GA Research Packet | LEBMUN

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GA Research Packet | LEBMUN FORUM: GENERAL ASSEMBLY TOPIC 1: The question of the safe and free passage of commercial vessels through the Persian Gulf TOPIC 2: The question of basic human rights to agricultural land, natural resources, and water in Palestine-Israel Conflict LEBMUN ‘21 | 2 CONTENTS TOPIC 1 4 Introduction 4 Key Terms 5 Key Actors 6 Background 7 Recent Developments 8 Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue 8 Suggested Solutions 9 Avenues of Discussion 9 TOPIC 2 10 Introduction 10 Key Terms 10 Key Actors 11 Background 11 Previous Attempts to Resolve the Conflict 13 Suggested Solutions 13 Avenues of Discussion 13 Bibliography 14 LEBMUN ‘21 | 3 TOPIC 1: The question of the safe and free passage of commercial vessels through the Persian Gulf INTRODUCTION The Persian Gulf To figure out what the conflict happening in the Persian Gulf is, one must first understand the significance of this body of water. The Persian Gulf is a key passageway for vessels (see definition in ‘Key Terms’ section below), whether they be commercial (for trade) or naval (military). The Persian Gulf is bounded by multiple wealthy Arab states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which is the reason for it being a longtime flourishing trading hub, crucial for access to vital trading routes in the Middle East region. So what’s the deal with the Persian Gulf? Each Gulf state has maritime territories in the Persian Gulf, which are based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) Treaty. However, because of how valuable these territories are, nations will oen try their best to place the most claims. Maritime territorial claims made by the Gulf states have led to escalating tensions in the region. The disagreements over which nation has sovereignty over which areas have even resulted in violent action, which raises the question, “How safe is it for commercial vessels to pass through the Persian Gulf?” LEBMUN ‘21 | 4 KEY TERMS Nautical Miles Unit of measurement for distances at sea. 1 nautical mile is equal to 1,852 metres. Maritime Anything referring to the sea (trade by sea, territories in the sea, naval matters). Territorial Waters The maritime territory of each country (right next to their shores) that extends 12 nautical miles from land. The Contiguous Zone An area 12 nautical miles from the end of territorial waters where other nations must be cautious. Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) Extending 200 nautical miles from the shore is the “Exclusive Economic Zone” (EEZ), where the respective nation has somewhat of a control over trade and passing ships. All ships are allowed to pass in this area, but the respective nation can regulate ships under the pretext of environmental concerns. International Waters Any area that is outside of territorial waters. International waters do not belong to any nations. Vessels from all nations are allowed to freely and safely pass through international waters. Commercial Vessels Vessels are ships or large boats. Commercial vessels refer to ships used for trade or carrying passengers (ex. Cargo ships, cruise ships). The tensions stemming from the Persian Gulf Dispute have resulted in the compromising of the safety of commercial ships passing through this body of water. The Strait of Hormuz The Persian Gulf’s narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz, is only 30 nautical miles in diameter. This has led to disputes and conflicts on who has the authority over this waterway. LEBMUN ‘21 | 5 KEY ACTORS Which countries are bordering the Persian Gulf, and what do they claim as their territorial waters? The countries that surround the Persian Gulf are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Each country has their own respective maritime territories in the sea. Key Actors & Geography In the map included, the divided sections of each claimant in the Persian Gulf Dispute are shown with the red lines. The red center line indicates the division of the Persian Gulf between the Arab (Gulf) States and Iran (both sides of the conflict). EEZs and territorial waters are shown in this map as well, along with a disputed area marked by dashed lines between Dubai and Iran. Current Western Involvements The United States Navy and British navy among others parade their warships and aircra carriers throughout the Persian Gulf in attempts to provoke Iran. LEBMUN ‘21 | 6 BACKGROUND Iran’s capture of an international ship (2009) The points ‘1’ and ‘2’ along with text refer to an incident that occurred on the 25th of November, 2009, when Iran took an international ship captive under the pretext that it had “violated Iran’s international waters”. It’s important to note that this conflict existed well before US sanctions on Iran but the sanctions significantly intensified this conflict. US-Iran Relations Several merchant ships in the Persian Gulf were damaged in two incidents in May and June 