Soft Power in South Caucasus

RELIGION AND SOFT POWER IN SOUTH CAUCASUS

POLICY PERSPECTIVE

Editors: Ansgar Jödicke Kornely Kakachia

TBILISI 2017 The Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP) is a Tbilisi-based non-proﬁ t, non-partisan, research and analysis organization founded in early 2011. GIP strives to strengthen the organiza- tional backbone of democratic institutions and promote good governance and development through policy research and advocacy in Georgia. It also encourages public participation in civil society-building and developing democratic processes. Since December 2013 GIP is member of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.

*This publication has been produces from the resources provided by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SCOPES-Program). The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the Georgian Institute of Politics and the Swiss National Science Foundation (SCOPES-Program).

Forward...... 4

Biopolitical conservatism and “pastoral power”: a Russia – Georgia meeting point

By Andrey Makarychev & Alexandra Yatsyk...... 7

Foreign Policy of the Georgian Orthodox Church: Interplay between the West and Russia

By Salome Minesashvili...... 17

Implementing EU’s Normative Agenda in the South Caucasus: Contradictory Effects

By Eiki Berg & Alar Kilp...... 25

Turkey in Georgia: pursuing the “soft power”politics

By Vahram Ter-Matevosyan...... 33

Turkey’s Soft Power in Azerbaijan and the Gülen Movement

By Fuad Aliyev...... 41

Religion as a factor in Kurdish identity discourse: Case study on Armenia and Turkey

By Lia Evoyan & Tatevik Manukyan...... 49

Iran’s Soft Power in Georgia – Weak for now, Bigger Potential for the Future

By Mariam Gabedava & Koba Turmanidze...... 57

Iran’s Soft Power Policy in Armenia: Cultural Diplomacy and Religion

By Tatevik Mkrtchyan...... 63

Iranian soft religios power in Azerbaijan: old new threat for Baku

By Anar Valiyev...... 69

About Authors...... 75 Forward

For centuries, the South Caucasus was a re- had to somehow integrate the religious factor gion where external powers exercised strong in society, and all of them included religion infl uence. While independence has changed to some extent in the construction of national the situation and autonomous states evolved identity. after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, both Religious-based soft power combines two dependencies from - and necessary partner- politically ambivalent factors: the external in- ships with - powerful neighbours s are still fl uence, and the fuzzy social force of religion. the reality in Georgia and Armenia and Azer- It is not by chance that wielding soft power baijan. through religious channels threatens political In this context, the term “soft power” be- elites. came popular, drawing special attention to It was in this controversial situation that a specifi c type of external infl uence that is the contributors to this booklet did their re- based on attraction rather than coercion. First search on religion and soft power in the mentioned in a publication by Joseph Nye South Caucasus. The three-year project was in 1990 (with a more detailed elaboration in fi nanced by the Swiss National Science Foun- 2004), the term underwent a stellar career in dation (SCOPES-Programme) and coordinat- political science and among policymakers. ed at the University of Fribourg/Switzerland World powers like USA, Russia, and to some (Social Sciences Department). The research extent the EU or Turkey, included the term in group consisted of both young and more ex- their own foreign policies though the mean- perienced researchers from the Caucasus and ing differs from capital to capital. In contrast, abroad, and included researchers from dif- the smaller countries of the South Caucasus ferent academic disciplines. The detailed out- mostly perceive soft power as something comes will be published in a volume by Rout- dangerous that threatens their autonomy. ledge this year. With the generous support of This holds especially true when it comes to Iv. Javakishvili Tbilisi State University and religion. the Georgian Institute of Politics, participants Obviously, in the fi eld of culture, trans- in the research project presented a policy ori- national attraction can be based on religious ented summary of their research results at a grounds. Religious ties include emotions, conference in Tbilisi on March 13/14, 2017 feelings of proximity, and solidarity. Thus, and published them in this booklet. religion can be a platform on which states It is risky to transport the results from wield soft power and gain infl uence in the academic writing to political discussion for South Caucasian democracies. The papers several reasons. First, most of the researchers the following booklet ask what party religion are not familiar with this kind of develop- plays in soft power policies or how it infl u- ment. Politically, the topic of our research is ences in soft power policies. very relevant and controversial although the Religion in the South Caucasus is diverse. inclusion (or exclusion) of normative state- However, the religious policies in the three ments depends very much on the academic countries struggle with similar problems. All discipline. The research group consisted of re- three countries have repeatedly proved that searchers from political science, international they consider themselves to be secular coun- relations, history, oriental studies and the ac- tries. Nevertheless, all three countries have ademic study of religions―all of them with

4 a different understanding of “religion” and sion about the factor of religion in national “politics”. Second, the political perception of and transnational politics. We hope that this religion is still highly controversial. Academ- publication will be of interest to many insti- ic researchers specialising on religion often tutions and organizations, government ofﬁ - emphasize frictions in the religious groups cials, regional analysts and to all those who and historical dependencies. In contrast, so- are involved in researching problems related cial scientists with closer relations to politics to the role of religion in South Caucasus and often see religion as a uniform factor that is its political development. unable to join a rational political discourse. The conference aimed to encourage a Ansgar Joedicke well informed and nuanced public discus- Project Leader

BBIOPOLITICALIOPOLITICAL CCONSERVATISMONSERVATISM AANDND ““PASTORALPASTORAL PPOWER”:OWER”: A RRUSSIAUSSIA – GGEORGIAEORGIA MMEETINGEETING PPOINTOINT

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV ALEXANDRA YATSYK

Introduction

This paper seeks to unveil biopolitical di- reconnect them to the Russian collective Self. mensions of Russia’s increasing self-asser- Our argument is three-fold. First, we ap- tion in Georgia, a country that has faced the proach biopolitics not in a narrow technical loss of two of its regions and continues to face sense as a set of policy tools that are meant intense political pressure from the Krem- to protect or control (groups of) population; lin. We argue that one of Russia’s strongest we claim that biopolitics necessarily presup- policy instruments is biopolitical, since it is poses as its key strategy the social construc- aimed at imposing a socially conservative tion of a population that is never “given”. agenda of biopolitical “normalization” wide- Through biopolitical instruments it can be ly supported in Georgian society (Thornton constructed differently – as a unifi ed com- and Sichinava 2015). In this context, the idea munity supposedly sharing common nor- of empire acquires visible biopolitical con- mative grounding (the “Russian world”); as notations: Russia intends to reshape borders a group of internally displaced people that by expanding its version of biopolitical con- need to be taken care of (refugees in confl ict servatism (Makarychev and Yatsyk 2015) areas); as recipients of humanitarian assis- and include the Georgian population, which tance, and so forth. These role identities are shares the Orthodox values constitutive for situational and depend on the contexts cre- Putin’s ideology, in the sphere of the Russian ated by different modalities of biopower. normative counter-project. Second, the application of biopolitical - The concept of biopolitics has a rich ac- i.e. focused on controlling groups of popula- ademic legacy, yet it also denotes a specifi c tion - instruments strengthens imperial logic type of policy that distinguishes it from geo- in Russian foreign policy. This argument can political strategies. In January 2016 Russian be explored on the grounds of the projection President Vladimir Putin explained the an- of Russian “pastoral power” to Georgia, nexation of Crimea in predominantly bio- with its strong conservative components political – as opposed to geopolitical - terms, and moral appeal, as well as on the basis of claiming that Russia is more concerned about Moscow’s policy of gradually incorporating people than about borders. As a policy, bio- its population through passportization. politics is conducive to the emergence of a Third, we deem that the practice of bio- specifi c Russian identity based largely on politics in the South Caucasus is a battlefi eld the idea of defending the threatened lives of for a number of projects competing with people looking for protection, rather than on each other. Being an object of Russian bio- the logic of material gains through territori- power, Georgia itself develops biopolitical al acquisition. For Russia, territory as such is approaches and thus includes them in the not necessarily at the top of its priorities – the process of its identity-making. This recip- Russian Army did not fully occupy Georgia rocal biopoliticization of Russian– Georgian in August 2008, and Russia is reluctant to relations creates spaces where the two actors fully and immediately absorb Abkhazia and either compete with each other (over loyal- South Ossetia (along with Donbas and Trans- ties of the residents in Abkhazia and South nistria). In the meantime, Russian dominance Ossetia), or fi nd themselves in a comple- is, to a larger extent, based on infl uencing mentary position over a plethora of policy different groups of the population through issues pertaining to the conservative agenda discourses that culturally and (bio)politically with its strong biopolitical elements. 9 “Pastoral Power” and Russian – Georgian Relations

