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Yemen and the Middle East Conference : the Challenge of Failing

Yemen and the Middle East Conference : the Challenge of Failing

ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST POLICY BRIEF FOR THE MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE ON A WMD/DVS FREE ZONE

NO. 7 • MAY 2012

Yemen and the Middle East Conference The Challenge of Failing States and Transnational Terrorism Lars Berger, Maurice Döring, Sven-Eric Fikenscher, Ahmed Saif, and Ahmed Al-Wahishi

Yemen’s ongoing domestic crisis has comes to the problématique of WMD and Abstract profound regional and global implica- proliferation, Yemen might store chemical tions. This is due to the country’s unique weapons, depending on whether rumors The preparatory debate of the Middle East combination of a geostrategically sensitive about the use of nerve gas against anti- Conference is dominated by major regional location, the stubborn weakness of state government protesters in early 2011 turn actors. Politically and geographically, Yemen institutions, linkages with transnational out to be true. In addition, Yemen imported represents the regional periphery and is not the terrorism, a prominent role in the regional various WMD-capable aircraft and missiles focus of signifi cant non-proliferation concerns. weapons market, and, crucially, the suspected and probably still operates most of them (see Sana’a has ratifi ed all three legal documents existence and use of nerve gas. These inter- Table No. 1). In the aircraft realm, Yemeni against nuclear, biological, and chemical related challenges might constitute a serious decision-makers from the North, the South, weapons. However, it is not altogether clear impediment to the short-term success and and the unifi ed country alike have mostly whether Yemen has consistently lived up to long-term sustainability of the Middle East received Soviet/Russian fi ghter jets and all its commitments. The regime of former 1 Conference (MEC). This gathering on the bombers. President stood accused establishment of a regional zone free of of having used nerve gas against protesters weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and The current level of instability and the threat demanding his ouster. In addition, Yemen their delivery vehicles (DVs) was mandated of further deterioration could thus spoil any possesses a number of aircraft and missiles by the 2010 Review Conference of the serious arms control effort in Yemen. This is which might be used as delivery vehicles for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). particularly troublesome since the country, weapons of mass destruction. The mandate In this context, Yemen’s ongoing domestic given its history and affi liation with the for the Middle East Conference requires their crisis thus requires urgent attention by Arab League, will have to be part of far- abolishment as well – a task that could be policy-makers in the region and beyond. reaching regional disarmament initiatives. made more diffi cult by the current instability. The prospect of an Arab state with an uncon- The Importance of Yemen trolled chemical arsenal is likely to affect Moreover, Yemen’s status as a failing state in the Context of the Israeli and Iranian calculations with regard at a geostrategically sensitive location poses Middle East Conference to the MEC. Both states are suspicious of profound challenges to regional and global the Arab League and tensions between security. Should Yemen become a failed state, While in a geographical and political sense and , which is particularly infl u- human traffi cking as well as weapons and Yemen is far from being a central actor in ential in Yemen, have recently worsened. drug smuggling could increase. The potential the envisioned MEC, its political future access of terrorist groups to chemical weapons could easily shape the gathering on several Second, with a long history as one of the or the means of producing them could seriously levels. First, the Middle East Conference region’s eminent weapons markets, Yemen undermine regional and global security. The aims at establishing a WMD/DVs Free has the potential to serve as a major gateway ongoing tensions in the country’s North also Zone. On the one hand, Yemen is a party for illicit weapons, both conventional and raise the specter of Yemen being drawn into to all three legal documents banning unconventional, entering the Arab peninsula the wider competition over regional infl uence weapons of mass destruction: the Nuclear and other parts of the Arab East. If the between and Tehran. With Iran’s tradi- Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and situation escalates, states with an interest tional vehicles of power projection engulfed Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and in such technology might, for instance, try in the fall-out of the ‘’, Yemen’s the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). to obtain missiles and their spare parts or instability offers Tehran an alternative route In addition, Sana’a has embraced the Gulf attempt to gain access to sensitive material for pressuring Riyadh and its Western allies. Cooperation Council’s (GCC) call for a Gulf from the country’s suspected chemical Thus, addressing Yemen’s domestic crisis is WMD Free Zone, independent of Israeli warheads. This could contribute to the prolif- of concern for the success of the Middle East nuclear policy. On the other hand, when it eration of delivery systems as well as WMD Conference.  ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 7 • MAY 2012

