Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East Peace Process Meghan Mohrland

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2006 Hope Deferred: Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East Peace Process Meghan Mohrland

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SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

HOPE DEFERRED:

PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

MEGHAN MOHRLAND

A Thesis submitted to the Department of International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2006

The members of the Committee approve the thesis of Meghan Mohrland defended on April 6, 2006.

______David Levenson Professor Directing Thesis

______Burton Atkins Committee Member

______Peter Garretson Committee Member

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

To Dr. Levenson for devoting his time to help me complete this project.

To the Lord Jesus Christ, “my strength and my song; He has become my salvation.”

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………… v

INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………1

1. BEGINNING OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ……………………………………..11

Right of Return…………………………………………………………………..11 Lausanne…………………………………………………………………………24

2. DEFERRING THE REFUGEE ISSUE……………………………………...………..40

Camp David I…………………………………………………………..………...40 Madrid……………………………………………………………………………50 Oslo……………………………………………………………………………....60

3. NEGOTIATING THE REFUGEE ISSUE……………………………………………69

Stockholm Talks…………………………………………………………………69 Stockholm Channel……………………………………………………………....72 Camp David II……………………………………………………………………74 Taba………………………………………………………………………………85

CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………..…92

APPENDIX A: UN General Assembly Resolution 194...……………….……..……..…99

APPENDIX B: UN Security Council Resolution 242...………………………..……....102

APPENDIX C: Geneva Accords, Article 7...…………………………………..……....104

REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………...…….110

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH……………………………………...……………………118

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a comprehensive study of the negotiations on the Palestinian refugees in the Middle East peace process from 1948 to the present. The Palestinian refugees are an integral part of the Middle East peace process and, according to many analysts, the crux of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, with the right of return as the most difficult aspect of the refugee problem. The history of the refugee issue in the peace process can be divided into three periods. The first period begins with the proposal of UN Mediator Bernadotte in September 1948, which led to the adoption of UN Resolution 194 in December 1948. Resolution 194 created debate on the right of return and led to the Lausanne meetings (1949) which held significant discussion on the refugee issue. As the issue remained unresolved, international attention turned away from a political process to addressing the humanitarian needs of the refugees. During the second period, extending from Camp David I (1978) to the Oslo Process (1993), the refugee issue was subordinated to the questions of Palestinian self-determination and an interim self- government. The signing of the Declaration of Principles at Oslo deferred the refugee question along with Jerusalem, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, to the final status negotiations. The Refugee Working Group, created as a result of the Madrid Conference (1991), was concerned primarily with humanitarian dimension of the problem, such as establishing guidelines for family reunification. The third period extends from the Stockholm talks (1995) to Taba (2001), where serious discussions about a resolution of the final status issues including the refugees, were undertaken. However, with the exception of Camp David II (2000), these talks were between either non-government officials or lower-ranking government officials. Only minimal progress was made on the refugee issue during this period. This lack of progress has been seen by both sides as an indication that this issue will remain a major impediment to peace in future negotiations.

INTRODUCTION

The Palestinian refugees are the oldest and largest group of refugees in the world today. The refugee problem is at the very core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at the center of the world’s attention. They ask for one thing—the right to return to their homes. Generations have grown up outside of Israel, but those who lived through al-Nakba, the disaster of 1948, teach their children of their homeland. They hope to return one day. The conflict between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine during the winter and spring of 1948 and the war between the newly created state of Israel and the Arab states, which began immediately after the May 14th declaration of statehood, caused approximately 725,000 Palestinians1, or 80% of the Palestinian people, to leave their homes in what became Israel and to go to the UN- designated areas for what was to be the Palestinian state, the “West Bank” and the “Gaza Strip,” and to the Arab states, such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (Masalha 1992, 175). When the Palestinians left their homes, most of them thought they were only leaving temporarily. Some even took the deed to their land with them and locked up their houses. Many still have their key. But after the war ended, Israel would not allow them to return to their homes. As a result, they became known as the Palestinian refugees. As defined by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)2, the official humanitarian UN organization for the Palestinian refugees, “Palestine refugees are persons whose

1 The numbers widely range with Palestinians on the high end and Israel on the low end, but 725,000 is an average middle ground (Morris 2004, 1).

2 The 1951 Refugee Convention states that the UNHCR shall provide for and protect all refugees under the Convention. However, the Convention excludes any refugee who receives protection or provision under another UN agency. Therefore, the UNHCR does not cover the Palestinian refugees because they already receive provision under the UNRWA. The problem is that the Convention does not distinguish between protection and provision. The UNCCP, the first UN agency designated for the Palestinian refugees, offered protection, but it ceased to exist in the early 1950s and it changed into the UNRWA, an organization that only offers provision. Consequently, the Palestinian refugees are left with no protection (BADIL).

normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict” as well as the descendants of these refugees.3 The 1967 War created an exodus of another 350,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. They became known as displaced persons (DP’s). Some Palestinian DP’s are also Palestinian refugees, if they fled to the West Bank or Gaza from Israel in 1948 and then again left their home in the territories in 1967. However, the majority of DP’s are in a separate category from the refugees because the 1967 War displaced them from the West Bank and Gaza. They do not claim a right of return to Israel. Today, the number of Palestinian refugees has escalated to more than four million (UNRWA). With the highest birthrate in the world, there is a much larger refugee problem today than there was in 1948. Almost half of the population in the West Bank and Gaza is under the age of 15 (Arzt 1997, 38). In fact, the population of the DP’s alone has doubled since the 1967 exodus (Arzt 1997, 28). Approximately one-third of the refugees live in UNRWA refugee camps. More than half of the refugees are located in Arab host countries; nearly all of the rest are in the West Bank and Gaza. Jordan has by far the most refugees out of any of the areas, and Lebanon and Syria also have a large refugee population, although not as many as the West Bank and Gaza. Today three- quarters of the Palestinians are displaced, whether it is the 1948 refugees or the 1967 DP’s (UNRWA).4 They continue to wait, stateless and seeking to return to their homes.

3 While this is one definition, they define themselves on a much deeper level. With their harshness of life comes a common identity involving migration, poverty, and discrimination distinguishing them apart from other Arabs, even from other Palestinians (Arzt 1997). Refugee life is fraught with suffering. Not being a citizen of a state has deprived them of the rights a state offers. What others take for granted, they lack in proper healthcare, housing, employment, land for agriculture, a passport to travel, social services, education, and protection. “Approximately 1 million refugees have no form of identification apart from their UNRWA identification card, meaning they are not legally the responsibility, nor under the protection, of any individual state” (Bowker 2003, 62).

4 “There are five primary groups of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons. The largest group is comprised of those Palestinians displaced/expelled from their places of origin in 1948. This includes Palestinian refugees who receive international assistance from the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), i.e., ‘registered refugees’; and Palestinian refugees not eligible for international assistance. The second major group of Palestinian refugees is comprised of those Palestinians displaced for the first time from their places of origin in the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip (often referred to as ‘1967 displaced persons’). The third category of refugees includes those Palestinian refugees who are neither 1948 or 1967 refugees and are outside the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza occupied by Israel since 1967 and unable due to revocation of residency, denial of family reunification, deportation, etc., or

The resolution of the refugee problem is essential for there to be a final peace settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Middle East Peace Process has been a long, hard road marked by difficulty. The refugee issue has been a primary cause of this difficulty. Throughout the history of the peace process, negotiators have struggled with how to deal with the refugee issue. Four main groups have been involved in the peace process, each having its own view of how to solve the refugee problem: the international community, Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. The international community began its involvement in the refugee issue soon after the 1948 War. The UN attempted to help solve the refugee problem through the mediator it appointed to the Israeli-Arab conflict, Count Bernadotte. Bernadotte drafted a proposal the UN would later turn into a UN document calling on Israel to permit the refugees to return to their homes. This document, known as Resolution 194, served as a catalyst by which refugee advocates could claim a “right of return.” Resolution 194 has played a central role in the peace process relating to the refugee issue. Negotiators have disagreed over whether there is such a right of return, and if so, how it would be implemented. While the gap between the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives on the refugee issue appears to be closer now than it was in 1948, traditionally, the Palestinians have held that the resolution of the refugee problem lies in the right of the refugees to return to their homes. Israel, on the other hand, continues to deny the right of return and prevent the refugees from returning. The international community, particularly the UN, was instrumental in establishing internationally-recognized human rights and principles which created a premise for the entire peace process. The U.S. has also played a significant role as mediator and initiator in the peace process, exerting its influence as it did at Camp David in 2000 due to its close relations with Israel. Israel has been the only group out of the international community, the Arab states, and the Palestinians, to be directly involved in the entire peace process. The Arab states deferred to the Palestinians after the Palestinians were able to represent themselves. Peace talks such as Oslo, Stockholm, and Taba did not begin from the organization of the

unwilling to return there owing to a well-founded fear of persecution. In addition, there are two groups of internally displaced Palestinians. The first includes internally displaced Palestinians who remained in the area that became the state of Israel in 1948. The second group of internally displaced Palestinians includes Palestinians internally displaced in the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip” (BADIL).

U.S. or any other outside country. Israel is aware of the importance of the peace process to its national interests. Through the 1948 and 1967 wars, it was essentially Israel against a united Arab force, although Israel received outside aid and the Arab states certainly did not always act in one accord. With hostile neighbors at times, Israel is concerned for its national security. In the peace process, Israel has sought secure borders and peace with the Arab states. Since Lausanne, Israel has wanted a peace settlement. At Camp David II, it pressed for an end to the conflict. In exchange for land, all Israel asked for was peace. For Israel, the refugee problem in particular acts as a threat to the existence of the Jewish state of Israel. This is why Israel did not allow the refugees to return to their homes after the 1948 War. This is why Israel prevents their return today. Israelis believe agreeing to the right of return with the unrestricted admittance of a mass of Palestinian refugees would pose a real threat to the Jewish character of Israel. In the peace process, Israel refuses to accept moral, legal, and political responsibility for the refugee problem. If it did accept responsibility, it would not be able to evade liability for resolving the refugee problem. By not accepting blame, Israel has been able to approach the refugee problem from a humanitarian standpoint as a concerned country, rather than from a political standpoint with an obligation to repatriate and compensate the refugees. Within a humanitarian framework, Israel implemented the family reunification program, allowing refugees to return to Israel to reunite with their families who did not leave from the 1948 War. Regardless of whether Israel drove out the refugees in 1948, or if the Arab leaders called them to leave, or whether they simply fled from the circumstances of war, the right of return is still the refugees’ to claim. But Israel continues to deny an implementation of a full right of return. Yet the phrase, “right of return,” is never stated in Resolution 194, the document refugee advocates so often refer to; additionally, Resolution 194 states the refugees should live at peace with their neighbors. While the hostilities from the 1948 War ended long ago, it is peace Israel is still seeking from the Arabs. The primary Arab states involved in the peace process are Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. Not only are these Arab states involved in the peace process because of their close proximity to Israel, or Mandate Palestine, but also because these are the countries the majority of Palestinian refugees went to during the 1948 War, apart from those who

went to the West Bank and Gaza. The Arab states approached the peace process as a unified entity. Starting at Lausanne, they wanted to be addressed as one body in order to strengthen their position and influence. Though in a general sense they spoke with one voice, they did not always hold the same position. While they started at Lausanne as a single entity, as soon as 1978 in the next negotiation at Camp David, the single image began to break. Egypt, the leader of the Arab states at that time, did the unthinkable; it signed a separate peace agreement with Israel. Acting without the rest of the Arab states, soon after the Oslo Accords, Jordan followed Egypt’s lead and also signed a separate peace agreement with Israel. Regarding the negotiation of the refugee issue, the Arab states have been accused of either ignoring or betraying the rights of the refugees at various times throughout the peace process. They have also been accused of using the refugee issue as a political weapon against Israel. While there is certainly truth to this, it was not always the case. At Lausanne in particular, the Arab states placed the refugee issue at the top of their agenda. They have wanted the refugees to return to their homeland. With the exception of Jordan, who granted citizenship to the refugees located in their country, the rest of the Arab states have opposed the resettlement of the refugees. Lebanon especially, is notorious for its poor living conditions in the refugee camps. The refugees place an added burden upon the resources and the economy in the Arab states, thereby increasing the Arab states’ desire to keep the refugees from resettling. Up until Madrid in 1991, many of the refugees would not have resettled anyway. They wished to remain refugees for fear that any kind of resettlement would prejudice their right to return. They even refused better living conditions to avoid any semblance of permanence and normalcy (Arzt 1996). The state of a refugee is supposed to be temporary, a problem needing to be resolved, not a life-long condition. However, for the refugees living during the 1948 War, to date, it has been a 58-year condition. The involvement of the Palestinians in the peace process has certainly progressed from the first negotiations. At Lausanne, the Palestinians held no official position. While they were actively present at Lausanne, unofficially discussing the refugee issue with the Israeli delegates, they did not have any power or authority in the negotiations. This later changed at Madrid with the creation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation

in which the Palestinians could represent themselves, but could not negotiate or act alone. Finally, in 1993 at Oslo, the Palestinians, through the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), were able to represent themselves in the peace process, on an equal footing with Israel. With 80% of the Palestinians being refugees, the refugee issue is an important issue for them to resolve. But with al-Nakba and the prolonged suffering of the refugees that so shaped and identified the Palestinian people, it also means the refugee problem is among the most intense issues in the peace process. It is a struggle to make any progress on the refugee issue at all. As in the Quadripartite Committee at Oslo, negotiators could not get past trying to decide on a definition of the DP’s. Consequently, it is easy to set aside the refugee issue as an insurmountable problem in order to tackle the less controversial issues with hopes of making progress. In fact, Oslo officially deferred the refugee issue for permanent status negotiations to take place in the last phase of the peace process. Therefore, the refugee issue will be one of the last, if not the last, issue to be resolved before a final peace agreement.

Summary

Finding the Palestinian refugee issue in the Middle East peace process is not as easy as it may seem. Any library or internet search engine will pull up a plethora of books and articles on the Palestinian refugee issue. The Middle East peace process does not suffer from a lack of writers either, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to make the headlines every week, if not every day. Most, if not all scholars would agree the peace process has made little progress on the refugee issue. But few have written about the negotiations on the refugees. The following summaries entail a list of scholars who have included in some shape or form, the refugee issue as it relates to the peace process. However, many of them have written works focusing on other issues while including only partial research on the refugees in the peace process, or having written articles on this topic, but barely putting any research into the topic itself and simply scratching the surface of what was really in the negotiations and filling the remaining portions of the article with background and their own solution to the refugee problem to accommodate for their lack of information on the refugees in the negotiations. A few scholars have done an exemplary job, but only on one peace talk. The scholarly research

that is lacking is a comprehensive study of the issue of the Palestinian refugees in the peace process. Evidence of this need is shown through the following summaries of other works that do not fulfill this need. The analysis of the scholarly works used for this thesis support the claim that a study is needed for a comprehensive account of the Palestinian refugees in the Middle East peace process. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the peace process from 1948 to the present, giving an account of what negotiators have essentially discussed on the refugee issue in the various negotiations. This study will discern patterns and progress on the refugee issue. This thesis will also serve as a resource, a comprehensive study of negotiating the Palestinian refugees in the Middle East peace process. While an overview of each peace talk is given to provide a context for the refugee issue, it is beyond the scope of this study to give detailed accounts of all of the issues in the peace process, as well as the various causes and effects of the peace process. However, the core issues of the negotiations are inextricably linked to each other, making it impossible to separate discussions on the refugee issue completely from the other issues. Because the refugees are an issue in the negotiations, their rights are bartered and exchanged for other objectives, whether it be land, security, or Jerusalem. Land, in particular, is difficult to separate from the refugee issue. As the world sees the creation of a Palestinian state as a key to a resolution of the conflict, negotiations on land exchanges and Palestinian governance of that land are all steps to create a Palestinian state where refugees would be free to settle and thereby end their refugee status. The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter, “Beginning of the Refugee Problem”, introduces the notion of the right of return and its importance to a resolution of the refugee problem. It also examines the first attempt at negotiating the refugee issue at Lausanne in 1949, soon after the 1948 War and the creation of the refugee problem. UN Mediator Bernadotte prepared a proposal to solve the refugee problem. In it he reaffirmed the right of the refugees to return to their homes. After his assassination, the UN passed Resolution 194, based on Bernadotte’s proposal, but the phrase “right of return” was absent from the resolution, which could be interpreted to mean that Israel’s acceptance of the refugees was only a suggestion. The UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, established by Resolution 194, mediated between

Israel and the Arab states at Lausanne because the Arab states would not negotiate directly with Israel. Israel wanted a peace settlement so its existence as a Jewish state could be secure, and the Arab states placed resolving the refugee problem at the top of their negotiations. Israel proposed the Gaza Plan, which essentially would annex Gaza as well as the refugees in Gaza. In this way, the thousands of refugees located in the Gaza Strip would “return” to Israel. After the Arab states refused their offer, the Lausanne meetings ceased for a short time until they resumed for Phase II of Lausanne. After receiving international pressure during the break, Israel announced what is known as the 100,000 Offer; 100,000 refugees could return to Israel. After the Arab states rejected this offer as well, the Commission tried to salvage Lausanne by shifting away from the political right of return to a humanitarian focus. The establishment of the Economic Survey Mission and the McGhee Plan was intended to alleviate the refugee problem. The second chapter, “Deferring the Refugee Issue”, analyzes a period in the peace process which did not discuss the refugee issue. From Camp David I in 1978 to Oslo in 1993, there were essentially no refugee negotiations. In reality, following the failure of Lausanne in 1949 up to the Stockholm Talks in 1995, the peace talks deferred the refugee issue. For nearly 50 years the refugee problem was not resolved nor did negotiators try to resolve it. Even at the 1995 Stockholm, the participants were not government officials nor were they acting under their leadership. Even if the participants had agreed to a resolution of the refugee problem, they would have had no authority to implement it. Therefore, it was not until the 2000 Stockholm talks that the states first debated the refugee issue since Lausanne. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem set the stage for a resumption of the peace process, preceding Camp David I. By visiting Jerusalem, Sadat was already acting apart from the Arab states even before he signed the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. He entered into bilateral negotiations with Israel and not only signed a separate peace agreement with Israel, but also a Framework Agreement to advance the Palestinians’ right to self-determination based on Resolution 242, which the UN passed in response to the land annexed by Israel from the 1967 War. This resolution called for Israel’s withdrawal from this land, but Israel and the Palestinians disagreed over this resolution’s interpretation, too.

The 1991 Madrid Conference was a highly publicized, internationally-involved conference that divided negotiations onto two tracks. Track I served as the bilateral negotiations at the top leadership level, and Track II was the multilateral negotiations among lower-ranking delegates. The conference discussed less contentious issues on Track I, while it placed the refugee issue on Track II. Within the multilateral talks were various committees, one of which was the Refugee Working Group (RWG). Track II did not allow for the RWG to negotiate the refugee issue from a political standpoint, by debating the right of return. Instead, the RWG could only discuss the humanitarian aspects of the problem by improving their living conditions and further developing the family reunification program in which Israel allowed a limited number of refugees to return to Israel to be reunited with their families. Learning from the failure of the Madrid Conference, the Oslo Process started through secret talks between Israel and the Palestinians. As it progressed, party leaders Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin and PLO leader Yasir Arafat joined the process, and with involvement from third party, U.S. President Clinton, they signed an agreement. The 1993 Oslo Accords are heralded as one of the great achievements in the history of the peace process, but not for its progress on the refugee issue. Oslo is important because Israel recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of the Palestinian people and entered in to direct negotiations with them, and the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist. In addition to the Interim Agreement, out of the Oslo Process came the Declaration of Principles (DoP). The DoP designated the refugee issue for the final status negotiations, officially agreeing not to discuss it until negotiations for a comprehensive peace settlement. The third chapter, “Negotiating the Refugee Issue,” examines the most recent talks of the peace process from the 1995 Stockholm talks to the Taba talks in 2001. It is in these last negotiations that Israel and the Palestinians have engaged in substantial discussions on the refugee issue. The 1995 Stockholm talks were led by unofficial participants, some of which were the same participants who began the Oslo Process. Even though there were no government leaders involved, it was the first time since Lausanne that there were discussions on the political nature of the refugee issue. Before Stockholm, at best there would be humanitarian dialogue that would try the band-aid approach to the refugee problem, and never solving it. Five years passed until the next

Stockholm negotiations. This time government leaders, although not at the top level, began Track II negotiations secretly, motivated by the success of the covert beginnings of the Oslo Process that led to its Interim Agreement. In the little amount of time the Stockholm Channel lasted, negotiators carried on substantial discussions on the permanent status issues, including the refugee issue. Intended to be in preparation for the more serious, bilateral negotiations, it was cut short before it could develop into Track I negotiations. In 2000, Clinton, Arafat, and Israeli PM Ehud Barak met for a summit conference for two weeks at Camp David in Maryland. Camp David II had intense negotiations on all of the permanent status issues, thought how much the negotiators discussed the refugee issue is a matter of debate. Arafat knew going into Camp David that their positions were still too far apart; they needed more time to discuss these complicated and difficult issues. The Clinton Parameters also contributed to the peace process by formulating a proposal for a resolution, but the Palestinians did not agree to use it as a basis for negotiations. Soon after Camp David II, the Taba talks began in the beginning of 2001 on the permanent status issues. Although not including the party leaders, Taba delegates had significant discussions on the refugee issue. While it ended without an agreement and without passing their progress on to the leadership, both the Israeli and the Palestinian delegation agreed it was the closest they had ever come to an agreement. Since Taba, there have not been any significant official bilateral negotiations, and certainly none that have discussed the refugee issue. And so, the refugees wait for the peace process to continue.

BEGINNING OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

Right of Return

Near the end of the 1948 War, the Arab armies were exhausted after Israel defeated them. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were living as refugees apart from their homes in what was formerly known as Palestine. These were the conditions in 1949 under which Israel and the Arab states made a truce to end the threat of continued fighting. The new state of Israel was not a welcome neighbor, and despite its military superiority, Israel knew the reality that the Arab states could take up arms again, putting an end to the Jewish state of Israel. The Israelis stayed on their guard, looked out for their national security interests, and were prepared to defend Israel. Both sides were ready for the armistice, and both sides wanted peace, but under extremely different circumstances. For the Arab states, there was a wide chasm between signing the armistice agreement and making a peace agreement with Israel, whose right to exist they would not acknowledge. Israel wanted the right to live as a Jewish state in peace, without the imminent threat of their Arab neighbors. By the spring of 1948, the refugees were already seeking to return. In May, the Arab states began protesting for the right of return on behalf of the refugees. The return of the refugees was a difficult issue for the leadership of the Israeli government. Whether they decided to grant return or withhold it, their decision would be met with hostility and conflict. The Arab states and the international community were pressuring Israel to admit the refugees, while internally Israel was divided over the issue of return. Even the Israeli leaders were not of one accord. David Ben-Gurion, first Prime Minister of Israel, voiced his opposition to the return of the refugees. His reasoning was it was not Israel’s responsibility that they left.

He argued that the refugees left willingly and by starting the war, the Arab states were responsible for the refugees. However, some Jews were tempted to make life difficult for the Palestinians who remained in Israel after the 1948 War. Therefore, Ben-Gurion called for equal treatment of all Israelis (Morris 2004, 310). Golda Meir, a part of the Israeli government and later to be Prime Minister, was of a slightly different mindset than Ben-Gurion. Although she called those Jews who fought for the Palestinians’ return “extremists” and did not name herself among them, she sympathized with the refugees who fled and were not involved in the acts of violence against the Jews. These “friendly Arabs”, she said, posed no threat to the state of Israel and their return should not be prohibited. Morris (2004, 311) speculates this was Meir’s insinuation, but she did not formally state this position. Eliahu Sasson, Director of the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Middle East Affairs Department, was an advocate of allowing a limited number refugees back over an extended period of time in order to gain respect in the international community and to bring about a lasting peace settlement (Morris 2004, 327). Moshe Shertok, Israeli Foreign Minister, was especially against the refugees returning. In a private conversation in late July of 1948 with UN Mediator, Count Bernadotte, he told Bernadotte that Israel would not allow the refugees to return while they were still at war. However, Shertok also told him that Israel would provide aid to the 20,000 refugees from Haifa who, as Bernadotte (1951, 190) described, were living in “appalling conditions.” This was not a promise for their return, but only to give them humanitarian assistance. Bernadotte tried many times to discuss the refugee issue with Shertok in hopes that he would compromise on their return. However, much to the frustration of Bernadotte, Shertok could not be dissuaded. Despite Shertok’s inflexible stance on the refugee issue, he did request from Bernadotte (1951, 204) the coordination of a peace conference in order to resolve the conflict, within which there might be discussions on the refugee issue. However, the Arab states initially were unwilling to engage in direct negotiations with Israel as this would imply their acceptance of the state’s existence. At another meeting with Shertok, Bernadotte (1951, 209) admonished Israel for not showing compassion for the refugees, saying they had missed a “great opportunity” to gain respect in the international community.

