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A Critical Examination of the Moral Status of Animals, with Particular Reference to the Practices of Factory Farming and Animal Experimentation

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A Critical Examination of the Moral Status of Animals, with Particular Reference to the Practices of Factory Farming and Animal Experimentation R e b e k a h H u m p h r e y s A Critical Examination of the Moral Status of Animals, with Particular Reference to the Practices of Factory Farming and Animal Experimentation A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment o f the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of English, Communication and Philosophy Cardiff University August 2010 UMI Number: U584635 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U584635 Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 C o n t e n t s Acknowledgements i Declaration and Statements ii Summary iii Chapter One - Introduction 1.1. Background, Importance and Aim 1 1.2. Central Research Questions 4 1.3. General Outline 9 1.4. Presentational Details 13 Chapter Two - Speciesism, Value and Moral Judgments 2.1 Typology 17 2.2 Animal Discrimination as ‘Speciesism’ by Analogy 19 2.3 An Analysis of Speciesism 22 2.4 Value, Moral Consideration and Moral Significance 27 2.5 Attitudes and Obligations 32 2.6 Impartiality, Partiality and Moral Judgments 35 2.7 Objectivity and Animals 41 2.8 Speciesism Revisited 44 Chapter Three - The Principle of Equal Consideration 3.1. Equal Consideration not Equal Treatment 49 3.2. Comparative Judgments 55 3.3. Morally Important Distinctions 58 3.4. Coherence Theory 61 Chapter Four - Contractarianism 4.1. The Veil of Ignorance 67 4.2. Contractarianism and Animals 76 4.3. Indirect Duties 79 4.4. Rationality and Moral Agency 85 4.5. Desensitization, Compartmentalization and the Imagination 87 4.6. Science and Morality 96 4.7. Virtue Ethics: the manifestation of virtue 103 4.8. Social Stability and the Slippery Slope 114 4.9. Contractarianism Revisited 121 Chapter Five - Rights, Interests and Suffering 5.1. Animal Rights 130 5.2. Interests 135 5.3. Sentience 142 5.4. The Argument from Existence 148 5.5. Suffering and Pain 152 5.6. Conclusions 155 Chapter Six - Language, Communication and Scepticism 6.1. Suffering and Awareness 162 6.2. Language as Conceptual 167 6.3. The Concept of Death and Reflective Understanding 170 6.4. Animal Communication and Language 175 6.5. Scepticism and Language 181 6.6. Perceptual Faculties 188 6.7. Conclusions: revisiting Leahy’s views 194 Chapter Seven - Human Concerns: The Environment, Hunger and Health 7.1. Sustainability and the Global Environment 201 7.2. Human Health 208 7.3. Practical and Aesthetic Concerns 214 7.4. Intervention in Predation 217 Chapter Eight - Links Between Animal Ethics and Environmental Ethics 8.1. The Principle of Nonmaleficence 225 8.2. The Life Criterion 231 8.3. Biocentrism: the good of beings and independent value 236 8.4. Anthropocentrism: against the value of nonhuman beings 239 8.5. Ecocentric Objections to the Life Criterion 244 8.6. Remarks on Further Objections 245 8.7. Considerations of Life Interests 247 8.8. Moral Conclusions: the ethics of factory farming and animal experimentation 250 Chapter Nine - Moral Feelings, Concepts and the Imagination 9.1. Compassion, Pity, Empathy, and Sympathy 260 9.2. The Concept of Dignity 264 9.3. Living Creatures and the Imagination 277 9.4. Concepts: application, meaning and the role of literature 280 9.5. Concepts: the role of the body 284 9.6. Sentimentality 289 Chapter Ten - A Re-evaluation of Anthropomorphism 10.1. Anthropomorphism and Cartesian Dualism 300 10.2. Instinct and Consciousness 305 10.3. Human Language as Paradigm 310 10.4. Problems with Animal Communication Studies 313 10.5. Language Redefined: meaningful communication as language 318 10.6. Animal Consciousness: a problem concerning description and language 329 Chapter Eleven - Conclusions 340 Bibliography 350 Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to those who have supported me in the writing and completing of this thesis. First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Robin Attfield. I am grateful that Robin agreed to supervise my PhD. He has been very generous with his time and I have valued all the helpful comments and suggestions he has made about my thesis. Robin has enabled me to achieve greater clarity in respect of certain arguments and concepts. His knowledge, expertise, and thoroughness have been of enormous help in writing this thesis. I have learnt much from Robin and