Israeli and Palestinian Public Opinion

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DECISION MAKING UNDER THREAT: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION

A Dissertation Presented by

Sheila Deborah Kohanteb

To The Department of Political Science

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

In the Field of Political Science

Northeastern University Boston, MA March 2012

DECISION MAKING UNDER THREAT: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION

Sheila Deborah Kohanteb

This research examines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a new conceptual perspective that incorporates the psychology of threat into the study of inter-group conflict. The specific objective of the proposed work is to develop a better understanding of how inter-group perceptions of threat may affect the decision-making of citizens and political leaders, and may ultimately affect progress in peace negotiations. The study utilizes data on Israelis and Palestinians over the period 1994 through 2011, drawing on public opinion polls, conflict related casualties, and major historical events in order to assess factors affecting public opinion. The research specifically examines the impact of perceived threat on: changes in Palestinian public opinion regarding support for punitive military actions against Israel, optimism about the future, and support for the peace process; and changes in Israeli public opinion regarding support for peace (negotiations/agreements). It is hypothesized that perceived threat pushes both Israelis and Palestinians toward more extreme positions regarding the peace process. This study also examines the impact of perceived threat on support for negotiation versus confrontation-oriented leaders. ! ! !

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science In the Graduate School of Northeastern University March 2012 ! ! !

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Faculty, friends, and family members that have helped me reach this point in my academic career, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for your guidance and support!

From our first meeting at Northeastern, Denis Sullivan has opened door upon door of opportunities for me, introducing me to the academic study of the Middle East and allowing for my own research interests to flourish. Under his trust and confidence, I was given the opportunity to create what has come to be a fundamental component of my experience at Northeastern, the Dia- logue of Civilizations program to Israel and Palestine. The calming voice of reason and support in any conflictual storm, Gordana Rabrenovic has been a mentor, an advisor, a colleague, and a friend. Looking out for my wellbeing and future with the wisdom of academic experience, I consider myself exceptionally fortunate to have Gordana in my life. The privilege of working with Glenn Pierce has been paramount to the success of this dissertation. I have spent the past four years learning from his keen eye of human behavior and the complexities of his vision, and hope to continue through the future as our research expands. The inspirational embodiment of a true academic, Amílcar Barreto has been the rock from which I have laid the foundation of my academic career. Under his guidance, I have learned how to focus on the details, while never losing sight of the bigger picture: to connect the leaf, to the tree, to the greater ecosystem.

I would like to thank the Political Science department for their support and guidance throughout my time as a Master’s student, and through the PhD. Additionally, I would like to thank the broader Northeastern community of faculty and staff who I have come to know in the past six years. In what is generally viewed as a largely hierarchical academic system, these people have always treated me with the respect of a peer and a colleague.

The backbone of my education and thirst for knowledge, my family has instilled in me the importance of questioning and the absolute necessity for one to dig in order to reach the truth. The unwavering support of my family and loved ones through the peaks and valleys of the PhD has been invaluable. Thank you!

"Since in order to speak, one must first listen, learn to speak by listening." - Rumi

3 Table of Contents

Abstract 2

Acknowledgements 3

Table of Contents 4

Chapter 1 ……… Introduction 5

Chapter 2 ……… Incidence & Persistence of Inter-Group Conflict 16 Part I: Alternative Perspectives & Objectives 17 Part II: Research Data & Methodology 36

Chapter 3 ……… Public Opinion Under Threat 51

Chapter 4 ……… Political Leadership Under Threat 81 Part I: Context of Leadership 82 Part II: Analysis of Threat 120

Chapter 5 ……… Conclusion 129

Appendix 1 The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre 1a Chart: Support for the Peace Process – Dates Adjusted 1a-i Chart: Support for the Peace Process – Original 1a-ii Polls: Support for the Peace Process 1b Chart: Support for Suicide Operations – Dates Adjusted 1b-i Chart: Support for Suicide Operations – Original 1b-ii Polls: Support for Suicide Operations 1c Chart: Optimism – Dates Adjusted 1c-i Chart: Optimism - Original 1c-ii Polls: Optimism 1d Chart: Support for Military Operations – Dates Adjusted 1d-i Chart: Support for Military Operations - Original 1d-ii Polls: Support for Military Operations 1e Chart: Support for Political Parties – Dates Adjusted 1e-i Chart: Support for Political Parties - Original 1e-ii Polls: Support for Political Parties

Appendix 2 The Peace Index 2 Indices 1994 -2011

Appendix 3 B’Tselem 3a Casualties: 1994-2000 3b Casualties: 2000-2011 3c Casualty Totals

Appendix 4 Dahaf Institute/Ynet 4a Polls – Dates Adjusted 4b Polls – Original

Appendix 5 Qassam Data 5a Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 5b IDF & Israel Security Agency/Shabak

Appendix 6 Israeli & Palestinian Political Leadership 6a Israeli Leadership 6b Palestinian Leadership 6c Confrontation vs. Negotiation

Appendix 7 Additional Statistics & Graphs

References

4 Chapter 1

Decision-Making Under Threat

“No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear.” Edmund Burke

Engineers bring about change by tackling technical problems. They analyze problems, assess and compare outcomes, and, while reaching a solution may be an onerous task, the path is clearly defined. The certainty of the applied sciences stands in stark contrast to the lack thereof in the social sciences. Indeed, it is no less the case when one studies the social riddle of conflict.

Social issues involve power-driven personalities and emotion, directed and misdirected by political structures and egomaniacs. To approach this riddle with a technical eye is to blind oneself from the critical component of humanity. Adding the human element to a technical malady ad- mixes affect, anger, and self-interest with political inertia, violence, fear, and threat – distancing resolution from a tenable reality.

While sacrosanct in principle, the reality of human rights violations committed by Israelis and Palestinians is nothing shy of profane. Tersely grandiose misjudgments based on defensive atrocities have caused entire populations to unite against one another under an umbrella of fear, and with the conduction of leadership, have institutionalized hypocritical stigmas of good vs. bad. The media fans the flames by shepherding public perception within the confines of state interest, feeding on an anxious public who turn to power-wielding/“protective” leadership, causing them to succumb to take more defensive opinions themselves. Humanity kicks in. Fight or flight is activated as a cloud of threat covers the Israeli and Palestinian sky, presenting an ultimatum of instinctual proportions.

5 Armies of scholars, diplomats, politicians, and average citizens have dedicated themselves exclusively to the resolution of this conflict. Enough books, articles, speeches and rebut- tals have been written on this subject to cover the Israeli-Palestinian land several times over; yet no real accountable progress has been made. It is time to change the lens of analysis we use to view this conflict. How does one realistically recognize accurate perception, and avoid socially and culturally induced misperception?

A multitude of rationales have been given for the initiation and persistence of this conflict, stemming from religion, colonialism, and settlements, to Jerusalem, borders, refugees, and simply a long-fraught history of adversarial relations. While these factors play a role in the protracted and intractable nature of this conflict, their impact is only surface deep. Underlying issues of land rights and holy sites is the essence that unites human beings regardless of race, nationali- ty, or religion: fear. Fear does not judge based on religion or ethnicity, it produces the same threatened response from all whose path it crosses, breeding the same instinctively protective responses that manifest in different ways through the socio-cultural climate of a given society.

Some people choose to take power into their own hands and retaliate against the entity producing this unwelcomed feeling. This choice can be made all the same whether or not a for- mal governing structure exists to deal with such issues, and whether or not a given person trusts the effectiveness of these structures in protecting their wellbeing. Other people choose to leave this type of action solely in the hands of existing structures – even if they do not entirely trust them – in fear of their own mortality if they become involved in combat.

People cling to the various identities that define them, such as religion, culture, ethnicity, political opinions, and worldview. History shows many cases of where people were given the option to deny their faith or face grisly repercussions; the resulting religious conversions attest to

6 the dominating power of threat. How strongly one grasps to their identities can rapidly change in the presence of threat, leaving people to support parties they would normally detest and rally against, in support of hardline policies towards security and their personal protection. Suddenly, the Left runs for shelter under the umbrella of the Right, before the shower of rockets bombards its existence.

This change is highlighted when comparing relations between Jews and Arabs in the late

1800s prior to the waves of Aliyot1 to Israel. Relations at the dawn of the twentieth century were for the most part cordial, cooperative, and friendly. Jewish and Arab neighbors did not disdain or ignore one another; there was a certain degree of trust and amity. In some cases, they worked together, as seen in the early years of the Jaffa orange industry. A person of the Old Yishuv2 who carried on such good relations will give an entirely different account of their current relations with Arabs, and similarly the other way around. In the time that has passed since their amiable interactions, violence has engendered a deep-rooted fear between these neighbors, presented in the form of animosity, contempt, exclusion, and separation.

Under the Ottoman Empire, relations between Arabs and Jews were relatively good. Ar- abs comprised the majority of the population and Jews the minority, with the power balance between them set at a comfortable and cooperative level. As Zionist thought and the goal of creating a Jewish state spread, tensions between these two communities increased. Although Zionism took root in response to the Jewish condition in Europe and was not connected with the Jewish population in Palestine, Jews all over were nonetheless associated with Zionism. Suddenly, no-

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! meaning to ascend or ,(לעלות) Aliyot, the plural of Aliya, comes from the Hebrew verb La’alot 1 rise. This term is used to refer to Jewish immigration to Israel to symbolize an ascent of the soul in reaching the holy land of Israel. 2 Yishuv, meaning ‘settlement’ in Hebrew, refers to the Jews living in Palestine prior to the creation of Israel. The Yishuv is often divided into two groups: 1. Old: referring to the Jews in Palestine prior to the Aliyot, and 2. New: Jews who made Aliya prior to the creation of Israel.

7 tions of creating a Jewish state promoted by Jews in Europe were being reflected on Jews in Pal- estine – many of whom would not consider themselves Zionists – causing a divide between the

Arabs and the Jews in Ottoman Palestine. This divide grew wider with the large waves of Jewish immigration under the British Mandate. The demographic balance had shifted, threatening the old status quo of Arab-Jewish relations.

Making Aliya meant that Jews could shake off their history of persecution, and begin fresh to create a future based on their terms rather than the anti-Semitism they had previously experienced. This ‘new Jew’ was self-sufficient and driven. It did not matter if someone was a mathematician, doctor, or tailor in their former country; in Israel, all the new immigrants would till the land just the same in their new cloak of freedom. The Jewish collective would not only work together, they would fight together for their mutual protection. Having been a victimized minority for so long, the Jewish people could now stand up together as one unified force.

The status quo of relations in Palestine continued to be threatened through the establishment of Israel in 1948, and continues to be threatened now as the Israeli government holds the upper hand in guiding and maintaining the status quo. With the increasing divide between Arabs and Jews came wars and violence, and the looming threat of one’s existence hanging in balance.

Just prior to 1967 war, public rhetoric in Israel became apocalyptic, as though the threat of war jeopardized the existence of the Jewish people. The phrase “Never Again” became ingrained into the collective psyche of Jews that an atrocity such as the Holocaust will never happen again, that these new Jews now had the strength and authority to defend themselves against any aggressor.

Israel’s adoption of a power-based culture had become concrete. This power-based culture is rooted in Jewish history, and entrenched in the threat that fuels Israeli unity in protectionism.

The threat of violence not only triggers protectionist behaviors, it also triggers a type of

8 militarism that embeds deeper into the social fabric of a society the more prolonged the conflict.

The outcome for people who do not want to associate with conflict or violence is that they feel trapped between the constraints of threat and militarism. Consequently, the people more associated with conflict and violent action – including some leadership, political parties, and factional radical groups – are empowered through the public’s demand for security. A power vacuum is created, influencing changes in public opinion based on an atmosphere of threat. Support for protectionist policies are welcomed, and the construction of separation barriers are invited to rid people of the feeling of threat they dread. There is a continued willingness among the public to tolerate draconian security measures based on a habitual fear of impending threat. Security policy thereby maintains status as a hard-power act from the protection-driven powers above, designed to assuage fears through (questionably efficacious) security measures.

Decision-Making Under Threat

Over the past several decades, the number and seriousness of intercommunal conflicts at the national or sub-national level has caused human misery and often lead to regional and sometimes even wider political instability. The observed increase in the number of these “inter-group” conflicts appears in a variety of forms and they range in duration. Most recently, the emergent forms of such conflicts have involved intensive violent activities that include terrorist acts such as suicide bombers, assassinations, and whole scale attacks.

Examples of such events include the Arab-Israeli conflict, conflict between the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, continued conflict in Sri Lanka, and the resurging violence of the 1990’s in the former Yugoslavia. In these and in many other instances of shorter duration, each conflict is characterized by significant, severe, and often protracted acts of violence be-

9 tween the disputing groups. In each case, a similar pattern takes form, where a sudden and uni- form unity of purpose emerges within a society; the society in each case transforms itself from a multi-identity society to one that acts as a unified whole.

Inter-group conflicts appear in a variety of forms and vary in duration. Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians are a territorial debate that includes four main issues: borders,

Israeli settlements, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem. Con- flicting claims to land ownership and entitlement are part of a larger emotive conflict by Israelis and Palestinians as competing autochthons. This protracted/intractable conflict — described as such due to long duration, complexity, and violence — involves issues of identity (national and religious), culture, and security. Compromises have been fraught with difficulty as expectations differ between Israeli and Palestinian leadership, and policy implementation has been interfered, among other things, by extremist action.

The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is littered with periods of peace and negotiation, entwined with periods of severe violence (often followed by disengagement). For both groups, threat is the dominant basal factor that has pushed each group, independently, to take more radical positions and actions. The unquestioned authority threat has over people constrains leaders in their scope of decision-making, while simultaneously furnishing plenty of opportunities for leaders to manipulate the public in pursuit of self-interest. Blame cannot be placed directly on leaders, governments, or people for responding in their respective manners to situations of threat. There are tendencies in the psychological functioning of human decision-making that ine- radicably protect us from our own demise. Such tendencies tilt us towards military use, for example, if there is a prospective conflict, and may be greatly accentuated under conditions of im- placable threat. Very simply, acting in self-preservation, when forced into a threatening situa-

10 tion, (be it physical or mental), people tend to choose the best possible course of action for themselves.

The research task here is to look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a new perspective to determine the impact of threat on public opinion in each society, and subsequently, on political leadership. Decision-making of both leadership and societies can be influenced by a multitude of factors such as economy, security, and uncertainty. The encompassing goal of this work is to understand decision-making under conditions of threat.

Human being as a whole, do not wish to be unhappy or to have poor relationships with others. Maintaining an enemy is exhaustive and takes a toll one’s own happiness, livelihood and well being. While issues of racism and bigotry still abound in our modern world, inter-personal relationships between neighbors, and cross-culturally between societies are generally cordial, if not positive. One may not be inclined to go next door to borrow a cup of sugar, yet they do not wish bad things upon their neighbor. Whether there is a positive relationship or merely neutral cordiality, relationships become strained and come to a screeching halt when either one person, or both parties experience threat. Bigoted views towards a neighbor that had always been kept silent become the focal point of animosity when threat is involved. Threat not only strengthens in-group identification, it clarifies the out-group, bringing justification for their status and utiliz- ing this to further unify the in-group. Pulling the strings behind this theatrical performance are individual historical narratives engineered and operated by political leadership.

With respect to the Israelis and Palestinians, this work endeavors to develop a better understanding of how inter-group threat perceptions may affect the decision-making of citizens and political leaders on both sides of the conflict and ultimately affect and/or constrain progress in peace negotiations.

11 Included in the following pages is an examination of the impact of threat perceptions on changes in Palestinian public opinion in the West Bank and Gaza regarding support for punitive military actions against Israel, optimism about the future, and support for the peace process, as well as changes in Israeli public opinion regarding support for peace (negotiations/agreements).

Implications concerning the potential impact of threat and concomitant changes in public opinion on the political leadership and approaches to the peace process in Israel and Palestine will be also discussed.

Chapters Presented

This work seeks to examine what happens when a group is faced with the perception and/or reality of violence. Explored herein are the mechanics and the dynamics of group activity under the threat or real instance of violence through the development of an alternative model that describes intra and inter-group cooperation and intra-group dynamics. In this model, the game theoretic process of cooperation and defection is turned inside out, and although these terms continue to mean the same, they are used in an entirely different context as the outcomes/payoffs have changed.

Various measures are used to calculate threat, specifically casualty figures as these overwhelmingly correspond with incidences of violence, all of which produce a perception of threat among the population. Threat is thereby the yardstick by which Israeli and Palestinian public opinion and support for political leadership is measured, behind the backdrop of major agreements/negotiations, armed incursions, and progress/regress with respect to the peace process.

Chapter 2 is broken down into two parts: Alternative Perspectives & Objectives, and Re- search Data & Methodology. Part I begins with a descriptive review of the research model de-

12 signed to explain the psychological underpinnings of group violence. Included is an overview of relevant literature written on and related to threat, which encompasses multiple fields and sub- fields of thought such as cognitive science, neuroscience, sociology, political realism, international relations, rational choice theory, psychology, deterrence and retaliation, spoiler behavior, and game theory. The interdisciplinary nature of this study is a testament to its foundations in human behavior; only a holistic understanding of the interplay between these fields can accurately portray why human beings react in particular ways when under certain conditions.

Part II of this chapter delves into details of the research data and methodology utilized for this study. With the vast number of polls and statistics used, it is necessary to specify data limitations and methods of analysis. Additionally, with an issue as contentious as the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict, providing such information openly leaves no detail hidden, giving unre- stricted credibility to the results.

With the foundation set, Chapter 3 pushes forward providing an analysis of public opinion through history under the scope of threat through violence. Trends in casualty levels over the period investigated in this study, 1994 – 2011, are held against the fluctuations of Palestinian and

Israeli public opinion, which is naturally variable based on the current socio-political climate of the time in question. While a multitude of factors can contribute to changes in public opinion, this work argues that underlying these stratums of elements lays the crucially influential component of threat.

Chapter 4 is broken down into two parts: Context of Leadership, and Analysis of Threat.

Part I provides the structural context of political leadership through history under the scope of threat and violence. Political leadership comprises both political parties and political leaders. For the Palestinians political parties are used, while for the Israelis, political leaders are used to de-

13 termined public support political leadership under the changing context of threat. Representing the two dominant dogmatic outlooks towards conflict, political parties and leaders are divided into two categories between those who support more confrontation-oriented policies, and those who support more negotiation-oriented policies.

Part II of this chapter gives a detailed analysis of shifts in threat based on public support for political leadership. Included is a discussion of how individual support for otherwise unlikely leadership changes during periods of threat, as well as how this leadership has taken the necessary measures of shifting their support for peace negotiations based on this climate of threat. Sta- tistical representations are provided that highlight key points in Israeli and Palestinian history such as violent incursions, military operations, ceasefires, and peace negotiations and agreements.

Finally, Chapter 5 will conclude with an overall analysis of patterns of change under threat, matching a set of probable strategies, outcomes, equilibria, and implications for future negotiations to specific conditions of violence and threat. Also included is an analysis of the limits of this study based on the prospects for further research in particular areas. This research is part of a larger project studying the impact of threat on conflict, and will continue to be built upon. Based on this research, prospects for future policy change and change within the political sphere based will be assessed.

______

This work provides an alternative view of this conflict, separating it from the parables of history and the rationalized irrationality of conflict. Justifications for the continuance of this conflict are plenty. For someone with a vested interest in this region, such justifications can easily be

14 rationalized based on a person’s individual narrative, history, and perspective. In a conflict where this person does not have a vested interest, such justifications can be seen as highly irrational.

The fact is human beings – like any other animal – act instinctually when they feel threatened.

The protective responses triggered in the brain are part of a natural defensive system that helps keep us alive. Analyzing Israeli and Palestinian societies, this work will provide an encompassing view of conflict under the existing conditions of threat.

15 Chapter 2

Incidence and Persistence of Inter-Group Conflict

When the doors of perception are cleansed, man will see things as they truly are, infinite” William Blake

This work complements a significant body of social science research on the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict. This corpus has examined a broad range of political, structural, economic, cultural, environmental, geographic, and other aggregate social factors found to be important contributors to the incidence, character, and duration of conflict between groups within a political entity and across political entities. Among these issues are: evolving political boundaries, the political, economic, and social divisions within Israeli and Palestinian societies, and the impact of the conflict’s long history on political positions and trust in the two communities (e.g., Fearon

& Laitin 1996; Fearon 2002). With respect to previous research, the present analysis will also seek to understand how psychological factors may interact with previously studied social or group-related factors associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This chapter includes is presented in two parts: Part I, Alternative Perspectives & Objec- tives; Part II, Research Methodology. Part I will explore previous research from a variety of dis- ciplines that relates to this study and sets the groundwork for understanding the interplay between threat and public opinion. Part II delves into the specifics of the data utilized and the statistical analysis, giving a microscopic view of how this analysis was carried out.

16 Part I

Alternative Perspectives & Objectives

The Cognitive Lens of Psyche

Despite the extensive body of existing knowledge on this subject, uncertainty exists concerning factors that account for the persistence of inter-group conflicts in situations that are clearly at odds with the well being of the respective groups’ general populations that are in conflict. Several reasons may help account for current gaps in our understanding of factors associated with the incidence and persistence of inter-group conflicts. For the most part, existing research on the incidence and persistence of inter-group conflicts has most often focused on the economic (e.g. overall wealth of the country, availability of rich natural resources), structural/political factors (e.g. supply of weapons to groups in conflict, strength of central government, geographic isolation of insurgent groups, level of ethnic diversity) and historical factors as the underlining causes and reasons for the persistence of inter-group conflicts (Fearon & Latin

2003). Among the factors that have received less attention in terms of their potential role in inter- group conflicts are the psychological dynamics associated with changes in the political attitudes of groups in conflict and their leaders. It is perhaps not surprising that research over the last five decades on public opinion and beliefs has fairly consistently found that political attitudes and support for public policies are stable over time and appear resistant to many environmental events (Álvarez & Brehm 2002; Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Poole & Rosenthal 1997). It is thus important and “worth reminding ourselves that political reality can influence voters at the polls only by getting into their mind and under their skin. Thus, we have to pay attention to psychological processes of cognition and affect” (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 32).

17 More recently, however, research has begun to identify circumstances under which the public or segments of the public dramatically and abruptly alter their attitudes and opinions. Re- cent research on human cognition has identified an almost automatic quality of many political choices and decisions in some contexts (Lodge & Taber 2006). Such research has produced evidence that helps explain how cognitive traits may affect political attitudes and beliefs. Additional research has found that physiologically relevant traits, such as feelings of disgust and fear, can be related to political attitudes and political beliefs and “can be predicted by observing brain activa- tion patterns in response to unanticipated events…” (Oxley et al. 2008: 1667). There is a postu- lated link between such reactions and the survival mechanisms that illicit abrupt and defensive bodily responses to perceived threats. As Oxley and his co-authors stated: “Less immediately, perceived threat causes signals from the sensory cortex to be relayed to the thalamus and ultimately to the brain stem, resulting in heightened noradrenergic activity in the locus cereleus” (a nucleus in the brain stem activated by stress)” (Ibid.).

Research conducted by Westen shows that neural activity increases when people are forced to make decisions under both threatening and non-threatening conditions. The results show that when facing threat, people were likely to “reason to emotionally biased conclusions,” and “when confronted with potentially troubling political information, a network of neurons becomes active that produces distress,” at which point, the brain “begins to search for ways to turn off the spigot of unpleasant emotion” (Westen 2007: xiii). Westen’s studies show that for the most part, the brain succeeds is quelling these emotional negativities through faulty reasoning.

Meaning, logical reasoning is put aside as a more immediate and visceral reaction, effectively silencing distress, takes over.

18 Among the factors that have received little attention in terms of their potential role in inter-group conflicts are the psychological dynamics associated with perceived or actual external threats such as mortality salience (e.g., Rosenblatt et. al. 1989; Greenberg et. al. 1990) and the potential impact of these dynamics on the general public and their political leaders. Peterson

(2002: 71) finds that “it is fear of physical attack, and balance-of-power advantages in the present, that drive ethnic conflict.” Unlike many political, structural and economic factors associated with inter-group conflict, psychological factors can potentially be far more volatile and also more likely to produce abrupt impacts within very brief time spans.

Grounded Fear - Iran

Contrary to studies that suggest the crucial role of threat perception, Ram’s recent study on Israeli-Iranian relations suggests that the notion of threat perception is often exaggerated in

Israel’s fear/obsession with Iran (Ram 2009). Israeli fear of Iran can be seen as a manufactured byproduct of elites’ status maintenance; and it is suggested that threats on Israel and Iran by the other are simply reflections of respective historically based vulnerabilities (Ibid.). For Israeli hawks absorbed in security preservation, it is necessary to distinguish ones adversaries. Follow- ing the 1979 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, remaining Israeli regional tensions piv- oted around Syria and Iran; and without nuclear capability, Syria did not pose as big a threat as nearby Iran.

Ram draws a parallel between the pre-1979 westernization of Iran and the Ashkena- zi/Europeanization of Jews in Israel; Iranian Jews often faced discrimination in Israel, yet people still have difficulty understanding why Jews in Iran did not want to leave their country to make aliyah (Jewish immigration to Israel). While “the idea of a Jewish polity in Palestine as a viable

19 and perhaps the sole option for those Jews who did not succeed in immigrating to the United

States became relevant as other options seemed to close,” this was not always the case for Irani- ans, many of whom wanted to remain in Iran (Kimmerling 2001: 5). For early Zionist elites, a major internal threat was the possibility of “decomposition and alternation of the original charac- teristics of the state by mass immigration;” and in order to contain the influence of the immigrant populations, the institutions of state bureaucracy, military, and the educational system were de- veloped (Ibid.: 6). It wouldn’t be until nearly the mid-1980’s that Mizrahim would challenge the dominant hegemony to become connected with the central symbols of the Israeli state (Ibid.).

While Israeli obsession with Iran is an integral component necessary to understanding present relations, the importance of threat perception cannot be understated, particularly in reference to this current study, as cognitive science and psychology assist in the proposed hypothesis of a connection between threat, political parties and leadership, and public opinion and attitudes.

On Political Realism

The research reviewed by Kahnemann and Renshon and others concerning bias and human decision-making provides some potential psychological underpinnings for the realist school of thought in international relations, and also suggests some potential limitations. Realism posits that threat and security dominate states' decisions in an inherently anarchic international system

(Jervis 1976), thereby giving precedence to preserving national interest rather than ideals or ethics. While threat perception is a key component to international relations, and specifically realist theory, it is most crucial in situations where there is an overall lack of trust, such as the classic example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma vs. the Assurance Game. Realist theory however, also em-

20 phasizes that our assessment of risks may be flawed, and perhaps even more importantly, be tilted toward aggressive policies.

In the realm of political realism, Jervis contends that fear and vigilance are byproducts of the anarchic international system, which can therein lead to perceptions of conflict. Jervis argues that if the impact of desires is not taken into consideration, perceptions can be very pessimistic.

The nature of the anarchic international system combined with psychological processes can lead to the misperception of others as harboring more hostility than they really are. “If the perceptions of threat were accurate, the policies would by their failure be shown to be influenced by desires.

But since the threat is overestimated wishfulness is not revealed so clearly” (Jervis 1976: 372).

Reality is hard to deny, even for political leaders who call for violent actions in the name defense and security. In Israel’s youth, first Prime Minister David Ben Gurion tells the president of the World Jewish Congress:

If I were an Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we

have taken their country… We come from Israel, but two thousand years ago, and

what is that to them? There has been anti-semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz,

but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we have come here and stolen

their country. Why should they accept that? (Goldmann 1978: 99)

Since, other leaders such as Golda Meir, Yitzhak Shamir, and Ehud Barak, have all openly stated their recognition of Israel’s mal-actions. In an inherently anarchic system, defense is often viewed as the sole means of progress. Just as “the creation of Israel in 1947-48 involved acts of ethnic cleansing, including executions, massacres and rapes by Jews,” “neither Jewish ethics nor

Jewish tradition can disqualify terrorism as a means of combat. First and foremost, terrorism is for us a part of the political battle being conducted under the present circumstances, and it has a

21 great part to play...in our war against the occupier” (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006; Shamir as quoted in Chomsky 1999: 485-486).

States rely on developing their power capacity in order to survive out of an inherent fear of, and lack of trust in other states’ intentions. As such, (regional) hegemonic status is the primary assurance of a state’s survival, as no other state would dare threaten a dominating power — this is seen as the best way to sustain in a dangerous world (Mearsheimer 2001). As clarified by

Mearsheimer, “consider…how badly the Palestinians want their own state, and before 1948, how desperately the Jews wanted their own state. Now that the Jews have Israel it is unthinkable that they would give it up. If the Palestinians get their own state, they surely will go to great lengths to ensure its survival” (Ibid., 366).

A Canon of Threat

Public attitudes may be especially susceptible to change under conditions of threat from outside groups (Pyszczynski & Greenberg 2003). Under such conditions, perception of threat has been found to have significant effects on public attitudes, support for particular public policies, tolerance of dissent, and support for political leaders (Ibid.). Huddy and her co-authors (2005) found that “as perceived threat increased, there was heightened support for a wide range of domestic and international government actions to combat the threat of terrorism, including overseas military action, a curtailment of civil liberties, and increased surveillance and tighter immigration restrictions for Arabs” (Ibid., 604). Further, not only do individuals want retaliatory action, they want a leader who is strong, active, and powerful (Ibid.). Other effects are the increase in intoler- ance, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and prejudice (Huddy et al. 2002: Huddy et al. 2005). Posen contends that for outsiders to reduce the probability of conflict, groups must feel less threatened,

22 and the windows of opportunity for military action (that could therein incite need for retaliatory action, or the security dilemma) must be reduced (Posen 1993: 43).

In examining public perceptions of threat, the ‘rally effect’ provides a sociological context for which human reactions can be analyzed. Tal Jonathan (2010: 1) utilizes the ‘rally effect’ in his study of public attitudes towards policing in Israel, and finds that “when faced with severe terrorism threats, public perceptions of the police will rise in the short term but decline over time.” Jonathan’s analysis shows that support for leadership and public institutions increases in situations of perceived external threat, and declines to previous levels once the threat has been removed. Looking specifically at statistics around the period of the second Intifada, evaluations of police legitimacy rose at the onset of the Intifada, “reached a peak at the height of the terrorism threat, and have been declining since, along with the decline in terrorism threat levels”

(Ibid., 2). The rally around Israeli Police initiated with the second Intifada was triggered by the

Israelis’ perception of severe threat, particularly as realized through the disruption of their daily lives — something which generally went on undisturbed despite past violent actions in the country. “This ‘rally’ is evidenced by a general rise in positive attitudes toward the Israeli Police in many aspects of legitimacy, including trust, procedural justice, general performance and performance in fighting terrorism” (Ibid., 17). Perhaps due to the brief nature of rallies – exhibiting a sharp increase and then declining — Jonathan concludes that police evaluations declined side by side with the threat of terrorism.

Additional consequences appear to arise when threatening events are perceived to be un- fair. De Quervain and his co-authors (2004) found that penalizing those who we think are deserv- ing of punishment is a rewarding behavior that excites the reward centers in the brain. To the extent that anger accompanies such reactions, individuals seem likely to endorse seemingly

23 “risky” behavior, as they are more likely to perceive the benefits of actions geared towards punishment (Moons & Mackie 2007).

Self-Service Spoiling

With the potential impact of threat perception, the use of violence may be an extremely effective tool in the hand of groups interested in derailing the peace process. When two groups are entering a peace agreement, terrorist violence can impact the results (Kydd & Walter 2002).

In their research on the Israeli and Palestinian conflict Kydd and Walter conclude that terrorist attacks committed by extremists or fringe groups are successful at disrupting peace settlements if the attacks foster mistrust between the moderate groups on each side. This is typically “spoiling.”

Stedman (1997: 5) argues that the greatest source of risk for terminating civil war “comes from spoilers — leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” Ben Po- rat (2006: 195-196) contends that the presence of spoilers in a peace process is virtually inevitable, and in the case of Israel, such behavior has been seen with religious factions and suicide attacks, all of which set back the peace process and economy in a vicious cycle. In his discussion of the Oslo process, Ben Porat finds that among Israelis, the “ideological and mostly religious right have been ‘active spoilers’ engaged in various acts of opposition…attributing a high value to the territory and the entrenchment of citizenship, solidarity, and destiny within the bounded space of the homeland and downplayed[ing] the significance of peace dividends” (Ibid., 184).

According to Tsebelis, veto players are “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo;” the greater the number of veto players, the more likely the status quo will be preserved (2002: 19). In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian con-

24 flict, the status quo can be seen as the perpetuation of conflict. Spoilers are the agenda setters, or

“specific veto players that present ‘take it or leave it’ proposals to the other veto players [and] have significant control over the policies that replace the status quo,” enabling them to mold and configure the status quo to their desired ends (Ibid., 2).

As Stedman suggests, actual or perceived threat may be employed by mainstream leaders who are typical viewed as spoilers, as well as by fringe groups or terrorists (Stedman 1997). Un- der some circumstances, Gagnon (1995) found that if mainstream political leaders feel threatened by opposition in the domestic arena, they may try to shift the focus of political discourse away from that which is most challenging, to another aspect that is more cultural or ethnic.

While it is difficult to measure leader’s influence on an event and its respective outcome, leaders’ incentives can be much more discernable. Often times, “an elite may not be manipulating the situation as much as going along with, or simply exacerbating, the flow of events” (Peterson

2002: 66). For this study, Peterson’s reference of ‘elites’ is likened to ‘leaders’; Peterson depicts elite behavior as demagoguery and influential to society (as such, any further reference to ‘elites’ will be considered a reference to ‘leaders’) (Ibid., 35). In Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis, they conclude that leaders tend to gravitate towards the first solution to a problem that can remove any air of uncertainty, rather than alternatively analyzing other possible measures. This attempt to remove possible anxieties not only provides and immediate solution to an active problem, but can allow leaders to pursue particular policies that may or may not be publicly favorable.

Affectually Inclined

In the battle of reason and logic versus emotion and gut, while leaders tend to pride them-

25 selves in their capability of harnessing the former in their decision-making, it is the latter that ultimately dominates. The role of emotion in average, diurnal decision-making should not be under-scored, even though the mere perception of political decisions based in emotion rather than reason seems preposterous to many. In actuality, our emotions – the gut inclination we often feel driving us in one direction rather than the other – are responsible for a vast majority of our decisions, particularly when we are faced with threatening situations.

According to affective intelligence theory addresses the connections between emotions and reason, specifically targeting the importance of emotion in various aspects of society, such as politics (Marcus et. al 2000). In The Affect Effect, Neuman and his co-authors discuss how

“emotional appeals often delve into messages that resort to trying to make individuals fearful or angry about a particular person or policy. And such appeals often appear to be designed not only to change attitudes but also to affect behavior by motivating viewers.” (2007: 385). Politicians who seek to advance themselves and/or their agenda through the public’s weakened emotional state often overstate and dramatize threats. In such circumstances of increased anxiety, people reevaluate their options in order to change what initially evoked this undesired emotion. “Simp- ly, and in the political context, anxious citizens begin to consider alternative political choices”

(Ibid.: 319). New leaders and tighter security policies may possibly remove the actual threat, yet they will assuredly assuage the psychological threat and put the public at ease.

Power of Predisposition & Bias

A separate body of psychological research on human decision-making provides additional support for the importance of psychological factors in conflict situations for both leaders and average citizens. A review of this literature by Kahnemann and Renshon (2007) found that hu-

26 man psychological/cognitive traits appear to bias human decision making toward conflict. Ac- cording to these two authors, leaders can be divided into two main categories: hawks and doves.

While doves tend to remain skeptical of the utilization and necessity of force in negotiation, favoring more diplomatic means of achieving their goals, hawks are quite the opposite. These authors find that the human mind is predisposed in favor of Hawkish tendencies. Basically, humans are more likely to value coercive military action and devalue offering concessions. Such psychological biases they conclude, “incline national leaders to exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries, to misjudge how adversaries perceive them, to be overly sanguine when hostilities start…” in effect, “making wars more likely to begin and more difficult to end” (Ibid., 2). Re- search on cognitive biases also indicates that people tend to believe they are immune to in-group biases; in contrast however, people tend to favor those who share their in-group identity when faced with a decision of who is right or wrong in a conflict (Pronin 2006).

Importantly, these types of biases appear to become stronger in threat related situations.

This research finds that generally, “when issues are viewed as divisive, people tend to see those on the ‘other side’ as being more biased by ideology and personal experience than those on their

‘own side’ (Pronin 2006: 39-40). The recognition of one’s perspective having been influenced by personal experience is viewed as “enlightening rather than biasing” (Ibid., 40). People are more inclined to take aggressive action in conflict when they perceive their adversaries to be biased; similarly, people tend to view their adversaries as biased in situations of conflict and disagreement – all thereby spurring a cyclical wheel of defensive and offensive responses. (Kennedy &

Pronin 2008).3 In a conflict, aggression serves to preserve hierarchies and values perceived as

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 3 The research reviewed by Kahneman and Renshon and others concerning biases inhuman decision making, as well as research on the potential impact of perceived threat on the attitudes of the public and possibly leaders provides some psychological underpinning for the realist

27 traditional; “people with blatant prejudices often approve aggression to maintain the status quo…. If out-groups deviate and threaten traditional values, they become legitimate targets of aggression” (Fiske 2002: 127).

In a study on the neural bases of motivated reasoning, Westen and his co-authors provide insight into why partisans tend to stick to their opinions, and indirectly, why public opinion tends to change slowly. Motivated reasoning is described as a type of “implicit emotion regulation in which the brain converges on judgments that minimize negative and maximize positive affect states associated with threat to or attainment of motives” (Westen 2006: 1947). In concurrence with prior studies on partisan behavior and biases, “when confronted with information about their candidate that would logically lead them to an emotionally aversive conclusion, partisans arrived at an alternative conclusion” (Ibid., 1955). A position of external perceived threat may often create the fairly unique situation where most people in a given group either drop or partial- ly drop partisanship in order to assign for defense. “Neural information processing related to motivated reasoning appears to be qualitatively different from reasoning in the absence of a strong emotional stake in the conclusions reached” (Ibid.)

Violence & Retaliation

In a study of the second Intifada, Jaeger and his co-authors discuss the effect of violence on Palestinian public opinion, and the conditions under which support for factions shifted. Con- sonant to social-psychology literature, they found that Israeli violence towards Palestinians re-

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! school of thought in international relations. The assessment of threat is basic to the realist theoretical perspective in international relations, and posits that threat and security dominate states' decisions in an inherently anarchic international system, thereby giving precedence to preserving national interest rather than ideals or ethics (Mearsheimer 2001). However, human decision-making research also has found that human assessment of risks may sometimes be systemically flawed, and perhaps even more importantly, be tilted toward aggressive policies.

28 sulted in an increase of Palestinian support for more radical attitudes and factions. This support however, was found to be temporary, fading entirely within 90 days (Jaeger et. al. 2008). The authors present the outbidding hypothesis, whereby Palestinian factions Hamas and Palestinian

Islamic Jihad vie for public support through attacks on Israelis. Some support is found “for the key assumption underlying the outbidding hypothesis, namely that Palestinian factions can increase their popularity by carrying out attacks against Israelis. However, it appears that this strategy is effective only for shifting support between different radical factions, but not between radical factions and the moderate Fatah” (Ibid., 25-26). Evidence is also found supporting the notion that Palestinian casualties bring about population polarization, and “increased disaffection and a lack of support for any faction” (Ibid., 2). With relation to policy, Jaeger and co-authors find that this protracted conflict grants “more opportunities for the public to influence policymakers’ decisions and actions. Consequently, the general population, which is directly affected by violent events, may be able to shape them to a certain extent” (Ibid., 27-28).

Retaliation has often been used in defensive justification for violent actions taken against the other, both Israelis towards Palestinians and vice versa. Jaeger and Paserman (2008) find that

Israeli violent actions depict a pattern of retaliation, while Palestinian violent actions did not. In accordance with what is seen as tit-for-tat hostilities, Haushofer and his co-authors find that Pal- estinian violent action also depicts retaliation; Israeli actions against Palestinians are seen to es- calate rather than incapacitate Palestinian actions. Additionally, they find a sharp increase in Pal- estinian Qassam rocket attacks on Israel the day after Palestinians have been killed by Israelis.

While Palestinian rocket attacks rarely result in Israeli casualties, and are not followed by immediate Israeli retaliation, the attacks still have a resonating effect on the Israeli public and cause

"widespread public anger in Israel and attract broad media coverage" (Haushofer et. al. 2010: 3).

29 As such, rocket attacks may "nonetheless lead to an overall (not time-locked) increase in Israeli violence against Palestinians..." (Ibid.). They conclude that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is

“characterized by retaliatory dynamics in both directions: both sides respond to killings by the other side in a time-locked fashion; in the case of Israel, this response takes the form of killings of Palestinians, whereas in the case of the Palestinians, it comes in the form of (mostly nonlethal)

Qassam attacks against Israel” (Ibid., 5-6).

Framework of Resentment

Separate from the large body of psychology and cognitive science research relevant to this project are studies of ethnic conflict. In his examination of the roles of fear, hatred, and resentment (all emotion-based) in 20th century Eastern European, Peterson cites resentment as a key explanation for the presence of ethnic conflict. “While an emotion-based account cannot explain every case, and while Fear and Hatred motivate hostile ethnic actions in some situations,

Resentment pervasively appears to inflame ethnic animosity and drive outcomes in the timing and patterns of actions” (Peterson 2002: 2). Increasing individual emotion strengthens bonds between the individual and the group as “resentment is built on the assumption that individuals care deeply about group status” (Ibid., 45). Peterson finds that status reversal — when a hierarchically powerful group is deposed and brought to a lower status — produces the greatest probability of violent conflict, as well as resentment of the greatest magnitude. Leaders can manipulate and frame events “in ways that provoke and inflame violent resentments” they could also employ

“persuasion and reason at this juncture to shape more benign beliefs” (Ibid., 270).

30 Rational Choices

After bring questioned what he would have done were he born a Palestinian, Barak bla- tantly said, “join a terrorist organization” (Barak 2003). The rational choice model of comparative politics assumes that reasons motivate actions and individuals employ these reasons in order to satisfy their interests (Lichbach & Zuckerman 1997). While the traditional focus of this para- digm has been on the individual, the theoretical framework allows for the attainment of conclusions at the collective/group level as well; individual-level actions are connected to collective- level results by “focusing on the strategic interactions among individuals” (Hardin 1997: 203).

Rational choice addresses groups that have a common set of ordered preferences – often the case with militaries, political parties, and other hierarchical organizations. As such, rational choice serves as a lens through which leaders’ actions and motivations can be analyzed for the preservation of their individual self-interest, position, reputation, and/or collective political party.

Rational choice has been critiqued for a narrow conception of human motivation (Lichbach &

Zuckerman 1997). However, in combination with threat, the rationality of an actor becomes somewhat primal; preservation of interests can be synonymous with the struggle to survive.

Tsebelis more broadly exemplifies this through his rationality assumption that assumes “human activity is goal oriented and instrumental and that individual and institutional actors try to maximize their goal achievement” (1990: 6). While rational choice has also been critiqued for an often widely inclusive definition of rationality (extending to irrational or non-rational behavior), a broader conception of rationality allows for the consideration of influences such as threat, violence, policy change, and emotion on individual and collective interests.

Scholars such as Zagare (1990: 39), contend that procedural rational decisions require the actor to have “an accurate perception of the implications of all conceivable alternatives and a

31 well-defined set of preferences over the entire set;” also they require a particular type of decision maker who can “correctly and dispassionately assess the preferences of other relevant actors, their likely responses to his or her choices and, in particular, to concessions or threats.” Contrary to this notion, other scholars contend that while often neglected or overshadowed by material pursuits, “a more complete portrait of instrumental rationality must encompass the aspirations of many to maximize social or emotional goods” (Barreto 2009: 59), whether financial, territorial, or based in historical vindication. In terms of predispositions, “excuses for bias fulfill the social norm requiring rational, fair judgment” (Fiske 2002, 125).

Ongoing research by Baliga and Sjöström considers the strategies of conflict manipulation through specific types of communication by extremists. Such communication revolves around the sending of “messages,” as exemplified through actions taken with extremist agendas or “cheap-talk”, however, it is important to note “the logic of extremist communication must depend on the nature of the underlying conflict” (Baliga & Sjöström 2010: 2). Third party “cheap- talk” is essentially “provocative acts and speech by hawkish extremists, or peace rallies by paci- fists” (Ibid., 34). Hawkish extremists are herein considered either bad or irrelevant for peace whereas dovish extremists are considered irrelevant or ambiguous. This theory suggests “hawkish extremists engage in rational provocation only when there are real opportunities for peace.

Otherwise, it would be counter-productive. The provocations are meant to increase tensions and trigger a spiral of fear between players A and B. But if player A is not responsive, for example, if he is a radical dominant-strategy type himself, provocative acts would be counter-productive”

(Ibid., 35). With respect to rational behavior, neither A nor B will gain from independent deviation — “this logic is reinforced by the desire of political leaders not to look weak in the face of terrorism” (Ibid., 36).

32 In his discussion of Mayalsia and Pakistan, Nasr (2001) exemplifies state (leader) utilization of Islam as a means to establish hegemony over society and expand its powers and control.

When incentives are present, state leaders have acted in pursuit of Islamic politics by embedding

Islam into the political sphere. Providing a rationalist approach to new institutionalism, Nasr looks at the strategic decisions made by key actors to bring about institutional change and development outcomes. A state will thereby use any cultural resources possible in order bolster its legitimacy and preserve control over a potentially rebellious populace. While Nasr’s example was based in research on Malaysia and Pakistan, the state’s manipulation of resources – for this study, threat — as a rallying call is clearly depicted in the case of Israel and Palestine.

Deterrence

Danilovic's (2002: 10) study of deterrence theory outlines three primary preconditions necessary to prevent deterrence failure and crisis escalation as determinations of: the deterrer’s retaliatory capability and its effectiveness as a deterrent therein, willingness of the deterrer to act on the threat, and whether the aggressor believes the deterrer is willing to counterattack (defined as, threat credibility). It is clear that governments, both weak and strong, have the capability to execute threats on their people by means of policy implementation and violence (among other methods). However, Danilovic contends that the problems lie in powers expressing their willingness to carry out these threats. Incidences of (possible) self-interested manipulation by leaders clearly depict the crafty and cunning manner in which threats are often carried out; the effects of which are born by the people (Ibid.). Israeli and Palestinian leadership have the respective capacities for threat implementation, yet their individual willingness to actualize these threats depends

33 on both external and internal factors, comprising the influence of international actors, pursuit of policy interests, and desire for and maintenance of power.