thereby undermining the MEC. In 2011, to curry favor with individual tribes or the Table No. 1: Yemen’s Military Holdings protesters seized an army base in Sana’a, effective manipulation of tribal customs to in the Delivery Vehicles’ Sector while Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula turn them against each other when necessary. (AQAP) has, on a frequent basis, been able Saleh once described his way of governing to temporarily control several cities and as “dancing on the head of snakes.”2 This Number in Year of launch deadly assaults on military bases approach effectively determined and Name Type Possesion Delivery in the southern province of Abyan. Such characterized politics and decision-making 1972; Fighter developments could offer AQAP the chance processes more than the formal govern- MIG-21 15 1979–1981; bomber to use existing dual-use laboratories or mental and administrative structures. It has 2006–2007 even to build their own facilities capable of contributed to ineffi cient, underdeveloped, Fighter producing biological and chemical material and corrupt state institutions and eroded MIG-23 ? 1979 bomber in remote areas under their control. the state’s capacity to fulfi ll its key tasks Fighter 1994; such as providing safety and security for its MIG-29 18 bomber 2002–2003 Third, Yemen has the potential to play citizens, basic social welfare, or safeguarding a more prominent role in the ongoing the and political participation. Fighter Su-7B 1979 tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. bomber Riyadh has a long history of attempts to The resulting crisis appears almost 30 Fighter 1980; 1995; shape the course of political events in overwhelming: in 2011, the ‘Failed State Su-22 bomber 2006–2007 Yemen with which it shares a 1,800 km-long Index’ of the Fund for Peace ranks Yemen as border. Saudi Arabia’s different reactions to 13th of 177 states.3 In addition to thousands Luna-M/ Missile 12 1983 domestic calls for change in Bahrain and of refugees from the Horn of Africa, almost Frog-7 launcher have made clear that it is viewing the half a million Yemenis have been displaced OTR-21/ Missile ‘Arab Spring’ primarily through the lens of by fi ghting in the South and North of the SS-21 10 1988 launcher its long-running confl ict with Iran. From country. One third of the population faces Scarab a Saudi point of view, instability in Yemen chronic hunger. In 2008, the UN World Short- opens up the specter of increased Iranian Food Program reported that 97 percent of 9M79/ range infl uence at a time when Tehran’s foothold Yemeni households saw family members SS-21 ? 1988 ballistic in the ’s northern tier comes either foregoing meals or taking up second Scarab missile under strain in the context of the popular jobs in order to pay their bills.4 This crisis Short- uprising against the Assad regime in Syria. will escalate further if expectations prove range correct that see Yemen’s population double Scud-B 33 ballistic Fourth, a number of narrowly foiled to more than 40 million within the next two missile terrorist attacks on U.S. targets and the decades. The prospects of Sana’a being able 2009 Fort Hood shooting in Texas have to tackle these challenges look bleak. Not Short- shifted global attention towards Yemen’s only is Yemen forecast to run out of water range Scud-C 45 2001–2002 status as the home to Al-Qaeda in the Arab by 2015, two years later it will also cease ballistic Peninsula. Continuing instability in Yemen earning income from oil exports which missile allows AQAP to regroup and pose a direct currently support 75 percent of the annual Source: Modifi ed and updated from Michael threat to the security of Saudi Arabia and budget. The lack of educated and reliable Haas and Bernd W. Kubbig (2012) ‘Appendix: other countries on the Arab peninsula. It partners and the general weaknesses of state The arsenals of actors relevant to a missile free zone in the Middle East/Gulf’, in Bernd also puts AQAP into a position to intensify structures have made international donors W. Kubbig and Sven-Eric Fikenscher (eds) its support for the ‘home-grown’ attempted reluctant to provide the kind of fi nancial Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the terrorist attacks the United States has assistance that could help tackling the crisis. Middle East, : Routledge, p. 326. witnessed over the last couple of years. In According to the most recent World Bank short, Yemen’s instability has the potential data, Yemen receives about a third ($21) to allow transnational actors to undermine of the average per capita aid granted to the security arrangements which the region’s Sub-Saharan countries ($54).5 state actors might contemplate as part of the envisioned MEC. The Impact of Yemen’s Crisis on Saudi-Iranian Relations The Risks of Yemen as a Failed State Riyadh has a strong interest in the continued unity of Yemen to serve as a central bulwark The of Yemen faces various against transnational or other regional actors political challenges, persistently endan- using Saudi Arabia’s vulnerable southern gering its unity and stability. The political fl ank to undermine its security. In addition, landscape is deeply divided across tribal suffi cient stability would open up the possi- confederations, Islamist movements, and bility of establishing the port of as economic as well as military interest groups. a central gateway for Saudi oil reaching For most of his rule, former President Ali the global market. This would make Saudi Abdullah Saleh skillfully employed a policy Arabia independent from a possible Iranian of divide-and-rule that included patronage threat to the Strait of Hormuz.

