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Kadima for Half Price? the Formation of a National Unity Government in Israel

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Kadima for Half Price? the Formation of a National Unity Government in Israel Israel Office_____________________________ Kadima for half price? The formation of a national unity government in Israel . The formation of a national unity government strengthens Prime Minister Netanyahu and gives him new leeway during negotiations. Kadima’s entry to the government strengthens moderate forces and weakens the hardliners. There will be no real change in policy. Kadima failed in opposition, and as a government party it will be even less able to push through a different policy. The agreement between Mofaz and Netanyahu was motivated in the main by domestic political reasons. This is the primary field in which moderate changes will take place rather than in foreign policy. There will be new Israeli offers of talks in the peace process, but no real progress should be expected, together with no surmounting of the present stalemate. It is not clear whether Mofaz will join the moderates or the hardliners in Netanyahu’s security cabinet over the Iran question. Dr. Ralf Hexel FES Israel, May 17, 2012 1 More political power for Netanyahu secure an influential ministerial position for himself? Or is he seeking a change in policy? In a surprise move on May 8, 2012, the opposi- tion Kadima party (28 seats), led by former No early elections - a national unity gov- army head and defense minister Shaul Mofaz, ernment instead joined prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right leaning-religious government coalition (66 When the Knesset convened on the morning of out of 120 seats). Netanyahu now has a gov- May 7, parliamentarians and public were abso- ernment comprising seven parties; this has a lutely sure that the votes needed to hold early parliamentary majority of 94 and can rightly be elections on September 4, 2012 and to dissolve called a national unity government. Facing it is the Knesset would take place as planned. As all the opposition, led by the Avoda (Labor) chair- the parliamentarians in the plenary and person, Shelly Yachimovich, who heads a party committees alike vehemently discussed these with just eight seats. Not only is the opposition questions until the wee hours, behind the politi- very small: it is also completely frag-mented, cal drama that was being played out on the comprising six parties with a total of 26 seats parliamentary stage three men – prime minister between them. Until the next Knesset elections Netanyahu, his closest political confidant de- in November 2013 Netanyahu now has fense minister Ehud Barak, and Shaul Mofaz – considerable political room for maneuver, since were engineering Kadima’s entry to the now none of his coalition partners acting coalition. At 2:00 am the following day, independently will be able to bring him down. Netanyahu and Mofaz announced at a joint This strengthening of his political power has conference that Kadima was joining the gov- once again proven that he is a master political ernment and that a coalition agreement had just tactician. been signed at Netanyahu’s Jerusalem resi- dence. The two men who had been Netanya- But will Netanyahu use this new political leeway hu’s closest coalition partners, foreign minister to inject momentum in order to overcome the Avigdor Lieberman (Yisrael Beiteinu) and inter- stalemate in the Middle East peace process? ior minister Eli Yishai (Shas), were informed in Will he change his policy toward Iran? Or will he advance about the decision, to which they instead continue his previous policy of agreed. maintaining the status quo, in other words will he continue building settlements, refusing to At the press conference Netanyahu said that make concessions to the Palestinians, saying the new coalition was good for the security, no to any constructive cooperation with the economy and people of Israel. Mofaz stressed Obama administration, and increasing his that Kadima was not interested in being in country’s isolation on the international scene? charge of ministries but wanted to help contend more effectively with the challenges facing Isra- Answers to these questions depend crucially on el, including “a historic territorial compromise Shaul Mofaz, who having replaced Tsipi Livni with our Palestinian neighbors.” as chair of the Kadima party on March 27 was sworn in by the Knesset as a new vice prime In addition to a statement of intent declaring minister on May 9. Did he join the government that Kadima will support the government’s pol- solely to prevent the likely loss of more than icy until the next elections in November 2013, half of his party’s seats in new elections and to the very brief coalition agreement contains four 2 additional points, which according to Netanyahu For months Netanyahu has been doing well in and Mofaz will also constitute the new govern- the polls, with over 30 seats predicted for his ment’s political priorities: 1) legislation party, which currently has 27 parliamentary to