Deductions

The psychology of threat along with other human decision making traits may be especially salient factors to consider in research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The history of this conflict reveals periods of peace and negotiation intertwined with periods of severe violence, sometimes followed by periods of disengagement. The negotiations between Israel and the Pales- tinians involve a territorial debate that includes three main issues: the future of Israeli settlements, the right of return for Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war and the status of Jerusalem.

Because of its complexity, long duration and violence, the conflict has been described as "protracted" or intractable. Specifically, it involves issues of identity (national and religious) as well as security. Compromises have been proven difficult as expectations differed and implementation was interfered, among other things, by extremists’ actions. It is entirely possible that within the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, inter-group threat accompanied by intra group competition has been a dominant factor that has pushed each group independently into more extreme positions. The influence of threat may in turn constrain leaders in their scope of decision-making authority and capability, while also offering at least some opportunities for leaders to play or attempt to manipulate public concerns. The psychological dynamics in turn may tilt both Israelis and Palestinians towards more aggressive policies and the use of military measures.

This project will examine the impact on the general population of a group confronted with perceived and/or real external threats on their support for punitive policies against the perceived external threat, on their support for negotiations, and on their general sense of optimism

34 about the future. Specifically, it will examine the impact of threat on changes in Palestinian opinion regarding the support of Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza for punitive military actions against Israel and on their optimism about the future. Implications concerning the potential impact of threat and concomitant changes in public opinion on the political leadership of Israel and

Palestine and on the policies and approaches to the peace process will be discussed. These implications will be examined from the perspective of what Robert Putnam (1988) terms two level games, where simultaneous political actions take place at and between both the intra-group and inter-group levels of interaction.

Public perceptions are critical to peace processes where leaders are engaged in two-level games (Putnam 1988). In this case leaders depend on the support of their constituents, but this does not always result in leaders pursuing the long-term interests of their populations, this may especially be true with populations that experience external threats. Under these conditions the more immediate affective needs of citizens and leaders may encourage out-group belligerency on the part of leaders (Kahneman and Renshon 2006). Thus, scholars and policy makers involved in the study of conflicts and their resolution often have to account for the reversal of peace processes and their collapse into violent cycles. Peace and conflict are strongly related to perceptions of security and threat. Leaders involved in peace negotiations often need to reassure their public that their security will not be compromised. Anti-peace activists, on the other hand, can use security concerns and threats as arguments against a peace process that allegedly compromise security. These arguments are especially pertinent when the peace process is a "rocky road" and violence does not stop during the negotiation process. Leaders under these circumstances have to contend with a negative public opinion that would undermine their capacity to negotiate.

35 Drawing on a separate set of hypotheses, Pierce, Boulay, and Malyutov modeled threat perceptions in conflict in mathematical form, creating a theoretical foundation for the empirical example exhibited here. These authors found that “under certain assumptions, the level of inter- group conflict depends upon an interaction between the level of leaders’ initial commitments to such a conflict-oriented strategy and the degree to which perceptions of threat are amplified”

(2012).

Part II

Research Data & Methodology

The methodology for this project consists of the utilization of survey and casualty data from several organizations, both in Israel and Palestine, in order to draw the statistical connections between the impact of threat on public opinion. The sources of data used are: the Jerusalem

Media and Communications Centre (JMCC), B’Tselem (The Israeli Information Center for Hu- man Rights in the Occupied Territories), the Peace Index conducted by the Evans program in

Mediation and Conflict Resolution at Tel Aviv University (TAU), the Meir Amit Terrorism and

Intelligence Information Center, and IDF, and the Dahaf Institute in conjunction with Yedioth

Ahronoth.

Political Leadership4

In order to logically and succinctly organize data, material on Palestinian and Israeli political leadership was divided based on outlook towards the conflict. Leadership among Israelis and Palestinians is divided on a range of issues, from settlements and Jerusalem to borders and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 4 The term “leadership,” is used to reference both political parties and leaders.

36 refugees. However, when the cards unfold, lucid lines are drawn between those more likely to use confrontation and aggressive measures and those more likely to negotiate as means to achieve a peaceful settlement. With this understanding, political leadership has been divided based on confrontation and negotiation oriented parties and leaders. While this tends to fall in line with where leadership stands on the political spectrum, it is important to note that right/left or conservative/liberal are not the basis for this division, which is more so comparable to the dis- tinction between Hawks and Doves.

Palestinian Public Opinion

Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre

The JMCC collects data though regular polls conducted in the West Bank (including East

Jerusalem) and Gaza, through face-to-face interviews. From these polls, several questions have been utilized for this study that provide a consistent monitor of Palestinian public opinion on a variety of topics over a large span of time. The specific questions used for this study include the following areas:

Palestinian Support for the Peace Process Palestinian Support for Suicide Operations Palestinian Optimism About the Future Palestinian Support for Military Operations Palestinian Trust/Support in Political Parties

For the first three areas outlined above, some of the response categories were collapsed in order to reach a total “optimism” or “support.” For Optimism About the Future, the response categories were: Optimistic, Very Optimistic, and Somewhat Optimistic; of these categories, the first two were averaged to achieve a Total Optimism. In some cases, the response category for a poll was entitled Total Optimism, which was used only when the first two categories were not

37 available to average. For Support for Suicide Operations and Support for the Peace Process, the response categories were: Support, Strongly Support, and Somewhat Support; similar to Opti- mism, the first two categories were averaged to achieve a Total Support. Palestinian

Trust/Support in Political Parties is (in most cases, according to the polls) divided between Gaza and the West Bank, and has been used as such in order to show variances between the two populations and the dominant parties. There are times where this study has utilized the overall Pales- tinian support for political parties as a summation of both these groups.

The questions and response categories for these polls vary slightly over time, however these variations do not appear to take effect on response distribution over time. According to the

JMCC regarding Palestinian support for suicide bombings, “variations in question construction before and after the year 2000 do not appear to be associated with substantial shifts in public support for suicide bombing, whereas the events of 2000 are associated with a substantial shift in support.” All polls are provided in Appendix 1.

In order to properly analyze the JMCC polling data, it was imperative to know the exact dates the polls were conducted. JMCC did not conduct their polls on a fixed timeline and these dates vary over the course of each month. For example, JMCC will mark a poll as having been conducted in April 2003, with the actual interviews taking place on April 5-9. With data collected at such an early time-point in the month, it is hardly representative of events taking place over the duration of the entire month. For this project, data analysis has been done against Israeli and

Palestinian monthly fatalities (compiled by B’Tselem at the end of each month), and as such, the data has been organized to have the JMCC polls aligned as much as possible with the end of each month. If a poll was conducted between the 1st and 14th of a month, then the data associated with it has been incorporated and analyzed with the month prior; if a poll was conduced between the

38 15th and the end of the month, then the data associated with it has been incorporated and analyzed with the month represented by JMCC. So for example, Poll 48 was conducted between

April 5-9 of 2003, so the data used from this poll will be associated with March 2003; Poll 49 was conducted between October 18-21, 2003, so the data used from this poll will be associated with October 2003.

There are three adjustment made to this organizational method. 1) Poll 12 was conducted on January 11 and 21, 1996, and the data used from this poll is associated with January 1996.

Poll 13 was conducted on February 1 and 2, 1996, and the data used from this poll is also associated with January 1996. As such, the data from both Poll 12 and 13 have been averaged. 2) Poll

23 was conducted on November 19-21, 1997, and the data used from this poll is associated with

November 1997. Poll 24 was conducted in late November and early December 1997, and the data used from this poll is also associated with November 1997. Similar to the first adjustment, the data from both Poll 23 and 24 have been averaged. 3) Poll 59 was conducted on July 6-7, 2006 and the data used from this poll has been associated with July 2006. Poll 58 was conducted on

June 21-22, 2006, just before IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit was kidnapped by Hamas (on June 25), and Israel retaliated with an increase in military action. Poll 59 was kept as July due to Israel’s immediate military response to the kidnapping, resulting in the deaths of Palestinians.5

Israeli Public Opinion

The Peace Index

The “Peace Index” project is directed by Professor Ephraim Ya’ar of TAU and Professor

Tamar Hermann of the Israel Democracy Institute with the goal of following Israeli public opin-

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 5 Following the July 2006 poll until the end of the month, there were 36 fatalities. Between Poll 59 and 59, there were 13.

39 ion trends regarding the Arab-Israeli/Israeli-Palestinian conflict and assessing the impact on Is- raeli society. The Peace Index project was initiated by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Re- search at TAU in June 1994, and since January 2010, the project has been conducted through the

Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution at TAU and the Israel Democracy Institute.

The Peace Index is comprised of periodic surveys of Israeli public opinion, from which, specifically represented in this project, is the Oslo Peace Index. Following the official signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993, the War and Peace Index began in 1994, with the Oslo

Peace Index serving as a barometer by which to measure public opinion in terms of this agreement. This Index is discontinued after the early months of 2008, likely due to the time lapse since the Accords. While the General Peace and Negotiation Indices ask about the general Arab population, the Oslo Index specifically asks about the Palestinian population, making it a more accurate measure of Israeli public opinion for this study.

Peace Index data is collected through monthly telephone interviews based on a sampling of Israeli adults, sometimes including Israeli Arabs, Jewish settlers living beyond the Green Line, and inhabitants of moshavim and kibbutzim – approximating 500-600 women and men, with a sampling error of about 4.5%.6 In September 2000, the TSC began submitting every peace index twice: one index as calculated for the overall sample, and the second as calculated for the Jewish sample only. As described in the September 2000 Index, “the addition of the Arab sector results in a slight increase in all indices. In effect, the opinions of the Arab sector on the peace process

[until this Index] and its various aspects are far more positive than those of the Jewish public, but given their small relative proportion in the overall population, the impact of their inclusion in the general sample is inevitably reduced” (Peace Index). For the purpose of this study, the Jewish

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 6 Between 1994 and August 1997, the margin of error is listed as “+/- 4%,” after this point, the margin of error is specified as “4.5%.”

40 sample of Israelis will be used, not the overall sample alone, due to the consistency of this sample throughout the 1994-2011 period. Polls are provided in Appendix 2; those that are not provided were temporarily unavailable through the Peace Index and can be accessed via their website. The polls provided in this Appendix are in English; some data was pulled from the Hebrew and Arabic polls, which can be accessed via the Peace Index website.

To comprise the index, each response is given a score between 0 (strongly disbe- lieve/don’t support) and 4 (strongly believe/support). The average scores of respondents for all questions are then multiplied by 25 – for example, this results in an index of 100 with a response of “strongly believe/support.” Of the questions asked, the following are the permanent questions of the Indices:

Oslo Index: 1. What is your opinion on the agreement that was signed in Oslo between Israel and the PLO (Agreement of Principles)? Heavily in favor Somewhat in favor In the middle Somewhat opposed Heavily opposed Don’t know/no opinion

2. Do you believe or not believe that the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the PLO will bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the coming years? Greatly believe Somewhat believe In the middle Somewhat don’t believe Certainly don’t believe Don’t know/no opinion

General Peace Index: 1. In general, do you consider yourself a supporter or opponent of the peace process between Israel and the Arabs? Greatly opposed Somewhat opposed In the middle

41 Somewhat supportive Greatly supportive Don’t know/no opinion

2. Do you believe or not believe that in the coming years there will be peace between Israel and the Arabs? Certain there will be peace Think there will be peace In the middle Think there will not be peace Certain there will not be peace Don’t know/no opinion

Negotiation Index: 1. What is your position regarding the negotiations between Israel and the Pales- tinian Authority? Heavily in favor Somewhat in favor Somewhat opposed Heavily opposed Don't know/no opinion

2. Do you believe or not believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority will bring about peace between Israel and the Pales- tinians in the coming years? Greatly believe Somewhat believe

Dahaf Institute for Yedioth Ahronoth

The Israeli newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth (Ynet), publishes regular polls in conjunction with the Dahaf Institute and Dr. Mina Tzemach. These polls survey the Israeli population on a range of issues, of which specifically used for this study, is the question of Israeli support for political leaders. Israelis were asked, “If elections were held today who would you vote for PM?”7 on a regular basis, sometimes with several polls per month, and in some cases with only several polls per year. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 7 Variations of this question were asked in reference to political parties and political leaders; these can be found in Appendix 4.

42 For political leaders, specifically the position of Prime Minister (PM), not all of the polls presented in the original data were utilized for this study. In some cases, the polling question asked questions of conditional support based on one person’s presence or absence if an election was to take place; these questions were not used. Otherwise, all questions were analyzed for this study

Similar to the JMCC, if a poll was conducted between the 1st and 14th of a month, then the data associated with it has been incorporated and analyzed with the month prior; if a poll was conduced between the 15th and the end of the month, then the data associated with it has been incorporated and analyzed with the month represented by the poll.

In cases where there are several polls per month, the figures were averaged – all with respect to the previously mentioned method of monthly division. In these cases of averaging, if for example there are three polls to average and two polls show support for one candidate while one does not, the poll that does not show that candidate is still averaged with the other two polls, simply representing zero seats. Detailed statistics for these polls are in Appendix 4.

To analyze this polling data, the leaders were divided into those who are more confrontation-oriented and those more negotiation-oriented (details of these divisions provided in Chapter

4). The categories of “No Answer”, “NA,”8 “Undecided,” “Will not vote,” “Don’t know” and

“Did not answer” were all combined to create the category, “Not Committed to a Candidate,” since the individual’s lack of response or uncertain response depicts an inability to commit to a particular candidate. In some cases, these category options were not given in the polling results, either because they were just not presented as possible responses, or the results were simply not reported. In the very few cases where there is support for centrist leadership (specifically for the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 8 In these polls, NA refers to “no answer,” it does not refer to not applicable.

43 candidates: Gaydamak and Milo) this score is accounted for as “Not Committed,” due to a lack of commitment to a clearly confrontation or negotiation leader.

Support for each polling month should total 100%, however there are six cases where the total does not equal this amount. These discrepancies can be attributed to averages calculated within and between polls for a given month. In December 1994 and 2001, the total equals 93% and 79.5%, respectively; in both cases, the unaccounted for percentage is attributed to the “Not

Committed” category, which was not provided. In cases such as March and May 2002 and Au- gust 2005, either none or some of the categories comprising “Not Committed” were listed in all or select polls comprising a given month; such absences account for shifted totals (75%, 92%, and 64%, respectively). Lastly, in January 2007, eight sub-categories with options for different mixes of candidates are provided; due to averaging across such a range, without the “Non Com- mitted” category, the total is 75.13%.

Two specific questions can be seen in the polling results, yet are not reflected in the graphs. For both December 2001 and March 2002, support for negotiation-oriented leaders is zero, not because the public supported only confrontation-oriented leaders, but because no negotiation-oriented leaders were presented as options for the respondent to choose from. These two months are outliers, and if used would represent artificially high readings for confrontation- oriented leaders, so they have been omitted from the final analysis. In figure 4B in Chapter 4, the absence of these two zeros has been connected with a line from the points directly preceding and proceeding these dates.

Palestinian and Israeli Casualties

B’Tselem

44 B’Tselem9 is the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territo- ries, created with the goal of educating the public and policymakers about human rights violations in the OT. Among the data collected by B’Tselem, this study utilizes solely the fatality statistics provided. Fatality data is broken down into the following categories:

Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in the OT Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians in the OT Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in Israel Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians in Israel Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians in the OT Israeli security force personnel killed by Palestinians in the OT Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians in Israel Israeli security force personnel killed by Palestinians in Israel

Fatality figures following the outbreak of the second Intifada on September 29, 2000 through present are available to the public via the B’Tselem website. Fatality figures prior to 2000 were provided to the study directly from B’Tselem and have been provided (in addition to the other data) in Appendix 3.

Qassam Attacks

Both qassam and mortar attacks on Israelis can be received with similar reactions: anger, threat, and fear. With this in mind, it would seem important to include both these types of attacks as measures of fear among the Israeli population. Nonetheless, this study has chosen to focus solely on qassam rocket attacks, and the chances of mortars having as potent of an impact as qas- sams is far less. Detailed statistics for qassam attacks are in Appendix 5.

The Meir Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Information Center

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 9 Translated from Hebrew, meaning “in the image of” – synonymous to human dignity – this word comes from Genesis 1:27.

45 As a part of the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC) NGO, and among the data collected on terrorism with respect to Israel and its neighbors, the Meir Amit

Center also reports on qassam rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel. Through their bi-weekly

“News of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict” reports, the Center gives detailed statistics of rocket attacks, rocket launches, precise locations where the rockets hit, and so forth. For this study, data regarding qassam attacks have been utilized from the Meir Amit Center.

When discussed rocket attacks, it is important to distinguish a “hit” from a “launch.” In a given attack where one rocket is launched, the rocket has the potential of splitting off and both landing in multiple locations, and producing shrapnel that could result in separate injuries/casualties, or “hits”, having broken off from the original launch. Essentially, one launch can produce multiple hits. The Center reports both hits and launches at various points of time, however for this study, rocket launches will be used as this was most consistently reported. For some years, monthly figures were available, and for some, only yearly totals. All details can be found via the Meir Amit Center website.

While data for nearly all years was obtained from the reports providing monthly statistics, no report published monthly data for 2009. Weekly data is provided from January 1 through De- cember 31, 2009, however it is not broken down by precise weeks or months. In order to have an accurate account of attacks per month, the figures were calculated based on weeks and days. So for example, in January there are 9 qassam rocket attacks over 14 days; 9/5 = .642. Two days included in the 9 qassam rocket attacks figure are in February; so .642x2 = the total qassam attacks in that period in January. Similar calculations were made to all the figures to represent the monthly data used in this study. Additionally, other sources for qassam data have been used in this study to buttress data from the Meir Amit Center and to show that while some sources differ

46 slightly in their report of the exact number of attacks, the major movement of this data trends across multiple sources.

Israel Security Agency – Shabak

While the Israel Security Agency (ISA) has a reputation as the Israeli watchdog, they also produce a great deal of data regarding trends of terror attacks carried out against Israel. The website online provides detailed reports of these incidents on a regular basis since the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000. Unfortunately, the high levels of security surrounding the

ISA restricted access to data prior to 2000, which is why this study utilizes other sources for qassam attacks in addition to the ISA; ISA data functions as a supplement to other the other sources.

The Israel Defense Forces

Additional data regarding qassam rocket attacks on Israel were pulled from, “Both Sides

Retaliate in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” by Johannes Haushofer, Anat Biletzki, and Nancy

Kanwisher (2010). This data comes from a private undisclosed source within the IDF, and provides data from 2002 through 2007. Similar to data from the ISA, the IDF data is used as sup- plementary support for data from the Meir Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Information Center.

Threat

In order to calculate threat, Israeli and Palestinian casualties as well as qassam rocket attacks were used to create a reliable measure of threat. For Palestinians, casualties alone are utilized to measure threat; and while it can be argued that Israeli incursions and the number of home demolitions can also be used to measure threat, casualties more consistently correlate with

47 Israeli incursions/attacks – this is not to say that other occurrences such as home demolitions would not be significantly correlate with threat. For Israelis, both casualties and rocket attacks are used as a measure of threat. With the creation of the separation barrier came an instantaneous switch from suicide bombing attacks to qassam and mortar attacks; while all these occurrences produce threat, rocket attacks and casualties more consistently correlate with Palestinian incursions/attacks. If casualties or rockets alone were used to measure threat, the correlation with support for the peace process would be lost, testing and proving the theory presented in this study.

To accurately calculate this measure, threat is standardized. For Palestinians, the log of casualties was taken10 as this produces the most linear relationship between threat and public opinion. For Israelis, casualties and rocket attacks are independently divided by their respective standard deviations, and the results are added together to create standardized threat. Of the cases researched, 95% should fall between -3 and +3; when it is greater, there is a higher correlation with threat.

______

Methodology & Objectives

In order to understand the effect of threat on public opinion, political leaders, public policy, and political parties with respect to the peace process in Israel and Palestine, the following hypotheses are addressed in this study:

H1: In response to perceived threat, public support for aggressive action against the

external opponent will increase.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 10 The log was calculated plus 1 per month because the log of zero cannot be taken.

48 H2: In response to perceived threat, public support for a negotiated settlement with the

external opponent will be reduced.

H3: In response to threat, support for negotiation-oriented leadership will decrease,

and support for confrontation-oriented leadership will increase.

In order to address each specific hypothesis, the following steps were taken:

Op-H1: For Palestinians, look at surveys measuring a) support for military operations and

b) support for suicide bombings; for Israelis, I will look at the Peace Index sur-

veys.

Op-H2: For Israelis and Palestinians, look at surveys measuring a) support for the peace

process and b) optimism about the future.

Op-H3: Israeli and Palestinian political leadership will be divided based on respective

tendencies towards confrontation or negotiation. Support for leadership will

thereby be broken down on these lines to delineate shifts in support.

Since present scholarship lacks of a direct measure of threat, various measures of threat- related activity were utilized as an overall measure of perceived threat. Threat-related activity is herein inclusive of: measures Israeli and Palestinian casualties, alongside major socio-political and violent events, Palestinian suicide bombings and kidnappings, and Israeli and Palestinian rocket attacks.

People share a common interest in protecting themselves and their social structures from impending harm, particularly threat; threats encompass physical and mental fear of danger, from within one’s own structure, or from abroad — essentially a prelude for what may come.

Throughout history, we see examples of the masses ruled under a governance of threat — wheth-

49 er it was the Great Purge (Great Terror) in Stalinist Russia, propaganda and rhetoric in Nazi

Germany, or most recently, President George W. Bush’s post 9/11 campaign of terror. Threat has been and continues to be a powerful tactic that brings people to the feet of their leaders, ser- vile, and willing to take whatever measures necessary in order to prevent their impending fright- ful fate from the barrage of threats they cannot avoid — willingly. The outlined methodology will utilize threat perception in order to understand possible shifts in public opinion and policy, as well as strategies of leaders and political parties in dealing with conflict. This project seeks to convey the critical role of threat perception, both as a byproduct of violence, and as a force manipulated by leaders, with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

50 Chapter 3

Public Opinion Under Threat

"Men are moved by two levers only: fear and self interest" Napoleon Bonaparte

The following is an analysis of the impact of perceived threat on public opinion among

Israelis and Palestinians from 1994-2011. Over this period, the Jerusalem Media and Communi- cations Centre (JMCC) conducted random sample surveys at varying intervals of approximately

1,100-2,000 Palestinian residents, including residents of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusa- lem. Over the period of 1994-2011, the Peace Index project (through the Evans Program in Me- diation and Conflict Resolution), conducted monthly surveys from a sampling of approximately

600 Israelis, sometimes including Israeli Arabs, Jewish settlers living beyond the Green Line, and inhabitants of moshavim and kibbutzim. Results of these public opinion surveys are then compiled into various Peace Indices of which used for this study are the Oslo Index and the Gen- eral Peace/Negotiation Index. Analyzed in conjunction with the JMCC and Peace Index data, casualty and qassam rocket statistics (provided by B’Tselem and the Meir Amit Intelligence and

Terrorism Information Center, respectively) allow for an overall image of the implications of threat on Israelis and Palestinians. This analysis examines trends in annual levels of Israeli and

Palestinian casualties over the 1994-2011 period with comparable trends in levels of Palestinian public opinion as measured by the JMCC, and Israeli public opinion as measured through the

Peace Index.

51 Data & Limitations

Among Palestinians, a subset of reasonably consistent survey questions were asked that inquired about 1) support for the peace process, 2) optimism about the future, 3) support for military operations against Israel, and 4) support for suicide operations. This analysis examines annual levels of fatal Palestinian casualties along with survey data on Palestinian support for suicide bombings (Figure 1a), general Palestinian optimism about the future (Figure 1b), support for the Peace Process (Figure 1c), and support for military operations against Israel (Figure 1d).

Among Israelis, the permanent questions of the Peace Index gauge overall Israeli support for

Peace with Palestinians. The analysis presented in Figure 2 examines annual levels of fatal Israe- li casualties along with survey data from the Peace Index.

Prior to examining the statistics presented in Figures 1 and 2, a limitation concerning the underlying data needs to be considered. Casualty figures are an indirect measure of the extent to which a population feels threatened; actual threat is interpreted through more mainstream media sources such as newspapers, television, and Internet. A more comprehensive analysis will measure how causality figures as well as other types of threats (e.g., the destruction of terrorist identified homes and suicide bombings) are portrayed to the Palestinian and Israeli publics. Despite this limitation, the significant shifts in casualty figures (shown in Appendix 3) and Figures 1 and

2) may well translate into corresponding shifts in perceptions of threat among the Israeli and Pal- estinian populations.11 Considering this data limitation, Figures 1 and 2 can provide some basis for comparing changes in Palestinian and Israeli public opinion and annual causality statistics of each population. These comparisons are made within the context of major events within Israeli and Palestinian societies.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 11 See Appendix 3 for Palestinian and Israeli casualty statistics.

52 Israeli and Palestinian Public Opinion

Oslo as Precedent

In the first direct agreement between the Israeli government and the PLO, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP; Oslo Accords) was intended to be a framework through which final status issues could be resolved and negotiations for future relations could be solidified. The September 13, 1993 DOP, while promising in the outset, was in the end a symbolic handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin – under the watchful custodianship of Bill Clinton and the United States – and a “great first real try!” Nobel Peace

Prize for the two leaders and Shimon Peres. With the Accords came mutual recognition between

Israel and the newly created PNA (Palestinian National Authority), Palestinian authority over designated territories and self-governance (to be implemented in phases), and withdrawal of IDF forces from parts of the West Bank and Gaza. The anticipated five-year agreement would carry out in phases, with the subjects of Jerusalem, refugees, borders, and settlements intentionally shelved for eventual negotiation.

Implementation was nearly derailed following a violent incident on February 25th in Heb- ron, where 29 people were killed by a Jewish settler who opened fire on Muslims at prayer. The agreement was met with contention among Israelis and Palestinians alike – all fearful of possible changes such an arrangement could bring. Following a meeting in Cairo on May 4, 1994, Israel and the PLO agreed on the first phase of implementation of the DOP, and voices of Palestinian opposition were (temporarily) quieted with Yasser Arafat’s welcomed return to Gaza City soon after on July 1st. The lull did not last long as over the next year Palestinian militants carried out bomb attacks in cyclical retaliation with Israeli assassinations of militants and blockades of PA autonomous zones. The Israeli settlements that were to have been halted with the DOP were still

53 sprouting, and increased Palestinian violence was fomenting great dissent among the Israeli right, Zionists, and religious nationalists who were questioning their government’s loyalty to Is- rael and Zionism.

In the midst of dissension and social schisms, The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza (Oslo II) was signed in Taba, Egypt on September 24, 1995, and made official on the

28th in Washington (with the US countersignature). Oslo II marked the end of Phase I negotiations between Israel and the PLO, and the initiation of Phase II with the expansion of Palestinian self-governance in the creation of the Palestinian Council, and Israeli efflux of security. The

West Bank was divided into three zones, or areas:

Area A: Palestinian Council will have full control of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Kalkilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Hebron (minus the Old City of Heb- ron, the Jewish Quarter, and everything that is linked from there to Kiryat Arba and the Tomb of the Patriarchs). The Council will have full authority over internal security, public order, and civil affairs.

Area B: Palestinian Council will have full civil authority, including maintaining public order, yet Israel will have overriding authority in terms of security; “This responsibility shall take precedence over the Palestinian responsibility for public order.” This area is comprised of Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank.

Area C: Israeli control of security and public order. The Palestinian Council will assume civil responsibilities unrelated to the territory, such as health, economy, education, etc. (Israel MFA September 1995)

Oslo, while promising to a certain degree, came with a price tag for peace. This agreement indicated a specific type of peace that would take place under certain conditions. While most Israelis and Palestinians did not know the details of these conditions unless they were directly impacting their lives, they did know (and still know) what the Oslo Accords represented.

From the beginning, Oslo had limited support from Israelis and Palestinians, due in part to its

54 confined scope of applicability. Opposition reached an apex for Israelis when orthodox extremist and far right conservative Yigal Amir, supporter of the campaign against Prime Minister Rabin, assassinated the Prime Minister on November 4, 1995. The reverberating impact of the explicit murder of an Israeli leader who had taken great steps towards peace shocked the international community, as well as Israelis and Palestinians. Following Rabin’s assassination, Foreign Minis- ter Peres who had a heavy hand in what had become an ailing peace process, assumed the position of Prime Minister until elections were held the following year.

"We went to sleep with Peres, woke up with Netanyahu"12

For months, Peres had been forecasted as victor, with polls confirming his 20% (approx- imate) lead through early 1996; yet two months preceding the election in March 1996, Peres' support had dropped 3% below Netanyahu’s (“Suicide Bombings…”; Steinberg 1998). Peres’ support had receded to an unsustainable level, and Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister of the

14th Knesset on May 29th, by a .9% margin (Israel MFA May 1996).13 How did such an enormous advantage dwindle in only five months and result in Netanyahu's election? Outlined below are factors associated with Netanyahu’s election and Peres’ loss as a result of unanticipated incidences that frightened Israelis into self-defense through conservatism.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 12 “Remember Prime Minister Netanyahu?” 13 In the Israeli political system of proportional representation, it is possible to become the Prime Minister without receiving the majority of votes, insofar as a candidate wins the majority of seats in the Knesset. Building coalitions with different political parties is a large part of Israeli politics and can greatly promote or inhibit a candidate’s election. In the 1996 election, Peres won the Prime Ministership by receiving the majority of votes as well as a greater number of seats for his Labor Party.

55 Campaign Salvo

The violence of early 1996 had consequently produced unanticipated election results. On

January 5th, Israel’s Shin Bet assassinated Yahyeh Ayyash, a leader and organizer of the Izz ad-

Din al-Qassam Brigades, known as “the engineer” for advancing the technique of suicide bombing, specifically for Israel. While considered enormous security threat by Israel, Ayyash was seen by many Palestinians as a type of hero for standing up to Israeli military power. A spate of suicide attacks was initiated soon after:

February 25th: a Hamas suicide bomber detonates on Jerusalem bus 18, near the Central Bus Station, killing 26 (17 civilians, 9 soldiers). February 25th: Another Hamas suicide bomber detonates at hitching post outside Ash- kelon, killing one Israeli. March 3rd: Suicide bombing in Jerusalem on bus 18 on Jaffa Road, killing 19 (16 civilians and 3 soldiers). March 4th: Suicide bomber detonates a 20kg nail bomb in Tel Aviv, just outside the Di- zengoff Center, killing 13 (12 civilians, 1 soldier). (Israel MFA “Suicide and Other Bombing…”)

The narrowing gap between Peres and Netanyahu is attributed to numerous factors. By early 1996, support for the peace process had declined (Figure 2). Immediately proceeding Rab- in’s assassination, support for Netanyahu plummeted; however, by early 1996 the weight of the

Rabin assassination had diminished and people returned to their “pre-murder positions” (Inbar

1998: 39). Likud’s diligent campaigning aimed to embarrass Labor in the eyes of the Israeli public, particularly on the issue of Jerusalem. Having an enormous impact, however, were the suicide attacks that left dozens of people dead and scores injured; this “underscored the internal security problems associated with the Oslo process – issues the Likud had been consistently focusing upon” (Ibid.).

56 Public speeches given by Peres’ following the attacks were not what the public needed to hear from their head of state, particularly given the “dignified reaction of Netanyahu and the

Likud to the terrorist attacks (they refrained from protest demonstration and from attacking the government)” (Ibid.). In a statement to the Knesset following the February attacks, Peres announced: “I turn to those Palestinians who want peace and ask them to prevent this violent minority from destroying their future and their hope. The ballot and not the bullet, is the right ticket for peace and freedom” (Israel MFA February 1996). Peres’ campaign of peace negotiations with

Palestinians following such devastating attacks rapidly lost popularity; and his public discourse stating that “the Palestinians Authority must do its part, we will do ours. We will not halt the peace process; we will continue with it” now spoke to a much smaller audience, even despite

Peres’ commitment to strike at the terrorists (Ibid.). In a press conference with President Clinton following the March attacks, Peres discussed how to move forward with peace in an environment of terror, concluding that the “foundation was laid down to do both: namely, to go ahead with peace and reject terror” (Israel MFA March 1996). Israelis, however, wanted retaliation, not rec- onciliation.

With a public divided between national security and regional peace, Peres’ chances at election were severely damaged. While Peres played off of Rabin’s vision of a peace agreement,

Netanyahu “played off Israelis’ fear of terrorism and…gained much support in the process”

(Sadler 1996). Speaking of her husband in an interview on election day, Leah Rabin pleaded Is- raelis to vote for the Labor party, stating, “if the Labor Party doesn’t win today, then his loss

[Rabin] was in vain…a triumph for his murderer and those who sent him” (“Rabin’s Widow…”).

In the opposing camp, Netanyahu had gained overwhelming support from the orthodox commu-

57 nity, and had Rabbis such as the ultra orthodox Eliezer Schach, rallying congregations in support of Netanyahu and Likud (Israeli Race…”).

It is clear that the course of the election was drastically altered as a result of the suicide attacks. November 1995, Peres held a lead of 31%, only decreasing minimally to 21% in early

1996 (Steinberg 1998: 218). Polls taken following the terrorist attacks, however, depict a diminu- tive gap between the two candidates. Peres’ firm belief in the Oslo Agreement became detrimental to his campaign, as the Israeli public could no longer envision a compromise with Arafat, who continued to spur anti-Israeli rhetoric in the midst of Hamas-led violence. Meanwhile, Net- anyahu’s carefully calculated actions and statements “present[ed] the image of a responsible statesman, and the head of the Likud as a credible national leader” (Ibid.: 210). When Likud began to publicize it’s support of the once Labor led campaign of peace negotiations with it’s slogan, “Netanyahu – We Make a Safe Peace,” Labor had lost its monopoly as sole peace maker, and was undermined by Likud’s promise of uncompromised security (Inbar 1998: 40).

In February 20/21, a poll showed Netanyahu trailing behind Peres by 14%, while just days later following the February 25th attacks, polls on February 27/28 show a tie between the two, with the undecided vote cut in half to 4%. Less than a week later following the attacks on

March 3rd and 4th, a poll on March 5/6 showed Netanyahu leading by 3%. The same pattern is evident when looking at political parties. The February 20/21 poll has Labor at a 10% lead over

Likud, yet just days later, the February 27/28 poll has them tied, where they remain through the

March 5/6 poll as well. The figures listed above all come from Steinberg 1998, and are detailed

Tables 3A and 3B.

58 Table 3A

Impact of Terrorism on Poll Results: Prime Minister (%)

1995 1996 Nov Dec Jan Jan Feb Feb Feb Feb March 7/8 5/6 2/3 30/31 7/8 13/14 20/21 27/28* 5/6* Peres 54 46 50 46 51 50 50 48 46 Netanyahu 23 28 29 30 36 37 36 48 49 Undecided 12 16 12 11 5 7 8 4 5 Won’t Vote 10 1 9 13 8 6 6 + + + Included in “Undecided” * After Suicide Bombings! (Source: Steinberg 1998: 218)

Table 3B

Poll Data on Party Preference

1995 1996 Nov Dec Jan Jan Feb Feb Feb March 7/8 5/6 2/3 30/31 6/7 20/21 27/28 5/6 Labor 46 44 44 44 45 45 40 43 Likud 30 31 31-32 29 36* 35* 40* 43*+ * Likud Tzomet Bloc + Levy Party added to Likud (Source: Steinberg 1998: 218)

Evolving Opinion

1994 to The Shake Off

Examination of the Palestinian casualty figures shows that overall Palestinian casualties declined from 152 fatalities in 1994 to 45 in 1995, with Israeli casualties expressing a similar decline from 74 to 45, respectively. The period following the implementation of Oslo was fraught with difficulties and violence, particularly in terms of authority and control over territories that had changed hands with the agreement. In 1996, Israeli casualties cluster around the suicide bombings carried out by Hamas at the beginning of the year (23 and 22 fatalities in Febru-

59 ary and March respectively), while Palestinian casualties cluster around the Al-Aqsa Tunnel Ri- ots of September (55 fatalities).

In the period between January 1994 and November 1996, the JMCC conducted 10 surveys asking Palestinians how optimistic they were about the future. While optimism is at 57.3% in January 1994, the subsidence of violence in 1995 shows a general increase in optimism over the next two years, reaching a high of 84.2% in January 1996 and dipping down slightly to 74% in October 1996 following the Riots.

Beginning in June 1995, the JMCC began asking about Palestinian support for suicide operations, at which point support was measured at 32.8%. Between 1997 and 1999, support fluctuated, dropping to 23.6% in May 1997 following the Café Apropos bombing in March, increasing up to 28.2% in August 1997 following the Mahane Yehuda bombing in July, and then descending again to 26.1% in March 1999. Simultaneously, Palestinian optimism about the future went from 68.7% in May 1997, down to 61.8% in August, increasing to 72.45% by Novem- ber 1997, fluctuating around the mid-60s to low-70s throughout 1998 and 1999. A similar trend reflected in Israeli public opinion with support for the peace process at 64.6 in January 1997, dropping down to 59 at the end of March, and down further to 50.9 on July 30, the day of the suicide bombing.

With the onset of 1998 came the January 17th Israeli IDF withdrawal from Hebron in the

West Bank, followed immediately by a January 18th re-deployment of troops. Ehud’s Barak’s victory over Benjamin Netanyahu and subsequent inception into the Knesset in 1999 brought to the forefront a platform based on the notion of an inclusive Israel. Barak appeared willing to make concessions with Palestinians in order to assure peace and security, and engaged in negotiations with Yasser Arafat at Camp David in 2000 under the mediation of President Clinton. As

60 peace talks fell apart, Barak returned to Israel on July 31st and was branded by some factions in

Israel as a complete failure; support for Barak began to drop, and unrest among the Palestinians grew. By September 2000, tensions appeared to have reached an apex. This situation was further aggravated on September 28th, when Ariel Sharon exerted what he believed to be his territorial authority through an attempted visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Prior to his ascent to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, Sharon articulated his motive for his actions as: “I came here with a message of peace. I believe that we can live together with the Palestinians. I came here to the holiest place of the Jewish people in order to see what happens here" (Clinton 2005).

Despite his said intentions however, this action coincided with the initiation of the 2nd Intifada,

Al Aqsa Intifada. “Nevertheless, Sharon’s visit was neither the exclusive not even the chief factor in the Intifada’s explosion or continuation” (Meital 2006: 96).

The failure of Camp David solidified any preexisting notions among the Israeli and Pal- estinian publics that there is no partner for peace. Diplomatic means of reaching a peace agreement were for naught and thereby discredited as a strategy for progress, making way for more violent alternatives. Immediately following the breakdown of Camp David, Palestinian support for military operations (on targets) hit 51.6%, and reached an ultimate high of 81.8% in Decem- ber 2001, according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR).14 Shamir and Shikaki identified this increase as the result of a disappointed public following the demise of

Camp David; however this was a modest assessment as the increase occurred in July 2000 immediately following the inconclusive Camp David Summit15 only reaching 81.8% after months of violence in the 2nd Intifada (Shamir & Shikaki 2010). The suggested relationship between an

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 14 The terms, “support for violence” and “support for military operations” are used interchangeably in the data and in this piece. 15 The Poll was conducted between July 27 and 29; Camp David ended unresolved on July 25.

61 increase in support for violence and casualties is further reinforced by the data from the PCPSR.

Shamir and Shikaki state that, "Palestinians continued to support violent means in the conflict, although this support peaked during the first year of the Intifada. In the next polls the percentage declined somewhat, oscillating between 53 and 48 percent" (Ibid.: 74).

Up through the July 2000 survey, the PCPSR asks the question, “Concerning armed attacks against Israeli targets I.…” with options for the respondent to: 1) support; 2) oppose; 3) no

Opinion/don’t Know. This question was not asked again until the following year in December

2001, where, while the question remained the same, options for respondents were changed to: 1) strongly support; 2) support; 3) oppose; 4) strongly oppose; 5) no opinion/don’t know.16 The availability of more options to a respondent allows for the spread of opinion across a wider spectrum, reducing the possibility for, often-harsh results produced from questions formatted in a more black and white manner. Shikaki and Shamir identified an increase in Palestinian support for violent action against Israel from 44% in March 2000 to 52%17 in July, placing the weight of shifting public opinion on the demise of Camp David. By July 2001, following months of violence during the 2nd Intifada, support skyrockets to 92% support for armed confrontations against the IDF in the West Bank and Gaza, and 58% support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel. While some (including Shamir & Shikaki) contend that the collapse of Camp David was a pivotal point in altering public opinion, it is evident here that these shifts cannot be attributed entirely to this cause. Very simply, the public did not lose faith in the peace process and begin to support violent action due to the failure of Camp David; the public lost faith and began

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 16 It is the combined total of the categories, “strongly support” and “support” that comprise the stated 81.8% support level for December 2001. 17 There is 60% Palestinian support for violent action against Israelis if no agreement is reached by September.

62 supporting violent action when fatalities became more frequent, and the violence of the 2nd Inti- fada became a reality.

Significantly, even though tensions between Israelis and Palestinians were rising during the first nine months of 2000, actual casualties remained quite low (approximately 32 Palestinian and 3 Israeli fatalities between January 1, 2000 and September 28, 2000). Following the initiation of the 2nd Intifada during the last three months of 2000, there was a sharp increase in violence between Palestinians and Israelis, with casualties rising to 266 Palestinians and 41 Israelis, representing an 8 and 13 fold increase for each respective population from the first nine months of the year. Over the next several years, violence levels continued to rise: Palestinian casualties rose annually from 402 to 469 to 1032 between 2000 and 2002; Israeli casualties rose from 43 to

192 to 419 during the same period.

Although survey data does not trend exactly with the major events of 2000, they nevertheless provide potentially important information on shifts in Palestinian and Israeli public opinion during that period. The March 1999 survey shows 26.1% of the Palestinian respondents supported suicide bombing against Israel.18 By December 2000 (the next survey that asked the suicide bombing question) the percentage of the Palestinians supporting suicide bombing had jumped dramatically to 66.2%.19 Functioning concurrently with this pattern, the March 1999 survey shows 35.7% Palestinian support for military operations, while the December 2000 survey shows a similar jump to 72.1% support. The events of late 2000 had a converse effect on Pales- tinian optimism about the future, declining from 68% in June 2000 to 48.8% in December, yet

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 18 The average change in support for suicide bombing over the four surveys this question was asked prior to 2000 was 5.2%. 19 Importantly after this dramatic increase, the average between-survey shift in support for suicide bombing varied by an average of 5.9% over the next four surveys starting in December of 2000.

63 falling directly in line with overall relationship between public opinion, casualties, and threat.

For Israelis, there was a general decline in support for the peace process between 1999 and the

2nd Intifada from 62.4 in November 1999 to 52.7 in October 2000 just one month into the violence.

Second Intifada – Cast Lead

Israeli construction of the security barrier in the West Bank on June 23rd, 2002, was an attempt to ensure security for Israelis by any means possible. While the security barrier was believed by some to “undermine the Jewish right to settle anywhere in the land of Israel” (Meital

2006: 180), it was seen (through the actions of Fence for Life) as an “attempt to circumvent the political debate by deliberately avoiding the discussion of withdrawal or stating a position regarding the future of the territories” (Mizrahi et al. 2008: 163). The decline in Palestinian casualties can possibly be attributed to the new lack of mobility and confrontational restriction imposed by the barrier (Appendix 3 shows Palestinian casualties decreasing to 588 in 2003). Optimism decreases slightly among Palestinians around the same time as the barrier extended further into the West Bank, seizing territory and homes, while further dividing Palestinian communities.

Over the next four years Palestinian casualties fluctuated, yet remained substantially higher than the years immediately preceding the 2nd Intifada. As shown in Figure 1 Palestinian casualties increased to 828 in 2004, dropped to 197 in 2005, and then went back up to 662 in

2006, followed by 390 casualties in 2007, and 463 casualties for 2008. According to statistics drawn from survey data, there is fluctuation in Palestinian support for military action for the

2004-2006 period. In November 2003, Ariel Sharon publicly announces his plan for unilateral

Israeli Disengagement from Gaza; in April 2004, Sharon seeks and receives US support in this

64 endeavor; in May 2004, the Likud party rejects the plan; in June 2004, the Israeli Cabinet approves Disengagement Plan; in October 2004 the Knesset endorses the plan. Casualty levels were fairly moderate during this period, however, there are sharp increases between May and

December 2004, associated with Israeli demolition of Palestinian homes and operation Days of

Repentance; Israeli military action was taken in response to multiple suicide attacks and qassam rockets launched from Gaza. In February 2005, the Knesset approves the implementation of disengagement, which was frozen shortly thereafter following a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv that halted withdrawal from Palestinian towns.

While clashes continued through 2005 with a suicide bombing, rocket attacks on Israeli settlements, IDF incursions, and resistance to disengage from Yesha (the settlers' council), Pales- tinian casualty levels decreased drastically as a result of Israeli commitment to the Disengage- ment Plan — triggering controversy and increased division among Israelis — as well as a re- newed IDF strategy of targeted assassinations of terrorist leadership. Effective at midnight on

August 14th, Israelis in Gaza or living in Gaza were required to vacate (Israel MFA 2004; Israel

MFA 2005), otherwise they would be forcibly evacuated by the IDF – some of whom were; mainly the opposition (Yesha) who upheld noncompliance to disengagement. Disengagement of

Gaza was completed on August 22nd, and from Northern Samaria on August 23rd, 2005 (Ibid.).

By September 12th, the disengagement was complete, and all Israelis, including military, had been evacuated from Gaza. Casualties remained fairly low in both the West Bank and Gaza, spiking in Gaza in July 2006 following IDF Operation Summer Rain, a military attempt to sup- press qassam rockets from Gaza into the Negev, and impel the release of Corporal Gilad Shalit, who was kidnapped on June 25th. President Ehud Olmert made it clear that, “The IDF was de- ployed for operational activity against Kassam rocket fire even before Cpl. Shalit’s abduction;

65 the abduction added a dimension that required special attention” (Israel MFA, Cabinet Commu- niqué July 2006). Again in November 2006, casualties soared following IDF Operation Autumn

Clouds, another military response to stop Palestinian rocket attacks into Israel. Casualties dropped in December 2006 and remained low until the first few months of 2007. According to statistics, there is a relative improvement in attitudes in late-2004 through mid-2006, just before

IDF operations began, reflecting a trend that when casualties decrease, attitudes, and optimism for the future adjust accordingly.