A major source of biopolitical discours- we can save ourselves only with Russia”. es and practices in this fi eld is the Russian But it is not necessarily that the ROC di- Orthodox Church (ROC) that, in accordance rectly instructs the GOC on specifi c policy with Michel Foucault’s thinking, can be seen issues. There is no strong evidence of Geor- as a biopolitical institution of “pastoral pow- gia’s high importance for the ROC, which er”. Religion must be included in the biopo- does not have a well-developed and artic- litical sphere of taking care of human lives. ulated policy towards Georgia, yet it is the Along the lines of Foucault’s reasoning, pas- GOC that explicitly or implicitly uses the toral power is a power of taking care of lives conservative discourse emanating from the through “modern biopolitical rationalities” ROC for the sake of signifying the tradition- (Hannah 2011, 230-231). As Mika Ojakangas al value-based core of Georgian authentic (2005, 19) posits, from the times of antiquity identity. “Presumably, what irritates the West states exercised power “over land, whereas is the high authority of religion in Georgia, the shepherd wields power over a fl ock… which appears to contravene experiences of dem- The task of the shepherd is to provide con- ocratic countries. Yet our patriarch does have a tinuous material and spiritual welfare for high authority that they (the West. – authors.) each and every member of the fl ock”. Pas- would like to destroy”, - this statement by toral power has strong connotations with a Georgian priest resembles the conspira- biopower since its object is “people on the cy theories that are also popular in Russia. move rather than ... static territory” (Golder The same goes for Eurosceptic voices in the 2007, 165); biopower and pastoral power Georgian religious community: “Perhaps, share other important characteristics – nor- Europe has already detached itself from mative / spiritual components and surveil- Christianity... It does not deem it essential lance mechanisms. any longer to fi ll your liberties with eternal After Russia lost many forms of infl uence values ... The most fundamental for Europe in Georgia as a result of the August war of is the untouchable freedom of choice. Yet is 2008, one of the few channels of communi- there a deep wisdom in this?“. cation that remained between the two peo- Against this backdrop, the ROC undoubt- ples was maintained by the two Orthodox edly has an essential infl uence on Georgian Churches (Kornilov and Makarychev 2015). Orthodox culture, to a large extent through The accentuation of cultural and religious Russian language theological literature. Yet, affi nity with Georgia is for Moscow a biopo- as one of local priests mentioned, litical instrument allowing for emphasizing “since 1990s the situation has changed. the incompatibility of “traditional” Ortho- When Georgian priests begun to move out of dox values with the EU’s liberal, emancipa- Georgia and the USSR, to Greece or Romania, tory agenda, which, according to its critics, we have started learning from others. Older “calls for respecting sin” and “forgets about priests are closer to Russian religious tradi- nations and patriotism” (Devdariani 2014). tions, while their younger colleagues share As a Georgian Orthodox priest noted, more with the Balkan canons”. “We have a common Orthodox spirit with The specifi city of the latter is mostly re- Russia...I like the way the Russian state treats lated to such religious practices as frequen- same-sex marriages; it is important for us here. cy of Eucharist or confession, though these When the West came to resist God, we see that canonical differences have also contributed 10 to the spread of European cultural values to while also meet the explicitly-pro-Kremlin the Georgian clergy in general. The shared group of the “Night Wolves” biker club, Orthodox faith can also produce some am- which is known for its neo-imperial image biguity towards Russia. Some priests with- (Chinkova 2014, Kevorkova 2013). However, in the GOC are not happy to see themselves even if we take the GOC narratives that ra- dependent on their Russian brothers.5 diate pro-Russian sympathies, the question “As I see it, we don’t have such big prob- arises: are those sympathies a product of lems with Russia as we do with the West... Russian biopower, or do they stem from the Both of them are empires that wish to control ideological consonance of the two kindred the world... We don’t want to be parts of either churches? It is true that the Patriarch Ilia has of the two projects... As far as Russia’s policy called Putin “a wise ruler who will neces- is concerned, it is rude... If Russia comes again sarily help reunite Georgia... Russia’s idea is with its aggressive attitudes – well, something about the protection of spirituality” (Apsny that already happen can repeat... We have lost 2013). It is also true that Georgian priests a lot, yet kept intact our language, faith and can refer to their Russian spiritual teachers morals, which are the main values for us... in public pronouncements and copy many You Russians have force and culture, we also practices of the ROC, but still the latter is have our own spirituality, and we all togeth- overwhelmingly perceived by the Georgian er can say to the West – no, what exists with Orthodox community as an external force you will not exist here; we can take from you indirectly infl uenced by the Kremlin: something good, but not homosexuals”. “There is a presumption that people who The GOC is a diverse and fragmented ag- propagate pro-Russian sympathies might have glomeration of different religious platforms, been working for Russian special services, or and does not speak with a single voice on for kindred Georgian organizations for which policy issues. Within the GOC there are religious connections are important“. priests who share classical theories of West- There is an undeniable potential for ROC ern conspiracy against Orthodoxy, and there infl uence in Georgia, but that hardly leads are also those who accept the liberal values to direct practical implications. The head of of human dignity and freedom. Yet both of the GOC has, on numerous occasions, made them see Russia as an empire. pro-Western statements, and celebrations “Georgia does not wish to submit itself to of the 30st anniversary of his enthronement Russia, since this would entail a loss of the po- were held without representatives of the litical freedom that we have gained... A blend ROC. It is telling that GOC representatives of Christianity and imperialism does not give try to keep a critical distance from Russian us anything healthy. The spirit of Byzantium policies towards Ukraine. Thus, the Metro- that could have had historical roots nowadays politan Nikolay suggested that “what hap- looks obsolete. Russia does have that kind of pens in Ukraine is close to us: in 1993 we inclinations, which is bad... In the meantime went through pretty much the same. In an I can’t say that the ROC is short of the holy Abkhazian village a monk, who never took spirit” arms in his hands, was killed just because he The GOC is thus a controversial institu- represented the GOC” (RIA 2015). By say- tion: it may both support the European inte- ing that, the Georgian priest drew a paral- gration of Georgia and team up with Stalinist lel between separatists in the two countries, sympathizers; Ilia the Second may be critical and indirectly identifi ed GOC with the Ky- of Russia’s policy in the occupied territories, iv-based Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 11 Normatively, Russian religious diploma- of the Abkhazian clergy to create their own cy revolves around a conservative agenda Church with the assistance of the Moscow that plays a political role: the pro-LGBT vs. Patriarchate were supported after the war of anti-LGBT dichotomy transforms into a pro- 2008. EU vs. pro-Russian dilemma. Thus, some The Moscow Church has taken the prag- in Georgia think that Russia manipulates matic stand of non-recognition of the inde- the widely spread religious feelings and pendence of the Abkhaz Orthodox Church. the veneration of Orthodox values to isolate The Russian Patriarch Kirill stressed many Georgia from the West: times that both Abkhazia and South Osse- “Church in Georgia is a key identity mak- tia continue to fall under the jurisdiction of er. It imposes two bans on those who are sup- the Georgian Orthodox Church. The ROC posed to be loyal to the idea of the nation – on did not challenge the outcome of the Au- being non-Orthodox and being LGBT… On gust war of 2008 but followed the principle May 17 2013 Orthodox priests called for join- of respecting the borders of the “canonical ing a homophobic demonstration. 40,000 peo- territories” (Venediktova 2013). In response, ple celebrated hegemonic masculinity against the Tbilisi Patriarchate refused to recognize a dozen of their LGBT opponents”. the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Yet some of Georgian priests didn’t sup- Ukraine, which had proclaimed its indepen- port this idea: dence from Moscow. Answering why the “The May 17 event has elucidated a stark GOC has made such a decision, one of our difference between locally educated priests experts suggested that “should we support and those who had the experience of studying any of these churches, we’ll lose the Ortho- in Europe. Everyone was contacted by the Pa- dox unity”. triarchy and invited to come to the public ac- ROC’s support for the integrity of the cation with their entire parish, but not everyone nonical territory of the GOC comes out of the liked this… It’s a shame that this manifesta- fear of losing infl uence in post-Soviet coun- tion took place under the aegis of the GOC” . tries and the interest to have the GOC on its Meanwhile, representatives of a different side in issues that are important to the ROC religious group were in agreement that - its property in Estonia and uneasy rela- “LGBT is a convenient point of consolida- tions with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. tion for the Church… Even if LGBT disap- Unlike the Kremlin, the ROC is disinterest- pears from the agenda, the Church would fi nd ed in reconsidering the extant borders, and another issue – they would campaign against for pragmatic reasons is more interested in Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, etc.”. keeping relations with Georgia rather than Relations between the two Churches are with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Yet polit- complicated by the religious situation in ically, the stand of the ROC has created con- Abkhazia, where the Orthodox clergy of troversy, since the head of the Georgian Or- local origin started to gain infl uence in the thodox Church keeps insisting that the lost diocese only in the 1990s and welcomed the territories will ultimately return to Georgia military success of their compatriots in the (Rosbalt 2013). The Georgian Patriarch has war of 1992-1993. By contrast, the clergy of also said that Moscow Patriarch Kirill does Georgian origin continued to hope for a uni- everything possible to help restore the unity of all lands that are claimed as the “canon- ty of Georgia (Apsny 2013). The reaction in ical territories” of the Georgian Orthodox Abkhazia to this statement was predictably Church (Ieromonakh Dorofey 2006). Plans negative. 12 Nevertheless, as our interviewee said, could be an intermediary between the GOC “non-offi cially the ROC administers the and the Abkhaz priests, but instead the ROC Abkhaz diocese by sending monks and priests started taking a top-down position… GOC to serve in Abkhazian churches… A local fel- does not raise this issue, being reluctant to low of mine admitted that these actions were agitate anti-Russian attitudes. But emotions not canonic, yet the Georgians simply close persist”. their eyes to it. We don’t protest and don’t However, high representatives of the make a case out of it since we can’t physically GOC raised some issues internationally: be in Abkhazia, yet our co-believers who need for example, Archbishop Andrian Gvazava spiritual help remain there”. asked UNESCO to monitor churches and The GOC itself is unhappy with some of monasteries in the regions that are beyond the ambiguity of the ROC’s policy toward the Georgian government’s control (Inter- the two break-away territories. pressnews 2015). The Holy Synod of the “We are very concerned about what is go- GOC issued a statement accusing the ROC ing on in Abkhazia. In words, the ROC rec- of converting churches built in Sukhumi and ognizes it as an integral part of the Georgian Tkvarcheli in September 2013 into Russian patriarchy, yet de-facto ROC administers the Orthodox Churches. As the President of In- Abkhazian Church. Churches over there are ternational Foundation for Unity of Ortho- reshaped in closer compliance with the Rus- dox People Valery Alexeev explained, how- sian style. This is an intentional policy of do- ever, Russian Orthodox priests only attended ing away with traces of the Georgian Ortho- the ceremonies according to the agreement doxy. It is impossible to hold services in the between the ROC and GOC on the spiritu- Georgian language there any longer. This is al nurturing of Russian soldiers located in an unfriendly stance”. Abkhazia (Prikhody 2014). Therefore, con- Another Georgian priest shared similar troversies over separatist territories inhibit concerns: religious communication even though the “Georgians are being expelled from Ab- two churches share a common conservative khazia... A few remaining priests proclaimed agenda grounded in strong practices of bio- their independent parish… Their policies are political regulation and control over human non-canonical… It would be ideal if the ROC bodies.

Conclusion

In this article we have reached three main to protecting and taking care of their everyday conclusions. First, the application of biopo- lives. This explains the role of biopower as one litical policy tools creates new forms of inclu- of nodal points in Russian neo imperial project. sions to and exclusions from political commu- Second, we have justifi ed the applica- nities-in-the-making, and thus it infl uences tion of biopolitical frame for studying vast practices of border making and unmaking, the areas of consonance between Russian and logic of which might not coincide with national Georgian religious discourses. Apart from jurisdictions. We have seen that biopolitical in- ideological affi nity we have seen that both struments (care and protection of human lives) parties use each other for political gain: are inseparably connected with constructing the ROC is eager to project its conservative role identities of groups of people as related agenda onto Georgia for the sake of expand- 13 ing the Moscow-patronized community of the authority of ROC for boosting its excep- Orthodox believers, while the GOC refers to tional role in Georgian society and politics.

