DOCSLIB.ORG

Digital Activism and Authoritarian Adaptation in the Middle East August 2021 Contents

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Digital Activism and Authoritarian Adaptation in the Middle East August 2021 Contents POMEPS STUDIES 43 Digital Activism and Authoritarian Adaptation in the Middle East August 2021 Contents Preface . 3 Larry Diamond and Eileen Donahoe, Stanford University Digital Activism and Authoritarian Adaptation in the Middle East . 4 Marc Lynch, Project on Middle East Political Science Binary Threat: How Governments’ Cyber Laws and Practice Undermine Human Rights in the MENA Region . 8 Ahmed Shaheed, University of Essex, & Benjamin Greenacre, City University of New York The Implementation of Digital Surveillance Infrastructures in the Gulf . 16 James Shires, Leiden University The web (in)security of MENA civil society and media . 22 Alexei Abrahams, University of Toronto Beyond Liberation Technology? The Recent Uses of Social Media by Pro-Democracy Activists . 29 Joshua A. Tucker, New York University Chinese Digital Authoritarianism and Its Global Impact . 35 Xiao Qiang, University of California at Berkeley Transnational Digital Repression in the MENA Region .. 41 Marwa Fatafta, Access Now Social media manipulation in the MENA: Inauthenticity, Inequality, and Insecurity . 48 Andrew Leber, Harvard University and Alexei Abrahams, University of Toronto Tracking Adversaries and First Responding to Disinfo Ops: The Evolution of Deception and Manipulation Tactics on Gulf Twitter . 56 Marc Owen Jones, Hamid Bin Khalifa University Follow the Money for Better Digital Rights in the Arab Region . 63 Afef Abrougui, Independent Consultant and Researcher and Mohamad Najem, Executive Director, SMEX Digital Orientalism: #SaveSheikhJarrah and Arabic Content Moderation . 69 Mahsa Alimardani and Mona Elswah, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford Official Foreign Influence Operations: International Broadcasters in the Arab Online Sphere . 76 Alexandra A. Siegel, University of Colorado - Boulder Russian Digital Influence Operations in Turkey 2015-2020 . 83 Akin Unver, Ozyegin University and Ahmet Kurnaz, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University Middle East Influence Operations: Observations Across Social Media Takedowns . 91 Renée DiResta, Stanford University; Josh A. Goldstein, Stanford University; and Shelby Grossman, Stanford University Changing Sources: Social Media Activity During Civil War . 103 Anita Gohdes, Hertie School, Berlin and Zachary C. Steinert Threlkeld, University of California, Los Angeles The Project on Middle East Political Science The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) is a collaborative network that aims to increase the impact of political scientists specializing in the study of the Middle East in the public sphere and in the academic community . POMEPS, directed by Marc Lynch, is based at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University and is supported by Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation . For more information, see http://www .pomeps .org . The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University is an interdisciplinary center for research on development in all of its dimensions: political, economic, social, and legal, and the ways in which these different dimensions interact with one another . CDDRL does not simply seek to study democracy, development and the rule of law; we think these phenomena embed critical values that we believe in and want to promote . CDDRL was launched in 2002 . Its first director was Coit Blacker, followed by Stephen Krasner, Michael McFaul, Larry Diamond, and Francis Fukuyama . For more information, see https://cddrl .fsi .stanford .edu/ . The Global Digital Policy Incubator at the Stanford Cyber Policy Center The mission of the Global Digital Policy Incubator at the Stanford Cyber Policy Center is to inspire policy and governance innovations that reinforce democratic values, universal human rights, and the rule of law in the digital realm . Its purpose is to serve as a collaboration hub for the development of norms, guidelines, and laws that enhance freedom, security, and trust in the global digital ecosystem . The Global Digital Policy Incubator provides a vehicle for global multi-stakeholder collaboration between technologists, governments, private sector companies, diplomats, international organizations, academics, and civil society in a shared purpose: to develop norms and policies that enhance security, promote economic development, and reinforce respect for human rights in or our global trans-border digital ecosystem . For more information, see https://cyber .fsi .stanford .edu/gdpi . 2 Preface Preface The essays in this collection are the fruit of a collaboration between the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) and two Stanford University research programs: the Global Digital Policy Incubator (GDPI, based at the Cyber Policy Center) and the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy (ARD, based at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law) . As leaders of the latter two programs, we would like to express our appreciation to Marc Lynch and his colleagues in POMEPS, especially Tessa Talebi, and to our own program colleagues, Hesham Sallam of ARD and Tracy Navichoque of GDPI . Most of all we want to thank the authors for their papers, their insights, and their patient commitment to this project, which was delayed by the onset of the COVID pandemic . This project is coming to fruition at an increasingly troubling time for freedom and democracy, both in the Arab world and globally . Over the last decade, the bright political hopes of