It is considerable that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza produced some changes in Palestini- an public opinion. For example between May 2004 and April 2005, Palestinian support for suicide bombing dropped from 62.1% to 49.7%. In a similar manner Palestinian optimism about the future rose from a level of 45.3% as of May 2004, to about 60% by early 200520. After 2005, until the end of the period of analysis, general support for suicide bombing rose slightly (to 55.4% in January 2009 and optimism fluctuated, yet remained fairly stable with 62.6% of the Palestini- an population expressing optimism about the future in November 2008.

Operation Cast Lead

In analyzing correlations between casualties, support for military action, and support for suicide bombings, the period of Operation Cast Lead appears to deviate from the preceding trends – which are quite stable throughout the January 1997 to September 2008 period – presenting a hiccup of disparity in the fluctuation of Palestinian support, specifically for Hamas.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 20 The last IDF troops left Gaza on September 1st 2005, and the settlements were given back to the Palestinians 11 days later. Debates about the Gaza pullout, however, had began years prior to the actual pullout.

66 In the year preceding Cast Lead, there was a rise in casualties beginning in November

2007 and continuing through March 2008, which is attributed to inter-Palestinian violence between Fatah and Hamas, as well as a large scale Israeli raid in Gaza that took place between Feb- ruary and March 2008. Casualties declined following the Israeli incursion, reaching 1 in August

2008 - the lowest point in nearly 10 years (as compared to .75 in December 1999). While the climate of violence improved during this period as a result of sociopolitical advances such as the

Israel-Hamas truce in Gaza and approval by the Israeli cabinet for the release of 200 Palestinian prisoners, between March 2008 and January 2009, support for military operations went up from

49.5% to 53.5%, respectively; support for bombing operations of Israeli civilians increased from

50.7% to 55.4%. In the months preceding Cast Lead, opposition to peace negotiations also rose from 34.7% to 40.9% between September 2008 and January 2009, respectively. Immediately following the surge of casualties from Cast Lead in January 2009, survey reports show a 5% increase in support for military operations (in relation to prior trends); support for suicide bombing surprisingly decreases by 10% in Gaza – which, according to prior trends, would have increased following bouts of violence and increase casualties - and increases by 10% in the West Bank, producing a 5% increase (as the West Bank has twice the number of people as Gaza). This anomaly is attributed to actions and statement by Hamas leadership as well as the overwhelming impact of the media's emotive social governance – in other words, good old-fashioned propaganda.

The responses around armed conflict tend to be more volatile than the responses around optimism; this is speculated to be a direct result of the media's transmission of casualties – a pu- issant factor that can constrain and manipulate leaders. While there was individual Palestinian opposition to Hamas's position with the militarily powerhouse of Israel and its resistive actions

67 therein, this was not a popular sentiment, particularly not one to openly pronounce in the midst of shelling and warfare. The rhetoric of resistance was the instrument manipulated by Hamas to rally and unite Palestinians against what was portrayed as the obviously ruthless and inhumane

Israeli aggressor who attacks without clear objective. While the rest of the world saw a blatant victory by Israel in Gaza (at least militarily), the Palestinians (most) saw themselves as victorious for having not submitted to Israel’s dominant military might.

In a televised speech from Damascus on January 10th, 2009, exiled Hamas leader Khaled

Meshal spoke about a strengthened Palestinian resistance as a byproduct of Israeli aggression, stating, “as long as there is an occupation there is a resistance” (in Associated Free Press 2009).

Meshal’s self-inclusive rhetoric of how “we are living the hardest moments of the resistance now, we want another intifada in Palestine and on the Arab street,” (Al Jazeera 2009) was ultimately unifying (and did not lose him support) — as statistics show — despite his being physi- cally distanced and unaffected by the war from his refuge in Syria. The bottom line, as stated by

Meshal, resonated with Palestinians: “You have lost on the moral and humanitarian fronts ... and you have created a resistance in every house” (Ibid.). Meshal managed to drive the point closer to home for Israelis by stating, “The enemy has failed by creating a real holocaust on the soil of

Gaza,” then claiming (as others had also done) that “Palestinian blood has become a means to win elections,” referencing the upcoming February 10th Israeli elections (Ibid.).

Deputy chair of Hamas’s Political Bureau, Abu Marzouq, expressed similar sentiments about the unintended and antithetical outcome of Israeli aggression, stating, “The Israeli push against Hamas has increased our popularity sharply among the Palestinian people and throughout the Muslim world. After the Israelis killed Hamas leaders like Ahmed Yassin and Ismail Abu

Shanab, Hamas won the elections with 76 seats out of a 132-seat parliament. Using these means

68 doesn't decrease the popularity of Hamas, it increases it” (Bauer 2009). In a speech on January

11th, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert spoke of Israel’s intended goals in the Operation, stating, “Is- rael is approaching these goals, but more patience and determination are required in order to reach these goals in a manner that will change the security reality in the south in a way that will allow our citizens to live in security and stability over a long period of time” (AFP 2009). Con- trarily, when asked about a Hamas victory, Marzouq responded: “A victory for Hamas would mean the Israelis did not accomplish their objectives. If they can't stop rockets from coming into

Israel, that means they failed. But the real reason for Israel's aggression is to change the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip — they have been thinking about this since Hamas won the elections — it is not because of the rockets” (Bauer 2009). Marzouq’s optimistic rhetoric falls in line with that of Meshal and other Hamas leaders who emboldened the Palestinian populace with promises of an unequivocal propitious outcome, regardless of the human and economic toll.

Marzouq contended that Hamas is making it known on behalf of Palestinians that “we will not surrender. We have to fight the Israelis and we will win this battle. We know we are going to lose a lot of people from our side, but we are going to win, inshallah” (Ibid.).

Contrary to popular, or desired (for that matter) media publication, Arab dissent to Ha- mas’s political stratagem was extant, while perhaps not prominent. In an article published in

Lebanon’s Daily Star, Sultan Al-Qassemi does not demur from concealing his sentience, by as- serting that Hamas’s incompetence is part of a greater incompetence characteristic and exclusive to Arab dictators (Al-Qassemi 2009). In an effort to strike down Israel with its “arsenal…of long-range firecrackers,” Al-Qassemi contends that Hamas’ image is what has actually been tarnished, leaving it a failed organization (Ibid.). “It has failed in peace, it has failed in governance, and it is failing in war. In addition to Hamas' ambiguous political agenda, the movement's goal

69 seems to be resistance for the sake of resistance, where it is the journey that ends up being the destination” (Ibid.).

One year after the end of what was internationally seen as an epic failure for Hamas, the prevailing language remained the same. In rallies celebrating Hamas’s victory over Israel, leaders “proudly reminded their supporters of the organization's achievements during the conflict.

For them, the fact that Hamas had stood its ground against the strongest army in the region and continued shooting rockets until the last day of the war was more than enough to declare victory.

Survival was the goal, and it had been achieved” (Harel & Issacharoff 2010). In a reference to the asymmetrical conflict in Gaza, “perception — even marketing — is far more important than results. The images that organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas manage to sell to their publics, to their enemy, and to the international community have a far greater effect than actual events on the battlefield” (Ibid.). Clarity may not be sacrificed entirely as exemplified by Presi- dent Mahmoud Abbas’s announcement on Egyptian television five years after the fact, that “the second intifada was one of our worst mistakes” (as cited by Haaretz 2010). Contrarily, Palestini- an leadership is still reveling in their 2010 victory over Israel.

Shifting Support

In March 2008 and January 2009, JMCC polls asked the question: “If PLC elections were to take place today, which party would you vote for?” Resulting figures show a respective increase in total support for Hamas from 19.3% to 28.6%; contrarily, total support for Fatah respectively decreased from 34% to 27.9%. When broken down between the West Bank and Gaza, polling responses are as follows:

70 Table 3C

West Bank West Bank Gaza Gaza

(Mar 2008) (Jan 2009) (Mar 2008) (Jan 2009) Hamas 17.8% 29% 22.1% 28% Fatah 32.5% 24.5% 36.7% 36.6%

(Source: Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre)

The data show a general decline in support for Fatah, with a jump in support for Hamas from both the West Bank and Gaza. Another poll was taken in June 2009 once the aftermath of Cast

Lead had set in, reflecting drastic drops in support for Hamas and increased support for Fatah.21

Subsequent polls in October 200922 and April 201023 follow a similar trend.

Table 3D

West Bank West Bank West Bank Gaza Gaza Gaza (Jun 2009) (Sep 2009) (Mar 2010) (Jun 2009) (Sep 2009) (Mar 2010) Hamas 13.9% 15.5% 13.5% 27.3% 24.1% 16% Fatah 38.7% 38.3% 38% 38.3% 43% 42.7%

(Source: Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre)

Distinct differences can be seen when comparing Operation Cast Lead and the 2nd Intifada.

Whereas the sheer duration of the 2nd Intifada spanned over four years with periods of extreme violence and periods of relative calm during temporary ceasefires, Cast Lead was short, direct, and fought without relent. Much of Cast Lead was fought at a distance resulting in inequitable

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 21 The question in the June 2009 poll was stated as, “If PLC elections were to take place today, which party would you vote for? Fatah, Hamas, Popular Front, National Initiative, Islamic Jihad, PPP, Democratic Front, or FIDA?” 22 The question in the October 2009 poll was stated as, “If elections were to take place during 2010, which of the following party/faction will you vote for?” 23 The question in the April 2010 poll was stated as, “If elections were to take place during 2010, which of the following parties/factions would you vote for?”

71 infrastructural damage and human loss, while more face-to-face combat and interaction was characteristic of the 2nd Intifada, resulting still in inequitable damages, yet with comparably greater Israeli loss than the former conflict. For Palestinians and Israelis alike, there was no end in sight during the 2nd Intifada, and threat of violence flowed in a continuous stream. Upon Isra- el’s concluding call for a ceasefire on January 18th, 2009, Cast Lead and it’s indicative threat of violence that had been looming over Palestinians and Israelis (primarily only those geographical- ly situated near the border with Gaza) for nearly one month had come to a complete halt. The sudden termination of military operations allowed for immediate reflection on the war without the impending threat of violence.

Surveys are not always conducted directly following incidents of extreme violence, thereby giving time for opinions to possibly shift as the freshness of conflict fades; in other words, media in the post-violence phase acts as a type of control. Following Cast Lead, the

JMCC conducted a public opinion poll between January 29th and 31st, 2009, just 11 days after both Israel and Hamas declare a ceasefire, allowing for an accurate post-war assessment of public opinion. In response to the question: “Now that the Gaza war has ended, who do you think is the winning side? Israel, Hamas, Israel and Hamas or neither Israel nor Hamas?” polling results reflect as astounding difference in the portrayal of Cast Lead by Palestinian leadership (through media sources most read by Palestinians), than in sentiments reflected in public opinion – with a notable disparity between the West Bank and Gaza.

Table 3E

Total West Bank Gaza Israel 9.8% 8.6% 12% Hamas 46.7% 53.3% 35.2% Neither 37.4% 31% 48.4%

(Source: Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre)

72 While it appears as though Hamas is victorious over Israel, even despite the meager 35.2% support from Gaza, the overwhelming response of 48.4% of people who found neither Israel nor

Hamas a winner is paramount.

A study by Gelpi and co-authors on casualty sensitivity in the recent Iraq war found that public measurement of success during wartime is not measured in terms of human loss, but on whether the American coalition abroad was able to gain the support and hearts of the Iraqi people who would therein cooperate with American forces. “Findings suggest that believing the war was the right thing to do combines with expectations of success to determine an individual’s tolerance for the human cost of war. Not only do expectations of success have a larger marginal impact on casualty tolerance, but the public also has remained optimistic about success even though it has been divided regarding the justification for the war” (Gelpi et al. 2005:45). It is also suggested that leadership could be central to the positive relationship between public opinion and the rhetoric of the Bush administration.

The research presented by Gelpi and co-authors draws a parallel with Palestinian public opinion following Operation Cast Lead. While Palestinians in the West Bank felt unity with their people in Gaza during the war, they did not personally see the atrocities around them and experience the atmosphere of fatalities. For this reason 53.3% of people from the West Bank viewed

Hamas as the victor, compared to 35.2% of people from Gaza. Gazans, having lived to see their cities decimated and thousands of their people killed, concluded by 48.4% that there was no winning side to this war.

Shifts in Palestinian and Israeli public opinion continue to reflect dominant events affecting both populations. Though Palestinian optimism about the future was teetering around 62.6% in November 2008, it increased to 68% in June 2009 following President Obama’s speech in Cai-

73 ro, and Netanyahu’s support of the creation of a Palestinian state. Palestinian support for military operations against Israel decreases drastically from 53.3% in January 2009 to 30.3% in Septem- ber 2010 following a period of relative calm. Optimism about the future, at 70.4% in September

2010, drops to 64.2% with support for military operations correspondingly increasing to 37.1% in March 2011 following Israeli attacks on Gaza. Among Israelis, support for the peace process dipped to 44.4 in May 2011 following Nakbah24-day related incidences, increasing again to 49.4 in June.

Threatened Opinion

Change is the fundamental component of public opinion. A multitude of factors can be attributed to peoples’ attitude shifts and outlook towards their society, from a slow month in business, to a growing family, to the desire for sought after change by one’s elected officials.

Health, economy, social status, living conditions, freedom, jingoism, and even racism and bigotry are accountable for changes in public opinion. Below all the stratum of factors however, threat is the core foundation that both reminds and cautions people of their shared humanity, crossing all social boundaries designed for separation, bringing everyone to a level playing field. Under situations of threat, both Israelis and Palestinians have been shown to react and respond in a similar manner. Support for aggressive action against the opponent increases with threat as support for compromised peace negotiations decreases correspondingly. Israeli and Palestinian public opinion is subject to change based on a number of factors relevant to each society, yet the drastic

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 24 Nakba in Arabic means “catastrophe.” While Israelis see 1948 as a war of independence, the Arab population sees it as a nakba that resulted in large-scale displacement and the current plight of Palestinians.

74 fluctuations correlating with threat are indicative of the impact of this stronger domineering force.

75 Figure 1A

76 Figure 1B

77 Figure 1C

78 Figure 1D

79 Figure 2

80 Chapter 4

Political Leadership Under Threat

“Fear is the foundation of most governments.” John Adams

While the subject of political leadership among Israelis and Palestinians rarely generates consensus, these internally divided populations have been inclined, at one time or another, to support leadership they may not entirely favor. Ethnic, national, and confessional conflicts often lead voters to select their second or third-best option. A combination of internal domestic politics and politics toward the conflict makes it nearly impossible for an individual’s viewpoints to con- form to that of dominant political leadership – an obvious trend seen throughout the world, irre- spective of this specific conflict. Nonetheless, individual support for otherwise unlikely leadership has been strengthened in periods of increased threat, among Israelis and Palestinians alike.

Political leaders have modified their platforms, shifting their support for peace and negotiation pending the climate of terrorism and threat. This chapter will discuss threat in relation to the governing organisms/leadership of Israel and Palestine – their respective political leaders and parties – and how this threat affects leadership in terms of their support for, or inhibition of peace and negotiations. The first part of this chapter will begin with a discussion of the dominant Israe- li and Palestinian political parties, followed by an examination of framework in terms of historical context. Part II will analyze Israeli and Palestinian leadership in terms of the impact threat has had on each respective society.

81 Part I

Context of Leadership

Background

Zionism

Despite the divisions that almost seem inherent in the Israeli political system, all parties agree on the need to address the triple axis of political parties: 1. Security & the Peace Process,

2. Socio-Economic Issues, 3. Culture (Filc, discussion 2011). An underlying “given” attribute for any Israeli leader is that she or he be an ardent Zionist. Zionism began as a political movement – not a religious one, contrary to popular belief – and has only changed its colors with the changing perceptions and ideas of Israel’s supporters. Intellectually driven, Zionism initially strove to transform Judaism from a religious to a national identity, emphasizing a push for Jews to return to Zion. The desire for a Jewish homeland morphed into the desire for a Jewish state, and once

Palestine was designated as the target location for what would become Israel, international support began to point in that direction.

While interpretations of Zionism vary in the modern day context, particularly among religious Jewish and Christian factions, the political drive to ensure a home for Jewish people remains constant.25 Ultra-orthodox religious groups combat growing Israeli secularism by demand- ing the necessity of Judaism as the core of the Israeli state. Zionist supporters around the world lobby for a Jewish homeland in Israel and endorse political parties and candidates that promise to carry out this objective at any cost. In today’s Israeli political system, Zionism is defined as the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 25 “Jewish people” can be broken down by religious and ethnic identifications.

82 Jewish right to a homeland in Israel, and leadership acts accordingly with respect to negotiations and relations with its minority populations, particularly the Palestinians.

Since the 1994 election until present, four different political parties have come into power

– government coalitions having been formed of the remaining parties – with the same cast of characters recycled through the system, taking on different positions in different governments, while promoting their own individual teloi. A description of the dominant party positions in the

2009 election, the Israeli political party spectrum, a summary of the dominant Israeli party positions between 1994 and 2011 (Table 4A), and a summary of the Israeli Prime Ministerial and

Legislative elections (Table 4B) can all be found in Appendix 6A.

Islamism

Before examining the relationship between threat and Palestinian leadership, it is important to begin with a brief discussion of Islamist movements, to understand how such movements arose and under what conditions – as these factors often shape the purpose and character of the movements – and to highlight the depth of Fatah/Hamas friction. Ajami contends that Ar- abs have never fully recovered from the 1967 war and are still coping with its consequences; he states that rather than grappling with their problems, people turned to Islam as a clutch and have been caught in what he terms, the Arab Predicament (Ajami 1981). The impact of 1967 combined with tremendous pressures growing throughout the Middle East (corruption, inflation, social disparities), was the perfect fodder on which Islamist movements fed and grew.

Hamas emerged as a powerful response to the first Palestinian Intifada of 1987, primarily due to a change of heart of some Muslim Brothers (Egyptian) who decided to leave their quies- cent stance and embark on a jihad against the Israeli occupier (Kepel 2002). The PLO (Palestine

83 Liberation Organization) was politically strangled by the US and Israel, thus giving rise to and support for Hamas in the occupied territories (OT).26 The PLO’s decision to support Saddam

Hussein in the Gulf War led countries in the Arab peninsula to withhold funds that were to have been given to the PLO for dispersal throughout the OT; allegiances were severed and the PLO lost much of its built-in advantage over Hamas. Through extremist actions, Hamas gained more support as blame was placed on the PLO by Israel, and Israel would retaliate, leading to cyclical violence and the ultimate downfall of the PLO. Hamas was manipulating the structures around them, and in February 1988, the Muslim Brothers publicly acknowledged responsibility for Ha- mas, further strengthening their position. Ironically, Israel assisted in Hamas’s rise by annihilat- ing cells of Islamic Jihad – Hamas’s opponent – in March 1988.

In the 1990’s, tensions grew between Fatah and Hamas when Fatah strongmen cracked down on Islamist movements in the OT; this divide has existed since and has grown larger through the years. Efforts have been made (by international and local actors) to both concretize this separation and to unite the two sides, however the situation persists. Hamas promotes its agenda on three levels: political, private, and social; and their legitimacy strengthens through Is- raeli restrictions in the OT as the Palestinians in Gaza turn to them for support. Like many other

Islamist groups gripped by the ideology of terrorism, so too has Hamas fallen into the terrorist trap (Ibid.). Extremist actions have divided the once unified Hamas into moderate sympathizers and radical activists, leaving all others to the side, and in a dangerous position if they show support for Fatah. Hamas is a member of the Arab League yet it has not signed the Arab Peace Initi- ative, favoring a policy of ambiguity. The Taif Agreement of 1989 called for the disarmament of all national and non-national militias, however neither Hamas nor Fatah have disarmed.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 26 The public also began to support Hamas since it was seen as not being corrupt like the PLO (or as corrupt as the PLO), and it was seen as a stronger challenger towards the Israelis.

84 Palestinian Political Leadership

In following with the guidelines of the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-

Government Arrangements (Oslo) between the PLO and the Israeli government (under Rabin), the Palestinian National Authority (PNA; also referred to as the PA) was created as a transitional interim administrative organization under which final status negotiations would take place. After the formation of the PA, 16 Governorates were established in the West Bank & Gaza Strip (West

Bank: Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Salfit, Hebron, Jericho, Bethlehem, Nablus, Ramallah,

Jerusalem; Gaza Strip: Gaza City, Jabalya, Khan Younis, Deir Al-Balah). All governorates function under the auspices of the Ministry of Local Government and must cooperate with the heads of village and municipal councils, who have a long history in Palestine since the British Mandate period. With the PA in power, municipal and village councils that were limited in authority following the 1967 war, resumed responsibility over local needs such as plumbing and electric, school, and road construction. As outlined in Chapter 3, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were divided into three areas of control:

Area A: Under PA jurisdiction, with security and civilian control. No Israeli settlements are included in this area. Road signs approaching Area A state: “This way leads to Area ‘A’, controlled by the Palestinian Authority. Is- raeli entrance into Area ‘A’ is forbidden, life-endangering, and a crimi- nal offense.”27 IDF does not control this area, however Israel retains control over Palestinian movement.

Area B: Under PA civilian authority, and joint Palestinian and Israeli security control. No Israeli settlements are included in this area.

Area C: Over 60% of the West Bank. Under full Israeli civilian and security control; Israeli settlements are included in this area (United Nations OCHA).

(Israel MFA September 1995)

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 27 Translated by Kohanteb

85 Jurisdiction and authority over these areas have been widely debated, particularly as land is expropriated for further settlement – illegally according to international law.

Since the 1996 elections, the PLO has maintained its central positions on the dominant issues surrounding conflict with the Israelis. These positions according to the Palestinian Aca- demic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) in 2009 are listed located in Ap- pendix 6B (Table 4C). While the PLO has always been seen as an umbrella organization for all other Palestinian organizations, since the Oslo Accords, the PLO has lost increasing support and its development has come to somewhat of a standstill. Taking precedence, the PA’s growing support was influential in marginalizing the PLO. The dominant positions of the primary Pales- tinian factions, and a summary of Palestinian elections between 1996 and 2006 can be found in

Appendix 6B (Tables 4D and 4E, respectively).

Position of the Prime Minister & President

While in most countries the position of the Prime Minister is one that generally carries the greater burden of state affairs, the case is different with the Palestinian National Authority.

The Prime Minister position in the PA was created out of necessity in 2003, after years of Israel and the United States refusing to meet or negotiate with Yasser Arafat. With this new position, the US and Israel would have an acceptable point person with whom to negotiate. The Prime

Minister is responsible for some governmental and administrative affairs, while executive duties are the responsibility of the President of the PNA. A breakdown of Palestinian Prime Ministers can be found in Appendix 6B (Table 4F).

As of 2007, there are two Palestinian Prime Ministers serving. While Fayyad is from the

Third Way party, this dual incumbency is attributed to the ongoing clash between Hamas and

86 Fatah. The Third Way party came about in 2005 as an alternative to Palestinians who had become disillusioned with the Fatah/Hamas dance for dominance. Both Fayyad and Haniyeh claim the Prime Ministership, each vying for control and legitimacy with the Palestinian people and the international community (with particular exceptions).

In Israel, the position of the President largely an apolitical ceremonial role, comparable to other parliamentary democracies. Duties are defined by law, many of which require previous approval or are based on the recommendation of other political bodies. A breakdown of Israeli

Presidents can be found in Appendix 6A (Table 4G).

1996: Israeli Actuating Foundation

For the first time in Israel's short history, on May 29th, 1996, Knesset elections would concurrently take place with Prime Ministerial elections. Accepting inherently fragmented nature of the Knesset, this body resolved to fortify the role of Prime Minister by having a separate direct ballot for this position. With only two candidates in the election, the choices were clear. Begin- ning with his 1952 appointment as Deputy General of the Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres has played an active role in Israeli politics, first as a member of Mapai, then Rafi, followed by the

Alignment, and now Labor. While Peres has been criticized (like all Israeli leaders) for not being sympathetic towards the Arab Palestinians, the weight of such criticisms is subjective when held against other, perhaps less commiserative leaders. After all, Peres' involvement in secret negotiations with Yizhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat resulted in both the Oslo Accords and a Nobel Peace

Prize. Unfortunately the Accords, like the Peace Prize, if not neglected and not preserved, will gather dust and serve only as a shallow reminder of a once notable accomplishment. Peres' vision was long term and advocated Middle East economic integration, believing that, "Ultimately, the

87 Middle East will unite in a common market- after we achieve peace. And the very existence of this common market will foster vital interests in maintaining the peace over the long term" (Peres

& Naor 1993: 99). Following the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November

1995, then Foreign Minister Peres took office as acting Prime Minister, with new elections to be held in May 1996.

After serving as the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations for four years (1984-1988),

Benjamin Netanyahu formally entered the Israeli political sphere in 1988 with his election into the Knesset as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Shortly after becoming chairman of the Likud party in 1993, Netanyahu was elected Likud party candidate for Prime Minister. While Peres played the political game in its standard Israeli fashion, Netanyahu enlisted international support, which among other factors, assisted in increasing his popularity among the Israeli populace.

“Under the leadership of Australian tycoon Joseph Gutnick, and with contributions from tax de- ductible, nonprofit Chabad affiliates in the United States, international members of Chabad suc- cessfully rallied the 1996 campaign around the slogan of ‘Bibi’s good for the Jews’” (Swisher

2004: 7). Numerous estimates have been made as to the exact amount Gutnick ultimately gave to the Netanyahu campaign/Likud, yet all speculations tend to fall in the millions of dollars (Long

2003). To run his campaign, Netanyahu sought the assistance of Arthur Finkelstein, a well- known American republican pollster/strategist whose clientele include American Presidents Nix- on and Reagan and would also include Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Deputy Prime

Minister Avigdor Lieberman. "Finkelstein was largely responsible for the strategy that brought

Benjamin Netanyahu victory in the 1996 general elections, with below-the-belt slogans and negative campaigning” (Shimon 2008).

88 Israeli Platforms & Proposed Principles

With Both Labor and Likud running on platforms of ‘Peace & Security, election results ultimately reflected the equipoise manner in which each man ran his campaign and played to the environment of threat and violence. Peres’ platform was outlined into seven main components:

Peace and the New Middle East; the Security of Israel; Peace Negotiations; Israel and the United

States; Regional Peace; Israel’s International Relations; and Jerusalem (Israel MFA May 1996).

With respect to the key conflicting issues of Palestinians, Jerusalem, and settlements, Peres gave a general outline to the Labor approach to governing Israel. Encompassing a general desire to achieve peace, Peace and the New Middle East highlights the threat of terrorism from Hezbollah,

Hamas, and Islamic Jihad as the “enemy of individual freedom in Israel” (Ibid.). The Labor party intends to continue peace negotiations while “fighting against the remnant of the old Middle

East, the fundamentalist and terrorist forces which seek to destroy the peace process” (Ibid.). In order to preserve the security of Israel, by any means deemed fit by the Israeli government, La- bor will promote international and regional cooperation as exemplified by the summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, and will actively work to prevent the arming of fundamentalist regimes advocating a doctrine of hate. Labor contends to continue peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in order to achieve a long-lasting peace agreement and ultimately strengthen Israel’s security. To reach a final settlement with the Palestinians, the premise for negotiations will be set according to the Oslo Accords: a united Jerusalem under Israeli jurisdiction as the capital of Israel; economic cooperation between Palestinians, Jordan, and Israel; settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem outside of Israel’s borders – no right of return; continued Israeli jurisdiction over most

Israeli settlers; no establishment of new Israeli settlements. Jerusalem, and specific areas sur-

89 rounding the capital city,28 will remain undivided under the sovereignty of the Israeli state; “the government will spare no effort to ensure the personal security of all the people living in Jerusa- lem and the visitors to the city” (Ibid.).

Following Netanyahu’s presentation of the government to the Knesset on June 18th, 1996, the guidelines of the government of Israel – the premises of Netanyahu’s election campaign – were established. Ten key components are identified: Peace, Security and Foreign Relations; Je- rusalem; Religion and State; Immigration and Absorption; Economics and Social Policies; Set- tlement; Status of Women; Quality of Government; Minorities; and Education. It is principally stated:

The government presented to the Knesset will act on the premise that the right of

the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal and indisputable, that the State of

Israel is the State of the Jewish people, whose democratic government guarantees

equality for all its citizens, and whose main goal is the ingathering and integration

of the Jewish people.

The striving for national unity, social justice, and personal liberty, and the search

for genuine peace with all of our neighbors while safeguarding the national and

personal security, shall serve as the basis for Government’s policies. (Israel MFA

June 1996)

With respect to the key conflicting issues of the Palestinians, Jerusalem, and settlements,

Netanyahu gave a general outline of the Likud approach to governing Israel. The Israeli government would negotiate with the Palestinian Authority under the condition that Palestinians fully

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 28 Areas include: Ma’ale Adumim, Giv’at Ze’ev, the Etzion Bloc, and the area northwest of the Dead Sea.

90 comply with their commitments. However, Israel opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state and the right of return for Palestinian refugees to Israel. Israel will remain responsible for the

Jewish settlements and their residents, and will exercise its right to use any force necessary to combat the threat of terrorism. The capital city of Jerusalem will remain undivided and “forever under Israel’s sovereignty,” with freedom of access and worship to holy places assured to people of all religions (Ibid.). Settlement is a national interest and expression of Zionism that is important to Israel’s defense; the Israeli government will counter any attempt made to prevent residents from exercising their rights.

It is evident that what the Israeli public needed was a leader more committed to their protection. While Netanyahu defeated Peres by a margin of .9%, the Labor party controlled the

Knesset with 34 seats to Likud's 32 - a 1.7% margin. In order to form a viable and sustainable government, Netanyahu would need to gain the support of the religious parties. The government could not sustain itself for long and new elections were called for in 1999. While his first term as

Prime Minister was brief, there was sufficient activity in the region to erode Netanyahu’s popularity.

1996: Palestinian Actuating Foundation

The Palestinian political leadership has been anything but stable. Shifting often, and to the detriment of Palestinian people, it does not always work for the people. Of course, one could say something similar regarding Israeli political leadership. January 20th, 1996 marked the historically significant first Palestinian elections. This election was looked on by some with hope, as means of engendering democracy for Palestinians. “Reversing the whole attitude of victimiza- tion,” this election was an opportunity to motivate and activate the Palestinian population (Pales-

91 tinian Council Candidate Hanan Ashrawi). While some people saw this election precipitating democracy, others saw it as a “as a game, manipulated by Israel and the institutionalized Pales- tinian leadership, that would only serve the interests of a small oligarchy within the PLO…the elections would legitimize the power of this group, which would then establish an authoritarian regime prepared to use any means to maintain its power” (As’ad Ghanem 1996: 515).

Arafat won the election with 88.2% of the vote, versus his contender’s 11.5%. It was essentially a matter of course that Arafat would take the Presidency, having already been actively involved in as President of the PLO, then head of the PNA. Samiha Khalil ran on an Independent party line, and her history as a political activist was simply not strong enough to compete.

Tunnel Riots

Following the 1967 war, the Western Wall Tunnel Project was initiated by Israel in an effort to expose parts of the wall that had been hidden, and also to learn about the history behind and within the wall itself. The result was a man-made tunnel stretching along the western portion of the wall. During Peres’ term, proposals were made to continue with efforts to excavate an additional exit out of the tunnels, yet were put on hold on account of the political climate of elections. Picking up where Peres had paused, Netanyahu’s called to reinitiate excavation near the

Strouthion Pool, creating an exit on the Via Dolorosa in the Christian Quarter of the Old City.

Just two and a half hours after approval was granted on September 24th, 1996 the northern exit door was opened. Digging in the tunnels had been an incendiary issue for a long time, as Israel is constantly in search of ancient Jewish heritage and history in the land to buttress the Zionist ar- gument, while Palestinians are anxious of such measures due to the tremendously increased weight Israel would carry with such authentication.

92 While Palestinian riots have generally been attributed to Israel digging the tunnels, animosity and complications were rising months before September arrived. Threats of violence found justifying grounds with the excavation, yet the violence “occurred as a direct result of a determined campaign by the Palestinian Authority to bring out the masses and arouse public fu- ry” (Levin 1996).

Hebron Protocol

In accordance with provisions set forth in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of

September 1995, Israeli chief negotiator, Dan Shomrom, and Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, signed the Hebron Protocol on January 17th, 1997, under the supervision of US negotiator, Den- nis Ross. This agreement detailed the terms of access, security, and responsibility in Hebron.

With this Protocol, IDF troops would be redeployed to Hebron within the coming 10 days. To ensure mutual security, joint security measures were agreed upon, with both sides committing to prevent any type of radical activity that could disrupt the redeployment process, and the agreement therein. In order to monitor Palestinian and Israeli efforts to maintain undisturbed relations in Hebron, and to preserve security, an agreement was signed on January 21st, which permitted

Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), consisting of 180 personnel from Norway,

Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey – with Norway responsible for TIPH activity

(Israel MFA January 1997). Israeli security would be responsible for H-2 and Palestinian security would be responsible for H-1 – with particular joint security measures.

For Arafat, the Protocol represented Israel’s recognition of “land for peace” in Likud’s territorial compromise/concession for a part of the West Bank. For Netanyahu, the Protocol portrayed Israel’s ability to compromise and come to a mutually beneficial agreement with the Pal-

93 estinians. Nonetheless, the Protocol was designed in order to preserve Israel’s dominant position in the “balancing” act. Restrictions were placed on Palestinian police firearms and more pivotal- ly, Palestinian construction. While Palestinian leadership saw the Protocol as an interim step towards future negotiations, Israel had claimed legitimate jurisdiction over settlements and settlers, and had maintained control over holy sites such as the Tomb of the Patriarchs. Though the Pro- tocol was significant in unifying Israelis and Palestinians based on mutual favorability in the agreement, it would ultimately pull both sides irreparably apart in terms of a final-status negotiation. Just two months later on March 17th, following Israel’s plans to expand settlements in the

West Bank, the PLO refused to participate in final status negotiations in an act of defiance for

Israel’s commandeering.

Settlements & Suicide Bombings

Unbeknownst, or all too aware of ensuing repercussions the Netanyahu government approved the construction of 2,500 residential units in the Jebel Abu Ghneim settlement in Arab

East Jerusalem (annexed East Jerusalem) on February 26, as a preliminary phase of construction in Har Homa29 which would eventually yield 6,500 (Israel MFA February 1997). For the Arab population, the first stage of construction was set to yield about 3,000 residential units dispersed throughout 10 different Jerusalem neighborhoods (Ibid.). With the completion of this construction, Israelis would be effectively positioned along the entire perimeter of Jerusalem, excluding the Western portion; East Jerusalem Palestinians would essentially be encircled by Israeli settlements (FMEP 1997). While some held that such development would disconnect East Jerusalem from the West Bank, Netanyahu contended that with the additions to transportation infrastruc-

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 29 Har Homa is the Hebrew name for the same plot of land, meaning Wall Mountain.

94 ture, access to Jerusalem would significantly improve (Israel MFA July 14, 1997). According to

Netanyahu, “Every city is a growing, living tissue. Its a living organism, and we have every right to build in Jerusalem…on land that is primarily private Jewish land” (MFA March 1997).

Netanyahu’s controversial development plan was met with outrage by Palestinians, as this was seen as a blatant breach of previous peace agreements; nevertheless, Arafat had asked his people not to respond with violence. Yet after a year reprieve from suicide attacks, on March

21st, 1997, a suicide bomber detonates an explosive device in the Apropo Café, a Tel Aviv establishment, killing 3 and wounding 48 (Israel MFA, Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks). Having not taken a firm position against Israeli development plans, the Palestinian populace grew ques- tionable of Arafat’s intentions, as his image was willfully tarnished in the eyes of Israel and the

United States (Telhami 1997). “As usual, he [Arafat] seemed incapable of clearly communicating his opposition to terrorism, even though he had been actively working with Israeli security forces to thwart terrorist attacks” (Ibid.). Hamas was quick to claim responsibility, particularly as such terrorist attacks, “serve only to undermine Arafat,” and among Palestinians “who regard such attacks as necessary ‘credit’ Hamas, not Arafat” (Ibid.). Public perceptions could now be exploited by the opposition (Islamic Jihad, Hamas) to portray Arafat’s inadequacy; and as attacks against Israel increased, Israel’s retaliation intensified, undermining and destabilizing Arafat further. The Jerusalem development project and the Tel Aviv suicide attack wholly derailed the

PLO-Israel relationship following the Hebron Protocol. The violence however, undeniably strengthened Netanyahu’s position to build in East Jerusalem.

Just a few months later on July 20th, two Israelis are attacked and beaten by (a) Palestini- an(s) at a construction site in Rishon LeZion – one Israeli dies from his injuries (Rubin and Ru- bin 2008: 212; Israel MFA Major Terror Attacks). On July 30th, two consecutive suicide bomb-

95 ers detonate in Mahane Yehuda marketplace in Jerusalem, killing 16 people, and wounding 178

(Israel MFA, Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks). For the second time in just four months, Ara- fat telephones Netanyahu with his condolences, yet this time, Netanyahu lividly states that he is not satisfied with Arafat’s regret: "You have encouraged the violence and incitement, you have not arrested Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists, and you have not fought the terrorist infrastructure” (Israel MFA July 30, 1997). The Netanyahu government held the Palestinian Authority wholly responsible for the marketplace atrocity. In a Cabinet communiqué in August, Netanyahu laid the success of Oslo on Arafat and the PA, stating that if Arafat succeeds in upholding his portion of the agreement, specifically by fighting terrorism, then the agreement will succeed. Is- rael was now employing different measures in order to pressure the PA to follow through with its commitments. In accordance with a decision made by the Ministerial Committee on Security Af- fairs, Palestinian radio broadcasts would be jammed if they are found to incite or rouse the population (Israel MFA August 1997).

Despite Israel’s hawkish tactics, on September 4th, three Hamas suicide bombers detonat- ed on the Ben Yehuda pedestrian mall, killing five, and wounding 181 (Sheleg 2001). Having not followed through with Israel’s demand to take more aggressive measures against terrorist organizations, and to fulfill the Oslo agreement, the Ministerial Security committee determined in Sep- tember that negotiations regarding the PA’s receipt of additional territory are no longer realistic; the focus should more importantly be placed on reaching a final settlement with the Palestinians that would ensure lasting security (Israel MFA September 1997). Israel’s desired security was again rattled when on November 19th one Israeli was shot and killed in the Old City.

Later that month in Jordan, Israeli Mossad’s attempted assassination of Hamas leader

Khaled Meshal went awry when Meshal’s bodyguards caught and identified the assailants as Is-

96 raeli spies (Frankel 2011). The subsequent public outcry from Jordanians and Palestinians backed Israeli into a corner. In return for the two captured Mossad agents, Israel released Hamas founder and spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, on the condition that he refrain from inciting suicide bombings in Israel. Yassin continued to call for violence (including suicide bombings) against Israel (Plaw 2008).

Growing Israeli Instability & the 1999 Election

Led by host Bill Clinton, the Wye River Memorandum was a measure taken to ensure the implementation of the Interim Agreement of Sept 28, 1995 regarding the West Bank and Gaza

Strip. The Interim Agreement addresses issues of security, redeployment, and reciprocity, and includes a timetable by which each respective side must adhere to. The agreement was signed on

October 23rd, 1998, yet the terms remained unmet up until the outbreak of the second intifada – at which point, they could no longer stand a chance of implementation.

Instability in the Knesset and a dividing coalition ultimately led to the call for early elections in 1999. In the week preceding the election, 3 candidates dropped from the race (including

Knesset member Azmi Bishara, leaving behind only Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud) and Ehud

Barak (One Israel). Years later Bishara was charged with espionage in the Parliament). As chairman of the Labor party (elected in 1996 following Peres defeat) Ehud Barak created the

One Israel party (Labor, Gesher, and Meimad) in an effort to shift the dominant perceptions of

Labor as a secularist party to a party with a more centrist platform. On May 17th, Barak won the election by a landslide of 56.08% to 43.92%, taking not only the Prime Ministership, but also the position of Defense Minister as announced on the July 6th presentation of the Knesset (Israel

97 MFA May 1999; Israel MFA “Ehud Barak”). Following his defeat, Netanyahu announces his temporary retirement from politics.

With the collapse of the Netanyahu government came a freeze in peace negotiations. Bar- ak’s strong line regarding final status agreements sparked outrage among Palestinians. However the Sharm El-Sheikh agreement of September brought together Arafat and Barak and concluded with a shared understanding of the necessity for final status negotiations. On July 27th, 1999 the second time in just one month, Barak and Arafat meet at the Erez crossing, this time, to discuss implementation of the Wye Memorandum. A firm timetable for implementation is debated until

September 4th, when the second Wye Accord is signed in Sharm el-Sheikh. In the proceeding days – in accordance with the newly signed agreement – Israel releases 199 or 350 Palestinian prisoners, Israel transfers 7% of land from Area C to Area B in the West Bank, and the PA gives

Israel the names of 30,000 policemen (Israel MFA July 2002). On October 12th, Barak orders the dismantling of 15 of 42 unauthorized settlements that had been built since the 1998 Wye Accord.

On January 5th, Israel transfers 3% of land from Area C to Area B to the PA, and also 2% of land from area B to Area A (controlled by the PA) (Ibid.). On March 21st, Israel transfers 6.1% of Ar- ea B to Area A; in total, leaving the PA in control of 18.2% of the West Bank (Area A) and in partial control of 21.8% (Area B). On May 15th, the Israeli cabinet approves the transfer of 3 Pal- estinian villages to Area A: Abu Dis, Izariyah, and Sawarah al-Sharquiya; yet after the May 21st attack on Israeli civilians near Jericho, the transfer was suspended.

In an attempt to broker a peace agreement before concluding his second term in office,

President Clinton called for a meeting with Arafat and Barak at Camp David on July 11, 2000.

The summit lasts 15 days and ultimately ends in failure. Both Clinton and Barak blame Arafat for the collapse and not being flexible enough to achieve a mutual peace agreement. Throughout

98 the summit however, both Arafat and Barak were making concessions beyond the acceptable limit of their party, constituency, and the general Israeli and Palestinian populations – concessions of the gravity that have resulted in the assassination of other world leaders, that could jeop- ardize the safety of both Barak and Arafat upon their return home. Yet negotiable concessions were made, whether for the sake of mere discussion or to reach a workable peace agreement.

Talks came to a standstill however, when neither leader was willing to cede on the issue of Jeru- salem.

In the Clinton administration’s final attempt, peace talks are hosted in Washington DC on

September 26, between representative of the Israeli and PA negotiating teams. This time, talks came to an abrupt halt when on September 28, Likud party leader Ariel Sharon boldly proclaimed his territorial freedom in the state of Israel by visiting Haram al-Sharif, the Temple

Mount.30

Second Intifada

The coming years were fraught with violence and attempted negotiations. With Barak in

Israel and Clinton’s term coming to a close in the US, the meeting at Camp David could not have happened any later. In early 2000, the Central Council of the PLO determined to declare statehood by September 13th. Heightened tensions and clashes saw this target date come and go, with no peace agreement, and no Palestinian state

Culpability for the outbreak of the second intifada has been ascribed to the breakdown of

Camp David, and more directly, to both Sharon and Arafat – individually and as a whole. De- spite his attendance at the Camp David Summit with Prime Minister Barak and President Clinton

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 30 For this project, the terms Haram al-Sharif and the Temple Mount will be used interchangeably in consideration of both Jewish and Muslim religious groups.

99 in July 2000, Arafat’s had taken calculated steps in preparation for combat with Israel beginning in early 2000. Heated discussions specifically regarding the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif during Camp David lit the match Arafat had been stoically gripping for years. “By the time of the

Camp David summit, an embryonic division had reportedly been established in Gaza with hun- dreds of Palestinian security operatives having undergone military training in Algeria, Morocco,

Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Pakistan” (Karsh 2003: 179). Palestinian galvanization was the word

– in newspapers, on the radio – inciting people that the time for action and change had come

(Ibid.).

“This is MY Country”31

The issue of whether Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount was an instigating factor of the second intifada is widely debated. Some contend that the outbreak of Palestinian violence was inevitable, that Sharon was simply going for a stroll in his own country – why shouldn’t he be able to visit the Temple Mount? Others find that this was a calculated act of provocation, played out on fomenting frustrations and anger in the Palestinian community. Or, in a climate where the

Israeli public felt betrayed by Barak and his attempted concessions at Camp David, was Sharon simply trying assert himself as a stronghold in order to secure his position in the Knesset’s upcoming elections?

In the midst of intifada violence, President Clinton presented a set of proposals on De- cember 23, 2000 to bridge the quarry between Israelis and Palestinians, including a proposition to essentially divide Jerusalem in half horizontally – above and below ground in the Holy City.

Clinton’s proposals were overwhelmingly rejected.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 31 Ariel Sharon, as quoted in Elusive Peace.

100 Iconic symbols were utilized by both Palestinians and Israelis as a means of solidifying each respective society. On September 30th, a 12 year-old Palestinian boy, Muhammad Jamal al-

Durrah, was killed by IDF gunfire. A cameraman happened to capture footage of Muhammad’s father trying to protect him from the gunfire as they both crouched behind a barrel. Pictures were released showing a frightened father and son, then a severely wounded father grasping his de- ceased son. These images revived Muhammad as a martyr, symbolizing Palestinian paralyzed vulnerability to Israeli strength and force. On October 12th, Palestinian police arrested two IDF soldiers and took them to police headquarters in Ramallah. Shortly after, a Palestinian mob flooded the station, stabbed the soldiers, and hurled one of the dead bodies out of the second floor window. The images of Palestinians beating the dead, mutilated soldiers came to symbolize the Israeli necessity to defend itself against Palestinian barbaric brutality.

Reign of Sharon: 2001 - 2006

On February 6, 2001, among rampant intifada violence, Ariel Sharon was elected leader of Likud with an astounding 62.4% of votes to Barak’s 37.6% (Israel MFA March 2001). It was evident that Barak had lost tremendous support for participating in negotiations with Arafat, the man who was seen by Israelis to have instigated and incited the second Intifada. Sharon’s platform was based on security and the preservation of a Jewish Israeli state. As his first measure of business, Sharon rejected any negotiations with Arafat.

