhammad Abdullah al-Yadoumi - the current president of the party, to journalists ’questions at a press conference held by Islah on the sidelines of its second general conference - the second session in November 2000, in: Documents of the Second General Conference of Islah, previous reference. 89-Jihad Abdul-Rahman, Yemeni opposition parties, previous reference, page 16 90-Fouad Al-Salahi and others, the Yemeni revolution in background and prospects, previous reference, p. 178

77 104

91-Nagib Ghanem, The Yemeni Congregation for Reform ... Previous reference, pg. 24. 92-Fuad Massad, “Yemen ... the political struggle and the wars of the agency,” Abaad Center for Studies and Research, May 2020, p. 67. 93-Abdul Qawi Hassan, The Islamic Movement in Yemen, Previous Reference, pg.50. 94-Fuad Al-Salahi and others, The Yemeni Revolution ..., previous reference, p. 180. 95-Amr Hamzawy, The Model of the Yemeni Assembly for Islah, Previous Reference, P.18. 96-Adel Jarallah and Omar Seif, Islamists in Yemen .. Previous reference, p. 5. 97-Fuad Al-Salahi and others, The Yemeni Revolution ..., previous reference, p. 183. 98-Sheikhan Al-Dabai (Assistant Secretary-General of the Islah Party), Islamists and the Arab Revolutions ... The Yemeni Case, a paper presented at the symposium on "Islamists and Arab Revolutions ... Challenges of Democratic Transition and Rebuilding the State", Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Doha, September 2012. 99-See: Adel Jarallah and Omar Seif, Islamists in Yemen ..., previous reference, page 7. 100-Sheikhan Al-Debai, the Islamists and the Arab Revolutions ..., previous reference. 101-Adnan Yassin Al-Maqtari, The Political Transition in Yemen 2011-2015, in: The Political Transition in Yemen and Its Economic, Social and Human Implications, Edited by: Yahya Al-Mutawakel, published by the Economic Observatory for Studies and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation - 2016, p. 21. 102-Same reference, same page. 103-Adel Dashila, Targets of the Parties to the Local and Regional Conflict in Yemen, in: (magazine) Turkish Vision, published in Istanbul, Spring 2019, pg. 132. 104-Naguib Ghanem, The Yemeni Congregation for Reform ... Previous reference, p. 38. 105-Islah announces its support for Storm Al-Hazm, Al-Jazeera network website, (viewed on July 6, 2020), at the link: https://cutt.us/PJRYW. 106-Nagib Ghanem, The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, Previous Reference, pg. 40. • It included the homes of: the President of the High Authority of the Islah Party, the Secretary-General of the Party, two members of the High Authority, and three heads of departments, in addition to the house of the head of the parliamentary bloc.

78 104

• It is the following headquarters: The Executive Office for Reform - Amanat Al Asimah (the local leadership of the party in the capital Sanaa), the Islah party headquarters in Old Sana'a, the Islah Institute on Sixtieth Street, the Islah students ’headquarters at the College of Education - University of Sana’a, the Student Department’s office, in addition to the Islah headquarters in the departments (12- 13-14-19). 107-The Human Rights Center monitors Houthi violations, website: Al-Masdar Online, (viewed on July 6, 2020), at the link: https://cutt.us/6U7a6. 108-Adel Al-Shuja, the UAE alliance urging the eradication of the Islah party, posted on the Mandeb Press website, February 2020, (viewed on August 30, 2020), at the link: https://mandabpress.com/ art34451.html. 109-Same reference 110-Statement of the President of the Islah Party on the 28th anniversary of its founding, previous reference. 111-The researcher's interview with the deputy head of the media department for reform, previous reference. 112- Same reference 113 - Same reference 114- The statement of the President of the Islah Party on the 29th anniversary of its founding, published on the Islah website (seen on July 7, 2020), at the link: http://alislah-ye.net/news_details. php?sid=4272. 115- Same reference 116- Adel Dashila, Objectives of the Parties to the Conflict in Yemen, Previous Reference, pg. 132. 117- Separatists in southern Yemen for Saudi Arabia: Deport the Islah Party or lose the war, Reuters, August 2019, (seen on September 1, 2020) at the link: https://ara.reuters.com/article/topNews/ idARAKCN1V41PG. 118- Same reference 119- “There is no way out of the war as long as the Islah party dominates legitimacy,” a report published in the pro-UAE newspaper, Al-Arab, August 2019, (seen on September 1, 2020) at the link: https://cutt.us/B9DGE. 120- The researcher's interview with the deputy head of the media department for reform, previous reference.

79 104

121- Final Statement of the Second Conference on Reform - Second Session, November 2000. 122- The researcher's interview with the deputy head of the media department for reform, previous reference. 123- Statement of Islah Party Chairman Muhammad al-Yadoumi on the party's 28th anniversary, previous reference. 124- The researcher's interview with the deputy head of the media department for reform, previous reference. 125- Same reference 126- Same reference

80