the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings have given way to political polarization, violence, coups, and in a few cases, state breakdown . As we publish these essays, an authoritarian executive coup is unfolding in the one Arab country that was able to move from protest to democracy—Tunisia . The wealthy and technologically sophisticated Gulf states have not only set the regional standard for digital surveillance, repression, and control, they have also lent generous political, financial, and technical support and encouragement to their embattled or unstable authoritarian peers in the region . And they have intensified repression of their own citizens through digital technologies of censorship and information control . China is the world’s leader in materializing George Orwell’s nightmarish vision of omniscient totalitarian monitoring of individuals and pervasive state control and manipulation of information . But Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are coming up fast in these capacities . As our papers make clear, the trend toward digital authoritarianism in the Middle East also draws crucial support from outside the region, not only through the technology exports and cross-border information operations of authoritarian mega-powers like China and Russia, but through the promiscuous transfer of spyware and other digital surveillance tools and expertise by private companies based in Western democracies and especially notably of late, in Israel . Yet our essays caution against overly gloomy or deterministic forecasts . As in other regions, civil society activists adapt and innovate to use and widen available spaces . As we see from the recent protests in Lebanon, Algeria, and Sudan, from the substantial boycott of Iran’s recent presidential “election”, and from new and ongoing forms of activism elsewhere in the region, as well as from multiple rounds of the Arab Barometer, people in the Middle East still aspire for the same basic political ideals that drove the Arab uprisings: dignity, voice, accountability, and self-determination . Thus, the public sphere remains contested, even embattled, in cyberspace, as it periodically does in the streets as well . And just as authoritarian powers and amoral corporations have aided Middle Eastern states in their ambitions to extend control, there remains considerable scope for the world’s democracies to help tip the balance toward freedom and accountability through financial and technical assistance and diplomatic support for the region’s creative, courageous, and tenacious netizens . They are not going away . Larry Diamond and Eileen Donahoe Stanford University July 29, 2021 3 Digital Activism and Authoritarian Adaptation in the Middle East Marc Lynch, Project on Middle East Political Science Social media platforms and digital technologies played novel have become ubiquitous, with internet use now a decisive role in political mobilization, before, during nearly universal across most of the region and with no and after the 2011 Arab uprisings; inspiring academic easy separation between the virtual and the real . Media and popular discussions of the internet as a “liberation ecosystems, as Ethan Zuckerman reminds us, cannot in technology” inevitably undermining the foundations any useful way be understood as a set of discrete online of authoritarian states .1 But it is no longer 2011 . The and offline platforms .6 What could it mean to say “Twitter naïve assumption that “the internet” necessarily would caused X” or “Clubhouse could lead to Y” when those serve as a liberation technology has been dislodged by platforms are fully integrated into dense, richly interwoven overwhelming evidence to the contrary, as authoritarians communication networks? Broadcast media stream over have discovered creative ways to capitalize on digital mobile devices and maintain popular websites and social technologies for repression and control .2 The ubiquity of media feeds, while videos and ideas from social media online infrastructures has facilitated new forms
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Calculated for the Use of the State Of
    3i'R 317.3M31 H41 A Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2009 with funding from University of IVIassachusetts, Boston http://www.archive.org/details/pocketalmanackfo1839amer MASSACHUSETTS REGISTER, AND mmwo states ©alrntiar, 1839. ALSO CITY OFFICERS IN BOSTON, AND OTHER USEFUL INFORMATION. BOSTON: PUBLISHED BY JAMES LORING, 13 2 Washington Street. ECLIPSES IN 1839. 1. The first will be a great and total eclipse, on Friday March 15th, at 9h. 28m. morning, but by reason of the moon's south latitude, her shadow will not touch any part of North America. The course of the general eclipse will be from southwest to north- east, from the Pacific Ocean a little west of Chili to the Arabian Gulf and southeastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. The termination of this grand and sublime phenomenon will probably be witnessed from the summit of some of those stupendous monuments of ancient industry and folly, the vast and lofty pyramids on the banks of the Nile in lower Egypt. The principal cities and places that will be to- tally shadowed in this eclipse, are Valparaiso, Mendoza, Cordova, Assumption, St. Salvador and Pernambuco, in South America, and Sierra Leone, Teemboo, Tombucto and Fezzan, in Africa. At each of these places the duration of total darkness will be from one to six minutes, and several of the planets and fixed stars will probably be visible. 2. The other will also be a grand and beautiful eclipse, on Satur- day, September 7th, at 5h. 35m. evening, but on account of the Mnon's low latitude, and happening so late in the afternoon, no part of it will be visible in North America.