On April 30th, 2001, the Sharm El Sheikh Fact Finding Committee Report (the “Mitchell

Report”) was released, where among numerous recommendations to the Bush Administration, the committee also discussed the basis of provocation of the second Intifada. The report outlined the Israeli government’s assertion that “immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown

101 of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the ‘widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse.’ In this view, Palestinian violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at ‘provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative’” (Mitchell Report 2001: 11). The report concludes that Sharon’s visit, while ill timed and advertently provocative, was not the cause of the second Intifada; the consequences of such a visit should have been foreseen however. Barak was advised of Sharon’s intent to visit the Temple Mount, and perceived this as an “internal political act directed against him by a political opponent, and he declined to prohibit it”

(Ibid., 10).

The period following the initiation of the second Intifada was spate with violent attacks from both Israelis and Palestinians. Retaliatory salvos claimed countless lives in targeted assassinations, suicide bombings, and with average citizens simply taking matters into their own hands – all of which took place under the aegis of the Israeli and Palestinian leadership. Each side cowed to the others’ incendiary attacks in tit for tat requitals, decimating much optimism or hope for negotiation, let alone peace. In September 2001, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was set to meet with Arafat in order to discuss a ceasefire agreement, however the meeting was cancelled by Sharon on the grounds that it would “legitimize Arafat as a ‘good guy’” and give him the

“opportunity to continue terrorist actions without allowing us [Sharon on behalf of Israel] to act against him” (Israel MFA September 2001).

Shortly after on March 31st, 2002, Sharon publicly announced the implementation of Op- eration Defensive Shield – an effort to dismantle terrorist infrastructures in the PA areas:

We must wage an uncompromising fight against this terror, uproot these weeds,

and smash their infrastructure because there is no compromise with terror. It is

102 impossible to compromise with someone who is prepared - like the suicide-

bombers on the streets of Israel's cities and at the World Trade Center in the US -

to die in order to kill innocent civilians, children, women and infants, to die in or-

der to cause fear and terror. (Israel MFA March 2002)

Reigniting the interminable flame of underlying Israeli fear and terror with the speech alone,

Sharon continued to inspirit Israeli unity in his address:

We will wipe out the terrorist infrastructures from their foundations because, in

the end, we know that the only way to reach a cease-fire, negotiations, a settle-

ment, an agreement and peace is if we succeed in eliminating the infrastructure of

terrorism…The situation is not easy, but we have known worse situations than

this, and we overcame them all. This time, as in the past, we will be victorious;

we will win this time, too. When this happens, we will be able to live here togeth-

er in peace. (Ibid.)

Operation Defensive Shield was not merely a valiant attempt for Israel to terminate terrorism, it was more immediately an effort to end the second Intifada. While unsuccessful in ending the second Intifada, Israel did manage to temporarily quiet attacks, yet they left behind a more permanently disgruntled and incensed Palestinian population. With incursions into Bethle- hem, Jenin, Tulkarem, Nablus, and Ramallah, in addition to persistent claims of corruption, Ara- fat had become politically isolated.

Less than two months after Operation Defensive Shield, on June 23rd, 2002, Israel began construction of the security barrier with the intended goal of reducing suicide bombings and violence – which it succeeded in achieving. The “Security Fence,” as dubbed by Israel, is intended

103 to “keep terrorists out of Israeli cities and towns” (Israel MFA November 2003). It was said the fence will not: establish a border of any kind, annex any Palestinian lands to Israel, or prevent

Palestinians from going about their lives – all of which it did (Ibid.).

Following his 2001 victory, Sharon created a coalition that included the Labor party.

However, following budgetary disputes and disagreements on strategies to achieve peace, Labor left the coalition in 2002, leaving Sharon to call for a special election in 2003. On January 23rd,

Sharon was reelected with his new National Unity Government including Likud, Shinui, the Na- tional Religious Party (NRP), the National Union, and Labor. Labor sat on an entirely different spectrum than the NRP when it came down to issues surrounding the conflict. While the NRP opposed a Palestinian state and supported Jewish settlements, Labor wanted immediate peace talks and to dismantle settlements (“Sharon Secures Majority Coalition”). Nonetheless, Labor carried 19 seats to Likud’s 38 in the 16th Knesset.

In 2002, the Quartet (US, EU, UN, Russia) began discussion of a Road Map for Peace as means of resolving conflict between Israelis and Palestinians through the creation of a Palestini- an state. On April 30th, 2003, a “Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solu- tion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” was introduced to the Israeli and Palestinian publics (Is- rael MFA April 2003).

The Road Map was to be achieved in three phases with a given timeline. Phase I stated an end to violence and terror, the normalization of Palestinian life, and building of Palestinian institutions, and was to take place immediately. Phase II was to be transitional, taking place between

June 2003 – December 2003. Lastly and most onerously stymieing, Phase III was to finalize a permanent status agreement to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was to take place between 2004 and 2005. To date, full implementation of Phase I has not been achieved, leaving

104 Israeli leadership with little rationale to pursue the Road Map. After months of continued violence, and Israeli deemed Palestinian noncompliance to the Road Map, Ariel Sharon was ready to move forward in an effort to ensure the security of his country. In a speech on December 18th,

2003, Ariel Sharon gave notice that if the Palestinians choose not to move forward with Phase I of the Road Map, then Israel would be compelled to disengage completely from the Palestinians.

Sharon stated the purpose of the Disengagement Plan as “to reduce terrorism as much as possible, and grant Israeli citizens the maximum level of security.” Bluntly stated, Sharon said, “we are interested in conducting direct negotiations, but do not intend to hold Israeli society hostage in the hands of the Palestinians. I have already said – we will not wait for them indefinitely” (Is- rael MFA December 2003). On June 6th, 2004, the Israeli cabinet approved disengagement, and on October 25th, the Knesset officially endorsed the plan to be completed by August 14th at midnight. Full Israeli civilian evacuation of Gaza was completed on August 22nd, and from the northern West Bank on August 23rd; IDF evacuation of Gaza was completed on September 12th

(Israel MFA August 2005; Israel MFA September 2005).

Sharon had gained a great deal of support from much of the traditionally non-Likud aligned public, in their overall support of disengagement. With a growing Palestinian population, demographic realities had come to the forefront, jeopardizing the existence of a Jewish state, and calling for immediate action to ensure that Jews in Israel continue to outnumber Palestinians.

While the primary public message was one of security and anti-terror, disengagement was a strategic maneuver to secure statehood through demographic gerrymandering. In acting unilaterally however, Sharon incurs a great risk in strengthening extremists (Beilin 2004). “In acting unilaterally, Sharon discounts the value of those Palestinian pragmatists with whom he could have negotiated such a withdrawal. He also proves those extremists right who argued that there was no

105 point in talking to Israel all along; not because Israel would never budge, but because it eventually will without even exacting a price” (Ibid.). According to Likud member Ayoob Kara, “the withdrawal is going to be terrible for Israeli security. Hamas is going to become dominant as soon as Israel leaves Gaza, and they will use the land to stage more attacks against Israel” (Klein

2005). Among those who oppose disengagement from the political left, many support a negotiated settlement and see Israel’s unilateral actions as inhibiting future brokering with Palestinians.

The religious right views Gaza as a part of Biblical Israel, and therefore disengagement is a counterproductive obstruction to the belief in a Greater Israel.

While Hamas and Islamic Jihad exhibit a harsh line in terms of detoxifying Palestine from Israelis, Abbas viewed the withdrawal as an opportunity for the international community to see that Palestinians are capable of governing themselves. Viewing Israeli disengagement from

Gaza as a positive primary step towards future agreements/Israeli concessions, Abbas looked upon the plan with slight trepidation, knowing nothing is final until the last soldiers have evacuated

Palestinian land. “The Israelis are still occupying out land. The road is still long ahead” (“Abbas

Calls”).

Needless to say, withdrawal created deep divisions in Likud, ultimately leading to Sha- ron’s departure from the party, and the creation of Kadima. On November 21st, 2005, Sharon met with President Katsav to seek his approval to dissolve the Knesset and hold new elections as leader of a “national liberal party” (Israel MFA November 2005). Just a few days later on the morning of the 24th, Sharon registers the newly created Kadima (Hebrew for “Forward”). Fol- lowing years of Labor-Likud election face-offs, Kadima offered a middle ground between the increasingly left leaning left, and the settlement supportive religious right.

106 However, with relations with the Palestinians apparently going nowhere, a majori-

ty of Israelis backed Sharon but told pollsters they were increasingly disenchanted

with both Labor and Likud. Among those disenchanted voters are more than 1

million Russian Jews who have immigrated to Israel in the past few years. Con-

servative, they have voted with Sharon but dislike the Orthodox and settlers, who

they feel get too many undeserved government benefits. Because the Russian

Jews have just fled socialism in Russia, they are not comfortable with Labor, es-

pecially Labor's new leader, Amir Peretz. Peretz, a self-described socialist known

for his fiery rhetoric and class-warfare style, has promised to take Labor back to

its socialist roots. (“Sharon Names”)

Significant Passings

The coming years were characterized by a dietary barrage of attacks and counterattacks, attempts at ceasefires, and failures. Both Israeli and Palestinian leadership firmly adhered the social glue necessary to maintain control of their respective societies – to maintain their control.

In a targeting assassination by the IDF, Hamas leader and co-founder, Abdel Aziz Rantisi was killed on April 17th, 2004, marking the second assassination of a Hamas in less than a month, following the March 22nd, attack on Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. After suddenly falling ill in late Oc- tober 2004, Yasser Arafat succumbed to a coma and passed away on November 11th. For Pales- tinians, the death of Arafat was a tremendous loss, but also the end of an era. Cabinet member

Saeb Erekat, noted on Arafat’s passing:

Arafat's legacy will be the one, the leader, the president who united the Palestini-

an people, the leader who kept the Palestinian national identity from extinction,

107 the man who initiated the peace of the brave, the man who united the Palestinian

people and it's his legacy of peace. It's the determination today that we continue

the path of freedom and independence and peace, the path of an independent Pal-

estinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. (“Arafat’s Death”)

Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s was calculatedly precise in his missive:

The recent events could be a historic turning point for the Middle East. Israel is a

country that seeks peace and will continue its efforts to reach a peace deal with

the Palestinians without delay. (Ibid.)

Soon after the formation of his new party, on January 4th, 2006, Sharon suffered his second stroke in less than one month, causing a severe brain hemorrhage, and leaving him incapac- itated to carry out his political post. Assuming the duty of acting Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert soon after took the Prime Ministership with Kadima’s victory in 2006. While Kadima supports negotiations with Palestinians, the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian legislative elections on

January 25th, 2006 immediately constrained negotiations with Israel’s refusal to pursue talks with what they considers to be a “terrorist organization,” Hamas.

Palestinian Elections 2005 & 2006

While elections were scheduled to take place in 2000, the outbreak of the second Intifada, followed by the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004 delayed the elections until January 9th, 2005. The campaign itself faced many difficulties with Israel’s increased presence. Particular candidates were restricted from entering East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, and on the day of election, access to some polling stations was hindered and delayed by roadblocks. Israel’s

108 publicly stated support for the Palestinian elections did not manifest. In trip summary of former

President Jimmy Carter’s visit during election time, Carter reflects on a conversation with Prime

Minister Sharon, where “he promised that the Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza would be manned by soldiers but would not impede traffic, and that military forces would be withdrawn from the major cities during the election period” (Carter 2005). Carter continued to describe the issues facing voters in East Jerusalem:

Of the 150,000 eligible voters living in the city, less than 6,000 would be permit-

ted to vote near their homes, and only in five post offices (some quite tiny), where

Israelis could claim that the ballots were being mailed outside.

Approximately 120,000 others were expected to leave the city and cast their bal-

lots in 12 neighboring communities. Justified or not, all of them had been intimi-

dated by fear that they would lose their dwelling rights, so that many were afraid

to vote. (Ibid.)

Apart from Hamas’s boycott of the election, there was still significant voter turnout for

Mahmoud Abbas to win the Presidency by 62.52%, to Barghouti’s 19.48% (CEC). Municipal elections were also held this year, resulting in unanticipated success for Hamas.

Following a ten-year delay, in 2006 the first elections to the PLC took place since 1996

(other than the 2005 Presidential election). Prior to the 2006 election, Fatah was in primary control of the PLC with 68 of the 88 seats. However, after 10 years of Fatah and deteriorating conditions for Palestinians, a change was vital. According to Palestinians, “rampant corruption, nepo- tism and mismanagement are the main factors in the draining away of support from Fatah”

(McGreal 2006). Frustrations generally reserved for Israelis were now directed towards Fatah –

109 and in enters Hamas. No atrocious track record like Fatah, and a possible beacon of hope in a demoralized time of economic hardship and defeat from the Intifada. For some, Hamas poses the same predicament as Fatah – a leader is a leader is a leader. Period. Additionally, the election of

Hamas almost guarantees no peace agreement with Israel as Hamas refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist. So which is the preferable handicap? On January 26th, Hamas won the legislative elections by a majority of 74 seats to Fatah’s 45 (in the new 132 seat legislature). Amid the violent clashes that ensued shortly after the elections, on May 25th, 2006, Abbas calls for Hamas to accept plans for a Palestinian state alongside Israel in ten days, or otherwise face a referendum

(“Abbas Gives Hamas 10 Days to Accept Israel”). Clashes continued.

Gilad

On June 25th, 2006 Palestinians who crossed into Israel from Gaza attacked an IDF army post and kidnapped IDF corporal Gilad Shalit. Israel immediately expanded its military operations in Gaza in an effort to rescue Shalit and stop the firing of Qassam rockets from Gaza into

Israel. While Israeli public opinion still remains divided on how to negotiate with Hamas over the kidnapping, Olmert and his successors have, for the most part, left the issue as is to not disrupt the status quo. As a whole, Gilad Shalit has become a symbolic figure for Israelis, representing strength and perseverance against their outside aggressors. Israeli leadership frequently men- tions his name in order to evoke sentiments of unity and a common struggle among the public.

Following his return to Israel in the first phase of the prisoner exchange agreement on October

18th, 2011, the icon of “Gilad” is summoned by Israeli leaders in a manner similar to that of the

Holocaust in that “never again” will this happen; Israel will fortify its security further to ensure the safety of all its soldiers so another “Gilad” won’t happen again.

110 Lebanon War

Shortly after Olmert took office, a Hezbollah attack on July 12th, 2006 at the Israel-

Lebanon border resulted in the death of eight IDF soldiers and the kidnapping of two soldiers – the casus belli for the second Lebanon war. In a July 17th address to the Knesset, Olmert stated:

“On the Palestinian front, we will conduct a tireless battle until terror ceases, Gilad Shalit is returned home safely and the shooting of Qassam missiles stops. And in Lebanon, we will insist on compliance with the terms stipulated by the international community” (Israel MFA July 2006).

With the passing of UN Resolution 1701 on August 11th, Israel withdrew its troops from Leba- non and a ceasefire was called shortly after on August 14th. One cannot forget the “special power of metaphor to ‘create social reality’” and essentially transform horrific acts into commonplace occurrences – basic everyday activity (Gavriely-Nuri 2009: 165). One such metaphor utilized by leadership during the 2006 Lebanon war referred to “‘surgical strikes’ – precise, well planned and causing minimal peripheral damage. This metaphor was extensively used for local consump- tion but also as part of Israel’s response to the international criticism directed against its massive destruction of civilian property and infrastructure in South Lebanon” (Ibid.: 164). Despite rhetoric used by leadership to justify incursions into Lebanon, Israeli opposition to the Olmert-led in- vasion of Lebanon was no secret; and just a few short, yet violent, months after taking over,

Olmert was losing support from 35% in March to 11% in August 2006.

Palestinian Civil War

The United States has been providing financial aid to the Palestinians for years, yet just before the 2006 elections (Sharp & Blanchard 2006), this aid coming through the United States

Agency for International Development (USAID) was not going towards education or infrastruc-

111 ture, but to assist in Abbas’s election. Following Hamas’s victory, the US worked with Israel and

Fatah, indirectly taking action to remove Hamas from power. The divisions between Fatah and

Hamas shifted the focus from issues with Israel to issues dividing Palestinians. Beginning shortly after the 2006 elections, factional violence broke out between Fatah and Hamas, lasting through the spring of 2007. Experiencing a brief hiatus at the urging and assistance of Egypt in mid-May, the ceasefire was short lived, and political and military infighting escalated to what became the

Palestinian civil war.

On June 7th, 2007 Hamas initiated a military assault in effort to take over Gaza. In just six days, Gaza had come under full Hamas control. Trained and armed by the US (among other western nations), Fatah troops were ill prepared to face the tactics of Hamas. With Hamas in Ga- za, Finance Minister Salaam Fayyad was immediately appointed by Abbas to lead an emergency government in the West Bank. At this point, Hamas was “too strong and embedded, Fatah too fragmented and enfeebled, and the emergency government lacking in meaningful control in the

Israeli-occupied West Bank” (“Hamas Coup in Gaza”). In the proceeding years, the situation in

Gaza disintegrated to a nadir. Between Hamas’s tight grip and Israel’s ban on exports to Gaza, many people in Gaza were struggling to get by, placing a great deal of blame on Hamas and Fa- tah’s internal quarrel, and of course on Israel.

The months following the Battle of Gaza were distressfully straining for Fatah in the

West Bank. Abbas and Fayyad struggled to save face, however, the echoes of Fatah’s defeat pierced through residual waves of support from the Palestinian public. Threats from Gaza were endless; threats on Fatah were penetrating. Disconcerting snippets such as, “In the autumn, the leaves fall, and Abbas will fall,” likely had a greater impact on the Palestinian public in the West

Bank than on Abbas himself (Nizar Rayan in “Palestinian Officers”). Once it was apparent that

112 supporting Fatah would be favorable for the US and Israel in terms of reaching a peace deal through Abbas, a flood of international aid – monetary and armaments – came pouring into the

West Bank.

For the Israelis, a crackdown on terrorist cells has been a solid prerequisite to negotiations with the Palestinians. While Israelis have demanded the PA take the responsibility to elimi- nate these factions, the PA has placed blame on Israelis for hindering their ability to eradicate terrorism. With adversarial and combatant Fatah and Hamas, and “with a clear interest in neutral- izing Hamas, the PA accomplished what it always insisted it could not: an effective clampdown on terrorist operatives within its jurisdiction” (Schanzer 2008: 125).

As violence escalated further, Israeli leaders began brainstorming that a full-scale operation on Hamas strongholds in Gaza would be the only way to overtake Gaza and quell the rocket- fire. For Israeli leaders, such an operation was in its best interest – in its primary interest – and there was no doubt that Israel had the military capabilities to overcome Gaza. For Hamas, no international nudging could steer them away from what was now an inevitable war with Israel.

Cast Lead

Following devastation by Qassam rockets in the North of Israel, Olmert strengthened his line towards Hamas and the Palestinians, stating that he can no longer show restraint as Israel continues to be attacked (Israel MFA May 2007). On December 25th, in an interview with al-

Arabiya, Prime Minister Olmert implored Palestinians not to support Hamas, stating that Israel desires peace yet will be compelled to use force (Israel MFA December 25, 2008). After eight months of attacks, (faux) agreements, and counter attacks with Hamas in Gaza, on December

27th, 2008, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead with the following goals: “1) To stop the bom-

113 bardment of Israeli civilians by destroying Hamas' mortar and rocket launching apparatus and infrastructure; 2) To reduce the ability of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza to per- petrate future attacks against the civilian population in Israel” (Israel MFA, Gaza Facts…”). In a press briefing on the Operation, Olmert called for the unification of the entire Israeli public, expressing the support and unification of the opposition (Benjamin Netanyahu, Avigdor Lieber- man, and Haim Oron) (Israel MFA December 27, 2008). Following 22 days of what has been recognized as the most destructive incursion by Israel, a ceasefire was called for and accepted by

Hamas and Israeli on January 18th, 2009.

Shifting support of leadership during Cast Lead (as discussed in Chapter 3) can be attributed to both the success of leadership, as well as the ceasefire. While it is not definitive why there was a sudden drop in support for Hamas and an increase in support for Fatah, there is a strong connection between the actual success of leadership and the public’s perception of this success, and thereby their support. Additionally, the implementation of the ceasefire could have had an impact on the public’s altered perception towards its leadership. To a degree, this shift in support may be a result that cannot be singularly identified, but more clearly understood in the context of an interplay between multiple factors.

Netanyahu Round 2: 2009

Following much investigation on account of corruption, on July 30th 2008, Olmert publi- cally announced his decision not to run in the Kadima primaries, and resignation from his post as

Prime Minister once a new party chairman is elected. On September 18th 2008, Tzipi Livni was elected head of Kadima, and just a few days later on the 22nd, Olmert submitted his letter of resignation to President Peres. Since Livni was unable to form a coalition government in the six

114 weeks allotted early elections took place on February 10th. While Livni won the majority of votes

(in a very close race), she was once again unable to form a coalition, thereby resulting in Netan- yahu’s victory.

In a 2009 speech at Bar Ilan Univeristy, Netanyahu passionately proclaimed his vision of peace as one where Israelis and Palestinians live alongside one another – freely – each with their own government and respective nationalistic symbols (flag, national anthem) (Israel MFA June

2009). He confirmed that there is no intention to build new settlements or seize additional land to expand existing settlements. Netanyahu also outlined several principles to achieving this peace:

1) Palestinian recognition of Israel; 2) Palestinian demilitarization; 3) Ensuring Israeli security through defensible borders; 4) A united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (Ibid.). Once these goals are met, then discussions can open for a future agreement regarding a demilitarized Pales- tinian state. Israeli reactions were mixed, while the general Palestinian response was clear, as asserted by senior Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, "Netanyahu's speech closed the door to permanent status negotiations” (“Palestinians Reject Israeli Terms”).

Moving Forward

Despite his apprehensions one-year prior, upon the completion of his presidency in Janu- ary 2009, Abbas decided to extend his term for one more year. Disputing the Fatah Presidency of

Abbas, Hamas appointed PLC Speaker, Abdel Aziz Duweik, to the Presidency. Neither Duweik nor Abbas are individually recognized a legitimate President by many Palestinians, both in the

West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The status of future elections is unclear. According to Fatah, elections were to take place on January 24th, 2010 (based on the Palestinian Election Law); if the presidency expires prior to

115 new elections, the position is temporarily given to the PLC Speaker, who in this case, would be a member of Hamas. Rejecting Abbas’s legitimacy as President of the Palestinians, Hamas’s inte- rior ministry stated the election had been called "by figures who do not have the right to declare it" (“Hamas ‘Bans’ January Polls in Gaza”). Ministry spokesman Ehad Al-Ghsain stated that

“Gazan officials had been instructed not to co-operate with Abbas’s efforts to stage the vote.

‘Any preparations, any committees, any collecting of names will be regarded as an illegal action that we will pursue’” (Ibid.).

In the past, scheduled negotiations and talks between Israel and Hamas have been abort- ed; Hamas refuses to recognize Israel, therefore Israel refuses to meet, and communication carries on through violence as a means of conveying each one’s objectives. On countless occasions,

Israel has tried to control and crush Hamas through manipulative tactics, specifically targeted assassinations aimed to wipe out the leadership (among the assassinated include: Sheikh Ahmed

Yassin, Nizar Rayan, and Abdel Rantisi). Operation Cast Led was a clear attempt by Israel to wipe Hamas out of existence, through targeted assassinations, destruction, and demolition of the tunnel system used by Gazans and Hamas to import goods (food, water, medical aid, weaponry) into the quarantined region. Gaza continues to suffer from inaccessibility to basic goods, and

Hamas has remained in power – to the satisfaction of some and dismay of others.

No Access

On May 31st, 2010, IDF soldiers intercepted six ships heading towards the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza. The flotilla was said to be carrying humanitarian aid and construction materi- als to Gaza. Netanyahu dubbed the flotilla incident an “international provocation,” stating the sixth ship (the only one that had not changed course following IDF warnings) had “a premeditat-

116 ed plan to harm IDF soldiers” (Israel MFA May 2010). There have been numerous efforts to send ships carrying aid to Gaza, however Israel remains reluctant, prioritizing state security above all else, and does not give coastal access to these groups.

In September, the Israeli moratorium on settlement expired, and despite tremendous international pressure, particularly by the United States, Israel did not renew the freeze on building settlements in the West Bank. Peace talks had just resumed between the PA and Israel, yet Isra- el’s inaction regarding the freeze cut all dialogue short. Not long after the expiration of the 10- month moratorium, Israel began its construction. While Netanyahu clarified that no more land will be expropriated for new settlements, to expand current settlements and allow for increasing numbers of people, Israel is required to push the peripheries of existing settlements, thereby cut- ting in, through, and around Palestinian villages. In a December 1st speech to the Knesset, Net- anyahu asks a rhetorical question as to why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not being resolved.

Firstly, Netanyahu identifies Hamas as the metastasis grown by Iran that is impeding the peace process. Then, Netanyahu states, “Israel is not the side that does not want to advance peace negotiations and it is the PA who has real obstructions preventing them from making the moves…We are trying to advance peace in various ways, we are making attempts to advance the political process…” (Israel MFA December 2010). The definition of ‘obstruction’ is herein debatable. It is obvious the Palestinians find the construction of settlements both a physical and metaphorical obstruction, while the Israeli leadership under Netanyahu contends the obstruction to be the PA’s impotence in communicating to the Palestinian people the need for a real compromise (Ibid.).

Palestine Papers

In January 2011, the Al-Jazeera Transparency Unit and The Guardian simultaneously re-

117 leased 1,684 files detailing the diplomatic correspondences and inner-workings of the Israeli-

Palestinian peace process, known as, the Palestine Papers. While Al Jazeera did not reveal how they came across accessing this information, the files dating back to 1999 shined light on many issues such as the PA’s willingness to compromise Haram al-Sharif and Israeli settlements in

East Jerusalem, as well as private discussions between high-level US officials, PA members, and

Israelis. Al Jazeera openly stated that is their intention to inform people and initiate a discussion on these issues, believing that “this material will prove of inestimable value to journalists, scholars, historians, policymakers, and the general public” (“Introducing the Palestine”).

Palestinian reactions to the leak were universally negative. Having played a dominant role in negotiations over the years, chief negotiator Saeb Erekat had much at stake with the release of these Papers, including his safety. Erekat referred to the documents as an inaccurate

“bunch of lies,” stating that he was misquoted and that his words were not represented in their original context (McGreal 2011). With the source of the leak under investigation, Erekat said he would resign if the leak was found to have come from his office, the Negotiation Support Unit.

The internal investigation concluded the leek did in fact come from Erekat’s office; taking responsibility for the theft of these documents from his office, Erekat announced his resignation on

February 12 (“Erekat Quits”).

Israeli leadership did not hesitate to utilize this opportunity to play on Israeli biases. Fol- lowing the leak concerning Olmert and Livni’s concessions in negotiation, Foreign Minister

Lieberman stated, "Even the most left-wing government of Olmert and Livni did not manage to reach a peace agreement, despite the many concessions…the documents prove that if even

Olmert and Livni couldn't reach a compromise with the Palestinians, everyone will eventually see that the only solution is a long-term interim agreement” (“Liberman Leaked”).

118 According to Stephen Walt, the Palestine Papers clearly showed the PA leadership working towards a desired peace, putting to rest the notion that Israel has no “partner for peace.” The

Papers expose the “bipartisan and binational strategy that Israel and the United States have followed under both Bush and Obama: to keep putting pressure on the Palestinians to cut a one- sided deal.” Walt continues to state that George Mitchell was “leaning on the Palestinians to get back to the table, to accept a less-than-complete settlement freeze, etc., yet there's no hint of any pressure on the Israeli side” (Walt 2011).

Independence: Israel or Palestine?

In January 2011, Ehud Barak broke off from the Labor and established the Independence party with several MKs, marking a “fresh” page in Israeli political leadership. Palestinian leadership refuses to pursue talks with Israel amid continued construction of settlements in the West

Bank, and Israeli leadership continues to insist that the PA is being unreasonable in their lack of desire to pursue peace talks. With the PA’s intent to declare Palestinian statehood at the Septem- ber 2011 meeting of the United Nations, this cycle may come to an end. While Erekat claims "It is time for the international community to support the Palestinian plan to obtain membership for the state of Palestine on the 1967 borders because this approach will preserve the peace process and the two-state solution," (“Abbas Vows”) Netanyahu maintains that “The Palestinian attempt to impose a settlement through the United Nations will not bring peace. It should be forcefully opposed by all those who want to see this conflict end” (Israel MFA May 2011).

With deep divisions already separating Palestinian and Israeli leadership from reaching a viable solution for peace, the Fatah/Hamas rivalry only weakened the Palestinian position – among themselves, and also with the international community. After years of friction, the detri-

119 mental divide was finally came to an agreement, which was signed on May 4th, 2011 – in Cairo under the auspices of Egyptian mediation. Abbas and Meshal concluded to hold elections in one year, and in the interim period, they would form a transitional government. In the meantime,

Hamas would control security in Gaza, and the PA would continue to control the West Bank.

This agreement meant Hamas would be under the umbrella of the PLO – making it nearly impossible for Israeli leadership to negotiate with Palestinians due to Hamas’ refusal to recognize Isra- el. While talks were held in June 2011 to create a Palestinian unity government, these negotiations came to a standstill when a dispute arose over who would become Prime Minister. The situation for now remains inconclusive.

Part II

Analysis of Threat

The previously outlined context of political leadership helps paint a picture of the impact threat has had on both Israelis and Palestinians. To reiterate, individual support for otherwise unlikely leadership is increased during periods of increased threat. Additionally, political leadership has taken necessary measures by shifting their support for peace and negotiation based on the climate of threat.

The following section presents statistical representations and analysis of support for leadership, specifically highlighting the previously mentioned key points in Israeli and Palestinian history, such as: the Oslo period, the second Intifada, Israeli disengagement from Gaza, Opera- tion Cast Lead, assassinations, elections, and violent incursions. The data for Palestinians comes

120 from surveys collected by the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre (JMCC),32 and data for Israelis comes from surveys collected by the Dahaf Institute in conjunction with Ynet.33 The question asked of the sample Palestinian population was: Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust the most?34 In terms of this study, assessing Palestinian support for leadership, the term “trust” is used synonymously with “support.” The question asked of the sample

Israeli population was: “If elections were held today who would you vote for PM?35 The resulting outcome shows the ebb and flow of support for both Palestinian and Israeli leadership, moving with the tide of threat and casualties.

Political leadership, as previously mentioned, is used to reference both political parties and leaders. For the Palestinian population, political parties are used as a measure of support for political leadership. While many leaders come and go, the party lines remain consistent and show a greater consistency of support than Palestinian political leaders. For the Israeli population, political leaders are used as a measure of support for political leadership. Unlike Palestine, Israeli political parties are not as cut and dry. The system of coalitions and frequency of party divisions creates inconsistency in this variable and it is an unreliable measure. Nearly the same cast of Is- raeli leaders has dominated politics since 1994 (and even earlier), each representing more clearly defined objectives than the political parties. Additionally, a leader’s personal history of involvement in the conflict and contribution to its resolution forges a connection between citizen and leader, whereby the citizen identifies with the leader and shares her/his visions for the future.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 32 Survey Data in Appendix 1e and 1e-i. 33 Survey Data in Appendix 4. 34 Questions were presented in several forms: 1) Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? 2) Which political or religious party do you trust most? 3) Which Palestinian Faction do you trust the most? 35 Variations of this question were asked in reference to political parties and political leaders; these can be found in Appendix 4.

121 A notable difference between Israeli and Palestinian political leadership pivots directly around the function and proximity of the conflict in each society. In Palestinian society, the conflict is generally at the forefront of politics, pervading other issues and public concerns. While

Palestinian leadership still devotes itself to the development and progression of Palestinian society, it is viewed that the resolution of the conflict will allow for appropriate attention to be devot- ed to other pressing issues. For example, resolution of the conflict will allow for easier transit without checkpoints – an enormous impediment to daily Palestinian life – allowing the attention once given to the conflict to be directed towards the concerns of a growing society, such as schools, hospitals, etc. In Israel, other matters can override concerns with the conflict, as people are not directly affected by conflict-related issues, let alone on a daily basis. For example, if someone is living in Tel Aviv or Haifa, they will likely be more concerned with the cost of rising rent and increase of unaffordable housing than the conflict.

The manner in which the conflict is focalized among Palestinians and Israelis is vastly different, with Palestinians remaining more consistent, and Israelis shifting the attention given to the conflict based on the climate of threat. According to the office of the Palestinian National

Authority, the Government Plan generally encompasses two main points: 1. Ending the Occupa- tion, Establishing the State, and 2. Palestine: Moving Forward, Priority Interventions (Palestinian

National…). Comparatively, the Israeli government has far more issues filling its agenda, including, yet by no means centering solely on the conflict. Other than a few political parties advocating policies affecting only minorities of society (such as the Pensioner’s Party and Green Leaf),

Israeli political parties tend to all address the dominant social issues of economy, healthcare, etc. in a similar manner. Specific political leaders speak out about the conflict, respond to aggression, and voice decisions regarding military incursions. While political leaders (specifically the Prime

122 Minister) represent the political party, they have often taken the liberty of holding opposing positions and have acted accordingly. When leaders take such actions, this often breaks up a coalition, and can thereby lead to a party losing dominant support in the government. Meanwhile, the public is aware of these breakdowns, and their perceptions of the leader are determined by her/his actions and the repercussions therein.

Confrontation vs. Negotiation

While it is difficult – let alone controversial among many – to create such dichotomies as

‘confrontation’ and ‘negotiation,’ separation of political leadership based on these lines most logically distinguishes existing divisions. Differentiating those who are more willing to turn to negotiation tactics from those who are quicker to pull the trigger is essential as this division is reflected in public discourse and thereby influences public opinion. At various points of time, a confrontation-oriented party may decide to sit at the negotiation table, and visa versa, however for the most part, people tend to stay true to their colors throughout their time in politics. More significantly, the public’s perception of their leadership tends to stay the same, even if a leader takes minor measures in favor of the opposing team. This perception is only subject to change if there is a drastic shift in party line or compromise towards the conflict, which would alter public discourse, opinion, and perception. The division of confrontation and negotiation was made based on the dominant overall position of the leadership for the period of this study. A breakdown of Palestinian political parties and Israeli political leaders according to their position as being confrontation or negotiation-oriented can be found in Appendix 6C.

In only one instance has a confrontation-oriented leader completely changed positions, advocating more negotiation-oriented measures and pursuing policies originally supported by his

123 opposition. Ariel Sharon, originally seen as a hardline politician supporting stringent initiatives with respect to the Palestinians, made a complete 180 with his proposal for Israeli disengagement from Gaza, and his subsequent founding of the Kadima party. Between Sharon’s announcement of intent to disengage in November 2003 until the implementation of the plan on August 14,

2005, public criticism and endorsement of the withdrawal fluctuated heavily, yet general support throughout erred in favor of Sharon, only increasing further during this period (Appendix 4).

Two polls were conducted during this period, one in September 2004 and another in August

2005. In the data analysis, Ariel Sharon was still considered as confrontation during the Septem- ber 2004 poll and only switched to negotiation in the August 2005 poll. While plans for disengagement were under way during the period of the first poll, Sharon called for the launching of

Operation Day of Repentance (beginning in late September 2004), affirming his position as a confrontation-oriented leader. From the perspective of the Israeli public, discussions of negotiation and potential plans to take progressive measures are simply words that carry no weight since they are generally never followed through with. Sharon’s lean towards negotiation tactics was only realized as disengagement time drew near and actually took effect – when words became actions.

The public’s consideration of Sharon as a negotiation-oriented leader can also be seen when comparing the two questions asked in the August 2005 poll:

Who would you like to be the next PM? Should Sharon retire, who would you Sharon 24% like to be the next PM? Peres 16% Peres 43% Netanyahu 16% Netanyahu 35% Landau 8% Neither 22%

(Source: Ynet/Dahaf Institute)

124 The first question shows that as full Israeli disengagement from Gaza was nearly complete, Sha- ron’s support exceeds both confrontation-oriented leaders, Netanyahu and Landau; Sharon’s support also exceeds negotiation-oriented leader Peres. The second question shows that if Sharon was not a candidate for PM, the greater support would transfer to another negotiation-oriented leader, Peres, with Netanyahu trailing behind. This supports the contention that Sharon had come to be seen as playing on the same field as other negotiation-oriented leaders. Shortly after the completion of disengagement, Sharon and other moderate Likud members created Kadima as a center-liberal political party. Support for negotiation-oriented leaders had been on the rise and increased further as Kadima came into office in 2006 (Figure 4A).

In terms of the public’s support of political leadership, the theory of “Success Matters” holds strong (Gelpi et. al. 2005). If a leader is in office and there is violent action taken against that population, then the public’s support for this leader tends to decrease. The idea being that if this leader had been more security oriented and protectionist, then the violent actions would not have taken place. Under such circumstances of violence, support tends to shift towards the opposition, which at this point of time, has already begun to beef up their protectionist rhetoric. A clear example of such shifts in public opinion occur between the period prior to Camp David in

2000 and after the violence of the second Intifada broke out in late September 2000. While many view the failure of Camp David as the point of downfall for Barak, his support did not actually drop until the second Intifada. The Israeli population was aware of the concessions Barak was willing to make in these negotiations, yet this did not decrease their support for him. When the violence began, and people were killed on Barak’s clock, this is when his support plummeted.

Meanwhile, Sharon had been waiting in the shadows through the negotiation period, and the

125 growing Palestinian unrest followed by the violence of the second Intifada, laid the perfect platform for Likud’s anti-Barak/anti-negotiation and pro-confrontation campaign.

Graphs

Threat is defined by the casualties resulting from violent action carried out by both Israe- lis and Palestinians. While the events outlined below describe many Israel-driven actions, in some cases these were precipitated by suicide bombings, qassam rocket attacks, or individual violence. These smaller incidents of violence are not each specifically mentioned below, as the violence and threat ensuing thereafter can be incorporated under the time period of these various

Operations. This is not to imply in any way that violence is only initiated by Israel. Whether Is- rael retaliated or initiated violence, it was during these larger Operations that both populations carried out violent acts against the other, and this is why perceived threat is likely to cluster around these incidents. Highlighted below are key points in history identifying incidents of violence, negotiation, and ceasefires (specifying points of initiation), followed by two graphs correlating fluctuations in threat with support for Israeli and Palestinian confrontation and negotiation oriented leadership, to see how threat and public opinion changes relative to these events.

• September 1996: Al Aqsa Tunnel Riots • July 2000: Camp David • September 2000: Second Intifada • March – May 2002: Operation Defensive Shield • July 2003: Road Map for Peace announced April 30 • October 2004: Operation Days of Repentance (initiated on Sep 29) • March 2005: Cairo Agreement; Gaza Disengagement begins August 2005 • June 2006: Operation Summer Rain • November 2006: Operation Autumn Clouds • January 2008: Israeli blockade on Gaza; January – March: large scale Israeli attacks in/on Gaza and Palestinian qassam and mortar attacks on Israel • June 2008: Hamas/Israel ceasefire • December 2008 – January 2009: Operation Cast Lead

126 Figure 4A

127 Figure 4B

128 Chapter 5

Conclusion

“It isn’t that they can’t see the solution. It is that they can’t see the problem.” G.K. Chesterton

Conventional explanations of the formation of political attitudes have often revolved around three core factors: knowledge, experience, and socialization. These factors can be further divided to include education, economy, race, class, family & marital status, and even genetics.

For the most part, over the last forty years, research has found that public attitudes and support for public policies are fairly stable over time and also fairly resistant to change. More recent research has begun to identify ways in which the public or segments of the public can dramatically alter their attitudes and opinions; in particular, public attitudes can be especially volatile and almost automatic under conditions of conflict with another group. Under these conditions, perceptions of threat and also perceptions of the likely success of policies to address threat have been found to have significant effects on public attitudes, support for particular public policies, tolerance of dissent and support for political leaders. Studies of social science are inherently probabil- istic; ‘always’ and ‘never’ hold no bearing against the uncertainties of human behavior, let alone human behavior under threat. With this understanding, this work has presented alternative explanations for political attitudes in terms of the marriage between biology and psychology; more specifically, the impact of threat on one’s political attitudes.

This study has shown the significant correlation between public opinion and threat through an in depth analysis of historical events, violence, and precipitating actions taken by political leadership. Public opinion has shown dramatic changes in response to levels of external

129 threat, and inter-group threat appears to lead to more extreme positions among the Israeli and

Palestinian public. The findings of this research are as follows (with statistical associations in

Appendix 7):

• There is a negative association between general Palestinian optimism and

external threat.

• There is a high association between external threat and support for aggres-

sive action against the out-group.

• There is a high association between external threat and lack of support for

the peace process.

• There is a positive association between external threat and support for

confrontation-oriented leadership among Palestinians.

• There is a positive association between external threat and lack of support

for negotiation-oriented leadership among Israelis and Palestinians.

This research implies that external threat appears to affect public opinion in ways that can potentially restrict the actions of political leaders. The response of public opinion to perceived threat may possibly open opportunities for manipulation by sub-groups of spoilers (including fringe leaders and main-line leaders). Violent action sparks change in public opinion consonant with greater support for leadership, more conservative protocol, and limited concessions. Such shifts can in turn provoke more violent actions, and cyclically prompt change in public opinion.

Beneath the layers and years of this recurring trend, thickening the base of this obdurate and re- lentless conflict, lies threat.

As evidenced in this research, threat is the dominant basal factor that has pushed the Is- raeli and Palestinian populations, independently, into more polarized positions, with political

130 leadership responding in parallel with measures taken on behalf of society. Constraint on leaders’ scope of decision-making, and the opportunities for manipulation produced therein are the fruits of threat. Bearing in mind the aforementioned implications of psychological influence and threat, the question arises: having understood the instinctual reactivity of people under threat, is it possible for political leadership not to use the weakness of a threatened society for advantageous purpose? This is not to necessarily presuppose ulterior motives, self-interest, or manipulation on the part of leadership, but to recognize an existing reality present in all power structures. Addi- tionally, this begs the question: even if society is aware of these implications, won’t they still come to the bidding of their leaders if they are threatened?

‘Hide’

While human defense mechanisms have been traditionally divided into ‘fight’ or ‘flight,’

I suggest there is one more category that deserves attention: ‘hide.’ In a situation of danger, one can approach the issue head on, taking on whatever consequences ensue as the price paid for freedom from danger. This is to ‘fight.’ In a similar situation, one can run from the issue in fear of the repercussions that would ensue from a more aggressive approach, whether these are physical, emotional, or otherwise. This is ‘flight.’ For those who do not desire taking independent agency yet do not simply want to flee the problem, they can easily ‘hide’ from danger under the coattails of another, getting a free ride without really ever putting themselves in limbo by making a concrete decision. Seeking shelter behind the cover of a more powerful force is a sure way to protect oneself, while keeping danger, and thereby threat, at bay.

Electing individuals to make such decisions removes the weight of personal agency that would arise if one were to involve her/himself in politics directly, as well as the weight of risk

131 one would take by militarizing –independently or as a soldier. On the societal level, to ‘hide’ does not connote a weakness of character, but is more a reflection of the natural order of a democratic society. Trust is laid in the hands of elected officials to carry out the will of the majority in a manner that is not detrimental to the society as a whole. People ‘hide’ under the umbrella of these officials and hope for the best. In situations of danger where citizens are fearful of their condition, trust in leadership is strengthened. Citizens do not have the tools to rid of the fear themselves: they do not have personal diplomatic ties with neighboring countries to solve a dispute, they do not command an army, and they do not have allies in their pockets to call for back- up. In situations of danger, public rhetoric from leadership becomes increasingly protectionist, thus strengthening even further the support of the public for their leaders. This threat of danger creates a social dependence on leaders; a crutch if left without, individuals would be faced with their remaining two options: ‘fight’ or ‘flight’.

When such dependence is at play, it is beyond conceivable to assume some leadership would manipulate, use, and abuse this in their favor. When fearful enough, people become the putty with which leaders shape their objectives. What happens when this is abused? Does the public recognize this, and if so, is it in their best interest to fight it when the umbrella under which they hide is the only thing separating them from fear of violence? The panic response of the public in such situations is characterized by an awareness of threat and vulnerability, yet a stifling inability to take action against the threat.

Resilience

Having analyzed the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of conflict by explicitly examining the responses of the general public and group leaders to conflict related incidents and

132 violence, a common thread runs through both populations: resilience underlain by threat. Experi- enced in conflict, Israeli and Palestinian societies have grown rather resilient through their tu- multuous history together. This resilience, however, has been concentrated primarily on security and tenacity. With a strong economic backing, Israel has been able to fortify its security, create impenetrable barriers, and provide a sense of protection for the Israeli people. With a far inferior economy and the limited capabilities inherent to their current condition, Palestinians do not exhibit the resilience of security, but more the tenacious resilience of the struggle for a Palestinian home. While the resilience demonstrated by both populations is commendable in terms of their respective goals and given their respective circumstances, mere security and tenacity are not enough.

Resilience, like an immune system, if left unexposed will only lead to illness. While a parent clearly does not desire their child to fall ill, hug their friend with chicken pox, or eat with dirty hands, this exposure – while temporarily debilitating – ultimately strengthens a child’s immune system and leaves them less susceptible to illness than if left unexposed. Israeli and Pales- tinian resilience must be redirected towards the core values that lead to a compromise. Exposure to each group’s core values, understanding, and most importantly, acceptance of these values strengthens the immune system and reinvigorates compromise. An overwhelming emphasis has been placed on finding a solution to conflict, when the only way to reach this solution is through compromise. This should be the new lens through which conflict is understood. Change through violence, while producing the immediate desired results, has proved vastly unsuccessful in producing a lasting and durable peace. Such violence only further fuels fear and hatred, and fans the flames of animosity. The politics of fear can be a powerful weapon, yet its inherent dysfunction- ality will ultimately surface.

133 Subtle Status Quo

With the circumstances and level of violence under which one lives, the defensive conditions of the conflict allows everyone a chance to find their comfort zone, and brew in it with other like minded members of society, until fear has evaporated away. For members of both Israeli and Palestinian societies, fear and threat of imminent danger strengthen group identity and cultural worldviews respectively, while having a polarizing effect between groups. Palestinian and

Israeli entrenchment in their separate views and beliefs can be related to the optimism experienced at varying points in time. On average, levels of optimism across both groups are steady, rising as casualty figures decrease, and plummeting with violence and threatening situations. As casualties decrease, threat also decreases, optimism rises, and the potential for withdrawal from these respective comfort zones increases, thereby giving sanctuary to prospects for peace. Times of increased optimism come with a certain notion of trust or security between groups, however when this sense of security is shattered, Israelis and Palestinians once again return to square one, with no trust and little optimism.