2 Yemen and the Middle East Conference The Challenge of Failing States and Transnational Terrorism

For Saudi observers, AQAP is just the latest ideological threat to emerge at its southern Box No. 1: Map of the Republic of Yemen border following former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s and ’s socialism. Most of the estimated $1 billion of annual aid which Saudi Arabia allocated has been spent on direct patronage of tribes.6 It is thus not surprising that Saudi Arabia’s key contact in Yemen was Sheik Abdullah al-Ahmar whose tribal confederation’s militia helped safeguard Riyadh’s interest during the war in Sa’da. That is why Saudi Arabia is eager to see Yemen’s tribes suffi ciently represented in any future political scenario. The direct engagement with leading tribes is explained by some as refl ecting Saudi concerns about the ineffectiveness of Yemen’s security services and about their sympathies for radical Islamists. Critics have blamed this approach for retarding the development of a civic culture that could support modern political institutions.

Saudi Arabia’s strong presence is a double- edged sword for the international com- munity. On the one hand, Western and other governments can benefi t from an extensive range of informal ties between Saudi offi cials and key Yemeni decision- makers to work towards the common goal of a stable and unifi ed Yemen. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s vision of Yemen’s Source: http://carnegieendowment.org/fi les/yemen_tribes1.pdf (February 18, 2012). political future is at odds with the call for genuine political change put forward by the country’s reform movement. This became Yemen, the Al-Houthis justify their violent evident in a New York Times opinion article struggle for more political independence by Tawakkul Karman, the 2011 recipient and religious self-determination with the of the . For her, the expanding power of Saudi-sponsored American aid to Yemen’s security services Salafi s, which are supported by Sana’a as a made the U.S. responsible for the killing of counterbalance against the Houthis. Sa’da innocent women and children at the hands is Yemen’s poorest governorate and stands of the regime. She also accused Saudi Arabia economically and politically neglected by of engineering a limited change at the top of the central government, while suffering the the regime while trying to keep the corrupt socio-economic consequences of the bloody and authoritarian political and security war between 2004 and 2010. Saudi Arabia infrastructure intact.7 also played a role in exacerbating tensions by helping to set up the Dar Al-Hadith center The ongoing rebellion in Yemen’s North which was founded by Saudi-educated cleric has raised the specter of creating yet Sheikh Muqbil Al-Wadi’i who converted another theater for the ongoing compe- from Zaidi Islam to the Wahhabi inter- tition over regional infl uence between Saudi pretation dominant in Saudi Arabia. The Arabia and Iran. It is led by supporters of Dar Al-Hadith, where several thousand late Sheikh Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi, students from around the world are taught a former member of parliament who strongly anti-Shia religious doctrine, is part was killed in 2004.8 Like other tribes of the village of Dammaj which lies in the in the Northern province of Sa’da, the immediate vicinity of Sa’da, the capital of Al-Houthis are following a Shia version the Shiite dominated Yemeni province. The of Islam as practiced by the Zaidi political context of the Houthi rebellion who had ruled parts of Northern Yemen thus highlights how Saudi Arabia’s attempts from 892 until 1962. Constituting one of to safeguard its national security interests by the most powerful non-state actors within trying to spread its particular interpretation

