Getting It Right

1 GETTING IT RIGHT: AN ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL AGENCY OF NGOS By Alice Obrecht A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method of the London School of Economics and Political Science, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, September 2011 2 DECLARATION I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. 3 ABSTRACT This thesis provides an outline for how we should think of the ethics of Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) by giving sense to what it means to treat an NGO as a moral agent. That is, it aims to answer the following question: Which special moral obligations do NGOs have in virtue of the distinctive type of organisation that they are? In brief, the answer provided by this thesis is that NGO agency is defined by the multiple relationships that threaten to undermine its unity. Obligations are identified as what an NGO must do in order to maintain such a unified organisational self. In Chapter 1, I define an NGO as an autonomous, norm-enacting organisation not motivated by profit and reliant on voluntary interaction. The idea of NGOs as unique agents is then developed indirectly in the middle four chapters. Each chapter engages with a central topic pertaining to NGO ethics, arguing for a particular position with respect to the topics of accountability (Chapter 2), resource allocation (Chapter 3), contributions to domestic and global justice (Chapter 4), and NGOs’ impact on the viability of universal welfare rights (Chapter 5). The second task performed by each chapter is the identification of a particular ability, or power, possessed by NGOs as agents. These four abilities characterise the moral agency of an NGO and form the basis for identifying four types of NGO obligation: 1) accountability, 2) acting consistently with organisational norms, 3) demonstration of positive social change, and 4) epistemic procedural virtue. In Chapter 6 I produce a basic framework for NGOs to use as a way of assessing themselves with respect to these four obligations. This framework is then connected to the findings from a 10-month qualitative research project, conducted from 2007-2008, on the ethical perspectives of NGO workers in Mongolia. 4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS If there is anything I have learned from years of researching NGOs, it is that projects cannot be measured only by their immediate outputs: they have stories, processes, and broader, deeper effects. In the process of creating this output, I have benefitted greatly from the support, guidance and collegiality of many. My supervisors Alex Voorhoeve and Hakan Seckinelgin provided insightful and trenchant feedback that was invaluable to me throughout the writing process. When I thought I had defended everything, they uncovered assumptions that needed supporting and new lines of criticism. Without Hakan, my understanding of NGOs as social actors would be significantly impoverished. His efforts at seeing these issues through the perspective I was attempting to defend helped me to articulate it more clearly, and provided me with much-valued encouragement. Alex provided the kind of detailed edits that are the dream of many PhD students. I will miss having someone who is willing to pick through my arguments so carefully. He taught me many skills necessary for building a good philosophical argument, which I will endeavour to develop further in years to come. Luc Bovens provided me with crucial supervision and personal guidance throughout my master’s degree and the first half of my PhD. He is a skilled and inspiring instructor from whom I have learned very much. Also, Ilina Singh of the Methodology Institute was incredibly generous with her time in directing me to resources on grounded theory methodology and assisting me with the design of my research project in Mongolia. My research has also benefitted from generous funding from the MacElroy Graduate Trust, the Fulbright Program, the University of London Central 5 Research Fund, and the Department of Philosophy, Logic, and Scientific Method at LSE. I am indebted to the NGO staff who gave me their time and insight into the nature of their work. Without its qualitative component, this thesis would suffer from an impoverished understanding of NGO agency; I hope that the final chapter reflects in at least some degree the deep value of their participation. While in Mongolia, I was generously hosted by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Mongolia and would like to express my thanks to Professor Otgonbayar M. and Professor Dorjdagva T. for their support of my research. My interest in the topic of NGO ethics began during a very cold November in Mongolia in 2002. As my first introduction into the world of aid NGOs, I am grateful to the Tsaatan for sharing their homes and their stories with me. Without them, the course of the past decade of my life would have been significantly different. I would also like to express my deep appreciation to my grandmother Betty Garner, as well as Melissa Dattalo, Laura Farmer, Camillia Kong, Anastasia Piliavsky, Kirril Shields, Miloney Thakrar, and Kate Vang for their unwavering kindness and patience. Better colleagues could not be found than in Marilena Di Bucchianico and Conrad Heilmann. I am very grateful for their friendship throughout this journey. I am also grateful to Ben Ferguson, to whom I am indebted for his careful proofreading and generous support. Finally, I would like to express deep thanks to my mother, Virginia Garner, father, Christopher Obrecht, and sister, Julie Obrecht. They have supported me throughout an often arduous process in ways I can never repay. 6 Taking ourselves seriously means that we are not prepared to accept ourselves just as we come. We want our thoughts, our feelings, our choices, and our behaviour to make sense. We are not satisfied to think that our ideas are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. We need to direct ourselves—or at any rate to believe that we are directing ourselves—in thoughtful conformity to stable and appropriate norms. We want to get things right. Harry Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting it Right UFC is just so big. And, what, we target indirectly 50% of the population here. And we can have a huge impact. So I guess we’re trying to get it right too. That responsibility to—you know, we have so many resources—let’s get it right. INGO worker, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments ...................................................................................... 4 Table of Contents ....................................................................................... 7 List of Acronyms ........................................................................................ 10 Introduction ............................................................................................... 11 Chapter 1 What is an NGO? ...................................................................... 31 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 31 1.1 Why there is no simple answer to ‘What is an NGO?’ ............................... 33 1.2 NGO: A working definition ........................................................................ 50 1.3 Establishing uniqueness .............................................................................. 76 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 82 Chapter 2 The Value of NGO Accountability .......................................... 84 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 84 2.1 Accountability and value: the instrumental view ...................................... 88 2.2 Mechanism and relationship ..................................................................... 94 2.3 Ability and responsibility ..........................................................................100 2.4 To control and to appraise ........................................................................ 110 2.5 ‘Moral-appraisal’ versus ‘Mission’ accountability .................................... 130 8 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 133 Chapter 3 INGOs As Intermediary Agents .............................................. 135 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 135 3.1 Pogge on the obligation to aid ................................................................... 138 3.2 The (ABCD*) Principle ..............................................................................149 3.3 INGOs and the supposed transfer of obligation ...................................... 155 3.4 Are NGOs intermediary agents? ...............................................................

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