The dangerously divided Israeli public is united only in their shared understanding of the existence of conflict. Experiences of conflict and viewpoints thereof vary drastically. For example, someone is Sderot or Hebron will likely have a vastly different experience of conflict than someone living in Tel Aviv. The divisions within Israeli society run so deep, that if this conflict didn’t exist for all to rally around, Israelis just may have to face their own internal social demons. This is not to say that Israeli citizens are in any way invested in perpetuating this conflict, since the demons that would surface with conflict resolution would be largely the responsibility of governmental neglect. For now however, the government is overly occupied in sustaining the

134 status quo – not for the sake of the Israeli people, but very crudely, for the sake of their own un- alloyed equipoise.

For a leader, maintaining a sempiternal state of status quo, is a simple way to preserve one’s position in government while not rocking the boat too much to divide the coalition. Given this reality, is it worth it to move forward with negotiations and a peace process? A big step made towards peace can backfire and have a leader ousted from power if her/his coalition (or basis of support) isn’t entirely on board – which is never really the case. Once ousted, someone else will be elected who will essentially be immobilized by the same constraints.

While the Palestinian public is not as deeply fractured as the Israeli, they are similarly united in their shared understanding of the existence of conflict and the immediate need for change. Contrary to Israelis, experiences of conflict are more shared among Palestinians, whether someone is from Nablus, Khan Yunes, Hebron, or Jenin. Political and social divisions are drawn on the methods of achieving a resolution, not the necessity of a resolution. While it is not in the best interest of Palestinian leadership to maintain the status quo given the conditions under which they live, it is equally as risky and dangerous to step away from the current course and attempt a new pass at resolution. The same question comes into play: given this reality, is it worth it to move forward with negotiations and a peace process? Arafat was hailed for firmly holding his position during the 2000 Camp David Summit, with his approval ratings increasing shortly afterward. Had he been more open and willing to concede during negotiations – the factor that many believe lead to the failure of the summit – he would have not only been criticized and shunned by Palestinians, he could have possibly put his life at risk.

What limits can leaders push to achieve goals of progress, maintain positions of power, and not be assassinated in the process? The solution is definitely not a leader who makes

135 her/himself a martyr for the cause; someone new would quickly replace this leader, revamp the status quo, and gain the public’s support. The fear of losing power debilitates leaders’ scope of possibility. Power is lost when public support ceases to exist. Public support ceases when people feel their government is not working in their favor, when it does not protect its people from violence – when people feel threatened.

Prospects

Threat has been examined as an endogenous factor in a larger system of escalation and de-escalation of conflict-related incidents, not simply as an outcome. The knowledge gained in this research intends to firstly give understanding of these issues to the general public and expand knowledge in the academic community. Secondly, this research could enable national defense experts and others to develop enhanced methods for preventing or mitigating potential violent threats, as well as identifying potential emerging threats. To have clarity of hindsight is beneficial in as much as future measures are taken based on these new understandings.

Given the aforementioned interplay between threat, political leadership, and public opinion, prospects for change seem dim. When dealing with human nature, the possibility of changing innate responses based on survival mechanisms is a bleak feat. While removal of threat is ideal, it is far from realistic. Even the most pleasant of societies cannot eradicate threat’s existence and shield one’s humanity from surfacing to respond. The only prospect for change lies in understanding our perceptions of threat; from here, people can grow to decipher power from manipulation, protection from abuse, and reality from politics.

As G.K. Chesterton very cleverly said, “It isn’t that they can’t see the solution. It is that they can’t see the problem” (2001: 141). Chesterton’s reference to a character’s suspected du-

136 plicitous intentions is a relevant and common thread tying one conflict to another. Factors com- monly associated with the persistence of this conflict, such as Jerusalem, refugees, borders, and settlements are what both negotiations and violent actions have predicated on for Israeli and Pal- estinian leadership alike. These factors are viewed as the core on which the conflict has been based, and as such, are viewed as regulating the course of future relations between the two groups. Following years of incessant negotiation and violence, these problems have grown more complex, convoluted, and warped, further deteriorating relations and prospects for conflict resolution.

For Israelis and Palestinians, it isn’t that they cannot see the solution to conflict, they simply are not seeing the problems as they truly are. Threat has clouded respective public perceptions of the dominant issues, and has therein obscured prospects for resolution. Understand- ing the commanding role of threat is a necessary precondition that should be required prior to evaluating, let alone negotiating and attempting to resolve conflict. This understanding carries through on two levels: public and leadership.

While Israeli and Palestinian populations are aware of the respective threats they experience, it is the manner in which these threats are manifested which is well understood and reacted upon. The concept of threats, how they develop, how they are used, and how they can be abused are not so well understood, and for most people, are not even recognized. Increased public awareness always runs the risk of actions taken based on new knowledge, and often decreased legitimacy and authority of leadership. In cases where the public’s awareness transforms into the desire for change and revolution, the outcome splits into either an overthrow of the existing power, a change made internally by the existing power to more closely reflect the will of the people, or, the existing power can tighten its control over its citizens by taking more authoritative

137 measures, restricting freedoms, and increasing threat. Nonetheless, change can only be initiated from the root – the people.

The primary issue standing between an understanding of the impact of threat and the public is basic human conception of rationality. More often than not, people believe they are acting in the most rational manner as possible. Decisions are made and conclusions are drawn based on a process of rational evaluation of circumstances. It is rare that people believe themselves to act irrationally, or make a decision that is clearly not in their best interest. This would simply be il- logical and would go against fundamental concepts of self-preservation. While an action may appear to others as irrational, this merely demonstrates that rationality is in the eye of the be- holder. With this in mind, it is just about unimaginable for a person to accept they are not taking the best possible measures for themselves and their loved ones.

When threat becomes a controlling factor, rationality often takes the back seat. Immediate and instinctual responses conduct the manner in which one responds, as this is representative of basic self-preservation mechanisms in the brain; this is manifested in terms of the previously discussed divisions of fight, flight, or hide. To tell someone that they are acting irrationally in the height of what they contend to be the most rational action possible will most definitely not be met with open favor. This leads to the very important questions of: how can you tell someone their instinctual protective actions are not rational, and are predicated upon fear and threat? If such behavior is irrational, then what is rational behavior? Without delving too deeply into the realm of political philosophy – and leaving the second question as food for thought – the answer to the first question is met with much difficulty and even more repudiating consternation.

It is an inauspicious task to convince someone they did not take the optimal measures to protect their family; from the outside, there is a clear view. From the inside however, actions

138 taken were necessary – period. In addition, were a person to face threat, she or her would not necessarily take time to discern what is the cause and background producing this threat – this person would simply act. With threat serving as the clay with which human nature sculpts actions, is conflict resolution an attainable objective? While one may not consciously reflect on the type of threat they are under in a given circumstance, having a deeper understanding of surrounding threats will nonetheless enable for change to take place within each individual person. Such an understanding can overtime become an innate protective mechanism in the human psyche, where one’s awareness of possible manipulation, use, and abuse, of threat instinctually factors in to their rationale when making decisions under threat.

Various conflicts have reached a point of resolution, such as those in the Balkans, South

Africa, and Northern Ireland, yet these changes all came from the top and trickled down to the people. So whether people agreed with the changes or not, they had to deal with their new reality and move on; this does not mean however, that their opinions and perceptions necessarily changed. Many people still hold on to residual feelings of animosity and resentment towards the other group, and cannot simply forget about past hostilities. Although a peace agreement was made at the upper level within government, a cold peace exists on the ground among the people.

By recognizing the impact of threat on public opinion, specifically one’s own, an alternative course for change is created, taking place at the individual level. Such a mental revolution would transform a cold peace into a durable peace.

Ultimately, the battle between confrontation and negotiation boils down to which leader can wield the most powerful threat. Competition begins with who can garner and maintain the most public support; such support is held in many capacities, which at the base of all lies threat.

Levels of optimism, support for the peace process, and support for violent activity all play a role

139 in shaping the public’s view of what they support, and whom. Do people want a leader with forceful hand, or do they prefer someone who exercises the power of negotiation? These variables weigh in the election of any leader in any country, whether Democrat, Republican, Unionist,

Loyalist, Left, Right, Center, Hawk, Dove, or simply confrontation or negotiation.

The abuse of threat by leadership changes the game entirely, giving way to authoritarian governments and dictatorships. As leaders’ power increases, citizens are held firmly in their place with repercussions of violence surrounding and governing their actions. The possibility for change in such circumstances is grim. A united front could inspire and bring about change, as can be seen with the Egyptian uprising in 2011, or can similarly be plummeted, as seen in Syria in 2011. Assad’s reluctance to negotiate has reached an all time high, directly corresponding with the Syrians’ feelings of threat. While the abuse of threat is present among Israeli and Palestinian leadership, and seems to be increasing, it has yet to reach the catastrophic levels of some of their neighbors.

A change occurring within the leadership level would have to include a system of mis- chief detection for power happy and power hungry leaders. The system is supposed to be checked both within itself and also through the voice of the people, yet recurrent inter- governmental defections and a fearful public leave abuses of authority unidentified. Were someone to identify such abuses, this could possibly put their own well-being at risk. As previously mentioned, leaders also run the risk of their personal safety when it comes to progressive measures and simply doing the right thing – in this case, identifying abuses of power. When both costs and benefits are evaluated under conditions of threat, political leadership find themselves in a tight situation stuck between multiple paths of self preservation.

140 In order to move forward and progress through the understanding of threat’s impact on

Israeli and Palestinian societies, leadership will be put to the test, whereby true and invaluable leaders will be set apart from those seeking more of a personal gain. Open knowledge of manipulation, use, and abuse of threat gives people a foundation from which they can base their claims.

The few select people responsible for atrocities paid as the price for preserving their position and personal well-being, are nothing less than the rust corroding society. These people cannot simply be cleaned up with futile promises of change, they need to be removed from power, and replaced by people seeking resolution through negotiation. Israeli and Palestinian public opinion supports negotiation oriented leadership, and negotiation tactics when threat is not a factor and bombs are not overhead. It is threat that causes both people to withdraw and support confrontation. A clean slate is needed to carry out the desires of the Israeli and Palestinian public. Once people have learned to recognize their threatened biases however, will they use this new knowledge to move forward?

Moving Ahead

This study has attempted to provide a clear understanding of how the presence of threat may foster changes in public opinion among the Israel and Palestinian population. Playing the most influential role, the variable of threat has been analyzed under the scope of casualties and violent attacks; nonetheless, other factors contributing to this threat cannot be ignored. Incorpo- rated in the expansion of this project will be an in depth analysis of the media and it’s role in creating, disseminating, exaggerating, and heightening public perceptions of threat. While media was briefly mentioned in this study, a content analysis of leading Israeli and Palestinian newspapers and media outlets will provide a more detailed portrayal of events as perceived by each

141 population. Such an examination is hypothesized to support outcomes found in this study and contribute to a more profound understanding of threat.

The first chapter began by rivaling the technical problems engineers face to the maladies of social conflict, a pivotal comparison exemplifying the necessity for understanding the human element. A technical approach to conflict has no chance of success, no matter how many paths and outcomes are analyzed. The interwoven elements of social conflict are underscored by human nature in its most primal hour. Fallible and rational judgments are regulated by the threatened perceptions of a fearful society. While the methods engaged in achieving the shared outcomes of peace, security, and stability can often divide the public, there is nothing more unifying for a society than threat.

142

Appendices

143 Appendix 1A

Palestinian Support for the Peace Process

Total Palestinians Survey Survey Question Sample no. Date no. Size Strongly Somewhat Total Support Support Support Support

10 09/1995 12 1318 72.7 - - -

11 11/1995 3 1250 77.9 - - -

15 03/1996 3 1279 76.9 - - -

16 08/1996 13 1178 74.3 - - -

17 10/1996 11 1199 77.5 - - -

18 11/1996 4 1152 78.1 - - -

19 03/1997 1 1200 - 29.1 43.8 72.9

20 05/1997 2 1185 - 24.5 44.6 69.1

21 06/1997 2 1197 - 22.3 46.4 68.7

22 08/1997 2 1195 - 21.6 46.4 68.0

23 11/1997 2 1180 - 31.9 42.3 74.2

26 05/1998 2 1208 - 16.1 47.6 63.7

27 07/1998 2 1196 - 19.0 47.0 66.0

29 08/1998 3 1192 - 10.9 44.7 55.6

31 03/1999 3-1 1199 44.5 19.5 - 64.036

32 08/1999 2 1200 - 13.9 43.8 57.7

33 10/1999 2 1200 - 16.0 42.0 58.0

41 06/2001 2 1201 - 11.4 36.0 47.4

42 09/2001 15 1198 - 5.0 41.9 46.9

43 11/2001 3 1201 - 9.3 39.4 48.7

45 03/2002 3 1160 - 7.8 42.1 49.9

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 36 Question 3 specifically gave the option to answer “support” (which was 63.7). Question 3-1 gives the same options as the rest of the poll; the “total support” figure provided is the combination of “strongly support” and “support” (64.0); the proximity of these two figures (63.7 & 64.0) depicts consistency in results.

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/

144 Appendix 1A

45 05/2002 3 1179 - 6.2 40.4 46.6

46 09/2002 2 1199 - 7.4 39.1 46.5

47 11/2002 3 1200 - 11.4 42.7 54.1

48 03/2003 3 1201 - 9.7 41.6 51.3

63 10/2007 4 1200 - 23.6 44.3 67.9

64 03/2008 7 1199 - 17.6 43.6 61.2

65 09/2008 4 1194 - 20.4 42.4 62.8

67 01/2009 12 1198 - 19.2 38 57.2

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/

145 Appendix 1A-i

Palestinian Support for the Peace Process

Total Palestinians Survey Question Sample Survey no. Date no. Size Strongly Somewhat Total Support Support Support Support 10 10/1995 12 1318 72.7 - - -

11 12/1995 3 1250 77.9 - - -

15 04/1996 3 1279 76.9 - - -

16 08/1996 13 1178 74.3 - - -

17 11/1996 11 1199 77.5 - - -

18 12/1996 4 1152 79.1 - - -

19 04/1997 1 1200 - 29.1 43.8 72.9

20 05/1997 2 1185 - 24.5 44.6 69.1

21 07/1997 2 1197 - 22.3 46.4 68.7 08/1997 22 2 1195 - 21.6 46.4 68.0 (Part 1) 23 11/1997 2 1180 - 31.9 42.3 74.2

26 05/1998 2 1208 - 16.1 47.6 63.7

27 07/1998 2 1196 - 19.0 47.0 66.0 08/1998 29 3 1192 - 10.9 44.7 55.6 (Part 1) 03/1999 31 3-1 1199 44.5 19.5 - 64.037 (Part 1) 08/1999 32 2 1200 - 13.9 43.8 57.7 (Part 1) 10/1999 33 2 1200 - 16.0 42.0 58.0 (Part 1) 41 06/2001 2 1201 - 11.4 36.0 47.4

42 09/2001 15 1198 - 5.0 41.9 46.9

43 12/2001 3 1201 - 9.3 39.4 48.7

45 03/2002 3 1160 - 7.8 42.1 49.9

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 37 Question 3 specifically gave the option to answer “support” (which was 63.7). Question 3-1 gives the same options as the rest of the poll; the “total support” figure provided is the combination of “strongly support” and “support” (64.0); the proximity of these two figures (63.7 & 64.0) depicts consistency in results.

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/

146 Appendix 1A-i

45 05/2002 3 1179 - 6.2 40.4 46.6

46 09/2002 2 1199 - 7.4 39.1 46.5

47 12/2002 3 1200 - 11.4 42.7 54.1

48 04/2003 3 1201 - 9.7 41.6 51.3

63 11/2007 4 1200 - 23.6 44.3 67.9

64 04/2008 7 1199 - 17.6 43.6 61.2

65 10/2008 4 1194 - 20.4 42.4 62.8

67 01/2009 12 1198 - 19.2 38 57.2 !

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/

147 Appendix 1A-ii

Palestinian Support for the Peace Process

October 1995 Poll 10 - Q12 In general, would you say you support or oppose the peace process? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1318 N=972 N=346 Support the Peace Process 72.7 73.7 70.8 Oppose the Peace Process 17.8 17.2 19.7 No Opinion 9.5 9.1 9.5 Poll conducted on October 6-7, 1995

December 1995 Poll 11 - Q3 In general, would you say that you support or oppose the peace process? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1250 N=855 N=395 Support the Peace Process 77.9 76.6 80.8 Oppose the Peace Process 16.1 16.1 15.9 No Opinion 6.0 7.3 3.3 Poll conducted on December 8-9, 1995

April 1996 Poll 15 - Q3 Do you support or oppose the peace process? Total N=1279 Total N=835 West Bank N=444 Gaza Support 76.9 Oppose 13.4 Other 0.4 No Answer 9.3 Poll conducted on April 5-6, 1996

August 1996 Poll 16 - Q13 In general, would you say that you support or oppose the peace process? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1178 N=737 N=441 Support the Peace Process 74.3 69.7 81.9 Oppose the Peace Process 14.0 15.7 11.1 No Opinion 11.7 14.5 7.0 Poll conducted on August 19-20, 1996

November 1996 Poll 17 - Q11 In general, would you say that you support or oppose the peace process? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=753 N=446 Support the Peace Process 77.5 72.1 85.4 Oppose the Peace Process 14.0 16.7 10.3 No Opinion 8.5 11.2 4.3 Poll conducted on October 24-25, 1996

! ! Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/

148 Appendix 1A-ii

December 1996 Poll 18 - Q4 In general would you say you support or oppose the peace process? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1152 N=757 N=395 Support the Peace Process 78.1 75.8 82.5 Oppose the Peace Process 14.1 14.7 13.2 No Opinion 7.7 9.5 4.3 Poll conducted on December 13-14, 1996

April 1997 Poll 19 - Q1 In general, do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel? Do you strongly support, somewhat support, strongly oppose, or somewhat oppose? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=740 N=460 Strongly Support 29.1 24.9 35.9 Somewhat Support 43.8 43.1 45.0 Strongly Oppose 11.2 13.9 6.7 Somewhat Oppose 11.9 13.0 10.2 No Answer 4.0 5.1 2.2 Poll conducted April 3-7, 1997

May 1997 Poll 20 - Q2 In general, do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel? Do you strongly support, somewhat support, strongly oppose or somewhat oppose? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1185 N=750 N=435 Strongly Support 24.5 23.6 26.0 Somewhat Support 44.6 39.9 52.9 Strongly Oppose 12.6 14.3 9.7 Somewhat Oppose 13.7 16.1 9.4 I do not know 0.3 0.4 0.0 No Answer 4.3 5.7 2.0 Poll conducted May 15, 1997

July 1997 Poll 21 - Q2 In general, do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel? Do you strongly support, somewhat support, strongly oppose or somewhat oppose? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1197 N=750 N=447 Strongly Support 22.3 21.4 23.9 Somewhat Support 46.4 44.9 49.2 Strongly Oppose 13.6 14.2 12.5 Somewhat Oppose 12.9 13.9 11.4 No Answer 4.8 5.6 3.0 Poll conducted on July 2-4, 1997

August 1997 (Part 1) Poll 22 - Q2 In general, do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel? Do you strongly support, somewhat support, strongly oppose or somewhat oppose? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1195 N=756 N=439

! ! Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/

149 Appendix 1A-ii

Strongly Support 21.6 22.2 20.5 Somewhat Support 46.4 45.1 48.5 Strongly Oppose 13.4 12.6 14.8 Somewhat Oppose 12.6 13.9 10.5 No Answer 6.0 6.2 5.7 Poll conducted on August 20-22, 1997

November 1997 Poll 23 - Q2 In general, do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel? Do you strongly support, somewhat support, strongly oppose or somewhat oppose? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1180 N=749 N=431 Strongly Support 31.9 33.9 28.5 Somewhat Support 42.3 40.6 45.2 Strongly Oppose 9.4 10.1 8.1 Somewhat Oppose 12.7 11.9 14.2 No Opinion / Do not know 2.5 2.5 2.3 No Answer 1.2 1.0 1.7 Poll conducted on November 19-21, 1997

May 1998 Poll 26 - Q2 In general, how do you feel about the Palestinian - Israeli peace process? Would you say that you strongly support, somewhat support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the Palestini- an - Israeli peace process? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1208 N=775 N=433 Strongly Support 16.1 11.4 24.5 Somewhat Support 47.6 51.7 40.2 Neither Support nor Op- 13.8 14.5 12.7 pose Somewhat Oppose 9.6 9.4 9.9 Strongly Oppose 11.8 12.0 11.5 No Answer 1.1 1.0 1.2 Poll conducted on May 21-22, 1998

July 1998 Poll 27 - Q2 In general, do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel? Do you strongly support or somewhat support or strongly oppose or somewhat oppose? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1196 N=772 N=424 Strongly Support 19.0 15.5 25.2 Somewhat Support 47.0 48.6 44.1 Strongly Oppose 13.3 14.1 11.8 Somewhat Oppose 15.4 14.5 17.0 No Answer 5.3 7.3 1.9 Poll conducted on July 16-17, 1998

August 1998 (Part 1) Poll 29 - Q3 In general, do you support or oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process between the Palestinians and Israel? Total West Bank Gaza Strip

! ! Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/

150 Appendix 1A-ii

N=1192 N=757 N=435 Strongly Support 10.9 11.0 10.8 Somewhat Support 44.7 45.0 44.1 Strongly Oppose 20.6 19.8 21.8 Somewhat Oppose 16.4 16.5 16.3 No Opinion 2.9 2.9 3.0 No Answer 4.6 4.8 4.0 Poll conducted on August 27-28, 1998

March 1999 (Part 1) Poll 31 - Q3 In general, do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=761 N=438 Support 63.7 63.9 63.4 Oppose 34.7 33.9 36.1 No Answer 1.6 2.2 0.5

Poll 31 - Q3-1 Do you strongly support, somewhat support, strongly oppose or somewhat oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel? Total West Bank Gaza Strip Strongly Support* 19.5 20.4 18.0 Support* 44.5 44.3 45.0 Strongly Oppose** 15.1 14.6 16.0 Somewhat Oppose** 19.8 19.4 20.3 No Answer 1.1 1.3 0.7 * For those who answered "Support" in question 3 ** For those who answered "Oppose" in question 3 Poll conducted on March 18-19, 1999

August 1999 (Part 1) Poll 32 - Q2 In general, what do you feel towards the Israeli-Palestinian peace process? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=763 N=437 Strongly Support 13.9 13.9 14.0 Somewhat Support 43.8 46.5 38.9 Neither Support nor Op- 19.1 18.6 19.9 pose Somewhat Oppose 10.9 8.8 14.6 Strongly Oppose 10.0 9.3 11.2 No Answer 2.3 2.9 1.4 Poll conducted on August 26-27, 1999

October 1999 (Part 1) Poll 33 - Q2 In general, how do you feel about the Israeli - Palestinian peace process? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=762 N=438 Strongly Support 16.0 16.6 15.0 Somewhat Support 42.0 45.1 36.8 Neither Support nor Op- 21.8 21.9 21.5 pose Somewhat Oppose 9.6 7.7 12.8 Strongly Oppose 8.5 6.6 11.8 ! ! Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/

151 Appendix 1A-ii

No Answer 2.1 2.1 2.1 Poll conducted on October 21-22, 1999

June 2001 Poll 41 - Q2 In general, what is your feeling about the current peace process between the Palestinians and the Israe- lis? Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1201 N=761 N=440 Strongly Support 11.4 12.4 9.8 Somewhat Support 36.0 37.5 33.4 Strongly Oppose 26.9 22.3 34.8 Somewhat Oppose 20.8 21.6 19.5 No Answer 4.9 6.2 2.5 Poll conducted on June 14-17, 2001

September 2001 Poll 42 - Q15 In principle do you strongly support, somewhat support or somewhat oppose or strongly oppose peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israel? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1198 N=758 N=440 Strongly Support 5.0 4.7 5.5 Somewhat Support 41.9 41.7 42.3 Somewhat Oppose 26.5 28.9 22.5 Strongly Oppose 22.5 19.8 27.0 No Answer 4.1 4.9 2.7 Poll conducted on September 11-17, 2001

December 2001 Poll 43 - Q3 In principle, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1201 N=761 N=440 Strongly Support 9.3 10.8 6.8 Somewhat Support 39.4 36.9 43.6 Somewhat Oppose 21.0 19.1 24.3 Strongly Oppose 27.6 29.4 24.3 No Answer 2.7 3.8 1.0 Poll conducted on December 6-9, 2001

March 2002 Poll 44 - Q3 In principle, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1160 62% 38% Strongly Support 7.8 6.3 10.2 Somewhat Support 42.1 41.8 42.5 Somewhat Oppose 27.1 29.2 23.6 Strongly Oppose 21.6 20.8 22.7 No Answer 1.6 1.9 0.9 Poll conducted on March 23-24, 2002

! ! Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/

152 Appendix 1A-ii

May 2002 Poll 45 - Q3 In principle, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israel? Total West Bank Gaza N=1179 N=739 N=440 Strongly Support 6.2 5.8 6.8 Somewhat Support 40.4 39.1 42.5 Somewhat Oppose 25.2 25.4 24.8 Strongly Oppose 27.1 28.4 24.8 No Answer 1.1 1.3 1.1 Poll conducted on May 29-31, June 1-2, 2002

September 2002 Poll 46 - Q2 In principle, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israel? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=759 N=440 Strongly Support 7.4 9.0 4.8 Somewhat Support 39.1 37.8 41.4 Somewhat Oppose 23.4 22.7 24.8 Strongly Oppose 28.5 28.5 28.6 No Answer 1.6 2.0 0.4 Poll conducted on September 21-25, 2002

December 2002 Poll 47 - Q3 In principle, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=760 N=440 Strongly Support 11.4 10.7 12.79 Somewhat Support 42.7 40.4 46.6 Somewhat Oppose 21.3 22.6 18.9 Strongly Oppose 21.3 22.0 20.0 No Answer 3.3 4.3 1.8 Poll conducted on December 8-12, 2002

April 2003 Poll 48 - Q3 In principle, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis? Total West Bank Gaza N=1201 N=761 N=440 Strongly Support 9.7 11.4 6.8 Somewhat Support 41.6 39.7 45.0 Somewhat Oppose 21.6 20.8 23.0 Strongly Oppose 24.1 23.4 25.2 No Answer 3.0 4.7 0.0 Poll conducted on April 5-9, 2003

November 2007 Poll 63 - Q4 Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree; strongly disagree to the peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israeli?

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153 Appendix 1A-ii

Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Strongly agree 23.6 22.6 25.2 Somewhat agree 44.3 42.5 47.5 Somewhat disagree 15.8 16.6 14.3 Strongly disagree 14.8 16.2 12.3 I don’t know 1.3 1.7 0.5 No answer 0.2 0.4 0.2 Poll conducted on November 3-6, 2007

April 2008 Poll 64 - Q7 Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israel? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N= 760 N=439 Strongly Support 17.6 19.7 13.9 Somewhat Support 43.6 43.2 44.4 Somewhat Oppose 19.6 20.0 18.9 Strongly Oppose 17.9 15.5 22.1 I don’t know \ No answer 1.3 1.6 0.7 Poll conducted on April 8-13, 2008

October 2008 Poll 65 - Q4 Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis? Total West Bank Gaza N= 1194 N= 754 N=440 Strongly agree 20.4 17.8 25.0 Somewhat agree 42.4 45.1 37.7 Somewhat disagree 19.3 17.4 22.7 Strongly disagree 15.4 16.3 13.9 I don’t know \ No answer 2.5 3.4 0.7 Poll conducted on October 2-6, 2008

January 2009 Poll 67 - Q12 Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree with peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=758 N=440 Strongly agree 19.2 21.1 15.9 Somewhat agree 38.0 36.7 40.2 Somewhat disagree 16.4 15.0 18.9 Strongly disagree 24.5 25.3 23.2 I don’t know 1.9 1.9 1.8 Poll conducted on January 29-31, 2009

! ! Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/

154 Appendix 1B

Palestinian Support for Suicide Operations

Total Palestinians Survey Survey Question Sample no. Date no. Size Strongly Somewhat Total Support Support Support Support 7 06/1995 19 1397 32.7 - - 32.8

19 03/1997 13 1200 32.7 - - 32.7

20 05/1997 8 1185 23.6 - - 23.6

22 08/1997 7 1195 28.2 - - 28.2

31 03/1999 20 1199 26.1 - - 26.1

39 12/2000 5 1199 66.2 - - 66.2

40 03/2001 5 1200 - 55.4 19.3 73.7

41 05/2001 12 1201 68.6 - - 68.6

43 11/2001 13 1201 - 43.5 20.58 64.08

44 03/2002 18 1160 - 49.2 22.8 72.0

45 05/2002 11 1179 - 38.8 29.3 68.1

46 09/2002 15 1199 - 35.1 29.2 64.3

47 11/2002 13 1200 - 42.4 37.8 62.7

48 03/2003 11 1201 - 37.8 22.1 59.9

49 10/2003 11 1198 - 30.5 31.3 61.8

51 05/2004 10 1200 - 30.1 32.0 62.1

54 04/2005 4 1200 - 17.9 31.8 49.7

57 01/2006 18 1200 - 22.4 33.8 56.2

58 06/2006 6 1197 - 23.3 21.5 44.8

60 09/2006 3 1200 - 22.5 25.5 48.0

65 03/2008 5 1199 - 26.1 24.6 50.7

67 01/2009 14 1198 - 30.1 25.3 55.4

73 03/2011 7 1198 - 15.8 21.5 37.3 !

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/ ! 155!

Appendix 1B-i

Palestinian Support for Suicide Operations

Total Palestinians Survey Survey Question Sample no. Date no. Size Strongly Somewhat Total Support Support Support Support 7 06/1995 19 1397 32.7 - - 32.8

19 04/1997 13 1200 32.7 - - 32.7

20 05/1997 8 1185 23.6 - - 23.6 08/1997 22 7 1195 28.2 - - 28.2 (Part 1) 03/1999 31 20 1199 26.1 - - 26.1 (Part 2) 12/2000 39 5 1199 66.2 - - 66.2 (Part 1) 40 04/2001 5 1200 - 55.4 19.3 73.7

41 06/2001 12 1201 68.6 - - 68.6

43 12/2001 13 1201 - 43.5 20.58 64.08

44 03/2002 18 1160 - 49.2 22.8 72.0

45 05/2002 11 1179 - 38.8 29.3 68.1

46 09/2002 15 1199 - 35.1 29.2 64.3

47 12/2002 13 1200 - 42.4 37.8 62.7

48 04/2003 11 1201 - 37.8 22.1 59.9

49 10/2003 11 1198 - 30.5 31.3 61.8

51 06/2004 10 1200 - 30.1 32.0 62.1

54 05/2005 4 1200 - 17.9 31.8 49.7

57 02/2006 18 1200 - 22.4 33.8 56.2

58 06/2006 6 1197 - 23.3 21.5 44.8

60 09/2006 3 1200 - 22.5 25.5 48.0

65 04/2008 5 1199 - 26.1 24.6 50.7

67 01/2009 14 1198 - 30.1 25.3 55.4

73 04/2011 7 1198 - 15.8 21.5 37.3 !

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 156! Appendix 1B-ii

Palestinian Support for Suicide Operations

June 1995 Poll 7 - Q19 Do you support continued Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide operations against Israeli targets under the current political situation? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1397 N=892 N=505 Yes 32.8% 34.8% 29.5% No 52.3% 48.4% 59.2% Other 2.2% 1.8% 3.0% No Opinion 12.7% 15.0% 8.3% Poll conducted on June 15-16, 1995

April 1997 Poll 19 - Q13 What about the suicide bombing operations? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=740 N=460 Support Suicide Opera- 32.7% 35.0% 28.9% tions Oppose Suicide Opera- 54.5% 48.6% 63.9% tions No Answer 12.8% 16.4% 7.2% Poll conducted on April 3-4, 1997

May 1997 Poll 20 - Q8 What about the suicide bombing operations? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1185 N=750 N=435 Support Suicide Opera- 23.6% 23.3% 24.1% tions Oppose Suicide Opera- 64.7% 64.0% 66.0% tions I do not know 7.8% 7.9% 7.8% No Answer 3.9% 4.8% 2.1% Poll conducted May 15, 1997

August 1997 (Part 1) Poll 22 - Q7 Do your support the suicide bombing against Israeli targets in the current political conditions? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1195 N=756 N=439 Yes 28.2% 27.1% 30.1% No 56.0% 56.1% 55.8% Others 2.9% 2.9% 3.0% No Answer 12.9% 13.9% 11.1% Poll conducted on August 20-22, 1997

March 1999 (Part 2) Poll 31 - Q20 What about suicidal bombing operations, do you see them as an appropriate response in the currently political conditions or do you oppose them as they harm the national interest?

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 157! Appendix 1B-ii

Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=761 N=438 Support 26.1 25.0 28.1 Oppose 66.5 64.9 69.2 No answer 7.4 10.1 27.7 Poll conducted on March 18-19, 1999

December 2000 (Part 1) Poll 39 - Q5 What about suicide operations? Do you see them as a suitable response within the current political conditions or do you oppose them and see them harmful to national interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=759 N=440 I see them suitable response within the current 66.2 61.5 74.3 political conditions I oppose them and see it as harmful to Palestinian na- 22.2 24.5 18.2 tional interests I don’t know 7.8 9.0 5.9 No Answer 3.8 5.0 1.6 Poll conducted on December 21-24, 2000

April 2001 Poll 40 - Q5 How do you feel about suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians in Israel? Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=760 N=440 Strongly Support 54.4 49.6 62.7 Somewhat Support 19.3 17.9 21.8 Somewhat Oppose 10.1 10.0 10.2 Strongly Oppose 5.8 7.8 2.3 Don’t know 7.1 10.3 1.6 No Answer 3.3 4.4 1.4 Poll conducted April 5-7 (West Bank), and April 10-12 (Gaza), 2001

June 2001 Poll 41 - Q12 What about the suicide bombing operations? Do you see them as a suitable response in the current political conditions or do you oppose them and see them harmful to national interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1201 N=761 N=440 I see them as a suitable response in the current po- 68.6 63.1 78.2 litical conditions I oppose it and see it as harmful to Palestinian na- 23.1 26.4 17.5 tional interests I don't know 6.2 8.1 2.7 No answer 2.1 2.4 1.6 Poll conducted on June 14-17, 2001

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 158! Appendix 1B-ii

December 2001 Poll 43 - Q13 What is your feeling towards suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians, do you support it or oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1201 N=761 N=440 Strongly Support 43.5 39.0 51.4 Somewhat Support 20.58 18.9 23.2 Strongly Oppose 10.5 12.5 7.0 Somewhat Oppose 15.5 15.8 15.0 I don't know 7.5 10.2 2.7 No Answer 2.5 3.6 0.7 Poll conducted on December 6-9, 2001

March 2002 Poll 44 - Q18 What is your feeling towards suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians, do you support it or oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1160 62% 38% Strongly Support 49.2 45.0 56.1 Somewhat Support 22.8 25.1 18.9 Somewhat Oppose 14.7 14.0 15.9 Strongly Oppose 7.0 6.5 7.7 I don't know/No Opinion 4.3 6.1 1.4 No Answer 2.0 3.2 - Poll conducted on March 23-24, 2002

May 200238 Poll 45 - Q11 What is your feeling towards suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians, do you support it or oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza N=1179 N=739 N=440 Strongly Support 38.8 35.6 44.3 Somewhat Support 29.3 30.9 26.6 Strongly Oppose 16.2 16.8 15.2 Somewhat Oppose 9.8 9.2 10.7 I Don’t Know/ No Opinion 5.2 6.8 2.5 No Answer 0.7 0.8 0.7 Poll conducted on May 29-31, June 1-2, 2002

September 2002 Poll 46 - Q15 What is your feeling towards suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians, do you support it or oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=759 N=440 Strongly Support 35.1 29.2 45.2 Somewhat Support 29.2 28.3 30.7 Strongly Oppose 18.3 1.4 18.2 Somewhat Oppose 9.4 12.6 3.9 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 38!The!official!date!this!poll!was!taken!was!May!29831!and!June!182.!For!this!study,!the!month!listed!is!May.!

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 159! Appendix 1B-ii

I Don’t Know/ No Opinion 5.9 8.8 0.9 No Answer 2.1 2.7 1.1 Poll conducted on September 21-25, 2002

December 2002 Poll 47 - Q13 What is your feeling towards suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians, do you support it or oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=760 N=440 Strongly Support 42.4 37.5 50.9 Somewhat Support 20.3 20.3 20.2 Strongly Oppose 9.3 10.9 6.4 Somewhat Oppose 20.5 21.6 18.6 I don't know 5.1 6.3 3.0 No Answer 2.4 3.4 0.9 Poll conducted on December 8-12, 2002

April 2003 Poll 48 - Q11 What is your feeling towards suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians, do you support it or oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza N=1201 N=761 N=440 Strongly Support 37.8 31.1 49.3 Somewhat Support 22.1 20.8 24.5 Strongly Oppose 11.7 15.4 5.2 Somewhat Oppose 18.6 19.6 16.8 I don’t know 6.7 9.3 2.3 No Answer 3.1 3.8 1.9 Poll conducted on April 5-9, 2003

October 2003 Poll 49 - Q11 What is your feeling towards suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians, do you support it or oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1198 N=758 N=440 Strongly Support 30.5 24.0 41.6 Somewhat Support 31.3 33.6 27.3 Somewhat Oppose 11.4 13.5 21.8 Strongly Oppose 23.5 24.4 7.7 I Don’t Know/ No Opinion 2.7 3.4 1.4 No Answer 0.6 1.1 0.2 Poll conducted on October 18-21, 2003

June 2004 Poll 51 - Q10 What is your feeling towards suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians, do you strongly support it, somewhat support it, somewhat oppose it, or strongly oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=760 N=440 Strongly Support 30.1 24.5 39.8 Somewhat Support 32.0 32.8 30.7

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 160! Appendix 1B-ii

Somewhat Oppose 12.0 14.5 7.7 Strongly Oppose 19.5 19.9 18.9 I don’t know/No Opinion 5.2 6.8 2.3 No Answer 1.2 1.5 0.6 Poll conducted on June 6-9, 2004

May 2005 Poll 54 - Q4 How do you feel towards suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians? Do you support them, or oppose them? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=759 N=441 Strongly Support 17.9 15.7 21.8 Somewhat Support 31.8 30.2 34.7 Somewhat Oppose 32.3 33.1 31.1 Strongly Oppose 15.7 18.1 11.6 No Answer 2.3 2.9 0.8 Poll conducted on May 2-7, 2005

February 2006 Poll 57 - Q18 How do you feel towards suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians? Do you support them, or oppose them? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=760 N=440 Strongly Support 22.4 19.7 27.0 Somewhat Support 33.8 31.4 38.0 Somewhat Oppose 24.3 24.7 23.4 Strongly Oppose 16.4 20.4 9.5 No Answer 3.1 3.8 2.1 Poll conducted on February 8-12, 2006

June 2006 Poll 58 - Q6 How do you feel about the suicide bombings operations against Israeli Civilians? Do you strongly support it, somewhat support it , somewhat oppose it or strongly oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1197 N=759 N=438 Strongly Support 23.3 19.0 30.8 Somewhat Support 21.5 18.1 27.4 Somewhat Oppose 31.8 34.1 27.9 Strongly Oppose 20.4 25.3 11.9 I don’t know 2.3 2.6 1.6 No Answer 0.7 0.9 0.4 Poll conducted on June 21-22, 2006

September 2006 Poll 60 - Q3 How do you feel about the suicide bombings operations against Israeli Civilians? Do you strongly support it, somewhat support it , somewhat oppose it or strongly oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=760 N=440 Strongly Support 22.5 21.7 23.9 Somewhat Support 25.5 21.7 32.0

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 161! Appendix 1B-ii

Somewhat Oppose 32.1 31.4 33.2 Strongly Oppose 17.8 22.5 9.8 Don’t Know/Have no 1.9 2.4 1.1 Opinion No Answer 0.2 0.3 0.0 Poll conducted on September 19-22, 2006

April 2008 Poll 65 - Q5 How do you feel about the suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians? Do you strongly support it, somewhat support it, somewhat oppose it, or strongly oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=760 N=439 Strongly Support 26.1 20.1 36.4 Somewhat Support 24.6 22.2 28.7 Somewhat Oppose 28.4 31.3 23.2 Strongly Oppose 18.1 22.6 10.3 Don’t know/No Answer 2.8 3.8 1.4 Poll conducted on April 8-13, 2008

January 2009 Poll 67 - Q14 How do you feel about the suicide bombings operations against Israeli civilians? Do you strongly support it, somewhat support it, somewhat oppose it, or strongly oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1198 N=758 N=440 Strongly Support 30.1 30.9 28.6 Somewhat Support 25.3 21.5 31.8 Somewhat Oppose 22.7 23.9 20.7 Strongly Oppose 14.9 16.0 13.0 I Don’t Know 5.9 6.3 5.2 No Answer 1.1 1.4 0.7 Poll conducted on January 29-31, 2009

April 2011 Poll 73 - Q7 How do you feel about the suicide bombings operations against Israeli civilians? Do you strongly support it, somewhat support it, somewhat oppose it, or strongly oppose it? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1198 N=750 N=448 Strongly Support 15.8 10.1 25.2 Somewhat Support 21.5 15.2 32.1 Somewhat Oppose 26.0 26.1 25.9 Strongly Oppose 31.3 39.6 16.7 I Don’t Know 4.1 6.5 0.0 No Answer 1.5 2.5 0.1 Poll conducted on April 6-10, 2011

! ! ! ! !