The debates of the Israeli leaders came to a head July 28, 1948 when the Israeli Cabinet ministers voted 9 to 2 “not [to] discuss the return of the refugees until a peace settlement” (Morris 2004, 324). With an overwhelming majority, they made a formal decision to, in essence, bar the refugees’ return until the cessation of hostilities. The basis for their decision is evident; they could lose their state if the refugees came back. A mass return was a frightening thought as it would create chaos, undermine the control of the Israeli government, and quite possibly renew hostilities. Even though many Palestinians had become refugees, a seemingly non-threatening group of people, Israel had not forgotten the refugees were Arabs, and it was the unified entity of the Arab states that was fighting Israel in the war. It was still too risky to let their antagonistic enemies move back in across the street when the refugees’ property was on the Israeli front lines. If the refugees took up arms, Israel would have no secure line of defense. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) cautioned and pressured the government leaders to prevent a return; the military was well aware of the realities that could face them if there was a full return. Robbie Sabel (2003, 5), former legal adviser to the Israeli Foreign Minister, adds, “hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arab refugees” did not “wish to become loyal Israeli citizens.” This means that some Jewish Israelis thought the refugees did not merely want to return to live in their homes, work, and be satisfied with living as a minority in a Jewish state. The Arabs did not want a Jewish state on Arab land, and the refugees would only be satisfied when their lives were returned to the status quo ante— before the creation of the Jewish state (Morris 2004, 550).5 Although the Jews did not appear to expect the mass exodus of the Palestinians in the early stages of the war, they took measures in the last stages and after the war to prevent them from coming back. The Israeli government developed a plan from April to December of 1948 that would deny Palestinians employment, destroy 400 villages, place IDF on borders, create propaganda against Arabs returning, put forth legislation to prevent their return, takeover their land, take in new Jewish immigrants, and establish new settlements (Morris 2004, 313, 342).

5 Benny Morris (2004, 309) believes that not only did Israel prevent the refugees from returning for national security purposes, but also to boost the Jewish economy. By occupation, most Palestinians were farmers; and if they left their land, including their crops, the Jews could take over the land and harvest the crops, benefiting from its fruits as well as expelling the competition.

They established the Committee for Abandoned Arab Property to assist Jews in settling in former Arab homes (Masalha 1992, 185). By selling abandoned Arab property to immigrating Jews, they were able to put “facts on the ground”, and kill two birds with one stone: acquiring land and population transfer (Masalha 1992, 188). They determined to take advantage of the Arab exodus from the land by filling the land of Israel with Jews. They ensured the Palestinians had nothing to return to. The destruction of more Palestinian villages made way for Jewish settlements, and abandoned Arab property was sold to new Jewish immigrants. Israel took over the agricultural land formerly-owned by Palestinians, harvested, and profited from their crops (Morris 2004, 362). There were many Israelis living in former Arab homes. In fact, by 1951, 1.4 million Jews were living in Arab houses (Arzt 1997, 16). The Transfer Committee also helped Palestinians resettle into Arab lands (Morris 2004, 312).6 Resettlement was the main objective of Israel since they were against a return. The more refugees they could resettle, the less argument the Arabs would have for the absolute necessity of return. Resettlement was permanent and final. A refugee can accept repatriation or resettlement, and once either has been taken care of, the refugee loses his or her refugee status. A Palestinian cannot claim a right of return if he or she has already accepted resettlement. The Transfer Committee surmised that the Arab population should not exceed 20% of the total Israeli population (Masalha 1992, 199). The Transfer Committee was also in charge of population transfer. In exchange, they requested that any Jews living in Iraq might be allowed to settle in Israel (Masalha 1992, 141). Population transfer was a common justification for Israel denying the right to return. This exchange occurred in the wake of the 1948 War when 800,000 Jews fled the Arab states and made their home in Israel. In turn, 800,000 Palestinians, some estimates number, left their homes in Israel to take refuge in the Arab states. However, the Palestinian refugees argued that they were not responsible for the expulsion of the Jews from the Arab states (Bowker 2003, 108).

6 The Transfer Committee was established before it became an official agency under the Israeli government. It began under the direction of Haganah commander Yosef Weiz who had the support of an Israeli government official, Moshe Shertok. Weiz carried out the destruction of Arab homes, and similar activities as what took place later when it was official government activity. He received permission from the government for only some of his undertakings, but not all of them (Morris 2004, 313).

The Making of Resolution 194

Considering the impossibility of a peaceful resolution between Israel and the Arab states if left to themselves, the international community, with Britain leading the way, stepped in to assist the opposing parties. Count Bernadotte, the UN-appointed mediator for the Arab-Israeli conflict, was instrumental in achieving the truce that ended the hostilities of the 1948 War. In addition to being the Mediator, Bernadotte was a Swedish diplomat, vice president of the Red Cross, and a significant negotiator in World War II. Before his assassination by members of the Stern Gang in September of 1948, he composed a list of recommendations to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Tragically, he was killed a day after he submitted it to the UN General Assembly. Unfortunately, Bernadotte’s successor as mediator, Ralph Bunche, did not carry on Bernadotte’s legacy of fighting for a resolution to the Palestinian refugee problem with the same determination and resolve as Bernadotte (Morris 2004, 333). Bernadotte knew that without a resolution of the refugee problem, there could be no peace, and he worked to that end—for a just and lasting peace settlement (Bernadotte 1951, 244). September 16, 1948, the day before his assassination, Bernadotte (1951, 235) submitted a “Progress Report of the UN Mediator on Palestine” to the General Assembly. The report was sent with an accompanying letter pleading with the General Assembly to take immediate action on what he considered to be the two top priorities—a peaceful resolution of the conflict and humanitarian aid for the refugees. Under article 3(e) of his report, he stated the premise of the right of repatriation in which he wrote, “the right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who may choose not to return” (Bernadotte 1951, 239). Further on under article 4(i), he stated his proposal for a resolution to the refugee problem. It reads, “The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish- controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choose not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation commission.” He then details the functions of the Conciliation Commission (Bernadotte 1951, 241).

Bernadotte’s recommendation that the refugees have the right to return to their original homes in Israel as soon as possible is the recommendation most important to the refugee issue. Before he submitted this report to the UN in September, he wrote a list of suggestions at Rhodes in late June, which was very similar to his later proposal.7 At Rhodes, he requested that those who left from the war might “return to their homes without restriction” (Bernadotte 1951, 130). Moreover, he suggested that those choosing not to return should be compensated the estimated worth of their former property. Compensation should also be paid to those whose property was damaged during the war. Bernadotte suggested for the UN to form a Conciliation Commission. It would be responsible for overseeing the repatriation or resettlement of the refugees, whichever they so chose. The Commission would also help to resolve the conflict, encourage peaceful relations between the parties, and ensure that freedom of movement and other such basic human rights were respected along the border and within the West Bank and Gaza (Gabbay 1959, 221-222). Bernadotte’s (1951, 243) report also included a section on humanitarian aid in which he called for the involvement of the international community to increase the relief efforts in order to save the lives of the refugees, including Palestinian and Jewish refugees. He desired to provide them with relief and help them return to their homes. He called their situation “heart-rending” (Bernadotte 1951, 185-186). At the beginning of August, Bernadotte recalled in his journal “the refugee problem was vaster and more baffling than we had imagined” (Bernadotte 1951, 196). Only a few days later he visited another refugee camp where he was greatly affected by their plight and saw their desperate need for aid (Bernadotte 1951, 200). The measure to which the refugee problem affected him is evident as a few weeks later, he traveled around to the various Arab states working tirelessly to gather support for a humanitarian organization for the refugees (Bernadotte 1951, 192). However, both Israel and the Arab states, none of which were UN members at the time, rejected Bernadotte’s proposal and were unwilling to work with it or find some common understanding on which to compromise. This came as no surprise to Bernadotte (1951, 131), who was not expecting the proposal to pass without harsh criticism.

7 The Rhodes track, established by the UN, worked towards securing an armistice (Caplan 1993, 14).

However, he hoped the parties would acquiesce to negotiations rather than turn back to fighting. Israel did not approve of the proposal because it did not want to give up any of the territory it had acquired from the war. Israel did not accept responsibility for the refugee problem, but instead blamed their migration on the Arab states. They were willing, however, to establish peace talks with the Arab states to come to a peaceful resolution of not only the refugee problem, but also the conflict as a whole (Gabbay 1959, 222-223). Taking into account the precarious condition of Israel’s national security after the war, Israel feared a renewal of hostilities if it permitted the return of the refugees (Morris 2004, 318). Israel considered the refugees a threat to its existence as a state because the refugees were still Arabs, despite their deplorable circumstances, and the Arab states were still hostile towards Israel. Rather than repatriating the refugees, Israel focused its efforts on the resettlement of the refugees. However, Israel was willing to “keep the [refugee] question open” and determine a solution for the refugee problem when relations with the Arab states were normalized (Gabbay 1959, 223). Although the Arab states wholeheartedly disagreed with the Bernadotte proposal, it would be the only point of agreement between the Arab states and Israel. While Israel, in its dissent, went point by point, stating its own positions on the issues within the proposal, the Arabs did not get past their opposition to the existence of a Jewish state. In essence, their counter-proposal was a demand for Mandate Palestine to be a “unitary state with protection for the Jewish minority” (Bernadotte 1951, 144). When Bernadotte (1951, 146) met with the Prime Minister of Egypt regarding the proposal, Nokrashi Pasha made it clear the Arab states could never accept a Jewish state. He considered it “the duty of the Arab world” to prevent its existence. The Arabs refused to accept partition, and wanted the refugees to be able to return to their homeland and for Israel to pay compensation. They claimed Israel had no right to become a state because the Jews created it under the forced expulsion of its residents, and the Jewish state would be in the position of ruling over an Arab majority (Gabbay 1959, 223-224). Israel did not think the Arabs could expect circumstances to be the same as before the war. Bernadotte (1951, 146) also knew reality had changed dramatically, and the dynamics in the Middle East would never be the same—a difficult fact for the Arabs to accept.

Resolution 194

Despite the rejection of Bernadotte’s proposal by the Arab states and Israel, Britain decided to continue formulate it within the UN. Even much of the international community disapproved of the proposal. However, Britain continued to work with the UN to create an international document based on the Bernadotte proposal. With the revisions from the drafters of the proposal, the UN General Assembly adopted UN Resolution 194 on December 11, 1948 (Gabbay 1959, 227). Resolution 194, paragraph 11 advocates the right of return of the refugees to their homes and states as follows: Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible (UN General Assembly-b 1948). UN Resolution 194 is hailed today as one of the great official documents pertaining to the Palestinian refugees. Every advocate of Palestinian refugee rights refers to this resolution to support the refugees’ claim to the right of return. The Israelis and the Arabs have intensely debated it in negotiations, both interpreting it in their own way. Despite the different interpretations, the concept of the right of return has only been reinforced over the years (Akram 2002, 41). Although not a law itself, academics name it alongside other international laws which do grant the right of return. It is the first UN resolution to refer to the Palestinian refugee issue and their return and it is the most detailed. After 1948, the UN created a number of resolutions whose texts include a reaffirmation of Resolution 194. The UN recognizes the resolution’s importance to the refugee problem by confirming it every year since 1948 (Boling 2001). Yet Britain originally created this resolution and the UN adopted it against the wishes of Israel and the Arab states. The Arab states, which had always acted in unison, rejected the entirety of the final resolution (Gabbay 1959, 237). Al-Ghouri, chairman of the Palestine Arab Delegation, addressed the UN General Assembly in 1966 to formally refuse the acceptance of Resolution 194 on the basis of the recommendatory language used in reference to the right of return (Radley 1978, 600). The Palestinians held this was

indeed a right; therefore this was not something that could be withheld upon condition, given to Israel’s discretion, or negotiated away among state leaders. The right of return was their inalienable right. But times have changed, and now both Israel and the Palestinians have accepted Resolution 194, albeit with different interpretations. Regardless of its origins, it remains a fundamental part of the ongoing peace process. Besides its reference to the Jerusalem issue, UN Resolution 194’s main points are on its creation of the Conciliation Commission and its reference to the refugees (UN General Assembly-b 1948). Count Bernadotte originated the idea of the Conciliation Commission in his proposal. As he suggested, the Conciliation Commission would assist the opposing parties in negotiating a peaceful resolution and settlement of the Arab- Israeli problem and aid the refugees in repatriation, resettlement, and in receiving compensation, along with a few other minor functions. In paragraph 11, as provided earlier, UN Resolution 194 makes reference to the issue of the Palestinian refugees. The resolution allows the refugees to return not only to their land of origin, but to their homes as well. It also gives each individual refugee a choice of whether to accept return or resettlement. The refugees are not treated in this text as a unitary body. Unlike many other discussions of refugee rights, Resolution 194 gives each a choice and an individual identity. The text of the resolution does not only refer to Palestinian refugees, as it is thought of most commonly, but any refugee who lost his or her home in the 1948 War and who is no longer living on their own property. Technically, this text could also refer to the 7,000 Jewish refugees from the 1948 War (Bernadotte 1951, 243). The adoption of the final text of Resolution 194 did not come without debate in the UN General Assembly. The state leaders discussed the phrasing of paragraph 11 in particular, until they came to a consensus. There exist two major changes from Bernadotte’s proposal to the final text of Resolution 194. First, the UN omitted the word “right” and added a contingent clause. The refugees must be willing to live peacefully with their Jewish neighbors. A requirement to live at peace in order to return to one’s home was never included in Bernadotte’s recommendation. In his proposal, he had affirmed the refugees’ right to return to their homes in Israel (Bernadotte 1951, 241). According to him, returning to one’s homeland and one’s own property could not be disputed. It was the only humane and just response to the ugly realities of war.

Bernadotte did not treat it as something that could be taken away or given with a condition. However, the UN decided to add the stipulation that the refugees must live peacefully in order to be allowed to return. This second part of the clause is critical to the national interests of Israel, without which, they would have no line of defense against a sea of refugees demanding their own return. Israel argues that when the Palestinian refugees of today and the negotiators in the peace process tout their right of return, it can raise its hand in objection, basing its argument against return on the legal premise of national security. Attacks against Jews by Palestinian groups only strengthens Israel’s argument to refuse the refugees the right to return. Due to its national security interests, Israel is able to make a strong case to withhold the right of return. Under international law, refugee status is not accorded to persons who have violated human rights norms or have committed crimes against humanity. Israel also argues against the right of return in consideration of its demographic concerns. Israel fears it would cease to be a Jewish state if it allowed the return of the refugees. One factor weakening Israel’s argument based on national security is the fact that thousands of Palestinians stayed behind in the 1948 War, became Israeli citizens, and have been living peacefully with their Jewish neighbors (Arzt 1997, 52). Therefore, because of the frequent violent hostility of some Palestinian groups, Israel could argue for withholding refugee status from these persons, but it should not be used as an excuse to bar the return of all refugees. A country may grant repatriation on an individual basis, meaning Israel can deny repatriation to those involved in terrorist activities, while others, with no evidence existing against them, should be permitted to return (Arzt 1997, 70). The second amendment of Bernadotte’s proposal is the timing of the return. The UN disagreed on the phrasing of the draft resolution “at the earliest possible date.” Bernadotte used this phrase and Britain adopted it in their draft. The text the UN adopted states that refugees can return “at the earliest practicable date.” The UN designed this change from “possible” to “practicable” to make allowance for the requirement of refugees wishing to live at peace with their neighbor before being given the right to return. If the UN kept the word “possible”, then it implied that the refugees should be able to return immediately, no matter their disposition towards their Jewish neighbors.

This is what Bernadotte intended and what the Arabs supported. When the UN added the stipulation “to live at peace”, it also needed to alter the wording of the timing for returning in order to account for the change. Other members of the UN General Assembly even wanted to change it to “the earliest possible date” after a peace was established (Gabbay 1959, 232). However, considering this peace might not come for some time, the UN did not accept this recommendation. At the time of drafting Resolution 194, the UN General Assembly debated the concept of the repatriation of the refugees. The Arabs objected that repatriation would mean a Jewish minority would soon rule an Arab majority. The Arab states feared this concern would drive the refugees to accept resettlement and compensation rather than accept the fate of being treated as a minority in their own homeland (Gabbay 1959, 237). The UN also debated over a population exchange. In so doing, the refugees would not have to worry about being treated as a minority group. Israel voiced their agreement, but the majority of the UN General Assembly opposed population exchange. Thus, the UN kept the text allowing for repatriation of the refugees in the resolution (Gabbay 1959, 234). Considering the controversial nature of Resolution 194 and its significance in the peace talks, it is no wonder there are numerous debates among negotiators and among scholars regarding its interpretation. A primary argument prevalent in the debates is the absence of the “right of return” in Resolution 194. Nowhere in the resolution will one find the term “right” in relation to the return of the refugees. Furthermore, Resolution 194 is not able to give a right as it is not law. UN resolutions are not international laws because the UN General Assembly is not a law-making body. Consequently, the right of return that some claim to be found in Resolution 194 is non-existent (Sabel 2003, 6). That is, if it were law, then regardless of whether or not Israel had agreed to the resolution, Israel would still be bound to abide by it. However, this is not the case. Negotiators use Resolution 194 as a basis for discussions in the peace talks because it was specifically written in reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, Resolution 194 obligate Israel to permit the return of the refugees because it is not binding.

Even though Resolution 194 is not an international law, there are existing international laws providing for the right of return. The International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, Article 12 (4) affirms, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country (UN General Assembly 1966).” The International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination also states it similarly (UN General Assembly 1965). The right of return is in international law. Another important UN document, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, while not an international law, states in Article 13 (2), “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country (UN General Assembly-a 1948).” The Arab states interpret Resolution 194 as providing for the right of return in international law (Radley 1978, 601). However, this has been shown not to be the case, which the Israelis stress. While Resolution 194 is not an international law, but only a recommendation unable to bind Israel, it does reaffirm the right of return that exists in international law, as well as this right being a general humanitarian principle (Radley 1978, 602). Not only is Resolution 194 not law, but also the wording used in the resolution does not pretend to be obligatory, but only recommendatory. The obligatory word “right” is omitted from the text, and in its place is the recommendatory word “should.” In paragraph 11, it states, “The refugees wishing to return…should be permitted to do so…” “Should” is generally used as a term of recommendation, not a command (Sabel 2003, 6). Had this resolution been a law, it would have used wording demonstrating that fact, such as “the refugees…are permitted”, thereby giving the refugees that right. Instead, the UN General Assembly chose to use the word “should”, strongly urging Israel to allow their return, but this is all the UN body was capable of doing—making a recommendation. A second argument is one that has already been discussed in relation to the alterations of Bernadotte’s proposal—the condition to live at peace. Considering this phrase found its way into the final draft of the resolution, the UN General Assembly must have had a good reason for adding it. This reason is the preservation of the state of Israel. Israel was only a few months old and its existence as a state was in jeopardy with the onset of the 1948 War. This was a necessary clause considering Israel had recently

experienced hostile attacks from its neighboring states that refused to accept its existence. For the Israelis, this contingent clause to “live peacefully with their neighbors” is paramount to the protection of their national interests. However, the Arabs disregard the clause. They say the right of return is an inalienable right, and a condition cannot be placed on it (Boling 2001, 13). A third argument concerns the date Israel should permit the return of the refugees. Paragraph 11 states that this should be done at “the earliest practicable date.” Again, for the Israelis, “the earliest practicable date” would be the signing of a peace treaty. Without the full assurance of peace and an end to the conflict, Israel cannot assume the refugees will live peacefully, and therefore it is not yet time to permit their return. However, the Arabs interpret the meaning of “earliest practicable date” as being the cessation of the hostilities of the war (Boling 2001, 4). That is, once Israel and the Arab states signed the armistice agreement, Israel should have implemented the right of return. Regardless of its meaning, the reality is that more than 50 years have passed and the Palestinian refugees have not been able to return.

194 to Lausanne. After the UN adopted Resolution 194, the Conciliation Commission, composed of representatives from the U.S., France, and Turkey, began its work immediately in compliance with the resolution. The Commission based itself in Jerusalem and traveled to see the refugees. The Commission was struck with the dreadfulness of the refugees’ conditions, and, as living among the situation increased its sense of urgency to alleviate the refugees’ pain, it was determined to make every effort to resolve the refugee problem (Gabbay 1959, 237). The Arab states also pressed the refugee issue on the Commission, challenging them to make it a priority above any other issue in the conflict. They urged the Commission to resolve the refugee issue, but only in accordance with UN Resolution 194—a resolution they had previously rejected (Gabbay 1959, 239). The Conciliation Commission agreed with the Arabs on the priority of the refugee issue and using Resolution 194 to determine a resolution. The Conciliation Commission then called for a meeting with the Arab states and Israel. But the meeting would be between the Arab delegation and the Conciliation Commission and between Israel and the Conciliation Commission. This meeting was intended to focus on a

resolution of the refugee problem. After meeting with the Arab states, the Commission (UNGA/UNCCP-a 1949) concluded, “They [the Arab states] were not prepared to enter into general peace negotiations with Israel until the solution of the refugee problem had been found, at least in principle.” The Arab states agreed to meet as long as it was not considered a peace conference or they did not have to speak directly with Israel. Consequently, the Commission called the conflicting parties to Lausanne in April 1949 for an “exchange of views” rather than a “peace conference” (UNGA/UNCCP-c 1949).

Lausanne 8

8 The main secondary sources used for Lausanne are Gabbay, Caplan, and Morris. The Ethridge interview and various documents from the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) are the main primary sources. The UNCCP faithfully wrote up reports on the status of the Commission’s work, including their meetings throughout the Lausanne period. The reports, along with letters between the Commission and Israel or the Arab states, provide insight into the discussions at Lausanne. From the Truman Library comes “Mark F. Ethridge Oral History Interview” which discusses his involvement with the Conciliation Commission. While the interview provides some information on Ethridge’s viewpoint of the Commission, the majority of questions are directed towards his involvement elsewhere. Rony Gabbay, an Israeli historian, born in Baghdad, educated at Geneva, and currently a researcher at an Australian university, provides a useful resource in the Political study of the Arab-Jewish conflict: the Arab refugee problem. Written in 1959 only a decade after the refugee problem began, his book lays out an extraordinary historical account of the story of the refugees from before 1948 through the late 1950’s post Suez saga. He concentrates on the work of the UNRWA and its impact on the refugees, along with the idea of repatriation and resettlement. He only spends one chapter on refugees in the Lausanne peace process, but the chapter is filled with intensive research on everything that went on at Lausanne, especially pertaining to the resolution of the refugee problem. Not only is his political study invaluable to the field of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because it was thorough and written so soon after the conflict began, but also because of Gabbay’s background. He brings a rare perspective to the scholarly work on the issue because he is an Israeli, and yet born and raised in an Arab state and freely acknowledges his sympathies with the Arabs. Neil Caplan also contributes to the study of Lausanne in his booklet, “The Lausanne Conference”. Caplan writes from a different viewpoint than Gabbay, since he is not an Israeli or an Arab, and since he wrote in hindsight (1993), whereas Gabbay wrote when the conflict was still relatively new. Benny Morris is a well-known as a revisionist historian and one of the first Israelis to take a more sympathetic approach to the Palestinian refugees, refuting the claim that the Arab states were primarily responsible for the refugee problem. His stance led to condemnation from some Israelis, and the implication of his new historical account of the 1948 War placed the responsibility on Israel of taking care of and resolving the problem of the Palestinian refugees. His intensive and detailed work, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited: 1947-1949, was first written in 1988 and a revised edition came out in 2004. It is an important work to the conflict and to scholarly debates on the subject. While his book is mostly about the retelling of the 1948 War and the making of the refugees, it does end with a chapter on Lausanne.

The Lausanne meetings started the Middle East peace process, lasting longer than probably either party in 1949 thought it would last. Soon after the 1948 War and the creation of the refugee problem, the Conciliation Commission, Israel, and the Arab states gathered at Lausanne to discuss how to resolve the refugee problem, which was the main issue for the Arabs. They also discussed territory and a peace settlement for the conflict, which were Israel’s main issues, as well as the status of Jerusalem. The Lausanne Protocol established Resolution 181 and 194 as the basis for negotiations. Israel offered to repatriate all the refugees in Gaza if it could take the land as well, but the Arabs rejected the offer. Due to the lack of progress, those at Lausanne temporarily stopped meeting. After a hiatus, Israel made an offer, instigated by the U.S., to repatriate 100,000 refugees, but the Arabs rejected the proposal. Since they could not resolve the refugee problem, they turned to the Economic Survey Mission and the McGhee Plan to alleviate the problem by humanitarian means. The Conciliation Commission encouraged negotiations, in accordance with Resolution 194. The Commission arranged the Lausanne meetings with the intent to encourage discussion and an exchange of views on the refugee issue and territorial issues (UNGA/UNCCP-f 1949). The refugee issue was one of the Commission’s main priorities. The Commission had spent time at the refugee camps; they knew the deplorable living conditions of the refugees, and they sensed along with the Arab states the pressing weight to deal with the refugee problem, not only as a political issue, but a humanitarian one as well. The Commission agreed with the Arab states that Israel should repatriate the refugees. However, the Commission also knew resolving the refugee problem would come only through a practical solution. For the Commission, this meant Israel would repatriate only a portion of the refugees, while the Arab states would absorb the rest. The Commission did not believe every refugee wanted to return to Israel. They also believed the refugee issue was inextricably linked to the question of boundaries, and without a decision on permanent boundaries, they could not resolve the refugee problem (UNGA/UNCCP-d 1949). They invited the Arab representatives to Beirut for a preliminary meeting prior to the Lausanne meetings to learn their position on the refugee issue. The Arab states’ position, as given by the Arab delegates, placed the refugee issue as the top priority in the

Lausanne talks and they refused to discuss resettlement (Gabbay 1951, 243), and were reluctant to discuss territorial arrangements, the most important topic for Israel, until Israel agreed to repatriate the refugees (UNGA/UNCCP-f 1949). The Arabs, in agreement with the Commission, held that any resolution of the refugee problem should be based on Resolution 194. They complained of Israel not abiding by the resolution, and furthermore, accused them of creating facts on the ground—tearing down Arab homes and building up new Jewish settlements—to prevent the refugees from returning and to destroy that possibility (UNGA/UNCCP-d 1949). Just as the Commission met with the Arab states prior to Lausanne, so it met with Israel to understand its position. In the preliminary meetings between the Commission and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, Ben-Gurion expressed his desire for the refugee issue to be handled within the greater context of finding a peaceful solution to the entire Arab- Israeli conflict. Israel did not want to compromise and repatriate thousands of refugees without the assurance the Arab states would give them a peace settlement. Israel also wanted to focus on territorial arrangements at Lausanne and to not have the refugee issue take precedence (Gabbay 1951, 244). This stance was in opposition to the Arabs’ position that wanted Lausanne to focus, above all else, on the refugee problem. The Commission asked Ben-Gurion directly if Israel accepted Resolution 194, giving the refugees the choice of whether to return to their homes. Ben-Gurion answered them indirectly, emphasizing the resolution’s stipulation of the refugees’ need to live at peace with their Jewish neighbors. Considering the Arab states were not willing to make peace with Israel, Ben-Gurion pointed out that Israel could not trust the Palestinian refugees to live peacefully. He further explained Israel’s position on the refugees for the resolution to include their resettlement in Arab countries. Acknowledging the refugee problem was not merely a political issue to be negotiated in peace talks, but a humanitarian one as well, Ben- Gurion expressed Israel’s readiness and willingness to assist the refugees when it was time for it to do so (UNGA/UNCCP-d 1949). However, Israel did not accept any responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem. Moshe Sharett (1949) claimed it was entirely the fault of the Arab states which started the war. Still acknowledging the humanitarian problem of the refugee issue, Israel was willing to help in proportion to its

size and resources and with consideration of the willingness of the refugee to live in peace. Israel also would not accept the right of return. The Commission encouraged them to accept the principle of the right of return, and at one point, even Eytan wished the Israeli government would accept it, but they did not (Caplan 1993, 72). Before Lausanne officially began, the Commission was encouraged to find both parties “favoring peace,” but acknowledged the road to a peace settlement was a long one (UNGA/UNCCP-b 1949).