    [Show full text]
  • Maldives 2013 International Religious Freedom Report
    MALDIVES 2013 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT Executive Summary The constitution and other laws and policies restrict religious freedom and, in practice, the government enforced these restrictions. Restrictions were not enforced for foreign tourists on “uninhabited” resort islands. The government’s respect for religious freedom declined during the year. The law prohibits citizens’ practice of any religion other than Sunni Islam and requires the government to exert control over all religious matters, including the practice of Islam. The authorities did not recognize or respect freedom of religion and it remained severely restricted. There were reports of governmental detention, religious intolerance, and restriction of religious freedom. Governmental pressure to conform to a stricter interpretation of Islamic practice increased, particularly in the lead-up to presidential elections. The government used religious grounds to further constrain the space of free expression in the media. Some Muslims expressed concern about increasing “Islamic radicalism,” though advocates of religious freedom generally believed the public was becoming more aware of the issue. There were reports of societal abuses and discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice, including incidents against Maldivians who did not want to conform to a strict, conservative interpretation of Islam. There was an increasing trend among political leaders to call for greater limits on religious groups and activities, and impose criminal punishments in accordance with Islamic law. The use of religion in political rhetoric increased substantially, which led to derogatory statements about Christianity and Judaism and harassment of citizens calling for a more tolerant interpretation of Islam. Anti-Semitic rhetoric among conservative parties continued.
    [Show full text]
  • An Examination of the Impact of Astroturfing on Nationalism: A
    social sciences $€ £ ¥ Article An Examination of the Impact of Astroturfing on Nationalism: A Persuasion Knowledge Perspective Kenneth M. Henrie 1,* and Christian Gilde 2 1 Stiller School of Business, Champlain College, Burlington, VT 05401, USA 2 Department of Business and Technology, University of Montana Western, Dillon, MT 59725, USA; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +1-802-865-8446 Received: 7 December 2018; Accepted: 23 January 2019; Published: 28 January 2019 Abstract: One communication approach that lately has become more common is astroturfing, which has been more prominent since the proliferation of social media platforms. In this context, astroturfing is a fake grass-roots political campaign that aims to manipulate a certain audience. This exploratory research examined how effective astroturfing is in mitigating citizens’ natural defenses against politically persuasive messages. An experimental method was used to examine the persuasiveness of social media messages related to coal energy in their ability to persuade citizens’, and increase their level of nationalism. The results suggest that citizens are more likely to be persuaded by an astroturfed message than people who are exposed to a non-astroturfed message, regardless of their political leanings. However, the messages were not successful in altering an individual’s nationalistic views at the moment of exposure. The authors discuss these findings and propose how in a long-term context, astroturfing is a dangerous addition to persuasive communication. Keywords: astroturfing; persuasion knowledge; nationalism; coal energy; social media 1. Introduction Astroturfing is the simulation of a political campaign which is intended to manipulate the target audience. Often, the purpose of such a campaign is not clearly recognizable because a political effort is disguised as a grassroots operation.
