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Israeli and Palestinian Public Opinion

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Israeli and Palestinian Public Opinion DECISION MAKING UNDER THREAT: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION A Dissertation Presented by Sheila Deborah Kohanteb To The Department of Political Science In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the Field of Political Science Northeastern University Boston, MA March 2012 DECISION MAKING UNDER THREAT: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION By Sheila Deborah Kohanteb This research examines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a new conceptual perspective that incorporates the psychology of threat into the study of inter-group conflict. The specific ob- jective of the proposed work is to develop a better understanding of how inter-group perceptions of threat may affect the decision-making of citizens and political leaders, and may ultimately af- fect progress in peace negotiations. The study utilizes data on Israelis and Palestinians over the period 1994 through 2011, drawing on public opinion polls, conflict related casualties, and major historical events in order to assess factors affecting public opinion. The research specifically ex- amines the impact of perceived threat on: changes in Palestinian public opinion regarding sup- port for punitive military actions against Israel, optimism about the future, and support for the peace process; and changes in Israeli public opinion regarding support for peace (negotia- tions/agreements). It is hypothesized that perceived threat pushes both Israelis and Palestinians toward more extreme positions regarding the peace process. This study also examines the impact of perceived threat on support for negotiation versus confrontation-oriented leaders. ! ! ! In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science In the Graduate School of Northeastern University March 2012 ! ! ! 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Faculty, friends, and family members that have helped me reach this point in my academic ca- reer, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for your guidance and support! From our first meeting at Northeastern, Denis Sullivan has opened door upon door of opportuni- ties for me, introducing me to the academic study of the Middle East and allowing for my own research interests to flourish. Under his trust and confidence, I was given the opportunity to cre- ate what has come to be a fundamental component of my experience at Northeastern, the Dia- logue of Civilizations program to Israel and Palestine. The calming voice of reason and support in any conflictual storm, Gordana Rabrenovic has been a mentor, an advisor, a colleague, and a friend. Looking out for my wellbeing and future with the wisdom of academic experience, I con- sider myself exceptionally fortunate to have Gordana in my life. The privilege of working with Glenn Pierce has been paramount to the success of this dissertation. I have spent the past four years learning from his keen eye of human behavior and the complexities of his vision, and hope to continue through the future as our research expands. The inspirational embodiment of a true academic, Amílcar Barreto has been the rock from which I have laid the foundation of my aca- demic career. Under his guidance, I have learned how to focus on the details, while never losing sight of the bigger picture: to connect the leaf, to the tree, to the greater ecosystem. I would like to thank the Political Science department for their support and guidance throughout my time as a Master’s student, and through the PhD. Additionally, I would like to thank the broader Northeastern community of faculty and staff who I have come to know in the past six years. In what is generally viewed as a largely hierarchical academic system, these people have always treated me with the respect of a peer and a colleague. The backbone of my education and thirst for knowledge, my family has instilled in me the im- portance of questioning and the absolute necessity for one to dig in order to reach the truth. The unwavering support of my family and loved ones through the peaks and valleys of the PhD has been invaluable. Thank you! "Since in order to speak, one must first listen, learn to speak by listening." - Rumi 3 Table of Contents Abstract 2 Acknowledgements 3 Table of Contents 4 Chapter 1 ……… Introduction 5 Chapter 2 ……… Incidence & Persistence of Inter-Group Conflict 16 Part I: Alternative Perspectives & Objectives 17 Part II: Research Data & Methodology 36 Chapter 3 ……… Public Opinion Under Threat 51 Chapter 4 ……… Political Leadership Under Threat 81 Part I: Context of Leadership 82 Part II: Analysis of Threat 120 Chapter 5 ……… Conclusion 129 Appendix 1 The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre 1a Chart: Support for the Peace Process – Dates Adjusted 1a-i Chart: Support for the Peace Process – Original 1a-ii Polls: Support for the Peace Process 1b Chart: Support for Suicide Operations – Dates Adjusted 1b-i Chart: Support for Suicide Operations – Original 1b-ii Polls: Support for Suicide Operations 1c