Lausanne Phase I

On April 27, 1949, the Palestine Conciliation Commission, Israel, and the Arab states met in Lausanne, Switzerland to commence a series of meetings on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Conciliation Commission consisted of U.S. representative Mark Ethridge, French representative Claude de Boisanger, and Turkish representative Hussein Yalchein. The Israeli delegation was headed by Dr. Walter Eytan, and the Arab states included Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (Neff 1996). The Commission allowed the Arab states to be regarded as a unitary single Arab delegation at their request, much to the dismay of Israel who preferred to negotiate with the Arab states one at a time (UNGA/UNCCP-f 1949). Since the Arabs would not negotiate directly with the Israelis, the Commission acted as mediator at Lausanne, communicating back and forth between the two parties. The Israelis, on the other hand, encouraged such direct negotiations (UNGA/UNCCP-g 1949). At Lausanne, the delegates also discussed the preservation of the rights and property of the refugees. The Arabs expressed their concern over the Israeli government destroying abandoned Arab property, causing the Commission to make a concerted effort to achieve Israel’s assurance that it would protect and not destroy the property. Arab property not only included their homes but their crops, too. All parties were concerned about the effect abandoned orange groves would have on the economy. This is why the Arab delegates proposed to permit the Arab owners and workers to return to Israel in order to care for the orange groves. Raising enough humanitarian aid and emergency relief funds was also a real concern as funds and resources were already running out and

winter was approaching, meaning the refugees would not be able to survive the harsh winter in their present living condition (UNGA/UNCCP-f 1949). In hopes of making progress towards a resolution of the refugee problem, the Commission created a Technical Committee designed to gather accurate and detailed information on the refugees, particularly how many there were, where they came from and their occupation, decipher how many of the refugees wanted to return to their homes, account for the condition of their homes and other property and establish ways to protect it, assist the refugees into places of employment, and explore additional ways to resolve the refugee problem. The Commission based its dealings with the parties in the negotiations on the findings of the Technical Committee (UNGA/UNCCP-g 1949). The Technical Committee determined there were 711,000 refugees and that the vast majority of them wanted to return. The Committee reported on Israel’s methods to block the return of the refugees, and that the practicality of the full number of refugees returning was diminishing every day with the an estimated 800 Jews immigrating to Israel per day (Morris 2004, 579).

The Protocol. Due to the difficult and challenging nature of the conflict, and the extreme opposite positions of the Israeli and the Arab delegations, the Commission developed a Protocol that would serve as a basis for the Lausanne meetings. Israel and the Arab states signed the Protocol on separate documents on May 12, 1949. The Protocol stated as follows: The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, anxious to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives of the General Assembly's Resolution of December 11, 1948, regarding refugees, the respect for their rights and the preservation of their property, as well as territorial and other questions, has proposed to the Delegation of Israel and to the Delegations of the Arab States that the ‘Working Documents’ [Resolution 181] attached hereto, be taken as basis for discussion with the Commission. The interested Delegations have accepted this proposal with the understanding that the exchange of views which will be carried on by the Commission with the two parties will bear upon the territorial adjustments necessary to the above indicated objectives (UNGA/UNCCP-e 1949).

The Protocol itself was vague and ambiguous as was needed in order to get both delegations to sign. Part of its ambiguity addressed the Partition Plan as a “working document”, thereby avoiding any obligation by Israel (Gabbay 1951, 241). The Protocol based the proceeding Lausanne meetings on Resolution 181 and Resolution 194, both of which would provide direction to the two main issues of the Lausanne discussions— territory and the refugees. With Israel pressing territorial issues and the Arab states pressing the refugee issue, the Commission tried to prevent a deadlock in negotiations by linking the two issues in the Protocol. Israel wanted the armistice lines to be the basis for discussions rather than the Partition Plan, but signed the Protocol anyway, but not without reserving its right to communicate its views concerning territorial borders (Caplan 1993, 52). The Arab states also signed, agreeing for the first time to the Partition Plan (Gabbay 1951, 241). In the Protocol, the Arab states agreed to UN Resolution 181, or the 1947 Partition Plan, a plan they had originally rejected when Britain first proposed it in 1947 (Bowker 2003, 88). The Partition Plan divided historic Palestine into an Arab state and an Israeli state. But after Israel’s victory from the 1948 War, the territory from the armistice agreements formed a much larger Israeli state than the Partition Plan assigned, making an agreement to the plan much more advantageous to the Arabs than it had been before the war. The Arabs were pushing for an Israeli agreement to the Partition Plan, which, if implemented, would considerably reduce Israel’s territory from the land it had gained from the war as stated in the armistice agreements. If Israel agreed to withdraw to the Partition Plan borders, the Arab delegation agreed to only demand repatriation for the refugees who had resided in the Partition Plan boundaries of the Israeli state, rather than demanding a full right of return into Israel for all refugees from the war (UNGA/UNCCP-g 1949; Khalidi 1992, 32-33).

Palestinian Involvement. In addition to the Arab delegates representing the Arab states, representatives from the refugee population were also present at Lausanne, but not as an official delegation. Various elite groups of Palestinian refugees requested to be recognized by the Israeli delegates. Unlike the Arab delegation, the refugee delegates were willing to speak directly with the Israeli delegation on the refugee issue and did so

on numerous occasions throughout Lausanne. It was only the Arab states that refused to negotiate with Israel because they were afraid of any resemblance of making efforts towards a peace settlement. Although Israel expressed its desire to completely resolve the refugee issue with the refugee delegates and vice versa, Israel knew the refugee delegation held no real power and only the internationally-recognized Arab countries could uphold an agreement with Israel (Gabbay 1951, 267). Besides discussing the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees, the refugee delegates urged Israel to allow a number of refugees back under the auspices of family reunification. In stark contrast to the Arab states promoting a cold war with Israel as they continually refused to make a peace settlement with Israel, the refugee delegates urged the Arab delegation to either go back into war with Israel or make peace with them so the refugee issue could be resolved. Also in contrast to the Arab states, and Israel as well, the refugee delegates had no preference with regards to the decision of territorial arrangements. However, on the matter of the refugee issue, the refugee delegates found agreement with the Arab states, Israel, and the international community. They agreed the refugee problem should be resolved through a mix of repatriation and resettlement cases. Unlike Israel who wanted the choice to be at its own discretion, the refugee delegates wanted it to be the refugees’ choice where they went, just as Resolution 194 had given them this choice, even if this meant the vast majority of the refugee population choosing to return. The refugee delegates expressed their willingness to live at peace in Israel for those refugees who chose repatriation, and their desire as law-abiding residents, whether in Israel or in an Arab state, to become full-fledged citizens of that country (Gabbay 1951, 266-267).

The Gaza Plan. Near the beginning of discussions between the Commission and the respective parties, Israel made the first proposal, known as the Gaza Plan. The Gaza Plan, in essence, was an offer to take control of the Gaza Strip that was then under the authority of Egypt. If Israel obtained the Gaza Strip, it would not only become responsible for administration of the strip, but also responsible for the 300,000 plus refugees residing there9, thus doing its part to care for a portion of the refugees and

9 Morris (2004, 562) numbers the refugees from 200,000-250,000.

taking the financial burden off of Egypt (Gabbay 1951, 244-245). The Gaza Strip was a small piece of land Egypt, Israel, and Jordan all desired to have in their possession. To have control of the Gaza Strip was a bittersweet victory. It was, militarily, a strategic strip of land between Egypt and Israel and, for Jordan, a much-needed outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. But it was also the inheritance of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, many of whom were refugees, who were not an asset but rather a strain on the already war-torn countries, especially the losing Arab side whose resources were exhausted. Even though Egypt, administrator of the Gaza Strip, so vigorously fought to keep the strip during Israel’s forceful attempt to take it in late 1948 and early 1949, the Egyptian government was still unsure as to whether it wanted to keep it. Knowing the stress it placed on its fragile economy and the impossibility of absorbing the refugees, Egypt was considering whether it should give it to Israel or Jordan. Despite the added financial burden on Israel with the integration of the Gaza Strip, it would also be gaining more territory. No doubt it would aid Israel’s military interests by creating a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt. To the dismay of the Gazan residents, Israeli sovereignty over the Gaza Strip would mean elimination of all forms of self-government among the Palestinians in the strip who had been given limited freedom by Egypt to govern themselves (Gabbay 1951, 245). Even though Israel would certainly benefit in some ways if the Gaza Plan were implemented, it would, in addition to the added financial burden, need to financially compensate either or both Egypt and Jordan for Israel’s territorial gain and accept the repatriation of the refugees. Repatriation meant allowing them to return to their homes, thus increasing the Arab minority in the Jewish state, and assisting the termination of their refugee status (Morris 2004, 562). The Gaza Plan was Israel’s attempt to quiet the increasing demands of the Conciliation Commission and the international community, especially the U.S. on whom Israel relied so heavily for financial support. Until the Arabs rejected the proposal, Israel’s attempt to receive some approval as the Commission and the U.S. endorsed the Gaza Plan, hoping it would end the Arabs’ demands for repatriation (Morris 2004, 562). Despite their efforts to implement the Gaza Plan, the Commission stated in its third progress report that it had communicated the plan to the Arab delegation without giving its own opinion (UNGA/UNCCP-f 1949). Even after the Commission informed the Arab

representatives of the Gaza Plan and the subsequent Arab decline of the offer, the U.S. and Britain continued to press the Arab governments to accept the Gaza Plan with added compensation for Egypt and the guarantee of a route for Jordan and Egypt to have free access to one another (Morris 2004, 567). Britain created its “Eight-point plan” which supported the implementation of the Gaza Plan, as well as the resettlement of the refugees in Israel and in the Arab states (Caplan 1993, 87). Mark Ethridge in particular pushed for the plan to materialize. He knew if the Gaza Plan fell through, the chances of Israel suggesting a second offer of repatriating 300,000 refugees was next to nothing. His premonition was correct, as in the past 50 years Israel has not made such an offer as it had with the Gaza Plan (Morris 2004, 565). Despite the Commission’s support, the Arab states, offended by what they considered an inadequate proposal, outright rejected the Gaza Plan (Caplan 1993, 65). Egypt complained of the plan only benefiting Israel with land expansion. Egypt proceeded to reaffirm its stance of the requirement for the right of return to be a just settlement for the refugee problem. The Arab representatives considered it unethical to bargain territory for refugees (Rahim et al. 1949). Whether morally correct or not, the lives and destinies of the refugees have been negotiated time and again by the Arab states and the Israelis in the peace process. According to Sasson (1949), neither side cared for the refugees’ well-being. They didn’t listen to their wants or needs, but chose to use them as a negotiating tool to get what they wanted. Although the Arab states demanded the right of return, Sasson thought they preferred the refugee situation to remain a problem, except for Lebanon. Morris (2004, 569) claims Jordan and Syria were using the refugee problem to receive the international relief aid that was flowing in for the refugee crisis. He further claims Egypt enjoyed the internal trouble the refugees caused Jordan and Syria, and wanted to keep it that way. They abused the plight of the refugees to meet their own ends, rather than either side being legitimately concerned about their welfare. Whether for national interests or out of concern for the refugees, the Arab states jointly refused to accept the Gaza Plan. With this unwavering position, the Arab states proposed its own offer to the Commission. The Arab delegates based their offer on the 1947 UN Partition Plan, supporting a return to the areas designed in the Partition Plan. Under the proposed

agreement, the refugees would have free entry into the new Arab state, while relinquishing claim to a full right of return to the refugees’ homes in the UN Partition Plan borders of Israel. Israel rejected this offer, but continued to push forward the negotiations by suggesting the creation of a subcommittee for the refugees, along with subcommittees for other difficult issues, but not all of these subcommittees materialized (Gabbay 1951, 246). To no avail, the Israeli delegation tried to get the Commission to convince the Arab states to talk directly with them. Both sides wanted Lausanne to have drastically different outcomes, and the Commission was not making any headway. With the Arabs pushing the refugee issue and the Israelis pushing the territorial issue, the Commission tried to link discussions on the refugee and territorial issues by placing pressure on both parties to compromise on their positions (UNGA/UNCCP-f 1949). However, the Commission was having a difficult time accomplishing this. Acknowledging the negotiations were in a deadlock, the Committee moved to suspend the talks for a few weeks in order for the representation of both sides to talk with the heads of their government and reconvene for Phase II in mid-July, 1949 (Gabbay 1951, 247). Ethridge was so frustrated with the negotiations that he quit after the first phase of the Lausanne meetings. “There wasn’t any give or take,” he said, “There was just no way of reconciliation.” Ethridge (1974) believed “neither side was ready for peace” and no amount of international pressure was going to make Israel “give up an inch of land” or make the Arabs relinquish their demand on the right of return for the refugees. He was particularly frustrated with the Israelis, who he thought had not made any compromises, placing the blame chiefly on them (Neff 1996). In undeniably harsh tones, Ethridge (1949) accused the Israeli government of poor ethics and stinginess. He further blamed the Israelis for the deadlock at Lausanne and for the lack of peace, thereby prolonging the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ethridge communicated his sentiments regarding Israel to President Truman. The pressure the U.S. would soon place on Israel between Phase I and Phase II of Lausanne owed to this communication.

Hiatus

While on their hiatus from the meetings, the Arab and Israeli delegates came under intense internal and international pressure. The Arab delegates returned to the Arab countries only to be met with tension and turmoil in their respective country. The Arab leaders were filled with insecurity as many internal divisions within their country threatened their own leadership. These divisions took the form of riots and protests against Israel and the Lausanne meetings (Gabbay 1951, 252). According to the Israelis, there was such a sentiment of hostility towards Israel that the Arab leaders would not allow the Lausanne delegates to make a peace settlement with Israel. Eytan (1949) wrote to the Commission, “The Israeli delegation had come to Lausanne with full authority to conclude a peace settlement…it had been a source of disappointment to find that the Arab delegations’ powers were limited to discussion of the refugee question alone.” Israel also was under intense pressure to begin compromising on the refugee issue. Its pressure came largely from the international community, particularly the U.S., rather than from internal pressure. Raymond Hare, acting U.S. representative at Lausanne, informed Israel of the U.S.’ displeasure of Israel’s refusal to submit to Resolution 194 as it pertained to the refugees (Morris 2004, 573). The U.S. wanted a statement by Israel that would assure the U.S. and the Arab states of Israel’s intent to repatriate a number of the refugees. The U.S. also wanted a number on how many refugees Israel was prepared to accept. The U.S. thought this would be a nice “gesture” to perhaps encourage the peace process and make the Arabs more likely to make concessions (Morris 2004, 570). Additionally, knowing the Arab states only agreed to go to Lausanne because of the pressure from the UN and because they thought Israel would compromise on the right of return under pressure, the U.S. was more sensitive toward the needs of the Arab states. The U.S. intensified its pressure on Israel to allow at least 200,000-250,000 refugees to return to their homes (Gabbay 1951, 254). The U.S. was also concerned, considering the fragile state of the Arab countries, that failure at Lausanne would lead to a political upset in those countries, further building a wall of hostility between the Arab states and the West (Gabbay 1951, 253). President Truman was frustrated with how Israel was handling the refugee problem and threatened Israel with consequences, although he did not give details (Caplan 1993, 60). However, U.S. Ambassador George McGhee backed

up Truman’s position with an actual threat to withhold $49 million on an Export-Import Bank payment unless Israel raised its repatriation limit to 200,000 refugees. But after Israel refused to raise its repatriation limit, Truman instantaneously withdrew the threat (Caplan 1993, 94).

Lausanne Phase II

After the Arab delegation and the Israeli delegation had time to talk over their positions with their government leaders, they reconvened with the Commission for the second phase of the Lausanne talks. Both the Arabs and the Israelis were more flexible and willing to negotiate than they were in the first phase of Lausanne (Caplan 1993, 89). The Arab and the Israeli delegates expressed their desire for the end result of Lausanne to be a final peace settlement on the refugee and territorial issues. To show their willingness to compromise with Israel, the Arab delegation provided their position on the territorial aspects of the conflict, whereas before the Arabs would only discuss the refugees. Although the Arab delegates all agreed a solution to the refugee problem would involve a joint effort through repatriation and resettlement, their respective governments had different ideas concerning who would be responsible for resettlement. Jordan and Syria were willing to absorb the refugees who could not be repatriated into Israel, but Egypt and Lebanon were not willing to take any due to their countries already being overpopulated. Egypt, however, was willing to consider absorbing a portion of the refugees if Israel acquiesce some of its land (UNGA/UNCCP-g 1949). In addition to the borders marked from the Partition Plan, the Arab states wanted to claim the Negev and Eastern Galilee as additional land needed to resettle the refugees. However, Israel asserted its right to the land set by the armistice agreements, not to the Partition Plan as set in the Protocol, let alone any additional land agreement (Gabbay 1951, 260). The Israeli delegation also demonstrated their cooperation with the Arabs by their willingness to discuss the refugee issue first, before the other issues of the conflict. They also agreed to immediately repatriate refugees, primarily women and children, who had been separated from their families during the hostilities of the war. The family member still in Israel, usually the husband and father, must have been living there legally. The delegates agreed to deal with the family reunification cases separately, apart from a

resolution of the refugee issue. This meant it was not a part of the resolution, but a humanitarian gesture from Israel. The Arabs agreed to these terms for family reunification, but pressed for the definition of the family unit to include relatives, since culturally, the extended Arab family was much closer knit than the Western and Jewish definition (UNGA/UNCCP-g 1949).

The 100,000 Offer. While the U.S. pressured Israel to repatriate 200,000- 300,000, Israel’s proposal to the Arab states included the repatriation of 100,000 refugees (Bowker 2003, 101).10 The 100,000 Offer was a proposal which, upon implementation, was intended to resolve the refugee problem and end the conflict. Israel also intended to implement the 100,000 Offer, a plan of repatriation, alongside a resettlement plan for the Arab states to absorb the remainder of the refugees. Although the 100,000 refugees would be able to return to Israel, they would not, however, be allowed to return to their homes. Israel kept the discretion of where to relocate the refugees. The relocation of the refugees would complement the economic development interests of Israel. Israel would also relocate them in areas that would not threaten its security or hinder its military interests (UNGA/UNCCP-g 1949). The 100,000 Offer was met with nothing but criticism. The Commission deemed the proposal inadequate, not even considering it worthy to officially pass on to the Arab delegation. Unlike in the previous proposal, the Gaza Plan, the Commission conveyed its opinion of the 100,000 Offer by only unofficially transmitting the information to the Arab delegation. The Arab delegates immediately rejected the offer because they believed the number was much too low. They claimed it violated Resolution 194 stating the right of return to the homes of all refugees with compensation. They also claimed it violated the Lausanne Protocol which not only reaffirmed Resolution 194, but the 1947 Partition Plan as well (UNGA/UNCCP-g 1949). They protested Israel’s claim to the land designated from the armistice agreement as being more than the Partition Plan allotted it. Despite Israel’s acceptance of the Lausanne Protocol and the Partition Plan when the UN originally proposed it, it did not consider it binding because the Arabs rejected it in 1947.

10 These refugees would be not be the same refugees returning under the family reunification program. Israel did not intend family reunification to be a political acknowledgment of responsibility, but only a humanitarian response to the refugee crisis (Caplan 1993, 93).

Israel giving itself discretion over where to resettle the refugees within Israel according its own financial and military interests further angered the Arab delegation (Gabbay 1951, 257). The Arab states were envisioning a resolution to the refugee problem in accordance with Resolution 194 and the 1947 Partition Plan. This resolution included a choice for the refugees to either return to a smaller Israel under the Partition Plan, or to resettle in either the Arab state created by the Partition Plan or to already existing Arab states with the help of international aid for those host countries. Those choosing not to return to Israel would be compensated, which could take the form of territorial compensation rather than individually-dispersed financial compensation (UNGA/UNCCP-g 1949). The Conciliation Commission was in agreement with the Arabs, and critical of Israel. The U.S. was divided in its response. Some, including President Truman, expressed approval of the 100,000 Offer, while others agreed with the Arab states and the Commission that it was not enough (Morris 2004, 574). Considering Israel had previously offered to repatriate double the number of refugees in the Gaza Plan, the Arabs were not about to settle for half of that amount (Caplan 1993, 92). However, Israel was not willing to raise the bar higher than the 100,000 limit it already offered. Even Israeli citizens criticized the delegates’ proposal. The announcement of the 100,000 Offer brought an uproar within Israel. Many Israelis opposed permitting 100,000 refugees to return to Israel, claiming with an increased Arab minority, too many Arabs would create problems and bring national insecurity to the state. On the other side of the Israeli debate, Sasson (1949) expressed his frustration of the 100,000 Offer and what he saw as an uncompromising stance of the Israeli leadership. He believed Israel was all take and no give, expecting a peace settlement without compromising. He had no confidence in the success of the Lausanne meetings and foretold their doom of failure.

Economic Survey Mission & McGhee Plan. The delegates at Lausanne once more found the meetings to be at a stalemate—first with the failure of the Gaza Plan and again in Phase II with the failure of the 100,000 Offer. Not willing to give up yet, the Conciliation Commission brainstormed in order to salvage what was left of the

negotiations. The Conciliation Commission and the U.S. feared the embarrassment of a complete failure at Lausanne. Since it was clear to the Commission that there would be no resolution at Lausanne, Paul Porter, Mark Ethridge’s replacement, recommended a change of focus from the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees to finding an economic solution to the refugee issue (Gabbay 1951, 258). With the agreement of the U.S. and the UN, the Conciliation Commission and the U.S. worked together to develop the McGhee Plan and the Economic Survey Mission. The projects were in accordance with Resolution 194, commanding the Commission to promote and aid the refugees in economic rehabilitation. The U.S. was willing to contribute financially to the implementation of both programs, the McGhee Plan and the Economic Survey Mission. The Commission also had the agreement of both the Arabs and the Israelis to comply with and take part in the Economic Mission. But the Arabs ensured that economic development for the refugees would not influence the final status of the territorial agreement (UNGA/UNCCP-g 1949). The McGhee Plan was intended to promote economic development among all of the Arab states, aiding in the resettlement of the refugees within the states. Since repatriation did not seem to be imminent, the U.S. focused on resolving the refugee problem through resettlement with international aid distributed to the host countries. The U.S. had high aspirations for the McGhee Plan. The U.S. and the UN also devoted time and effort into forming the Economic Survey Mission. The Economic Survey Mission was designed to survey and report on the economic conditions of the Arab states, and to assist them in creating regional development projects that would provide employment opportunities for the refugees (Morris 2004, 579). By supplying the refugees with jobs, the Mission would be integrating them into the economy of the host countries, making them an asset to their society, as well as taking away the refugee status of the refugees by making them self- sufficient (UNGA/UNCCP-g 1949). The Economic Mission improved the living situation of the refugees. In fact, it evolved into the UNRWA, which over the years has not only helped Palestinian refugees find employment, but also expanded its aid into providing basic life necessities, education, and healthcare. However, as much good as the McGhee Plan and the Economic Mission did for the refugees, and as hard as the U.S. and the UN tried to resolve the refugee problem through economics alone, the refugee

problem was first and foremost a political problem, not an economic problem (Morris 2004, 579). Negotiations were the only way Israel and the Arabs could resolve the refugee problem. Although Israel had brought two proposals to the table, the Gaza Plan and the 100,000 Offer, the Arabs had instantly rejected both, regarding them as unworkable. The Arabs’ acceptance of the 1947 Partition Plan and Resolution 194 was met with Israeli rejection of the Partition Plan, regarding it as null and void, and rejection of the full right of return within the Israeli-designated borders of the Partition Plan. After the Arabs rejected the 100,000 Offer, Israel gave up on making any other repatriation allowances (Bowker 2003, 101). Everyone at Lausanne knew the meetings had failed to bring any progress on resolving the refugee issue and on obtaining a peace settlement (Morris 2004, 578). The representatives left Lausanne on September 12, 1949 (Morris 2004, 580). Due to Israel’s refusal to admit the refugees because of security and demographic concerns, and the Arabs’ refusal to accept Israel’s existence, the first peace talk had been a failure. Although Lausanne ended without a peace agreement, all was not lost. Even though neither side negotiated directly with the other, they decided to turn to negotiations rather than continue the war. It was the first time they discussed the refugee issue, and they discussed it at great length. The Protocol agreed to a two-state solution, and it established Resolution 194 as the document by which to resolve the refugee problem. However, Israel and the Arab states could not agree on its’ interpretation. Neither did they have the same interpretation of the origins of the refugee problem. Despite the Arabs’ insistence, Israel denied any moral, legal, or political responsibility. In the end, due to the lack of progress in the political sphere, they turned to assuaging the refugee problem through humanitarian programs. The refugees were the most important issue for the Arabs, and the most difficult issue for either party to resolve.

