ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST POLICY BRIEF FOR THE MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE ON A WMD/DVS FREE ZONE NO. 7 • MAY 2012 Yemen and the Middle East Conference The Challenge of Failing States and Transnational Terrorism Lars Berger, Maurice Döring, Sven-Eric Fikenscher, Ahmed Saif, and Ahmed Al-Wahishi Yemen’s ongoing domestic crisis has comes to the problématique of WMD and Abstract profound regional and global implica- proliferation, Yemen might store chemical tions. This is due to the country’s unique weapons, depending on whether rumors The preparatory debate of the Middle East combination of a geostrategically sensitive about the use of nerve gas against anti- Conference is dominated by major regional location, the stubborn weakness of state government protesters in early 2011 turn actors. Politically and geographically, Yemen institutions, linkages with transnational out to be true. In addition, Yemen imported represents the regional periphery and is not the terrorism, a prominent role in the regional various WMD-capable aircraft and missiles focus of signifi cant non-proliferation concerns. weapons market, and, crucially, the suspected and probably still operates most of them (see Sana’a has ratifi ed all three legal documents existence and use of nerve gas. These inter- Table No. 1). In the aircraft realm, Yemeni against nuclear, biological, and chemical related challenges might constitute a serious decision-makers from the North, the South, weapons. However, it is not altogether clear impediment to the short-term success and and the unifi ed country alike have mostly whether Yemen has consistently lived up to long-term sustainability of the Middle East received Soviet/Russian fi ghter jets and all its commitments. The regime of former 1 Conference (MEC). This gathering on the bombers. President Ali Abdullah Saleh stood accused establishment of a regional zone free of of having used nerve gas against protesters weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and The current level of instability and the threat demanding his ouster. In addition, Yemen their delivery vehicles (DVs) was mandated of further deterioration could thus spoil any possesses a number of aircraft and missiles by the 2010 Review Conference of the serious arms control effort in Yemen. This is which might be used as delivery vehicles for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). particularly troublesome since the country, weapons of mass destruction. The mandate In this context, Yemen’s ongoing domestic given its history and affi liation with the for the Middle East Conference requires their crisis thus requires urgent attention by Arab League, will have to be part of far- abolishment as well – a task that could be policy-makers in the region and beyond. reaching regional disarmament initiatives. made more diffi cult by the current instability. The prospect of an Arab state with an uncon- The Importance of Yemen trolled chemical arsenal is likely to affect Moreover, Yemen’s status as a failing state in the Context of the Israeli and Iranian calculations with regard at a geostrategically sensitive location poses Middle East Conference to the MEC. Both states are suspicious of profound challenges to regional and global the Arab League and tensions between Iran security. Should Yemen become a failed state, While in a geographical and political sense and Saudi Arabia, which is particularly infl u- human traffi cking as well as weapons and Yemen is far from being a central actor in ential in Yemen, have recently worsened. drug smuggling could increase. The potential the envisioned MEC, its political future access of terrorist groups to chemical weapons could easily shape the gathering on several Second, with a long history as one of the or the means of producing them could seriously levels. First, the Middle East Conference region’s eminent weapons markets, Yemen undermine regional and global security. The aims at establishing a WMD/DVs Free has the potential to serve as a major gateway ongoing tensions in the country’s North also Zone. On the one hand, Yemen is a party for illicit weapons, both conventional and raise the specter of Yemen being drawn into to all three legal documents banning unconventional, entering the Arab peninsula the wider competition over regional infl uence weapons of mass destruction: the Nuclear and other parts of the Arab East. If the between Riyadh and Tehran. With Iran’s tradi- Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and situation escalates, states with an interest tional vehicles of power projection engulfed Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and in such technology might, for instance, try in the fall-out of the ‘Arab Spring’, Yemen’s the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). to obtain missiles and their spare parts or instability offers Tehran an alternative route In addition, Sana’a has embraced the Gulf attempt to gain access to sensitive material for pressuring Riyadh and its Western allies. Cooperation Council’s (GCC) call for a Gulf from the country’s suspected chemical Thus, addressing Yemen’s domestic crisis is WMD Free Zone, independent of Israeli warheads. This could contribute to the prolif- of concern for the success of the Middle East nuclear policy. On the other hand, when it eration of delivery systems as well as WMD Conference. ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 7 • MAY 2012 thereby undermining the MEC. In 2011, to curry favor with individual tribes or the Table No. 1: Yemen’s Military Holdings protesters seized an army base in Sana’a, effective manipulation of tribal customs to in the Delivery Vehicles’ Sector while Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula turn them against each other when necessary. (AQAP) has, on a frequent basis, been able Saleh once described his way of governing to temporarily control several cities and as “dancing on the head of snakes.”2 This Number in Year of launch deadly assaults on military bases approach effectively determined and Name Type Possesion Delivery in the southern province of Abyan. Such characterized politics and decision-making 1972; Fighter developments could offer AQAP the chance processes more than the formal govern- MIG-21 15 1979–1981; bomber to use existing dual-use laboratories or mental and administrative structures. It has 2006–2007 even to build their own facilities capable of contributed to ineffi cient, underdeveloped, Fighter producing biological and chemical material and corrupt state institutions and eroded MIG-23 ? 1979 bomber in remote areas under their control. the state’s capacity to fulfi ll its key tasks Fighter 1994; such as providing safety and security for its MIG-29 18 bomber 2002–2003 Third, Yemen has the potential to play citizens, basic social welfare, or safeguarding a more prominent role in the ongoing the rule of law and political participation. Fighter Su-7B 1979 tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. bomber Riyadh has a long history of attempts to The resulting crisis appears almost 30 Fighter 1980; 1995; shape the course of political events in overwhelming: in 2011, the ‘Failed State Su-22 bomber 2006–2007 Yemen with which it shares a 1,800 km-long Index’ of the Fund for Peace ranks Yemen as border. Saudi Arabia’s different reactions to 13th of 177 states.3 In addition to thousands Luna-M/ Missile 12 1983 domestic calls for change in Bahrain and of refugees from the Horn of Africa, almost Frog-7 launcher Syria have made clear that it is viewing the half a million Yemenis have been displaced OTR-21/ Missile ‘Arab Spring’ primarily through the lens of by fi ghting in the South and North of the SS-21 10 1988 launcher its long-running confl ict with Iran. From country. One third of the population faces Scarab a Saudi point of view, instability in Yemen chronic hunger. In 2008, the UN World Short- opens up the specter of increased Iranian Food Program reported that 97 percent of 9M79/ range infl uence at a time when Tehran’s foothold Yemeni households saw family members SS-21 ? 1988 ballistic in the Arab world’s northern tier comes either foregoing meals or taking up second Scarab missile under strain in the context of the popular jobs in order to pay their bills.4 This crisis Short- uprising against the Assad regime in Syria. will escalate further if expectations prove range correct that see Yemen’s population double Scud-B 33 ballistic Fourth, a number of narrowly foiled to more than 40 million within the next two missile terrorist attacks on U.S. targets and the decades. The prospects of Sana’a being able 2009 Fort Hood shooting in Texas have to tackle these challenges look bleak. Not Short- shifted global attention towards Yemen’s only is Yemen forecast to run out of water range Scud-C 45 2001–2002 status as the home to Al-Qaeda in the Arab by 2015, two years later it will also cease ballistic Peninsula. Continuing instability in Yemen earning income from oil exports which missile allows AQAP to regroup and pose a direct currently support 75 percent of the annual Source: Modifi ed and updated from Michael threat to the security of Saudi Arabia and budget. The lack of educated and reliable Haas and Bernd W. Kubbig (2012) ‘Appendix: other countries on the Arab peninsula. It partners and the general weaknesses of state The arsenals of actors relevant to a missile free zone in the Middle East/Gulf’, in Bernd also puts AQAP into a position to intensify structures have made international donors W. Kubbig and Sven-Eric Fikenscher (eds) its support for the ‘home-grown’ attempted reluctant to provide the kind of fi nancial Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the terrorist attacks the United States has assistance that could help tackling the crisis.