References

1. Apsny. 2013. “Rech Ilyi Vtorogo na vstreche s gruzinskoi diasporoi Rossii.” Apsny (21 January), at http:// www.apsny.ge/2013/soc/1359267799.php, accessed October 10, 2013. 2. Chinkova, Elena. 2013. “Gruzinskaya “ottepel’”: Russkie ikony i ‘Nochnye volki’.” Komsomolskaya Prav- da (25 October), at http://www.kompravda.eu/daily/26150/3039287/, accessed March 10, 2015. 3. Devdariani, Nana. 2014. “Evrodesant v Patriarkhii, “Rossiya-Gruzia: Expertniy Dialog”. Kavkazskoe sotrudnichestvo (26 May), at http://www.georgiamonitor.org/detail.php?ID=562, accessed March 10, 2015. 4. Golder, Ben. 2007. “Foucault and the Genealogy of Pastoral Power”. Radical Philosophy Review 10 (2), 157- 176. 5. Hannah, Matthew. 2011. “Pastoral Power”. Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt. Stephen Legg, ed. London and New York: Routledge: 227-233. 6. Ieromonakh Dorofey (Dbar), 2006. “Kratkiy ocherk istorii Abkhazskoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi.” Noviy Afon: “Stratoﬁ l” Publisher. 7. Interpressnews. 2015. “Patriarchate of Georgia addresses UNESCO regarding monasteries in the breakaway region.” Interpressnews (15 July), at http://www.interpressnews.ge/en/society/70624-patriarchate-of-georgia-addresses-unesco-regarding-monasteries-in-the-breakaway-region.html?ar=A, accessed 10 August 2015. 8. Kevorkova, Nadezhda. 2013. “Patriarch of Georgia: Our church and people never cut ties with Russia”. RT (22 July), at https://www.rt.com/op-edge/patriarch-georgia-russia-ties-438/, accessed April 10, 2015. 9. Kornilov, Alexander and Andrey Makarychev. 2015. “Russia’s soft power in the South Caucasus: discourses, communication, hegemony.” Religion, Nation and Democracy in the South Caucasus. Agadjanian, Al- exander, Joedicke, Ansgar and Evert van der Zweerde (eds.) London and New York: Routledge, 238-254. 10. Makarychev, Andrey. From Chechnya to Ukraine: Biopolitical Patriotism in Times of War. Washington DC: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, September 9, 2015, available at https://www.wilson- center.org/article/chechnya-to-ukraine-biopolitical-patriotism-times-war 11. Makarychev, Andrey. Reassembling Land or Reconnecting People? Geopolitics and Biopower in Russia’s Neighborhood Policy. Washington DC: PONARS Policy Memo 367, September 2015, available at http:// www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/reassembling-lands-or-reconnecting-people 12. Makarychev, Andrey and Alexandra Yatsyk. 2015. “Refracting Europe: Biopolitical Conservatism and Art Protest in Putin’s Russia.” In Russia’s Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations. Cadi- er, David and Margot Light (eds) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 138-155. 13. Ojakangas, Mika. 2005. “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault”. Foucault Studies 2, May, 5-28. 14. Prikhody. 2014. “Golos druga: uslyshat’ i poniat’.” Prikhody (29 April), at http://prichod.ru/orthodoxy-everywhere/14261/, accessed April 10, 2015. 15. RIA. 2015. “Mitropolit Nikolay: glavnaya problema - v nereligionosti mnogikh liudei.” RIA-Ukraina news agency (26 May), at http://rian.com.ua/interview/20150526/368052105.html, accessed 10 August 2015. 16. Rosbalt. 2013. “Il’ya Vtoroy posle nagrazhdeniya potreboval vernut’ Abkhaziyu i Yuzhnuyu Osetiyu.” Rosbalt Agency (22 January), at http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2013/01/22/1084343.html, accessed Oc-

14 tober 10, 2013. 17. Thornton, Laura and Davit Sichinava. 2015. “Public Attitudes in Georgia Results of April 2015 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia.” NDI, at available https://www.ndi.org/ﬁ les/NDI%20Georgia_ April%202015%20Poll_Public%20Issues_ENG_VF_0.pdf, accessed February 26, 2016. 18. Venediktova, Nadezhda. 2013. The Role of the Church in the Georgian–Russian Relations. Available from: http://www.international-alert.org/blog/role-church-georgian-russian-relations-english-0#sthash.gGo- jg8l5.dpbs, accessed January 5, 2016].

FFOREIGNOREIGN POLICYPOLICY OFOF THETHE GEORGIANGEORGIAN OORTHODOXRTHODOX CHURCH:CHURCH: INTERPLAYINTERPLAY BBETWEENETWEEN TTHEHE WWESTEST AANDND RRUSSIAUSSIA

SALOME MINESASHVILI

Introduction

The Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) ing identical. Despite its opposition towards is seen as a main proponent of ideological the West by some of its representatives, the resistance to Georgia’s pro-Western orienta- GOC as an institution exhibits somewhat tion. Church representatives often portray contradictory behavior. For instance, on sev- Western values as a threat to Georgian tradi- eral occasions the GOC has made statements tions. As a result, some claim that the Geor- ofﬁ cially supporting Georgia’s Western in- gian Orthodox Church is one of the major tegration. In the political context of Russia/ tools of Russian propaganda, conveying the West dichotomy, this appears to be contra- Russian narrative to the Georgian nation1. dictory and leads to questions about the role But critics often perceive anti-Western pro- and expected behavior of the GOC in Geor- paganda and pro-Russian narrative as be- gia`s foreign policy.

The GOC between Russia and the West: Mixed Behavior and Rhetoric

The Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) is on the meeting, saying that the church had powerful enough to play a considerable role misperceptions about NATO and the EU not only in Georgia`s domestic affairs, but and their policy on a number of issues. Two also in the country’s foreign policy. More- such issues include removing religion from over, the GOC pursues its own foreign pol- the school program and resisting a consti- icy that does not always coincide with that tutional amendment on defi ning marriage of the state. However, how the different as a union between a man and a woman,2 policies intersect or clash is a matter of con- some of the key opposing points towards cern. As the GOC is primarily perceived as the West. an ideological institution in value terms, its This statement came as a surprise con- value affi nity or opposition towards certain sidering that the GOC has multiple times political actors is often linked to its political openly expressed that it fi nds the West cul- position. However, this linear relation does turally less appealing and even inferior in not always refl ect reality. moral terms.3 Representatives of the Church On 7 November 2016, an offi cial dele- frequently describe the West’s fl awed spir- gation of the Georgian Patriarchy visited ituality, partly owing to technological de- NATO headquarters and the EU structures velopment, as a threat to the notion of Geor- in Brussels and met with institutional rep- gianness. Some of the EU requirements resentatives, including with James Ap- towards Georgia in the framework of the pathurai, NATO Deputy Assistant Secre- Eastern Partnership are considered as an act tary General for Political Affairs. After their of imposing those values. This perception return, the Patriarchy issued a statement of threat varies among different groups and

1 Netgazeti.ge. (9 May, 2016). “Saqartveloshi rusuli propagandis tsinaaghmdeg gaertianebuli organizatsiebis gegmebi“ [Plans of organizations in Georgia united against Russian propaganda]. Netgazeti.ge. Available at: http://netgazeti. ge/news/113152/ [Accessed 28 December, 2016]. 2 Democracy & Freedom Watch. (16 November, 2016). Georgia`s Orthodox Church realizes it is wrong about EU and NATO. Available at: http://dfwatch.net/georgias-orthodox-church-realizes-it-was-wrong-about-eu-and-nato-46554 [Accessed 20 December, 2016] 3 Preaching of the Patriarch. (27 July, 2014). Youtube video, Orthodox Videos. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=-y7zrhGVGOo [Accessed 20 December, 2016] 19 representatives within the church. In 2011, the Russian government. However, even Patriarch Ilia II appealed to the nation „to taking into consideration their ideological protect its history, past and traditions be- closeness, some opposition to the Russian cause what fl ows from the West is unaccept- side exists within the GOC. able for Orthodoxy”4. In 2010, the Patriarch The GOC positions itself at the ideological even called on Georgian parents to avoid orbit of Eastern Orthodoxy, which is mainly sending their children abroad at an early age advocated by the ROC. The latter also de- as this could damage their cultural and spir- veloped its ideology by rejecting the values itual development.5 that mainly stem from the West.8 The GOC The GOC appears to be clearly hostile to- ideology corresponds to the ideas dominat- wards the ideological basis of the West. How- ing the ROC discourse such as Orthodoxy as ever, the Church as an institution has always a unique civilization, anti-globalization and refrained from openly declaring its position focus on homosexuality as a major point for about Georgia’s Western integration in polit- opposition towards the West.9 At the same ical terms. On the contrary, the GOC has ex- time, as an alternative to the secularized pressed some support several times. During a West, the Russian state employs an ideology meeting between the European Commission- that blends traditional values with the idea er, Stephen Füle, and the Patriarch, Ilia II said of Orthodox civilization.10 that the Church “will do everything to help The GOC also maintains positive relations Georgia become EU member”.6 He expressed with the ROC and the Russian state and its similar sentiments at a meeting with Austrian representatives, advocating for improving re- President Heinz Fischer, stating: “Georgia has lations between the two countries. In Novem- chosen the European path. […] Our choice is ber 2016, Patriarch Ilia II paid his fi fth visit very fi rm and we will defi nitely achieve it”.7 to Russia since August 2008 War, to partici- On the other hand, the GOC has a com- pate in the events marking the 70th birthday mon ideological basis with the Russian Or- of the Russian Patriarch Kirill. The Georgian thodox Church (ROC) and Russian state in Patriarch, when referring to his counterpart, terms of its national-ideological ground. The stated that “regulation of relations between Church maintains good relations with the Russia and Georgia is very important for the ROC and also tries to maintain contact with two countries. We need each other“.11 At pre-

4 interpresniusi [Interpressnews]. saqarTvelos kaTolikos-patriarqi ruis-urbnisis eparqias stumrobs. [Ca- tholicos-Patriarch of Georgia visits Ruis-Urbnisi Eparchy]. 10 November 2011. Available at: http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/sazogadoeba/184026-saqarthvelos-katholikos-patriarqi-ruis-urbnisis-eparqias-stumrobs.html?ar=A [Ac- cessed 23 January, 2017] 5 Civil.ge. (3 October, 2010). “Patriarch: refrain from sending children abroad for education”. Civil.ge. Available at: http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22722 [Accessed 27 December, 2016]. 6 Civil.ge. (4 March, 2014). “Patriarch: Church will do everything to make Georgia EU member”. Civil.ge. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27008 [Accessed 27 December, 2016]. 7 http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28283 8 Ramet, S.P. (2006). “The way we were - and should be again? European Orthodox Churches and the “idyllic past”. In: T.A. Byrnes and P.J. Katzenstein, eds. “Religion in an expanding Europe”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9 Popkova, I. (2011). “Russian Orthodox concordat? Church and state under Medvedev”. Nationalities papers: The Jour- nal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 39(5), 667-683. 10 Leustean, L.N., 2015. Eastern Christianity and the liberal international order. In: Barnett, M., Bob, C., Onar, N.F, Jenichen, A., Leigh, M. and Leustean L.N. (eds.). (2015). Faith, freedom and foreign policy: challenges for the transatlantic community. Washington DC: Transatlantic Academy. Kornilov, A. and Makarychev, A., 2015. Russia’s soft power in the South Caucasus: discourses, communication and hegemony. In: Agadjanian, A., Jodicke, A. and Van Der Zweerde, E. (eds.)., 2015. Religion, nation and democracy in the South Caucasus. London and New York: Routledge. 11 Civil.ge. (21 November, 2016). “Georgian Patriarch visits Moscow”. Civil.ge. Available at: http://civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=29640 [Accessed 26 December, 2016]. 20 vious meetings, Ilia II has also met with Rus- position that can sometimes seem puzzling sia’s former and incumbent presidents, Dim- from an ideological point of view. Contrary itri Medvedev and Vladimir Putin. During to the development of Russia and the West his visit in January 2013, the Patriarch called as opposing poles in Georgian politics, the the two nations “friends and brothers” and GOC seems to hold both in its orbit. The appealed to the Russian president as “a wise GOC’s frequently ambivalent and occasion- leader of state, who can change the situation ally supportive position on Western integra- and Georgia can once again be united”.12 tion contradicts its ideological hostility to- But on the other hand, ideological afﬁ n- wards the West on the one hand, and, on the ity does not exclude skepticism or some other hand, its closeness with the ROC and distancing from the side of the GOC when advocacy for improving relations with Rus- its interests are threatened. In 2015, the Pa- sia. However, as previously noted, even the triarchate of Georgia addressed UNESCO latter comes with some contradictions. Ide- with a request to monitor monasteries and ology does not always play a decisive role in churches beyond the control of the Geor- the GOC`s foreign policy or the way it inter- gian government. In 2013, the GOC issued a acts in Georgian state`s foreign policy. There statement that accused the ROC of sanctify- are multiple factors that can shed a light on ing newly built churches in Abkhazia.13 the Church`s foreign policy and its potential The GOC displays an ambivalent political behavior in the future. The GOC and Western Integration as Georgia`s Foreign Policy Priority

