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A Decade Since the Outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada: a Strategic the IDF in the Second Intifada | Giora Eiland the Rise and Fall Volume 13 | No. 3 | October 2010 A Decade since the Outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada: A Strategic Overview | Michael Milstein The IDF in the Second Intifada | Giora Eiland The Rise and Fall of Suicide Bombings in the Second Intifada | Yoram Schweitzer The Political Process in the Entangled Gordian Knot | Anat Kurz The End of the Second Intifada? | Jonathan Schachter The Second Intifada and Israeli Public Opinion | Yehuda Ben Meir and Olena Bagno-Moldavsky The Disengagement Plan: Vision and Reality | Zaki Shalom Israel’s Coping with the al-Aqsa Intifada: A Critical Review | Ephraim Lavie 2000-2010: An Influential Decade |Oded Eran Resuming the Multilateral Track in a Comprehensive Peace Process | Shlomo Brom and Jeffrey Christiansen The Core Issues of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: The Fifth Element | Shiri Tal-Landman המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURcITY STUDIES INCORPORATING THE JAFFEE bd CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES Strategic ASSESSMENT Volume 13 | No. 3 | October 2010 CONteNts Abstracts | 3 A Decade since the Outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada: A Strategic Overview | 7 Michael Milstein The IDF in the Second Intifada | 27 Giora Eiland The Rise and Fall of Suicide Bombings in the Second Intifada | 39 Yoram Schweitzer The Political Process in the Entangled Gordian Knot | 49 Anat Kurz The End of the Second Intifada? | 63 Jonathan Schachter The Second Intifada and Israeli Public Opinion | 71 Yehuda Ben Meir and Olena Bagno-Moldavsky The Disengagement Plan: Vision and Reality | 85 Zaki Shalom Israel’s Coping with the al-Aqsa Intifada: A Critical Review | 101 Ephraim Lavie 2000-2010: An Influential Decade | 123 Oded Eran Resuming the Multilateral Track in a Comprehensive Peace Process | 133 Shlomo Brom and Jeffrey Christiansen The Core Issues of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: The Fifth Element | 141 Shiri Tal-Landman The purpose of Strategic Assessment is to stimulate and Strategic enrich the public debate on issues that are, or should be, ASSESSMENT on Israel’s national security agenda. Strategic Assessment is a quarterly publication comprising policy-oriented articles written by INSS researchers and guest contributors. The views presented here are those of the authors alone. Editor in Chief Oded Eran Managing Editor Moshe Grundman Editor Judith Rosen Editorial Board Yehuda Ben Meir, Meir Elran, Oded Eran, Moshe Grundman, Ephraim Kam, Anat Kurz, Emily B. Landau, Judith Rosen, Zaki Shalom Editorial Advisory Board Dan Ben-David, Azar Gat, Efraim Halevy, Tamar Hermann, Itamar Rabinovich, Amnon Lipkin Shahak, Shimon Shamir, Gabi Sheffer, Emmanual Sivan, Shimon Stein, Asher Susser, Eyal Zisser Graphic Design: Michal Semo-Kovetz, Yael Bieber Tel Aviv University Graphic Design Studio Printing: Kedem Ltd. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) 40 Haim Levanon • POB 39950 • Tel Aviv 61398 • Israel Tel: +972-3-640-0400 • Fax: +972-3-744-7590 • E-mail: [email protected] Strategic Assessment is published in English and Hebrew. The full text is available on the Institute’s website: www.inss.org.il © All rights reserved. ISSN 0793-8942 Abstracts A Decade since the Outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada: A Strategic Overview / Michael Milstein This essay presents an overview of the events surrounding the Palestinian uprising that erupted in September 2000. It outlines several key chronological stages of the al-Aqsa intifada as defined by their political and military features, and then offers a balance sheet of the past decade from the Palestinian and Israeli perspectives. It considers the overall implications of the struggle for both sides and its incorporation into their respective narratives, and sketches three leading possible scenarios on the future evolution of relations between Israel and the Palestinians. The IDF in the Second Intifada / Giora Eiland This article analyzes the way the IDF, in conjunction with other security forces, confronted the “armed conflict short of war” that became known as the second intifada. It divides the subject into two periods: up to Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002), and after Defensive Shield, with an emphasis on the period from 2002-2005. It addresses both the pure military aspects and the complexity that resulted from the need for the military echelon to hold an ongoing dialogue with the political echelon. The article also lists four main lessons that should be learned from the IDF’s experience in the confrontation. The Rise and Fall of Suicide Bombings in the Second Intifada / Yoram Schweitzer This essay presents the background to Palestinian suicide terrorism and its use in the decade since the second intifada erupted. It then