Chart: Optimism – Dates Adjusted 1c-i Chart: Optimism - Original 1c-ii Polls: Optimism 1d Chart: Support for Military Operations – Dates Adjusted 1d-i Chart: Support for Military Operations - Original 1d-ii Polls: Support for Military Operations 1e Chart: Support for Political Parties – Dates Adjusted 1e-i Chart: Support for Political Parties - Original 1e-ii Polls: Support for Political Parties Appendix 2 The Peace Index 2 Indices 1994 -2011 Appendix 3 B’Tselem 3a Casualties: 1994-2000 3b Casualties: 2000-2011 3c Casualty Totals Appendix 4 Dahaf Institute/Ynet 4a Polls – Dates Adjusted 4b Polls – Original Appendix 5 Qassam Data 5a Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 5b IDF & Israel Security Agency/Shabak Appendix 6 Israeli & Palestinian Political Leadership 6a Israeli Leadership 6b Palestinian Leadership 6c Confrontation vs. Negotiation Appendix 7 Additional Statistics & Graphs References 4 Chapter 1 Decision-Making Under Threat “No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear.” Edmund Burke Engineers bring about change by tackling technical problems. They analyze problems, assess and compare outcomes, and, while reaching a solution may be an onerous task, the path is clearly defined. The certainty of the applied sciences stands in stark contrast to the lack thereof in the social sciences. Indeed, it is no less the case when one studies the social riddle of conflict. Social issues involve power-driven personalities and emotion, directed and misdirected by politi- cal structures and egomaniacs. To approach this riddle with a technical eye is to blind oneself from the critical component of humanity. Adding the human element to a technical malady ad- mixes affect, anger, and self-interest with political inertia, violence, fear, and threat – distancing resolution from a tenable reality. While sacrosanct in principle, the reality of human rights violations committed by Israelis and Palestinians is nothing shy of profane. Tersely grandiose misjudgments based on defensive atrocities have caused entire populations to unite against one another under an umbrella of fear, and with the conduction of leadership, have institutionalized hypocritical stigmas of good vs. bad. The media fans the flames by shepherding public perception within the confines of state in- terest, feeding on an anxious public who turn to power-wielding/“protective” leadership, causing them to succumb to take more defensive opinions themselves. Humanity kicks in. Fight or flight is activated as a cloud of threat covers the Israeli and Palestinian sky, presenting an ultimatum of instinctual proportions. 5 Armies of scholars, diplomats, politicians, and average citizens have dedicated them- selves exclusively to the resolution of this conflict. Enough books, articles, speeches and rebut- tals have been written on this subject to cover the Israeli-Palestinian land several times over; yet no real accountable progress has been made. It is time to change the lens of analysis we use to view this conflict. How does one realistically recognize accurate perception, and avoid socially and culturally induced misperception? A multitude of rationales have been given for the initiation and persistence of this con- flict, stemming from religion, colonialism, and settlements, to Jerusalem, borders, refugees, and simply a long-fraught history of adversarial relations. While these factors play a role in the pro- tracted and intractable nature of this conflict, their impact is only surface deep. Underlying issues of land rights and holy sites is the essence that unites human beings regardless of race, nationali- ty, or religion: fear. Fear does not judge based on religion or ethnicity, it produces the same threatened response from all whose path it crosses, breeding the same instinctively protective responses that manifest in different ways through the socio-cultural climate of a given society. Some people choose to take power into their own hands and retaliate against the entity producing this unwelcomed feeling. This choice can be made all the same whether or not a for- mal governing structure exists to deal with such issues, and whether or not a given person trusts the effectiveness of these structures in protecting their wellbeing. Other people choose to leave this type of action solely in the hands of existing structures – even if they do not entirely trust them – in fear of their own mortality if they become involved in combat. People cling to the various identities that define them, such as religion, culture, ethnicity, political opinions, and worldview. History shows many cases of where people were given the option to deny their faith or face grisly repercussions; the resulting religious conversions attest to 6 the dominating power of threat. How strongly one grasps to their identities can rapidly change in the presence of threat, leaving people to support parties they would normally detest and rally against, in support of hardline policies towards security and their personal protection. Suddenly, the Left runs for shelter under the umbrella of the Right, before the shower of rockets bombards its existence.
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