DEFERRING THE REFUGEE ISSUE

Camp David I 11

After Lausanne, not much happened in the way of negotiations for another 30 years. It was apparent the refugee issue would not be resolved as quickly as was originally hoped. One roadblock to peace was the 1967 War between Israel and the Arab states—Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran and manned troops on the border with Israel after requesting withdrawal of the UN buffer troops, so Israel defended itself with a preemptive strike. In so doing, Israel defeated the Arab states, annexing the Sinai, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights in six days, so it is also known as the Six-Day War. Another Palestinian exodus came from the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. The war displaced an estimated 350,000 Palestinians from their

11 The primary resources on Camp David I include Ismail Fahmy’s memoirs, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East, which gives an account of his time as Egyptian Foreign Minister from 1974-1977, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s memoirs, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, from the time he served as Egyptian Foreign Minister from 1977-1991. Fahmy addresses Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, as this was the reason for Fahmy’s resignation. Boutros-Ghali’s book brings his perspective of Camp David I. Out of all the resources used for Camp David I, his book provides the most information on the Palestinians in the negotiations. Camp David I did not address the refugees, but, like Sadat, Boutros-Ghali was a proponent of Palestinian rights, such as the right of self-determination. There is also an interview with Boutros-Ghali from another source taken in 1978, just after Camp David I. The secondary sources include Ovendale, Hopwood, Finklestone, Lorenz, Hinnebusch, and Lesch and Tessler, all of which address Camp David I generally, not focusing on the refugee issue. Since the refugee issue was not discussed, the secondary sources only briefly refer to Palestinian rights in the context of the negotiations. Fayez Sayegh, a UN advisor to the Kuwaiti delegation, wrote on “The Camp David Agreement and the Palestine Problem” in 1979. Sayegh analyzes and laboriously picks apart the text of the Camp David agreement to determine what the Palestinians are practically obtaining from it. Within this analysis is the agreement for a transitional regime in the West Bank and Gaza, a Palestinian self- government, full autonomy, and Israeli settlements. Although each of these agreements is strongly related to the refugee issue, he does not provide a direct discussion of refugees at Camp David. He spends only a fraction on the refugees in which he analyzes the UN resolutions’ ambiguity. Sayegh analyzes the Camp David agreement, but does not spend enough time on the refugee issue itself.

homes, with the vast majority fleeing to Jordan. Another roadblock to peace was the 1973 War, or October War, between Israel and the Arab states. Sadat led the October War with Syria against Israel. Egypt and Syria surprise attacked Israel on their holiest day, Yom Kippur, to take back the territories Israel annexed in the 1967 War. The Arabs did not succeed, but they did not fail either; the war ended with a ceasefire. After the damage from the wars, as well as the frustration from the cancellation of a peace conference that was to be held in Geneva, Sadat decided to visit Jerusalem and discuss peace efforts with Israeli PM Begin in November of 1977. Sadat was known for his spontaneity. He made his decision independently, leaving the world, including his administration, in shock. After Sadat arrived in Jerusalem, he gave a speech in Arabic to the Knesset on his vision for peace. He said he was ready for peace, not a separate peace or a partial peace, but a permanent peace. This peace would be based on justice, which to Sadat, meant complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories annexed in the 1967 War— the Sinai, West Bank including Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. He rebuked Israeli expansionism, saying it was contrary to peace. In his eyes, this expansionism also included the creation of Jewish settlements on what was rightfully the Palestinians’ land. He said, “The Palestinian problem is the core and essence of the conflict…there can be no peace without the Palestinians” (Sadat 1977). In conjunction with Israeli withdrawal and the creation of a Palestinian state, Israel and the Arab states would have secure borders and the end of belligerency—a permanent peace. He said the peace settlement would respect relevant UN resolutions and the rights of the Palestinians—the right to self-determination and their own state. Sadat (1977) also stated that the Palestinians’ right to statehood was their right of return. His position was drastically different from the Palestinians, as well as the Arab states’ position at Lausanne. His statement characterized the new approach to the refugee problem throughout Camp David I, Madrid, and Oslo—to seek a resolution through self-determination, not a full right of return. Even though he upheld the Palestinians’ right to self-determination in his speech, the Arab world reeled in anger, including his Foreign Minister, Ismail Fahmy. Fahmy was completely against Sadat’s visit, and he let the world know it by quickly announcing his resignation (Fahmy 1983, 250).

After Fahmy’s resignation in 1977, Sadat handpicked Boutros Boutros-Ghali to assume the vacant post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Boutros-Ghali was a strong proponent of the Palestinians and played an important role in Egyptian foreign policy towards the Palestinians. He freely admitted he had emotional ties with them. But in addition to being an Arab, he was also an Egyptian. And as an Egyptian, he knew that if Egypt did not help the Palestinians, then Egypt would lose its position of leadership among the Arab world. During his years as Foreign Minister, he was outspoken and fought for the rights of the Palestinian people (Boutros-Ghali 1997, 235-236). He was also an advocate of the right of return for all Palestinians. His policy toward the Palestinians incorporated resolving the refugee problem in three stages: first, those living in the West Bank and Gaza—Egypt tried to resolve that situation at Camp David, then the refugees from the 1967 War, and lastly those from the 1948 War. His three-stage policy shows he knew any resolution to the Palestinian problem would be a slow and gradual process (Boutros-Ghali 1978). He encouraged Sadat to share his vision and support the Palestinian cause. After the Arabs had suffered numerous losses from the 1967 War and the 1973 War, it was time for a peace initiative from the Arab world leader. Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem prepared the way for a continuation of the peace process at Camp David. Although many Palestinians, and Arabs in general, strongly opposed Sadat because of his trip, he took stands for the Arabs and the Palestinians in Jerusalem. He asserted that Israel should return to its pre-1967 borders, and supported the Palestinians’ right to self- determination and their own state. In justification of his trip, Sadat claimed the aim of his unforeseen action was for a “just solution of the Palestinian problem” (Hopwood 1982, 110). Despite his attempt at a heroic effort, his decision to visit Jerusalem would deeply affect Egypt’s status among the Arab nations. But he would not feel the full effects of his visit until after another peace effort with Israel—Camp David. Camp David continued the Middle East peace process. Egypt, Israel, and the U.S. agreed to use Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations. Resolution 242 was aimed primarily on territorial issues, calling for Israel to withdraw after its victories from the 1967 War. Sadat went to Camp David pushing for Palestinian autonomy and self- determination. Camp David resulted in two agreements, a separate peace treaty between

Egypt and Israel, and a framework agreement on Palestinian self-rule. However, the framework agreement collapsed. In 1978, Egypt, Israel, and the U.S. met at Camp David to come to a peace agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis. Israel was still occupying the Sinai, and Sadat desperately wanted Egypt to have it back. While Camp David did not have representation from the Palestinians, it was an important peace conference for them because as leader of the Arab world, it was Egypt’s responsibility to uphold the cause of the Palestinians. At the conference, Sadat was eager to find a solution to the enduring conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The two main issues on the negotiating table were Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. Although Sadat was primarily concerned with the national interests of his own country and taking care of his own people first, he was still wholly committed to taking the leadership role in resolving the Palestinian problem. At Camp David, Sadat focused on caring for the most desperate group of Palestinians—those living in the West Bank and Gaza, and he did this by arguing for the West Bank and Gaza to become an autonomous region (Boutros-Ghali 1978). In the negotiations, Sadat insisted on Israeli withdrawal from the territories annexed by Israel in 1967, and Boutros-Ghali added it would be impossible to obtain peace without a withdrawal (Boutros-Ghali 1997, 138). Sadat also fought for the Palestinians’ right of self-determination and creation of a state, but was met with full rejection from Israel (Boutros-Ghali 1997, 45). Israel opposed full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. Instead it proposed a kind of self-rule, but essentially kept control in the hands of Israel. U.S. President Carter supported the position of Boutros-Ghali and Sadat. Carter urged Israel as well to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders. Carter was committed to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Fahmy 1983, 190) and assured Sadat of his assistance in working towards a solution to the Palestinian problem (Finklestone 1996, 199). Carter promoted the rights of Palestinians and the creation of a state (Ovendale 1999, 230). However, Sadat could not count on Carter’s full support because Carter also supported Israel (Fahmy 1983, 188). Because the U.S. supported Israel, Carter had to balance his position at Camp David. Wanting to reach peace in the Middle East, Carter sympathized with the Palestinians, but also retained his support of Israel.

Resolution 242

November 20th, a few months after the 1967 War, the UN Security Council passed another resolution pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. UN Resolution 242 called for Israel to withdraw from all or part, depending on the Israeli or Arab interpretation, of the territories annexed in the 1967 War. Resolution 242 also called for a “just settlement of the refugee problem (UN Security Council 1967).” Just as Resolution 194 had been the basis of the talks at Lausanne, so Resolution 242 was the basis at Camp David. However, because of the differing interpretations of what the resolution meant by “withdrawal from territories”, Egypt and Israel had difficulty agreeing to the very basis of the peace talks, even before getting to the actual negotiations. Virtually present in every Israeli- Palestinian peace agreement from Camp David on, Resolution 242 is a fundamental, internationally-supported declaration on Israeli withdrawal. Already Resolution 194, which is more detailed on the return of the refugees than Resolution 242, was left out of the negotiations. Because the Arabs shelved the idea of the Palestinians’ right of return in the negotiations and focused more on the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, the peace talks began to only recognize Resolution 242, and not Resolution 194. The peace process after Lausanne focused on exchanging land for peace. Because of the 1967 War and the land Israel gained from it, the Arabs centered negotiations on getting the land back, rather than on the refugees. Also, recognizing the permanence of the state of Israel, the Arabs did not prioritize the refugee problem as it had at Lausanne, but instead sought a resolution of the Palestinian problem through the creation of a Palestinian state. The Arabs fought for the state to be on the land from an Israeli withdrawal, not the Partition Plan as they had at Lausanne. Resolution 242 was a key component in the Camp David Accords. The U.S. supported it being the basis of negotiations (Ovendale 1999, 234), and the basis of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty (Boutros-Ghali 1997, 196). However, founding the peace talks on Resolution 242 did not come easily. Egypt had been a proponent of Resolution 242 since 1971 (Boutros-Ghali 1997, 292), but the Israelis were not as excited about the resolution because by agreeing to it, they would be agreeing to compromising their land (Lorenz 1990, 125). Debates on the resolution ensued, particularly regarding the interpretation of the phrasing of “territories.” The UN intentionally crafted Resolution

242 with ambiguous language to advance the peace process (Tessler 1994, 420). Israel pointed out that it did not say “the territories”, which would clearly mean the West Bank and Gaza. Rather, “territories” is a more ambiguous term that does not necessarily need to be interpreted as all of the West Bank and Gaza (Boutros-Ghali 1997, 295). Under this interpretation, the Israelis could withdraw from any part of the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for peace. The Palestinians understood its phrasing of “Israeli withdrawal from territories” to mean the West Bank and Gaza—or pre-1967 borders. Egypt’s interpretation of Resolution 242 held that Israel must withdraw from all the territories occupied since 1967. Sadat did not waver on this position at Camp David (Boutros-Ghali 1997, 299). Sadat also took into account the Palestinians’ attitude towards Resolution 242. The PLO had not accepted it, in large part due to the text referring to them as refugees (Fahmy 1983, 197). The Palestinians wanted to be a political problem, not a humanitarian problem (Fahmy 1983, 192). They did not want the international community’s charity, but to be dealt with diplomatically and to have their issues at the forefront of governments’ agendas. They wanted to be taken seriously on the political scene as a distinct people with their own government. Boutros-Ghali agreed with the Palestinians and he wanted to change Resolution 242 to include the right of self- determination, but Sadat along with the U.S. and Israel opposed this alteration because altering the foundation of the agreement would have jeopardized Camp David (Boutros- Ghali 1997, 259). Even with the differing views on Resolution 242, all parties agreed to use it for the basis of Camp David. The resolution is notoriously ambiguous, and this ambiguity allowed Israel and Egypt to agree since each side could interpret it as it saw fit (Tessler 1994, 420). After the parties had moved on from discussing Resolution 242, they debated over the main issues of the accords—Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of autonomy for the latter areas. Egypt wanted all this from Israel, and Israel wanted peace. Peace was Sadat’s bargaining chip. However, Sadat had a new foreign policy towards the Israelis, a policy different from any other Arab country. He believed he should first give the Israelis what they most wanted—peace, and then negotiate from there (Boutros-Ghali 1978). However, his policy got him into trouble

with the Arabs, and eventually played a part in costing him his life. Sadat made bold statements about the rights of the Palestinians and Israeli withdrawal, but Israel was uncompromising. When the negotiations were not going Sadat’s way, he found himself in a quandary between not wanting to go home without some kind of a peace agreement and not wanting to give up any Palestinian rights.

Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty

What ensued were two agreements. One agreement within the Camp David Accords was a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. The Arab world broke into an uproar because Egypt had done one of the worst things an Arab state could do—it had made a separate peace with Israel. The Arab world had a policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—to be united. The Arabs were stronger together than apart, and with Arab nationalism at its height, this policy intensified. Any settlement of the conflict, they decided, should be a comprehensive peace. The Arabs would agree together, stand together, and work together toward a resolution (Fahmy 1983, 102). Sadat joined the Arabs in supporting this comprehensive peace. He said peace would include a solution to the Palestinian problem. He assured the Arabs there would not be a separate peace (Lorenz 1990, 69). Israel was aware of the importance of a comprehensive peace and did their best to isolate Egypt from the Arab world, and they succeeded (Fahmy 1983, 102-104). The U.S. promoted the separate treaty, and Sadat finally agreed to it (Ovendale 1999, 236). Both parties signed the peace treaty in March of 1979. Boutros-Ghali, speaking on behalf of Sadat and Egypt, denied that it was a separate treaty. In defense of the accusations, he protested, “We are not heading in any way toward a separate peace” (Boutros-Ghali 1978). He argued his point by showing Egypt linking the progress of the two agreements: the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai with the withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Without this link, he said, the agreement would be a separate peace rather than a comprehensive one (Boutros-Ghali 1997, 141-2). Sadat also defended the separate peace by arguing that Egypt needed the two-part agreement to focus first on acquiring back Sinai to strengthen Egypt internally so it would be more capable of aiding the Palestinian cause (Lorenz 1990, 95). This was also

his reason for having two separate timetables, even though linked progressively, on the withdrawal from Sinai and the withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza (Boutros-Ghali 1978). According to Rabinovich (2004, 26), Sadat believed if he demanded withdrawal from all of Sinai in exchange for peace, then it set a premise for later in the peace process to demand withdrawal from all of the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for peace. Also by building trust with Israel through the peace treaty, Israel might be more willing to compromise on the Palestinian problem (Quandt 2005, 317). While these are all justifications for Sadat’s good intentions for the Palestinians through the Camp David Accords, others argue Sadat merely folded under the pressure of signing an agreement (Quandt 2005, 323). Up until Camp David, Sadat maintained an impressive balance between Egyptian interests and Palestinian interests, which was a difficult task to achieve (Lorenz 1990, 100). Although Sadat stood for Palestinian rights, he was ultimately an “Egypt-firster”, primarily looking out for national interests over Arab nationalism (Hinnebusch 1988, 161). So when Israel was willing to negotiate and return Sinai, it was an offer he could not refuse. Even with the treaty, Sadat tried to assure the Arab states that regardless of the treaty with Israel, Egypt’s primary allegiance stayed with the Arabs (Hinnebusch 1988, 67). Despite denials by Egypt, the Arabs saw things differently. The Egypt-Israel treaty sure looked like a separate peace to them and the treaty had devastating effects; Egypt was severed from the rest of the Arab world (Ovendale 1999, 245).

Framework Agreement

The second agreement in the Camp David Accords, “The Framework for Peace in the Middle East”, was a plan for autonomy and Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. This plan laid out a timetable for Israel to gradually hand over the West Bank and Gaza and for the Palestinians to gradually assume self-governing authority. Israeli martial law and military government were to leave the West Bank and Gaza for the coming of “genuine autonomy” (Boutros-Ghali 1978). The framework agreed to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Palestinian representatives working together to resolve the Palestinian issue. The framework also established West Bank and Gaza self-governance in five years, and for negotiations to begin on core issues, including the final status of the West

Bank and Gaza, a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, Israeli security, and the Palestinian refugee problem (Ovendale 1999, 235). Since the West Bank and Gaza seemed to be the most logical solution to the Palestinian problem, this was where Sadat focused his negotiations. If the parties implemented the framework, Camp David would be a step in the right direction of achieving the Arabs’ primary goal, obtaining the right to self-determination and a Palestinian state (Lesch and Tessler 1989, 9). The framework also laid the groundwork for future negotiations, particularly the Oslo Accords. Egypt saw Palestinian autonomy, arguably a stepping-stone to a future Palestinian state, as the primary resolution to the refugee problem rather than the primary resolution being the right of return. Even though Sadat pursued a resolution of the Palestinian problem through Palestinian autonomy, Camp David barely mentioned the refugee issue. Israel and Egypt agreed to “recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements”, as well as finding a “resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects” (Sayegh 1979, 27, 31). These phrases led to controversy between Israel and Egypt, but Israel accepted them because of their ambiguity (Quandt 2005, 246). According to Carter (1985, 169), Egypt regretted the omission of the Palestinian right of self-determination, considering it the worst error in the framework agreement. Egypt and Israel also determined they would “work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem” (Sayegh 1979, 37). Within this provision is only an agreement to find a way to deal with the refugees. Nothing else was determined—not whether Palestinians could work with Egypt and Israel or how they would even approach resolving the issue. While Arabs accused Sadat of settling for a weak framework agreement, Quandt (2005, 262, 322) argues that Sadat truly wanted to help the Palestinians attain their rights, that he refused to make peace with Israel without first ensuring Israel would compromise on Palestinian autonomy, and that through linking the framework agreement and the peace treaty, Egypt would achieve these objectives. Although the parties did not discuss the refugee issue at any length, they did address the issue of displaced persons. The agreement designed the new Palestinian self- government to assist the process of returning DP’s to the West Bank and Gaza.

However, the Palestinian self-government did not have complete authority over who returned. Egypt, Jordan, and Israel were on a committee with the Palestinian entity, and were required to agree on how many DP’s were to return, with Israel having veto power. This veto power was largely on the grounds of whether Israel believed DP’s to be a threat to its national security. Additionally, Israel wanted to require the DP’s to make a contribution to the Israeli economy as a qualification for return. In response to Camp David, the UN General Assembly expressed its disagreement with its solution regarding DP’s because it favored Israel, as Israel ultimately had sovereign discretion over the return of the DP’s (Sayegh 1979). Unfortunately, neither party fully implemented the Framework for Peace (Brynen 1998). Over the course of the following months, negotiations became increasingly weaker. Because it dealt with such difficult issues, Egypt and Israel originally wrote the framework in an ambiguous manner so they could sign some kind of agreement. The transitional period towards full autonomy was supposed to be taking place, but negotiations and the timeline were far behind. Egypt and Israel were becoming progressively more uncompromising, and they felt the consequences of the framework’s ambiguity. Sadat kept pushing for full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, which caused conflict with Israel. With the controversial nature of the framework, Rabinovich (2004, 27) claims Sadat did the “bare minimum” to uphold his end of the peace agreement. Boutros-Ghali, being a strong advocate of Palestinian rights, was especially vocal about his frustration and disappointment in the failing peace treaty (Lesch and Tessler 1989, 9). He thought they could resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in five years, as the framework established (Boutros-Ghali 1978). He believed Israel would have withdrawn from the West Bank and Gaza had Sadat insisted upon it late in the negotiations (Boutros-Ghali 1997, 138). Even the Palestinian people did not work with Sadat to implement the framework agreement because they did not want to recognize the state of Israel, also leading to the failure of the peace process (Carter 1985, 45). In the last years of a waning agreement, Sadat grew increasingly more desperate to save it. In 1980, the spontaneous man that he was, Sadat negotiated with Israel and offered the precious Nile water in exchange for peace for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and in particular, Jerusalem. Israel quickly turned away the offer, and

Sadat was left with no agreement with Israel and returned back home to a mass of angry Egyptians upset that Sadat would bargain away their water—their lifeblood. He also traveled to Europe and the U.S. to propose a Palestinian government in exile. This move was also met with hostility—this time from the Palestinians. Sadat kept trying to link the standing Egypt-Israel treaty with the weaker Framework for Peace, but nothing worked. A portion of the failure goes to Israel’s unwillingness to compromise. The uncompromising Israeli position was so great, two of the top Israeli leaders, Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman, became frustrated to the point of resigning (Lorenz 1990, 99- 100). Although Sadat expressed his commitment to the Palestinian cause and to seeing through the framework’s provision for full autonomy, he knew the agreement could not be saved (Lorenz 1990, 95). Camp David had dissipated into nothing and the Palestinians were left where they had begun. With the awareness that the hoped-for- peace was not going to materialize, in 1980, Sadat put an end to the negotiations (Lesch and Tessler 1989, 10). What ensued was a “cold peace” between Egypt and Israel (Rabinovich 2004, 27). The aftermath of Camp David did not lead to a permanent peace in the Arab- Israeli conflict. Although Camp David resulted in two agreements, one of which established a framework on Palestinian self-rule and the other a peace treaty, neither agreement resolved the refugee problem. In fact, the parties hardly discussed the refugee issue at Camp David. Rather than recognizing the refugee-focused Resolution 194 as at Lausanne, it recognized the land-focused Resolution 242. Sadat knew the Palestinian issue was the most important issue in the conflict, but he demanded rights on Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza rather than the right of refugees to return to Israel.

Madrid 12

12 The primary sources in the Madrid section are Bentsur, Ross, and Tamari. Eytan Bentsur’s book Making Peace, focuses on the Madrid Conference. As Israeli Foreign Affairs Director General, Bentsur provides the details of the bilateral negotiations at Madrid, but since the refugee issue was only in the multilateral negotiations, Bentsur does not discuss the refugees. The three chief peace talks that U.S. Ambassador Dennis Ross addresses in The Missing Peace are Madrid, Oslo, and Camp David II. His book is an excellent resource with a detailed inside look at a number of the peace talks. However, as with so many other authors, he does not go into detail on the refugee issue.