The Georgian Orthodox Church oper- pro-Western discourse under the Saakashvi- ates in a complex political reality where the li government, began to operate more freely government’s ofﬁ cial policy is pro-West- in the rather relaxed political atmosphere ern, which has substantive public support. created by the Georgian Dream coalition.14 In this context, the GOC should be viewed However, despite this change, the Georgian as a political player that has to maneuver in Dream government has also declared Eu- the unequivocally deﬁ ned political environ- ro-Atlantic integration a top priority of Geor- ment in order to avoid any major clash with gian foreign policy.15 According to the IRI the government as well as maintain high public opinion polls, an overwhelming ma- support among the public. jority of the Georgian population supports a Since 2004, all the governments have pro-Western policy. The share of supporters maintained a strong pro-Western foreign of the EU membership varied between 88% policy. After 2012, anti-Western groups, and 85% throughout 2013 and 2016. And the which had been restrained by the strict support for NATO membership varied be-

12 Грузия онлайн. (26 January, 2013). “Речь Илии Второго на встрече с грузинской диаспорой России”. [Speech of Ilia II at the meeting of Georgian diaspora in Russia]. Available at: http://www.apsny.ge/2013/soc/1359267799.php [Accessed 21 December, 2016]. 13 Makarychev, A. (January 2016). “The limits to Russian soft power in Georgia”. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo: No.412. Available from: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/fi les/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm412_Makarychev_ Jan2016_1.pdf [Accessed 22 December, 2016] 14 Kakhishvili, L. (2016). “Georgia – the choice: the perceived West-Russia dichotomy in Georgian politics”. In: Knodt, M. and Urdze, S. (eds.). “Caucasus, the EU and Russia – Triangular cooperation?” Available at: http://dx.doi. org/10.5771/9783845257402-165 15 Civil.ge. (7 March, 2013). “Parliament adopts bipartisan resolution on foreign policy“. Civil.ge. Available at: http:// www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25828 [Accessed 28 December, 2016]. 21 tween 85% and 79% in the same years.16 In position to the existing situation. the face of the wide-spread public and gov- For instance, in December 2015, the Eu- ernment support for Euro-Atlantic integra- ropean Commission launched the visa lib- tion, the Church would risk its popularity eralization process by releasing a report that by openly standing against any of the West- Georgia met all the criteria for a legislative ern institutions from a political perspective, proposal to the European Council and Parlia- even though the GOC maintains the prerog- ment to lift visa requirements for Georgians. ative of cultural resistance, considering that During the visit of Prime Minister Irakli it sets the moral agenda in the country. Garibashvili and EU ambassador to Geor- As a player in the political context with gia Janos Herman to the Patriarchate, Ilia II its own interests, the Church can be fl exible called the occasion “a huge achievement, a in its political position, depending on the celebration for the entire Georgian popula- context. Even though the West is hardly a tion and the Georgian Church among them”. normative-ideological choice for the GOC, But he also expressed hope that “Europe will it can become a political one depending on not only bring much goodness, but will also the circumstances, such as level of the gov- protect our culture”.17 A similar statement ernment and public support of the West- of support was made by the Patriarch at the ern integration. For instance, the GOC has event dedicated to celebrating the signing of made statements supporting the EU at times the Association Agreement with the EU.18 that coincided with major milestones in This shows that the Church can be fl exi- EU-Georgian relations, and increased politi- ble in response to changing circumstances, cal and public interest in the EU. Since 2013, including the prospects of closer relations two major events have taken place in the with the EU, as well as the prevailing mood EU-Georgia relations: the signing of Associ- in the Georgian political spectrum and pub- ation Agreement and DCFTA in June 2014 lic. In addition, the Church appears to be and developments in the process of nego- ignoring the government’s policy of dichot- tiations over visa liberalization. The whole omy between Russia and the West and seek- process was characterized by strong opti- ing to maintain safe relations with both of mistic and EU-favoring political discourse them. For example, when the Patriarch an- that consequently infl uenced the Georgian nounced his support for Georgia’s EU mem- public and their expectations. The fact that bership in March 2014, he added: “when we the GOC chooses these moments to make speak of joining European structure, it does statements in support of the EU indicates not mean that we are limited in having links the extent to which the Church can adjust its with other organizations”.19

16 International Republican Institute. (2016). Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia. IRI. Available at: http://www. iri.org/sites/default/fi les/wysiwyg/georgia_2016.pdf 17 Netgazeti.ge. (20 December, 2015). “Ilia II: imedia evropa ara marto bevr siketes mogvitans, aramed daitsavs chvens kulturas” [Ilia II: I hope that Europe will not only bring much of goodness to us, but will also protect our culture]. Net- gazeti.ge. Available from: http://netgazeti.ge/news/86231/ [Accessed 28 December, 2016]. 18 Ipn.ge. (27 June, 2014). “Ghmertma dalotsos kvela adamiani, vints shromobda am bednieri dghisatvis“. [God bless every person who worked for this happy day]. Ipn.ge. Available at: http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/sazogadoeba/287882-ilia-meore-ghmerthma-dalocos-yvela-adamiani-romelic-shromobda-am-bednieri-dghisathvis.html?ar=A [Accessed 21 December, 2016] 19 Civil.ge. (4 March, 2014). “Patriarch: Church will do everything to make Georgia EU member”. Civil.ge. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27008 [Accessed 27 December, 2016]. 22 The GOC and Russia: How Realistic is Ideological-Political Affi nity? The GOC shares value affi nity with the as a potential means for confl ict resolution, Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which which has become the basis for the Geor- complements good relations between the gian Church’s appeasement policy towards two institutions. The ideologies of both Russia. The GOC also sees itself as a medi- Churches revolve around a conservative ator in this process. In 2013, during one of agenda. However, ideological closeness can his meetings in Moscow, Patriarch Ilia II also be seen as an intermediary for political- has emphasized the role of religion in two ly motivated interests. These interests, inde- countries’ relations: “Georgia and Russia pendent of ideological similarities, draw the have huge spiritual wealth and we should two churches closer. For example, the two take care of our Orthodox faith. Orthodoxy churches provide mutual support for each helped us and helped Russia”24. Realizing its other against breakaway churches: the ROC infl uential role in Georgia and assuming/ recognizes the GOC’s canonical territorial hoping the same from the ROC in Russian integrity including on the territories of South state, the GOC becomes an advocate for im- Ossetia and Abkhazia, but in exchange the proving Russian-Georgian relations through GOC supports the ROC’s canonical rights in the interference of religious institutions. As Estonia, Moldova and Ukraine.20 With this Patriarch Ilia II told his Russian counterpart policy, the ROC maintains its legitimacy in during a visit to Moscow: “Although we are the Orthodox world and avoids the risk of not politicians and cannot take serious steps pushing the GOC into the camp of the ec- in this sphere, it is possible to somehow in- umenical Patriarch. At the same time, this fl uence the processes”.23 behavior complements Kremlin’s interest In sum, the GOC`s close relations with to assert the ROC’s role as a mediator in the the ROC and the Russian state seems to be Caucasus.21 based on a blend of ideological and politi- Furthermore, the GOC seems to have an- cal interests. Occasional opposition from the other reasoning for maintaining close ties GOC shows that some threat to the politi- with the ROC and the Russian state: it con- cal interests might shake up this harmony. siders religious and ideological closeness Therefore, simple ideological affi nity with as a tool for improving deteriorated Rus- Russia cannot predict the GOC`s behavior sia-Georgia relations. Good relations with unless it is combined with complementing the ROC and the Russian state are regarded pragmatic interest.

20 Conroy, K.M. (2015). “Semi-recognized states and ambiguous churches: the Orthodox Church in South Ossetia and Abkhazia”. Journal of State and Church, 57(4): 621-639. 21 Ibid. 22 Грузия онлайн. (26 January, 2013). “Речь Илии Второго на встрече с грузинской диаспорой России”. [Speech of Ilia II at the meeting of Georgian diaspora in Russia]. Available at: http://www.apsny.ge/2013/soc/1359267799.php [Accessed 21 December, 2016]. 23 Civil.ge. (21 November, 2016). “Georgian Patriarch visits Moscow”. Civil.ge. Available at: http://civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=29640 [Accessed 26 December, 2016]. 23 Conclusion

The Georgian Orthodox Church can in- ical institution in terms of its foreign policy, ﬂ uence not only cultural and ideological but rather it is also a political player that has moods in Georgia, but also politics, includ- to take into consideration both domestic and ing foreign policy. Therefore, its attitude international political context. This maneu- and position towards the two major poles vering between ideology and politics, and in Georgian foreign policy, Russia and the its adjustments based on pragmatic inter- West, are important and, for some, a matter ests, makes the GOC ﬂ exible in its political of concern. The GOC does employ its own positioning. This means that the Church can foreign policy, which at times diverges from change its stance in accordance to changing the government’s position, as is the case of circumstances in the Georgian government`s Russia and cultural resistance of the West. policy, the level of public support and the However, the GOC is not simply an ideolog- actions of external political actors.