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 162! Appendix 1C

Palestinian Optimism About the Future

Total Palestinians Survey Survey Question Sample no. Date no. Size Very Somewhat Total Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic Optimism 6 04/1995 2 1069 51.8 21.7 - 73.5

10 09/1995 1 1318 - 25.5 48.4 73.9

11 11/1995 1 1250 - 45.0 36.2 81.2

12 12/1995 1 1199 37.5 - 47.0 84.5

13 01/1996 1 1255 50.1 - 34.1 84.2

15 03/1996 1 1279 - 22.2 53.1 75.3

16 08/1996 1 1178 - 21.1 51.7 72.8

17 10/1996 1 1199 - 19.0 55.0 74.0

18 11/1996 1 1152 12.4 - 62.2 74.6

20 05/1997 1 1185 60.9 7.8 - 68.7

21 06/1997 1 1197 60.1 6.7 - 66.8

22 08/1997 1 1195 56.0 5.8 - 61.8

- 11/1997 - - 66.1 6.35 - 72.45

26 05/1998 1 1208 59.0 6.6 - 65.6

27 07/1998 1 1196 60.5 6.2 - 66.7

29 08/1998 1 1192 62.6 6.0 - 68.6

32 08/1999 1 1200 64.3 6.8 - 71.1

33 10/1999 1 1200 63.1 7.6 - 70.7

34 11/1999 1 1200 68.9 5.5 - 74.4

37 06/2000 1 1200 61.7 6.3 - 68.0

39 12/2000 15 1199 45.0 3.8 - 48.8

40 03/2001 1 1200 41.8 3.8 - 45.6

41 06/2001 1 1201 46.2 4.4 - 50.6

42 09/2001 1 1198 41.1 3.8 - 44.9

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/ ! 163! Appendix 1C

43 11/2001 1 1201 40.4 4.4 - 44.8

45 03/2002 1 1160 42.3 6.0 - 48.3

45 05/2002 1 1179 38.7 3.9 - 42.6

46 09/2002 1 1199 39.3 3.3 - 42.6

47 11/2002 1 1200 38.9 2.3 - 41.2

48 03/2003 1 1201 41.1 2.3 - 43.4

49 10/2003 1 1198 38.5 2.3 - 40.8

51 05/2004 1 1200 42.0 3.3 - 45.3

52 11/2004 1 1200 52.0 7.3 - 59.3

53 12/2004 1 1199 56.5 6.8 - 63.3

54 04/2005 1 1200 55.5 5.8 - 61.3

55 11/2005 1 1199 60.1 7.9 - 68.0

57 01/2006 1 1200 41.2 - 38.6 79.8

58 06/2006 1 1197 49.4 4.8 - 54.2

61 03/2007 1 1198 60.5 7.3 - 67.8

62 08/2007 1 1199 50.7 7.4 - 58.1

63 10/2007 1 1200 50.1 7.6 - 57.7

64 03/2008 1 1199 46.5 5.6 - 52.1

65 09/2008 1 1194 56.3 7.7 - 64.0

66 11/2008 1 1200 55.0 7.6 - 62.6

68 06/2009 1 1199 60.5 7.5 - 68.0

69 09/2009 1 1200 54.0 9.4 - 63.4

70 04/2010 1 1198 60.0 8.0 - 68.0

71 09/2010 1 1200 61.1 9.3 - 70.4

73 03/2011 1 1198 58.7 5.5 - 64.2

74 05/2011 1 1198 63.9 10.8 - 74.7

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/ ! 164! Appendix 1C-i

Palestinian Optimism About the Future

Total Palestinians Survey Survey Question Sample no. Date no. Size Very Somewhat Total Optimistic Optimistic Optimistic Optimism 4 01/1994 1 1622 - 18.6 38.7 57.3

6 05/1995 2 1069 51.8 21.7 - 73.5 (Part 1) 10 10/1995 1 1318 - 25.5 48.4 73.9

11 12/1995 1 1250 - 45.0 36.2 81.2

12 01/1996 1 1199 37.5 - 47.0 84.5

13 02/1996 1 1255 50.1 - 34.1 84.2

15 04/1996 1 1279 - 22.2 53.1 75.3

16 08/1996 1 1178 - 21.1 51.7 72.8

17 11/1996 1 1199 - 19.0 55.0 74.0

18 12/1996 1 1152 12.4 - 62.2 74.6

20 05/1997 1 1185 60.9 7.8 - 68.7

21 07/1997 1 1197 60.1 6.7 - 66.8

22 08/1997 1 1195 56.0 5.8 - 61.8 (Part 1) 23 11/1997 1 1180 66.1 6.3 - 72.4

24 12/1997 1 1185 66.1 6.4 - 72.5

26 05/1998 1 1208 59.0 6.6 - 65.6

27 07/1998 1 1196 60.5 6.2 - 66.7

29 08/1998 1 1192 62.6 6.0 - 68.6 (Part1) 32 08/1999 1 1200 64.3 6.8 - 71.1 (Part1) 33 10/1999 1 1200 63.1 7.6 - 70.7 (Part 1) 34 11/1999 1 1200 68.9 5.5 - 74.4

37 06/2000 1 1200 61.7 6.3 - 68.0

39 12/2000 15 1199 45.0 3.8 - 48.8 (Part 1) 40 04/2001 1 1200 41.8 3.8 - 45.6

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 165 Appendix 1C-i

41 06/2001 1 1201 46.2 4.4 - 50.6

42 09/2001 1 1198 41.1 3.8 - 44.9

43 12/2001 1 1201 40.4 4.4 - 44.8

45 03/2002 1 1160 42.3 6.0 - 48.3

45 05/2002 1 1179 38.7 3.9 - 42.6

46 09/2002 1 1199 39.3 3.3 - 42.6

47 12/2002 1 1200 38.9 2.3 - 41.2

48 04/2003 1 1201 41.1 2.3 - 43.4

49 10/2003 1 1198 38.5 2.3 - 40.8

51 06/2004 1 1200 42.0 3.3 - 45.3

52 12/2004 1 1200 52.0 7.3 - 59.3 (a) 53 12/2004 1 1199 56.5 6.8 - 63.3 (b) 54 05/2005 1 1200 55.5 5.8 - 61.3

55 12/2005 1 1199 60.1 7.9 - 68.0

57 02/2006 1 1200 41.2 - 38.6 79.8

58 06/2006 1 1197 49.4 4.8 - 54.2

61 03/2007 1 1198 60.5 7.3 - 67.8 (Part 1) 62 08/2007 1 1199 50.7 7.4 - 58.1

63 11/2007 1 1200 50.1 7.6 - 57.7

64 04/2008 1 1199 46.5 5.6 - 52.1

65 10/2008 1 1194 56.3 7.7 - 64.0

66 11/2008 1 1200 55.0 7.6 - 62.6 (Part 1) 68 06/2009 1 1199 60.5 7.5 - 68.0

69 10/2009 1 1200 54.0 9.4 - 63.4 (Part 1) 70 04/2010 1 1198 60.0 8.0 - 68.0

71 09/2010 1 1200 61.1 9.3 - 70.4

73 04/2011 1 1198 58.7 5.5 - 64.2

74 06/2011 1 1198 63.9 10.8 - 74.7

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 166 Appendix 1C-ii

Palestinian Optimism About the Future

January 1994 Poll 4 - Q1 Would you say that you are optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future of the Palestinians in the coming new year? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1622 N=1110 N=512 Very optimistic 18.6 17.0 21.9 Somewhat optimistic 38.7 36.8 42.6 Pessimistic 3.7 40.0 32.8 Other 2.2 2.7 1.2 No answer 2.8 3.4 1.6 Poll conducted on January 8, 10-11, 1994

May 1995 (Part 1) Poll 6 – Q2 How optimistic are you about the future? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1069 68% 32% Very optimistic 21.7 20.1 25.5 Optimistic 51.8 53.3 48.4 Not optimistic 25.2 25.3 24.9 No opinion 1.3 1.4 1.2 Poll conducted on May 5-6, 1995

October 1995 Poll 10 - Q1 After signing the Interim Phase Agreement in Washington last week, how optimistic are you about the future in general? Would you say you are very optimistic, somehow optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1318 N=972 N=346 Very optimistic 25.5 25.8 24.9 Somehow optimistic 48.4 48.2 49.4 Pessimistic 14.7 15.5 12.7 Very Pessimistic 7.5 6.5 10.1 No opinion 3.9 4.0 2.9 Poll conducted on October 6-7, 1995

December 1995 Poll 11 – Q1 In general, what is the extent of your optimism towards the Palestinian future. Would you say you are very optimistic, somewhat optimistic, optimistic, or very pessimistic? West Total Gaza Strip Bank N=1250 N=855 N=395 Very optimistic 45.0 44.7 45.8 Somewhat optimistic 36.2 36.3 35.2 Pessimistic 12.2 12.4 11.6 Very pessimistic 4.4 4.0 5.3 No opinion 2.2 2.3 2.1 Poll conducted on December 8-9, 1995

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 167 Appendix 1C-ii

January 1996 Poll 12 – Q1 In General, what is the extent of your optimism towards the Palestinian future. Would you say you are very optimistic, somewhat optimistic, or pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=776 N=423 Optimistic 37.5 36.3 39.7 Somewhat optimistic 47.0 47.4 46.1 Pessimistic 13.6 13.7 13.5 No opinion 1.9 2.6 0.7 Poll conducted on January 11 & 21, 1996

February 1996 Poll 13 – Q1 In general, what is the extent of your optimism towards the Palestinian future. Would you say you are very optimistic, somewhat optimistic, or pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1255 N=807 N=448 Optimistic 50.1 46.8 56.0 Somewhat optimistic 34.1 36.7 29.5 Pessimistic 13.6 14.0 12.9 No opinion 2.2 2.5 1.6 Poll conducted February 1-2, 1996

April 1996 Poll 15 – Q1 How optimistic are you about the future of the Palestinians? Total N=1279 Total N=835 West Bank N=444 Gaza Very Optimistic 22.2 Somewhat optimistic 53.1 Pessimistic 15.1 Very pessimistic 7.3 No answer 2.3 Poll conducted on April 5-6, 1996

August 1996 Poll 16 – Q1 In general, what is the extent of your optimism about the Palestinian future. Would you say you are very optimistic, somewhat optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1178 N=737 N=441 Very optimistic 21.1 19.7 23.4 Somewhat optimistic 51.7 49.0 56.2 Pessimistic 19.1 22.9 12.7 Very pessimistic 5.6 5.2 6.3 No opinion 2.5 3.3 1.4 Poll conducted on August 19-20, 1996

November 1996 Poll 17 – Q1 In general, what is the extent of your optimism about the Palestinian future? Would you say you are very optimistic, somewhat optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic?

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 168 Appendix 1C-ii

Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=753 N=446 Very optimistic 19.0 18.2 20.0 Somewhat optimistic 55.0 50.7 62.8 Pessimistic 18.3 21.7 12.6 Very Pessimistic 6.4 7.5 4.5 No answer 1.3 1.9 0.1 Poll conducted on October 24-25, 1996

December 1996 Poll 18 – Q1 In general, what is the extent of your optimism towards the Palestinian future? Would you say you are very optimistic, somewhat optimistic, or pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1152 N=757 N=395 Optimistic 12.4 10.0 17.0 Somewhat optimistic 62.2 62.2 62.3 Pessimistic 18.4 20.2 14.9 Very Pessimistic 5.9 6.2 5.1 No opinion 1.1 1.3 0.8 Poll conducted on December 13-14, 1996

May 1997 Poll 20 – Q1 In general, to what extent would you say you are optimistic about the future in general? Would you say you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1185 N=750 N=435 Very optimistic 7.8 7.5 8.3 Optimistic 60.9 57.7 66.4 Pessimistic 22.5 25.2 17.7 Very Pessimistic 6.9 7.6 5.7 I do not know 1.7 1.6 1.9 No answer 0.2 0.4 0.0 Poll conducted May 15, 1997

July 1997 Poll 21 - Q1 In general, to what extent would you say you are optimistic about the future in general? Would you say you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1197 N=750 N=447 Very optimistic 6.7 6.1 7.7 Optimistic 60.1 57.0 65.4 Pessimistic 25.7 29.3 19.6 Very Pessimistic 6.9 6.9 7.1 No answer 0.6 0.7 0.2 Poll conducted on July 2-4, 1997

August 1997 (Part 1) Poll 22 – Q1 In general, to what extent would you say you are optimistic about the future? Would you say you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 169 Appendix 1C-ii

N=1195 N=756 N=439 Very optimistic 5.8 5.3 6.6 Optimistic 56.0 54.1 59.2 Pessimistic 28.3 30.4 24.6 Very Pessimistic 9.0 9.7 7.7 No answer 0.9 0.5 1.9 Poll conducted on August 20-22, 1997

November 1997 Poll 23 – Q1 How optimistic or pessimistic are you towards the future in general? Can you say you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1180 N=749 N=431 Very optimistic 6.3 5.6 7.4 Optimistic 66.1 66.5 65.4 Pessimistic 20.3 21.0 19.0 Very Pessimistic 5.8 5.6 6.3 No answer 1.5 1.3 1.9

Poll conducted on November 19-21, 1997

December 1997 Poll 24 – Q1 How optimistic or pessimistic are you about the future in general? Would you say you are: Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1185 N=769 N=416 Very optimistic 6.4 5.6 7.9 Optimistic 66.1 64.8 68.5 Pessimistic 20.8 21.6 19.2 Very Pessimistic 5.4 6.4 3.6 No answer 1.3 1.6 0.8 Exact date(s) poll was conducted not listed; it is listed that the poll was conducted in late November and early De- cember

May 1998 Poll 26 – Q1 How optimistic or pessimistic are you towards the future in general? Can you say you are very optimistic, optimistic pessimistic or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1208 N=775 N=433 Very optimistic 6.6 5.4 8.8 Optimistic 59.0 59.9 57.5 Pessimistic 23.2 23.1 23.3 Very pessimistic 10.3 11.0 9.2 No answer 0.9 0.6 1.2 Poll conducted on May 21-22, 1998

July 1998 Poll 27 – Q1 How optimistic or pessimistic are you towards the future in general? Can you say you are very optimistic, optimistic pessimistic or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1196 N=772 N=424

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 170 Appendix 1C-ii

Very optimistic 6.2 4.3 9.7 Optimistic 60.5 60.9 59.9 Pessimistic 22.2 24.0 18.9 Very pessimistic 10.0 9.8 10.4 No answer 1.1 1.0 1.1 Poll conducted on July 16-17, 1998

August 1998 (Part 1) Poll 29 - Q1 How optimistic are you towards the future in general? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1192 N=757 N=435 Very optimistic 6.0 5.4 6.9 Optimistic 62.6 62.6 62.5 Pessimistic 19.8 19.8 19.8 Very pessimistic 9.9 10.6 8.7 No answer 1.7 1.6 2.1 Poll conducted on August 27-28, 1998

August 1999 (Part 1) Poll 32 – Q1 In general, how optimistic or pessimistic are you towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=763 N=437 Very Optimistic 6.8 6.0 8.0 Optimistic 64.3 66.7 60.2 Pessimistic 19.5 19.8 19.0 Very Pessimistic 7.6 6.3 9.8 No answer 1.8 1.2 3.0 Poll conducted on August 26-27, 1999

October 1999 (Part 1) Poll 33 – Q1 In general, how optimistic or pessimistic are you towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=762 N=438 Very Optimistic 7.6 5.8 10.7 Optimistic 63.1 65.7 58.4 Pessimistic 19.9 20.6 18.8 Very Pessimistic 8.0 6.7 10.3 No answer 1.4 1.2 1.8 Poll conducted on October 21-22, 1999

November 1999 Poll 34 - Q1 To what extent do you feel optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future in general? Would you say that you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=761 N=439 Very Optimistic 5.5 4.5 7.3 Optimistic 68.9 69.8 67.4 Pessimistic 18.3 18.8 17.5 Very Pessimistic 6.6 6.0 7.5 No answer 0.7 0.9 0.3

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 171 Appendix 1C-ii

Poll conducted on November 25-26, 1999

June 2000 Poll 37 - Q1 To what extent do you feel optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future in general? Would you say that you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=762 N=438 Very optimistic 6.3 6.2 6.6 Optimistic 61.7 61.0 62.5 Pessimistic 23.8 23.9 23.5 Very pessimistic 7.4 7.7 7.1 No answer 0.8 1.2 0.0 Poll conducted June 22-23, 2000

December 2000 (Part 1) Poll 39 - Q15 How optimistic or pessimistic are you about the future in general? Would you say you are: Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=759 N=440 Very Optimistic 3.8 4.0 3.4 Optimistic 45.0 47.3 41.1 Pessimistic 37.0 35.6 39.5 Very Pessimistic 13.2 11.9 15.5 No answer 1.0 1.2 0.5 Poll conducted on December 21-24, 2000

April 2001 Poll 40 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=760 N=440 Very optimistic 3.8 3.8 3.6 Optimistic 41.8 45.5 35.7 Pessimistic 37.0 36.3 38.2 Very Pessimistic 16.3 13.7 20.9 No answer 1.1 0.7 1.6 Poll conducted April 5-7 (West Bank), and April 10-12 (Gaza), 2001

June 2001 Poll 41 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1201 N=761 N=440 Very optimistic 4.4 5.4 2.7 Optimistic 46.2 45.5 47.5 Pessimistic 34.1 35.2 32.0 Very Pessimistic 14.6 13.3 16.8 No answer 0.7 0.6 1.0 Poll conducted on June 14-17, 2001

September 2001 Poll 42 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza Strip

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 172 Appendix 1C-ii

N=1198 N=758 N=440 Very optimistic 3.8 4.1 3.2 Optimistic 41.1 41.4 40.5 Pessimistic 34.6 35.6 32.7 Very Pessimistic 19.9 18.5 22.5 No answer 0.6 0.4 1.1 Poll conducted on September 11-17, 2001

December 2001 Poll 43 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1201 N=761 N=440 Very optimistic 4.4 5.4 2.7 Optimistic 40.4 36.7 46.8 Pessimistic 31.1 32.1 29.3 Very Pessimistic 23.7 25.6 20.5 No answer 0.4 0.2 0.7 Poll conducted on December 6-9, 2001

March 2002 Poll 44 – Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1160 62% 38% Very optimistic 6.0 5.3 7.3 Optimistic 42.3 43.3 40.7 Pessimistic 34.0 35.3 31.8 Very Pessimistic 17.4 16.1 19.5 No answer 0.3 - 0.7 Poll conducted on March 23-24, 2002

May 2002 Poll 45 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza N=1179 N=739 N=440 Very optimistic 3.9 4.7 2.5 Optimistic 38.7 36.1 43.0 Pessimistic 32.6 34.0 30.2 Very Pessimistic 24.2 24.5 23.6 No answer 0.6 0.7 0.7 Poll conducted on May 29-31, June 1-2, 2002

September 2002 Poll 46 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=759 N=440 Very optimistic 3.3 4.2 1.8 Optimistic 39.3 38.7 40.2 Pessimistic 30.1 27.9 33.9 Very Pessimistic 26.7 28.3 23.9 No answer 0.6 0.9 0.2

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 173 Appendix 1C-ii

Poll conducted on September 21-25, 2002

December 2002 Poll 47 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=760 N=440 Very optimistic 2.3 3.0 1.1 Optimistic 38.9 36.8 42.5 Pessimistic 33.7 32.0 36.6 Very Pessimistic 23.9 26.4 19.5 No answer 1.2 1.8 0.3 Poll conducted on December 8-12, 2002

April 2003 Poll 48 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza N=1201 N=761 N=440 Very optimistic 2.3 1.8 3.2 Optimistic 41.1 38.9 45.0 Pessimistic 35.1 37.5 31.1 Very Pessimistic 21.2 21.7 20.5 No answer 0.3 0.1 0.2 Poll conducted on April 5-9, 2003

October 2003 Poll 49 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=758 N=440 Very optimistic 2.3 2.2 2.3 Optimistic 38.5 41.4 33.4 Pessimistic 38.6 35.2 44.5 Very Pessimistic 20.3 20.7 19.5 No answer 0.3 0.5 0.3 Poll conducted on October 18-21, 2003

June 2004 Poll 51 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Very optimistic 3.3 3.0 3.9 Optimistic 42.0 37.2 50.2 Pessimistic 33.8 38.6 25.5 Very Pessimistic 20.7 21.1 20.0 No answer 0.2 0.1 0.4 Poll conducted on June 6-9, 2004

December 2004 (a) Poll 52 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 174 Appendix 1C-ii

Very optimistic 7.3 6.2 9.3 Optimistic 52.0 48.4 58.2 Pessimistic 23.3 23.3 23.4 Very Pessimistic 16.9 21.8 8.4 No answer 0.5 0.3 0.7 Poll conducted on December 4-5, 2004

December 2004(b) Poll 53 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=759 N=440 Very optimistic 6.8 6.5 7.3 Optimistic 56.5 52.4 63.4 Pessimistic 20.4 9.9 21.1 Very Pessimistic 15.8 20.7 7.3 No answer 0.5 0.5 0.9 Poll conducted on December 18-20, 2004 May 2005 Poll 54 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=759 N=441 Very optimistic 5.8 4.3 8.4 Optimistic 55.5 51.6 62.1 Pessimistic 25.4 27.5 21.8 Very Pessimistic 13.0 16.1 7.7 No answer 0.3 0.5 0.0 Poll conducted on May 2-7, 2005

December 2005 Poll 55 - Q1 In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=759 N=440 Very optimistic 7.9 7.4 8.9 Optimistic 60.1 57.4 64.5 Pessimistic 20.0 20.6 19.1 Very Pessimistic 11.5 14.1 7.0 No answer 0.5 0.5 0.5 Poll conducted on December 5-9, 2005

February 2006 Poll 57 - Q1 In General, What is the extent of your optimism towards the Palestinian Future? Would you say you are optimistic, somewhat optimistic, or pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Optimistic 41.2 40.0 43.2 Somewhat Optimistic 38.6 39.7 36.6 Pessimistic 19.6 20.0 18.9 No answer 0.6 0.3 1.3 Poll conducted on February 8-12, 2006

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 175 Appendix 1C-ii

June 2006 Poll 58 - Q1 In general, how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Total West Bank Gaza N=1197 N=759 N=438 Very optimistic 4.8 3.4 7.1 Optimistic 49.4 50.5 47.5 Pessimistic 28.7 28.5 29.2 Very Pessimistic 16.7 17.1 16.0 No answer 0.4 0.5 0.2 Poll conducted on June 21-22, 2006

March 2007 (Part 1) Poll 61 - Q1 To what extent do you feel optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future in general? Would you say that you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=757 N=441 Very optimistic 7.3 5.7 10.0 Optimistic 60.5 58.7 63.7 Pessimistic 23.0 25.9 17.9 Very Pessimistic 8.3 8.5 8.2 No answer 0.9 1.2 0.2 Poll conducted on March 19-21, 2007

August 2007 Poll 62 - Q1 In general, how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Could you tell me if you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=759 N=440 Very optimistic 7.4 7.8 6.8 Optimistic 50.7 50.9 50.5 Pessimistic 27.4 26.6 28.6 Very Pessimistic 14.1 14.2 13.9 No answer 0.4 0.5 0.2 Poll conducted on August 16-20, 2007

November 2007 Poll 63 - Q1 In general, how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Do you say that you are: very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Very optimistic 7.6 6.8 8.9 Optimistic 50.1 50.5 49.3 Pessimistic 25.9 25.1 27.3 Very Pessimistic 16.2 17.2 14.3 No answer 0.2 0.4 0.2 Poll conducted on November 3-6, 2007

April 2008 Poll 64 - Q1 In general, how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Would you say you are: very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic?

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 176 Appendix 1C-ii

Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=760 N=439 Very optimistic 5.6 5.8 5.2 Optimistic 46.5 48.8 42.4 Pessimistic 31.6 27.2 39.2 Very Pessimistic 15.8 17.6 12.5 No answer 0.5 0.6 0.7 Poll conducted on April 8-13, 2008

October 2008 Poll 65 - Q1 In general, how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Would you say you are: very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1194 N=754 N=440 Very optimistic 7.7 7.4 8.2 Optimistic 56.3 59.7 50.5 Pessimistic 26.9 24.5 30.9 Very Pessimistic 8.4 7.3 10.2 No answer 0.7 1.1 0.2 Poll conducted on October 2-6, 2008

November 2008 (Part 1) Poll 66 - Q1 In general, how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Would you say you are: very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Very optimistic 7.6 9.1 5.0 Optimistic 55.0 57.1 51.4 Pessimistic 27.1 25.7 29.5 Very Pessimistic 9.8 7.4 14.1 No answer 0.5 0.7 0.0 Poll conducted on November 20-23, 2008

June 2009 Poll 68 - Q1 To what extent do you feel optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future in general? Would you say that you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=760 N=439 Very optimistic 7.5 8.4 5.9 Optimistic 60.5 59.6 62.0 Pessimistic 23.5 23.4 23.7 Very Pessimistic 8.3 8.4 8.0 No answer 0.2 0.2 0.4 Poll conducted on June 20-24, 2009

October 2009 (Part 1) Poll 69 - Q1 To what extent do you feel optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future in general? Would you say that you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 177 Appendix 1C-ii

Very optimistic 9.4 9.2 9.8 Optimistic 54.0 52.1 57.3 Pessimistic 24.6 23.9 25.7 Very Pessimistic 11.6 14.2 7.0 No answer 0.4 0.6 0.2 Poll conducted on October 7-11, 2009

April 2010 Poll 70 - Q1 In general, how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future? Would you say you are: Very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=748 N=450 Very optimistic 8.0 9.5 5.6 Optimistic 60.0 60.0 60.0 Pessimistic 25.1 24.1 26.9 Very Pessimistic 6.5 6.3 6.9 No answer 0.4 0.1 0.6 Poll conducted on April 10-15, 2010

September 2010 Poll 71 - Q1 To what extent do you feel optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future in general? Would you say that you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=750 N=450 Very optimistic 9.3 10.8 6.9 Optimistic 61.1 61.3 60.7 Pessimistic 24.3 23.9 24.9 Very Pessimistic 5.1 4.0 6.9 No answer 0.2 0.0 0.6 Poll conducted on September 11-15, 2010

April 2011 Poll 73 - Q1 To what extent do you feel optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future in general? Would you say that you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=750 N=448 Very optimistic 5.5 5.6 5.4 Optimistic 58.7 59.7 56.9 Pessimistic 26.6 24.5 30.1 Very Pessimistic 8.7 9.5 7.4 No answer 0.5 0.7 0.2 Poll conducted on April 6-10, 2011

June 2011 Poll 74 - Q1 To what extent do you feel optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future in general? Would you say that you are very optimistic, optimistic, pessimistic, or very pessimistic? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=750 N=448 Very optimistic 10.8 10.7 10.9 Optimistic 63.9 58.8 72.3

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 178 Appendix 1C-ii

Pessimistic 17.5 19.7 13.8 Very Pessimistic 7.4 10.3 2.7 No answer 0.4 0.5 0.3 Poll conducted on May 31- June 4, 2011

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 179 Appendix 1D

Palestinian Support for Military Operations

Total Palestinians Survey Survey Question Sample no. Date no. Size Support Oppose

19 03/1997 12 1200 39.8 47.7

20 05/1997 7 1185 34.2 52.7

31 03/1999 19 1199 35.7 56.0

39 12/2000 4 1199 72.1 16.8

41 06/2001 10 1201 70.6 19.8

42 09/2001 9 1198 84.6 9.9

43 11/2001 11 1201 67.5 26.1

45 03/2002 16 1160 73.6 20.0

45 05/2002 9 1179 70.7 22.5

46 09/2002 13 1199 69.5 23.2

47 11/2002 11 1200 69.3 24.0

48 03/2003 9 1201 64.6 25.1

49 10/2003 9 1198 67.9 28.0

51 05/2004 7 1200 65.4 26.9

52 11/2004 4 1200 41.1 51.8

54 04/2005 5 1200 36.2 57.2

57 01/2006 19 1200 43.8 51.5

58 06/2006 5 1197 43.1 50.8

59 06/2006 2 1197 66.8 30.7

60 09/2006 2 1200 43.1 53.2

64 03/2008 4 1199 49.5 45.5

67 01/2009 13 1198 53.3 38.1

71 09/2010 13 1200 30.3 59.4

73 03/2011 5 1198 37.1 51.8

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 180 Appendix 1D-i

Palestinian Support for Military Operations

Survey Survey Question Sample Total Palestinians no. Date no. Size Support Oppose

19 04/1997 12 1200 39.8 47.7

20 05/1997 7 1185 34.2 52.7 03/1999 31 19 1199 35.7 56.0 (Part 2) 12/2000 39 4 1199 72.1 16.8 (Part 1) 41 06/2001 10 1201 70.6 19.8

42 09/2001 9 1198 84.6 9.9

43 12/2001 11 1201 67.5 26.1

45 03/2002 16 1160 73.6 20.0

45 05/2002 9 1179 70.7 22.5

46 09/2002 13 1199 69.5 23.2

47 12/2002 11 1200 69.3 24.0

48 04/2003 9 1201 64.6 25.1

49 10/2003 9 1198 67.9 28.0

51 06/2004 7 1200 65.4 26.9 12/2004 52 4 1200 41.1 51.8 (a) 54 05/2005 5 1200 36.2 57.2

57 02/2006 19 1200 43.8 51.5

58 06/2006 5 1197 43.1 50.8

59 07/2006 2 1197 66.8 30.7

60 09/2006 2 1200 43.1 53.2

64 04/2008 4 1199 49.5 45.5

67 01/2009 13 1198 53.3 38.1

71 09/2010 13 1200 30.3 59.4

73 04/2011 5 1198 37.1 51.8

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 181 Appendix 1D-ii

Palestinian Support for Military Operations

April 1997 Poll 19 - Q12 Do you support the continuation of military operations against Israeli targets as an adequate response to the current political conditions, or do you oppose it and see it as harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=740 N=460 Support military opera- 39.8 41.6 37.0 tions Oppose military operations 47.7 42.7 55.7 No answer 12.5 15.7 7.4 Poll conducted on April 3-4, 1997

May 1997 Poll 20 - Q7 Do you support the continuation of military operations against Israeli targets as an adequate response to the current political conditions, or do you oppose it and see it as harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1185 N=750 N=435 Support military opera- 34.2 35.1 32.6 tions Oppose military operations 52.7 51.3 55.2 I do not know 9.0 8.9 9.2 No answer 4.1 4.7 3.0 Poll conducted May 15, 1997

March 1999 (Part 2) Poll 31 - Q19 Do you support the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as an appropriate response in the currently political conditions or do you oppose them as they harm the national interest? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=761 N=438 Support 35.7 36.4 34.5 Oppose 56.0 52.2 62.5 No answer 8.3 11.4 3.0 Poll conducted on March 18-19, 1999

December 2000 (Part 1) Poll 39 - Q4 Do you support the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=759 N=440 I see it as suitable response within the current political 72.1 66.9 80.9 conditions I oppose it and see it as harmful to Palestinian na- 16.8 19.2 12.7 tional interests I don’t know 7.4 8.6 5.5 No answer 3.7 5.3 0.9 Poll conducted on December 21-24, 2000

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 182 Appendix 1D-ii

June 2001 Poll 41 - Q10 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1201 N=761 N=440 I see it as suitable response within the current political 70.6 62.8 84.1 conditions I oppose it and see it as harmful to Palestinian na- 19.8 24.3 12.0 tional interests I don't know 7.6 10.1 3.2 No answer 2.1 2.8 0.7 Poll conducted on June 14-17, 2001

September 2001 Poll 42 - Q9 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian National Interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N= 1198 N=758 N=440 A suitable response within the current political condi- 84.6 82.5 88.2 tions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 9.9 10.3 9.3 interests I don't know 4.6 5.9 2.3 No answer 0.9 1.3 0.2 Poll conducted on September 11-17, 2001

December 2001 Poll 43 - Q11 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1201 N=761 N=440 A suitable response within the current political condi- 67.5 61.5 78.0 tions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 26.1 29.3 20.5 interests I don’t know 5.7 8.4 0.9 No answer 0.7 0.8 0.6 Poll conducted on December 6-9, 2001

March 2002 Poll 44 – Q16. Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1160 62% 38% A suitable response within 73.6 71.3 77.5

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 183 Appendix 1D-ii the current political conditions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 20.0 20.4 19.3 interests Others 0.2 0.1 0.2 I don’t know 4.4 5.6 2.5 No answer 1.8 2.6 0.5 Poll conducted on March 23-24, 2002

May 2002 Poll 45 - Q9 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1179 N=739 N=440 A suitable response within the current political condi- 70.7 68.7 73.9 tions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 22.5 23.5 20.7 interests Others 0.8 0.5 1.1 I don’t know 4.9 5.8 3.4 No answer 1.1 1.5 0.9 Poll conducted on May 29-31, June 1-2, 2002

September 2002 Poll 46 - Q13 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=759 N=440 A suitable response within the current political condi- 69.5 63.8 79.3 tions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 23.2 26.1 18.2 interests Others 0.9 1.3 0.2 I don’t know 5.4 7.5 1.8 No answer 1.0 1.3 0.5 Poll conducted on September 21-25, 2002

December 2002 Poll 47 - Q11 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israel targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=760 N=440 A suitable response within the current political condi- 69.3 65.3 76.1 tion I reject it and find it harm- 24.0 26.8 19.1

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 184 Appendix 1D-ii ful to Palestinian national interest I don't know 4.8 5.3 3.9 No answer 1.9 2.6 0.9 Poll conducted on December 8-12, 2002

April 2003 Poll 48 - Q9 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1201 N=761 N=440 A suitable response within the current political condi- 64.6 57.7 76.6 tions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 25.1 28.4 19.3 interests I don’t know 8.1 10.8 3.4 No answer 2.2 3.1 0.7 Poll conducted on April 5-9, 2003

October 2003 Poll 49 - Q9 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=758 N=440 A suitable response within the current political condi- 67.9 61.7 78.6 tions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 28.0 33.0 19.3 interests Other 1.1 1.5 0.5 I don’t know 2.7 3.3 1.6 No answer 0.3 0.5 0.0 Poll conducted on October 18-21, 2003

June 2004 Poll 51 - Q7 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 A suitable response within the current political condi- 65.4 62.0 71.4 tions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 26.9 29.5 22.5 interests Others 0.2 0.1 0.2 I don’t know 6.2 6.7 5.2 No answer 1.3 1.7 0.7

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 185 Appendix 1D-ii

Poll conducted on June 6-9, 2004

December 2004 (a) Poll 52 - Q4 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 A suitable response within the current political condi- 41.1 42.1 39.3 tions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 51.8 51.2 53.0 interests Others 0.4 0.5 0.2 I don’t know 4.8 4.9 4.5 No answer 1.9 1.3 3.0 Poll conducted on December 4-5, 2004

May 2005 Poll 54 - Q5 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject them and find them harmful to Palestinians national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=759 N=441 Suitable response within the current political condi- 36.2 35.3 37.6 tions I reject them and find them harmful to Palestinian na- 57.2 57.4 57.1 tional interests Others 1.1 1.5 0.5 I don’t know 4.2 4.2 4.1 No answer 1.3 1.6 0.7 Poll conducted on May 2-7, 2005

February 2006 Poll 57 - Q19 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you oppose them and find them harmful to Palestinians national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Suitable response within the current political condi- 43.8 42.1 46.8 tions I oppose them and find them harmful to Palestinian 51.5 52.5 49.8 national interests Others 0.3 0.3 0.2 Don’t know 2.8 3.4 1.6 no answer 1.6 1.7 1.6 Poll conducted on February 8-12, 2006

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 186 Appendix 1D-ii

June 2006 Poll 58 - Q5 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject them and find them harmful to the Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1197 N=759 N=438 Suitable response within the current political condi- 43.1 38.9 50.5 tions I reject them and find them harmful to Palestinian Na- 50.8 54.8 43.8 tional Interest Others 0.8 0.4 1.6 I don't know 3.7 4.2 2.7 No answer 1.6 1.7 1.4 Poll conducted on June 21-22, 2006

July 2006 Poll 59 - Q2 Do you support the resumption of the military operations that aim to abduct Israeli Soldiers as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject them and find them harmful to the Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1197 N=757 N=440 Suitable response within the current political condi- 66.8 65.0 70.0 tions I reject them and find them harmful to Palestinian na- 30.7 32.5 27.5 tional interests I don' t know/ No answer 2.5 2.5 2.5 Poll conducted on July 6-7, 2006

September 2006 Poll 60 - Q2 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject them and find them harmful to the Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Suitable response within the current political condi- 43.1 42.6 43.9 tions I reject them and find them harmful to Palestinian Na- 53.2 53.3 53.0 tional Interest Other 0.2 0.3 0.0 I don't know 3.1 3.3 2.7 No answer 0.4 0.5 0.4 Poll conducted on September 19-22, 2006

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 187 Appendix 1D-ii

April 2008 Poll 64 - Q4 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=760 N=439 A suitable response within the current political condi- 49.5 44.5 58.1 tions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 45.5 50.0 37.6 interests Others 1.0 0.8 1.4 I don’t know 2.9 3.9 1.1 No answer 1.1 0.8 1.8 Poll conducted on April 8-13, 2008

January 2009 Poll 67 - Q13 Do you support the continuation of military operations against Israeli targets as an appropriate response under current political conditions or do you oppose them and believe they harm Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=758 N=440 An appropriate response under current political con- 53.3 56.2 48.2 ditions Oppose them and believe they harm Palestinian na- 38.1 35.0 43.6 tional interests Other 0.9 0.9 0.9 I don’t know 5.8 5.7 6.1 No answer 1.9 2.2 1.2 Poll conducted on January 29-31, 2009

September 2010 Poll 71 - Q13 Do you support the resumption of the military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current political conditions, or do you reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=750 N=450 A suitable response within the current political condi- 30.3 23.1 42.2 tions I reject it and find it harmful to Palestinian national 59.4 64.0 51.8 interests Other 0.9 0.9 0.9 I don’t know 7.6 9.6 4.2 No answer 1.8 2.4 0.9 Poll conducted on September 11-15, 2010

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 188 Appendix 1D-ii

April 2011 Poll 73 - Q5 Do you support the continuation of military operations against Israeli targets as an appropriate response under current political conditions or do you oppose them and believe they harm Palestinian national interests? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=750 N=448 An appropriate response 37.1 32.0 45.5 Oppose them and believe they harm Palestinian na- 51.8 54.4 47.5 tional interests Other 2.5 2.4 2.7 I don’t know 7.3 9.5 3.8 No answer 1.3 1.7 0.5 Poll conducted on April 6-10, 2011

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 189 Appendix 1E

Palestinian Support for Political Parties

Fatah Hamas Survey Survey Question no. Date no. West West Total Gaza Total Gaza Bank Bank 5 07/1994 8 40.90 42.20 38.50 10.80 9.20 13.50

7 06/1995 20 46.60 - - 18.20 - -

10 09/1995 16 41.30 41.70 40.50 10.70 8.80 15.60

- 01/1996 - 39.05 36.65 43.4 11.9 10.6 14.15

15 03/1996 6 33.40 - - 7.90 - -

16 08/1996 14 34.0 29.30 41.70 6.50 6.50 6.60

17 10/1996 12 42.0 38.20 46.90 9.30 9.80 9.20

18 11/1996 5 35.20 31.40 42.30 10.30 8.30 14.20

19 03/1997 4 38.50 35.80 42.80 10.60 9.90 11.70

20 05/1997 3 37.90 38.0 37.70 10.30 8.0 14.30

21 06/1997 3 34.80 34.80 34.90 11.30 11.10 11.60

23 11/1997 7 40.90 38.20 45.70 17.30 16.30 19.00

26 05/1998 3 32.90 30.70 36.70 13.30 11.40 16.90

29 08/1998 5 34.40 30.30 41.60 13.40 12.90 14.30

31 03/1999 9 37.60 35.00 42.20 14.70 12.60 18.30

32 08/1999 10 28.00 29.10 26.10 8.50 7.90 9.60

33 10/1999 5 33.80 35.00 31.50 11.10 9.40 13.90

37 06/2000 5 34.50 31.80 39.30 12.00 10.20 15.10

39 12/2000 9 32.10 31.80 32.70 19.20 16.90 23.20

40 03/2001 4 35.10 34.50 36.10 17.70 14.50 23.20

41 06/2001 24 34.90 32.90 38.40 18.60 15.10 24.50

42 09/2001 33 29.20 24.90 36.60 20.70 18.70 24.10

43 11/2001 24 26.10 23.30 30.90 21.30 16.70 29.40

44 03/2002 24 29.50 26.0 35.20 19.80 18.50 22.0

45 05/2002 21 27.30 22.50 35.50 22.60 19.90 27.0

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/ ! 190 Appendix 1E

46 09/2002 28 32.90 29.40 38.90 20.90 19.60 23.0

47 11/2002 25 28.10 24.10 35.0 20.10 19.50 21.10

48 03/2003 22 22.60 18.0 30.70 22.0 17.70 29.30

49 10/2003 20 29.30 27.80 31.80 22.60 21.10 25.20

51 05/2004 18 26.40 25.70 27.70 21.70 18.90 26.40

52 11/2004 6 40.0 38.40 42.70 18.60 16.30 22.50

53 12/2004 5 41.60 42.30 40.50 20.0 17.40 24.50

54 04/2005 9 36.10 35.60 37.0 19.80 18.60 22.0

55 11/2005 22 38.90 38.20 40.20 18.50 17.40 20.50

57 01/2006 21 30.60 30.80 30.20 38.70 34.10 46.60

58 06/2006 33 33.70 35.80 29.90 28.90 24.20 37.0

60 09/2006 28 30.70 31.30 29.50 29.70 27.50 33.40

61 03/2007 31 31.40 32.50 29.50 25.20 21.50 31.50

62 08/2007 16 34.40 32.70 37.50 21.60 17.70 28.40

63 10/2007 26 40.0 38.0 43.40 19.70 16.40 25.20

64 03/2008 33 32.50 31.10 35.10 17.80 15.0 22.80

66 11/2008 9 31.30 28.80 35.50 16.60 12.80 23.20

67 01/2009 16 26.00 24.30 29.10 27.70 26.50 29.80

68 06/2009 23 34.90 35.10 34.60 18.80 14.10 26.90

69 09/2009 18 34.60 33.90 35.70 17.90 15.30 22.50

70 04/2010 27 36.20 36.60 35.60 14.40 13.10 16.70

71 09/2010 39 40.70 41.50 39.30 13.20 8.30 21.30

72 10/2010 16 35.30 37.60 31.60 13.3 10.40 18.0

73 03/2011 31 34.00 34.50 33.0 15.0 12.40 19.40

74 05/2011 16 39.20 38.0 41.30 16.60 13.60 21.70 !

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/ ! 191 Appendix 1E-i

Palestinian Support for Political Parties

Fatah Hamas Survey Survey Question no. Date no. West West Total Gaza Total Gaza Bank Bank 5 Jul-94 8 40.90 42.20 38.50 10.80 9.20 13.50

7 Jun-95 20 46.60 - - 18.20 - -

10 Oct-95 16 41.30 41.70 40.50 10.70 8.80 15.60

12 Jan-96 10 38.90 36.60 43.0 12.30 10.60 15.60

13 Feb-96 23 39.20 36.70 43.80 11.50 10.80 12.70

15 Apr-96 6 33.40 - - 7.90 - -

16 Aug-96 14 34.0 29.30 41.70 6.50 6.50 6.60

17 Nov-96 12 42.0 38.20 46.90 9.30 9.80 9.20

18 Dec-96 5 35.20 31.40 42.30 10.30 8.30 14.20

19 Apr-97 4 38.50 35.80 42.80 10.60 9.90 11.70

20 May-97 3 37.90 38.0 37.70 10.30 8.0 14.30

21 Jul-97 3 34.80 34.80 34.90 11.30 11.10 11.60

23 Nov-97 7 40.90 38.20 45.70 17.30 16.30 19.00

26 May-98 3 32.90 30.70 36.70 13.30 11.40 16.90

29 Aug-98 5 34.40 30.30 41.60 13.40 12.90 14.30

31 Mar-99 9 37.60 35.00 42.20 14.70 12.60 18.30

32 Aug-99 10 28.00 29.10 26.10 8.50 7.90 9.60

33 Oct-99 5 33.80 35.00 31.50 11.10 9.40 13.90

37 Jun-00 5 34.50 31.80 39.30 12.00 10.20 15.10

39 Dec-00 9 32.10 31.80 32.70 19.20 16.90 23.20

40 Apr-01 4 35.10 34.50 36.10 17.70 14.50 23.20

41 Jun-01 24 34.90 32.90 38.40 18.60 15.10 24.50

42 Sep-01 33 29.20 24.90 36.60 20.70 18.70 24.10

43 Dec-01 24 26.10 23.30 30.90 21.30 16.70 29.40

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/ ! 192 Appendix 1E-i

44 Mar-02 24 29.50 26.0 35.20 19.80 18.50 22.0

45 May/Ju 21 27.30 22.50 35.50 22.60 19.90 27.0 n-02 46 Sep-02 28 32.90 29.40 38.90 20.90 19.60 23.0

47 Dec-02 25 28.10 24.10 35.0 20.10 19.50 21.10

48 Apr-03 22 22.60 18.0 30.70 22.0 17.70 29.30

49 Oct-03 20 29.30 27.80 31.80 22.60 21.10 25.20

51 Jun-04 18 26.40 25.70 27.70 21.70 18.90 26.40

52 Dec-04 6 40.0 38.40 42.70 18.60 16.30 22.50

53 Dec-04 5 41.60 42.30 40.50 20.0 17.40 24.50

54 May-05 9 36.10 35.60 37.0 19.80 18.60 22.0

55 Dec-05 22 38.90 38.20 40.20 18.50 17.40 20.50

57 Feb-06 21 30.60 30.80 30.20 38.70 34.10 46.60

58 Jun-06 33 33.70 35.80 29.90 28.90 24.20 37.0

60 Sep-06 28 30.70 31.30 29.50 29.70 27.50 33.40

61 Mar-07 31 31.40 32.50 29.50 25.20 21.50 31.50

62 Aug-07 16 34.40 32.70 37.50 21.60 17.70 28.40

63 Nov-07 26 40.0 38.0 43.40 19.70 16.40 25.20

64 Apr-08 33 32.50 31.10 35.10 17.80 15.0 22.80

66 Nov-08 9 31.30 28.80 35.50 16.60 12.80 23.20

67 Jan-09 16 26.00 24.30 29.10 27.70 26.50 29.80

68 Jun-09 23 34.90 35.10 34.60 18.80 14.10 26.90

69 Oct-09 18 34.60 33.90 35.70 17.90 15.30 22.50

70 Apr-10 27 36.20 36.60 35.60 14.40 13.10 16.70

71 Sep-10 39 40.70 41.50 39.30 13.20 8.30 21.30

72 Oct-10 16 35.30 37.60 31.60 13.3 10.40 18

73 Apr-11 31 34.00 34.50 33.0 15.0 12.40 19.40

74 Jun-11 16 39.20 38.0 41.30 16.60 13.60 21.70

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/ ! 193 Appendix 1E-ii

Palestinian Support for Political Parties

July 1994 Poll 5 – Q8 Which of the following factions do you support? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1920 N=1246 N=674 Fatah 40.9 42.2 38.5 Hamas 10.8 9.2 13.5 PFLP 6.9 5.9 8.8 PPP 4.0 4.3 3.4 Jihad 3.2 2.8 4.0 FIDA 2.4 2.3 2.5% DFLP 2.2 2.3 1.9 Independence 16.8 17.7 15.0 No answer 12.8 13.3 12.4 Poll was conducted on July 15-17, 1994

June 1995 Poll 7 – Q20 What are the two political or religious factions you trust the most? Total N=1397 (Total) 892 (West Bank) 505 (Gaza) Fatah 46.6 Hamas 18.2 PFLP 4.4 DFLP 0.7 Jihad 4.3 PPP 1.4 FIDA 0.3 Other Islamic Groups 1.1 'Pro-Peace' Secularists 0.4 'Anti-Peace' Secularists 0.1 Don't trust anyone 6.4 No opinion 16.1 Poll conducted on June 15-16, 1995

October 1995 Poll 10 - Q16 Which is the most political or religious faction you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1318 N=972 N=346 Fatah 41.3 41.7 40.5 Hamas 10.7 8.8 15.6

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 194 Appendix 1E-ii

PFLP 3.6 3.9 2.9 DFLP 0.5 0.6 0.3 Islamic Jihad 2.4 1.7 4.0 PPP 1.0 1.0 1.2 FIDA 0.5 0.5 0.6 Palestinian Struggle Front 0.1 -- -- Other Islamic Groups 0.9 1.3 -- Democracy Building 0.1 -- 0.3 Movements Do not trust anyone 20.9 22.9 15.9 PLO 0.2 0.2 0.3 No answer 17.8 17.4 18.4 Poll conducted on October 6-7, 1995

January 1996 Poll 12 - Q10 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=776 N=423 Fatah 38.9 36.6 43.0 Hamas 12.3 10.6 15.6 PFLP 2.3 1.4 3.8 Islamic Jihad 1.4 0.5 2.8 PPP 1.8 2.6 0.5 FIDA 0.9 1.2 0.5 DFLP 0.6 0.8 0.2 Other Islamic Groups 1.9 1.3 3.1 I do not trust anyone 17.1 20.2 11.3 Others 1.0 1.8 0.5 No opinion 21.8 23.0 18.7 Poll conducted on January 11 & 21, 1996

February 1996 Poll 13 - Q23 Which political or religious party do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1255 N=807 N=448 Fatah 39.2 36.7 43.8 Hamas 11.5 10.8 12.7 PFLP 2.7 2.5 3.1 Islamic Jihad 2.5 2.0 3.3 NDC 0.2 0.0 0.9 DFLP 0.6 0.9 0.2 PPP 1.6 2.4 0.2 FIDA 0.7 0.6 0.9

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 195 Appendix 1E-ii

Other Islamic Groups 3.3 3.2 3.6 Others 0.4 0.1 0.4 I do not trust anyone 20.0 22.1 16.3 No opinion 17.3 18.7 14.6 Poll conducted February 1-2, 1996

April1996 Poll 15 - Q6 Which political or religious party you trust most? Total N=1279 Total N=835 West Bank N=444 Gaza Fatah 33.4 Hamas 7.9 PFLP 1.6 DFLP 0.3 Jihad 1.6 PPP 1.3 FIDA 0.5 Democratic Coalition 0.3 Other Islamic Groups 5.9 Others 0.4 Do not trust anyone 29.3 No answer 17.5 Poll conducted on April 5-6, 1996

August 1996 Poll 16 - Q14 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1178 N=737 N=441 Fatah 34.0 29.3 41.7 PFLP 2.8 3.3 2.0 DFLP 0.2 0.3 0.0 Hamas 6.5 6.5 6.6 Islamic Jihad 1.4 1.1 1.8 FIDA 0.6 0.9 0.0 PPP 1.1 1.6 0.2 I do not trust anyone 29.4 29.9 28.6 Others 2.0 2.6 0.7 No answer 22.0 24.5 18.4 Poll conducted on August 19-20, 1996

November 1996 Poll 17 - Q12 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most?

