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UN Security Council MCGS MUN 2018 UN Security Council MCGS MUN 2018 Letter from the Executive Board Greetings Delegates, It is an honour for us to welcome you to Security Council simulation of Mayo College Girl’s School Model United Nations 2018. The committee shall be having “Emergency Meeting on the Israel-Palestine and Reassessing the Need of the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus” as its agendas for discussion. Both the agendas are of equal importance when it comes to their severity and need for immediate action. Through this guide, we shall try our level best to offer as much as clarity possible on discussion at hand. However, the responsibility of exploring depth and vastness of each topic is totally yours. We hope that you will be able to examine the issue critically and come up with solutions for the same. Your duty as diplomats is not just limited to finding solutions to the problem but more importantly, to problematizing the issue and available solutions on the first hand. In this context, what we mean by problematizing is to analyze the issue at various levels such as but not limited to cultural, legal, political and etc., so that it makes the debate highly substantive. Problematizing the situation is one way of doing what people call as constructive debating. This however can only be possible if you are well worse with your research. We also request you to locate these events in wider functioning and understanding of global politics and not in isolation to one another. We see this MUN as an opportunity as a chance to sensitize each other with our respective thoughts and enable a shared learning environment. We also see this as an experience where each one of us would be able to question our biases towards these words. We believe that this simulation will end up facilitating decision making in an individual life’s and affecting everyday experiences as well. It would help us all to reflect and realize the deep-rooted nature of our thoughts and the intensity with which we hold them true. At the end of three days, we all wish to see you a step ahead of what you were few days before. The marking criteria shall be explained to you in the committee. But do take into consideration that one has to excel in every field may it be diplomacy, research, documentation, lobbying or chits to win an award and it won’t just be matter but manner and method which shall also be taken into consideration while deciding the awards. Success or failure of the committee does not depend on passing of a document. Cooperation to understand each other and accommodate viewpoints is what ensures quality. We humbly ask you for your support to make these three days a memorable learning experience. Feel free to contact us anytime. Regards Chairperson Nikhil Goyal ([email protected]) Nature of Reports and Evidences in Council Evidence or proofs from the following sources will be accepted as credible in the committee: 1. News Sources a. REUTERS – Any Reuters’ article which clearly makes mention of the fact stated or is in contradiction of the fact being stated by another delegate in council can be used to substantiate arguments in the committee. (http://www.reuters.com) However, Reuters reports claiming to quote any individual affiliated in any manner to any government may not necessarily reflect the views of that government in totality. For example, at times the office holding individuals venture out for lectures, talks, discussions and etc. wherein they tend to express things which that be a contravention/extension of the policy they hold. So we need to take into consideration the time and space dimension of such views and also the chronology of what they spoken or what their government policy was post and prior to this. Thus, Reuters report can be denied by any member state subject to their policy and it is only when the report is accepted by the government that it shall be admitted as persuasive proof. b) State operated News Agencies – These reports can be used in the support of or against the State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any country as such but in that situation, they can be denied by any other country in the council. Some examples are: (i) RIA Novosti (Russia) http://en.rian.ru/ (ii) IRNA (Iran) http://www.irna.ir/ENIndex.htm (iii) Xinhua News Agency and CCTV (P.R. China) http://cctvnews.cntv.cn/ 2. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State Operated News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country. However, a nuance is that a report that is being denied by a certain country can still be accepted by the Executive Board as credible information. Some examples are, a. Government Websites like the State Department of the United States of America http://www.state.gov/ or the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (http://www.eng.mil.ru/en/index.htm) b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like India (http://www.mea.gov.in/) or People’s Republic of China (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/) c. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Reports http://www.un.org/en/members/ (Click on any country to get the website of the Office of its Permanent Representative.) d. Multilateral Organizations like the NATO (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm) OPEC (http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/) 3. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered as credible information or evidence for the Executive Board. a) UN Bodies like the UNSC (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/) or UNGA (http://www.un.org/en/ga/) b) UN Affiliated bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (http://www.iaea.org/) World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/) International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm) International Committee of the Red Cross (http://www.icrc.org/eng/index.jsp) c) Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty System (http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm) , the International Criminal Court (http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC) Please note that under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org/) Amnesty International (http://www.amnesty.org/) or newspapers like The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/) Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/) Be accepted in the Council. Duly note each document’s source before its presentation in council. Please carry the required reports in soft copy (saved directly from the source and unedited). Also, the background guide cannot be used as proof in the council. Suggested Pattern for Researching Researching and understanding the United Nations and the Committee/Council being simulated –Its Mandate, including understanding historical work done on the agenda. research on the allotted country. Understanding its polity, economy, military, culture, history, bilateral relations with other countries, ideological position on various other relevant issues related to the agenda etc. Comprehending the Foreign Policy of the allotted country. It includes understanding the ideology and principles adopted by the country on the agenda. It further includes studying past actions taken by the country on the agenda and other related issues – specifically analyzing their causes and consequences. Reading the background guide thoroughly. Researching further upon the agenda using the links given in the guide and from other sources such as academic papers, institutional reports, national reports, news articles, blogs etc. Understanding policies adopted by different blocs of countries (example: NATO, EU etc.) and major countries involved in the agenda. Including their position, ideology and adopted past actions. Characterizing the agenda into sub-topics and preparing speeches and statements on them. It is the same as preparing topics for the moderated caucuses and their content. Preparing a list of possible solutions and actions the UNSC can adopt on the issue as per your country‘s policies. Assemble proof/evidence for any important piece of information/allegation you are going to use in committee and keeping your research updated using various news sources. Committee Description Introduction Under the Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Security Council also recommends to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and the admission of new Members to the United Nations. And, together with the General Assembly, it elects the judges of the International Court of Justice.1 Mandate The UN Charter established six main organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened. According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes: to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights; and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. All members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.
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