3 ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 7 • MAY 2012

Lars Berger is a Lecturer in of Islam is increasing the risk of domestic an attempt to explore the possibilities of Politics and Contemporary strife in Yemen. better management of their relationships, History of the Middle East thus appear increasingly tenuous. at the University of Salford/ Iran’s Role in Yemen Manchester, . The Impact of Yemen’s Crisis He was an APSA Congres- For Iranian observers, Tehran’s role in on Regional and Global sional Fellow in Washington, Yemen is to a large extent a function of Saudi- Counter-terrorism Efforts D.C. in 2002-03. His research interest focuses Iranian relations. They admit that, ideologi- on Islamism, Islamist terrorism, foreign cally, Tehran may feel an obligation to help Yemen is of special importance to Al-Qaeda. policy of Arab countries, U.S. foreign policy, other Muslims in general and Yemen’s Shiite The Hadramawt province in the country’s democracy and human rights in the Arab Muslims in particular in overcoming state Southeast is the ancestral home of Osama world as well as on images of the West and failure and bloodshed. At the same time, they Bin Laden’s family. As a failing state, Yemen Western policies in the Arab public debate. describe Yemen as too far from the strategic is highly attractive as a basis for AQAP and calculus of decision-makers in Tehran. its affi liates due to the easy accessibility However, current events in the region have of weapons. The Yemeni society is highly Maurice Döring holds an the potential to change these perceptions as armed with six to nine million weapons in MA in Political Science, Tehran increasingly perceives a coordination private hands.10 Since Yemen is not able to International Law and of hostile activities against its vital interest secure its long land border and coast lines Philosophy from the by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. While the of approximately 3,650 km, it also serves as University of . He United States is seen as shaping and leading a fl ourishing international black market for was formerly an intern the international coalition to put political, all kinds of weapons. A further challenge at the Peace Research diplomatic, economic, and military pressure stems from the fact that effective counter- Institute Frankfurt and also interned at the on Iran, their Saudi partners are seen as insurgency operations require active support German Development Service in Bonn and applying the same logic at the regional level. by the local population. This runs into the at the German Agency for International Tehran increasingly leans towards the belief problem that many Southerners resent the Cooperation (GIZ) in Sana’a, Yemen. While that there is a division of tasks between the presence of the Northern military which is in Yemen, he focused on issues of food two. This is important as perceptions have widely seen as an instrument of repression. security and confl ict prevention. an obvious infl uence on shaping political Southern calls for greater autonomy or deliberations and decision-making. even independence are based on a history Sven-Eric Fikenscher is a of political distinctness that saw many Research Fellow at Goethe If Iran sees its regional infl uence increas- Southerners develop a sense of cultural University, Frankfurt and ingly under threat, particularly in Syria and difference.11 The South was controlled by was a Research Assistant , infl uential elites might become the British from 1839 until 1967 and allied at the Peace Research Insti- more willing to engage in areas of previ- itself with the as the People’s tute Frankfurt in 2006–11. ously secondary or even tertiary concern. Democratic Republic of South Yemen. Post He studied International Such a decision would have important unifi cation, the failure of Northern elites Relations, Law, Religious Studies, and ramifi cations for the region. Iran then may around the Saleh regime to adequately Islamic Religion at Goethe University. His fi nd Yemen an important strategic space for address Southern demands for equal research interests include regional security challenging Saudi interests and infl uence. political rights has hardened their positions in the Middle East, terrorism, and U.S. This means that, at the moment, Iranian regarding independence. Many Southerners foreign policy. contemplation of building important infra- resent the North’s greater religious conserv- structures for deterrence and retaliation atism as represented by the Islah Party cannot be ruled out. In fact, media accounts and Saudi-sponsored Salafi s. Tackling the have highlighted new U.S. concerns about specter of radical Islamists consolidating increasing signs that Iran is becoming more or even expanding their control over parts active in the Sa’da confl ict. Local tribesmen of Southern Yemen thus requires the rebal- describe both warring parties as relying on a ancing of relations between the North and comparatively unlimited supply of weapons the South. which can only be explained by outside assistance.9 AQAP in Yemen

For Yemeni observers, Iranian involvement The strength and roots of AQAP nowadays goes beyond funding and also entails the are deeply intertwined with Yemeni history. provision of training facilities for Houthi While Sana’a failed to establish full executive veterans in Hezbollah’s training camps in control over large parts of its territory, a Lebanon. They also point to the provocative network of radical fundamentalists managed presence of Iranian warships and submarines to create parallel structures mainly in the in the and the Gulf of Yemen. The Northern areas, providing people with chances of implementation for a proposal schools and social care. This network was put forward by some Iranian observers of further radicalized when Yemeni and Arab a Track II endeavor, which would bring Mujahidin returned to Yemen from their together Iranians, Saudis, and Yemenis in fi ght against the Soviets in in