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 196 Appendix 1E-ii

Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=753 N=446 Fatah 42.0 38.2 46.9 Hamas 9.3 9.8 9.2 PFLP 3.3 3.4 3.4 Islamic Jihad 0.8 0.7 0.9 Coalition - Haidar 0.2 0.1 -- DFLP 0.4 0.7 -- PPP 0.8 1.3 0.2 FIDA 0.6 0.9 -- Other Islamic Groups 2.3 2.1 2.5 Others 1.2 1.5 0.6 Do not trust anyone 21.1 25.8 13.9 No answer 18.0 15.5 22.4 Poll conducted on October 24-25, 1996

December 1996 Poll 18 - Q5 Which political or religious party do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1152 N=757 N=395 Fatah 35.2 31.4 42.3 Hamas 10.3 8.3 14.2 PFLP 3.2 4.0 1.8 DFLP 0.4 0.5 0.3 Islamic Jihad 1.3 1.3 1.3 PPP 0.5 0.7 0.3 FIDA 0.9 1.2 0.3 Democratic Coalition 0.1 0.1 -- Other Islamic Groups 3.8 4.5 2.3 ‘Pro-peace’ Secularists 0.3 0.4 0.3 ‘Anti-peace’ Secularists 0.1 -- 0.3 PLO 1.0 1.5 -- Do not trust anyone 27.0 27.2 26.6 No opinion 15.9 18.9 10.0 Poll conducted on December 13-14, 1996

April 1997 Poll 19 - Q4 Which Palestinian Faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=740 N=460 Fatah 38.5 35.8 42.8 Hamas 10.6 9.9 11.7 PFLP 1.4 1.8 0.9

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 197 Appendix 1E-ii

DFLP 0.7 0.9 0.2 Islamic Jihad 1.4 1.4 1.5 PPP 0.4 0.5 0.2 FIDA 0.4 0.5 0.2 ‘Pro-Peace’ Secularists 0.6 0.7 0.4 Other Islamic Groups 5.0 7.2 1.5 Others 1.3 1.2 1.3 Do not trust anyone 25.9 25.0 27.4 No answer 13.8 15.1 11.9 Poll conducted April 3-7, 1997

May 1997 Poll 20 - Q3 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1185 N=750 N=435 Fatah 37.9 38.0 37.7 Hamas 10.3 8.0 14.3 PFLP 2.9 2.9 2.8 DFLP 0.5 0.7 0.2 Islamic Jihad 1.4 1.1 2.1 PPP 0.4 0.7 0.0 FIDA 0.7 0.7 0.7 ‘Pro-Peace’ Secularists 0.6 0.9 0.0 Other Islamic Groups 4.2 5.3 2.3 Others 1.7 1.7 1.8 Do not trust anyone 31.3 30.3 33.1 No answer 8.4 9.7 5.0 Poll conducted May 15, 1997

July 1997 Poll 21 - Q3 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1197 N=750 N=447 Fatah 34.8 34.8 34.9 Hamas 11.3 11.1 11.6 Islamic Jihad 2.6 2.0 3.6 PFLP 3.1 3.7 2.1 DFLP 0.8 1.3 0.0 PPP 0.8 1.1 0.5 FIDA 0.7 0.8 0.5 Other Islamic Groups 2.3 2.6 1.6 Others 1.0 1.1 1.0 Do not trust anyone 31.2 30.3 32.6

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 198 Appendix 1E-ii

No answer 11.4 11.2 11.6 Poll conducted on July 2-4, 1997

November 1997 Poll 23 - Q7 Which Palestinian political or religious faction you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1180 N=749 N=431 Fatah 40.9 38.2 45.7 Hamas 17.3 16.3 19.0 PFLP 2.0 2.0 2.1 Islamic Jihad 1.8 0.9 3.2 DFLP 0.9 1.1 0.7 PPP 0.7 0.9 0.2 FIDA 0.4 0.7 0.0 Other Islamic Groups 3.0 4.1 0.9 Other Factions 1.2 1.2 1.2 Poll conducted on November 19-21, 1997

May 1998 Poll 26 - Q3 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1208 N=775 N=433 Fatah 32.9 30.7 36.7 Hamas 13.3 11.4 16.9 PFLP 2.8 3.2 2.1 Islamic Jihad 0.8 0.5 1.4 PPP 1.2 1.7 0.2 Other Islamic Groups 3.9 4.9 2.1 Other Factions 2.9 3.9 1.3 Do not trust anyone 29.1 30.3 27.2 No answer 13.1 13.4 12.1 Poll conducted on May 21-22, 1998

August 1998 (Part 1) Poll 29 - Q5 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1192 N=757 N=435 Fatah 34.4 30.3 41.6 Hamas 13.4 12.9 14.3 PFLP 3.7 3.7 3.7 Islamic Jihad 1.8 1.5 2.3 Other Islamic Groups 1.3 1.7 0.5 Other factions 3.3 4.3 1.5

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Do not trust anyone 28.9 30.9 25.5 No answer 13.2 14.7 10.6 Poll conducted on August 27-28, 1998

March 1999 (Part 1) Poll 31 - Q9 Which political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=761 N=438 Fatah 37.6 35.0 42.2 Hamas 14.7 12.6 18.3 PFLP 2.0 2.5 1.1 Islamic Jihad 2.6 2.7 2.3 Others 2.8 3.0 2.3 Do not trust anyone 31.0 33.0 27.6 No answer 9.3 11.2 6.2 Poll conducted on March 18-19, 1999

August 1999 (Part 1) Poll 32 - Q10 What is the most political faction you mostly trust? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=763 N=437 Fatah 28.0 29.1 26.1 Hamas 8.5 7.9 9.6 PFLP 2.8 3.3 1.8 Islamic Jihad 2.0 1.0 3.7 Other factions 3.4 3.4 3.6 I don't trust any faction 42.2 41.9 42.6 No answer 13.1 13.4 12.6 Poll conducted on August 26-27, 1999

October 1999 (Part 1) Poll 33 - Q5 Which political faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=762 N=438 Fatah 33.8 35.0 31.5 Hamas 11.1 9.4 13.9 PFLP 1.3 1.3 1.4 Islamic Jihad 1.9 2.1 1.6 Other Islamic Groups 2.9 3.4 2.1 Other factions 2.7 3.7 1.3 I don't trust anybody 34.1 33.3 35.4 No answer 12.2 11.8 12.8 Poll conducted on October 21-22, 1999

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June 2000 Poll 37 - Q5 Which political faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=762 N=438 Fatah 34.5 31.8 39.3 Hamas 12.0 10.2 15.1 PFLP 2.3 2.0 2.7 Other factions 3.9 3.7 4.5 I don't trust any faction 37.3 39.2 33.8 No answer 10.0 13.1 4.6 Poll conducted June 22-23, 2000

December 2000 (Part 1) Poll 39 - Q9 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1199 N=759 N=440 Fatah 32.1 31.8 32.7 Hamas 19.2 16.9 23.2 PFLP 1.7 1.4 2.0 DFLP 0.3 0.4 0.2 Islamic Jihad 3.0 2.6 3.6 PPP 0.9 1.4 0.0 FIDA 0.4 0.7 0.0 Other Islamic Groups 0.8 0.5 1.5 PLO 0.3 0.4 0.0 Hezbollah 0.8 0.9 0.7 Other Factions 0.8 0.9 0.7 Don't trust anyone 28.1 28.2 28.0 No answer 11.6 13.9 7.4 Poll conducted on December 21-24, 2000

April 2001 Poll 40 - Q4 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1200 N=760 N=440 Fatah 35.1 34.5 36.1 Hamas 17.7 14.5 23.2 Islamic Jihad 4.9 4.2 6.1 Other Islamic Groups 3.2 3.4 2.7 PFLP 1.5 1.3 1.8 PPP 1.1 1.3 0.7 Others 1.9 2.8 0.4 No one 23.1 24.1 21.4

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No answer 11.5 13.9 7.6 Poll conducted April 5-7 (West Bank), and April 10-12 (Gaza), 2001

June 2001 Poll 41 - Q24 Which Political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1201 N=761 N=440 Fatah 34.9 32.9 38.4 Hamas 18.6 15.1 24.5 Islamic Jihad 5.2 5.1 5.5 PFLP 2.7 2.2 3.6 Other Islamic Groups 2.5 2.1 3.2 Other factions 2.3 3.2 0.9 Don't trust anyone 24.6 27.3 19.8 No answer 9.2 12.1 4.1 Poll conducted on June 14-17, 2001

September 2001 Poll 42 - Q33 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=758 N=440 Fatah 29.2 24.9 36.6 Hamas 20.7 18.7 24.1 Islamic Jihad 5.7 5.3 6.4 PFLP 4.3 3.8 5.0 DFLP 1.1 1.1 1.1 Other Islamic Groups 1.7 0.9 0.2 Other factions 2.3 3.8 3.0 Don’t trust anyone 22.7 26.5 16.1 No answer 12.3 15.0 7.5 Poll conducted on September 11-17, 2001

December 2001 Poll 43 - Q24 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1201 N=761 N=440 Fatah 26.1 23.3 30.9 Hamas 21.3 16.7 29.4 Islamic Jihad 5.3 4.7 6.4 PFLP 3.0 2.5 3.9 Other Islamic Groups 2.2 2.1 2.5 Other PLO Factions 1.9 2.5 0.9 Other Factions 1.0 1.3 0.5

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I don't trust anyone 30.4 35.1 22.3 No answer 8.8 11.8 3.2 Poll conducted on December 6-9, 2001

March 2002 Poll 44 - Q24 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza Strip N=1160 62% 38% Fatah 29.5 26.0 35.2 Hamas 19.8 18.5 22.0 PFLP 3.9 4.0 3.6 Islamic Jihad 3.7 4.0 3.2 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 1.9 1.1 3.2 Others 5.3 5.3 5.5 I don’t trust anyone 29.6 34.0 22.3 No answer 6.3 7.1 5.0 Poll conducted on March 23-24, 2002

May 2002 Poll 45 - Q21 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1179 N=739 N=440 Fatah 27.3 22.5 35.5 Hamas 22.6 19.9 27.0 Islamic Jihad 4.2 4.1 4.5 PFLP 3.7 3.8 3.6 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 1.4 0.8 2.3 Other Factions 3.9 4.2 3.4 I don’t trust anyone 27.2 32.5 18.4 I don’t know 0.3 0.5 0.0 No answer 9.4 11.7 5.3 Poll conducted on May 29-31, June 1-2, 2002

September 2002 Poll 46 - Q28 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=759 N=440 Fatah 32.9 29.4 38.9 Hamas 20.9 19.6 23.0 PFLP 3.9 3.3 5.0 Islamic Jihad 3.2 3.4 2.7 Other Factions 3.0 3.0 3.0 I don’t trust anyone 25.8 29.0 20.2

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No answer 10.3 12.3 7.2 Poll conducted on September 21-25, 2002

December 2002 Poll 47 - Q25 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Fatah 28.1 24.1 35.0 Hamas 20.1 19.5 21.1 Islamic Jihad 5.7 6.1 5.0 PFLP 2.1 2.2 1.8 Other Islamic Groups 1.6 2.0 0.9 Other Factions 1.9 2.0 1.8 I don’t trust anyone 31.4 35.3 24.8 No answer 9.1 8.8 9.6 Poll conducted on December 8-12, 2002

April 2003 Poll 48 - Q22 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1201 N=761 N=440 Fatah 22.6 18.0 30.7 Hamas 22.0 17.7 29.3 Islamic Jihad 6.3 6.6 5.9 PFLP 2.0 1.6 2.7 Other Islamic Groups 1.2 1.2 1.4 Other Factions 1.9 1.8 2.0 I don’t trust anyone 34.3 41.1 22.5 No answer 9.7 12.0 5.5 Poll conducted on April 5-9, 2003

October 2003 Poll 49 - Q20 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N= 1198 N=758 N=440 Fatah 29.3 27.8 31.8 Hamas 22.6 21.1 25.2 Islamic Jihad 5.4 5.1 5.9 PFLP 3.6 3.2 4.3 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 1.0 0.5 1.8 PPP 0.8 1.3 0.0 FIDA 0.7 0.9 0.2 Other Islamic Groups 0.9 0.9 0.9

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Other PLO Factions 0.2 0.3 0.0 Others 0.4 0.7 0.0 Don’t trust anyone 28.0 29.6 25.5 No answer 7.1 8.6 4.4 Poll conducted on October 18-21, 2003

June 2004 Poll 51 - Q18 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Fatah 26.4 25.7 27.7 Hamas 21.7 18.9 26.4 Islamic Jihad 5.5 5.0 6.4 PFLP 2.9 2.6 3.4 PPP 0.8 1.2 0.2 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 0.8 0.0 2.0 Other Islamic Groups 0.7 0.9 0.2 Other PLO Factions 0.7 0.7 0.7 FIDA 0.6 0.9 0.0 Other Factions 0.1 0.1 25.2 Don’t trust anyone 28.2 29.9 7.8 No answer 11.6 14.1 0.0 Poll conducted on June 6-9, 2004

December 2004 (a) Poll 52 - Q6 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Fatah 40.0 38.4 42.7 Hamas 18.6 16.3 22.5 Islamic Jihad 4.3 4.2 4.5 PPP 1.8 2.4 0.7 PFLP 1.7 1.4 2.0 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 0.8 0.5 1.1 Democratic Front 0.5 0.4 0.7 FIDA 0.4 0.5 0.2 Other Islamic Groups 0.8 0.8 0.9 Others 3.2 3.3 3.0 I don’t trust any Faction 22.5 25.3 17.7 No answer 5.4 6.5 4.0 Poll conducted on December 4-5, 2004

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 205 Appendix 1E-ii

December 2004 (b) Poll 53 - Q5 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=759 N=440 Fatah 41.6 42.3 40.5 Hamas 20.0 17.4 24.5 Islamic Jihad 3.8 2.9 5.5 PPP 2.6 3.3 1.4 PFLP 2.2 1.8 2.7 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 0.2 0.0 0.5 Democratic Front 1.0 0.8 1.4 FIDA 0.2 0.3 0.0 Other Islamic Groups 2.9 2.6 3.4 Others 0.6 0.8 0.2 I don’t trust any Faction 19.7 22.8 14.3 No answer 5.2 5.0 5.6 Poll conducted on December 18-20, 2004

May 2005 Poll 54 - Q9 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=759 N=441 Fatah 36.1 35.6 37.0 Hamas 19.8 18.6 22.0 Islamic Jihad 3.7 3.4 4.1 PFLP 2.9 2.9 2.9 PPP 1.1 1.7 0.0 DFLP 0.4 0.3 0.7 FIDA 0.4 0.5 0.2 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 0.3 0.1 0.5 Other Islamic Groups 2.3 2.0 2.9 Others 1.1 0.8 1.6 I don’t trust any Faction 28.2 30.7 23.8 No answer 3.7 3.4 4.3 Poll conducted on May 2-7, 2005

December 2005 Poll 55 - Q22 Which Palestinian Political or Religious factions do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=759 N=440 Fatah 38.9 38.2 40.2 Hamas 18.5 17.4 20.5 Islamic Jihad 4.4 5.0 3.4

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 206 Appendix 1E-ii

PFLP 1.8 1.7 2.0 PPP 0.8 1.3 0.0 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 0.3 0.1 0.5 FIDA 0.2 0.3 0.0 DFLP 0.1 0.1 0.0 Other Islamic Groups 2.1 1.8 2.5 Others 2.1 2.2 1.8 Don't Trust any one 25.5 26.2 24.3 No answer 5.3 5.7 4.8 Poll conducted on December 5-9, 2005

February 2006 Poll 57 - Q21 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Hamas 38.7 34.1 46.6 Fatah 30.6 30.8 30.2 PFLP 3.9 4.3 3.2 Islamic Jihad 2.4 2.0 3.2 DFLP 1.0 1.4 0.2 PPP 0.6 0.7 0.5 FIDA 0.4 0.5 0.2 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 0.2 0.3 0.0 Other Islamic Groups 1.6 2.0 0.9 Others 1.8 2.4 0.7 I don’t trust any Faction 15.1 17.6 10.7 No answer 3.7 3.9 3.6 Poll conducted on February 8-12, 2006

June 2006 Poll 58 - Q33 Which Palestinian faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1197 N=759 N=438 Fatah 33.7 35.8 29.9 Hamas 28.9 24.2 37.0 Islamic Jihad 2.2 2.1 2.3 PFLP 4.3 3.7 5.5 Democratic Front 0.6 0.9 0.0 PPP 0.3 0.4 0.0 Palestinian National Initia- 1.3 1.7 0.7 tive Other Islamic Factions 1.7 2.5 0.2 Don't Trust any one 21.7 23.3 18.9

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No answer 4.3 4.1 4.8 FIDA 0.4 0.7 0.0 Others 0.6 0.6 0.7 Poll conducted on June 21-22, 2006

September 2006 Poll 60 - Q28 Which Palestinian faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Fatah 30.7 31.3 29.5 Hamas 29.7 27.5 33.4 PFLP 3.6 4.3 2.3 Palestinian National Initia- 1.5 2.0 0.7 tive Islamic Jihad 1.2 0.9 1.6 Other Islamic Groups 1.0 1.2 0.7 DFLP 0.8 1.2 0.2 PPP 0.3 0.4 0.2 FIDA 0.3 0.5 0.0 Other 0.8 0.8 0.7 Don’t trust anyone 25.8 24.1 28.9 No answer 4.3 5.8 1.8 Poll conducted on September 19-22, 2006

March 2007 (Part 1) Poll 61 - Q31 Which Palestinian Faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=757 N=441 Fatah 31.4 32.5 29.5 Hamas 25.2 21.5 31.5 PFLP 3.3 3.3 3.2 Islamic Jihad 1.5 1.1 2.3 Palestinian National Initia- 1.4 1.8 0.7 tive Other Islamic Groups 1.7 1.8 1.4 Other factions 2.3 2.1 2.5 Don't trust any faction 27.1 29.2 23.6 No answer 6.1 6.7 5.3 Poll conducted on March 19-21, 2007

August 2007 Poll 62 - Q16 Which Palestinian Faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza

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N=1199 N=759 N=440 Fatah 34.4 32.7 37.5 Hamas 21.6 17.7 28.4 PFLP 2.8 3.2 2.3 Islamic Jihad 2.1 1.3 3.4 Palestinian National Initia- 1.8 2.2 0.9 tive Other Islamic Groups 2.3 3.2 0.7 Other parties 2.2 2.5 1.6 Don’t trust any one 29.1 32.8 22.7 No answer 3.7 4.4 2.5 Poll conducted on August 16-20, 2007

November 2007 Poll 63 - Q26 Which Political or Religious Palestinian Faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Fatah 40.0 38.0 43.4 Hamas 19.7 16.4 25.2 PFLP 2.8 3.2 2.3 Islamic Jihad 2.3 1.4 3.6 Others 2.5 3.6 0.5 Other Islamic Groups 1.1 1.2 0.9 Don’t trust any one 26.9 30.7 20.5 No answer 4.7 5.5 3.6 Poll conducted on November 3-6, 2007

April 2008 Poll 64 - Q33 Which Palestinian Faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=760 N=439 Fatah 32.5 31.1 35.1 Hamas 17.8 15.0 22.8 Islamic Jihad 2.8 2.1 3.9 PFLP 2.4 2.5 2.3 Other Islamic Groups 2.0 2.6 0.9 Palestinian National Initia- 1.0 1.4 0.2 tive Others 1.4 2.1 0.2 Don’t trust any one 33.6 36.4 28.7 No answer 6.5 6.8 5.9 Poll conducted on April 8-13, 2008

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November 2008 (Part 1) Poll 66 - Q9 Which Palestinian Faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Fatah 31.3 28.8 35.5 Hamas 16.6 12.8 23.2 Islamic Jihad 2.4 1.3 4.3 PFLP 2.3 1.8 3.2 Palestinian National Initia- 1.3 1.7 0.5 tive Other Islamic Groups 3.9 5.5 1.1 Others 1.8 2.0 1.4 I don’t trust anyone 35.8 39.9 28.6 No answer 4.6 6.2 2.2 Poll conducted on November 20-23, 2008

January 2009 Poll 67 - Q16 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=758 N=440 Hamas 27.7 26.5 29.8 Fatah 26.0 24.3 29.1 PFLP 3.3 4.0 2.0 Islamic Jihad 2.8 2.1 4.1 Palestinian National Initia- 1.1 1.7 0.0 tive Other Islamic Groups 2.0 1.5 3.0 Others 2.7 3.0 2.0 Don’t trust anyone 29.4 31.3 26.1 No answer 5.0 5.6 3.9 Poll conducted on January 29-31, 2009

June 2009 Poll 68 - Q23 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1199 N=760 N=439 Fatah 34.9 35.1 34.6 Hamas 18.8 14.1 26.9 PFLP 4.4 4.6 4.1 Islamic Jihad 2.8 1.7 4.8 Other Islamic Groups 0.8 1.3 0.0 Others 2.4 3.6 0.5 Don’t trust anyone 30.4 32.9 26.2

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No answer 5.5 6.7 2.9 Poll conducted on June 20-24, 2009

October 2009 (Part 1) Poll 69 - Q18 Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=760 N=440 Fatah 34.6 33.9 35.7 Hamas 17.9 15.3 22.5 PFLP 3.7 4.9 1.6 Islamic Jihad 2.3 1.7 3.4 Palestinian National Initia- 1.9 2.6 0.7 tive Other Islamic Groups 2.9 2.0 4.5 Others 1.5 1.6 1.4 Don’t trust anyone 29.8 30.7 28.4 No answer 5.4 7.3 1.8 Poll conducted on October 7-11, 2009

April 2010 Poll 70 - Q27 Which Political or religious faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=748 N=450 Fatah 36.2 36.6 35.6 Hamas 14.4 13.1 16.7 PFLP 2.8 3.3 2.0 Islamic Jihad 2.7 1.2 5.1 Palestinian National Initia- 1.3 2.1 0.0 tive Other Islamic Groups 2.4 0.1 6.2 Others 1.7 2.0 1.1 Don’t trust any one 31.3 32.0 30.2 No answer 7.2 9.6 3.1 Poll conducted on April 10-15, 2010

September 2010 Poll 71 - Q39 Which political or religious faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=750 N=450 Fatah 40.7 41.5 39.3 Hamas 13.2 8.3 21.3 PFLP 2.9 3.5 2.0 Palestinian National Initia- 2.0 3.1 0.2 tive

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Islamic Jihad 1.7 0.5 3.6 PPP 1.1 1.6 0.2 DFLP 0.4 0.3 0.7 FIDA 0.1 0.1 0.0 Others Islamic Groups 1.7 0.3 4.0 I don’t trust any faction 30.8 34.5 24.7 No answer 5.4 6.3 4.0 Poll conducted on September 11-15, 2010

October 2010 Poll 72 - Q16 Which political or religious faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1200 N=750 N=450 Fatah 35.3 37.6 31.6 Hamas 13.3 10.4 18.0 PFLP 3.3 2.9 3.8 Islamic Jihad 1.5 0.7 2.9 Palestinian National Initia- 0.9 1.5 0.0 tive PPP 0.7 0.9 0.2 DFLP 0.5 0.4 0.7 Other Islamic Groups 2.3 0.8 4.9 Others 0.6 0.9 0.0 I don’t trust any faction 37.3 38.1 35.8 No answer 4.3 5.8 2.1 Poll was conducted on October 24-28, 2010

April 2011 Poll 73 - Q31 Which political or religious faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=750 N=448 Fatah 34.0 34.5 33.0 Hamas 15.0 12.4 19.4 PFLP 3.0 3.2 2.7 Islamic Jihad 1.7 0.9 2.9 Palestinian National Initia- 1.5 2.3 0.2 tive Other Islamic Groups 1.3 0.8 2.0 Others 2.0 2.3 1.6 I don’t trust any faction 37.0 36.9 37.1 No answer 4.5 6.7 1.1 Poll conducted on April 6-10, 2011

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June 2011 Poll 74 - Q16 Which political or religious faction do you trust the most? Total West Bank Gaza N=1198 N=750 N=448 Fatah 39.2 38.0 41.3 Hamas 16.6 13.6 21.7 PFLP (C) 2.5 2.8 2.0 Palestinian National Initia- 1.3 1.7 0.7 tive Islamic Jihad 1.0 0.1 2.5 Independents 2.8 4.0 0.9 Other Islamic Groups 1.7 0.5 3.6 Others 1.4 1.7 0.9 Don’t trust any one 28.4 30.7 24.6 No answer 5.1 6.9 1.8 Poll conducted on May 31- June 4, 2011

Data accessed online from the JMCC The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre http://jmcc.org/! ! 213 Appendix 2

The Peace Index 1994 – 2011

General Oslo Sample Date Poll was Sample Popula- 1994 Peace Sample Location Index Size Conducted tion Index January ------February ------March ------April ------May ------June 55.2 51 512 Jun 24 Jewish Public Israel, excl. Kibbutzim July 64.1 51.8 506 Jul 24 Jewish Public Israel, excl. Kibbutzim August 65.6 54.5 502 Aug 24 Jewish Public Israel, excl. Kibbutzim September 64.95 51.3 501 Sep 28 Jewish Public Israel, excl. Kibbutzim October 64.7 48.0 504 Oct 23 Jewish Public Israel, excl. Kibbutzim November 62.75 48.3 501 Nov 23 Jewish Public Israel December 59.7 47.4 501 Dec 25 Jewish Public Israel, incl. Kibbutzim

General Oslo Sample Date Poll was Sample 1995 Peace Sample Location Index Size Conducted Population Index January 52.5 43.7 503 Jan 27 Jewish Public Israel February 52.7 45.6 503 Feb 27 Jewish Public Israel March 56.1 48.5 - - - - April 52.7 45.5 505 - Jewish Public Israel May 59.5 49.0 506 May 25 Jewish Public Israel June 59.75 48.4 - - Jewish Public Israel July 54.4 45.9 502 Jul 27 Jewish Public Israel

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 214 Appendix 2

August 53.4 45.5 500 Aug 28 Jewish Public Israel September 51.44 45.3 507 Sep 27 Jewish Public Israel October 54.9 46.9 506 Oct 29 Jewish Public Israel November39 73.1/65.7 57.9/58.0 501 Nov 8/Nov 29 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim 40 December 62.1 55.8 507 Dec 27 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

General Oslo Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 1996 Peace Sample Location Index Size Conducted lation Index January 60.3 51.5 505 Jan 29 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim February 58.6 50.4 504 - Jewish Public Israel March 62.5 50.5 504 Mar 27 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim April 63.3 56.0 503 April 29 Jewish Public Israel May 66.3 52.8 505 May 30 Jewish Public Israel June 63.3 53.0 505 Jun 30 Jewish Public Israel July 63.3 50.5 504 Jul 29 Jewish Public Israel August 63.8 52.6 506 Aug 28 Jewish Public Israel September 60.5 50.0 507 Sep 26 Jewish Public Israel October 63.1 52.3 509 - Jewish Public Israel November 63.6 51.2 509 Nov 28 Jewish Public Israel December 62.5 54.5 504 Dec 13 Jewish Public Israel

General Oslo Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 1997 Peace Sample Location Index Size Conducted lation Index January 64.6 56.6 504 Jan 29 Jewish Public Israel !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 39 The first November poll listed was taken just after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on November 4 40 The figures for the General Peace Index and the Oslo Index were averaged for this month in the analysis!

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 215 Appendix 2

February 62.4 54.1 503 Jan 27-28 Jewish Public Israel March 59.0 48.0 503 Mar 30 Jewish Public Israel April 60.2 49.1 505 Apr 30 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim May 58.1 51.1 502 May 29 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim June 62.5 50.2 502 Jun 30 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim July 50.9 46.1 509 Jul 30 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim August 56.7 43.9 500 Aug 31 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim September 58.4 45.9 505 Sep 29 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim October 58.9 47.2 504 Oct 29 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November 63.9 50.4 501 Nov 31 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim December 59.6 49.4 505 Dec 30 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

General Oslo Sample Date Poll was Sample 1998 Peace Sample Location Index Size Conducted Population Index January 59.5 49.9 500 Jan 28 Jewish Public Israel, Judea, Samaria, & Kibbutzim February 55.8 47.6 510 Feb 25-26 Jewish Public Israel, West Bank, settlements, & Kibbutzim March 56.1 50.9 501 Mar 29 Jewish Public Israel, West Bank, settlements, & Kibbutzim April 61.5 50.9 501 Apr 27 Jewish Public Israel, West Bank, settlements, & Kibbutzim May 62.0 50.4 501 May 28 Jewish Public Israel, West Bank, settlements, & Kibbutzim June 61.0 51.4 501 Jun 29 Jewish Public Israel, West Bank, settlements, & Kibbutzim July 62.0 50.2 504 Jul 29 Jewish Public Israel, West Bank, settlements, & Kibbutzim August 59.4 48.5 502 Aug 30 Jewish Public Israel, West Bank, settlements, & Kibbutzim September 57.3 47.2 504 Sep 27 Jewish Public Israel, Judea, Samaria, & Kibbutzim October 64.1 57.3 506 Oct 27 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November 60.6 51.5 509 Nov 29 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim December 63.0 52.2 500 Dec 30 Jewish Public Israel, incl. Territories & Kibbutzim

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 216 Appendix 2

General Oslo Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 1999 Peace Sample Location Index Size Conducted lation Index January 64.5 52.3 504 Jan 27 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim February 65.7 52.8 500 Feb 24-25 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim March 64.5 55.2 497 Mar 30 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim April 66.8 56.8 506 Apr 27 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim May 67.1 54.5 501 May 30-31 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim June 65.0 52.1 505 Jun 28-29 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim July 64.7 54.7 501 Jul 28 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim August 63.3 47.8 501 Aug 29 Jewish Public Israel, Judea & Kibbutzim September 61.2 49.4 501 Sep 28-29 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim October 61.2 50.4 500 Oct 26-27 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November41 62.4 51.7 500 Nov 16-17, 30 Jewish & Arab Israel December 59.9 48.3 502 Dec 29 Public42 Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

General Sample Date Poll was Sample Popula- 2000 Oslo Index Sample Location Peace Index Size Conducted tion January 58.6 50.0 500 Jan 31 Public Israel, Judea, Samaria, & Kibbutzim February 55.9 46.4 501 Feb 28 Public Israel, Judea, Samaria, & Kibbutzim March 54.0 46.0 506 Mar 29-30 Public Israel, Judea, Samaria, & Kibbutzim April 56.4 47.9 501 Apr 30 Public Israel, West Bank, & Kibbutzim May 54.3 43.5 519 May 30-31 Public Israel, West Bank, & Kibbutzim June 64.6 46.5 - Jun 23-26 Public - July 57.5 44.3 509 Jul 31-Aug 1 Jewish Public Israel, West Bank, & Kibbutzim August 56.0 45.3 508 Aug 29-30 Jewish Public Israel, West Bank, & Kibbutzim September43 53.5; 52.2** 42.6; 40.7** 572; 586* Sep 26-27; Oct 2* Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 41 Poll taken of two sample populations: Arab and Jewish, each with 500 respondents. 42 For all charts stating “Public,” polls state they were taken of the population and did not specify between Jews and Arabs, or both.

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 217 Appendix 2

October 55.1; 52.7** 39.8; 37.7** 585 Oct 29-30 Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim 58.7; November 43.8; 41.6** 575 Nov 29-30 Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim 56.95** December 59.6; 57.7** 44.5; 43.4** 574 Dec 22-23, 25-26 Jewish & Arab - * The sample sizes and dates correspond with one another respectively ** The first figure represents the entire sample, the second represents only the Jewish sample

General Peace Oslo Index Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 2001 Index Sample Location Size Conducted lation Overall Jewish Overall Jewish January 55.5 52.9 40.1 37.0 573 Jan 30-31 Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim February 57.1 55.7 40.3 38.2 572 Feb 27-28 Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim March 51.4 50.2 34.2 31.8 578 Mar 28-29 Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim April 55.2 53.6 37.0 35.2 574 Apr 29-30 Jewish & Arab Incl. Judea, Samaria, Gaza, & Kibbutzim May 52.4 50.6 36.3 33.7 570 May 29-30 Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim June 51.7 49.4 35.4 30.8 575 Jun 26-27 Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim July 51.5 50.1 32.5 30.1 574 Jul 30-31 Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim August 53.4 50.9 30.4 26.7 580 Aug 29-30 Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim September - 47.1 - 29.8 506 Sep 23-25 Jewish Public Entire country, incl. Gaza, & Kibbutzim October 51.8 49.1 36.5 33.0 577 Oct 29-31 Jewish & Arab Entire country, incl. West Bank, & Kibbutzim Nov 27-28; Entire country, incl. West Bank, Gaza, & November 53.3 50.1 34.7 31.9 587 Jewish & Arab Dec 3-4 Kibbutzim Dec 30-31; Entire country, incl. West Bank, Gaza, & December 52.5 50.2 34.4 31.0 578 Jewish & Arab Jan 2 Kibbutzim

General Peace Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 2002 Oslo Index Sample Location Index Size Conducted lation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 43 Based on samples of previous surveys of the Arab population, from hereon, every Index will be submitted twice: Overall population and Jewish population. For September-December 2000, the Overall sample is separated from the Jewish sample by a semicolon, respectively.

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 218 Appendix 2

Overall Jewish Overall Jewish Entire country, incl. Judea, Samaria, January 52.9 51.2 33.7 30.2 578 Jan 28-30 Jewish & Arab Gaza, & Kibbutzim February 55.9 53.4 35.8 28.7 582 Feb 26-28 Jewish & Arab Israel, incl. Territories, & Kibbutzim Entire country, incl. Judea, Samaria, March 55.3 54.8 36.6 32.6 581 Mar 24-25 Jewish & Arab Gaza, & Kibbutzim April 55.2 53.7 29.4 26.1 571 Apr 23-25 Jewish & Arab Israel, incl. Territories, & Kibbutzim May 54.7 52.6 29.2 27.6 576 May 28-30 Jewish & Arab Israel, incl. Territories, & Kibbutzim Entire country, incl. Judea, Samaria, June 54.9 52.8 30.5 27.3 571 Jun 25-27 Jewish & Arab Gaza, & Kibbutzim Entire country, incl. Judea, Samaria, July 53.7 51.3 30.6 26.9 579 Jul 29-31 Jewish & Arab Gaza, & Kibbutzim August 55.9 53.8 33.5 30.8 588 Aug 27-29 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim September 54.0 52.0 33.0 29.8 588 Sep 29-Oct 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim October 54.9 52.9 35.3 31.2 574 Oct 29-30 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November 54.1 50.7 33.1 29.9 592 Dec 1-3 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim December 55.2 53.1 33.9 30.7 575 Dec 30-31 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

Negotiation Index Oslo Index Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 2003 Sample Location Overall Jewish Overall Jewish Size Conducted lation January44 - - 33.7 29.7 573 Feb 2-4 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim February45 - - 34.4 31.3 576 Feb 25-27 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim March - - 31.2 28.3 576 Mar 30-31 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim April - - 36.2 32.5 580 Apr 29-30 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim May46 - - 37.4 33.1 573 May 27-29 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim June47 - - 38.7 35.0 573 Jun 30-Jul 2 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 44 A General Peace Index was also given for this month: Overall = 55.2, Jewish = 51.0. These are the figures used in the analysis. 45 A General Peace Index was also given for this month: Overall = 56.0, Jewish = 53.8. These are the figures used in the analysis. 46 A Road-Map Index was also given for this month: Overall = 46.7, Jewish = 43.0

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 219 Appendix 2

Entire country, incl. Judea, Sa- July48 57.3 - 36.6 - 576 Jul 28-30 Jewish & Arab maria, & Kibbutzim August 47.6 46.3 30.2 26.9 583 Aug 31-Sep 2 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim September 49.4 47.7 33.5 29.8 582 Sep 30-Oct 2 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim October 52.3 50.8 31.2 27.2 574 Oct 28-29 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November 56.8 54.4 35.0 28.9 583 Nov 30-Dec 2 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim December 52.4 50.4 32.0 28.7 579 Dec 29-31 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

Negotiation Index Oslo Index Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 2004 Sample Location Overall Jewish Overall Jewish Size Conducted lation January 50.8 49.7 33.1 29.4 575 Jan 27-29 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim February 48.7 45.5 31.8 26.4 580 Mar 1-2 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim March 48.0 46.7 34.1 30.6 576 Mar 28-30 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim April 51.1 47.5 35.8 30.8 581 May 4-6 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim May 53.4 51.2 34.2 30.6 589 May 31-Jun 2 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim June 54.1 52.3 38.9 35.9 579 Jun 28-30 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim July 50.0 47.8 34.8 30.6 577 Aug 1-3 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim August 53.3 51.0 37.0 34.2 575 Aug 29-31 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim September 51.6 49.7 36.9 33.4 599 Sep 26-28 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim October 52.7 51.1 38.2 34.9 579 Nov 1-3 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November 56.7 54.9 36.7 33.9 581 Nov 29-30 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim December 56.8 55.6 38.5 37.5 594 Dec 27-28 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

Negotiation Index Oslo Index Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 2005 Sample Location Overall Jewish Overall Jewish Size Conducted lation January 61.6 59.7 42.2 38.5 581 Jan 31-Feb 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 47 A Road-Map Index was also given for this month: Overall = 44.4, Jewish = 39.4 48 The figures for this month represent the general population, as the Jewish sample was not provided by the Peace Index.!

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 220 Appendix 2

February 59.8 58.0 39.9 36.2 582 Feb 28-Mar 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim March 59.8 57.7 40.2 37.0 580 Mar 29-30 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim April 58.0 54.9 40.3 36.8 578 May 2-3 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim May 57.8 54.9 40.8 36.8 584 May 30-31 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim June 56.1 54.1 39.1 36.6 573 Jun 28-30 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim July 52.7 49.9 36.0 33.2 576 Aug 2-4 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim August 51.7 49.0 36.8 32.9 576 Aug 30-Sep 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim September 52.3 49.9 36.6 33.1 582 Sep 28-29 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim October 53.4 50.6 39.6 36.6 585 Oct 31-Nov 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November 59.2 57.4 42.9 40.6 583 Nov 28-29 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim December 55.6 52.9 41.1 37.0 591 Dec 26-27 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

Negotiation Index Oslo Index Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 2006 Sample Location Overall Jewish Overall Jewish Size Conducted lation January - - 36.5 33.8 582 Jan 30-Feb 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim February 52.2 49.7 40.0 35.0 673 Feb 27 –Mar 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim March 54.1 51.1 38.5 33.7 603 Apr 3-4 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim April 50.7 44.5 38.2 33.9 588 May 7-8 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim May 51.1 46.9 38.2 33.2 593 May 29-31 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim June 46.3 43.2 33.6 30.0 589 July 3-4 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim July 45.8 41.0 - - 617 July 31-Aug 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim August 46.3 41.8 - - 594 Sep 4-5 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim September 45.9 42.2 33.0 29.0 614 Oct 3-4 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim October - - 36.9 33.0 585 Oct 31-Nov 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November 53.1 49.4 35.8 33.0 598 Nov 28-29 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim December49 - 47.0 - 31.0 488 Jan 1-2 Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim !

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 49 Due to the difficulty in conducting surveys of the Arab public during Id al-Adha holiday, only a Jewish sample was taken.

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 221 Appendix 2

! Negotiation Index Oslo Index Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 2007 Sample Location Overall Jewish Overall Jewish Size Conducted lation January 50.4 48.2 37.1 33.2 607 Jan 29-31 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim February 49.3 46.3 36.4 33.8 590 Feb 26-27 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim March 52.3 50.1 40.0 37.2 583 Mar 26-27 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim April 47.7 44.6 35.8 32.4 639 Apr 30-May 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim May 45.7 41.9 33.7 30.1 613 May 38-30 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim June 48.5 46.6 35.0 32.9 580 Jun 26-27 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim July 50.1 47.1 34.8 31.4 600 Jul 30-Aug 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim August 46.9 43.6 31.5 27.7 589 Sep 3-5 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim September50 51.6 49.2 35.1 32.3 580 Oct 8-10 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim October 53.3 49.4 40.7 37.6 599 Oct 29-30 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November51 50.7 47.7 36.9 34.5 592 Dec 3-4 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim December52 49.7 47.0 34.7 31.4 595 Jan 1-2 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

Negotiation Index Oslo Index Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 2008 Sample Location Overall Jewish Overall Jewish Size Conducted lation January 42.9 39.3 32.8 29.3 595 Feb 4-6 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim February 44.1 40.3 30.1 26.7 590 Mar 3-4 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim March ------Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim April ------Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim May ------Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim June ------Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim July ------Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim August ------Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 50 A General Peace Index was also given for this month: Overall = 54.2, Jewish = 48.3 51 A General Peace Index was also given for this month: Overall = 48.1, Jewish = 45.6 52 A General Peace Index was also given for this month: Overall = 49.4, Jewish = 46.5!

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 222 Appendix 2

September53 ------Jewish Public Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim October 49.3 45.5 - - 598 Nov 3-5 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November 51.0 47.6 - - 598 Dec 1-3 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim December ------Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

Negotiation Index Oslo Index Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 2009 Sample Location Overall Jewish Overall Jewish Size Conducted lation January ------Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim February 50.4 47.0 - - 598 Feb 17-18 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim March 50.3 47.3 - - 595 Mar 30-31 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim April 50.4 48.7 - - 600 Apr 21-22 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim May - - - - 516 Jun 1-2 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim June - - - - 503 Jun 30-Jul 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim July 52.3 48.9 - - 512 Jul 27-28 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim August - - - - 530 Aug 31-Sep 1 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim September 51.4 47.8 - - 514 Oct 12-13 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim October 54.3 51.8 - - 507 Nov 11-13 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim November 50.3 47.8 - - 512 Dec 8-9 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim December 52.4 50.0 - - 525 Jan 4-5 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

Negotiation Index Oslo Index Sample Date Poll was Sample Popu- 2010 Sample Location Overall Jewish Overall Jewish Size Conducted lation January ------Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim February 54.1 51.3 - - - Feb 8-10 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim March 56.3 54.5 - - 505 Mar 15-17 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim April 57.6 56.1 - - 518 May 3-4 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 53 Due to the difficulty in conducting surveys of the Arab public during Ramadan, only a Jewish sample was taken

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 223 Appendix 2

May 46 46.3 - - 603 Jun 7-9 Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim June ------Jewish & Arab Israel, Territories & Kibbutzim July - - - - - Jul 6-7 Jewish & Arab Israel August 54.2 50.6 - - 601 Aug 8-9 Jewish & Arab Israel September 51.3 49.8 - - 601 Sep 12-14 Jewish & Arab Israel October 52.5 50.0 - - 601 Oct 18-20 Jewish & Arab Israel November - 47.2 - - 510 Nov 15-16 Jewish Public Israel December 52.5 50.0 - - 610 Dec 14-15 Public Israel

Negotiation Index Oslo Index Sample Date Poll was Sample Popula- Sample 2011 Overall Jewish Overall Jewish Size Conducted tion Location January 50.6 49.8 - - 600 Jan 18-19 Jewish Public Israel February 49.0 46.3 - - 600 Feb 21-22 Jewish Public Israel March 47.0 45.3 - - 601 Mar 23-24 Jewish Public Israel April ------May 47.4 44.4 - - 600 May 17-18 Jewish Public Israel May II54 - - - - 602 May 29-30 Jewish Public Israel June 49.7 49.4 - - 599 Jun 27-28 Jewish Public Israel July 49.0 47.3 - - 600 Jul 26-27 Jewish Public Israel August - 49.8 - - 613 Aug 23-24 Jewish Public Israel September 49.6 49.7 - - 600 Oct 2-3 Jewish Public Israel October 50.0 49.8 - - 6060 Oct 31-Nov 1 Jewish Public Israel

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 54 Following Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to the U.S. on May 20, and address to Congress on May 24, 2011.