The Madrid Conference was an international event. With the participation of numerous countries, it was evident the Arab-Israeli conflict was a conflict of monumental proportions, capturing the interest and involvement of the world. Madrid split into two tracks, with the bilateral negotiations in Track I and the multilateral negotiations in Track II. For the first time, the Palestinians were able to take part in the negotiations through a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Track I focused on exchanging land for peace, and Track II established the Refugee Working Group to discuss the refugee issue only on humanitarian grounds, with discussions centered mostly on the family reunification program. However, the working group meetings ended with little progress. Numerous international events occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s creating an avenue to open peace negotiations between the Arab states and Israel. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which had so long supported the Arab states, the Gulf War causing an increase in instability within the Middle East especially between the Arab states, and the Intifada, which caused an increase in instability within Israel itself, were all catalysts preparing the way for the 1991 Madrid Conference. One man made the Madrid Conference possible —U.S. Secretary of State James Baker (Bentsur 2001, 117). Years

Salim Tamari, Palestinian coordinator for the Refugee Working Group (RWG) in Madrid’s multilateral track, provides a useful booklet, Palestinian Refugee Negotiations, on the RWG. While Tamari does not give a detailed account such as what was said and who said it, he does detail the issues the RWG addressed, family reunification in particular. The main secondary source is Rex Brynen, a Canadian author and professor at McGill University and consultant for Foreign Affairs Canada, has been a key contributor to articles written on the refugee issue in the peace process. In his 1998 article on “Palestinian Refugees and the Middle East Peace Process” he dedicates only a portion of his article to the issue, while spending latter portion of the article on possible solutions for a resolution of the conflict. He does cover the Madrid and Oslo peace talks after he begins by presenting a historical background of the refugee problem and looking at the living conditions of refugees residing in each country. He then moves into the heart of his paper, the peace process. At Madrid, he focuses on the RWG and provides a substantial amount of information on the multilateral negotiations. He also provides a helpful resource as he focused on the obstacles faced for each peace talk and the reasons for each failure. Brynen’s article is a good resource for the refugee issue in the RWG in particular. However, he only covers Madrid and Oslo, and he focuses primarily on the multilateral negotiations, whereas what is needed is an in-depth study of the refugee issue in the bilateral negotiations as well as the multilateral negotiations. Brynen also wrote on “The Roadmap and the Refugees” which analyzes implications of the Roadmap on the refugees, as well as what the Roadmap is missing and fails to address in order to bring a peaceful and lasting solution to the refugee problem. Avi Shlaim, a revisionist historian, wrote The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, attempting to be balanced in his study of Israeli foreign policy from the state’s inception to 1998. It is a comprehensive look at Israel’s involvement in numerous peace talks and is a useful resource of an overview of Israel’s relations with the Arab states from the perspective of a new historian. Since the book itself covers a broad topic, the accounts of the refugees are not as detailed as they would be if the topic were narrower, but Shlaim supplies information on the refugees in general as well as the refugee issue in the various peace talks.

prior to the actualization of the conference, Baker was working tirelessly to organize an international conference whereby all of the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, along with countries holding observer status, would agree to go to Madrid for peace negotiations. The formation of Madrid and the gathering of Israel and the Arab states under one roof was a great achievement in and of itself. The framework, or structure of the conference, if carried through to fruition, would enable the parties to have a comprehensive peace (Bentsur 2001, 160). The participants at Madrid included Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. PM Yitzhak Shamir headed the Israeli delegation. The Arab leaders sent their Foreign Ministers to head their delegations, but Shamir went himself, instead of sending his Foreign Minister, David Levy (Bentsur 2001, 115). The U.S. and the Soviet Union, headed by President Bush and Gorbachev, worked together serving as co-sponsors of the conference and mediators in the negotiations, with Baker acting as chief mediator (Bentsur 2001, 127). The UN, the European community, and the Gulf Cooperation Council attended as observers. The Gulf Cooperation Council was invited so other Arab states that would not normally be directly engaged in negotiations with Israel, such as Saudi Arabia, could be a part of the international conference. Any efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict needed the involvement of the entire international community, particularly the whole of the Middle East. Secretary of State Baker’s great accomplishment was the creation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (Bentsur 2001, 122). He spent a great amount of time and energy traveling to the Middle East, speaking with the Jordanian government, key Palestinian leaders, and the Israeli government before they all agreed to his arrangement. Although it was a joint delegation, the arrangement included two separate tracks—an Israel-Jordan track including a couple Palestinians and an Israel-Palestinian track with a couple Jordanians (Bentsur 2001, 132). This arrangement satisfied both sides. Through the joint delegation, the Palestinians, who so desperately wanted to represent themselves apart from the delegation of any other Arab state, would essentially be having direct bilateral negotiations with Israel; and Israel would still have Jordanians on the delegation to keep some semblance of a joint party. Israel was willing to have the Palestinians represent themselves if they were joined with the Jordan delegation, but did not allow the

Palestinian delegation to include any members from the PLO, terrorists, nor refugees from outside the West Bank, Gaza, or East Jerusalem.13 Even though these prerequisites for Palestinian involvement limited the representation of the Palestinian people at Madrid, the joint delegation was a great victory for the Palestinians. It meant Israel recognized the Palestinians as a unified and distinct people from the wider classification of being Arab. It was also the first time the Palestinians represented themselves in negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Shlaim 2000, 487). The Madrid Conference opened October 30, 1991 in Madrid, Spain. The opening conference lasted four days. On the first day, each delegation gave an opening speech. Syria, and Israel to a lesser extent, used their statements to play the blame game. Syrian Foreign Minister, Farouk al-Shara (1991) condemned Israel for encouraging Jews to immigrate to Israel but refusing to implement Resolution 194 allowing the refugees to return. Israeli PM, Yitzhak Shamir (1991) blamed the Arab states for using the refugees as a “political weapon against Israel.” He declared that, apart from Jordan, the Arab states did not “welcome nor integrate” them. Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi (1991), head of the Palestinian delegation, on the other hand, gave a forward-looking speech that was more in a spirit of cooperation and peace than the others (Ross 2004, 80-81). He affirmed the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and the creation of a Palestinian state. He agreed to an interim period that would not “prejudice the permanent status negotiations.” He stated that Resolution 194 should serve as the basis for the permanent status negotiations on the refugees would be based on, and that the refugees have the right of return. He did not neglect to mention the rights of the DP’s and family reunification cases to return to their respective homes. Jordanian Foreign Minister, Dr. Kamel Abu Jaber (1991) also reaffirmed the Palestinians’ right of self-determination, and that a resolution to the refugee and DP problem should agree with the “relevant UN resolutions.” The second day of the opening conference, each delegate gave brief follow-up statements; they broke from meeting the third day for the Jewish Sabbath, and wrapped up the opening conference on the fourth day with preliminary bilateral negotiations. The opening conference in Madrid was only the beginning of a two-track plan lasting several years.

13 However, the Palestinian delegates took orders from the PLO, even though they claimed they were not attached to the PLO (Bentsur 2001, 139).

Track I

Track I was a series of bilateral negotiations, one-on-one between Israel and each of the Arab state delegations. The Madrid bilateral negotiations resulted in two points of progress in the peace process. One, the Arab states and the Palestinians engaged in direct negotiations with Israel, whereas previously at Lausanne, they were in separate rooms with the Conciliation Commission mediating between the two parties due to the Arab states’ refusal to negotiate directly with Israel (Bentsur 2001, 117). Two, the Arab states agreed to bilateral negotiations, another great feat for Israel. Again, at Lausanne the Arab states were a unitary delegation, speaking with one voice. The separate peace treaty Egypt made with Israel at Camp David had already weakened the unified Arab body. The bilateral negotiations at Madrid were yet another step towards peace.14 However, they did not discuss the Palestinian refugees. Track I was reserved for the core issues needed for peace—land and security—land concessions for a Palestinian state and the assurance of secure borders and a peaceful coexistence for Israel (Bentsur 2001, 127). At Lausanne, the core issue being the Arab states’ first priority was the refugee issue, but the Arab states’ promotion of a resolution of the refugee problem had taken a turn over the years from the right of return to the creation of a Palestinian state, causing a drastic change in the peace process. Madrid was not the same peace process as it was at Lausanne. The refugee issue had taken a backseat to the territorial issue. The refugees were upset with the Palestinian delegation at Madrid for abandoning their cause (Bowker 2003, 157). Additionally, rather than Resolution 194 being the basis for the Madrid talks as it was at Lausanne, Resolution 242 and 338 were established as the foundation for Madrid (Bentsur 2001, 125). Resolution 242 and 338 spoke nothing of the refugees as Resolution 194 had, and focused instead on Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Resolution 194 was not the only resolution the parties were disputing; Resolution 242 also had varying interpretations. Israel interpreted it to mean a withdrawal from some of the territories it took in the 1967 War, and Israel had already given the Sinai back to Egypt. The Arab states interpreted it to mean Israel should withdraw from all of

14 Israeli delegate, Eytan Bentsur (2001, 140) described the Madrid bilateral negotiations in Washington as “negotiating about potential negotiations.”

the 1967 territories, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, in addition to the Sinai (Quandt 2005, 493). With the approval of the international community, land-for-peace was the slogan of the Madrid Conference. However, the focus on Israeli withdrawal from land displeased Shamir (Bentsur 2001, 125). Shamir continued to build up Jewish settlements, visually expressing his unwillingness to acquiesce any land. Shamir blamed the Arab- Israeli conflict on Arab rejection of Israel’s right to exist (Shlaim 2000, 490, 2).15 Syria, the radical party among the Arab states, held diametrically opposing views from Israel. It wanted Israel to give the Golan Heights back to Syria before the negotiations could even begin (Shlaim 2000, 490-491). Lebanon wanted the refugees located in Lebanon to be given the right to return to Israel (Bentsur 2001, 123). Jordan played the middle ground as a practical moderate, but its counterpart was not always in agreement. In fact, many times at Madrid the Israelis found the Jordanians’ negotiations constructive and helpful, but found the Palestinians to be difficult and uncompromising (Bentsur 2001, 141). The Palestinians wanted the their right of self-determination to be realized through Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and an interim arrangement of self-government, with the final aim of it turning into a Palestinian state (Bentsur 2001, 130). They protested the continued construction of Jewish settlements and the human rights’ violations against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (Bentsur 2001, 134). They supported all relevant UN documents pertaining to the refugee issue, meaning Resolution 194, to be used as a basis for resolving the conflict (Bentsur 2001, 122). In accordance with Resolution 194, the Palestinians demanded the right of return in addition to a new state (Bentsur 2001, 130). At Madrid, all of the Arab states stood for Palestinian political and national rights—their right to self-determination, self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza, and the establishment of their own state (Bentsur 2001, 123, 5). 16

15 Israel’s initial position was not aimed at exchanging territory along with acceding governing powers to the Palestinians, but rather only agreeing to Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza in the context of administration. The Palestinians were upset because they wanted Israel to begin negotiations with its final offer, rather than negotiation to get there (Bentsur 2001, 130-131). 16 When Rabin was elected as Prime Minister in June 1992, and the Labor party came to power, he offered an accelerated timetable with the hope of signing onto an agreement, but nothing changed and Madrid ended as a failure (Bentsur 2001, 139).

Track II

Only in Track II of the Madrid process did the talks specifically deal with the refugee problem. While Track I was the venue for bilateral negotiations, Track II was venue for multilateral negotiations in the Madrid Conference. Multilateral negotiations and bilateral negotiations differ in many ways. Bilateral talks generally deal with past, political problems, while multilateral talks deal with future, non-political problems (Tamari 1996, 3). Bilateral negotiations are notoriously unsuccessful in resolving any part of the refugee problem. Both parties only see in black and white, and refugees seem to be an insurmountable problem. Bilateral negotiations also tend to stop progressing when Israeli leadership changes. Therefore, multilaterals have taken the responsibility of analyzing the problem and supplying interim solutions, improving the situation one step at a time (Tamari 1996). The multilateral talks were divided into five groups: economic cooperation and development, environment, water, arms control and regional security, and refugees. The multilateral delegates created the Refugee Working Group (RWG) to address the refugee problem.

Refugee Working Group. Canada and participants comprised of individuals from various countries worldwide hosted the RWG. The Palestinians, who could not represent themselves, were in a joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation in Track II just as they were in Track I (Tamari 1996, 5-6). Within the RWG were seven subcommittees covering a range of issues within the refugee problem: human resource development, job creation and vocational training, public health, child welfare, economic and social infrastructure, databases, and family reunification (Brynen 1998, 75). The delegates selected one country to oversee each subcommittee. For instance, France was in charge of the family reunification group. The purpose of the RWG was threefold. One purpose was to reunite families separated by the 1948 War. Family reunification was one way to help alleviate the refugee problem. This was done through the admittance of a specified number of refugees, separated from their families living in Israel and who Israel had prevented from returning. With the separation of husbands from wives and children from their parents, Madrid gave priority to these refugees over other refugees. To be united with one’s

family is a human right endowed in the Geneva Conventions and all countries should grant it as a right, not an item up for negotiation. Out of all of the RWG subcommittees, the family reunification group had the most difficulty because it was the only subcommittee with a political dimension. The subcommittee’s goals were aimed at resolving the number of problems with the family reunification program. The application procedures were unclear; there was no accountability of whether Israel was fulfilling its yearly quota, or whether it was following its procedural guidelines. These guidelines include contacting refugee applicants within three months. Yet, Israel was violating those guidelines by not informing the applicants of their application status in a timely manner, as well as not offering them a reason if it rejected their application (Tamari 1996, 9-15). The RWG was able to agree on fixed criteria for the application procedure, as well as address the violation concerns of the refugee applicants. However, their difficulty laid in the actual implementation of their new standards (Tamari 1996, 9).17 The family reunification group faced other problems including how many cases Israel should admit per year. Israel had been giving 1,000 refugees residence in Israel per year through the family reunification program. Through the RWG, Israel doubled the number to 2,000, along with granting residency to 6,000 illegal residents living in the West Bank and Gaza (Tovy 2003). Even though Israel doubled the yearly quota, the RWG was still not satisfied (Tamari 1996, 29). The family reunification group also had difficulty agreeing on what constitutes a family. Israel was on one side holding to the nuclear definition of a family, while the Palestinians were on the other side holding to the extended definition of a family. The debate over the family definition was not only rooted in political agendas—getting the most refugees into Israel or keeping them out, but in cultural differences as well. The second purpose of the RWG was to promote dialogue and brainstorm on possible solutions to the refugee problem. The RWG met for the first time in January of 1992 and continued to meet subsequently for a total of seven plenary meetings, in addition to various intersessional meetings. In the plenary meetings, each subcommittee

17 Under the Interim Agreement at Oslo II, the Palestinian Authority would work with the Israeli government on family reunification applications (Tamari 1996, 12).

sought to work out each of the issues through encouraging communication between the countries. The RWG attempted to define each problem by instigating a variety of surveys throughout regions populated by the Palestinian refugees. Although the surveys contributed to the goals of the RWG, the survey questions they distributed did not deal with the core problems because the subject matter was too sensitive. Therefore, the RWG did not collect the information it really needed, such as how many refugees would want the right of return (Tamari 1996, 28). They also were successful in raising funds to accomplish their objectives, and worked with the UNRWA to increase the amount of aid and relief going to the refugees (Tamari 1999, 84). A third purpose of the RWG was to improve the living situations of the refugees without prejudicing the final settlement (Brynen and Tansley 1995). Madrid was instrumental in changing an ongoing debate of whether or not refugees that are given aid by their host countries lose their right of return. Previously, the Arabs states were reluctant to push for aid, fearful it would settle the refugees permanently in the host Arab states and that the aid would be considered a just settlement of the refugee problem rather than the full right of return. This mindset changed, however, with Madrid’s formation of the RWG (Arzt 1996). For years Palestinian refugees lived in deplorable conditions and did not want to improve their living conditions so that they as refugees would remain a problem to their host country. Wanting the attention of the international community and Israel, Palestinians refused resettlement, compensation, and better living conditions. They held out for the right of return. Because of the RWG, Palestinians were able to receive humanitarian aid without affecting final status negotiations regarding the right of return (Tamari 1999, 85). When the Madrid delegates first created the RWG, they disagreed on whether the RWG should concentrate on the political aspects of the refugee problem, meaning the right of return, or on its humanitarian aspects by improving the refugees’ living conditions (Tamari 1999, 7). The delegates decided that the RWG should move away from the political realm to the humanitarian in order to address the urgent needs of the refugees. They made this decision alongside an agreement establishing that the humanitarian activities of the RWG would not prejudice the political aspects of the final status agreement. To stress the importance of this agreement, the Palestinian delegates

reiterated the agreement along with quoting Resolution 194 at the beginning of every plenary session (Tamari 1999, 7, 35). In pursuing a humanitarian solution to meet the urgent needs of the refugees, the RWG raised a substantive amount of funds and put this money into action through development projects. However, these projects did not exclusively target refugees, but were geared toward developing entire communities, regardless of their refugee status (Tamari 1999, 29). As an overall assessment, the RWG made little improvement on the refugee issue and was primarily a disappointing failure. Salim Tamari (1999, 85), coordinator of the RWG, was not pleased with the results of the RWG. Of all of the multilateral groups, the RWG had the most complications because it was so tied to and dependent on the bilateral negotiations (Brynen and Tansley 1995). The RWG faced a number of difficulties, hindering the extent of its work. Although it was successful in bringing in a significant amount of funds to build up the lives of refugees, it ironically was not able to continue its work or accomplish its goals because of insufficient funds (Tamari 1999, 84). It was difficult for the RWG to make progress due to the fact that all of the delegations needed to unanimously agree on every decision. To complicate matters further, state heads replaced Track II delegates with lower ranking and less influential delegates because many of the original supporters of the multilateral talks were becoming disenchanted with its lack of progress. The RWG suffered from a lack of reasonable proposals (Hassassian 2002, 72-73). Furthermore, the inflexibility of Syria and Jordan obstructed their relief efforts. Since both countries boycotted the RWG meetings, the RWG was not able to reach the Palestinian refugees located in those host countries. Israel also posed a problem. It did not favor multilateral talks from the start. It much preferred bilateral negotiations, as opposed to the Arab states, which wanted multilateral talks (Brynen 1998). Israel was especially hesitant about the RWG because it included a subcommittee for family reunification—a topic Israel was reluctant to discuss (PRRN). Israel viewed family reunification as a humanitarian concern, not a political right (Brynen and Tansley 1995). In fact, Israel boycotted the first RWG meeting, and nearly boycotted the second meeting because of the family reunification issue. Unfortunately, even the Arab League boycotted the multilateral negotiations in 1997, officially putting an end to the RWG.

Although Madrid did not end with an agreement, it was instrumental in making the Oslo agreement possible through its bilateral negotiations in Track I. However, the delegates hardly discussed the refugee issue in Track I. Due to the difficulty of the problem, the delegates deferred the refugee issue in the bilateral negotiations, and with the creation of Track II negotiations, the RWG addressed its humanitarian concerns. The RWG made some progress on the family reunification program, but even the non- political nature of the RWG was too controversial, and ultimately, the RWG and Madrid ended with little to show for its efforts.

Oslo 18

18 The main primary sources for Oslo include: Agha, Rabin, and Savir. Hussein Agha, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev Schiff in Track-II Diplomacy focus on the preliminary talks at Oslo, as well as their involvement in the Stockholm talks. Their book stresses the importance of the Track-II talks in order to achieve progress on the difficult issues like the refugees. While they provide the context and process of the talks with exactly who was involved and their role in the talks, it did not divulge any significant amount of what was actually discussed at the talks concerning the refugees. In his memoirs, Yitzak Rabin gives an account of his life, with the culmination of his term as Prime Minister at the Oslo Process. While his account of his interactions with the other leadership at Oslo is invaluable, he does not spend any great length on the refugee issue and what he does write is in the context of a Palestinian state. Uri Savir, in The Process, details his time at Oslo as Israel’s chief negotiator with the PLO. While Oslo did not discuss the refugees, Savir writes some on the refugee issue in the context of the permanent status issues. The secondary sources used for Oslo include: Brynen, Hassassian, Levin, and Said. In addition to the reference to Brynen’s article, “Palestinian Refugees and the Middle East Peace Process”, in the Madrid section, for Oslo he gives a short synopsis on its components, the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli- Jordanian Treaty, and the Interim agreement, as well as the Quadripartite Committee and the concept of final status talks. Manuel Hassassian in 2002 wrote Political Refugee Problem and the Light of the Peace Process. In it he lays out the basic points of the Israeli and the Palestinian positions on the refugee issue, and writes on the basic family reunification discussions of the RWG. He also presents the basic international laws found in discussions on the refugee issue, and possible solutions. Once again there is a lack of an in-depth study on refugees in the negotiations. Scholars tend to give more background information than the main topic of negotiations, as the title of the paper indicates. Lengthy sections on the authors’ proposals for a solution to the refugee problem are also a part of most papers. Ken Levin, author of The Oslo Syndrome: Delusions of a People under Siege and American scholar of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, begins his recent work with the Diaspora and Jewish thought coming out of the Diaspora and leading up to Oslo. Much of his writings on the Oslo process are on the general peace talk itself and negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, but he does include some information on the right of return in the Oslo process. Edward Said, in The End of the Peace Process, analyzes the Oslo Process as a failure from his perspective as a Palestinian. Said, a well-known scholar of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, represents an

Unlike Madrid, Oslo began meeting simply between Israel and the PLO, being the first time the Palestinians represented themselves in the negotiations, without Jordan or the other Arab states. It was also the first time Israel and the Palestinians negotiated directly with each other, without the involvement of the Arab states. They signed an agreement called the Oslo Accords, or the Declaration of Principles. The Declaration of Principles set aside the refugee issue, along with other issues deemed for final status talks only. The meetings in Oslo began while the Madrid negotiations were still taking place. The multilateral talks the delegates established at Madrid continued to meet for a few more years. Delegates in the bilateral negotiations also periodically met, but it was apparent that Madrid was unraveling quickly and would not end with the result everyone hoped for at its inception. Much of Madrid’s failure was attributed to its high profile. The international fanfare of the Madrid Conference received mass publicity. With all of the attention from the press, the government leaders and negotiators were not able to delve deeper into the difficult issues as they needed to in order to resolve the conflict. Rather, they remained on safe, surface-level discussions at Madrid, as they gave the media politically acceptable answers (Bentsur 2001, 133). As negotiators were still occupied with the failing Madrid negotiations, the head of the PLO Economics Department, Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurei) thought of a different approach to the peace process. It was he, a Palestinian, who started the Olso Process and who was primarily responsible for its existence (Agha et al. 2003, 29). Abu Ala began working on assembling an informal, low profile Israeli-Palestinian peace talk to take place in Olso, Norway. This approach aided Oslo in resulting in an agreement. In December of 1992, the Israelis and members of the PLO began meeting secretly. They kept Oslo such a secret that it was below the radar of not only the media, but also the U.S. and Israeli top government officials. Yossi Beilin, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, did not make the Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, aware of Oslo until it had been going on for some time. And Peres did not tell PM Rabin of its existence until even later. Much of the success of the Oslo Process is attributed to its secrecy and also to

Arab viewpoint critical of Oslo, with the use of referencing numerous Arab news articles. He highlights the plight of the refugees and stresses their right to self-determination.

the negotiations starting informally with lower level participants (Agha et al. 2003, 37). The Oslo Accords, hailed as one of the great successes in the Middle East peace process, did not have a mediator or third-party present at its beginnings. It was simply a group of Palestinians and Israelis meeting together to discuss ways to resolve their conflict, with the hope of it eventually leading to an agreement. The Palestinians were PLO members, Abu Ala, Hassan Asfour, and Maher al-Kurd. Asfour was Deputy Director at Abu Mazin’s Directorate of International Relations and al-Kurd was involved in the PLO Economics Department with Abu Ala. Non-government, unofficial participants, represented the Israeli side. Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik were academics, linked only to the government through their relationship with Beilin. Hirschfeld had formerly been involved in negotiations and was a friend of Beilin, and Pundik was a journalist and former student of Hirschfeld’s (Agha et al. 2003, 37). It was not until later when the Oslo talks held some promise that the two unofficial Israeli participants stepped down to let a government official take over the negotiations. Uri Savir, Israeli Foreign Ministry Director General, and Joel Singer, a former military lawyer, grabbed the baton in May of 1993 and resumed the negotiations (Agha et al. 2003, 38). Beilin and Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) acted as mentors at Oslo, in which the original participants report back to them. Later, when the Oslo Process was well underway, Peres and Rabin joined along with Arafat and the U.S. President Clinton.

The Oslo Accords/ Declaration of Principles

The picture of success that embodies the Oslo Process is Rabin and Arafat shaking hands on the White House lawn with U.S. President Clinton standing in between them. This picture was taken September 13, 1993, to mark the achievement of Israel and the PLO signing the Oslo Accords, or the Declaration of Principles (DoP). However, this success did not mean much for the Palestinian refugees. Before the signing of the accords could take place, other agreements were made between Rabin and Arafat that were apart from the actual official agreement. Rabin recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. This was not only the first time Israel recognized the PLO, but also the first time they negotiated with each other. Arafat

recognized Israel’s right to exist, accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, and agreed to stop using terrorism and violence against Israel, just as he had done before the UN General Assembly in 1988 (Levin 2005, 321). This exchange of agreements marked progress in the peace process and were necessary steps in order to attain peace. In essence, the Oslo Accords was an agreement to have a Palestinian Interim Self- Government, to hold elections for a Palestinian council, for Israel to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho, and for the deferment of the permanent status negotiations. The Oslo Accords were based on the Camp David framework (Rabin 1996, 327). The accords set a timetable for the Palestinian Interim Self-Government to rule most aspects of Palestinian life in the West Bank and Gaza for three to five years (Shlaim 2000, 516). The establishment of the Palestinian Authority enabled it to administer passports and grant residency to those living in the West Bank and Gaza (Brynen 1998). According to the Israelis, the interim period was a trial run to see if Israel and the Palestinians could coexist peacefully under this kind of an agreement. But if Arafat went back on his agreement to end violence, all bets were off (Levin 2005, 322). Violence would prove to the Israelis that a Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza would not work alongside the state of Israel. Besides renouncing terrorism, the Palestinians showed their willingness to compromise by accepting the Interim Agreement without demanding it be linked to a future Palestinian state, as they had demanded at Madrid. In this way, the Interim Agreement would not bind Israel to create a Palestinian state, but rather would provide leeway if the Palestinians chose to retract their agreement to keep the peace (Agha et al. 2003, 29). The Oslo Accords also agreed to Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. Offering up Gaza first was the most logical move for Israel. Predominately filled with Palestinians, and many of them refugees, Gaza had always been somewhat of a headache. Withdrawing from Gaza and Jericho would certainly affect the refugees as many of them lived in those localities. It would allow them to be governed by their own people for an interim period. Because the negotiators shifted their focus to establishing an interim period, Oslo did not directly deal with the refugee issue (Hassassian 2002, 72). Instead of making the refugees a priority, delegates focused more on the displaced persons of 1967. Oslo set up a Continuing Quadripartite Committee—comprised of the

Palestinians, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, to address the issue of displaced persons. The Quadripartite Committee had the responsibility of defining a DP, determining the actual number of DP’s, and creating ways in which the DP’s could return to their homes (Tamari 1996, 21). Unfortunately, the committee’s work was extremely slow. The Quadripartite Committee could not agree on basic aspects of the DP problem. The committee ardently debated seemingly simple issues, such as the definition of a DP. Since they were no closer to agreeing than when they started, they eventually suspended the talks on defining the DP’s and shifted their focus to minor issues. They also had difficulty agreeing on the number of DP’s; Israeli numbers were on the low end and the Palestinians were on the high end. The degree to which they differed was quite large—a difference of about 600,000 DP’s (Tamari and Jaradat-Gassner 1996, 8). For the most part, the difference went back to their opposing definitions of the family. With Israel not adding the families and descendants of the DP’s, its numbers were much lower. Israel did not want to permit their return along with the original DP’s from 1967. Without being able to move from these basic negotiations, the committee could not accomplish its goals. However, it was able to make some progress on a few minor issues, such as family reunification, the refugees in Lebanon, and the readmission of the “latecomers” (Tamari and Jaradat-Gassner 1996, 9). The committee also gave priority to the refugees in Lebanon to receive humanitarian aid. All parties agreed that these refugees suffered from the worst living conditions. The committee also discussed the issue of the “latecomers.” “Latecomers” were those Palestinians working or studying abroad who passed the renewal period for their visas before they returned to their homes in the West Bank and Gaza. Because their visas expired when they were abroad, Israel invalidated their identity cards. Although the committee discussed the problem, the Oslo II agreement decided to handle the latecomer issue rather than the committee (Tamari and Jaradat-Gassner 1996, 8). The committee made progress in agreeing that DP’s have a right to return to their 1967 homes. However, Israel feared that if it agreed to the return of the DP’s, it was only a matter of time before the 1948 refugees would implement the right of return (Hassassian 2002, 70). The committee also made progress by creating a claims commission to handle requests for compensation (Arzt 1996).