24 IIMPLEMENTINGMPLEMENTING EEU’SU’S NNORMATIVEORMATIVE AAGENDAGENDA IINN TTHEHE SSOUTHOUTH CCAUCASUS:AUCASUS: CCONTRADICTORYONTRADICTORY EFFECTSEFFECTS

EIKI BERG ALAR KILP

Introduction

It is not a secret that the EU has sought to however, may drive these countries into con- infl uence regional developments by imposing fl ict with the conservative mores sustained by liberal democratic norms on the third coun- the state/religious institutions. tries interested in closer relations with the This memo focuses on the South Cauca- union. Given that this soft power approach sus where the EU has tried to “softly” in- may effect change, we analysed the role of crease its leverage by imposing liberal dem- EU normative powers in infl uencing human ocratic norms on the countries in a region rights dialogues. We also saw how both the interested in closer relations with the union. political establishments and societies at large Although all three are Eastern Partnership have adapted to these new circumstances. countries, they are moving in different di- Further to the east, the lever for European- rections: Georgia is interested in integra- ization seems to be eroding. To that end, the tion with Western structures; Armenia was EU has continuously reaffi rmed that its sup- heading along the European track but made port for and cooperation with target countries a sudden U-turn in September 2014 when must be conditional on the promotion of civil it aligned itself to the Eurasian Customs liberties and democratic reforms. While there Union; Azerbaijan has remained undecided. is concern that the EU’s normative policies This variation is refl ected by the (un)willing- may be ineffective if they are not fully imple- ness of the political elite of these respective mented on the ground, it is possible that the countries to participate in human rights di- prospect of EU integration could prove to be alogues, to harmonize national legislations an attractive aspiration for large segments of with European norms and values, and fi nal- these societies. Fully implementing EU norms, ly, to implement new regulations in practice. Problematic implementation It appears that accepting European scribed norms will not be rewarded with an norms has only been welcomed on the sur- invitation to accession talks. face, while the implementation of new reg- During the seven rounds of EU-Armenia ulations in practice has been problematic. human rights dialogues and nine rounds of When comparing the three Caucasian coun- EU-Georgia dialogues, the sides discussed tries, striking differences appear. Georgia the existing mechanisms for the protection has been the most keen on adapting its own of human rights in these countries. Georgia value system and has become more liber- is the only one of the three that has passed a al and reform-minded. Azerbaijan has the comprehensive anti-discrimination law pro- least desire to change, preferring to keep tecting homosexuals from discrimination, things as they are. Armenia falls somewhere while Azerbaijan has preferred to avoid in between – accommodation of Europe- human rights dialogue of any kind and, in an norms is welcome, yet inaction and the many ways, has not been inclined to adopt government’s slow approach to improving the EU’s normative agenda. Regardless of law enforcement reveals diffi culties in im- the position of the countries’ governments, plementation. An additional challenge to the EU norms have had a minimal effect on implementing EU norms could be the asym- the way these societies treat their ethnic, re- metric relation between the South Caucasus ligious and sexual minorities. Participating countries and the Union: meeting the pre- in dialogue is usually perceived as an easy 27 task to fulfi l, but implementation poses attitudes are slow to disappear. Politicians enormous challenges because all three soci- seek popularity by playing on society’s val- eties are, for the most part, religious, deeply ues and national ideologies. Priests take part traditional and defi ned by conservative val- in homophobic rallies and warn people not ues. to go against “God’s will”. Police feel reluc- The Armenian Apostolic Church and the tant to step in when ultra-orthodox Chris- Georgian Orthodox Church are considered tians attack those who promote change. national churches with special status and The Eu expects that the change of value privileges in Armenia and Georgia, respec- orientations will naturally follow liberaliza- tively. They have played a major role in iden- tion of legislation regulating sexuality, gen- tity politics and national consolidation ef- der and family. On the surface, this expecta- forts. Religious affi liation is largely nominal tion makes sense because all South Caucasus in Azerbaijan; percentages for actual practic- countries are maintaining their commitment ing members of a faith are much lower. In to strengthening of “democracy, rule of law, terms of religiosity, Armenia and Georgia sit human rights, and fundamental freedoms” at one end of the religious spectrum while (Riga Declaration of May 2015). In practice, Azerbaijan has a place at the opposite, more however, the liberalization of legislation secular extreme. The comprehensive data of regulating sexuality has not been supported the World Values Survey, which combines or initiated by social demand (which typi- multiple dimensions of religiosity, demon- cally has been the case in Western Europe- strate a repeating pattern where Azerbaijani an societies). Instead of having an intended society is the least and Georgian society the positive effect on social attitudes, the laws most religious in terms of self-identifi cation, passed in parliament have intensifi ed social regular religious practice, the importance of polarization over the issue, as we have seen religion in socialization and public trust in in the case of the anti-discrimination law in religious institutions. Georgia. There are innate cultural predispositions South Caucasus countries differ in their towards the values of democracy in both geopolitical aspirations, state reactions to EU, Georgia and Armenia, which should also and levels of religiosity. They share, how- logically apply to that part of the Western ever, strongly traditional and conservative value system supporting tolerance, diver- attitudes toward gender and sexuality. The sity and respect for minorities of all forms societal perceptions in the South Caucasus (Matrosyan 2015). Yet this may be wishful highlight masculinity as a safeguard for the thinking. What is the most striking is the survival of society and the family.1 Women fact that all three countries reformed their must be protected; they should only be mar- legislations to ensure the rights of sexual mi- ginally present in public and should serve norities as a follow-up to their entry into the their husbands in every way. Unmarried Council of Europe in the late 1990s and early heterosexuals over 30 are rarely accepted in 2000s. Furthermore, Georgia and Armenia society; those with no children and not in a have made a big leap forward in the frame- relationship are under enormous social pres- work of human rights dialogues conducted sure. Most families in the South Caucasus by the EU. Yet, at the societal level radical see homosexuals as shameful because their

1 See Georgia: Between Modernity and the Middle Ages, http://www.gwi-boell.de/en/2013/05/30/georgia-between-modernity-and-middle-ages [Accessed 21 November 2016]; LGBT Rights in the South Caucasus, http://www. gwi-boell.de/en/2013/05/30/lgbt-rights-south-caucasus [Accessed 21 November 2016] 28 apparently “deviant” behaviour threatens have unmarried couples living together as social unity and the continuity of the fami- neighbours. Only Armenia beats Azerbaijan ly. Homosexual men are seen as a source of in religious exclusivity – 57 percent of Ar- insecurity and weakened self-defence be- menian respondents want to have people cause it is thought that young men may be of a different religion as neighbours. The “infected” and thereby destroy society from survey results also conﬁ rm that the South the inside. Sexual minorities become objects Caucasus countries remain the three least of public aggression, social ostracism and vi- tolerant societies in Europe in terms of atti- olence. In short, those who want to belong in tudes towards homosexuality, despite their society must adopt traditional values regard- level of Europeanization and the depth of ing cultural norms and religious morals. integration with the EU (Kuyper et al. 2013). When we turn to the World Values Sur- Among the 15 European countries surveyed vey results, the least tolerant society is Azer- by World Values Survey 2010-2014, South baijan, in all possible categories: 58 percent Caucasus societies were the top three in the did not want to have people of a different percentage of respondents who considered race as neighbours, 26 percent did not want homosexuality “never justiﬁ able” – 95 per- people who speak a different language as cent in Armenia, 93 percent in Azerbaijan, neighbours and 58 percent did not want to 86 percent in Georgia. Quest for pro-European stance

As demonstrated above, the EU’s ability formation of the South Caucasian countries to win hearts and minds may face consid- serves this purpose. It has proven to have erable challenges due to cultural differenc- limited soft power potential – it remains ates over social issues and its mixed record in tractive but only to a relative degree. Pub- support of diversity and the human rights lic opinion polls show more favourable at- agenda. Although Georgia, Armenia and titudes towards EU integration in Georgia Azerbaijan have chosen different develop- and less favourable attitudes in Azerbaijan ment tracks and have displayed uneasy and (Caucasus Barometer 2013). The largest varied allegiances to the imposition of EU share of non-supporters came from Armenia norms, all three are conservative societies (23 percent), whereas Azerbaijanis stood out with intolerant views on sexual minorities. with their indifference on this question (32 George Mchedlishvili from Chatham House percent of respondents did not care about notes that ‘taking a ﬁ rm and principled line their country’s Europeanization). Two years in support of protections for LGBT commu- later, the support rate for EU membership nities, for example, could come at a political had dropped to 42 percent in Georgia while cost’ (2016, p. 11), and that this is the biggest staying more or less the same in Armenia dilemma for Europeanization in the region. (39 percent). At the same time, the number Whether that has an effect on public percep- of respondents against EU membership in- tions of EU integration will be discussed next. creased to 16 percent of the Georgian sample The EU is an important player in the re- (Caucasus Barometer 2015). gion whose main interest is providing sta- Dominant national religious institutions in bility and security along its borders by pro- Georgia and Armenia constitute a challenge moting a normative value system. Its policy for the EU. These religious institutions have a is based on the sincere belief that the trans- privileged status by default; they are relative-

29 ly autonomous from the government; they are protests by opponents of the demonstra- highly trusted by society; they play a role in tion, and at the same time three youngsters the political processes and, as far as the legal burned down DIY, the fi rst gay bar in Arme- regulation of gender, family and sexuality is nia. There were clearly heightened tensions concerned, these institutions have their own in all three countries, yet this angst is not re- interests and stake in the game. In regard to fl ected in the public opinion polls. the introduction of liberal EU norms, these To sum up, tensions run highest in select- religious institutions are the local bastions of ed policy areas (liberalization of norms re- conservative attitudes par excellence. At mo- lated to gender and sexuality) where chang- ments of unrest, the leaders and representa- es are not enthusiastically welcomed by tives of these institutions are the ones which local populations, yet opposition to a single argue that national values and traditions are dimension of EU policies seems to coexist at risk of being compromised. with a general positive attitude regarding This means there is a good reason to as- the EU. The fi rst wave of the Annual Sur- sume that very religious people are most vey Report of Eastern Partnership countries likely to reject the EU’s normative agenda, (2016) demonstrated that the EU enjoyed a which goes against the traditional value sys- high level of trust in general, and that in Ar- tem and shakes the authority of religious in- menia and Georgia the EU was trusted even stitutions. The most logical outcome would more than national political parties, the par- be a clear rejection of EU membership aspi- liament or the government. If and when dis- rations, which might be seen to “let the devil satisfaction about the imposition of liberal in”. For example, while in 2013 both Georgia social norms has an impact on the general and Armenia were fi nalizing preparations reception of Europeanisation in the South to meet the AA/DCFTA preconditions set Caucasus are questions for policy-makers by the EU, in the form of several rounds of in the EU. They will need to decide whether human rights dialogues which enabled the to make corrections in the imposed policies start of anti-discriminatory legislation, there and see the EU’s role grow in the region, or were clear examples of violence against sex- the opposite: leave things as they are, and ual minorities in both countries in 2012. In conclude that support will probably remain May 2012, a diversity march in Georgia took too limited to implement social change in place against the background of aggressive value systems.

