WellBeing International WBI Studies Repository

1983

Vivisection and Misanthropy

George P. Cave Trans-Species Unlimited

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Recommended Citation Cave, G.P. (1983). Vivisection and misanthropy. International Journal for the Study of Animal Problems, 4(1), 21-23.

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Millions of animals Vivisection and Misanthropy

George P. Cave

Part of the aftermath of the Edward without harm to humankind." On the Taub monkey case has been a spate other hand, it is quite clear that he is of articles accusing the antivivisection completely unaware of the sheer quanti­ movement of misanthropy. The latest ex­ ty of absolutely worthless experiments ample is Walter Goodman's essay, "Of currently being conducted, ,and that he Mice, Monkeys and Men" (Newsweek, subscribes to the popular misconception, August 9, 1982). While drawing essentially deliberately perpetrated by the research the same conclusion as his predecessors, establishment, that animal experimenta­ Goodman opts for a milder version of tion is coextensive with biomedical re­ the charge. Unlike William Raspberry search, thereby contributing directly to ("Saving Monkeys, Ignoring People," human welfare through the conquering Washington Post, October 14, 1981), who of disease. Furthermore, Goodman seems believes that antivivisectionists care more to be largely ignorant of the extent to about animals than people, and Timothy which nonanimal alternatives are already Noah ("Monkey Business," The New Re­ available to the researcher, a fact that public, June 2, 1982), who believes that those with a vested economic interest in they don't care about people at all, Good­ perpetuating animal experimentation man thinks they care about them more or naturally play down. less equally, and this, in his view, is "in­ Goodman is also aware that resolv­ human." He rounds off his essay with ing the debate as to whether animal ex­ the statement: perimentation really benefits humans is not the end of the matter, ethically Proscribing experiments on animals speaking. Unlike most critics of the an­ may mean prescribing them for peo­ tivivisection movement, who content ple. But, then, carrying humane im­ themselves with the dogmatic assertion pulses to an inhuman end is one of that experimentation helps humans and the talents that distinguishes us from therefore (by traditional homocentric other species. valuations), is necessary, he is at least To arrive at this conclusion, Goodman willing to entertain the question as to has even taken the trouble to go directly whether "the prospective benefit to hu­ to a text which is widely regarded, within mans is sufficient justification." He is the animal rights movement, as one of unsatisfied, however, with what he takes I I the primary sources of animal rights ide­ to be the antivisection movement's an­ 1960• 1970 1980 Year 1945 1950 ology- Peter Singer's Animal Liberation. swer to this question, namely, that an ex­ Goodman recognizes that it is reason­ periment is not justified unless it is done able to question whether all experiments "for the benefit of the animal involved." performed on animals really contribute Goodman assumes that this statement, to human welfare, and he even concedes made by William A. Cave, President of that the use of animals in laboratories the American Anti-Vivisection Society, "could no doubt be reduced further summarizes the unanimous opinion of

George P. Cave is President of Trans-Species Unlimited, P.O. Box 1351, State College, PA 16801. /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4[1) 1983 21 20 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4[1) 1983 G.P. Cave Comment G.P. Cave Comment

the entire antivivisection movement. In attitude toward human welfare that unwilling to sacrifice the infant's life for on animals are justified only if they point of fact, things are not that simple: imbues much of the anti-experiment the benefit of humanity, then one should benefit the animals themselves- is not there is considerable divergence of opin­ campaign. be equally unwilling to do so with the that human and animal life are identical ion within the antivivisection movement chimpanzee. in value, but that it is morally wrong to as to what experiments, if any, are jus­ The question as to whether human In short, one may well agree with sacrifice the interests of the inferior for tifiable. Not all antivivisectionists would life is of greater value than animal life is, Goodman that there are significant "crit­ the interests of the superior. "Proscrib­ agree with William A. Cave's position. however, here completely irrelevant. A chimpanzee does not suffer any less in­ ical differences of mind or soul" between ing experiments on animals" does not It is clear, however, that Goodman's tensely from electric shock than a (normal) humans and other animals, with­ mean "prescribing them for people," as rejection of this position rests on a fun­ woman because his life has less value. out concluding that infliction of pain or Goodman asserts. It means doing with­ damental misunderstanding of Peter Sin­ Hence, if it is wrong to inflict pain on death on these animals is justified for out them. This is not misanthropy; this is ger's argument. In Animal Liberation, human beings to relieve greater suffering human benefit. The basis for William A. justice. Singer does not claim that human and of other human beings, then it must be Cave's conclusions- that experiments nonhuman animals are equal, in the equally wrong to inflict it on nonhuman sense that they are morally entitled, in animals who are just as capable of suf­ all cases, to identical treatment, nor that fering. There is no rational reason for re­ their lives are of equal value. What he garding a human's physical pain as inher­ claims is that they are entitled to equal ently worse than a chimpanzee's. consideration of their interests. Where there are relevant differences between In cases where the experiment humans and animals, different treat­ would result in the death of the subject, ment is justified. A difference is relevant however, the value of the life is a rele­ only if, by virtue of that difference, the vant consideration. If one were forced to animal will suffer no evil, or at least less choose between experimenting on a chim­ evil, if treated differently. For example, panzee or on a normal human being, the a relevant difference between sheep and morally appropriate choice would be humans with respect to the question of the chimpanzee, since the human life in voting is that sheep lack the capacity to this instance is presumably of greater understand the significance of voting, value. We are not, however, forced to and hence suffer no evil if denied the experiment on anyone, and this example only shows that in the case of terminal right to vote. In this case unequal treat­ experiments it would usually be ment is morally justified. less wrong to experiment on chimpanzees. With respect to the question of This does mean that such experi­ physical, and in many cases, psychologi­ not cal pain, however, there are no relevant ments are ethically defensible. It is in differences between humans and the vast order to make this argument clear that majority of nonhuman animals. Pain is Singer cites the case of the retarded in­ pain no matter who suffers it. To treat an fant orphan. But no matter what standards animal differently in this respect simply one uses, it is obvious that the I ife of because it is not human is speciesism, a a healthy chimpanzee must be granted a form of prejudice that is precisely paral­ greater value than the life of a human lel to racism and sexism. Goodman thinks who is a hopelessly retarded infant or­ this parallel is insulting to blacks and phan. In such a case, there can be no women because he mistakenly attributes moral justification for choosing the to Singer the view that all animals' lives chimpanzee over the orphan to serve in are of equal value, something which the experiment. If one does so, it can on­ ly be because of the orphan's member­ Singer explicitly denies. Goodman states: ship in the species Homo sapiens- a In thus equating animals with peo­ morally irrelevant consideration. If, on ple, Singer exemplifies an ambiguous the other hand, one is for some reason 22 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4(1) 1983 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4(1) 1983 23 G.P. Cave Comment G.P. Cave Comment