4 Yemen and the Middle East Conference The Challenge of Failing States and Transnational Terrorism

the 1980s. In that decade the regime used facing the prospect of AQAP members and Ahmed Saif is Executive the Salafi network and radical Afghanistan sympathizers using Yemen’s instability to Director of the Sheba veterans to fi ght the remnants of the Shiite regroup in preparation for another attempt Centre for Strategic Studies monarchy in the North and also during the at AQAP’s ultimate goal, the toppling of the (SCSS), Sana’a, Yemen civil war in 1994 against a Marxist secession House of Al-Sa’ud. The increased profes- and Associate Dean at attempt in the South. Through this, radical sionalization of AQAP has widely been the Yemen College of militants have developed and maintained attributed to the infl ux of Saudi radicals. Middle Eastern Studies. close ties to the regime and even became The immediate nature of the threat became Furthermore, Dr. Saif is Professor of Politics at integrated into the security apparatus. The evident in August 2009 when Al-Qaeda in Sana’a University and Member of the editorial close links between the regime and radical the Arab Peninsula failed in its attempt to board of the Journal of Strategic Studies, Islamists are exemplifi ed through the assassinate Prince Mohammad Bin Nayef Bahrain Centre for Strategic Studies. persons of Tareq Al-Fadhli, a prominent who leads the kingdom’s counter-terrorism Islamist, and his brother-in-law, General efforts. Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, who both sided with the opposition against President Saleh The U.S. Focus on Yemen Ahmed Al-Wahishi is in early 2011. In the past, U.S. observers Executive Secretary of the have criticized Ali Mohsen for his perceived The reemergence of a terrorist threat also Yemeni International Affairs unwillingness to actively pursue those explains why the United States began to Center (YIAC). Since 2007, deemed responsible for the attack on the refocus on Yemen after a longer period of he serves as Chief Repre- U.S.S. Cole in 2000. Tareq Al-Fadhli stands inattention. This was prompted by the reali- sentative of the League of accused by some American observers of zation that radical Islamist Anwar Al-Awlaki Arab States Mission, New having been involved in the 1992 attack on had been in contact with Major Nidal Delhi. Prior diplomatic assignments include a hotel in Aden which housed U.S. troops Hassan, currently awaiting trial for killing Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, United Arab who were on their way to support the UN 13 people at the Fort Hood military base Emirates, and Japan. He is involved in operation in Somalia. in Texas, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab various activities on peace and disarmament, who pleaded guilty for trying to bring on a Middle East WMD Free Zone as well as While the old Yemeni regime’s closeness down an American airliner over Detroit on political, economic, and social problems. to the Arab-Afghan generation of radical on Christmas Day 2009. Since then, more Islamists is well-documented, Al-Qaeda’s and more politicians and counter-terrorism current operatives in Yemen pose a more offi cials began to expect future attacks on direct threat. Al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch U.S. soil to emanate from Yemen rather than was set up by the Yemeni national Nasser from Afghanistan or . In reaction, Al-Wuhayshi, a former confi dant of Osama the United States dramatically increased its Bin Laden, and two Saudi nationals, Sa’id military aid from $5 million in 2006 to $150 Al-Shihiri and Mohammad Al-Awfi , million in 2010. Wikileaks cables showed both of whom had been in detention that some U.S. support had been diverted by at Guantanamo Bay and subsequently the Saleh regime to fi ght the Houthi rebels graduated from Saudi Arabia’s deradicali- in the North. This refl ects the differences zation program. International observers in threat perceptions that long plagued the put the number of AQAP members in American-Yemeni relationship. Whereas Yemen somewhere between 100 and 600 the U.S. and other international actors are while Yemeni offi cial estimates are in the preoccupied with the threat posed by AQAP, range of 500 to 700. The group’s inter- for the Yemeni government this issue has national relevance is larger than these long been less important than the Southern numbers suggest. This is highlighted by secessionism or the Houthi rebellion. reports about Saudi, Iraqi, and Sudanese nationals among AQAP members. In The inability or unwillingness of the Yemeni an indication of transnational cooper- regime to address the perceived menace ation, spokesmen for Somalia’s Islamist posed by AQAP has prompted the United Al-Shabab have pledged to support AQAP States to look for other ways of responding in the wake of the increasing number of to this ever more urgent security threat. U.S. strikes against the group. First, the U.S. increased its cooperation with Saudi Arabia which provides crucial Hardly any country in the region is currently intelligence gathered through its extensive more concerned about AQAP’s role in network of contacts. Second, Washington Yemen than Saudi Arabia. Some of the made use of this intelligence by employing weapons and explosives used in various the same military instruments it began to terrorist attacks in the Kingdom are alleged rely on in confronting the terrorist threat in to have come from Yemen. After having the border region between Afghanistan and seemingly succeeded in stopping the spiral Pakistan. Wikileaks cables published in 2010 of terrorist violence which gripped the indicated that President Saleh had consented country from 2003 to 2005, Riyadh is now to the use of U.S. airplanes against suspected

