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Speciesism: a Form of Bigotry Or a Justified View? Evelyn Pluhar

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Speciesism: a Form of Bigotry Or a Justified View? Evelyn Pluhar -------~------------ - SPECIESISM: A FORM OF BIGOTRY OR A JUSTIFIED VIEW? EVELYN PLUHAR Pennsylvania State UniversityUniversity Fayette Campuscampus Editor's Note: An abridgedabridged version of this paper and thethe commentary on it by Prof.Prof. Sapontzis were delivered atat the December, 1987, meetingmeeting of the Society for the StudyStudy of Ethics and Animals held inin New York City.City. g~;~~~:Fr:iiil~~JmoDs. He ..... York: Dover, 1979 We humans tend to view ourselves as the paradigms of morally considerable beings. Humans, it is often claimed, are the most morally valuable (perhaps the ~ morally PHILOSOPHY valuable) beings on this planet. It is commonly assumed that "lesser" beings 83 BRIWEENBEIWEEN THE SPECIES should be sacrificed for our benefit. When For those who continue to think that it is not pressed to provide a rational defense for the wrong to eat and vivisect non humans, but belief in human pre-eminence, philosophers indefensible to do so to even less well have argued that our autonomous, richly mentally endowed humans, the issue should complex lives warrant our special status. be very pressing indeed. They stand accused Few, however, have argued that humans who of moral inconsistency by two very are incapable of autonomy may properly be different groups. Those who have become sacrificed to further the interests of normal convinced that moral considerability is not humans. restricted to humanity are urging that we cease even the painless exploitation of It was inevitable that this prima facie non humans. According to quite another, inconsistency would be challenged. Writers very disturbing view, we should consider like Peter Singer and Tom Regan advanced exploiting mentally defective humans in the argument from marginal cases to show addition to nonhumans. E. g., R. G. Frey has that our differential treatment of impaired recently argued that consistency requires us to choose between antivivisection and humans and many other animals is morally vivisection of some humans. He reluctantly suspect. 1 If it is wrong to use a severely chooses the latter alternative: retarded human to test the effects of toxic gas, let alone as a main course, isn't it also I am where I am, not because I begin a wrong to use a nonhuman with equivalent or monster and end up choosing the monstrous, higher mental capacities? On the other hand, but because I cannot think of anything at all if autonomy or personhood is necessary for compelling that cedes human life of any a right to life (perhaps even for moral quality greater value than animal life of any considerability), then it would be quality.4 permissible to kill humans who lack those Peter Singer has also argued that, given the attributes. If such humans do after all have appropriate circumstances, it may well be a right to life, then, it has been urged, we moral to use and kill nonhumans sm..d. humans must look beyond personhood for the source 5 who lack self-consciousness. of that right.2 In any case, according to the challenge, our attitudes toward very Those who reject both the exploitation of mentally impaired humans and many humans and the cessation of nonhuman nonhumans require readjustment. exploitation must explain why mere "membership in the human species does and Many have responded to this challenge by should have moral weight with us." In short, retorting that severely retarded humans are they must defend speciesjsm. The need for due full moral respect because they are such a defense has become increasingly humans, members of our own species. When evident, as several recent attempts in this asked w.b.Y. this fact should count morally, direction attest. I will argue that each of they often found their inability to answer no them fails. cause for concern. E. g., the Chairman of Harvard University's Department of Speciesism pefined Philosophy has acknowledged that "it is not easy to explain why membership in the We must begin by distinguishing two human species does and should have moral versions of Speciesism: weight with us," addil1g that "nothing much.. .should be inferred from our not presently (1) Weak Speciesjsm: The according of of havihg a theory of the moral importance of preferential treatment to a being, A, A, sp~cies membership that no one has spent because A is a member of species X. X. much time trying to formulate because the issue hasn't seemed pressing."3 (2) Strong Specjesjsm: The ascription of BE'IWEEN THE SPOCIES 84 ;;:::;::,\4 q. 6 basic moral rights, including the right to human and animal exploitation ridiculous. life, to a being, A, because A is member of "For reasons of this sort," Fox claims, species X. "some critics of animal liberation have denied that speciesism constitutes a form of Clearly, (2) implies (1), but not conversely. immorality comparable to racism and A being may be due preferential treatment sexism---indeed, that is immoral at all."