the entire antivivisection movement. In attitude toward human welfare that unwilling to sacrifice the infant's life for on animals are justified only if they point of fact, things are not that simple: imbues much of the anti-experiment the benefit of humanity, then one should benefit the animals themselves- is not there is considerable divergence of opin­ campaign. be equally unwilling to do so with the that human and animal life are identical ion within the antivivisection movement chimpanzee. in value, but that it is morally wrong to as to what experiments, if any, are jus­ The question as to whether human In short, one may well agree with sacrifice the interests of the inferior for tifiable. Not all antivivisectionists would life is of greater value than animal life is, Goodman that there are significant "crit­ the interests of the superior. "Proscrib­ agree with William A. Cave's position. however, here completely irrelevant. A chimpanzee does not suffer any less in­ ical differences of mind or soul" between ing experiments on animals" does not It is clear, however, that Goodman's tensely from electric shock than a (normal) humans and other animals, with­ mean "prescribing them for people," as rejection of this position rests on a fun­ woman because his life has less value. out concluding that infliction of pain or Goodman asserts. It means doing with­ damental misunderstanding of Peter Sin­ Hence, if it is wrong to inflict pain on death on these animals is justified for out them. This is not misanthropy; this is ger's argument. In Animal Liberation, human beings to relieve greater suffering human benefit. The basis for William A. justice. Singer does not claim that human and of other human beings, then it must be Cave's conclusions- that experiments nonhuman animals are equal, in the equally wrong to inflict it on nonhuman sense that they are morally entitled, in animals who are just as capable of suf­ all cases, to identical treatment, nor that fering. There is no rational reason for re­ their lives are of equal value. What he garding a human's physical pain as inher­ claims is that they are entitled to equal ently worse than a chimpanzee's. consideration of their interests. Where there are relevant differences between In cases where the experiment humans and animals, different treat­ would result in the death of the subject, ment is justified. A difference is relevant however, the value of the life is a rele­ only if, by virtue of that difference, the vant consideration. If one were forced to animal will suffer no evil, or at least less choose between experimenting on a chim­ evil, if treated differently. For example, panzee or on a normal human being, the a relevant difference between sheep and morally appropriate choice would be humans with respect to the question of the chimpanzee, since the human life in voting is that sheep lack the capacity to this instance is presumably of greater understand the significance of voting, value. We are not, however, forced to and hence suffer no evil if denied the experiment on anyone, and this example only shows that in the case of terminal right to vote. In this case unequal treat­ experiments it would usually be ment is morally justified. less wrong to experiment on chimpanzees. With respect to the question of This does mean that such experi­ physical, and in many cases, psychologi­ not cal pain, however, there are no relevant ments are ethically defensible. It is in differences between humans and the vast order to make this argument clear that majority of nonhuman animals. Pain is Singer cites the case of the retarded in­ pain no matter who suffers it. To treat an fant orphan. But no matter what standards animal differently in this respect simply one uses, it is obvious that the I ife of because it is not human is speciesism, a a healthy chimpanzee must be granted a form of prejudice that is precisely paral­ greater value than the life of a human lel to racism and sexism. Goodman thinks who is a hopelessly retarded infant or­ this parallel is insulting to blacks and phan. In such a case, there can be no women because he mistakenly attributes moral justification for choosing the to Singer the view that all animals' lives chimpanzee over the orphan to serve in are of equal value, something which the experiment. If one does so, it can on­ ly be because of the orphan's member­ Singer explicitly denies. Goodman states: ship in the species Homo sapiens- a In thus equating animals with peo­ morally irrelevant consideration. If, on ple, Singer exemplifies an ambiguous the other hand, one is for some reason 22 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4(1) 1983 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4(1) 1983 23