Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism
Moral StaDdlDg~ The Va,loe i I~ ~ -~ . ·ft: '_""l"~;'~~~" ~ :.Dl·i: ",_. ,8· .' "...... ll.S',liS·.>,<, - ,', ., -:iv',e'" a S'P::•• .<",' R.G. Frey Bowling Green State University The question of who or what has moral standing, of who or what is a member of the moral community, Editors~Note: has received wide exposure in recent years. Various answers have been extensively canvassed; and This essay by Professor Frey though controversy still envelops claims for the and the comments following it inclusion of the inanimate environment within the by Peter Singer were presented moral community, such claims on behalf of animals at the'Pacific Division Meeting (or, at least, the "higher" animals) are now widely of the Society for the Study of accepted. Morally, then, animals count. I do not Ethics and Animals, held in San myself think that we have needed a great deal of Francisco in March of 1987. argument to establish this point; but numerous writers, obviously, have thought otherwise. In any event, no work of mine has ever denied that animals count. In order to suffer, animals do not have to be self-conscious, to have interests or beliefs or language, to have desires and desires related to their own future, to exercise self-critical control of their behaviour, or to possess rights; and I, a utilitarian, take their sufferings into account, morally. Thus, the scope of the moral community, at least so far as but I have no quarrel with the general claim that ("higher") animals are concerned, is not something I they possess such standing.
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