his insight and he has made the writing of this thesis a rewarding experience. I am extremely grateful to Robin for this. I would also like to thank Dr. Alessandra Tanesini and Dr. Richard Gray for their challenging feedback about various sections of this thesis. Such feedback has been extremely useful. I am particularly grateful to Alessandra for her encouragement, support and advice in respect of other activities related to my PhD. Special thanks to my parents, Merriel Humphreys and Clive Humphreys, who have always been very helpful and supportive throughout my years of study, especially during some hectic periods. Finally, I would like to thank Arthur and Simba who have been quite literally by my side throughout the writing of this thesis and, as such, have been a wonderful source of strength and good-spirits during the past seven years (even if they are not aware of this). D e c l a r a t io n a n d S t a t e m e n t s Declaration This work has not been previously accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree. Signed (Candidate) Date g • Z o / o Statement 1 This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD. Signed (Candidate) Date a U - l Statement 2 This thesis is the result of my own independent work / investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. Signed (Candidate) Date o lU • 3. C Statement 3 I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations. Signed /7 /O (Candidate) Date S u m m a r y There is extensive literature that indicates animals suffer considerably in the practices of factory farming and animal experimentation. In the light of the evidence of this suffering there is an urgent need to answer the question whether our current use of animals is ever morally justifiable. The aim of this thesis is to provide a critical examination of the moral status of animals and of our treatment of animals in these practices. My objective is to assess whether these practices are ever justifiable and whether we have a moral obligation to revise our attitudes towards our use of animals. Animals are often denied moral standing on the basis that they lack certain capacities, such as rationality, language and the ability to think. Further, it is often thought that animals’ supposed lack of such capacities could be used as a defence for our use of them in intensive farming and animal experimentation. Thus, in examining the moral status of animals this thesis also examines animals and their capacities in order to determine whether any of the arguments given against the moral standing of animals are sound. In seeking to discover the extent of our moral obligations towards animals and the necessary conditions for moral standing, I will demonstrate that, although animals used in factory farming and experiments do have moral standing, the only consistent course is to extend moral standing to all living things (not just animal life or sentient life). I will conclude that although the possession of certain much-prized capacities is not necessary for moral standing, many animals do indeed possess such capacities, including the ability to use language. Centrally this thesis calls for a re-evaluation of our attitudes towards animals, particularly in respect of our beliefs about animals used in factory farms and experiments. C h a p t e r o n e I ntroduction 1.1. Background, Importance and Aim Millions of animals are used every year in experiments and the intensive rearing industry. This figure increases to billions for certain animals, such as chickens. While some animals used in experiments may endure little suffering, for many of the animals used in the practices of factory farming and animal experimentation their lives are ones afflicted by perpetual suffering, frustration and discomfort. This thesis then begins from the premise that factory-farmed animals and many experimental animals endure significant suffering. There is much evidence to support this claim.1 However, this thesis will not focus on proving this to be true (I will only look at the evidence of animal suffering where the context demands it, for example, in the case of arguing against Michael Leahy in chapter six), or outlining in detail the ways in which animals are used in such practices. Since this is a philosophical thesis, not a scientific one, neither will it include an enquiry of the neurophysiological details of animals. Doing all this would be beyond the scope of this thesis. So I begin in the knowledge that such animals suffer, although I sometimes argue this point where the context necessitates it.
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