    [Show full text]
  • Putin Praises Trump, Downplays Arms Race | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / Interviews and Presentations Putin Praises Trump, Downplays Arms Race by Anna Borshchevskaya Dec 23, 2016 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Anna Borshchevskaya Anna Borshchevskaya is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Russia's policy toward the Middle East. The Washington Institute's Anna Borshchevskaya and Cipher Brief's Leone Lakhani review Moscow's 2016 track record on the Syria war, Iran, and other Middle East-related issues. ipher Brief: In reference to the Russian Ambassador Andrei Karlov's assassination, Putin said it would not C affect Russian-Turkish relations, but earlier this week, you said that it's likely to "spur a Russian escalation against 'terrorists' in Syria." Why? Anna Borshchevskaya: All indicators are pointing to that. We saw the meeting in Moscow with Russian, Turkish and Iranian officials on Syria. Certainly both Erdogan and Putin are saying that whoever murdered the Russian ambassador was trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Turkey, and some commentators in Russia said it is the West that has exactly such an interest. So there are no indicators that the Russian-Turkish relationship is going to deteriorate. Putin never actually wanted a real solution in Syria, and he still doesn't. He says he wants to fight terrorism. He's been saying it for years, but most of his airstrikes have not been against ISIS. If anything, at certain times he even strengthened ISIS. So one possible outcome is an intensification of operations in Syria under the guise of fighting terrorism. Putin wants to keep Assad in power, or at least if not him, then someone like him, who would ensure Moscow's interests in Syria and the Middle East.
    [Show full text]
  • When Art Is the Weapon: Culture and Resistance Confronting Violence in the Post-Uprisings Arab World
    Religions 2015, 6, 1277–1313; doi:10.3390/rel6041277 OPEN ACCESS religions ISSN 2077-1444 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Article When Art Is the Weapon: Culture and Resistance Confronting Violence in the Post-Uprisings Arab World Mark LeVine 1,2 1 Department of History, University of California, Irvine, Krieger Hall 220, Irvine, CA 92697-3275, USA; E-Mail: [email protected] 2 Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University, Finngatan 16, 223 62 Lund, Sweden Academic Editor: John L. Esposito Received: 6 August 2015 / Accepted: 23 September 2015 / Published: 5 November 2015 Abstract: This article examines the explosion of artistic production in the Arab world during the so-called Arab Spring. Focusing on music, poetry, theatre, and graffiti and related visual arts, I explore how these “do-it-yourself” scenes represent, at least potentially, a “return of the aura” to the production of culture at the edge of social and political transformation. At the same time, the struggle to retain a revolutionary grounding in the wake of successful counter-revolutionary moves highlights the essentially “religious” grounding of “committed” art at the intersection of intense creativity and conflict across the Arab world. Keywords: Arab Spring; revolutionary art; Tahrir Square What to do when military thugs have thrown your mother out of the second story window of your home? If you’re Nigerian Afrobeat pioneer Fela Kuta, Africa’s greatest political artist, you march her coffin to the Presidential compound and write a song, “Coffin for Head of State,” about the murder. Just to make sure everyone gets the point, you use the photo of the crowd at the gates of the compound with her coffin as the album cover [1].
    [Show full text]
  • Amazon's Antitrust Paradox
    LINA M. KHAN Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox abstract. Amazon is the titan of twenty-first century commerce. In addition to being a re- tailer, it is now a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of television and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading host of cloud server space. Although Amazon has clocked staggering growth, it generates meager profits, choosing to price below-cost and ex- pand widely instead. Through this strategy, the company has positioned itself at the center of e- commerce and now serves as essential infrastructure for a host of other businesses that depend upon it. Elements of the firm’s structure and conduct pose anticompetitive concerns—yet it has escaped antitrust scrutiny. This Note argues that the current framework in antitrust—specifically its pegging competi- tion to “consumer welfare,” defined as short-term price effects—is unequipped to capture the ar- chitecture of market power in the modern economy. We cannot cognize the potential harms to competition posed by Amazon’s dominance if we measure competition primarily through price and output. Specifically, current doctrine underappreciates the risk of predatory pricing and how integration across distinct business lines may prove anticompetitive. These concerns are height- ened in the context of online platforms for two reasons. First, the economics of platform markets create incentives for a company to pursue growth over profits, a strategy that investors have re- warded. Under these conditions, predatory pricing becomes highly rational—even as existing doctrine treats it as irrational and therefore implausible.