5 ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 7 • MAY 2012

terrorists, but opposed employing cruise Majid Al-Zindani represent the Islamist Box No. 2: Important Dates of missiles. The resulting increase in pressure opposition. The latter is named by the Yemen’s Modern History on AQAP was also privately welcomed U.S. authorities as special designate global by Saudi counter-terrorism offi cials. In terrorist. The U.S. Department of the South Yemen under British summer 2011, U.S. drone strikes supposedly Treasury accuses Zindani of using the 1839–1967 rule () helped Yemeni army units that had found Al-Iman University in Sana’a, which he themselves under siege by AQAP-linked founded, for recruiting and fi nancing mili- ’s indepen- 1918 fi ghters in the Southern governorate of tant Islamists. Already in the 1980s, he and dence after the fall of the Abyan. Shortly thereafter, further drone General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar coordinated Ottoman Empire attacks led to the deaths of Anwar Al-Awlaki the mobilization of Yemenis for the war in Establishment of the and Samir Khan, the Pakistani-American Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. 1962 editor of the English-language AQAP (North Yemen) publication Inspire, in September 2011. One The GCC Proposal and North Yemen Civil War month later, U.S. drones killed Awlaki’s Power Transition between -backed son Abdul-Rahman and the media chief of 1962–1970 Republicans and Saudi- AQAP, Ibrahim Al-Banna. With these leading military, tribal, and backed Royalists Islamist fi gures distancing themselves from the Saleh regime, the youth movement’s call British withdrawal Yemen’s Unrest and the 1967 for genuine political reform became increas- and South Yemen Imperative of Genuine ingly overshadowed by the bloody internal independence Political Reform battles among members of the old elites. The Establishment of the The uprising of the in ’s proposal, which People’s Democratic 1970 the North since 2004, increasing calls for included immunity for Saleh and his family Republic of Yemen in autonomy or even independence in the members, was at fi rst broadly supported by South Yemen South since 2007, and a broader protest the opposition groups. Only after massive Ali Abdullah Saleh movement inspired by the ‘Arab Spring’ violence against protesters did large parts of 1978 becomes President of since January 2011 exemplify the political the opposition reject this version of the deal North Yemen crises which Saleh’s authoritarian rule and demand President Saleh to be charged 1986 South Yemen Civil War has brought about. When Yemen’s youth for the deadly shootings. Saleh was forced reacted to the events in and Egypt to be medically treated in Saudi Arabia after Unifi cation of North and calling for President Saleh’s resignation, he was seriously injured in an attempted South Yemen as the 1990 his regime unleashed a wave of violence. In murder. During his absence, Vice President Republic of Yemen with the most notorious incident, snipers shot Abdrabah Mansor Al-Hadi took over as Saleh as President and killed dozens of unarmed civilians Acting President. 1994 on March 28, 2011.12 In reaction to this 2004 Beginning of the Houthi bloodbath, many senior army offi cers and In early July 2011, the government rejected Rebellion in Yemen’s north parts of the army followed General Ali the opposition’s demands, including the The Yemeni Uprising: Mohsen Al-Ahmar and defected to the formation of a transitional council with 2011 major popular protests, Ali opposition. Their decision did not neces- the goal of formally transferring power Abdullah Saleh resigns sarily signal enthusiasm for the demands of from the current administration to a the youth movement. Rather, they refl ected caretaker government intended to oversee a long-simmering confl ict within the ruling constitutional amendments as well as elite that was caused by President Saleh’s presidential and parliamentary elections. attempt to centralize power in the hands of With its stalling tactics the regime hoped a small number of family members. Before to undermine the opposition’s unity and his defection, General Ali Mohsen had been unveil their internal cleavages. Tensions in charge of the repression of the Houthi have emerged, in particular, between rebels in the North of Yemen and coordi- Yemen’s established opposition of the Joint nated support for Yemen’s Arab volunteers Meeting Parties, dominated by the Islamist in the Afghan War of the 1980s. His break Islah Party and the considerably less infl u- with Ali Saleh highlighted the fact that ential Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), and a Yemen’s military cannot be considered a younger generation of activists that took a truly national institution, but merely an leading role in the protests erupting since agglomeration of different fi efdoms. 2011. Islah had a history of close collabo- ration with the Saleh regime before taking Tribal opposition to Saleh’s rule is person- a more confrontational stance since the ifi ed by Sadiq Al-Ahmar, the sheikh of the late 1990s. The YSP largely represents the tribal confederation, Yemen’s second leadership of the former South Yemen. largest. Sadiq’s brother Hamid Al-Ahmar, While Islah and YSP shared the youth a wealthy businessman who serves in a movement’s call for change, their ideas for prominent role in the Islah Party, and the a future Yemen diverge from the emanci- prominent radical cleric Sheikh Abdul- patory and liberating visions of a new civic