2019. Western nations blamed Iran, while Iran denied involvement. In June 2019, Iran shot down an American RQ-4A surveillance drone flying over the Strait of Hormuz (see map le), leading to a sharp increase in tensions between the two nations and nearly resulting in an armed confrontation. In July 2019, an Iranian oil tanker was seized by Britain in the Strait of Gibraltar on the grounds that it was shipping oil to Syria in violation of European Union sanctions. Iran later captured a British oil tanker and its crew members in the Persian Gulf. The Killing of Qasem Soleimani The crisis escalated in late 2019 and early 2020 when alleged members of the Kata'ib Hezbollah militia, part of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces, killed an American contractor in an attack on an Iraqi base hosting U.S. personnel. In retaliation, the U.S. conducted airstrikes against Kata'ib Hezbollah's facilities in Iraq and Syria, killing 25 militiamen. Kata'ib Hezbollah responded with an attack on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, which prompted the U.S. to deploy hundreds of new troops to the Middle East and announce that it would preemptively target Iran's "proxies" in Iraq. Days later, the commander of IRGC's Quds Force Qasem Soleimani and PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were both killed in a U.S. drone strike, resulting in Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei pledging to exact revenge on U.S. forces. Military Escalations The U.S. deployed nearly 4,000 troops in response to the tensions, and Israel heightened its security levels. On 5 January 2020, Iran ended its commitments to the nuclear deal, and the Iraqi parliament passed a resolution to expel all foreign troops from its territory. The U.S. and Iran nearly entered into an open conflict on 8 January 2020 when the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps launched ballistic missile attacks on two military bases in Iraq housing U.S. soldiers in retaliation for the killing of Soleimani, a rare direct Iran–U.S. confrontation and the closest to the brink of war between the two nations in decades. Upon initial assessments of no American casualties, the Trump administration curtailed tensions by temporarily ruling out a direct military response but announcing new sanctions on Iran. It was later revealed that more than a hundred U.S. troops sustained injuries during the attacks. LEBMUN ‘21 | 7 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS Seizing of the South Korean-flagged tanker On January 4, 2021, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps seized a South Korean-flagged tanker in the Gulf waters, detaining its crew. Seoul confirmed the seizure of this tanker by Iranian authorities in the waters off Oman and demanded its immediate release. Several Iranian media outlets, including state TV, said the Guards Navy captured the vessel for “polluting the Gulf with chemicals” and also stated that the vessel’s detained crew members included nationals of South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam and Myanmar. Iran’s state TV said the tanker was being held at Iran’s Bandar Abbas port city. The ship had 20 crew members, according to South Korea’s foreign ministry. The US State Department called for Iran to release the tanker immediately. The incident comes ahead of an expected visit by South Korea’s deputy foreign minister to Tehran. The visit would occur in the days aer, during which officials would discuss Iran’s demand that South Korea release $7 billion in funds frozen in South Korean banks because of US sanctions. Seizing of the British-flagged tanker In early 2019, Iran jacked up tensions in this waterway by seizing British-flagged tanker Stena Impero, two weeks aer a British warship had intercepted an Iranian tanker off the coast of Gibraltar. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE Land boundary demarcated by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC) An agreement in 1994 decided by the UNIKBDC, on the course of the Iraq-Kuwait land boundary. The line which they intended to demarcate was in effect a refinement of a detailed demarcation proposal submitted unavailingly by Britain. (Link can be found here) Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2015 (JCPOA) An agreement reached in July 2015, concerning the Iranian Nuclear Program, in Vienna. The agreement was between Iran, the five permanent members of the security council, and Germany, together with the European Union (EU). Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by significantly, and reduce the number of its gas centrifuges for 13 years. Iran also agreed not to build any new heavy-water facilities for the same period of time. International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) Group of countries, officially tasked with maintaining order and security in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden and Southern Red Sea.
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