30 References

1. Annual Survey Report of Eastern Partnership countries, 1st Wave. 2016. EU Neigborhood Info Centre. Available from: http://www.eaptc.eu/en/news/view-fi nd-out-more-perceptions-of-the-eu-in-eastern- neighbourhood-countries-1209.html [Accessed 15 January 2017] 2. Caucasus Barometer 2013 [online]. Available from: http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/datasets/ [Ac- cessed 11 August 2016]. 3. Caucasus Barometer 2015 [online]. Available from: http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2015/codebook/ [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 4. Kuyper, L., Iedema, J., & Keuzenkamp, S. 2013. Towards tolerance. Exploring changes and explaining differences in attitudes towards homosexuality in Europe. Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Social Research. 5. Matrosyan, T. 2015. Introduction. In: A. Agadjanyan, A. Jödicke , E. van Zweerde, eds. Religion, Nation and Democracy in the South Caucasus. Routledge: London, New York, 165–167. 6. Mchedlishvili, G. 2016. Changing Perceptions of the West in the South Caucasus: Adoration No More. Cha- tham House. Available from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/fi les/chathamhouse/publications/ research/2016-02-12-west-south-caucasus-mchedlishvili-fi nal.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2017] 7. Riga Declaration (21-22 May 2015). Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit. Available from: http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/riga-declaration-220515-fi nal_en.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2017]

TTURKEYURKEY IINN GGEORGIA:EORGIA: PPURSUINGURSUING TTHEHE ““SOFTSOFT PPOWER”OWER” PPOLITICSOLITICS

VAHRAM TER-MATEVOSYAN

Introduction Turkey’s relations with neighboring coun- are equally important cultural, religious and tries have been widely discussed in academic social factors that play a signifi cant role in literature. The Turkish ruling party’s foreign shaping Turkey’s policy towards Georgia. It is policy agenda based on “zero problems” the combination of these policies that shapes with neighbors was initially widely hailed. the essence and objectives of Turkey-Georgia However, since 2011 the policy has been criti- relations. This paper examines the key deter- cized over the mismatch between its ends and minants that shape and defi ne the essence of means. One of the overlooked components their deepening bilateral relations. Primarily, of Turkey’s expanding foreign policy is its it discusses various projects that Turkey has relations with neighboring Georgia. Until re- carried out in religious, cultural, educational cently, most studies mainly concentrated on and humanitarian spheres. It addresses some the geopolitical, bilateral and regional dimen- occasional issues of mutual discontent and sions of those relations, paying little or no at- argues that, parallel to expanding relations tention to the soft power politics that Turkey between the two nations, there is a growing has been exercising since the beginning of the opposition to Turkey in Georgia supported 2000s. Georgia interests Turkey for various by some political forces and the Georgian Or- strategic and political reasons, although there thodox Church. Framing the problem According to some experts, Turkey has (both under Mikheil Saakashvili and later elaborated and is carrying out a clear-cut and under the Georgian Dream coalition) seem comprehensive regional policy in the South determined by a number of geopolitical, eco- Caucasus, which has enabled it to become a nomic, infrastructural and simply pragmatic regional actor. Another group of researchers factors. For instance, former Georgian Presi- claim that Turkey pursues different interests dent Saakashvili referred to Turkey-Georgia vis-à-vis each South Caucasian political enti- relations during his presidential term as a ty, meaning no unifi ed and integrated Turk- ‘golden age’. Indeed, his administration was ish foreign policy exists for the South Cauca- an outspoken supporter and protagonist of sus. Yet another group of analysts posits that an even deeper Turkish presence both in the Turkey still lacks a long-term policy toward Georgian economy and in the whole region. the states of the South Caucasus and that lo- During his presidency, Saakashvili spoke cal processes alone defi ne Turkish political several times about the glory of Turkish his- objectives. Some even argue that the major tory, culture and its political system. obstacle for Turkey’s all-embracing policy The things started to change, however, in in the region is the absence of diplomatic re- the led-up to the 2012 elections. While cam- lations with Armenia, the establishment of paigning for the elections, a number of sin- which would lead to Turkey’s full and com- gle-seat candidates from the Georgian Dream plete geopolitical presence in the region. coalition (then in the opposition) for the Batu- A set of complex and systemic factors has mi, Shuakhevi and even Gardabani districts, infl uenced the development of the Georgian as well as party leaders, artists and TV an- political elite’s perceptions of Turkey. In chors, promoted anti-Turkish sentiments at elaborating policy approaches toward Tur- election rallies. Most vocal among them was key, the attitudes of the Georgian leadership Murman Dumbadze, a former associate pro- 35 fessor at Adjara State University and a former Azerbaijan and Turkey. Some statements member of the conservative Republican Party, in the fi rst months of Prime Minister Bidzi- who built his reputation on being an ardent na Ivanishvili’s new administration caused opponent of rebuilding mosques in Adjara. anxiety both to the previous administration He was expelled from the Republican Party and inside the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance. but was handpicked by the leader of the Geor- Some statements made after the elections gian Dream coalition, Bidzina Ivanishvili, to questioned the fi nancial and economic expe- be nominated as a coalition majoritarian can- diency of some regional projects, most strik- didate. He was elected to parliament and later ingly the Kars-Akhalkalaki railway, which became a deputy speaker. Beka Mindiashvili, was initiated in 2007 to connect Turkey and an offi cial at the Georgian Ombudsman’s of- Azerbaijan through Georgia. Turkish en- fi ce, claims that all election campaigns since trepreneurs in Georgia followed suit and 2007 have been known for their ‘electoral voiced their fears about different bureau- xenophobia’, because of a calculatingly con- cratic obstacles that they had begun to ex- structed ‘image of enemy’ and other phobias. perience. However, after visiting Baku and He particularly underlined the fact that during Ankara, PM Ivanishvili made a few remarks the 2012 elections, the Georgian Dream coali- that eased the tense atmosphere. In the same tion conceived of Turkophobia and “a new vein, former Georgian Minister of Defense ‘enemy’” of the country was identifi ed – “the Irakli Alasania, whose party was a member Aziziye mosque and the smell of chorba and of the Georgian Dream coalition, also noted doner kebab on Batumi Boulevard.” that Georgia’s relations with Turkey are ‘ex- Following the change of power in 2012- emplary and accelerating as our [Georgia’s] 2013, Georgia’s new leadership, the Geor- interests increasingly intertwine’. Overall, it gian Dream coalition, gave in to the con- can be noted that even though the new ad- cerns of some public circles. At the same ministration continued relations with Tur- time, it was also forced to recalibrate its an- key, compared to the Saakashvili govern- ti-Turkish rhetoric following backlash from ment, it is less enthusiastic towards Turkey. Cultural-religious implications of Turkish soft power politics in Georgia In parallel with the economic expansion, tial state institutions attached to the Turkish which has been widely discussed elsewhere, Prime Ministry: the Turkish Cooperation Turkish leadership has also attached partic- and Development Agency (Türkiye İşbirliği ular importance to religious, educational, ve Kalkınma İdaresi, TİKA), Yunus Emre cultural and humanitarian initiatives. Some Turkish Cultural Centres and the Presiden- interpreted the advancement of these initia- cy of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet). tives as purposeful steps to shape a positive TİKA has implemented a number of attitude towards Turkey in Georgian so- large-scale projects in Georgia since 1994. ciety; others saw a lack of synchronization The programs completed in recent years among these policies. The fact remains that, have included improving social and eco- just like in dozens of other countries, Turkey nomic infrastructures and services; repair- started to apply leverage to spread its reli- ing and furnishing educational centers; or- gious, ideological and cultural infl uence in ganizing educational programs (vocational, Georgia. By and large, those initiatives are language teaching, etc.), health care and im- coordinated by three increasingly infl uen- proving the quality of drinking water and 36 sanitation. According to the 2012 annual re- active in Turkey since 1924 and has expand- port, Georgia has received 4.23% of TİKA’s ed its activity abroad since the 1980s. Sub- overall fi nancial, vocational and technical sequently, it has signifi cant experience in support, which made Georgia the seventh dealing with Muslim communities abroad. largest TİKA benefi ciary based on spending. According to the 2014 national census, only Georgia was also the second largest benefi - 10.7% of the Georgian population identifi ed ciary in the post-Soviet space, after Kyrgyz- as Muslim. However, the leaders of Muslim stan. It should be noted, however, that the organizations claim that the real number is Georgian benefi ciaries of TİKA are mostly at least twice that, as many people don’t feel in Muslim-populated territories, and only comfortable declaring their religious identi- a few programs have been implemented in ty. The Muslim populations in Georgia live Tbilisi and Gori. The 2014 annual report, primarily in the regions of Kvemo Kartli, Ka- which was published in late 2016, howev- kheti and Adjara and comprise followers of er, shows that Georgia’s share from TIKA both Shiism and Sunnism. The Diyanet and budget has signifi cantly decreased as it was its consultants provide various religious ser- the sixth on the list of seven countries in the vices in Georgia: helping Georgian nation- Central Asia and Caucasus region receiving als in organizing the hajj, teaching imams, assistance from TIKA in 2014. training theologians and providing scholar- In 2007, Ankara decided to set up Yunus ships for post-graduate studies. It also coor- Emre Turkish Cultural Centers worldwide, dinates fi nancial support and advises in the which aimed at balancing the infl uence of restoration of mosques and the building of the Gülen Schools and promoting the Turk- new ones. The Turkish consulate in Batumi ish language, literature, history, culture and supports the Diyanet in spreading Islamic art. These centers have been established literature in Georgian in Adjara, and sends based on the model of the Goethe-Institut, Turkish religious leaders there to preach in British Council, Instituto Cervantes and various mosques. The Diyanet leadership other similar institutions. Bülent Arinç, the visits Georgia regularly and holds meetings Turkish deputy prime minister, inaugurated with the leaders of Georgia’s muftiates. It the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center in was also behind the initiative to open the Georgia in May 2012 in Ivane Javakhishvi- second biggest madrasa in Georgia in the li Tbilisi State University. According to the village of Meore Kesalo in 2000. In 1995, the Embassy of Turkey in Georgia, the Yunus Presidency of Religious Affairs established Emre Turkish Cultural Center has also the Eurasian Islamic Council (Avrasya Islam opened departments of Turkish Studies in Şurası, EIC), which has become an import- Akaki Tsereteli State University in Kutaisi, ant factor in promoting Turkey’s interests the second largest city in Georgia, and in among Muslim communities in the Balkans the Samtskhe-Javakheti State University in and former Soviet states. So far, the EIC has Akhaltsikhe, a city in the south-east of Geor- organized eight conferences that have been gia which has a size Armenian population. attended by Georgian Muslim community The activity of the third state institution, leaders, including muftis from Adjara. the Presidency of Religious Affairs or the Di- In addition to the above-mentioned state yanet, has focused on a couple of spheres in institutions, a number of Turkish education- Georgia which predominantly relate to real institutions belonging to the Fethullah ligious and spiritual issues. Unlike the pre- Gülen network also operate in Georgia. Be- vious two institutions, the Diyanet has been fore the rift between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 37 and Fethullah Gülen in December 2013, that Turkish citizens are largely responsible for network provided signifi cant support to both administrative duties and teaching at many Turkish policy initiatives. As long as the Gülen schools. These schools are known the Turkish government and the Gülen net- for their state-of-the-art facilities and ad- work peacefully coexisted in Turkey, many vanced technical equipment. They pay spe- of their activities in Georgia, and elsewhere cial attention to students’ participation in for that matter, complemented each other the Turkish Language Olympiads (Türkçe and were mutually supportive. As indepen- Olimpiyatları), which allow students to vis- dent actors, the two groups have sometimes it Turkey, be acquainted with the program challenged each other and engaged in fi erce organizers and establish contacts. Notably, a competition, but by and large the govern- fl exible and complementary system has been ment and the Gülen network have contrib- established between the schools and the uni- uted to creating a positive image of Turkey versity. Pre-school and middle school grad- among many Georgians. uates receive discounts for university tui- The Gülen schools in Georgia are widely tion. During their university years, students known as “Turkish schools” and operate un- also have the opportunity to periodically der the auspices of the Çağlar Educational take part in Turkish cultural events and of- Institutions (Çağlar Eğitim Kurumları, ÇEK), ten visit Turkish educational and academic established in February 1993. Since then, the institutions. Even though these schools were ÇEK has established seven schools and one established by the Gülenists, according to a university in Georgia. With the exception of professor at the International Black Sea Uni- the fi rst two schools and the university, the versity, there is no overt propaganda for the other fi ve were established after the Rose Gülen movement or for Turkey in the cur- Revolution during Saakashvili’s presidency. riculum. Conclusion This analysis of political and economic population support their resistance. Parts dynamics indicates that in deepening bilat- of society have started to speak about the eral relations, Turkey and Georgia pursue inherent problems that Georgia faces when different objectives deriving from different it allows a strong Turkish presence in Geor- (geo)political realities and ambitions. If Tur- gia’s strategically important domains, a dis- key aspires to a geopolitical, economic, re- cussion which could be joined by a sizeable ligious and socio-cultural presence in Geor- part of the population. Since 2004, Turkey’s gia, then Georgian policy towards Turkey growing infl uence in the Georgian econo- is based primarily on trade, economic and my, Georgia’s engagement in the energy social factors. Most Georgian public and po- programs directed from the Caspian region litical fi gures, as well as the vast majority of to the West and the on-going ambiguity in the research community, is positively orient- relations between Georgia and Russia have ed towards Turkey’s presence in Georgia’s created a systemic opportunity for Turkey to economic and strategic spheres. Neverthe- extend its political infl uence in Georgia. less, there is visible and growing resistance Religion also plays a role in Turkey’s poli- from some political forces, the Georgian cy towards Georgia. Unlike the economic and Orthodox Church and church-affi liated cir- political dimensions of Turkey’s soft power cles. Due to the importance of these groups politics, the religious component faces cer- for Georgian society, a sizeable part of the tain diffi culties and hurdles. The criticism and 38 counteractions by the Georgian Orthodox lead to confl ict with the religious majority or- Church and different sections of Georgian so- ganization in Georgia. This indicates that the ciety have visibly limited the options for Turk- religious part of Turkey’s soft power policy ish religious infl uence. In spite of that, a limited toward Georgia remains subordinated to the number of communities in Georgia are poised general goals of popularization. As manifes- to cooperate with Turkey in religious affairs. tations of soft power on religious groups have For now, Turkey has not been able to com- become more visible, the distinction between pletely rely on these groups for two reasons: the religious aspects and the cultural and eco- their number is small and cooperation could nomic aspects of soft power has grown.