6 Yemen and the Middle East Conference The Challenge of Failing States and Transnational Terrorism political culture that has been a hallmark used for the development of the country of the early ‘Arab Spring’. and not to shore up a corrupt system of Endnotes patronage. 1. Stockholm International Peace Research On November 23, 2011, President Saleh Institute (2011) ‘Arms Transfers fi nally signed the GCC deal, handing over Conclusions and Database’. Online, available at http:// power to Vice President Al-Hadi. This Recommendations www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers transition was reaffi rmed in a national (December 18, 2011). referendum held in March 2012. Yet, the As described, Yemen is more important for 2. ‘Yemen’s Saleh dance ‘on heads of Yemeni crisis is far from being solved. An the Middle East Conference than generally snakes’ nears end’, The Post, important step has been taken, but there recognized, for four reasons: November 23, 2011. are still key problems that could see the 3. The Failed States Index 2011. Online, country descend even further towards • Yemen might store chemical weapons available at http://www.foreignpolicy. com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_ instability. It remains an open question and has imported various WMD-capable states_index_interactive_map_and_ what level of infl uence key political and aircraft and missiles. rankings (February 13, 2012). military fi gures from the old regime will • The country is one of the region’s eminent 4. Quoted in Christopher Boucek (2010) play in a post-Saleh Yemen. Al-Hadi himself weapons markets with the potential ‘Yemen on the Brink: Implications for is a former general from South Yemen and to serve as a major gateway for illicit U.S. Policy’, Written Testimony, U.S. belonged to President Saleh’s inner circle weapons of conventional and unconven- House of Representatives, Committee since 1994. The youth movement’s promise tional nature. on Foreign Affairs. Online, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/fi les/ to institute a new political culture not only • In the ongoing tensions between Saudi 0203_testimony_boucek.pdf (February threatened the Saleh regime, but also the Arabia and Iran, Yemen could play an 13, 2012). tribal norms that, along with Saleh’s under- increasingly prominent role. 5. Data taken from The World Bank ‘Aid mining of effective formal political insti- • Yemen’s instability provides a basis for Effectiveness’. Online, available at tutions, have for a long time contributed Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, posing http://data.worldbank.org/topic/aid- to Yemen’s lack of political progress. The a direct threat to its vicinity and fueling effectiveness (February 13, 2012). weakness of state institutions, the division ‘home-grown’ terrorism in the United 6. Ginny Hill and Gerd Nonneman (2011) of the security apparatus through defection States. ‘Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf during the protests, and the fact that only States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy’, Chatham some groups of the opposition signed In the context of the stated aims of the House, Middle East and North Africa the GCC deal, will undermine the ability MEC, the Yemeni government would need Programme. of Al-Hadi or any successor to preserve to ensure that any existing stockpiles of 7. Tawakkol Karman (2011) ‘Yemen’s unity and establish stability. The interna- chemical weapons within the country are Unfi nished Revolution’, The New York tional community and regional actors in secure and that a strategy to destroy all Times, June 18. particular can play a crucial role in facili- existing material covered by the BTWC and 8. The Zaidi branch of was tating an inclusive political transformation CWC is developed. Yemen’s compliance named after Zayd Bin Ali, the great- by offering mediation and monitoring would be facilitated if Israel and Egypt were grandson of Fourth Caliph Ali bin Abi services. to agree to sign and/or ratify both conven- Talib. Ali’s followers became known as tions. The international community also the Shiat’ Ali, Shiites, i.e. the partisans of Ali. However, Zaidis are closer to Sunni Yemen’s government must now live up has a role to play in ensuring close cooper- Islam than Shia Islam because they to the task of creating and expanding ation between the regional member states reject the notion of the Hidden , effective central authority in order to and the Organization for the Prohibition which Ayatollah Khomeini skilfully instru- address the country’s various security of Chemical Weapons as the implementing mentalized to argue for the rule of juris- and socio-economic challenges at a time institution by pushing for on-site inspec- prudents in the Imam’s absence, and because they are open to the opinions when such expanded control is resented tions of the declared facilities. International of Abu Hanifah, the founder of one of by people in Sa’da and the South alike. technical support and assistance should four Sunni schools of jurisprudence. With Yemen further descending into a focus on training and capacity building in 9. Robert Worth (2011) ‘Yemen on the Brink security vacuum, supporters of Southern terms of securing and protecting chemical of Hell’, , July 20. independence will be strengthened by weapons, on implementing the obliga- 10. Derek B. Miller (2003) ‘Demand, the increasing appeal of the model set by tions of the relevant conventions as well Stockpiles and Social Controls: Small Somaliland which separated itself from as the aforementioned national destruction Arms in Yemen’, Small Arms Survey the failing rest of Somalia. Addressing program. Finally, multilateral coordinated Project, Graduate Institute of International widely shared demands for greater political security cooperation and active technical Studies , Occasional Paper No. 9. Online, available at: http://www. freedoms in the context of a more federal support is required in the fi elds of anti- smallarmssurvey.org/fi leadmin/docs/B- political structure could thus help diminish terror strategies, border control, regional Occasional-papers/SAS-OP09-Yemen. the prospects of Southern secession and a anti-smuggling, security sector reform, pdf (October 12, 2011). new escalation in Sa’da. What is needed is anti-corruption programs, and sustainable 11. International Crisis Group (2011) a genuine institution building and a rebal- rehabilitation initiatives for former ‘Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern ancing of civilian-military relations in favor militants. Question’, Middle East Report, No. 114, of the former. Genuine political reform October 20. would also mean that funds generated by The momentous long-term task of setting 12. Tom Finn (2011) ‘45 protesters killed in Yemen’s diminishing oil and considerable, Yemen on a course towards political Yemen’, , March 18. yet limited, gas resources would actually be stability requires that all factions refrain