presents the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives regarding their relative success in attaining their respective goals. The author contends that while Israel successfully contained Palestinian suicide terrorism, the phenomenon – which seems to have been replaced with high trajectory fire as a choice method for attack – could well be revived by Palestinian organizations in the future. Strategic Assessment | Volume 13 | No. 3 | October 2010 3 Abstracts 4 The Political Process in the Entangled Gordian Knot / Anat Kurz During the years of the intifada, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was split into three groupings: Fatah–Hamas; Israel–PA led by Fatah; and Israel–Hamas. This article examines the military and diplomatic moves that accelerated the development of the rift in the Palestinian arena. It reviews the lessons of the dialogue launched at Annapolis, which proved a failed attempt to exploit the rift in the Palestinian arena to bring about a diplomatic breakthrough, and analyzes the nature of the | Volume 13 | No. 3 | October 2010 13 | No. Volume | circular connection between the diplomatic deadlock and the split in the Palestinian arena. The End of the Second Intifada? / Jonathan Schachter Although if and when the second intifada ended is subject to dispute, Strategic Assessment Strategic this article attempts to identify the end of that uprising by focusing on the incidence of suicide bombings, arguably the most important element of second intifada-related violence. By 2005, the widespread suicide bombings had clearly ebbed, due to a mix of Israeli preventive measures and internal Palestinian constraints. Although other forms of violence have intensified in the intervening years, they have not attained the same impact as suicide bombings. The Second Intifada and Israeli Public Opinion / Yehuda Ben Meir and Olena Bagno-Moldavsky As one of the most important security events in Israel in the past decade, the second intifada presumably had no small influence on Israeli public opinion regarding national security issues. The article studies whether it is possible to identify any pattern in the influence of the intifada on public opinion; if so, what was the direction of the influence and what changes in public opinion occurred in the wake of the intifada; and whether the changes were short lived and reversible, or long term changes that have left their mark to this day. The Disengagement Plan: Vision and Reality / Zaki Shalom Five years after the disengagement plan was implemented, it is clear that a significant portion of the forecasts and assessments did not unfold as many had expected. Although the preparations for implementing the Abstracts 5 plan were extremely thorough, in the end almost little went as planned. This essay examines the direct results of the disengagement, several indirectly linked events, and their ramifications for the vision of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement Israel’s Coping with the al-Aqsa Intifada: A Critical Review / Ephraim Lavie This article explores the underlying complexity in defining the essence of the intifada, both in factual and legal terms, and Israel’s response to the violence by means of applying the doctrine of a “limited conflict.” 3 | October 2010 13 | No. Volume | Suggesting that Israel misread the situation and hence responded inappropriately, the article analyzes the outcomes of Israel’s policy, including the effects of the IDF’s operations on the positions of the Palestinian population towards Israel and towards the greater Israeli– Palestinian conflict. Assessment Strategic 2000-2010: An Influential Decade / Oded Eran It may well be that 2001–2010 will figure among the most important decades in the history of the ArabΩ—Israeli conflict. The decade was not distinguished by political and military decisions. On the other hand, several processes occurred that will exert decisive influence on future directions of the Arab–Israeli conflict and the search for its solution. These include changes in Israeli and Palestinian public discourse; the rise of a new generation of leaders; international involvement in the arena; the effect of the security fence; and others. Resuming the Multilateral Track in a Comprehensive Peace Process / Shlomo Brom and Jeffrey Christiansen This essay proposes resumption of the multilateral working groups of Madrid 1991 in a revised format in the framework of a comprehensive approach to Middle East peace. Using Madrid’s idea of multilateral talks to assist the bilateral talks in concluding peace agreements, the current idea, which incorporates the framework of the Arab Peace Initiative, proposes tailoring the multilateral groups so as to support the negotiations with the Palestinians. Abstracts 6 The Core Issues of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: The Fifth Element / Shiri Tal-Landman Recent years have seen emphasis on a new core issue in the Israeli— Palestinian
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