MAC1 Abstracts – Oral Presentations

Oral Presentation Abstracts OP001 Rights, Interests and Moral Standing: a critical examination of dialogue between Regan and Frey. Rebekah Humphreys Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom This paper aims to assess R. G. Frey’s analysis of Leonard Nelson’s argument (that links interests to rights). Frey argues that claims that animals have rights or interests have not been established. Frey’s contentions that animals have not been shown to have rights nor interests will be discussed in turn, but the main focus will be on Frey’s claim that animals have not been shown to have interests. One way Frey analyses this latter claim is by considering H. J. McCloskey’s denial of the claim and Tom Regan’s criticism of this denial. While Frey’s position on animal interests does not depend on McCloskey’s views, he believes that a consideration of McCloskey’s views will reveal that Nelson’s argument (linking interests to rights) has not been established as sound. My discussion (of Frey’s scrutiny of Nelson’s argument) will centre only on the dialogue between Regan and Frey in respect of McCloskey’s argument. OP002 Can Special Relations Ground the Privileged Moral Status of Humans Over Animals? Robert Jones California State University, Chico, United States Much contemporary philosophical work regarding the moral considerability of nonhuman animals involves the search for some set of characteristics or properties that nonhuman animals possess sufficient for their robust membership in the sphere of things morally considerable. The most common strategy has been to identify some set of properties intrinsic to the animals themselves. This usually includes things such as sentience, rationality, self-awareness, language, etc. However, this strategy has recently been under attack. Specifically, the charge is that no set of intrinsic properties could ever do the trick since there exist at least some humans who lack one of more of these properties yet who remain robustly morally considerable. In response to these charges, some philosophers argue that it is not intrinsic properties but extrinsic relational properties to humans that afford any moral considerability to nonhuman animals, and that the moral considerability these relations do provide is, at best, limited. This view I call the Special Relations view. I find the Special Relations view inadequate and argue that the Special Relations view fails to justify the privileged moral status of all humans over all nonhuman animals. Alternatively, I suggest that the two strategies might actually be complements within a larger framework whereby nonhuman animals may justifiably and robustly be included in the sphere of things morally considerable. OP003 The Place of Non-human Animals in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments Alejandra Mancilla Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Canberra, Australia By giving sympathy a central role, Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments can be regarded as one of the few ‘enlightened’ moral theories of the Enlightenment to widen the scope of moral consideration beyond the traditionally restricted boundary of human beings (although the author himself doesn’t seem to have been fully aware of this). In this paper, I would like to discuss three aspects of Smith’s thought which I think lead to this conclusion. Firstly, as a fellow-feeling, sympathy enables us to “change persons and characters” [1] and put ourselves in the place of others, sharing in their pain or pleasure and –by assessing their situation– evaluating their feelings as proper or improper. Sentience is all that is required of a creature to be taken into moral consideration. Secondly, although Smith does not think that nonhuman animals can be moral agents (as they lack the capacity to produce good or harm by design), his theory does allow the possibility for them to be considered as moral patients, insofar as we can approve or disapprove of the conduct of a rational moral agent towards them. If our dealings with them have to be governed by justice or benevolence is an important question to be raised here. Thirdly, I would like to point to Smith’s understanding of morality as working in concentric circles and how this would also justify our caring for non-human animals, especially domestic ones. [1] Smith, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Prometheus Books, New York, 2000, p. 466. OP004 An Investigation into Animal Welfare Prosecutions and Sentencing in New Zealand Gabriella Grönqvist, Jessica Walker, Arnja Dale Unitec, Auckland, New Zealand The importance of animal welfare has lead to an increase in animal welfare legislation being adopted by increasing number of countries and improvements being made to those countries that have established animal welfare legislation. This research investigates the importance of animal law and compares several different countries current animal welfare legislation and the growing area of scholarship in animal welfare law. A number of issues regarding the success of animal welfare legislation have been identified, such as a lack of appropriate implementation, enforcement and prosecutions. A comprehensive review of 244, Animal Welfare Act 1999, judgements was conducted to identify the success of animal welfare prosecutions, types of offending that lead to a prosecution, and the factors that the Judiciary have taken into account when sentencing (e.g. species type, numbers involved, offence type, aggravating and mitigating factors). In addition, a review of resulting penalties given in animal welfare convictions was undertaken. The trends over the last eight years since the Act came into force are discussed. The results indicate that further research into animal welfare offences in New Zealand is warranted. Recommended areas for future research would include investigating views on animal welfare offending by the Judiciary, as well an investigation into methods of reducing animal welfare offending in New Zealand. OP005 The Development of Animal Law - Following Environmental Law's Footsteps or Creating New Pawprints? Dominique Thiriet James Cook University, Townsville, Australia Unlike Environmental Law, a comprehensive set of laws and regulations now well integrated into state, national and international legal frameworks and the basis for 40 or more years of thriving critical discourse, Animal Law is an emerging discipline which has been the subject of academic interest for a decade at most. The two fields have much in common since they both aim to directly protect entities other than human beings. To fulfil their respective aims, both require a delicate balance between the protection of these entities on one hand and the protection of human interests, namely social and economic considerations, on the other. The tests used are quite different however. Environmental decisions are required to be consistent with the principle of environmental sustainable development (ESD), whilst acts causing harm to animals are generally allowed if the harm is deemed to be reasonable, justifiable or necessary. This presentation will compare and contrast the scope and limitations of these approaches to environment and animal law and will consider the lessons lawyers and decision makers concerned with the protection of animals can draw from the development and application of environmental law. OP006 Charity Begins at Home, but Not in the Paddock: An Examination of the Development of the Legal Meaning of Charity in the Context of What it Means for Animals Celeste Black University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia In Australia, the characterisation of activities as “charitable” can have important legal consequences. Where donations are made to support entities which carry out their activities for a charitable purpose, valuable income taxation consequences may follow, such as tax exemption for the recipient and a tax deduction for the donor. For trust law purposes, the characterisation of a trust as a charitable trust results in that trust being treated more favourably under the law in a number of significant ways. The term “charity” has developed a detailed legal meaning originating from the UK Statute of Elizabeth (1601) and expressed more fully in the opinion of Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel’s case (1891). The Statute of Elizabeth lists various charitable objects and this has been interpreted to include those purposes which are beneficial to the community and are within the “spirit and intendment” of the Statute. Lord Macnaghten listed four principal divisions of charities, being the relief of poverty, advancement of education, the advancement of religion and “other” purposes beneficial to the community. This paper will examine the way in which the courts in Australia have interpreted the “other purposes” category in the context of protecting animals. In particular, it will focus on the way in which the concept of charity has evolved to include animal protection based on the implicit link to benefits to the human community, rather than on the view that protecting animals for the benefit of the animals themselves can be charitable. OP007 Common human-dog-interactions – Are tactile stimulations welcome from both sides? Franziska Kuhne1, Johanna Hoessler2, Hans-Ullrich Balzer3, Rainer Struwe2 1Division of Animal Welfare and Ethology, Department of Veterinary Clinical Sciences, Giessen, Germany, 2Institute of Animal Welfare and Behavior, FU Berlin, Berlin, Germany, 3 Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin, Germany In the last years, stress reactions in dogs are more and more attracting attention,

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