TURKEY’S SOFT POWER IN AZERBAIJAN AND THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT

FUAD ALIYEV

41 42 Introduction

This memo analyses the role of the Turk- policy instruments (engaging all political ish transnational non-state actor – the Gülen actors, supporting democratic processes, ex- Movement and its role in Turkey’s soft pow- panding economic integration and increas- er towards post-Soviet Azerbaijan –before ing sociocultural relations and interpersonal the split between the current Turkish gov- communication), the Gülen movement has ernment and Fethullah Gülen in 2013. The been active in all areas with the exception effect of this split on Turkish soft power in of supporting democratic processes in Azer- Azerbaijan is also analyzed. baijan. The case of Turkish religious actors in It argues that the Gülen Movement was Azerbaijan has demonstrated that transna- the most successful not only among the tional non-state religious actors operating Turkish groups operating in Azerbaijan, but across state boundaries can be a successful also among the other competing religious soft power tool. While ethnic solidarity has actors, until relations between the Gülen played a much stronger role in advancing Movement and the Turkish ruling party, Turkish soft power, Islamic rhetoric has the AKP, soured. This process has serious- also contributed to a more general sense of ly damaged prospects for both Turkish reli- brotherhood. gious soft-power and Gülenists in Azerbai- The Gülen Movement, a non-state re- jan. With the weakened position of Gülen’s ligious actor, has been the most effective followers in Azerbaijan, Turkish foreign channel for advancing this soft power. The power has lost one of its most important and movement achieved public acceptance and, effective non-state channels. Given the im- more importantly, the acceptance of the rul- portance of transnational non-state religious ing elite, by delivering an attractive message actors in terms of effective soft power, this and adapting to local conditions, compro- development can limit Turkey’s inﬂ uence mising on many crucial elements of the Isla- in Azerbaijan, as well as in other countries mist - and even post-Islamist - agenda. Other where the AKP government could act against non-state religious actors from Turkey and its former transnational ally. The new status even the state institution, the Diyanet, have quo means Turkey will need an alternative not been as successful. transnational non-state (or state) actor to re- In terms of Turkey’s declared foreign place the embattled Gülen Movement. Turkish foreign policy and soft power Since coming to power in 2001, the AKP politics in the Middle East, the Balkans and government has, in many ways, continued the Caucasus. This new foreign policy of re- the foreign policy patterns of previous gov- gional expansion in the broader neighbor- ernments, even as it gives more attention to hood, with more embedded prospects for soft soft power, particularly in the Muslim world. power, could be interpreted as a forced step Turkey’s new foreign policy is inspired by by the AKP government to reduce the mili- historical and cultural ties with its neighbors. tary’s traditionally strong inﬂ uence on Turk- Under the AKP government, we have seen ish politics in both the domestic and interna- saw Turkey’s gradual activation in regional tional spheres1.

1 Jung, D., 2012. 43 Turkish soft power foreign policy is based personal communications3. All these instru- on three principles: political and econom- ments include elements of soft power, and ic justice; the balance between security and are implemented by government agencies, freedom; and trade and economic develop- as well as NGOs and business communities, ment2. In addition, the AKP government has which actively involve non-state actors. defi ned four foreign policy instruments: i) Religion has been an important part of engaging all political (including non-state) AKP’s soft power in its foreign policy strat- actors; ii) supporting democratic process- egy, which has resulted in a more active role es; iii) expanding economic integration; iv) for Turkey in the Middle East and Muslim increasing sociocultural relations and inter- Eurasia. Turkey’s soft power in Azerbaijan The Turkish government has used three baijan one of Turkey’s most important of its four declared foreign policy instru- oil and natural gas providers4. Azerbai- ments in Azerbaijan: jan is also the second largest recipient i) Engaging all political (including non- of Turkish foreign direct investments, state) actors: Turkish governments have with Turkey being the largest investor avoided working directly with Azer- in Azerbaijan’s non-energy sector5. In baijani political parties and NGOs, pre- addition, Azerbaijan’s national oil com- ferring to deal with the government or pany, SOCAR, has emerged as a signif- semi-government institutions. However, icant foreign direct investor in Turkey Turkish governments have been able to and is currently implementing several utilize Turkish movements and NGOs, important investment projects there6. including faith-based ones, to promote iii) Increasing sociocultural relations and issues on their foreign policy agendas interpersonal communications: Tur- (e.g. Osman Nuri Topbaş, Mahmut Ziya key has utilized linguistic and ethnic Hudayi Foundation, Gülen Movement). commonalities based on the two coun- ii) Expanding economic integration has tries’ shared Turkic Oghuz roots. The been one of the most important instru- “Turkic brotherhood” sentiments were ments of Turkish soft power in Azerbai- more compelling than those of “Mus- jan. Trade between the two countries has lim brotherhood”, due to the highly been growing; today Turkey is Azerbai- secularized nature of Azerbaijani soci- jan’s second biggest importer and Azer- ety and sectarian differences. Turkish religious actors in Azerbaijan Turkish religious infl uence, represented been more powerful in Azerbaijan than in by state and non-state religious organiza- other post-Soviet countries due to their his- tions based in Turkey, has been manifold torical, geographic, linguistic and cultural in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. It has also played closeness. a crucial role in the revival of Sunni Islam The chart below provides an overview of in the traditionally Shi’a majority country7. the Turkish religious groups that are active Moreover, Turkish religious infl uence has in Azerbaijan:

2 Kalin 2012, p. 14 3 Ibid. p. 17 44 Actor Capacity to deliver attractive mes- Ability to adapt to local conditions sages to target audiences

Gülen Given the secularized nature of Azer- Gülen integrated into the local Movement baijan and cautious attitudes towards conditions, avoiding all links to independent and foreign religious religious activism and operating activism, the Gülen movement’s sec- purely as an educational, humani- ular humanitarian and educational tarian and business network. It has messages worked well with the gen- always followed the established eral public and the government. Its rules and never challenged the capitalist pragmatism and business status quo or criticized the govern- activities on all levels helped position ment. it not only as a friend of the nation, but also of the ruling elite.

Diyanet The Diyanet is an ofﬁ cial Turkish The Diyanet integrated into exist- state institution and has agreement ing religious structures, cooperat- with the Azerbaijani authorities to ing with Baku State University and operate as a religious actor. Its tar- the region’s ofﬁ cial Islamic body, get audience is limited to practic- the Caucasus Muslims Board. ing Sunni Muslims.

Süleymancılar The Süleymancılar operates a lim- The Süleymancılar has been able ited number of training courses to mainly adapt to local conditions targeting mainly Sunni Muslims, by cooperating with formal and especially in the northern regions semi-formal institutions. There was of Azerbaijan. previously some cooperation with the Caucasus Muslims Board in the northern regions of Azerbaijan.

Mahmut The foundation has less capacity for The foundation has been able to Ziya Hudayi inﬂ uence, and is limited to a network mainly adapt to the local condi- Foundation of madrasas and humanitarian activ- tions by cooperating with formal ities targeting the youth and, more public institutions within the exist- generally, the Sunni audience. ing framework.

Mustafa Sungur The Mustafa Sungur community is The community has not fully adapt- community limited to targeting young people ed to local conditions, operating through informal networks. mainly based on purely religious proselytism and being subject to government interventions as a result.

4 Kartaş and Macit 2015 5 Kartaş and Macit 2015, Yavan 2012 6 Kartaş and Macit 2015 7 Balci, B. and Goyushev, A., 2012. 45 Until recently, most Turkish religious dramatically changed the status quo. The actors cooperated with each other despite movement’s deteriorating relations with its their differences and disagreements at home country have negatively affected its home. However, the split between the gov- relations with Azerbaijan and signiﬁ cantly ernment and the Gülen Movement in 2013 undermined its success there.