? on account of species membership without necessarily having a right to life. For I agree with the critics that it would be a examp.le, it might be argued that a human mistake automatically to dismiss speciesism nonperson should not be killed to "harvest" as yet another form of bigotry. But their its tissue if a nonhuman could be used reasons for rejecting the analogy with instead, but that no right to life would be racism and sexism quite miss the point. violated if we do kill the human when no With the possible exception of whales and nonhuman would serve our purposes. Those dolphins, there certainly is a large gap who instead believe that vivisecting or between the mental capacities of normal eating humans is a violation of those humans' adult humans and other animals. But thjs rights, but who see nothing wrong with same gap is present between the abilitjes of continuing to thus use nonhumans, need to normal adult humans and very mentally defend what I call strong specjesism.speciesism. jmpaired humans. Those who attack speciesspeciesismism focus on our differential The most straightforward way to justify treatment of impaired humans and either version of speciesism would be to nonhumans with comparable or superior show that species membership can be a capacities. According to racism, sexism, morally relevant characteristic, perhaps gmLspeciesism, two individuals who do not sufficiently weighty to warrant the otherwise differ in morally relevant ascription of a right to life. On the other respects may be treated differentially hand, it might be possible to show that because of their race, sex, or species. In preferential treatment or the ascription of a this respect, the views are exactly right to life on the basis of species analogous.S8 membership is justifiable even if species membership is .nQ1.QQ.1. a morally relevant Now, it is undeniably true that racism and characteristic. sexism have not been shown to be justified. No one has succeeded in showing race or sex speciesjsm and Bigotry to be a morally relevant characteristic, or in showing how preference on these grounds could be justified even if race and sex are However, it might be thought that the not morally relevant characteristics. It attempt to justify either version of does not follow, however, that speciesism speciesism is doomed from the start. It has cannot be justified. Speciesists who want to been charged that preferential treatment on escape the charge of bigotry must show that grounds of species is just as wrong as their view is different. letting moral considerations hinge on race or sex. It would be very difficult indeed to Attempts to Show that Speciesism Can Be aa justify bigotry! Morally Releyant CharacteristicCharacteristic Speciesists find the analogy to racism and It is generally agreed that personhood is sexism poorly based and offensive. E. g., sufficient for moral consideration and basic Michael A. Fox argues that racial minorities moral rights, includinginclUding a right to life and women, as autonomous beings, have (utilitarians who are uncomfortable with their rights violated by racists and sexists. rights talk prefer to speak in terms of By contrast, Fox believes that nonhuman "presumptions against killing"). animals lack the autonomy required for basic Philosophers differ on the criteria for rights. Thus, he finds the analogy between personhood: some require full autonomy and 85 BE'IWEENBElWEEN THE SPECIES moral agency (e. g., Michael A. Fox), 9 some fairness, requires us to ascribe basic rights stipulate little more than self-consciousness to human nonpersons as wel1. 13 and rudimentary agency (e. g., Joel 10 Feinberg and Peter Singer 11). Wreen goes on to argue that the same would Regardless of how liberally the criteria are hold for a nonhuman belonging to a species specified, there are conscious humans (and characterized by personhood. some nonhumans) who fail to satisfy them. For the purposes of this paper, the strict I have recently criticized this defense of interpretation of personhood, which requires speciesism.14 Wreen has replied;15 I have moral agency, will be adopted. On this replied in turn;16 and he has just fired the interpretation, most (perhaps all) nonhuman animals and a good number of humans do not last salvo.17 My purpose here is not to qualify as persons. rehash our lengthy debate. I simply want to spotlight the key claim in Wreen's argument Recent defenders of speciesism have agreed for strong speciesism: the appeal to that it is persons, primarily, who are fairness. It is instructive to see why this rights-bearers. They have argued that seemingly plausible appeal must fail. nonpersons who are members of species that are characterized by personhood have basic Wreen believes that we owe human moral rights as well. Belonging to a species nonpersons whose condition is no fault of of this kind, they believe, is a morally their own basic moral rights because it relevant characteristic.
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