    [Show full text]
  • Antisemitism in the United States Report of an Expert Consultation
    Antisemitism in the United States Report of an Expert Consultation Organized by AJC’s Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights in Cooperation with UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Dr. Ahmed Shaheed 10-11 April 2019, New York City Introduction On March 5, 2019, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, announced that he was preparing a thematic report on global antisemitism to be presented to the UN General Assembly in New York in the fall of 2019. The Special Rapporteur requested that the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights (JBI) organize a consultation that would provide him with information about antisemitism in the United States as he carried out his broader research. In response, JBI organized a two-day expert consultation on Wednesday, April 10 and Thursday, April 11, 2019 at AJC’s Headquarters in New York. Participants discussed how antisemitism is manifested in the U.S., statistics and trends concerning antisemitic hate crimes, and government and civil society responses to the problem. This event followed an earlier consultation in Geneva, Switzerland convened by JBI for Dr. Shaheed in June 2018 on global efforts to monitor and combat antisemitism and engaging the United Nations human rights system to address this problem.1 I. Event on April 10, 2019: Antisemitism in the United States: An Overview On April 10, several distinguished historians and experts offered their perspectives on antisemitism in the United States. In addition to the Special Rapporteur, Professor Deborah Lipstadt (Emory University), Professor Jonathan Sarna (Brandeis University), Professor Rebecca Kobrin (Columbia University), Rabbi David Saperstein (former U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Astroturfing Across the World
    Political astroturfing across the world Franziska B. Keller∗ David Schochy Sebastian Stierz JungHwan Yang§ Paper prepared for the Harvard Disinformation Workshop Update 1 Introduction At the very latest since the Russian Internet Research Agency’s (IRA) intervention in the U.S. presidential election, scholars and the broader public have become wary of coordi- nated disinformation campaigns. These hidden activities aim to deteriorate the public’s trust in electoral institutions or the government’s legitimacy, and can exacerbate political polarization. But unfortunately, academic and public debates on the topic are haunted by conceptual ambiguities, and rely on few memorable examples, epitomized by the often cited “social bots” who are accused of having tried to influence public opinion in various contemporary political events. In this paper, we examine “political astroturfing,” a particular form of centrally co- ordinated disinformation campaigns in which participants pretend to be ordinary citizens acting independently (Kovic, Rauchfleisch, Sele, & Caspar, 2018). While the accounts as- sociated with a disinformation campaign may not necessarily spread incorrect information, they deceive the audience about the identity and motivation of the person manning the ac- count. And even though social bots have been in the focus of most academic research (Fer- rara, Varol, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2016; Stella, Ferrara, & De Domenico, 2018), seemingly automated accounts make up only a small part – if any – of most astroturf- ing campaigns. For instigators of astroturfing, relying exclusively on social bots is not a promising strategy, as humans are good at detecting low-quality information (Pennycook & Rand, 2019). On the other hand, many bots detected by state-of-the-art social bot de- tection methods are not part of an astroturfing campaign, but unrelated non-political spam ∗Hong Kong University of Science and Technology yThe University of Manchester zGESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences §University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1 bots.
    [Show full text]
  • The Atlantic Council and Bellingcat Are Guilty of War Propaganda. As
    An essential dimension of humanitarian work is human rights investigations to identify violations and crimes. Human rights investigation organizations, in the digital age, are taking advantage of the growing prevalence of online citizen evidence and extractable data from what they often refer to as ‘open sources’ and social media TheThe AtlanticAtlantic CouncilCouncil andand BellingcatBellingcat areare guiltyguilty ofof warwar propaganda.propaganda. AsAs @ian56789@ian56789 wrotewrote toto mee in in a amessage: message: “The“The membersmembers ofof thethe AtlanticAtlantic CouncilCouncil andand DFRLabDFRLab shouldshould bebe indictedindicted asas accomplicesaccomplices toto WarWar Crimes,Crimes, forfor providingproviding actualactual materialmaterial supportsupport toto alal--QaedaQaeda terrorists,terrorists, andand forfor TreasonTreason (actively(actively supportingsupporting officialofficial enemiesenemies ofof thethe USUS && UK).UK). TheyThey shouldshould bebe spendingspending thethe restrest ofof theirtheir liveslives inin jailjail andand finedfined everyevery pennypenny they'vethey've got.”got.” AndAnd thosethose abusingabusing andand exploitingexploiting BanaBana alal--AbedAbed inin theirtheir ongoingongoing warwar propagandapropaganda shouldshould joinjoin themthem.. FromFrom https://www.rt.com/ophttps://www.rt.com/op--ed/431128ed/431128--banabana--alabedalabed--bellingcatbellingcat--atlanticatlantic--councilcouncil EvaEva Bartlett,Bartlett, JuneJune 29,29, 2018.2018. platforms. For the purpose of this discussion, we make use of the term ‘open source’ as it is specifically used by the organizations discussed here – we acknowledge that ‘open source’ as a term is often used in problematic ways in place of what is simply extractable, publicly available data – the term open source refers to accessible and editable software source code and in this paper’s context the term often misleadingly refers to datasets that have come at a high cost to the organization that procured them.