7 ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 7 • MAY 2012

from any actions that lead to further need to address the underlying causes of Further Reading violent escalations. It is incumbent upon instability by investing in socio-economic all political actors to engage in institution- progress, rule of law, and democratic  Gabriel Koehler-Derrick (2011) ‘A alized constructive (and transparent) talks governance. This requires bringing False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and over a stable political future of Yemen. This security and development assistance into Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen’, Combating is crucial to build confi dence in the near balance and safeguards against the abuse Terrorism Center at West Point, October 3, term and ensure an inclusive and peaceful of military and security assistance for the 2011. Online, available at http://www.ctc. political process, considering peoples’ suppression of dissent. usma.edu/posts/a-false-foundation-aqap- demands for a more democratic and trans- tribes-and-ungoverned-spaces-in-yemen parent political system, in the long term. Such long-term approach needs to cover (February 18, 2012). The aim should be to develop a binding and investment in Yemen’s educational system realistic plan to approve amendments to to ensure that the current and future  April Longley-Alley (2010) ‘Yemen’s the constitution and the election law which generation of Yemenis will be suffi ciently Multiple Crises’, Journal of Democracy, make future parliaments as inclusive as qualifi ed to gain entry into the job markets 21(4): 72–86. possible and strengthen active issue-based of Arab Gulf states and can interact with political parties as the central ingredients international donors in implementing  Sarah Phillips (2010) ‘What Comes Next of robust democratic processes. domestic development projects. Economic in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and reform proposals need to be tailored in a way State-Building’, Carnegie Papers No. 107, Regional and international actors have an that they support political progress towards Carnegie Endowment for International important role to play as well. First, they democracy and address the social crisis Peace. need to stop all military support to the associated with food and water shortages. government and oppositional non-state The international community should also  Jonathan B. Tucker (2007) ‘Verifying actors that could reasonably be expected indicate awareness of the grievances of the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing to be used against civilians and protesters Southerners through dialogue and provide Elements’, Arms Control Today, 37(1): or escalate the confrontation. The inter- tailored development assistance in an effort 6–13. national community and Western govern- to preserve the internationally supported ments have to recognize that policies aimed unity of the country and to sustain Southern at making Yemen a less hospitable place cooperation against Al-Qaeda in the for transnational terrorist organizations Arab Peninsula. 

About the ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST (APOME)

The ORCHESTRA is the follow-up project of the “Multilateral Study Group (MSG) on the Establishment of a Missile Free Zone in the Middle East”. The ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST is a classical Track II initiative: it consists of some 70 experts – mainly from the Middle East/Gulf, one of the most confl ict-ridden areas of the world. The ORCHESTRA is meeting regularly in working groups (CHAMBER ORCHESTRA UNIT s) on specifi c topics in the context of a workshop cycle from 2011-2014. The main goal of this initiative is to shape the 2012 Middle East Conference on the estab- lishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles agreed upon by the international community in May 2010.

For this reason, these experts develop ideas, concepts, and background information in a series of POLICY BRIEFS which are the result of intense discussions within the CHAMBER ORCHESTRA UNITS . In this framework, the broader normative Cooperative Security Concept will be further developed, embedded, and institutionalized in the region. At the same time, the ORCHESTRA meetings serve as venues for confi dence building among the experts. The networking activities of PRIF’s Project Group are documented by the ATLAS on Track II research activities in or about the Middle East/Gulf region.

Editor/Project Coordinator: Adj. Prof. Dr. Bernd W. Kubbig The views presented by the Co-Editors: Roberta Mulas, MA and Christian Weidlich, MA authors do not necessarily Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, represent those of the project

Baseler Straße 27-31, the coordinator, editors, sponsors, or PRIF. D-60329 Frankfurt am Main, © 2012 ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST . Phone: +49-69-95910436, Fax: +49-69-558481, All rights reserved. E-Mail: [email protected], Layout: Anke Maria Meyer Internet: www.academicpeaceorchestra.com

The Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East wishes to thank its generous sponsors, the Foreign Ministry of Norway, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and the Protestant Church of Hesse and Nassau.

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