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7. Politics and Diplomacy Hoover Press : Zelnick/Israel hzeliu ch7 Mp_119 rev1 page 119 7. Politics and Diplomacy as israeli forces were clearing recalcitrant settlers from their Gaza homes on August 16, 2005, Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ra- mallah, published a column in the Jerusalem Post headlined, “How Sharon and Abbas Can Both Win.”1 Shikaki, a pollster and political analyst respected in Israel and the west, questioned the wisdom of Israeli unilateralism in Gaza and on the West Bank as opposed to Lebanon, where no one on the other side wanted to talk. Here, he argued, Hamas may be as close-minded as Hez- bollah, preferring to paint Israel’s withdrawal as a victory for Pal- estinian resistance, but Abu Mazen, supported by Palestinian pub- lic opinion, wanted to reduce tensions and negotiate. Make him look good by easing restrictions on Palestinian trade and move- ment, and he will help Sharon and Israel by defeating Hamas and talking about the terms for settling the conflict. In other words, let the PA rather than Hamas control the Palestinian narrative of withdrawal. Shakaki updated his survey data two months later for a con- ference at Brandeis University hosted by Shai Feldman, director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies and former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv. By that October conference, 84 percent of Palestinians were convinced that violence had played a role in the Israeli withdrawal. Irre- 1. Khalil Shikaki, “How Sharon and Abbas Can Both Win,” Jerusalem Post, August 16, 2005. Hoover Press : Zelnick/Israel hzeliu ch7 Mp_120 rev1 page 120 120 israel’s unilateralism spective of this faith in the efficacy of violence, however, the per- centage of Palestinians willing to compromise on final status is- sues had grown from 25 percent in 1996 to 35–40 percent after Camp David to 55–60 percent after the Gaza pullout. Meanwhile, the needle of popular support for Hamas seemed stuck in the mid- high 20s, though it was later shown rising. Shikaki interpreted the Palestinian message to Hamas pointedly: “Thank you very much. Now go home.”2 Looking back after the January 2006 elections, Shikaki’s words have a quaint “Dewey beats Truman” ring. His message, however, was not fundamentally different from the sort of prac- tical, humanistic “day after” advice the Sharon government was receiving from many sources including the PA, left-of-center Is- raelis, the Europeans, and Condoleezza Rice. Abu Mazen and his PA were the last best hope for solving the problem. Yet Abu Ma- zen lacked a strong political base. His one hope, then, was to demonstrate effectiveness through making people’s lives better. That meant convincing the Israelis to move quickly on an assort- ment of issues that made a difference. In reality, Israel’s cooperation proved grudging, piecemeal, and incomplete, reflecting the judgment of its political leadership that Abbas was a losing horse. Sharon’s political position inside Israel grew strong enough for him to move with apparent success toward a major overhaul of the country’s political structure.3 Abu Mazen, on the other hand, suffered one personal setback after another, to the point where younger leaders of his own Fatah Party offered their own slate of legislative candidates, discarding Abbas’ prime minister, Ahmed Qurei.4 Atop their new slate was 2. Speech presented by Khalil Shikaki on October 20, 2005, at Brandeis Uni- versity, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, “Israel and the Palestinians: The Road Ahead.” 3. See, for example, Steven Erlanger and Greg Myre, “Sharon’s New Party Shuffles the Political Deck, Setting Off a Scramble for Israeli Elections,” New York Times, November 22, 2005. 4. See, for example, Conal Urquhart, “Fatah Faces Split as Militant Leader Hoover Press : Zelnick/Israel hzeliu ch7 Mp_121 rev1 page 121 Politics and Diplomacy 121 Marwan Barghouti, presently serving five consecutive life sen- tences in an Israeli jail for planning terrorist operations executed by his Tanzim militia during the Second Intifada that killed a total of five people. But even Barghouti was not enough to stop what turned out to be a massive and stunning Hamas victory. Why events unfolded as they did helps clarify the situation in both the Israeli and Palestinian camps and define what one can look for in the period ahead. First, it is worth repeating that unilateral separation came about not because a cooperative Palestinian faction was waiting in the wings but, to the contrary, because Israelis in large num- bers had concluded there was no Palestinian partner with whom to negotiate. When Sharon first announced his plan for unilateral territorial moves, Yasser Arafat was running Fatah, the PLO, and the PA. He had been thoroughly discredited in the eyes of most Israelis as a recidivist terrorist whose