Rabin was opposed to Palestinian autonomy being a resolution to the refugee problem. The Palestinian state that might have developed from the Interim Agreement, had conditions been better, would have been too small for the refugees anyway (Said 2000, 21). In his memoirs, Rabin (1996, 331-334) presented three options to resolve the refugee problem. The first option is the PLO’s position. They wanted to create a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza for the refugees to return to freely. The second option, held by the Likud party, is for an autonomous self-government to rule the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. The third option, and the one held to by Rabin and his Labor party, is the existence of two states, Israel and a Jordanian- Palestinian confederation with borders consisting of Jordan and substantial sections of the West Bank and Gaza. Since the majority of the refugees are located in these areas: Jordan, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, Rabin argued that a confederation would grant the Palestinians their right of self-determination. A Jordanian-Palestinian state would resolve the refugee problem. It would also prevent the creation of a Palestinian state, which he was adamantly against. He believed, if created, it would actively seek to destroy Israel. In May of 1994, Israel and the PLO signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, or Cairo Agreement, which basically started the clock on the interim period (Quandt 2005, 330). The agreement reaffirmed permanent status negotiations on the DoP would commence in two years. In keeping with Camp David, the agreement also gave the Palestinian Authority the jurisdiction to issue certificates, licenses, and documents in the West Bank and Gaza (Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 1994). This new function enabled the Palestinian Authority to provide refugees left without proper documents with residency or travel documents that Israel and many other host countries denied them. Another key aspect of the agreement was that “both Israel and the Palestinian Authority pledge to respect human rights as defined by international covenants” (Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 1994). Recognizing international human rights’ covenants would ideally bring in a whole host of rights and provisions for refugees, but no specific covenants were mentioned, nor was there any mention of how the parties might implement them. Also in 1994, Israel and Jordan made a peace treaty. Israel and Jordan agreed to work together to resolve the refugee problem through the Quadripartite

Committee, the RWG, and in future negotiations, basically reaffirming the Madrid and Oslo peace agreements (Brynen 1998). Palestinians stopped trusting Jordan after it normalized relations with Israel (Hassassian 2002, 72). Jordan had made a separate peace with Israel, following in the footsteps of Egypt. In September of 1995, Israel and the PLO signed Oslo II, marking the end of the first stage of the Oslo negotiations (Shlaim 2000, 527). Although part of Oslo II focused on territorial arrangements, its primary purpose was to develop the administration of the Palestinian Authority (BBC News). The Interim Agreement also gave new guidelines for returning refugees acquiring residency. The new guidelines included granting residency to those living in the West Bank and Gaza who had lived there the past three to four years, the creation of a joint committee for DP’s, giving priority to applications of spouses for family reunification, and giving children automatic residency if a parent possessed residency (Tamari 1996). Also, as mentioned in reference to the Quadripartite Committee, the Oslo II agreement made provisions for the 100,000 Palestinian “latecomers” of the West Bank and Gaza to be reissued their identity cards (Tamari and Jaradat-Gassner 1996, 8).

Permanent Status Negotiations. At Oslo, Israel and the PLO decided together to separate the more difficult issues from other workable issues. These issues have been set aside until the final status negotiations. One of these issues is the refugee issue. The Declaration of Principles (DoP) agreed on which issues would be put aside for permanent status negotiations. These issues include: Jerusalem, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and refugees. The DoP stated the agreement would not prejudice or prevent a final settlement, nor would it “waive any existing rights, claims or positions” (DoP 1993). Israel and the PLO also agreed within the text of the accords to not do anything to alter the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip before the permanent status negotiations could take place (DoP 1993). The DoP caused an upset among the refugees. It meant they were officially being set-aside until the final negotiations and that Israel and the PLO placed other issues first, like the Interim Agreement. Palestinians accused Arafat of ignoring the refugee issue and

even hurting them (Rabinovich 2004, 57; Said 2000, 24). Palestinians also accused Farouk Kaddoumi, the PLO’s equivalent of a Foreign Minister, of compromising the rights of the refugees (Shlaim 2000, 522). The delegates said nothing at Oslo of past wars or the losses of the refugees, or debated who was right and who was wrong (Said 2000, 313). This was because both parties agreed not to rehash or dwell on the past so that they would be more likely to end with an agreement (Agha et al. 2003, 40). If they had started their discussions at 1948 debating the right of return of the refugees, they would never have reached an agreement (Shlaim 2000, 517). Uri Savir (1998, 163), Israel’s chief negotiator, remarked, “We agreed that any discussion [of the permanent issues] was a recipe for disaster.” The success of Oslo came from separating the interim agreement from the permanent status negotiations (Shlaim 2000, 519). Rabin (1996, 329) believed Israel and the Palestinians needed three to five years of daily coexisting peacefully before they could attempt to approach the permanent status issues. Therefore, if it had not been for Oslo, there would be no permanent status negotiations (Savir 1998, 299). From the timetable set by the Oslo Accords, the permanent status negotiations were to commence May 4, 1996 with a final settlement reached by May 4, 1999 (Savir 1998, 240). On May 5th, the day before the negotiations were to start, both parties met at Taba to open the discussions (Savir 1998, 299). They developed two committees to negotiate the permanent status issues. One committee was comprised of working groups led by experts in each of the issues of the permanent issues, and the other was a steering committee in which Peres and Abu Mazin directed the talks (Shlaim 2000, 523). They acknowledged the vast differences between each parties’ position on the permanent issues, but had a common goal—peace, respect, and security (Savir 1998, 300). Savir and Abu Ala met privately and talked as if there would be a final settlement in three years, as planned. However, the next day, the day the permanent status negotiations were intended to start, there were bombings in Jerusalem and Dizengoff, a street in Tel Aviv. The Oslo Process had already undergone strain and tragedy with the assassination of Rabin at a peace rally in November, 1995. Within the month of when the permanent negotiations were scheduled to begin and soon after the bombings, the Israeli post for

prime minister was up for election. Rather than the Israelis reelecting Peres, they elected Benjamin Netanyahu, and the peace process came to a screeching halt (Savir 1998, 301). Just like Camp David, Oslo ended with an agreement, but it did not pertain to the refugees nor did the delegates discuss the refugees in any depth. Israel and the PLO agreed not to negotiate the refugee issue until the final status talks. The refugee problem was so complex and important to an overall peace that it was set aside until both sides were ready. Although they determined a date for the final status talks, the peace process fell through, largely from changes in Israeli leadership. With Netanyahu’s election, the date passed without any discussion on the refugee issue. However, Oslo played a significant role in starting the 1995 Stockholm Talks and in the strategy for the negotiations in the 2000 Stockholm Channel.

NEGOTIATING THE REFUGEE ISSUE

Stockholm Talks 19

The 1995 Stockholm talks was the first time the delegates had substantial discussions on the refugee issue since Lausanne. Non-government negotiators in academia held the Track II talks. The Beilin-Abu Mazen Understandings evolved out of the informal talks, largely consisting of a consensus on compensation for the refugees. With the momentum created from the Oslo Interim Agreement, the Palestinian delegation, headed by academics from England, Hussein Agha and Ahmad Khalidi, was motivated to continue the negotiation process and focus on the permanent status issues while a resolution was still possible with Rabin in office (Agha et al. 2003, 76). So they began Track II negotiations with Israeli academics, Hirschfeld and Pundik, in Stockholm late in 1995.20 Sweden supported the talks by allowing the participants to meet in Stockholm for a sum of 21 meetings (Agha et al. 2003, 71). Stockholm began in much the same way as Oslo—talks between Israelis and Palestinians who held no official position. Deputy Foreign Minister Beilin, acting as a mentor for the Israelis as he had done at Oslo, encouraged Hirschfeld and Pundik, who had been responsible for the start of the Oslo Process, to engage in the talks at Stockholm. By using the Oslo approach to negotiations, they hoped Stockholm might lead to a resolution of the permanent status issues just as Oslo had ended with the Interim Agreement. Stockholm, a series of unofficial talks, were held confidentially even from top Israeli leaders, Rabin and Peres. The Palestinians made Arafat aware of Stockholm’s

19 The primary source for the Stockholm talks is Agha which was addressed in the Oslo section. 20 There were two peace talks in Stockholm--one in 1995 and the other in 2000.

existence, but Arafat was not involved (Agha et al. 2003, 78, 80). Unlike Oslo, the Palestinian negotiators were not part of the PLO, holding no official position. Their Israeli counterparts also were not government officials. At that time, no other parties outside of Stockholm were discussing the permanent status issues (Agha et al. 2003, 77). What resulted from Stockholm is what is known as the “Beilin-Abu Mazen Understandings”, or “Agreement.” While neither Abu Mazen nor Beilin negotiated together or wrote the “agreement”, they both served as mentors at Stockholm, although Beilin was more directly involved than Abu Mazen (Agha et al. 2003, 82). The working paper was a consensus between the Israeli and Palestinian participants on the permanent status issues. They made progress on issues of borders, security, Jerusalem, and refugees.21 On the issue of the refugees, the working paper presented the positions of both sides. Whereas the Palestinian side considers that the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes is enshrined in international law and natural justice, it recognizes that the prerequisites of the new era of peace and coexistence, as well as the realities that have been created on the ground since 1948, have rendered the implementation of this right impracticable. The Palestinian side, thus, declares its readiness to accept and implement policies and measures that will ensure, insofar as this is possible, the welfare and well-being of these refugees. Whereas the Israeli side acknowledges the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the war of 1947-1949, it further acknowledges the Palestinian refugees' right of return to the Palestinian state and their right to compensation and rehabilitation for moral and material losses (Beilin-Abu Mazen Document 1995, Article VII, 1-2). The working paper provided for the principle of the right of return without its actual implementation. The implementation of the right of return would only be to the Palestinian state, while Israel would allow a limited number of refugees to return under its discretion. However, they did not determine a number for the refugees (Agha et al. 2003, 85). Most of the working paper centered on compensation, which they determined would be part of the resolution of the refugee problem. The International Commission

21 With the paper, the Palestinians would have an independent state including the Gaza Strip and 95-96% of the West Bank. The remaining 4-5% that Israel would keep would be compensated by an exchange of land elsewhere in Israel (Agha et al. 2003, 72-73).

for Palestinian Refugees would act as the mechanism by which the international community would implement the compensation program. It would provide compensation to the refugees for suffering and property losses of which Israel would be a contributor with the amount yet to be determined. If the working paper turned into an official agreement, Israel would have had its much-desired end to the claims of the refugees (Beilin-Abu Mazen Document 1995). Sadly, Rabin’s assassination prevented the Track II talks at Stockholm from developing into Track I talks, leading to a final peace agreement (Agha et al. 2003, 83). Peres, taking the place of Rabin, rejected the working paper when the Stockholm delegation presented it to him (Agha et al. 2003, 72). Even though the change of Israeli leadership cut short the progress of Stockholm, the framework established there still served as a basis for future Track I negotiations at Camp David and Taba (Agha et al. 2003, 75). The Beilin-Abu Mazen Understandings took center stage in talks surrounding the peace process from 1996 to 2000 (Shavit 2001-a). After Barak became Prime Minister, he also rejected the Beilin-Abu Mazen Understandings. At Camp David, Clinton supported the paper, but none of the delegates ever formally put forth the proposal at the summit (Beilin 2004, 154). Ari Shavit (2001-b), writer for Ha’aretz, called the Beilin-Abu Mazen Understandings a “conspiracy” since Beilin led peace talks without the knowledge of the Israeli leaders. In his paper Shavit argued that the Israeli- Palestinian conflict was resolvable, but according to the Israeli Right, only after too many compromises. He believed that even after the 1995 Stockholm talks, Israel continued to make huge concessions. Even with its concessions, the Palestinians ultimately rejected the Beilin-Abu Mazen Understandings, and according to Shavit, “humiliated” Israel. For Track II negotiations, Stockholm made some progress on the refugee issue. The parties at Stockholm still found each other debating over the right of return, but made headway on suggesting Israel accept the principle. However, Israel continued to deny responsibility for the refugee problem. The Beilin-Abu Mazen Understandings presented the idea of an international fund to compensate the refugees with Israeli participation, but there was no agreed amount. The party leaders refused the Beilin-Abu Mazen Understandings, but the working paper still circled around in future negotiations and commenced the next phase of the peace process that would negotiate the refugee issue.

Stockholm Channel 22

The 2000 Stockholm Channel met without the direct involvement of the party leaders in order to prepare the status of the negotiations for the final peace talks. Like the 1995 Stockholm, they came away from the talks with a non-paper. The non-paper created resettlement options for a resolution to the refugee problem. They also continued on with the idea of an international fund that was also present in the 1995 Stockholm talks. Despite the progress of the non-paper, the secret channel being made public suspended the peace efforts. Five years passed since the 1995 Stockholm, with little to show for in the peace process.23 When PM Ehud Barak was elected to office in 1999, he announced he was ready to reach a final settlement and end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict once and for all. With the encouragement of Barak, secret talks on the permanent status issues began for a second time in Stockholm in May 2000—this time between government officials. Barak’s chief negotiators were Shlomo Ben-Ami and Gilead Sher and their counterparts were Abu Ala and Hassan Asfour. While the Stockholm Channel did not last long, negotiators held discussions “around the clock” (Enderlin 2002, 148). What resulted was a draft joint paper entitled “Framework Agreement on Permanent Status” on the final issues with the exception of Jerusalem (Sher 2005, 65). It was not a finished product because Stockholm was suspended as a result of the secret channel leaking to the press, leading to an eruption of violence and protests (Indyk 2005, 100). Ben-Ami (2006, 282) blamed Abu Mazen for the leak. Abu Mazen, who shared responsibility for initiating the

22 The two main primary sources for the Stockholm Channel are two interviews, one with Palestinian negotiator Abu Ala and the other with Israeli negotiator Shlomo Ben-Ami. While these interviews are not long, they give great insight into the positions of the delegates on the refugee issue. As the Stockholm Channel was the first official negotiation since Lausanne in which there were significant discussions on the refugee issue, there is automatically more information on refugee negotiations. Charles Enderlin’s book, Shattered Dreams, is a secondary source on the failure of the peace process from 1995-2002. Enderlin, a French journalist, recounts word-for-word debates in the peace talks. The refugee issue is addressed, but not to any great length. 23 Netanyahu and Arafat signed the Wye River Memorandum in October 1998, with Clinton as overseer, for a second revision of the Interim Agreement. Barak and Arafat signed the Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum in September 1999 for a third revision of the Interim Agreement. Neither meeting discussed the refugees.

Stockholm Channel, was left out of the negotiations. As he was in the midst of vying for the position as successor to Arafat with Abu Ala, Ben-Ami believed, this internal competition led Abu Mazen to end the Stockholm Channel by making the press aware of the peace talks. Despite the short life of the Stockholm Channel, Ben-Ami and Abu Ala agreed that they had serious, substantive talks and that they made progress (MEMRI 2003; Shavit 2001-a). The joint paper, approximately eight pages in length, agreed to end the suffering of the refugees based on Resolution 242. They also agreed that resolving the refugee problem was necessary for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The non-paper created choices for the resettlement of the refugees; they could resettle in the Palestinian state, the host countries where they were residing, or a third country. The non-paper organized a survey in order to determine where the refugees would choose to resettle. It also created an international fund to compensate all of the refugees. Although negotiators agreed to these terms to resolve the refugee problem, both sides had additions, revealing significant gaps between the two parties. The Palestinians wanted to implement a resolution of the refugee problem, in accordance with Resolution 194. They also wanted to add Israel as a resettlement option for the refugees, while Israel only wanted to accept refugees under the family reunification program (Enderlin 2002, 157-158). Israel was willing to discuss the return of 10,000-15,000 refugees over a period of time on humanitarian grounds. However, the Palestinians did not agree to the amount or even that Israel should decide on any amount, because that would mean Israel had the choice of whether or not to allow the refugees to return, instead of the refugees having the right to return and the right to choose where to resettle (Shavit 2001-a). Israel wanted the implementation of the Stockholm document to put an end to the conflict (Enderlin 2002, 155). While Israel believed they made progress, Enderlin (2003, 158) cites Abu Ala as saying the Stockholm joint paper was an “Israeli document.” However, Ben-Ami (2006, 282) claimed Israel made large concessions at Stockholm.24

24 The Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum set September 2000 as the date for the conclusion of the permanent status negotiations. While this never occurred, the second Intifada began in September 2000. At the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit in October 2000 Barak and Arafat agreed to resume the negotiations. None of these negotiations addressed the issue of refugees.

The Stockholm Channel did not lead to final status negotiations as the delegates had hoped, but the non-paper included resettlement options for the refugees that would be present in later negotiations. They still had not decided on any numbers for repatriation or for compensation, and they continued to debate the principle and the implementation of the right of return. The government officials negotiated the refugee issue, while only non-government officials negotiated it at the previous Stockholm. The 2000 Stockholm paved the way for the government leaders to negotiate the refugee issue at Camp David.

Camp David II 25

Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. leaders and their delegates met for the 2000 Camp David Summit to discuss the final status issues, including the refugees. The refugee and the Jerusalem issue were the two most heavily debated topics, and ultimately led to the demise of the summit. Israeli PM Barak wanted to have substantial negotiations on the

25 Many of the participants from Camp David II have written on the negotiations. The primary sources used include: Ross, Clinton, Rabinovich, Hanieh, Sha’ath, an interview of Barak by Benny Morris, and a collection of articles on Camp David II. Former President Clinton’s memoirs, My Life, detail his entire life, and although he does talk about Camp David, he does not go into great detail on the discussions on the refugees. Itamar Rabinovich, an Israeli chief negotiator, provides a comprehensive overview of the peace process from 1948-2003. While his book, Waging Peace, is a useful resource for a summary of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, it does not focus on the refugee issue, but merely mentions it in passing. “The Camp David Diaries” kept and published in the Palestinian newspaper al-Ayyam by Akram Hanieh was on the Palestinian team at Camp David II. His publications are an excellent source for the Palestinian perspective of the peace process. He discusses the refugee issue, but does not document what was said in the debates and instead mostly makes generalizations. Palestinian negotiator Nabil Sha’ath wrote an article on Camp David II that was published in the Washington Post in May 2001. In the article he discusses the progress and difficulty of the refugee issue in the negotiations. The Camp David Summit – What Went Wrong? is a compilation of articles by U.S., Israeli, and Palestinian negotiators and a few scholars analyzing the negotiations of Camp David and making their assessments on why it ended without a lasting peace. The articles, edited by Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, expound on the issue of the Palestinian refugees in the negotiations. This collection is a useful tool for learning about the refugees in the Camp David II peace process. The secondary sources for Camp David are: Quandt, Enderlin, and Swisher. William Quandt’s Peace Process is a secondary source specializing in U.S. diplomacy in the peace process since 1967. While his book is helpful in the general context of the peace process, he has a different focus for his book and the refugee issue is not mentioned. Clayton Swisher consulted a number of the participants at Camp David for his book, The Truth about Camp David, to point the blame of its failure away from Arafat. Swisher provides an in-depth look at refugees in the negotiations at Camp David. Charles Enderlin, in Shattered Dreams, gives a detailed account of the discussions in the meetings at Camp David, including on the refugees.

permanent status issues with the Palestinians (Yatom 2005, 38). His approach to the peace process was distinct from former-PM Rabin, whose leadership at Oslo had ended in an Interim Agreement. Barak did not want to ease into the harder issues and draw out the peace process with a three to five year interim period. He was motivated to attack the permanent status issues at the start of the negotiations, sign onto an agreement, and announce an end to the conflict (Rabinovich 2004, 123). Barak’s purpose for the Camp David summit was to agree to a resolution on the permanent status negotiations and end the conflict. Clinton invited Barak and Arafat to Maryland for a summit conference. Camp David began July 11, 2000 and lasted until July 25, 2000. While Clinton (2004, 912) was prepared for the summit to be a failure, he still hosted Camp David as a last resort to salvage the peace process before he left office. As a lesson learned from Oslo, the parties kept the Camp David summit secret, with no intrusion from the media (Hanieh 2001, 77). With two eager leaders, Arafat was the odd one out. Arafat did not believe it was the right time for final status peace negotiations. The conflict was too complex for such a short summit as Camp David. He felt that both the Israelis and the Palestinians needed time spent in preliminary discussions before they could delve into the final negotiations (Hanieh 2001, 76). But Barak and Clinton were determined to carry on final negotiations, and Arafat cautiously agreed to attend. Because of their close relationship, Clinton was able to pressure Arafat into going (Hanieh 2001, 5). He also coerced him through the use of U.S. aid amounting to $10 billion for the rehabilitation of the refugees, if he went to the summit (Quandt 2005, 365; Tamir 2005, 240).

Israel’s Proposal

Barak arrived ready with his position, eager to offer it to the Palestinians. Barak’s offer included: a Palestinian state composed of 90% of the West Bank26, 100% of Gaza, with part of Jerusalem as its capital, free movement between the West Bank and Gaza and to the other Arab states without Israeli interference, international aid, and the right of return only to the Palestinian state. What Barak called a right of return, the Palestinians saw as no right of return at all (Palestinian Negotiating Team 2000). To the Palestinians,

26 However, the offer of 90% of the West Bank was not Barak’s initial offer.

the right of return meant the refugees were free to go to Israel if they so chose. If Arafat had agreed to Barak’s offer, he would have also been agreeing to no right of return to Israel, peaceful relations with the Jewish state, and the end of the conflict. Arafat rejected it completely, even as a basis for further negotiations (Barak 2005, 123). Arafat’s strategy was holding out for the best offer, not offering his own proposals. According to Clinton (2004, 912, 915), Arafat refused offers, which led negotiations to a dead end, rather than working with the offers to find a compromise. In Barak’s opinion, he [Barak] had made considerable concessions, but it was not enough to get an agreement. He agreed to a Palestinian independent state, something that Rabin had never agreed to doing. The Israeli delegation went to Camp David with an offer they thought the Palestinians should have grabbed, or at least could have served as a basis for negotiations. American negotiator, Dennis Ross (2004) agreed; he commented that with the Israelis initial offer, they would have nothing to negotiate, seeing their initial proposal as the furthest Israel should compromise. He felt that the Israelis were stepping out in boldness and in a spirit of cooperation. Even with Israel’s compromises, the Israeli and Palestinian positions were still too far apart on the core issues: territory, Jerusalem, and refugees (Lipkin-Shahak 2005, 47). Although Barak offered Arafat a Palestinian state, Arafat wanted it on 100% of the West Bank and Gaza, meaning a complete withdrawal to Israel’s pre-1967 borders. Barak came close to this, but did not accept it. However, the percentage of West Bank territory Israel wanted to keep, would, in effect, also integrate 97 Palestinian villages, totaling 370,000 Palestinians (Abed 2005, 75). This begs the question: how then could Israel be so adamant about not accepting any refugees on the basis of it threatening the demographics of the Jewish state? In fact, the Palestinians declared that their acceptance of Israel’s pre-1967 borders was a major concession for them and Israel and the U.S. should not assume it to be a starting point for negotiations (Quandt 2005, 365). From the viewpoint of the Palestinians, they were making a great compromise by only asking for 22% of their homeland (Hanieh 2001, 86). The Palestinian state Arafat was envisioning included East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, as well. Barak also compromised on the Jerusalem issue. In the middle of the summit, he made a bold offer to divide Jerusalem and allow for a limited form of sovereignty over

the Temple Mount (Rabinovich 2004, 152). He did this to persuade Arafat to sign an agreement without a right of return to Israel (Tamir 2005, 224). The offer to divide Jerusalem was unexpected. Although the Temple Mount offer was not linked formally to the abandonment of the right of return, Rabinovich (2004, 153) argues that it was one or the other. Barak would not offer both Jerusalem and the right of return. Arafat decided to hold to the right of return. On the matter of refugees, Arafat demanded a full right of return to their homes in Israel (Bar-Siman-Tov 2005, 197). In Benny Morris’ interview with the former PM, Barak (2001) expressed his frustration regarding Arafat’s unwillingness to negotiate, and only giving an emphatic ‘no’ to Israel’s offer. Barak claimed that Arafat did not want to resolve or end the conflict, but to get as much out of Israel as he could, for as long as he could.