Data accessed online from the Evans Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution Tel Aviv University http://www.peaceindex.org/! ! 224 Appendix 3A

Israeli and Palestinian Casualties January 1994 – September 29, 2000

Palestinian civilians killed by Israeli security forces in the OT Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 22 1988 17 30 43 44 17 12 22 24 16 24 10 30 289 1989 21 14 22 29 36 21 30 27 21 30 13 21 285 1990 11 8 10 9 24 7 4 1 4 33 3 11 125 1991 16 7 8 6 12 3 5 8 10 8 4 4 91 1992 6 9 16 11 14 7 10 6 7 13 12 23 134 1993 15 22 21 16 27 5 9 5 9 5 12 8 154 1994 12 28 27 8 3 3 3 4 4 8 5 0 105 1995 10 2 1 6 0 8 1 2 4 0 1 3 38 1996 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 44 4 2 0 56 1997 1 2 1 6 0 0 5 1 0 0 2 0 18 1998 0 0 4 1 5 1 0 0 3 1 0 6 21 1999 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 8 2000* 1 2 6 0 1 2 0 Second Intifada 12

* Until 28/09/2000

Palestinian civilians killed by Israeli civilians in the OT Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1988 1 5 1 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 15

1989 1 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 17

1990 1 2 1 1 3 1 9

1991 1 1 2 2 6

1992 1 1 2

1993 1 2 1 1 1 2 6 14

1994 29 3 2 2 1 1 38

1995 1 1 2

1996 1 1 1 3

1997 1 1 2

1998 1 2 1 1 1 6

1999 0

2000 0

Palestinian civilians killed by Israeli security forces in Israel Ja Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total n 1987 0

1988 1 1

1989 1 1

1990 1 1

1991 1 4 5

Data provided by B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 225 Appendix 3A

1992 1 1 2

1993 6 1 3 1 11

1994 1 1 2 1 2 7

1995 0

1996 0

1997 0

1998 0

1999 1 1

2000* 4 Second Intifada 4

* Until 28/09/2000

Palestinian civilians killed by Israeli civilians in Israel Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

1987 0

1988 4 1 5

1989 1 1 2

1990 7 1 2 10

1991 1 1 2

1992 0

1993 1 1 2

1994 1 1

1995 1 1

1996 1 1 2

1997 1 1

1998 1 1

1999 0

2000 0

Israeli security forces killed by Palestinian security forces in the OT Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

1987 0

1988 1 1 2 4

1989 2 1 1 2 6

1990 1 1 1 3

1991 1 1

1992 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 5 14

1993 2 3 2 3 5 2 1 18

1994 1 2 3 1 1 4 12

1995 7 1 1 9

1996 3 1 15 19

1997 0

1998 2 1 3

1999 2 2

2000* Second Intifada 0

* Until 28/09/2000

Data provided by B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 226 Appendix 3A

Israeli civilians killed by Palestinian civilians in the OT Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

1987 0

1988 1 4 1 6

1989 1 1 1 3

1990 2 2 4

1991 1 1 1 3 1 7

1992 2 1 1 2 2 3 11

1993 2 7 1 2 2 2 3 2 6 27

1994 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 11

1995 1 1 2 1 1 6

1996 1 2 3

1997 2 1 1 4

1998 1 1 1 1 3 1 8

1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2000* 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Second Intifada 2 * Until 28/09/2000

Israeli civilians killed by Palestinian civilians inside Israel Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

1987 0

1988 1 1 2

1989 1 2 1 12 1 17

1990 1 2 1 2 7 13

1991 5 1 1 7

1992 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 8

1993 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 9

1994 3 4 2 13 1 2 1 21 47

1995 1 6 2 9

1996 14 18 1 2 3 38

1997 1 3 13 2 5 1 25

1998 1 1

1999 1 1

Israeli security forces killed by Palestinian civilians inside Israel Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

1987 0

1988 0

1989 1 1 3 5

1990 2 2

1991 1 1 2 4

1992 1 1

1993 1 3 1 1 1 7

1994 2 1 1 4

1995 20 1 21

1996 9 4 1 1 15

1997 0

Data provided by B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 227 Appendix 3A

1998 0

1999 0

2000 0

Palestinian security forces killed by Israeli security forces in the OT Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

1994 1 1

1995 3 1 4

1996 11 2 13

1997 0

1998 0

1999 0

2000 0

Israeli civilians killed by Palestinian security forces in the OT Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

1996 1 1

Data provided by B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 228 Appendix 3B

Israeli and Palestinian Casualties September 29, 2000 – September 30, 2011

Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in the Occupied Territories Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

2000 16 101 110 48 275

2001 19 19 27 23 46 12 28 35 59 85 35 65 453 2002 23 79 229 243 45 55 39 49 51 62 43 71 989 2003 52 69 83 56 61 57 4 26 29 58 30 48 573 2004 27 54 79 53 113 46 58 39 113 140 40 61 823 2005 50 8 1 5 10 5 23 7 17 22 15 20 183 2006 13 29 15 31 37 41 180 74 32 60 134 14 660 2007 10 12 9 16 61 40 27 45 34 35 29 61 379 2008 87 78 112 72 39 30 6 0 3 4 15 432 878 2009 977 9 9 5 6 4 2 6 9 0 1 6 1034 2010 8 2 8 5 1 15 5 2 12 6 3 13 80 2011 8 5 15 24 2 0 4 31 2 91

Total 6418

Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians in the Occupied Territories Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

2000 0 2 1 3 6

2001 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 2 7 2002 0 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 13 2003 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2005 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 7 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2008 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2009 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2010 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2011 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

Total 50

Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in Israel Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

2000 0 1 0 0 1

2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 3 0 9 2002 5 5 7 1 0 1 3 3 0 2 2 1 30 2003 5 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 2 0 7 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2006 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 5 2008 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3

Data accessed online from B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 229 Appendix 3B

2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 69

Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians in Israel Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

2000 0 0 0 0 0

2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2007 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2008 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2011 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Total 3

Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

2000 0 6 7 5 18

2001 6 3 2 1 11 5 6 8 6 3 4 10 65 2002 2 12 18 4 5 13 15 5 3 4 3 3 87 2003 2 0 3 1 10 2 0 3 2 0 2 0 25 2004 2 0 1 1 5 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 15 2005 7 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 3 0 1 17 2006 0 0 5 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 2007 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2008 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 2009 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2010 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 5 2011 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 2 8

Total 254

Israeli security force personnel killed by Palestinians in the Occupied Territory Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

2000 1 4 11 3 19

2001 0 2 0 2 1 3 1 4 3 1 4 1 22 2002 1 14 19 29 2 7 3 1 4 3 14 4 101 2003 3 8 3 4 0 7 0 1 3 6 2 2 39 2004 3 1 0 1 14 1 1 0 7 3 0 6 37 2005 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 4

Data accessed online from B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 230 Appendix 3B

2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 6 2008 1 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 2009 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2010 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 252

Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians in Israel Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

2000 0 0 4 0 4

2001 0 1 6 3 5 18 1 14 3 8 6 23 88 2002 9 1 75 6 22 24 7 4 6 8 23 0 185 2003 15 0 15 1 3 18 2 21 7 21 0 1 104 2004 10 9 10 0 0 2 0 16 2 0 3 1 53 2005 3 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 7 0 5 25 2006 0 1 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 10 2007 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2008 0 2 8 2 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 3 21 2009 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2010 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2011 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2

Total 499

Israeli security force personnel killed by Palestinians in Israel Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

2000 0 0 0 0 0

2001 0 7 0 1 0 2 2 0 1 2 0 2 17 2002 4 2 10 7 0 13 0 3 0 7 0 0 46 2003 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 9 0 0 3 17 2004 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2006 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2008 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 90

Data accessed online from B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 231 Appendix 3C

Israeli and Palestinian Casualties 1994 – 2011

Palestinian Israeli Palestinian Israeli 1994 1996 Casualties Casualties Casualties Casualties January 12 4 January 4 3 February 57 8 February 1 23 March 31 3 March 0 22 April 11 15 April 0 1 May 6 4 May 0 1 June 3 1 June 2 3 July 4 4 July 0 3 August 4 4 August 0 0 September 7 2 September 55 17 October 9 23 October 8 0 November 5 6 November 2 0 December 3 0 December 2 3 Total 152 74 Total 74 76

Palestinian Israeli Palestinian Israeli 1995 1997 Casualties Casualties Casualties Casualties January 14 22 January 1 1 February 2 1 February 2 0 March 1 2 March 1 3 April 6 7 April 7 2 May 0 0 May 1 0 June 9 0 June 0 0 July 1 8 July 5 13 August 3 3 August 2 3 September 4 1 September 0 5 October 0 1 October 0 1 November 2 0 November 2 1 December 3 0 December 0 0 Total 45 45 Total 21 29

Data accessed online from B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 232 Appendix 3C

Palestinian Israeli Palestinian Israeli 1998 2001 Casualties Casualties Casualties Casualties January 0 1 January 19 6 February 0 1 February 19 13 March 4 0 March 27 8 April 1 1 April 23 7 May 7 1 May 46 17 June 3 0 June 13 28 July 0 0 July 32 10 August 0 3 August 37 26 September 4 0 September 59 13 October 2 4 October 89 14 November 0 0 November 38 14 December 7 1 December 67 36 Total 28 12 Total 469 192

Palestinian Israeli Palestinian Israeli 1999 2002 Casualties Casualties Casualties Casualties January 2 2 January 28 16 February 0 0 February 85 29 March 0 0 March 237 122 April 0 1 April 246 46 May 1 0 May 48 29 June 1 0 June 57 57 July 0 0 July 43 25 August 1 1 August 53 13 September 0 0 September 51 13 October 2 0 October 66 22 November 0 0 November 46 40 December 2 0 December 72 7 Total 9 4 Total 1032 419

Palestinian Israeli Palestinian Israeli 2000 2003 Casualties Casualties Casualties Casualties January 1 0 January 60 22 February 0 2 February 69 8 March 6 0 March 85 23 April 0 0 April 59 6 May 6 0 May 61 13 June 0 0 June 59 28 July 1 0 July 4 2 August 2 0 August 26 25 September 16 1 September 29 21 October 104 10 October 58 27 November 111 22 November 30 4 December 51 8 December 48 6 Total 402 43 Total 588 185

Data accessed online from B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 233 Appendix 3C

Palestinian Israeli Palestinian Israeli 2004 2007 Casualties Casualties Casualties Casualties January 27 15 January 10 3 February 54 11 February 12 1 March 79 11 March 9 0 April 53 3 April 16 0 May 113 19 May 62 2 June 46 4 June 40 0 July 59 3 July 27 1 August 39 17 August 47 0 September 114 11 September 34 1 October 145 3 October 36 2 November 42 3 November 31 1 December 61 8 December 61 2 Total 832 108 Total 386 13

Palestinian Israeli Palestinian Israeli 2005 2008 Casualties Casualties Casualties Casualties January 50 13 January 89 1 February 9 5 February 79 2 March 1 0 March 114 12 April 5 0 April 72 8 May 10 1 May 40 2 June 5 4 June 30 1 July 25 8 July 8 4 August 11 0 August 0 0 September 17 1 September 3 0 October 22 10 October 4 1 November 15 1 November 15 0 December 20 8 December 432 4 Total 185 51 Total 886 35

Palestinian Israeli Palestinian Israeli 2006 2009 Casualties Casualties Casualties Casualties January 13 0 January 997 6 February 31 1 February 9 0 March 15 5 March 9 0 April 31 7 April 6 1 May 37 0 May 6 1 June 43 3 June 4 0 July 180 2 July 2 0 August 74 1 August 6 0 September 32 1 September 9 0 October 61 0 October 0 0 November 134 3 November 1 0 December 14 0 December 6 1 Total 665 23 Total 1055 9

Data accessed online from B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 234 Appendix 3C

Palestinian Israeli 2010 Casualties Casualties Palestinian Israeli January 8 0 2011 February 2 2 Casualties Casualties March 8 2 January 10 0 April 5 0 February 6 0 May 2 0 March 15 5 June 15 1 April 24 2 July 5 0 May 2 0 August 2 4 June 0 0 September 13 0 July 4 0 October 6 0 August 31 1 November 3 0 September 2 2 December 13 0 Total 94 10 Total 82 9

Data accessed online from B’Tselem The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/! ! 235 Appendix 4A

Israeli Support for Political Leaders

December 1994 Personal Elections for PM % Netanyahu 51 Rabin 42

February 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Peres 45.6 Netanyahu 47.6 David 1.66 Levi NA 5

March 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Peres 51 Netanyahu 45 NA 4

April 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Peres 49.5 Netanyahu 44.5 NA 6

May 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Peres 49.95 Netanyahu 45 NA 5.05

December 1997 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Barak 16.3 Shahak 14.66 Ben-Ami 14 Netanyahu 36.3 Undecided 18.66

February 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today?

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute ! 236 Appendix 4A

% Netanyahu 44 Barak 36 Don’t 18 Know NA 2

April 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Netanyahu 35 Barak 27 Milo 13 Undecided 18 Will not 7 vote

June 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Netanyahu 39 Barak 42 NA 19

July 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Netanyahu 28 Barak 34 Milo 15 Sharon 15 Will not 8 vote

December 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Netanyahu 30 Barak 32.5 Shahak 9.5 Meridor 6 Begin 6 Eitan 2 Undecided 14

January 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Netanyahu 35 Barak 28

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute ! 237 Appendix 4A

Mordechai 19 Begin 5 Undecided 14

February 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Barak 34 Netanyahu 31.5 Mordechai 19 Begin 4 Undecided 4.5 Will not 7 vote

March 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Barak 33 Netanyahu 36 Mordechai 17 Begin 4 Undecided 10

April 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Barak 39.25 Netanyahu 36.25 Mordechai 10 Begin 3.25 Bishara 3.25 Undecided 8

October 2000 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Barak 38 Netanyahu 50 Did not 12 answer

November 30, 2000 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Barak 35.5 Netanyahu 50.5 Did not 14 answer

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute ! 238 Appendix 4A

December 2000 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Sharon 46 Peres 9.66 Barak 27.33 Undecided 17

January 2001 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Barak 32.4 Sharon 50 Undecided 17.6

October 2001 Who would you prefer to see as PM today? % Sharon 28.5 Netanyahu 24.5 Peres 35 Neither 12

December 2001 If elections were held today who would you vote for PM? % Sharon 24 Netanyahu 23.5 Ben- 32 Eliezer

March 2002 Who would you prefer as PM? % Sharon 25 Netanyahu 25 Ben- 29 Eliezer

Neither 11

Undecided 10

May 2002 If elections were held today who would you vote for PM? % Netanyahu 18 Sharon 50 Ramon 15 Ben- 8 Eliezer

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute ! 239 Appendix 4A

None 1

August 2002 Who is a better candidate for PM? % Sharon 27 Netanyahu 24.25 Ben- 10.25 Eliezer

Mitzna 16.25

Neither 15.25

Undecided 7

September 2004 Which of these people is more suitable to lead Israel? % Sharon 26 Peres 15 Netanyahu 16

Barak 8

None 30

August 2005 Who would you like to be the next PM? % Sharon 24 Peres 16 Netanyahu 16

Landau 8

January 2006 Who is your favorite candidate for PM? % Olmert 34 Netanyahu 34 Peretz 11

Undecided 21

February 2006 If the elections for PM were personal, who would you vote for? % Olmert 33.33 Netanyahu 24 Peretz 18

Undecided 24.66

March 2006 Who is most suitable to be PM?

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute ! 240 Appendix 4A

% Olmert 35 Netanyahu 29 Peretz 16

Undecided 20

August 2006 Who is most suitable to be PM? % Olmert 11 Netanyahu 22 Peretz 1

Liberman 18

Peres 12

Livni 10 Barak 4 None of the 20 above

September 2006 Who is most suitable to be PM? % Olmert 7 Netanyahu 27 Liberman 15

Peretz 1

Peres 12

Livni 14 Barak 3 Mofaz 5 None of the 14 above

November 2006 Who is most suitable to be PM? % Olmert 7 Netanyahu 22 Peretz 3

Liberman 10

Gaydamak 7

Shalom 3 Livni 14 Barak 12 None of the 22 above

January 2007 Who is most suitable to be PM?

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute ! 241 Appendix 4A

% Netanyahu 20.25 Livni 15.25 Olmert 4.88

Ayalon 15.25

Shalom 10

Barak 9.5

April 2007 Who would you like to see as PM? % Netanyahu 29 Livni 20 Ami 14 Ayalon

Barak 10

Silvan 8 Shalom

Olmert 6 No An- 13 swer

June 2007 Who would you like to see as PM? % Netanyahu 34 Barak 25 Olmert 5

No An- 36 swer

July 2007 Who would you like to see as PM? % Netanyahu 36 Barak 22 Olmert 8

None 34

November 2007 Who will fit better as PM? % Netanyahu 34 Barak 17 Olmert 14

None 32

December 2007 Who would you like to see as PM?

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute ! 242 Appendix 4A

% Netanyahu 33 Barak 17 Olmert 8

None 37

March 2008 Who will fit better as PM? % Netanyahu 31.5 Barak 18 Livni 12

Olmert 6.5

None 30

April 2008 Who will fit better as PM? % Netanyahu 37 Barak 20 Olmert 10

None 33

May 2008 Who will fit better as PM? % Netanyahu 32 Barak 17 Livni 10

Olmert 4.33

Mofaz 5.33

None 26.6

June 2008 Who will fit better as PM? % Netanyahu 31.66 Barak 15.66 Livni 10

Olmert 3.33

Mofaz 4.66

None 30

July 25, 2008 Who will fit better as PM? % Netanyahu 37.2

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute ! 243 Appendix 4A

Barak 15.6 Livni 11.4 Mofaz 6.6 Olmert 1.2 None 26.8

November 2008 Who will fit better as PM? % Netanyahu 35 Barak 9 Livni 35

None 21

December 2008 Who do you want to be PM? % Netanyahu 35 Barak 14 Livni 26

None 25

October 2009 Who will fit better as PM? % Netanyahu 41 Barak 7 Livni 31

None 16

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute ! 244 Appendix 4B

Israeli Support for Political Leaders

January 6, 1995 Personal Elections for PM % Netanyahu 51 Rabin 42

February 26, 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=501 4% sampling error % Peres 46 Netanyahu 43 Levi 5 NA 6

February 28, 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=1000 % Peres 45 Netanyahu 51 NA 4

March 8, 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=504 4% sampling error % Peres 46 Netanyahu 49 NA 5

April 5, 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=503 4% sampling error % Peres 51 Netanyahu 45 NA 4

April 26, 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=773 4% sampling error % Peres 49 Netanyahu 44 NA 7

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 245 Appendix 4B

May 10, 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=1008 4% sampling error % Peres 50 Netanyahu 45 NA 5

May 17, 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=1003 3% sampling error % Peres 49.6 Netanyahu 44.2 NA 6.2

May 23, 1996 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=1004 3% sampling error % Peres 50.3 Netanyahu 45.8 NA 3.9

January 9, 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=501 4% sampling error % Barak 49 Netanyahu 36 Undecided 15

January 9, 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=501 4% sampling error % Ben-Ami 42 Netanyahu 38 Undecided 20

January 9, 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=501 4% sampling error % Shahak 44 Netanyahu 35 Undecided 21

March 13, 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today?

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 246 Appendix 4B

N=503 4% sampling error % Netanyahu 44 Barak 36 Don’t Know 18 NA 2

May 5, 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=501 % Netanyahu 35 Barak 27 Milo 13 Undecided 18 Will not vote 7

July 3, 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? % Netanyahu 39 Barak 42 NA 19

August 7, 1998 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=503 4% sampling error % Netanyahu 28 Barak 34 Milo 15 Sharon 15 Will not vote 8

January 1, 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=501 4% sampling error % Netanyahu 30 Barak 29 Shahak 19 Begin 6 Eitan 2 Undecided 14

January 1, 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=501 4% sampling error % Netanyahu 30

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 247 Appendix 4B

Barak 36 Meridor 12 Begin 6 Eitan 2 Undecided 14

January 29, 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=500 4% sampling error % Netanyahu 35 Barak 28 Mordechai 19 Begin 5 Undecided 14

February 19, 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=500 4% sampling error % Barak 37 Netanyahu 30 Mordechai 20 Begin 4 Undecided 9

March 12, 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=602 4% sampling error % Barak 31 Netanyahu 33 Mordechai 18 Begin 4 Will not vote 14

April 2, 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=501 4% sampling error % Barak 33 Netanyahu 36 Mordechai 17 Begin 4 Undecided 10

April 16, 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=500 4.5% sampling error %

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 248 Appendix 4B

Barak 34 Netanyahu 33 Mordechai 17 Begin 4 Bishara 3 Undecided 9

April 30, 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=900 3.3% sampling error % Barak 37 Netanyahu 37 Mordechai 10 Begin 3 Bishara 3 Undecided 10

May 7, 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=436 4% sampling error % Barak 42 Netanyahu 37 Mordechai 7 Begin 3 Bishara 4 Undecided 7

May 14, 1999 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=1100 3% sampling error % Barak 44 Netanyahu 38 Mordechai 6 Begin 3 Bishara 3 Undecided 6

October 20, 2000 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=505 4.5% sampling error % Barak 38 Netanyahu 50 Did not answer 12

November 30, 2000 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today?

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 249 Appendix 4B

N=503 4.5% sampling error % Barak 37 Netanyahu 51 Did not answer 12

December 8, 2000 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=506 4.5% sampling error % Barak 34 Netanyahu 50 Did not answer 16

December 20, 2000 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=503 4.4% sampling error % Sharon 38 Peres 29 Barak 18 Undecided 15

January 5, 2001 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=510 4.5% sampling error % Barak 32 Sharon 50 Undecided 18

January 12, 2001 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=510 4.5% sampling error % Barak 32 Sharon 50 Undecided 18

January 19, 2001 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=574 4.5% sampling error % Barak 32 Sharon 50 Undecided 18

January 23, 2001 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=600 4.5% sampling error

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 250 Appendix 4B

% Barak 30 Sharon 46 Undecided 24

January 26, 2001 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=603 4.5% sampling error % Barak 32 Sharon 49 Undecided 19

January 29, 2001 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=603 4% sampling error % Barak 33 Sharon 49 Undecided 18

February 2, 2001 Who would you vote for PM if the elections were held today? N=1003 3.2% sampling error % Barak 35 Sharon 56 Undecided 9

October 19, 2001 Who would you prefer to see as PM today? N=507 4.5% sampling error A: % Sharon 57 Peres 33 Neither 10

B: % Netanyahu 49 Peres 37 Neither 14

December 28, 2001 If elections were held today who would you vote for PM? N=500 % Sharon 48 Ben-Eliezer 28

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 251 Appendix 4B

December 28, 2001 If elections were held today who would you vote for PM? N=500 % Netanyahu 47 Ben-Eliezer 36

March 29, 2002 Who would you prefer as PM? N=502 4.5% sampling error A: % Sharon 50 Ben-Eliezer 25 Neither 22

Undecided 3

B: % Netanyahu 50 Ben-Eliezer 33 Undecided 17

May 22, 2002 If elections were held today who would you vote for PM? N=519 4.5% sampling error % Netanyahu 18 Sharon 50 Ramon 15 Ben-Eliezer 8 None 1

August 23, 2002 Who is a better candidate for PM? N=500 4.5% sampling error A: % Sharon 58 Ben-Eliezer 15 Neither 21

Undecided 6

B: % Sharon 50 Mitzna 30 Neither 11

Undecided 9

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 252 Appendix 4B

C: % Netanyahu 51 Ben-Eliezer 26 Neither 17

Undecided 6

D: % Netanyahu 46 Mitzna 35 Neither 12

Undecided 7

October 8, 2004 Which of these people is more suitable to lead Israel? N=502 4.5% sampling error % Sharon 26 Peres 15 Netanyahu 16

Barak 8

None 30

August 26, 2005 Who would you like to be the next PM? N=501 % Sharon 24 Peres 16 Netanyahu 16

Landau 8

January 27, 2006 Who is your favorite candidate for PM? N=500 4.2% sampling error % Olmert 34 Netanyahu 34 Peretz 11

Undecided 21

February 24, 2006 If the elections for PM were personal, who would you vote for? N=500 4.5% sampling error % Olmert 34 Netanyahu 25

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 253 Appendix 4B

Peretz 19 Undecided 22

March 3, 2006 Who is most suitable to be PM? N=805 4.5% sampling error % Olmert 35 Netanyahu 22 Peretz 19

Undecided 24

March 9, 2006 Who is most suitable to be PM? N=700 4.4% sampling error % Olmert 31 Netanyahu 25 Peretz 16

Undecided 28

March 17, 2006 Who is most suitable to be PM? N=1002 4.5% sampling error % Olmert 35 Netanyahu 29 Peretz 16

Undecided 20

August 25, 2006 Who is most suitable to be PM? N=499 4.5% sampling error % Olmert 11 Netanyahu 22 Peretz 1

Liberman 18

Peres 12

Livni 10 Barak 4 None of 20 the above

September 22, 2006 Who is most suitable to be PM? N=499 4.5% sampling error %

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 254 Appendix 4B

Olmert 7 Netanyahu 27 Liberman 15 Peretz 1 Peres 12

Livni 14

Barak 3 Mofaz 5 None of 14 the above

November 24, 2006 Who is most suitable to be PM? N=499 4.5% sampling error % Olmert 7 Netanyahu 22 Peretz 3

Liberman 10

Gaydamak 7

Shalom 3 Livni 14 Barak 12 None of 22 the above

January 26, 2007 Who is most suitable to be PM? N=516 4.5% sampling error A: % Netanyahu 36 Livni 34 Barak 15

B: % Netanyahu 45 Barak 19 Olmert 9

C: % Netanyahu 44 Ayalon 31 Olmert 8

D: % Netanyahu 37 Ayalon 24

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 255 Appendix 4B

Livni 23

E: % Shalom 13 Ayalon 28 Livni 29

F: % Shalom 18 Barak 18 Livni 36

G: % Shalom 27 Barak 24 Olmert 10

H: % Shalom 22 Ayalon 39 Olmert 12

May 2, 2007 Who would you like to see as PM? N=500 4.5% sampling error % Netanyahu 29 Livni 20 Ayalon 14

Barak 10

Shalom 8

Olmert 6 No Answer 13

June 15, 2007 Who would you like to see as PM? N=503 4.5% sampling error % Netanyahu 34 Barak 25 Olmert 5

No Answer 36

July 27, 2007 Who would you like to see as PM? N=503 4.5% sampling error

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 256 Appendix 4B

% Netanyahu 36 Barak 22 Olmert 8

None 34

November 29, 2007 Who will fit better as PM? N=503 4.5% sampling error % Netanyahu 34 Barak 17 Olmert 14

None 32

January 11, 2008 Who would you like to see as PM? N=500 4.5% sampling error % Netanyahu 33 Barak 17 Olmert 8

None 37

March 28, 2008 Who will fit better as PM? N=497 4.5% sampling error A: % Netanyahu 31 Barak 20 Olmert 13

None 33

B: % Netanyahu 32 Barak 16 Livni 24

None 27

May 12, 2008 Who will fit better as PM? N = 500 4.5% sampling error % Netanyahu 37 Barak 20 Olmert 10

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 257 Appendix 4B

None 33

May 23, 2008 Who will fit better as PM? N = 500 4.5% sampling error A: % Netanyahu 30 Barak 15 Livni 30

None 22

B: % Netanyahu 32 Barak 18 Mofaz 16

None 28

C: % Netanyahu 34 Barak 18 Olmert 13

None 30

June 20, 2008 Who will fit better as PM? N = 500 4.4% sampling error A: % Netanyahu 30 Barak 14 Livni 30

None 21

B: % Netanyahu 34 Barak 16 Mofaz 14

None 31

C: % Netanyahu 31 Barak 17 Olmert 10

None 38

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 258 Appendix 4B

July 25, 2008 Who will fit better as PM? N = 497 4.5% sampling error A: % Netanyahu 35 Barak 13 Livni 27

None 22

B: % Netanyahu 36 Barak 19 Mofaz 18

None 27

C: % Netanyahu 41 Barak 14 Olmert 6

None 36

August 1, 2008 Who will fit better as PM? N = 500 4.5% sampling error A: % Netanyahu 36 Barak 15 Livni 30

None 19

B: % Netanyahu 38 Barak 17 Mofaz 15 None 30

November 20, 2008 Who will fit better as PM? N=500 4.6% sampling error % Netanyahu 35 Barak 9 Livni 35

None 21

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 259 Appendix 4B

January 9, 2009 Who do you want to be PM? N=501 4.4% sampling error % Netanyahu 35 Barak 14 Livni 26

None 25

October 23, 2009 Who will fit better as PM? N=500 4.5% sampling error % Netanyahu 41 Barak 7 Livni 31

Data provided by the YNet Through polls conducted by The Dahaf Institute! ! 260 Appendix 5A

Qassam Rocket and Mortar Shell Launches 2001-2011

2001 Qassam Mortar 2004 Qassam Mortar January - - January 7 - February - - February 12 - March - - March 7 - April - - April 16 - May - - May 13 - June - - June 16 - July - - July 53 - August - - August 19 - September - - September 46 - October - - October 34 - November - - November 8 - December - - December 50 - Total 4 245 Total 281 876

2002 Qassam Mortar 2005 Qassam Mortar January 3 - January 41 - February 9 - February 0 - March 6 - March 0 - April 0 - April 8 - May 0 - May 11 - June 0 - June 17 - July 9 - July 28 - August 0 - August 6 - September 3 - September 29 - October 2 - October 8 - November 1 - November 15 - December 2 - December 16 - Total 35 257 Total 179 238

2003 Qassam Mortar 2006 Qassam Mortar January 21 - January 1 - February 12 - February 47 - March 16 - March 69 - April 4 - April 58 - May 19 - May 45 - June 30 - June 134 - July 0 - July 197 - August 14 - August 41 - September 0 - September 46 - October 31 - October 68 - November 2 - November 182 - December 6 - December 58 - Total 155 265 Total 946 22

Data provided by the Meir Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Information Center http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/home/default.asp ! 261 ! Appendix 5A

2007 Qassam Mortar 2010 Qassam Mortar January 28 6 January 11 1 February 43 2 February 4 0 March 31 1 March 15 1 April 25 35 April 3 0 May 257 42 May 11 0 June 63 70 June 9 6 July 61 64 July 7 0 August 81 101 August 5 4 September 70 132 September 11 8 October 59 87 October 3 5 November 65 100 November 13 0 December 113 100 December 11 28 Total 783 740 Total 103 53

2008 Qassam Mortar 2011 Qassam Mortar January 241 136 January 15 17 February 257 228 February 6 12 March 196 103 March 23 74 April 145 373 April 69 67 May 149 206 May 1 0 June 87 158 June 3 0 July 1 8 July 17 6 August 8 3 August 155 19 September 1 3 September - 3 October 1 1 October - 0 November 125 68 November - - December 361 241 December - - Total 1572 1528 Total

Monthly 2009 Qassam Mortar Calculations January 1 - 19 354 110 Jan 362 Jan 20 - Feb 2 9 19 Feb 53 Feb 3 - Mar 2 55 21 Mar 37 Mar 3 - 30 32 18 Apr 4 Mar 31 - May 5 5 5 May 4 May 6 - Jun 2 4 2 Jun 1 June 3 - 30 1 0 Jul 1 July 1 - Aug 3 1 1 Aug 2 Aug 4 - Sep 1 2 4 Sep 11 Sep 2 - 29 11 4 Oct 5 Sep 30 - Nov 3 6 1 Nov 6 Nov 4 - Dec 1 6 2 Dec 6 Dec 2 - 28 5 0 Total 492 Total 491 187

Data provided by the Meir Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Information Center http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/home/default.asp ! 262 ! Appendix 5B

Total Qassam and Mortar Attacks

2001 Total 2004 Total January 0 January 6 February 0 February 12 March 0 March 8 April 0 April 20 May 0 May 11 June 0 June 16 July 0 July 51 August 0 August 10 September 0 September 47 October 0 October 30 November 2 November 8 December 2 December 49 Total 4 Total 268

2002 Total 2005 Total January 0 January 42 February 7 February 1 March 6 March 1 April 0 April 7 May 0 May 13 June 1 June 15 July 7 July 23 August 1 August 5 September 3 September 28 October 2 October 7 November 3 November 37 December 1 December 12 Total 31 Total 191

2003 Total 2006 Total January 17 January 1 February 9 February 73 March 17 March 94 April 4 April 70 May 30 May 57 June 41 June 153 July 1 July 170 August 24 August 48 September 2 September 36 October 62 October 75 November 10 November 195 December 5 December 62 Total 222 Total 1034

Data provided by the IDF & available through the ISA Israel Security Agency http://www.shabak.gov.il/english/pages/default.aspx

263 Appendix 5B

2007 Total January 29 February 44 March 28 April 34 May 279 June 68 July 68 August 93 September 66 October 70 November 104 December 143 Total 1026

2008 Total January 257 February 312 March 271 April 29 May - June - July - August - September - October - November - December - Total 869

Data provided by the IDF & available through the ISA Israel Security Agency http://www.shabak.gov.il/english/pages/default.aspx

264 Appendix 6A

Israeli Political Parties

The goal here is not to delve deep into the details of each and every party or leader, but to graze across the political spectrum from the most conservative right-wingers to the far left, and highlight several parties that characteristically have impacted the Israeli political system. Parties that participated in the 2009 election are listed below in order to exemplify general party positions. Further on, the dominantly elected parties will be discussed in greater depth across the

1994-2011 time period.

National Union, Ari Ariel and Aryeh Elda

“Not Afraid At All”

Against the creation of a Palestinian state. Opposes withdrawal from any territory.

Israel Beiteinu, Avigdor Lieberman

“Lieberman, I trust him! Leadership You Can Trust”

Rejects “land for peace” approach. Supports mutual compromise and commitment to in a

“land for land – peace for peace" approach.

Shas, Eliyahu Yishai

“Yes, We Can”

Ultra-orthodox religious political party representing primarily Mizrahi (Middle Eastern),

and Haredi Jews. Supports governing based on strict Jewish law. “In the past, prepared to

relinquish land in return for peace, but uncomfortable with this policy given increased

terror” (Israel Votes 2009, Political Party Platforms)

265! Appendix 6A

Likud, Benjamin Netanyahu

“Because we have a Country to Run, Remaining Strong Together”

1999 Platform: Settlement in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is the “realization of Zionist val-

ues,” Jerusalem is to remain the united capital of Israel, and there is no possibility of a

Palestinian state west of the Jordan River.

2009 Platform: Willing to negotiate with Palestinians, "not compromised by terror." No

negotiations with Hamas or PA (Palestinian Authority), yet supportive of an economic

peace plan to aid the Palestinian economy. No dismantling of major Israeli settlements.

Kadima, Tzipi Livni

“1) The Courage to Change 2) A Different Leadership”

Centrist liberal party. Supports negotiated peace based on the Road Map. Unwilling to

negotiate with Hamas-led PA, unless Hamas accepts Israel’s right to exist. Supports

keeping major Israeli settlements (Ariel, Gush Etzion and Ma'alei Adumim) within the

final borders of Israel.

Labor, Ehud Barak

“Look Me in the Eyes and See the Truth, Not Nice, a Leader”

Center-left social democratic Zionist party. Supports negotiations with the PA, the crea-

tion of a Palestinian state, and the dismantling of isolated Israeli settlements.

Meretz & The New Movement, Haim Oron

“Doing what is good for Israel”

266! Appendix 6A

Left-wing social democratic party. Supports negotiations with Palestinians, favors dis-

mantling settlements and a near full withdrawal from the West Bank (with a land swap

for the remainder).

Balad/National Democratic Assembly, Jamal Zahalka

Secular nationalist Israeli Arab party based in a democratic state inclusive of all its citi-

zens. Favors full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the creation

of a Palestinian state, and supports the right of return for refugees of the 1948 war.

Arab List, Ibrahim Ssarsour

Alliance of three Israeli Arab parties: United Arab Party (Ra’am), Arab National party

(Mada), and Islamic Movement. Supports withdrawal from East Jerusalem, the West

Bank, and Gaza, as well as the creation of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as the

capital. Favors the right of return for refugees of the 1948 war. Israel should be a state

for all its inhabitants with Arabs recognized as a national minority and regarded as such.

267! Appendix 6A

Israel Political Party Spectrum*

Meretz&&&The&New&a

Movementl & Kadima& Likud& National&Union&

N Center& a t i o n a l & D Labor& Shas& Yisrael&Beiteinu& Balad/National& e Democratic&As@ sembly& m @@@@@& o Arab&List& c r a t i c & (Source: Kohanteb) A !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!s ! * Based on the 2009 Elections e m b 268! l y & & Appendix 6A

Table 4A

Summary of Dominant Israeli Party Positions: 1994 – 2011 Elections

Support Negoti- Jerusalem Support Settlements: ation Party Control: Negotiation Hawk/Dove Build/Dismantle (Not with Ha- Shared/Israeli mas-led PA)

Labor Dismantle some Shared ✓ ✓ Dove

Likud Build Israeli ✓ ✖ Hawk

One Is- -- Israeli ✓ ✓ Dove rael

Kadima Dismantle some Israeli ✓ ✓ Dove

(Source: Kohanteb)

269! Appendix 6A

Table 4B

Summary of Israeli Elections: Prime Ministerial & Legislative

Results: Special Election Dominant Parties Government Prime Ministerial* Election Date ------Background People in the Race Knesset General Labor – 34.7% (44 Labor – Yitzhak Rabin seats) 25th Government 1992 – June 23 NA Rabin Likud – Yizhak Shamir Likud – 24.9% 13th Knesset (32 seats) Following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on November 26th Government 1995 – Nov 4 Labor – Shimon Peres Peres NA 4, 1995, Shimon Peres took 13th Knesset over as Prime Minister Labor – 26.8% Likud – Benjamin Netanyahu Netanyahu – 50.4% (34 seats) 27th Government 1996 – May 29 NA Labor – Shimon Peres Peres – 49.5% Likud – 25.1% 14th Knesset (32 seats)

Following defections from One Israel – 20.2% One Israel (Labor, Gesher, coalitions within the govern- Barak – 56.08% (26 seats) 28th Government 1999 – May 17 Meimad) – Ehud Barak ment, Netanyahu was forced Netanyahu – 43.92% Likud – 14.1% 15th Knesset Likud – Benjamin Netanyahu to call early elections (19 seats)

After most parties left the coalition, Barak was left with a Likud – Ariel Sharon Sharon – 62.4% Likud 29th Government 2001 – Feb 6 minority government and soon Labor – Ehud Barak Barak – 37.6% PM election only** 15th Knesset after resigned with the outbreak of the second Intifada

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! * Separate Prime Ministerial elections were held in 1996, 1999, and 2001. Following the 2001 election, separate direct Prime Ministerial elections were abandoned. ** This is the only election that not to take place alongside legislative elections.!

270! Appendix 6A

Previous government based on Likud – 29.4% Likud – Ariel Sharon a coalition between Likud and (38 seats) 30th Government 2003 – Jan 28 Labor-Meimad – Amram Sharon Labor fell apart when Labor Labor-Meimad – 14.5% 16th Knesset Mitzna pulled out (19 seats)

Kadima – 22.02% Olmert was designated acting (29 seats) PM following Sharon’s brain Kadima – Ehud Olmert Labor-Meimad – 15.06% 31st Government 2006 –Mar 28 hemorrhage in January; he Labor-Meimad – Amir Peretz Olmert (19seats) 17th Knesset assumed the PM position fol- Likud – Benjamin Netanyahu Likud – 8.9% lowing Kadima’s victory (12 seats)

Livni succeeded Olmert fol- Likud – 21.61%

lowing his resignation as lead- Likud – Benjamin Netanyahu (28 seats) 32nd Government 2009 – Feb 10 Netanyahu er of Kadima, yet she failed to Kadima – Tzipi Livni Kadima – 22.47% 18th Knesset

form a coalition government (27 seats)

(Source: Kohanteb)

271! Appendix 6A

Table 4G

Israeli Presidents

Incumbency Name Political Party

1993 – May 13 Ezer Weizman Labor 2000 – July

2000 – July Moshe Katsav Likud 2007 – July 1

2007 – July 13 Shimon Peres Kadima Present

(Source: Kohanteb) ! !

272! Appendix 6B

Table 4C

PLO Central Positions

Palestinian Minimum De- PLO Negotiation Position mands Jerusalem • No Palestinian state without East • Committed to respecting the freedom of Jerusalem as its capital is ac- worship at, and access to, religious sites ceptable. for all faiths. • East Jerusalem is essential to the • Willing to consider a number of economic, political and cultural creative solutions with respect to viability of a future state. the administration of the city in line with international law (e.g., Jerusalem as open city and capital of two states) Settlements • Settlements are illegal. • Settlements pose the single great- • An immediate genuine and com- est threat to a viable two-state so- prehensive settlement freeze, lution. Their evacuation would be dismantling of outposts. the most appropriate first step • Evacuation of (most) settlements towards satisfying Palestinian to allow for sufficient land, and rights and allowing for the com- access to resources to make a plete exercise of sovereignty over state viable. all territory within their future state. Borders • The border of the Palestinian • The 1967 boundary is the 1949 state should be the 1967 armistice Armistice Line plus all mutually line agreed legal modifications up un- • Full control over the borders (free til the1967 conflict. It is the only movement and access to interna- internationally recognized bound- tional markets) ary between Israel and the OPT • Territorial link between the West • Willing to discuss minor, recipro- Bank and Gaza cal, and mutually agreed changes • An equitable delimitation of the to the 1967 boundary (1:1 land maritime area (Mediterranean and swap) and how to manage re- Dead Sea), not only with Israel, sources that are shared with but also with Palestine’s other neighboring countries. maritime neighbors (Egypt, Cy- prus and Jordan).

(Source: PASSIA)

273! Appendix 6B

Table 4D

Summary of Dominant Palestinian Factions

Refugees: Borders: Jerusalem: Settlements: Right of Return, Support 1967,55 Shared/Palestinian Evacuation, Party Israeli Recognition Negotiation Hawk/Dove Land Swap, Control56 Relocate, of Responsibility, With Israel Both Cohabitate Both

PLO Both Shared Israeli Recognition Evacuation ✓ Hawk

Fatah Both Palestinian Both Evacuation ✓ Hawk

Hamas 1967 Palestinian Both Evacuation ✖ Hawk

(Source: Kohanteb) ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 55!1949 Armistice Line.! 56 Assuming all Palestinian parties want a capital in East Jerusalem.

274! Appendix 6B

! ! ! ! Table 4E

Summary of Palestinian Elections: Presidential & Legislative

Results: Dominant Parties Date Type of Election Background ----- Prime Ministerial People in the Race ----- PLC

Hamas refused to take General: 1996 – May part in these elections, Fatah – Yasser Arafat Arafat – 88.2% Presidential & Fatah – 55 seats 29 believing it would lend Independent – Samiha Khalil Khalil 11.5% PLC57 credibility to the PNA

Elections were set to take Presidential place this year, but were 2000 N/A N/A N/A postponed due to the second Intifada Following the death of Arafat on November 11, Fatah – Mahmoud Abbas Abbas – 62.3% 2005 – Jan 9 Presidential 2004, Rawhi Fattouh as- N/A Independent – Mustafa Barghouthi Barghouthi – 19.8% sumed the interim Presi- dency until this election

Hamas – 74 First election to the PLC Hamas – Ismail Haniyeh58 Haniyeh – 44.45% 2006 – Jan 25 PLC seats since 1996 Fatah – Farouk Kaddoumi Kaddoumi – 41.43% Fatah – 45 seats

(Source: Kohanteb) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 57 Palestinian Legislative Council 58 Despite Hamas’s victory in this election, Abbas still maintained his position as President of Fatah.

275! Appendix 6B

Table 4F

Palestinian Prime Ministers

Incumbency Name Political Party

2003 – March 16 Mahmoud Abbas Fatah 2003 – September 6

2003 – October 7 Ahmed Qurei Fatah 2005 – December 18

2005 – December 18 Nabil Sha’ath Fatah 2005 – December 24

2005 – December 24 Ahmed Qurei Fatah 2006 – March 29

2006 – March 29 Ismail Haniyeh Hamas Present

2007 – June 15 Salam Fayyad Third Way Present

(Source: Kohanteb) !

276! Appendix 6C

Table 4H

Political Leadership Divided: Confrontation vs. Negotiation

Confrontation Negotiation Hamas, PFLP59, PPP60, DFLP61, Fatah, FIDA62, ‘Pro-Peace’ Secu- Palestinian Jihad, Other Islamic groups, ‘Anti- larists, PLO, Other PLO Factions, Parties peace’ Secularists, Hezbollah, Al Palestinian National Initiative Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Netanyahu, Sharon,* Lieberman, Barak, Rabin, Peres, Livni, Olmert, Israeli Ben-Eliezer, Landau, Mofaz, Sha- Peretz, Ayalon, Ramon, Sharon,* Leaders lom, Levi, Eitan, Begin, Meridor Ben-Ami, Mitzna, Bishara, Shahak, Mordechai * Sharon’s inclusion as both confrontation and negotiation is discussed in Chapter 4, Part II.

(Source: Kohanteb) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 59 Peoples Front for the Liberation of Palestine 60 Peoples Party of Palestine 61 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 62 Palestinian Democratic Union

277! Appendix 7

! ! ! Table 1: Association of Perceived Threat (LN of Casualties in Palestine) and

Palestinian Public Opinion by Area

Palestinian Regions

Palestinian Public Opinion All Palestine West Bank Gaza

1. Support for Pearson r .619 .622 .591 military action Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .002

N (months)* 24 24 24 Pearson r .757 .708 .764 2. Support for suicide bombing Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 <.001 <.001

N (months)* 24 24 24 3. Support for the Pearson r -.577 -.602 -.462 peace process Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .002 N (months)* 28 28 28

4. Optimism Pearson r -.744 -.748 -.655 about the future Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 <.001 <.001 N (months)* 48 48 48

*The specific months used to these correlations depend when surveys with these ques-

tions were conducted. The specific months vary across each of the four public opinion indicators. The specific time period covered by the indicators also varies with the dates surveys were conducted. The time frame covered by the surveys includes 1994 to 2011.

(Source: Kohanteb)! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! 278 Appendix 7

! ! Table 2: Association of Perceived Threat (LN of Casualties in Palestine) and Palestinian Public Support for Confrontation and Negotiation-Oriented Leadership

Palestinian Public Support for Political Leadership Pearson r 1. Public support for Pearson r -.386 Palestinian negotiation- Sig. (2-tailed) .006 oriented leadership N (months)* 50

2. Public support for Pearson r .658 Palestinian confrontation- Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 oriented leadership N (months)* 50

1. Public support for Fatah Pearson r -.404 only Sig. (2-tailed) .005

N (months)* 50

2. Public support for Hamas Pearson r .654 only Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 N (months)* 50 *The specific months used to these correlations depend when surveys with these questions were conducted. The specific months do not vary across each of the four measures of support for political parties. The time frame covered by the surveys covers July 1994 to May 2011. ! (Source: Kohanteb) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! 279 Appendix 7

Table 3: Association of Perceived Threat (LN of standardized casualties in Israel and standardized Qassam rockets attacks) and support for the Peace Index (July 1994 to February 2008)*

Measure of association Regression B Regression B Israel Public Support for the Peace Index Pearson r ** ** 1. Perceived threat in- Coefficient -.786 ".185! "2.743***! dex that combines Is- Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 <.001 <.001 raeli casualties and Qassam rocket at- N (months)* 162 162 162 tacks 2. Perceived threat Coefficient -.588 -.084 -1.347 sub-index based on Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .011 .011 standardized measure of casualties only N (months)* 162 162 162

3. Perceived threat Coefficient -.519 -040. -.808 sub-index based on Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .232 .232 standardized measure of Qassam rocket N (months)* 162 162 162 attacks *The monthly time series is continuous except for the months July and August 2006 when no survey data is available. ** The full regression analysis included the lagged value of the dependent variable, and a set of dummy variables for failure of the Camp David process and the death of Yitzhak Rabin. *** The B coefficient indicates that a four standard deviation change in the combined perceived threat index is associated with an approximately 10 percent change in support for the Oslo Peace process among Israeli citizens, controlling for the lagged. ! (Source: Kohanteb) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! 280 Appendix 7

! ! ! ! Table 4: Association of Perceived Threat (LN of Casualties in Palestine) and Israeli Public Support for Confrontation and Negotia- tion-Oriented Leadership

Israeli Public Support for Political Leadership Pearson r

1. Public support for Israeli Pearson r or Beta -.466 negotiation-oriented political Sig. (2-tailed) .001 leadership N (months)* 44

2. Public support for Israeli Pearson r or Beta .032 confrontation-oriented Sig. (2-tailed) .837 political leadership N (months)* 44 *The specific months used to these correlations depend when surveys with these questions were conducted. The specific months do not vary across each of the four measures of support for political parties. The time frame covered by the surveys covers December 1994 to October 2009.

(Source: Kohanteb)

! 281 Appendix 7

! !

! 282 Appendix 7

! !

! 283 Appendix 7

! !

! 284 Appendix 7

! !

! 285 !

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