pretensions to the contrary during the Oslo years had proven a pack of lies. Abu Mazen had been plucked from early if comfortable retirement, whisked off, and made prime minister. He quit after a few months, principally because Arafat wanted no division of power. True, after Arafat’s death Abu Mazen had been elected in a fair vote. Yet although the position had been conferred on him, real power had not. Thus, while several matters—ranging from what to do with the settlers’ homes to how Palestinians could travel between Gaza and the West Bank—demanded consultation with the Israelis and some give and take, they were not negotiations in any sense of the word; they involved no quid pro quo. Israel’s responsibility for unilaterally ensuring its own interests was magnified, though some coordination with the PA at places such as the Rafah crossing remined essential. Second, as the principal critique of the unilateral pullback Quits to Set Up Rival Movement: Palestinian Young Guard Out to Modernise Party: President Tries to Appease Rebels without Success,” The Guardian, Decem- ber 16, 2005. Hoover Press : Zelnick/Israel hzeliu ch7 Mp_122 rev1 page 122 122 israel’s unilateralism plan was that it would reward—and hence encourage—terrorism, Sharon tried to ensure that the pullback itself generated no new security problems. Take the issue of the Rafah crossing along the Philadelphi Corridor separating Egypt from Gaza. Even under Is- raeli control, the crossing became a flashpoint for the smuggling of weapons into Gaza through tunnels dug from the Egyptian side. Terrorists sought by the Israelis also on occasion found their way through the tunnels. With the Israelis now pulling back, who would police the border? If not the Israelis, could they at least monitor the checkpoint in real time? Using what equipment? Who would make the decision as to whether a particular individual was free to cross? In the end, with the prodding of U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and the motivation provided by a cou- ple of all-night bargaining sessions, the parties came close enough to agreement to permit Rafah to reopen on November 25. The result: the border is presently under PA control and its officers have the final say over who can cross; the Israelis monitor the proceedings via live surveillance cameras; Egypt and teams of European observers patrol Egypt’s side of the border. Here, as we shall see shortly, from the vantage of security, the deal worked poorly. The price of guns in the area—a good indicator of smug- gling trade success—fell to the lowest point in years. And in a truly ugly incident, two Egyptian troops were shot and killed as a Palestinian mob, angered by the slow clearance pace, surged across the border into Egypt while another commandeered a front-end loader and began smashing down a restraining wall. Israelis, now safely out of Gaza, barely blinked. They had sus- pected all along that Abu Mazen was not a man who people feared to cross. The Karni crossing is a third illustration of the clash between Israeli security and Palestinian mobility. Karni had long been the exit point for fruits and vegetables produced by Palestinian farm- ers. With the coming of the Second Intifada, Karni became a tar- get of Palestinian terrorist attacks. The Israelis, therefore, became Hoover Press : Zelnick/Israel hzeliu ch7 Mp_123 rev1 page 123 Politics and Diplomacy 123 even more security conscious both at the Karni crossing and at the points of final destination, a concern that was underlined when militants attempted unsuccessfully to blow up the crossing. Palestinians soon faced economic loss if not disaster. They com- plained of multiple cargo transfers and inspection delays resulting in spoiled merchandise. And that was just to get to the far side of the checkpoint! Once on the West Bank, the trucks were sub- jected to the same delays as resident Palestinian vehicles. The Israelis recommended that the produce be transported in shipping containers, making goods far easier to monitor. But they were in short supply. So trucks continued to ply the roads, accompanied by multiple inspections, the cargo transfers, and delays. More of- ten than not, Palestinian farmers would have been better off de- stroying whatever portion of the produce could not be sold or consumed locally, yet another example of the terrorism surtax that survived even after Intifada 2 withered away. A final area of Rice-induced accommodation involved Israel’s agreement to permit bus convoys carrying Palestinians to travel between Gaza and Tarqumiya on the West Bank beginning De- cember 15, 2005. At Israeli insistence, no one between sixteen and thirty-five may be a passenger, the travelers must be Gaza residents, and all must return to Gaza within ten days. Yet despite such security measures, by year’s end the service had still to be- gin.
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