Negotiating the Refugee Issue

The reason for Camp David being so significant was because the top leadership level had substantive talks on the core issues (Quandt 2005, 369). The main issues they discussed were territory and security, Jerusalem, and the refugees. But after the first few days of not getting anywhere in the discussions, they looked for a new approach. Arafat recommended the negotiations divide into three separate committees, one for each issue (Swisher 2004, 272). The refugee committee issue included: Israelis Eli Rubinstein and Gidi Grinstein and Palestinians Abu Mazen and Nabil Sha’ath (Enderlin 2002, 196). The committee had met for five to seven long sessions during Camp David (Swisher 2004, 280). They met in the morning, reported to Clinton on their progress, and then resumed in the afternoons. Sometimes Clinton would attend the committee meetings. Many times they started their most in-depth and intense negotiations in the evenings, going all through the night into the early hours of the morning. Apart from the committees, Clinton, Barak, and Arafat negotiated all night, as well. In one such conversation between Clinton and Arafat, Arafat relayed to him the story of al-Nakba, thereby emphasizing the importance to the Palestinian leaders of finding a “just and fair solution” to the refugees (Hanieh 2001, 10, 18). The first day of the summit, Arafat made his position on the refugees clear: Israel must first accept the principle of the right of return; then they would talk about how to

implement that right with consideration to Israel’s demographic concerns. Arafat assured Barak that not all of the refugees would choose to return because many of them already settled in host countries (Enderlin 2002, 181). They estimated only 10-20% of the refugees would choose to return, or 400,000-800,000 refugees, and be added to Israel’s already booming Palestinian population (Enderlin 2002, 196). Arafat did not ask for an agreement to a full right of return, just the principle of the right of return (Swisher 2004, 281). Any discussions on the numbers of Israel’s limit ranged from the hundreds to the thousands, not on returning all of the refugees (Enderlin 2002, 324). However, Clinton agreed with Barak; the Palestinians could not ask Israel to agree to the principle of the right of return without set limitations on its implementation (Ross 2004, 665). Agreeing to the right of return would be like writing a blank check with no way of knowing the outcome; it was a chance Israel could not take. Clinton (2004, 912) also held that the Palestinians could not have the right of return and their own state; it had to be one or the other. Near the beginning of the summit, the U.S. presented a non-paper phasing the limited return of a set number of refugees into Israel along with compensation for those not returning, but Israel and the Palestinians both rejected it (Enderlin 2002, 191). On July 14th, the refugee committee along with Clinton who was in attendance, laid the groundwork for an agreement by presenting their positions to each other. Palestinian delegates, Abu Mazen and Nabil Sha’ath, wanted any resolution to be based on Resolution 194. They wanted Israel to accept the principle of the right of return and to accept responsibility for the refugee problem, two demands Israel would not meet. The Palestinians also wanted Israel to compensate the refugees individually for the property they lost from the 1948 War, and for the UNRWA to phase out over the course of the next several years (Enderlin 2002, 196-199). In addition, the Palestinians proposed for any evacuated Jewish settlements to become part of the Palestinian state (Enderlin 2002, 252). On behalf of Israel, Rubinstein agreed to compensation within an international fund, but stressed that any resolution to the refugee problem of which Israel was a part of was from a humanitarian standpoint (Enderlin 2002, 196-199). Israel was also willing to accept 500 family reunification cases per year (Enderlin 2002, 270). However, they could not accept the right of return, as it would threaten their Jewish state. With all of

Israel’s talk about demographic concerns in keeping a Jewish majority, the Palestinians pointed out that Israel’s immigration policies seemed discriminatory against Palestinians. The Palestinians were offended Israel would admit 300,000 non-Jewish Russians into Israel in the previous few years, but refused to admit the Palestinian refugees (Swisher 2004, 272). Even though Barak and Arafat wanted an agreement, their positions were too far apart and they were not making any progress (Clinton 2004, 915). Barak wanted to resolve the refugee problem so there would be an end to the claims of the refugees, claims to return and to compensation. But in his final agreement proposal, Barak only mentioned a “satisfactory solution” to the refugee problem (Clinton 2004, 911). Not wanting Camp David to end in failure, the U.S. delegates proposed signing a partial agreement in which Israel would agree to a Palestinian state and the Palestinians would agree to adhere to Israel’s security concerns, but it would defer the toughest issues— Jerusalem and the refugees. The U.S. also proposed another partial agreement on the right of return to the West Bank and Gaza, and for future peace talks to resolve the rest of the refugee issues (Swisher 2004, 130, 321). But the Palestinians refused any final agreement excluding a resolution to Jerusalem and the refugees in accordance with UN resolutions (Hanieh 2001, 21). When Camp David was supposed to have ended, Clinton had a trip scheduled to Japan, but still hoping they could make progress, he asked Barak and Arafat to extend their stay at Camp David and wait until he returned. They both complied and caught up on some sleep while he was away. But as soon as he returned, Clinton proposed holding marathon negotiations on each of the issues. July 24th was the refugee marathon. The Palestinians narrated al-Nakba, while the Israelis refused to accept responsibility. The Palestinians demanded the right of return and the implementation of Resolution 194, while the Israelis refused the right of return and would only agree to family reunification under a humanitarian umbrella (Hanieh 2001, 32). When the Palestinians recognized the talks were at a dead end, they shifted to talks on compensation. They wanted Israel to compensate the refugees, as a way to implement Resolution 194. But Israel did not agree to compensation outside of contributing to an international fund for humanitarian purposes, as it would have meant accepting responsibility for the refugees (Swisher 2004,

323). Israel also wanted the international fund to include the Jewish refugees from the Arab state, but the Palestinians refused to allow the Jewish refugees to be a part of the discussions (Hanieh 2001, 32). Every Palestinian position countered every Israeli position and vice versa. At the end of the summit, they were still far apart in their views, and far apart from an agreement. Just about the only thing they agreed on was giving priority to the refugees in Lebanon. The day after the refugee marathon, all realized the negotiations were over and that Camp David had failed. They packed their bags and headed home.

A Failure

U.S. Ambassador Indyk (2005, 103) thought the delegates hardly discussed the refugees at Camp David, but he conceded that it was talked about more at the summit than in previous negotiations. The lack of discussion on the refugee issue is seen through Israel only promising a “satisfactory solution” to the refugees (Mohammed Dajani 2005, 87). This is what Barak had communicated to Clinton when briefing him on the Israeli proposal (Ross 2004, 689). U.S. delegate, Robert Malley (2000, 111) agreed the refugee issue was too vague. While Indyk (2005, 105) did not think anyone had a real solution to the refugee problem, which accounts for Barak’s ambiguous language, he believed there could be a resolution to the right of return to the satisfaction of Israel and the Palestinians. Israeli negotiator, Gilead Sher (2005, 66) agreed that the refugee problem was resolvable. While the Palestinians were uncompromising on the refugee issue at Camp David (Quandt 2005, 365), as Arafat and Abu Mazen demanded the right of return, Beilin (2004, 183) believed this would not always be the case. One day the Palestinians would forfeit their right of return, he said. Beilin argued that the Palestinians knew Israel would never permit the right of return, so the Palestinians reserved it as their last “negotiating card” (Tamir 2005, 237-238). While the right of return was their negotiating card, Israel’s negotiating card was the West Bank and Gaza. Sher (2005, 66) agreed; the West Bank and Gaza were “not an asset to Israel, but a burden. However, they were an asset in the negotiations.” The only way Israel could contest the Palestinians’ demand for the right of return was to hold onto the West Bank and Gaza. The refugees and territory

are inextricably linked. One cannot be agreed on without an agreement on the other (Sher 2005, 63). The two topics that were the most difficult to negotiate and caused the most division were the Temple Mount and the right of return (Yatom 2005, 38). Most Israelis, including Barak, blamed the right of return for Camp David’s failure (Barak 2005, 145; Ginossar 2005, 51). After all, the Israeli and Palestinian positions were so far apart. For the Israelis, the right of return was “inconceivable” (Sher 2005, 62). They would never accept a flood of Palestinian refugees into Israel. They would also never accept moral or legal responsibility for the problem (Yatom 2005, 37). If they did take responsibility, they would be accepting the blame for the refugee problem. Therefore, they would be responsible to permit their full right of return plus compensation on a political and legal basis according to Resolution 194, rather than only being responsible to do their part along with the rest of the international community in aiding the refugees purely on a humanitarian basis (UN General Assembly-b 1948). The only avenue through which Israel would admit any amount of refugees was through the humanitarian family reunification program, not through a political right of return. Barak (2005, 145) stated, “Neither I nor any other Israeli prime minister would be ready to take in a single refugee based on the political principle of the Right of Return, because that would undermine Israel’s raison d’être.” The Palestinians blamed Barak for the lack of serious talks on the refugees based on his refusal to accept any responsibility for creating the problem (Palestinian Negotiating Team 2000). Barak had also appointed Eli Rubinstein as the Israeli negotiator for the refugee committee. Rubinstein was known for his cautious resolve and not someone who would be quick to compromise. The Palestinians viewed this as more evidence that Barak was not serious about resolving the refugee problem (Swisher 2004, 324). Furthermore, because of Israel’s refusal, Palestinian negotiator Akram Hanieh (2001, 82) claimed there was no progress on the refugee issue. In fact, he said it “did not move one inch forward.” Israel did not accept responsibility or the right of return, but would only discuss compensation within the context of an international fund. Hanieh (2001, 82) also thought the refugee issue was “the greatest failure of the summit.” He further explained, “This is not surprising, since the refugee file is the ‘moment of truth.’”

For the Palestinians, the right of return is essential. It is so strongly tied to Palestinian identity, uniting them in their journey of struggle as one people. It is the hope every refugee, a stateless people since their al-Nakba of 1948. They demand it is their right. At Camp David, the Palestinians were unmoving on the refugee issue. Their leader Arafat did not compromise. He always kept the rights of the refugees in mind (Hanieh 2001, 85). Barak (2005, 119) argued that the reason for Arafat’s demand for the right of return was found in Arafat’s feelings regarding the Jewish state. Barak believed Arafat did not recognize Israel as a Jewish state. That is, Arafat recognized the state of Israel, but not its right to exist as a Jewish state. Barak speculated that Arafat wanted a full right of return into Israel so that over time, through democracy and the high population growth of the Palestinians, Israel would cease to be a Jewish state, and merely have a Jewish minority in a state run by Palestinians. However, while he wanted the right of return, others speculate Arafat might not have been so unwilling to compromise on it if he were under different circumstances. Lipkin-Shahak (2005, 48) claimed, “Everyone, including Arafat, realized that no agreement could be reached unless the Palestinians gave up the right of return.” Sher (2005, 67) claimed that almost all of the Palestinian leaders did not believe they would ever get the right of return. Holding to that right at Camp David was merely “empty propaganda and negotiating maneuvers.” After decades of promising the Palestinian people they would return to their homes one day, Arafat could not leave for a two week-long summit and go back to his people with the news that he had forfeited their right permanently and negotiated it for more territory. The Palestinian people needed time to adjust to the idea of the right of return being to their own state rather than to Israel (Lipkin-Shahak 2005, 48). This was one reason why Arafat was in favor of the peace process being an actual process rather than Barak’s approach of a quick resolution. Arafat’s rejection of the agreement should not have come as a surprise. He made it clear at the start of Camp David that he was not ready to sign onto an agreement. Perhaps, if the wording in the agreement had been changed to account for the Palestinians’ need of some semblance of Israel acceding to their right of return, Arafat would have been more apt to agree to it. Sher’s (2005, 62) argument was that the Palestinians would be content with a symbolic right of return, not an actual return to

Israel. This statement goes against every claim of the Palestinian position regarding the refugees. The Palestinians continually reaffirmed their claim on a full right of return to be implemented according to Resolution 194 (Hanieh 2001, 94). Arafat also could not have signed the agreement alone, without the presence of the other Arab states (Munther Dajani 2005, 73). Until Camp David, the Palestinians had always accompanied the other Arab states in the peace process with the exception of Oslo, but Oslo never negotiated the permanent status issues. So even though Barak and Arafat made no compromises on the right of return, it was not necessarily the cause of the breakdown at Camp David. This was the position of two U.S. negotiators from Camp David, Indyk (2005, 103) and Sher (2005, 67). Instead of blaming the right of return for Camp David’s failure, Indyk (2005, 103), a U.S. negotiator, blamed it on Barak’s pressure to end the conflict. Ending the conflict was not something Arafat wanted to rush into. Hanieh (2001, 92) argues, “Israel’s goal at Camp David was to obtain the Palestinian ‘golden’ signature on final recognition and the ‘end of conflict’ at a cheap price—without returning all the land, without acknowledging full sovereignty, and, most dangerous of all, without solving the refugee issue.” Israel had wanted an “end of conflict” since Lausanne, but the Palestinians along with the other Arab states have prolonged the peace process, putting off a final peace settlement (Lipkin-Shahak 2005, 48). Many of the Palestinian delegates believed Camp David to be a failure, as well. The Palestinians blamed Israel’s unwillingness to compromise. Israel continued to hold to a position that did not meet the Palestinians’ interpretations of Resolution 194 and 242. Israel refused the right of return and full withdrawal to the 1967 borders (Hanieh 2001, 81, 87). Abu Ala said: “We went to Camp David without presenting clear positions to the leaders, and this is what caused the disaster. The Israelis and the Americans suggested nothing at all to which the Palestinians could have said ‘yes,’ on various issues, and therefore the summit failed. But this does not mean that we can be blamed for the failure of the summit. Our rights are sacred and we cannot relinquish them. Had Camp David been one round of negotiations, then I would say it was excellent. But as a decisive summit, it was a failure (MEMRI 2003).” Still, one Palestinian negotiator argued against the failure of Camp David. Even though there were significant gaps between the two sides’ positions, Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat (2000) believed that Camp David

was not a failure and that “the end of our conflict is truly in sight.” They could not have expected to reach an agreement within two weeks when Camp David was the first time they had truly negotiated the permanent status issues. Had they been preliminary talks, as Arafat had wanted, Camp David would have been successful and a good stepping-stone for future final talks (Hanieh 2001, 91). At Camp David II, the Israeli and Palestinian leaders negotiated the refugee issue, but in so doing, did not sign an agreement. Camp David ended in failure, which many attribute to the refugee problem. Camp David proved once again how essential the refugees are to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how difficult the problem is to resolve. Negotiators debated the interpretations of the right of return, as they had at the Stockholm Channel, discussing implementation through resettlement in a Palestinian state, host country, or a third country. Like every Israeli leader, Barak had wanted to end the conflict, including putting an end to all claims of the refugees, but without a comprehensive agreement including a resolution to the refugee problem, the conflict continued.

The Clinton Parameters

The foundation for the Clinton Parameters began to form at Camp David as Clinton was attempting to close the gap between the opposing sides. Over the course of the months after Camp David, Clinton’s plan became increasingly more favorable towards the Palestinian position, adding West Bank territory to the proposed Palestinian state. In November 2000, Clinton invited Arafat to Washington to present the Clinton Parameters. In his proposal, Clinton followed his outline except for when he came to the refugee issue. He bluntly told Arafat Israel could not accept the principle of the right of return (Ross 2004, 743). Although the Clinton Parameters were not a negotiation, they served as the basis for later negotiations at Taba (Moratinos 2001). Clinton declared the intent of the U.S. was to make the refugees a “high priority” and committed itself to work towards a resolution (Clinton 2000). Clinton knew “the fundamental gap is on how to handle the concept of the right of return.” But he believed “the differences are more relating to formulations and less to what will happen on a practical level.” Therefore, rather than a full right of return, Clinton approved

resettlement options to resolve the refugee problem. The resettlement options included the establishment of a Palestinian state where the refugees would be free to settle. They would also have the choice to settle in their host country, a third country, or Israel. However, each of these countries had sovereign discretion regarding the refugees’ admission, particularly Israel whose national security was at stake. Therefore, Clinton held that the right of return should not be fully implemented in the event of the Palestinians having their own state. Additionally, compensation should be given to those choosing not to return to the Palestinian state (Clinton 2000). Upon implementation of the Clinton Parameters, the parties would consider it as satisfying Resolution 194. In exchange for not having a full implementation of the right of return, the Palestinians would have the Temple Mount under their administration, as Barak had offered at Camp David (Indyk 2005, 106). The Israelis and the Palestinians responded differently to the Clinton Parameters. Although Barak could accept the plan “with a heavy heart,” he also considered it to be a “very good basis for final status talks” (Indyk 2005, 105). The Palestinians, on the other hand, did not agree. Arafat eventually accepted the principles, but included 52 objections of his own.27 His objections to the parameters as relating to the refugee problem were based on Resolution 194. According to the Palestinians, Resolution 194 gave the refugees the right to return to their homes, as well as compensation for those who choose not to return or who lose or have damaged property. Arafat refused to “accept a proposal that secures neither the establishment of a viable Palestinian state nor the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes” (Palestinian Negotiating Team 2001). The Palestinians should not only have the right to return to the Palestinian state, but the right to return to their homes in Israel. Arafat wanted the refugees to have the choice of where to resettle and not leave it up to the discretion of Israel. Without this choice, Arafat clearly stated there could be no end to the conflict.

Taba 28

27 Arafat was being pressured to accept the Clinton Parameters during the Intifada when it was not the time to concede on the right of return as the plan demanded (Indyk 2005, 107). 28 The following are the primary documents used for Taba: the Special Report from the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) uses numerous Arabic news articles to create its report on Taba.

Taba was a step back in a sense, because lower-ranking government officials led the negotiations on the refugee issue rather than the government leaders as at Camp David. However, the refugee issue was still being discussed, and at a significant length. Taba ended with a final statement announcing a consensus among the delegates, using the Clinton Parameters as a foundation. Taba also ended with a non-paper, the Moratinos Document.29 Negotiations came to a halt with the Israeli elections, changing leadership from Barak to Ariel Sharon. In January, 2001, negotiators frantically gathered at Taba before the Israeli February elections, attempting to achieve a peace agreement. They were concerned the same thing would happen at Taba as it did at Oslo—Israeli change of parties halting the peace process. From January 21-27, without mediation from the U.S., Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met in Taba, Egypt with the shared aim of coming to a final agreement on the permanent status issues: territory, security, Jerusalem, and refugees (Final Statement 2001). The Israeli delegation consisted of: Shlomo Ben-Ami, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Yossi Beilin, and Yossi Sarid, to name a few. The Palestinian delegation consisted primarily of: Yasir Abed Rabbo, Nabil Sha’ath, Hassan Asfour, and

The report quotes Palestinian negotiators on their positions including the refugee issue. The Final Statement is the document from Taba on the shared positions of the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators from the talks. The Camp David Peace Proposal is the official position of the PLO, including its position on the refugee issue. In his memoirs, The Path to Geneva, Yossi Beilin, Israeli negotiator on the refugee issue, gives a detailed account of the peace talks from 1996-2004 primarily focusing on Camp David and Taba. Since he was a negotiator specializing in the refugee issue, he defines what was discussed and reveals the day by day activities and discussions of the negotiators in the peace talks.

29 Included here is the introduction to the Moratinos Document: “This EU non-paper has been prepared by the EU Special Representative to the Middle East Process, Ambassador Moratinos, and his team after consultations with the Israeli and Palestinian sides, present at Taba in January 2001. Although the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status issues at Taba. It draws attention to the extensive work which has been undertaken on all permanent status issues like territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security in order to find ways to come to joint positions. At the same time it shows that there are serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which will have to be overcome in future negotiations. From that point of view, the paper reveals the challenging task ahead in terms of policy determination and legal work, but it also shows that both sides have traveled a long way to accommodate the views of the other side and that solutions are possible.” Moratinos and those that worked for him were the only outsiders present at Taba. “Moratinos interviewed the negotiators after every working group session and recorded their reports. During the six months after the Taba talks ended, he sent his document to both sides again and again for their comments”(Moratinos 2001).

Mohammed Dahlan (Enderlin 2002, 348). The Taba talks split into two committees, a committee on all the major issues except for the refugee issue, and the other committee on the refugees. Not for lack of effort, there was no agreement at Taba. With the absence of an agreement, Taba received mixed responses regarding its success (Rabinovich 2004, 159-160). Barak (2005, 141) tried to belittle the Taba talks by denying there were any negotiations at Taba. He referred to them as unofficial meetings between selected Israeli and Palestinian leaders, with the Israelis attending only to see if Arafat had changed his mind about Barak’s offer. He further argued that there could not have been serious negotiations due to the impending elections.30 Palestinian delegate, Samih Al-Abed (2005, 79) concurred, acknowledging an agreement could not happen because of the elections, as well as the Intifada. Therefore, on some level, the Taba Talks were not taken seriously from the start.

Reaching For an Agreement

Despite the pessimism regarding Taba, the Final Statement (2001) between the Israeli and the Palestinian delegates revealed their sentiments regarding the success of the talks: “The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections.” The statement also recognized that they made “substantial progress” on all of the permanent status issues (Final Statement 2001). Negotiators made notable progress on the issue of territory, in particular. Israel agreed to the 1967 borders, as in Resolution 242, as a basis for negotiations and Israel made further concessions than it had at Camp David (Moratinos Document 2001). Regarding the refugees, negotiators had never discussed the issue as in-depth as they did at Taba, and they had never come so close to resolving it. Yossi Beilin, Israeli negotiator on the refugee issue, was positive and hopeful about the work they accomplished in the discussions (Tamir 2005, 226). The refugee talks were primarily conducted one-on-one between Beilin and his counterpart, Nabil Sha’ath (Beilin 2004, 234). They made significant headway on the refugee issue, exchanging non-papers of their separate

30 Barak was not expected to win the elections and as predicted, he was not reelected (Rabinovich 2004, 158).

positions to form a framework agreement. No other committee apart from the refugees exchanged non-papers (Beilin 2004, 246). Israel and the Palestinians agreed on the seriousness of the problem and the importance of resolving it to improve relations between them (Moratinos 2001). They began discussions by restating each party’s viewpoint of the 1948 War, with neither side wanting to take full responsibility for the refugee problem. However, they did not linger on the difference as they knew it would result in discord and the prevention of progress. To encourage understanding, they even presented each other’s positions on the war (Beilin 2004, 235). Additionally, “the Israeli side put forward a suggested joint narrative for the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian side discussed the proposed narrative and there was much progress, although no agreement was reached” (Moratinos 2001). Moving on from the historical narratives, the delegates presented their own position of how to resolve the refugee problem, through rehabilitation and compensation. The key to rehabilitation was international funding. They agreed to the establishment of an international organization, discussing which countries would participate in the organization as well as contribute funding. However, Israel had not determined what amount it would contribute for compensation (Beilin 2004, 235-246). Even though this was the case, Sha’ath considered it progress for Israel to merely demonstrate a willingness to compensate the refugees (MEMRI 2001). The Taba delegates agreed on five different options for the rehabilitation of the refugees. This resettlement plan originated at the Stockholm Channel and continued to be the basis of discussions at Camp David II. It was also a central idea in the Clinton Parameters. Under a very limited number, yet to be decided, a small portion of the refugees would return to Israel over an extended period of time, along with the family reunification program. Unofficially, Israel offered to permit 25,000 to return to Israel in the first three years of a 15-year program (Moratinos 2001). However, it was only mentioned briefly and there was no agreement on this plan. The delegates also agreed to allow Israel to have a lower immigration quota than other receiving states. With the possibility of returning refugees, Israel started thinking of incentives to prevent as many Palestinians from wanting to return to Israel as possible (PRRN). Taba also created the option for refugees to resettle on Israeli land that would become part of the Palestinian

state given in exchange for additional West Bank territory that would be assimilated into Israel. With the creation of the Palestinian state, the refugees would be free to make their homes there. The refugees’ two other options were to stay in their present host countries or resettle to a third country, with all countries granting them citizenship (Moratinos 2001). Acknowledging the impoverished state of the 200,000 refugees in Lebanon, Beilin and Sha’ath agreed to give them priority in the rehabilitation program (Beilin 2004, 235). With the rehabilitation of all of the refugees, there would be no more need for the UNRWA, so they planned to phase it out in the next five years. According to a Palestinian view, this pleased Israel, because it believed that the UNRWA only strengthened the refugee problem (PRRN). 31

Back to the Main Issue—The Right of Return

The negotiators agreed that rehabilitating the refugees satisfy Resolution 194. Through the realization of Resolution 194, the Palestinians would not have any more claims on Israel regarding the refugees (Moratinos 2001). It would be a major step towards ending the conflict. However, the Israelis and the Palestinians had never before agreed on the interpretation of Resolution 194 and whether there was an actual “right” of return, and they were not able to agree at Taba either. The two parties deviated on the matter of whose choice it was where the refugees would resettle. The Israelis wanted to have sovereign discretion over how many returned to Israel. The Palestinians interpreted Resolution 194 to mean the refugees had the ultimate choice of where to resettle. Restricted return under Israel’s discretion would take away the refugees’ right. Sha’ath stated, “The Israelis can say whatever they want, but the starting point of all of our discussions is the refugees' absolute and sacred Right of Return. We know that if the matter was left in their hands, they would prefer that no Palestinian return to his homeland.” The head of the Palestinian delegation, Abu Ala added, “The disagreement on the refugee issue is great and deep rooted. There is an immense gap between someone

31 Israel also wanted to add the Jewish refugees from the Arab states to the discussions, but even though Israel recognized it was not the Palestinians’ responsibility for the problem, the Palestinians refused to include the topic to the talks as it was not relevant to the Israel-Palestinian conflict (Moratinos 2001).

who demands the Right of Return and its implementation in accordance with UN Resolution 194, and someone who denies this right” (MEMRI 2001). Despite the negotiators’ disagreements on the right of return, they reached a consensus on rehabilitation and compensation, except for how many refugees Israel would permit. The Israelis saw it as great progress in closing the gap on the refugee issue, but the Palestinians saw it as a rejection of the main issue—the right of return (Beilin 2004, 246). Abu Ala continued, “Now that the ambiguity has been removed there has never before been a clearer gap in the positions of the two sides” (MEMRI 2001). As far as the Palestinians were concerned, Israel should not have been trying to decide how many refugees it would permit. Whether it was one or one million it was the principle of the right of return that the Palestinians wanted Israel to accept. Even if Israel recognized the principle of the right of return, the Palestinians ultimately wanted to see Israel implement this right (Palestinian Negotiating Team 2000). In essence, the negotiators merely agreed on a framework for the refugee issue rather than on the details of the implementation of that framework. It was the implementation of a resolution that the Palestinians demanded and wanted to see from Israel (Abed 2005, 79). Beilin (2002) did not believe that limiting the number of refugees to return to Israel contradicted the principle of the right of return. Despite the resolute position of the Palestinians, Beilin claimed “it is possible to reach an Israeli-Palestinian agreement without granting the Palestinian refugees the right of return.” While the Palestinians would not relinquish the right of return, Israel would not accept it. Acceptance of the right of return would mean “an end to the Zionist vision, meaning the vision of a Jewish, democratic state” (Beilin 2002). The Israelis feared, as they had before at Camp David and throughout the state’s history, that the unlimited return of the refugees would threaten the existence of the Jewish state. Palestinian negotiators acknowledged Israel’s fears and were willing to allow for the refugees to return in phases. They also assured Israel that there would be a number of refugees who would choose not to return to Israel, but rather resettle in the Palestinian state or another country (Palestinian Negotiating Team 2000). The Palestinians also demanded that Israel accept responsibility for the refugee problem, but Israel was only willing to recognize the suffering the refugees had endured (Beilin 2004, 239). Sha’ath (2001) considered this a

breakthrough; “for the first time in 50 years, Israeli officials acknowledged a degree of responsibility for the Palestinian refugee crisis.” However, the Palestinians would not back down and continued to demand Israeli acceptance of political, legal, and moral responsibility for the refugees as a starting point for negotiations (Palestinian Negotiating Team 2000). Beilin (2004, 245) was exceedingly optimistic about Taba’s progress of being so close to an agreement. He said the refugee problem was “easier to resolve than he thought.” He blamed Abu Ala alone for Taba’s collapse, because Abu Ala verbalized his commitment to the right of return (Beilin 2004, 248). However, even Beilin’s counterpart, Sha’ath was committed to the principle and implementation of the right of return. Taba came to an end for various reasons. One, the right of return continued to bring disagreement and prevent peace. Two, the Intifada constantly threatened the life of the peace process. Throughout the duration of Taba, the negotiators never knew when the talks might end because of the violence (Beilin 2004, 244). Three, the February election came before they could make an agreement, appointing Sharon as Israel’s new Prime Minister (Pundik 2005, 153). Although nothing came of Taba, it was the furthest the peace process had come to resolving the refugee problem. Taba, the last significant negotiation on the refugee issue in the peace process, ended without an agreement. Delegates widely debated the principle of the right of return and the interpretation of Resolution 194. The final statement determined that implementation of the statement would satisfy Resolution 194. While they made progress and were the closest yet to an agreement, there were still significant gaps between the Israeli and Palestinian positions on the refugee issue. The debates were still on the principle and implementation of the right of return and Israel’s rejection and the Palestinians’ insistence of Israeli responsibility for the refugee problem. Although the final statement continued to use the idea of resettlement options along with a Palestinian state and an international fund, negotiators were still not able to agree on any numbers of refugees for Israel to repatriate or any amount for Israel to compensate. The refugee problem continues to be wrought with difficulty and needs to be resolved in order for there to be an end to the conflict.