    [Show full text]
  • University of Lo Ndo N Soas the Umayyad Caliphate 65-86
    UNIVERSITY OF LONDON SOAS THE UMAYYAD CALIPHATE 65-86/684-705 (A POLITICAL STUDY) by f Abd Al-Ameer 1 Abd Dixon Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philoso] August 1969 ProQuest Number: 10731674 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10731674 Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 2. ABSTRACT This thesis is a political study of the Umayyad Caliphate during the reign of f Abd a I -M a lik ibn Marwan, 6 5 -8 6 /6 8 4 -7 0 5 . The first chapter deals with the po litical, social and religious background of ‘ Abd al-M alik, and relates this to his later policy on becoming caliph. Chapter II is devoted to the ‘ Alid opposition of the period, i.e . the revolt of al-Mukhtar ibn Abi ‘ Ubaid al-Thaqafi, and its nature, causes and consequences. The ‘ Asabiyya(tribal feuds), a dominant phenomenon of the Umayyad period, is examined in the third chapter. An attempt is made to throw light on its causes, and on the policies adopted by ‘ Abd al-M alik to contain it.
    [Show full text]
  • 19 Mapping the Citizen News Landscape: Blurring Boundaries, Promises, Perils, and Beyond
    An Nguyen and Salvatore Scifo 19 Mapping the Citizen News Landscape: Blurring Boundaries, Promises, Perils, and Beyond Abstract: This chapter offers a necessary critical overview of citizen journalism in its many forms and shapes, with a focus on its promises and perils and what it means for the future of news. We will start with a review of the concept of “citizen journalism” and its many alternative terms, then move to briefly note the long history of citizen journalism, which dates back to the early days of the printing press. This will be followed by our typology of three major forms of citizen journal- ism (CJ) – citizen witnessing, oppositional CJ, and expertise-based CJ – along with an assessment of each form’s primary actions, motives, functions, and influences. The penultimate part of the chapter will focus on CJ’s flaws and pitfalls – especially the mis/disinformation environment it fosters and the “dialogue of the deaf” it engenders – and place them in the context of the post-truth era to highlight the still critical need for professional journalists. The chapter concludes with a brief review of the understandably but unnecessarily uneasy relationship between citi- zen and professional journalism and calls for the latter to adopt a new attitude to work well with the former. Keywords: citizen journalism, alternative journalism, citizen witnessing, social media, fake news, post-truth 1 One thing, many labels? Within a short time, citizen journalism (CJ) went from something of a novelty to a naturalized part of the news ecosystem and entered the daily language of journal- ists, journalism educators, and a large segment of the global public.
    [Show full text]
  • JULIAN ASSANGE: When Google Met Wikileaks
    JULIAN ASSANGE JULIAN +OR Books Email Images Behind Google’s image as the over-friendly giant of global tech when.google.met.wikileaks.org Nobody wants to acknowledge that Google has grown big and bad. But it has. Schmidt’s tenure as CEO saw Google integrate with the shadiest of US power structures as it expanded into a geographically invasive megacorporation... Google is watching you when.google.met.wikileaks.org As Google enlarges its industrial surveillance cone to cover the majority of the world’s / WikiLeaks population... Google was accepting NSA money to the tune of... WHEN GOOGLE MET WIKILEAKS GOOGLE WHEN When Google Met WikiLeaks Google spends more on Washington lobbying than leading military contractors when.google.met.wikileaks.org WikiLeaks Search I’m Feeling Evil Google entered the lobbying rankings above military aerospace giant Lockheed Martin, with a total of $18.2 million spent in 2012. Boeing and Northrop Grumman also came below the tech… Transcript of secret meeting between Julian Assange and Google’s Eric Schmidt... wikileaks.org/Transcript-Meeting-Assange-Schmidt.html Assange: We wouldn’t mind a leak from Google, which would be, I think, probably all the Patriot Act requests... Schmidt: Which would be [whispers] illegal... Assange: Tell your general counsel to argue... Eric Schmidt and the State Department-Google nexus when.google.met.wikileaks.org It was at this point that I realized that Eric Schmidt might not have been an emissary of Google alone... the delegation was one part Google, three parts US foreign-policy establishment... We called the State Department front desk and told them that Julian Assange wanted to have a conversation with Hillary Clinton...
    [Show full text]