be passed by the end of July 2012, to put an representatives. There was no reason for him to end to the widespread exemption of ultra- fear the planned new elections. He would have Orthodox Jews from military service; 2) the won them hands down, and would have passing of a responsible national budget able to become Israel’s new prime minister once again. meet the country’s security policy, economic His leading political position is unchallenged, and social challenges; 3) reforming the and to date his government has been stable. system of government by the end of 2012 in However, in the last few months he has order to have more stable governments; 4) increasingly been subject to political pressure. advancing the peace process along responsible This is primarily the result of two or three Sup- lines. It was also agreed that Shaul Mofaz will reme Court rulings, as well as to some extent become vice-premier and member of the the social protest movement. previously eight-strong security cabinet, and will run government affairs in Netanyahu’s absence. The Supreme Court’s decisions relate to the Tal In addition, Kadima will chair two of the most Law, requiring military service to be performed important parliamentary committees – defense by all, as well as two judgments requiring the and foreign affairs, as well as economic affairs evacuation and demolition of settlement – as well as another as yet unspecified outposts. In 2012 the court ruled that the Tal committee. When Mofaz was sworn in as vice- Law, which has been in force since 2002 and premier the day after the press conference by exempts from military service ultra-Orthodox 71 to 23 votes, Netanyahu con-firmed in a tur- men who wish to engage in full-time Jewish bulent Knesset debate that there had also been studies, was unconstitutional (Israel has no talks about additional Kadima politicians as- written constitution; instead, it has 12 “basic suming ministerial posts in the weeks to come. laws” which rank as constitutional provisions). However, there was no statement to this effect The Supreme Court required the Knesset to in the coalition agreement. pass a law by August 1 this year which will bring about complete equality in military ser- This is Israel’s third national unity government. vice. This would apply to some 62,000 ultra- The first one was from 1967 to 1970, during Orthodox men who are presently exempt from and following the Six-Day War. The second one military service because they are yeshiva existed during two consecutive legislative students. The two ultra-Orthodox parties in periods, from 1984 to 1992, when Israel had to Netanyahu’s previous coalition – Shas (11 tackle major economic problems and high rates seats) and United Torah Judaism (5) – made it of inflation. unmistakably clear that they would not agree to such legislation, inevitably bringing down the Netanyahu and Mofaz did not want early government. elections The Supreme Court’s rulings on West Bank Mofaz and Netanyahu each had their own – settlement outposts, which are unconstitutional differing – reasons for deciding to set up a unity under Israeli legislation as well, relate to government instead of holding early elections. Ulpana, on the outskirts of the settlement of 3 Beit El, and Migron. In both cases construction ment crisis, Netanyahu will very likely survive took place illegally on privately owned with the help of Mofaz. Palestinian land. Despite a series of attempts by the government to sidestep the rulings or The third factor, the social protest movement, is negotiate extended transition periods, the court relevant to the extent that with the warm has now ruled definitively that both outposts are weather the protests will take off again, once to be evacuated and demolished. The deadline more confronting the government with specific for Ulpana is July 1 this year, and for Migron socio-economic demands. However, social August 1. These rulings and their implemen- protest in the midst of an election campaign is tation were openly and vehemently opposed in not in Netanyahu’s interest. In addition, with the Likud party itself, including a number of Kadima in the government it will be politically ministers, as well as what until then had been easier for Netanyahu to deal with the protest Netanyahu’s most important coalition partners, and in the coming fall take the politically difficult Yisrael Beitenu (15) and Habayit Hayehudi decisions when passing the 2013 national bud- (“The Jewish Home”) settler party (3). During a get. Finance minister Steinitz has already solidarity visit to Ulpana finance minister Yuval stated that with the new government it will be Steinitz (Likud) said that although he had no easier to push through the requisite budgetary intention of clashing with the Supreme Court, its cuts. decision was absurd because it is “illogical and immoral to demolish the neighborhood.” When For Shaul Mofaz the situation prior to the the final Migron ruling was issued this March, decision to join forces with Netanyahu was very Netanyahu declared: “The Israeli government, clear.
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