CONCLUSION

Even after half a century of the peace process, Lausanne and the later negotiations have striking similarities. Although the parties are not debating the Partition Plan anymore, there continues to be the idea of the creation of a state for the Palestinians. Compensation, resettlement, and the right of return are still the primary issues. It all comes down to whose choice it is where the refugees can live—whether it’s the refugees’ right or Israel’s. Even with the same debates, the peace process has progressed. In fact, Taba came so close to a peace agreement that Yossi Beilin collaborated with Abed Rabbo, a leader in the PLO, and started work on the Geneva Accords. Their disappointment on how close they came to a peace agreement led them to draft a permanent resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Beilin 2004, 243). In the process of drafting, they received international support from many leaders, including Israeli and Palestinian leaders, the U.S., and especially Switzerland. What Beilin (2004, 264) calls the “heart of the agreement” of the Geneva Accords is the exchange of the Temple Mount for Israeli discretion over the admittance of refugees into Israel. The Geneva Accords stated the importance of resolving the refugee problem to reach a final peace agreement. As a basis for the accords, it not only recognized Resolution 242, but Resolution 194 as well. While Beilin agreed to recognize Resolution 194, its implementation in the accords would not be a full right of return. Israel would have “sovereign discretion.” As in previous talks, they did not specify an amount of the refugees for Israel to repatriate, but they did create a method for deciding on a number. Israel would determine the number of refugees to return by averaging the total number of refugees resettling to third countries. While the refugees would be free to express their choice of resettlement, they would only be free to have an unrestricted return to the Palestinian state. All other

countries, whether Israel, host countries, or third countries, would have sovereign discretion over their admittance. Regarding the number of refugees, “as a basis, Israel will consider the average of the total numbers submitted by the different third countries to the International Commission” (Beilin and Abed-Rabbo 2003, Art 7(4)e(iii)). The refugees living in Lebanon would have priority. The establishment of an International Commission would oversee the implementation of the refugee section of the Geneva Accords. The International Commission would not only take care of the resettlement or repatriation of the refugees, but also develop reconciliation programs. The establishment of an International Fund would support the work of the International Commission as well as compensate the refugees. All refugees would receive compensation, and those who lost property would receive additional compensation. If the Geneva Accords were to be implemented, the parties would regard it as a permanent negotiation, meaning the Palestinians could no longer claim their right of return because the parties would consider the refugee issue resolved. As a result, the UNRWA would phase out as the refugees acquired permanent residence (Beilin and Abed-Rabbo 2003). After Beilin and Abed-Rabbo released the Geneva Accords in October 2003, it received mixed responses. Sharon vehemently opposed the Geneva Accords, calling it “suicide.” President Bush called it “productive” (Lakely 2003). U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell supported the peace efforts of Beilin and Abu Mazen, and met with them after its release. Arafat said it would “open the door to peace,” but he did not agreed with how it resolved the refugee problem. While the Geneva Accords recognized Resolution 194, it did not implement the right of return to Israel. This was Arafat’s point of deviation; he wanted the Geneva Accords to call for the implementation of Resolution 194 (Mualem et al. 2003). This was also the point at which the Palestinian people opposed the Geneva Accords. After its release, while it gained the support of some, many among the Palestinians held mass protests and demonstrations in the West Bank and Gaza. Refugee organizations also voiced their opposition, all because it forfeited the Palestinians’ right to return. They considered the Geneva Accords “selling out the right of return” (Nimer 2004). In my opinion, the Geneva Accords would serve as a good basis for negotiations. In order to resolve the conflict, the Palestinians need to be able to establish their

independent state. A resolution of the refugee problem would include the principle of the right of return to the Palestinian state, compensation for lost property, as well as a continuation of the family reunification program under a humanitarian umbrella. Considering the security interests of Israel and upon its withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza for a Palestinian state, the right of return should only apply to the Palestinian state. The refugees could also choose to resettle in their host country, a third country, or Israel under each countries’ discretion. However, conditions first need to be ripe in order to have a successful peace process. The Israeli and Palestinian leaders first need to get back to a place like Camp David II again, in which they can discuss the refugee issue at the top leadership level. There would, however, need to be two primary differences from Camp David II: one, no added pressure from an upcoming election so the parties can take a longer period of time than they had at Camp David, and two, more in-depth discussions on the refugee issue as they had at Taba. Also in 2003, on April 30th, the Roadmap Quartet released the Roadmap to Peace. The Roadmap Quartet, including the U.S., UN, European Union, and Russia, created the Roadmap, which outlined a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Roadmap scheduled the final settlement on the permanent status issues to be in 2005. The Quartet designed Phase III of the Roadmap to resolve the refugee problem. However, the Roadmap was ambiguous and did not present a practical solution. It merely stated there should be an “agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue” (Roadmap Quartet 2003). The Roadmap was not nearly as it was at Taba or as in the Geneva Accords.32 Since 1948, the Palestinian refugees have remained the core problem in the Israel- Palestinian conflict. And after more than 50 years of a failed peace process, there is still no resolution. Created just after the 1948 War, Resolution 194 set a principle for the right of return that both parties would debate over and over. While Resolution 194 was

32 In 2004, although not a result of bilateral negotiations, Sharon made a unilateral decision to create the Gaza Disengagement Plan. While the plan did not mention refugees, the implication was that it would have a great effect on the refugee population considering the population of Gaza contains thousands of refugees. The purpose of the plan was for a future Palestinian state. The implementation of the plan will increase the likelihood of a Palestinian state, thereby turning some of the refugees into citizens of their own state, and, as the plan mentions, improving Palestinian life (Sharon 2004).

absent from most peace talks as an agreed basis for the negotiations, it was not absent from the minds of the negotiators. Disagreement over the right of return was the reason for there being a refugee problem; it was the reason for the deferment of the refugee issue since it was so controversial it inhibited progress on other issues, and it was the reason there were no agreements on the refugee issue when delegates negotiated it in the peace process. At Lausanne, Israel and the Arab states intensely debated the refugee problem, with the Arab states fighting for the refugees to be the primary issue in the negotiations. Israel and the Arab states signed the Lausanne Protocol, a working document including recognition of Resolution 194 to be used as the basis of the negotiations. However, neither side could agree on the interpretation of the right of return. After the Arab states rejected every Israeli proposal and Israel continued to disagree with the Arab states, Lausanne was near complete failure. So that Lausanne would make some progress, the Conciliation Commission shifted the focus of the refugee issue from a political problem to a humanitarian problem. With this change, the refugee issue was far less controversial, and through the creation of the Economic Survey Mission, it attempted to meet the imminent needs of the refugees. After Lausanne, the peace process stopped until Camp David I in 1978, and then again from Camp David I to Madrid in 1991. From the time Lausanne ended in 1949 to the start of the Stockholm talks in 1995, the refugee issue went through a period of deferment in the peace process. Rather than discussing the refugee issue, recognizing Resolution 194, and debating the right of return, neither the Israelis nor the Arabs discussed them. They only recognized Resolution 242, and focused their attention on the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. While not relinquishing the refugees’ right to return, the Arabs began to see the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the future Palestinian state where the refugees would be free to resettle. At Camp David I, Sadat upheld the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and signed the Framework Agreement. The Framework Agreement served as a basis for later negotiations during this period of deferment, Madrid and Oslo, leading to the Oslo II Interim Agreement. It set up a structured way to implement self-government for the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, moving closer to the realization of their right to self-determination, and ultimately a Palestinian state.

At the Madrid Conference, the delegates separated the refugee issue from the bilateral negotiations due to the difficult nature of the problem. In Track I, the Palestinians were able to represent themselves through a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Madrid also created the multilateral, Track II approach to the refugee issue. The multilateral committee, the RWG, addressed the refugee issue as a humanitarian problem, as the end of Lausanne had done. Rather than debating the right of return, the Madrid delegation sought to alleviate the present suffering of the refugees. While Madrid did not make progress on the refugee issue from a political perspective, it changed the notion that the refugees could not improve their living conditions because it might prejudice the final settlement. The RWG worked to encourage dialogue on the refugee issue and created surveys on the minor issues of the refugee problem. The efforts of the RWG led to Israel doubling their yearly quota of family reunification cases from 1,000 to 2,000, as well as improving guidelines for the application procedure. The RWG also raised funds to make the refugees’ living conditions better. Before the RWG stopped meeting due to protests by Israel and the Arabs in addition to a lack of funding, it made some progress on their work objectives, but it was minimal in light of the magnitude of the problem. The Oslo Process created the DoP, which defined the refugee issue as a permanent status issue to be negotiated in the final phase of the negotiations. Oslo set aside the refugee issue for May 1996 when Israel and the Palestinians were scheduled to start the permanent status negotiations. Due to Rabin’s assassination, Netanyahu defeating Peres in the Israeli elections, and bombings in Israel, they never started the permanent status negotiations. Not directly related to the refugee issue, Oslo did result in the Interim Agreement on Palestinian Interim self-government in the West Bank and Gaza. It also resulted in the Oslo Accords in which the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist and Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The 1995 Stockholm talks was the turning point in the peace process with regards to the refugee issue. Although they were unofficial talks, the participants discussed a political resolution to the refugee problem, along with the other permanent status issues. The talks ended soon after Rabin’s assassination, but Stockholm was instrumental in establishing a new approach to the refugee issue. Israel and the Palestinians could agree

to the principle of the right of return without actually implementing it. By agreeing to this idea, Israel would not have to risk their security by the unlimited return of the refugees and the Palestinians would still have their principle. This idea really comes out in the Taba talks. However, they have never made an agreement to recognize this principle. Stockholm also began a progression of negotiating the refugee issue from non- government negotiators, to lower level government officials in the Stockholm Channel, to the party leaders at Camp David II. The 2000 Stockholm Channel formed a draft comprehensive settlement, which, upon agreement would end the conflict, as Israel had always wanted. However, the Stockholm Channel ended without an agreement. But like other peace talks, it created a basis for future negotiations. The Stockholm document proposed a resettlement option for the refugees. The option included the Palestinian state, their host country, a third country, or a limited number in Israel. This plan reappeared in Camp David II, the Clinton Parameters, Taba, and the Geneva Accords. At the 2000 Camp David summit, the delegates negotiated the permanent status issues in hopes of making a final settlement. Before the summit, Arafat had warned that neither side was ready for a final agreement; their positions were still too far apart. The Palestinians wanted Israel to accept responsibility for the refugee problem, as they had wanted since 1948, but Israel continued to refuse to accept the blame. Israel made a proposal of a comprehensive agreement, but the Palestinians rejected it. Israel’s proposal included an end to the conflict. However, there could not be an end to the conflict without a detailed agreement to the heart of the conflict—the refugees. The proposal simply promised a “satisfactory solution” to the refugee problem. While Camp David II did not have extensive negotiations on the refugee issue, it was the first time since Lausanne that party leaders negotiated the refugees at the top level. The complexity and intensity of the right of return in the refugee negotiations contributed to Camp David’s failure. The 2001 Taba talks held significant negotiations on the refugee issue. While Taba ended without an agreement, Israeli and Palestinian delegates created a Final Statement in which they agreed on a number of issues, including an end to the claims of the refugees. It also included their points of disagreement, including the Palestinians’ desire for the right of return and Israel’s desire for an end to the conflict. In addition, the

Final Statement recognized Resolution 242 and Resolution 194. Taba was the first peace talk since Lausanne that agreed to base its negotiations on Resolution 194. The delegates also continued to develop the idea of accepting the right of return in principle, but not in practice. While still miles apart, Israel and the Palestinians determined that they were closer to an agreement than they had ever been before. None of the peace talks that discussed the refugee issue ended with an agreement. Many of the peace talks ceased because of the eruption of violence or a change in Israeli leadership. In the peace talks that deferred the refugee issue, such as Camp David I and Oslo, the talks ended with an agreement, but the agreements did not address the refugee issue. Even with the absence of an agreement, Israel and the Palestinians made progress on the refugee issue by building on what they already discussed. After one peace talk had failed, they tried to pick up where they left off with the next peace talk. When the peace process resumes, the Geneva Accords could serve as the basis for future negotiations. In so doing, the gap could close even further between the Israeli and Palestinian positions on the right of return, moving towards a resolution of the refugee problem. In April 2004, in a speech alongside Israeli PM Sharon, U.S. President Bush reiterated the Roadmap’s statement on the refugees, but he added that the resolution must include “the settling of Palestinian refugees there [a Palestinian state], rather than Israel” (Bush 2004). Bush and Sharon were in agreement; the refugees should not have the right of return. Palestinian leadership, from Abu Mazen, who became the leader of the PLO after Arafat’s death in 2004 and elected President in 2005, to Hamas, which won the 2006 Parliamentary elections, continues to hold to the right of all refugees to return to their homes (APS Diplomat Recorder 2005). After 50 years of the peace process, the Palestinian refugees have been ignored and they have been negotiated, but the refugee problem has yet to be resolved. Israel and the Palestinians continue to disagree on the right of return. After 50 years, many of the Palestinian people remain refugees. While there have been so many years of failed negotiations bringing no end to their suffering, there is always hope.

APPENDIX A

UN General Assembly Resolution 194

The General Assembly,

Having considered further the situation in Palestine,

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and

Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:

(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;

(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;

(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States

which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 1/ and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. Resolves that the Holy Places - including Nazareth - religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control;

Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;

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9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards to the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;

14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.

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APPENDIX B

UN Security Council Resolution 242

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

Affirms further the necessity

For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

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Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

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APPENDIX C

Geneva Accords, Article 7

1. Significance of the Refugee Problem (a) The Parties recognize that, in the context of two independent states, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace, an agreed resolution of the refugee problem is necessary for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace between them.

(b) Such a resolution will also be central to stability building and development in the region.

2. UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative (a) The Parties recognize that UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative (Article 2.ii.) concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees represent the basis for resolving the refugee issue, and agree that these rights are fulfilled according to Article 7 of this Agreement.

3. Compensation (a) Refugees shall be entitled to compensation for their refugeehood and for loss of property. This shall not prejudice or be prejudiced by the refugee's permanent place of residence.

(b) The Parties recognize the right of states that have hosted Palestinian refugees to remuneration.

4. Choice of Permanent Place of Residence (PPR) The solution to the PPR aspect of the refugee problem shall entail an act of informed choice on the part of the refugee to be exercised in accordance with the options and modalities set forth in this agreement. PPR options from which the refugees may choose shall be as follows; (a) The state of Palestine, in accordance with clause a below. (b) Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap, following assumption of Palestinian sovereignty, in accordance with clause a below. (c) Third Countries, in accordance with clause b below. (d) The state of Israel, in accordance with clause c below. (e) Present Host countries, in accordance with clause d below. i. PPR options i and ii shall be the right of all Palestinian refugees and shall be in

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accordance with the laws of the State of Palestine. ii. Option iii shall be at the sovereign discretion of third countries and shall be in accordance with numbers that each third country will submit to the International Commission. These numbers shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that each third country shall accept. iii. Option iv shall be at the sovereign discretion of Israel and will be in accordance with a number that Israel will submit to the International Commission. This number shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that Israel shall accept. As a basis, Israel will consider the average of the total numbers submitted by the different third countries to the International Commission. iv. Option v shall be in accordance with the sovereign discretion of present host countries. Where exercised this shall be in the context of prompt and extensive development and rehabilitation programs for the refugee communities.

Priority in all the above shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon.

5. Free and Informed Choice The process by which Palestinian refugees shall express their PPR choice shall be on the basis of a free and informed decision. The Parties themselves are committed and will encourage third parties to facilitate the refugees' free choice in expressing their preferences, and to countering any attempts at interference or organized pressure on the process of choice. This will not prejudice the recognition of Palestine as the realization of Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

6. End of Refugee Status Palestinian refugee status shall be terminated upon the realization of an individual refugee’s permanent place of residence (PPR) as determined by the International Commission.

7. End of Claims This agreement provides for the permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. No claims may be raised except for those related to the implementation of this agreement.

8. International Role The Parties call upon the international community to participate fully in the comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem in accordance with this Agreement, including, inter alia, the establishment of an International Commission and an International Fund.

9. Property Compensation (a) Refugees shall be compensated for the loss of property resulting from their displacement.

(b) The aggregate sum of property compensation shall be calculated as follows:

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i. The Parties shall request the International Commission to appoint a Panel of Experts to estimate the value of Palestinians' property at the time of displacement.

ii. The Panel of Experts shall base its assessment on the UNCCP records, the records of the Custodian for Absentee Property, and any other records it deems relevant. The Parties shall make these records available to the Panel.

iii. The Parties shall appoint experts to advise and assist the Panel in its work.

iv. Within 6 months, the Panel shall submit its estimates to the Parties.

v. The Parties shall agree on an economic multiplier, to be applied to the estimates, to reach a fair aggregate value of the property.

(c) The aggregate value agreed to by the Parties shall constitute the Israeli “lump sum” contribution to the International Fund. No other financial claims arising from the Palestinian refugee problem may be raised against Israel.

(d) Israel's contribution shall be made in installments in accordance with Schedule X.

(e) The value of the Israeli fixed assets that shall remain intact in former settlements and transferred to the state of Palestine will be deducted from Israel's contribution to the International Fund. An estimation of this value shall be made by the International Fund, taking into account assessment of damage caused by the settlements.

10. Compensation for Refugeehood (a) A "Refugeehood Fund" shall be established in recognition of each individual's refugeehood. The Fund, to which Israel shall be a contributing party, shall be overseen by the International Commission. The structure and financing of the Fund is set forth in Annex X.

(b) Funds will be disbursed to refugee communities in the former areas of UNRWA operation, and will be at their disposal for communal development and commemoration of the refugee experience. Appropriate mechanisms will be devised by the International Commission whereby the beneficiary refugee communities are empowered to determine and administer the use of this Fund.

11. The International Commission (Commission) (a) Mandate and Composition i. An International Commission shall be established and shall have full and exclusive responsibility for implementing all aspects of this Agreement pertaining to refugees.

ii. In addition to themselves, the Parties call upon the United Nations, the United States, UNRWA, the Arab host countries, the EU, Switzerland, Canada, Norway, Japan, the World Bank, the Russian Federation, and others to be the members of the Commission.

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iii. The Commission shall: 1. Oversee and manage the process whereby the status and PPR of Palestinian refugees is determined and realized. 2. Oversee and manage, in close cooperation with the host states, the rehabilitation and development programs. 3. Raise and disburse funds as appropriate.

iv. The Parties shall make available to the Commission all relevant documentary records and archival materials in their possession that it deems necessary for the functioning of the Commission and its organs. The Commission may request such materials from all other relevant parties and bodies, including, inter alia, UNCCP and UNRWA.

(b) Structure i. The Commission shall be governed by an Executive Board (Board) composed of representatives of its members.

ii. The Board shall be the highest authority in the Commission and shall make the relevant policy decisions in accordance with this Agreement. iii. The Board shall draw up the procedures governing the work of the Commission in accordance with this Agreement. iv. The Board shall oversee the conduct of the various Committees of the Commission. The said Committees shall periodically report to the Board in accordance with procedures set forth thereby. v. The Board shall create a Secretariat and appoint a Chair thereof. The Chair and the Secretariat shall conduct the day-to-day operation of the Commission.

(c) Specific Committees i. The Commission shall establish the Technical Committees specified below. ii. Unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, the Board shall determine the structure and procedures of the Committees. iii. The Parties may make submissions to the Committees as deemed necessary. iv. The Committees shall establish mechanisms for resolution of disputes arising from the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement relating to refugees. v. The Committees shall function in accordance with this Agreement, and shall render binding decisions accordingly. vi. Refugees shall have the right to appeal decisions affecting them according to mechanisms established by this Agreement and detailed in Annex X.

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(d) Status-determination Committee: i. The Status-determination Committee shall be responsible for verifying refugee status. ii. UNRWA registration shall be considered as rebuttable presumption (prima facie proof) of refugee status.

(e) Compensation Committee: i. The Compensation Committee shall be responsible for administering the implementation of the compensation provisions. ii. The Committee shall disburse compensation for individual property pursuant to the following modalities: 1. Either a fixed per capita award for property claims below a specified value. This will require the claimant to only prove title, and shall be processed according to a fast-track procedure, or 2. A claims-based award for property claims exceeding a specified value for immovables and other assets. This will require the claimant to prove both title and the value of the losses.

iii. Annex X shall elaborate the details of the above including, but not limited to, evidentiary issues and the use of UNCCP, “Custodian for Absentees' Property”, and UNRWA records, along with any other relevant records.

(f) Host State Remuneration Committee: There shall be remuneration for host states.

(g) Permanent Place of Residence Committee (PPR Committee): The PPR Committee shall, i. Develop with all the relevant parties detailed programs regarding the implementation of the PPR options pursuant to Article 7/4 above.

ii. Assist the applicants in making an informed choice regarding PPR options.

iii. Receive applications from refugees regarding PPR. The applicants must indicate a number of preferences in accordance with article 7/4 above. The applications shall be received no later than two years after the start of the International Commission's operations. Refugees who do not submit such applications within the two-year period shall lose their refugee status.

iv. Determine, in accordance with sub-Article (a) above, the PPR of the applicants, taking into account individual preferences and maintenance of family unity. Applicants who do not avail themselves of the Committee's PPR determination shall lose their refugee status.

v. Provide the applicants with the appropriate technical and legal assistance.

vi. The PPR of Palestinian refugees shall be realized within 5 years of the start of the

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International Commission's operations.

(h) Refugeehood Fund Committee The Refugeehood Fund Committee shall implement Article 7/10 as detailed in Annex X.

(i) Rehabilitation and Development Committee In accordance with the aims of this Agreement and noting the above PPR programs, the Rehabilitation and Development Committee shall work closely with Palestine, Host Countries and other relevant third countries and parties in pursuing the goal of refugee rehabilitation and community development. This shall include devising programs and plans to provide the former refugees with opportunities for personal and communal development, housing, education, healthcare, re-training and other needs. This shall be integrated in the general development plans for the region.

12. The International Fund (a) An International Fund (the Fund) shall be established to receive contributions outlined in this Article and additional contributions from the international community. The Fund shall disburse monies to the Commission to enable it to carry out its functions. The Fund shall audit the Commission’s work.

(b) The structure, composition and operation of the Fund are set forth in Annex X.

13. UNRWA (a) UNRWA should be phased out in each country in which it operates, based on the end of refugee status in that country.

(b) UNRWA should cease to exist five years after the start of the Commission's operations. The Commission shall draw up a plan for the phasing out of UNRWA and shall facilitate the transfer of UNRWA functions to host states.

14. Reconciliation Programs (a) The Parties will encourage and promote the development of cooperation between their relevant institutions and civil societies in creating forums for exchanging historical narratives and enhancing mutual understanding regarding the past.

(b) The Parties shall encourage and facilitate exchanges in order to disseminate a richer appreciation of these respective narratives, in the fields of formal and informal education, by providing conditions for direct contacts between schools, educational institutions and civil society.

(c) The Parties may consider cross-community cultural programs in order to promote the goals of conciliation in relation to their respective histories.

(d) These programs may include developing appropriate ways of commemorating those villages and communities that existed prior to 1949.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Meghan Mohrland received her B.M. from Wheaton College in oboe performance, and is receiving her M.A. from Florida State University in international affairs. She is focusing her studies on human rights and Middle East studies, in addition to studying Arabic. She is currently working in the Executive Office of Governor Bush. An activist at heart, upon graduation she will pursue the human rights’ field, advocating on behalf of those worldwide who have suffered such abuses, particularly relating to religious persecution.

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