Turkey’s soft power and the Gülen movement in Azerbaijan

The Gülen Movement was a central pillar ment. The confl ict moved beyond Turkey of the foreign policy formulated by Ibrahim into Azerbaijan in 2014, resulted in a weak- Kalin, which focused on expanding econom- ened Gülen network. Moreover, recent de- ic integration and increasing sociocultural velopments in Turkey have made it harder relations and interpersonal communications for the movement to maintain its claims of in Azerbaijan8. Hundreds of different Turk- apolitical interests: Gülen was blamed for ish and local business enterprises are part the July 2016 attempted military coup, and of the network, either as active members his alleged followers and supporters have and donors or as sympathizers. The Gülen faced an unprecedented purge. In addi- movement is also the most obvious exam- tion, the Azerbaijani government’s full sup- ple of the active and successful utilization port of Turkish President Erdoğan in these of Turkey’s sociocultural connections and activities has buried all hopes and chances ethnic-linguistic kinship in Azerbaijan by a for the movement in Azerbaijan. Connecting faith-based network. Its focus on education Fethullah Gülen to terrorism and inventing a and humanitarian projects made it easy for new label for the movement – FETÖ (Fethul- two decades of Turkish governments to ben- lahçı Terör Örgütü, Fethullah-followers Ter- efi t from the movement’s positive image of a rorist Organization) further aggravated the reliable, helpful and caring partner. movement’s changes to operate openly and The AKP government, like its more secu- legally. As a natural result of developments larist predecessors, recognized the global in- in Turkey and Azerbaijan within the confl uence of this movement and its benefi cial text of the Erdoğan-Gülen war, Turkish re- role in enhancing Turkish soft power9. The ligious soft power, and consequently Turk- Gülen Movement initially cooperated close- ish soft power in general, has been on the ly with the AKP, based on their common Is- wane in Azerbaijan. Thus, not only has the lamic roots. Gülen Movement suffered from the purges Relations changed in 2013, however, and lost support from offi cial Turkish insti- when the power struggle between Gülen tutions and diplomacy, but Turkish foreign and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan led to a split be- power has also lost one of its most important tween the movement and the AKP govern- and effective channels.

8 Kalin 2012 9 Balci 2014 46 References

1. Balci, B. and Goyushev, A., 2012. Changing Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan and its Weighting on the Sun- ni/Shiite Cleavage. In: B. Maréchal and S. Zemni, eds. The Dynamics of Sunni-Shia Relationships: Doc- trine, Transnationalism, Intellectuals and the Media. London: Hurst, 195-215. 2. Balci, B., 2014. The Gülen Movement and Turkish Soft Power. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [online], 4 February. Available from: http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/04/g%C3%BClen-movement-and-turkish-soft-power [Accessed April 2016]. 3. Jung, D., 2012. The Domestic Context of New Activism in Turkish foreign policy. International Journal, 67 (1), 23-38. 4. Kalin, I., 2012. Turkish Foreign Policy : framework, values and mechanisms. International Journal, 67 (1), 7-21. 5. Kartaş, S. and Macit, F., 2015. Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations: The Economic Dimension. Journal of Caspian Affairs, 1 (1), 23-46. 6. Yavan, N., 2012. Türkiye’nin Yurt Dışındaki Doğrudan Yatırımları: Tarihsel ve Mekânsal Perspektif. (“Tur- key’s Foreign Direct Investments: Historical and Spatial Perspective” in Turkish), Bilig, 63 (Autumn 2012), 237-270.

RRELIGIONELIGION ASAS A FFACTORACTOR IINN KURDISHKURDISH IIDENTITYDENTITY DISCOURSE:DISCOURSE: CASECASE SSTUDYTUDY OONN AARMENIARMENIA AANDND TTURKEYURKEY

LIA EVOYAN TATEVIK MANUKYAN

Introduction The Kurdish factor has acquired import- their ambitions within new geopolitical real- ant geopolitical signifi cance in current re- ities: the prospect of a solution of the Kurd- gional developments. It has become a polit- ish problem, reshaping borders, regional de- ical tool of interstate relations, manipulated stabilization. Furthermore, they are trying to by all the countries involved, as well as by establish a unifi ed policy with neighboring, Kurdish political and military organizations. smaller Kurdish communities. In this policy Today the Kurdish organizations in Iraq, memo, we analyze the interaction and iden- Turkey, Syria and Iran are trying to trans- tity formation between the Kurdish/Yezidi form from objects of regional policy to po- communities in Turkey and Armenia within litically self-determined players that realize the context of the soft power policies of na- their own political agenda. They are seeking tional actors in Armenia and Turkey. We will the means and tools to cooperate and infl u- demonstrate how the construction of ethnic ence each other, albeit without much success. and religious identities strongly depends on These Kurdish organizations are presenting politics and international relations. The Kurdish/Yezidi community in Turkey and Armenia The present population of Turkey is ap- lowed by the Kurds. Muhammed Fethullah proximately 18% Kurdish (The World Fact- Gülen, the founder of the Gülen movement, book 2016). added pan-Turkism to Nurcu pan-Islamic The majority of Turkey’s Kurds are Sunni ideas in an attempt to unite the Turkic peo- Muslims and are followers of Shafi ’i mad- ple and Turkic-language states under the hab. In Kurdish society, the mystical dimen- veil of Islamic ideology. sions of Sunni Islam are more common, such Until recently, this was considered one of as the tariqa and orders of Sufi religious phi- the most important tools for the implemen- losophy. The dominant order in Kurdish so- tation of Turkish foreign policy, especially ciety is the Naqshbandi. Naqshbandi is the in relations with Turkic-language communi- most active Sufi tariqa in Turkish politics to- ties. The movement had a unique and im- day. It is the most applicable tool for social portant “soft power” function in Turkey’s interaction between politics and religion in foreign policy. Turkey and has played a major role in the There are a signifi cant number of Kurds development of political Islam. This tariqa is in the Nurcu movement since, for the Kurds, also a unique bridge between Turkish and membership in the Nurcu movement was an Kurdish societies. easy way to start a successful public and po- With the Naqshbandi Sufi tariqa as a litical career in the years of the AKP’s rule. strong base, the Turkish Justice and Develop- Alevism is a comprehensive and popular ment Party (AKP) managed to gain the sup- religious movement among Turkish Kurds port and trust of a considerably large section which, as a religious identity, has at times of Kurdish society when it came to power manifested more powerfully than national and in the years that followed, countering the identity. atheistic leftist ideas of the Kurdistan Work- Some Kurds also follow Yezidism. How- ers’ Party (PKK) with the ideology of Islamic ever, in contrast to the clear ethnic term unity. “Kurds” and the clear religious terms “Sun- Nurcu is the other school of Islam fol- ni”, “Alevi”, etc., the term “Yezidi” has a 51 disputed religious or ethno-religious mean- has played a major role in awakening the na- ing. The Yezidi (Ezdi) is an ethno-religious tional self-consciousness of Kurds. group, whose main identity is religion - ei- A new phase for the Kurdish people be- ther Yezidism or Sharfadin. There are cur- gan in 2002/2003, with the AKP came to rently 35,308 Yezidi living in Armenia (ac- power in Turkey. cording the last census of the Republic of During the AKP government, the Islamic Armenia, RA). factor and general democratic liberties were There is a signifi cant academic and polit- integrated into Turkey’s Kurdish policy. The ical discourse concerning the perception of abolition of the “Kurdish taboo” and new “Yezidi” identity, however, whether it is a geopolitical developments provided Kurds separate ethno- religious group or just a reli- in Turkey with the opportunity to establish gion. The vast majority of Armenian Yezidis their ethnic identity and be successfully consider themselves ethnic Yezidis practic- integrated in regional activities. They even ing Yezidism. Meanwhile Kurds claim that started to try to conduct their own ethnic there is no such ethnicity, but there are eth- and religious “soft power” policy towards nic Kurds who practice Yezidi religion. A the Kurdish communities in neighboring small minority of Yezidis in Armenia (2162 countries. The AKP even began negotiations people according to 2011 Census of RA) con- with the PKK, which successfully resulted in siders itself, however to be ethnically Kurds the “Declaration of Peace”. and not Yezidi. This minority is also Yezidi It was obvious that the Turkish govern- from the point of view of religion, but tends ment was trying to achieve its objectives to separate its religious identity (Yezidi) through interactions with PKK leader Ab- from its ethnic identity (Kurdish). dullah Ocalan. In 2013, negotiations between In contrast to Armenia, where the Yezidis the AKP and Ocalan resulted in Ocalan de- are a small minority (1.3 %), Kurds consti- claring a ceasefi re and the PKK starting to tute approximately 18% of the total popu- leave the territory of Turkey. These negoti- lation of Turkey. The Kurds’ have had very ations were conducted by the National In- diffi cult and contradictory relations with the telligence Organization (MIT), led by Hakan Turkish government since the formation of Fidan. the Republic of Turkey in 1923, when the On 7 February 2016, however, then-Prime state implemented a clearly designed and Minister Davutoğlu announced that Abdul- strict assimilation policy towards Kurdish lah Ocalan would no longer participate in the national self-consciousness. process of regulating the Kurdish issue. Af- However, some Kurds were able to resist ter isolating Ocalan, the Turkish government the policy of assimilation due to the efforts launched major military actions against the of the PKK, which has organized and led the PKK and political persecution against the most comprehensive and enduring Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)1. movement in Turkey in centuries. The key During the recent armed confl icts, 483 to the PKK’s success is that it has based its Turkish soldiers were killed and 2,859 were activity on Kurdish national self-identity, injured. According to offi cial Turkish data rather than the religious, tribal principle on armed actions against the Kurds,7,078 typical to Kurdish political groups. The PKK Kurdish guerrillas were killed, includ-

1 On November 4,2016, the HDP leader Selahhetin Demirtas, together with co-chairperson Vigen Yuksekdag, was arrested by AKP regime in Diyarbakir. 52 ing PKK losses during a Turkish Air Force the snap elections in November, the politi- bombing in Iraqi Kurdistan (Hürriyet 2016). cal situation has changed and Erdoğan has These developments make it clear that, since developed a new plan for the Kurdish issue.

Soft power policy towards the Kurdish/Yezidi community in Armenia

The Kurdish/Yezidi minority in Armenia Kurds along both sides of the Araks River is is at the crossroad of different political inter- coordinated by Kurdish organizations based ests, which means different external actors in EU countries and elsewhere. are trying to infl uence it. In this section, we One of the main issues discussed by the will examine the different aspects of these two groups is the PKK, specifi cally bring- soft power policies. ing the group into contact with Armenia’s According to data collected during our Kurds/Yezidis and even establishing a pres- fi eldwork in Armenian Kurdish/Yezidi vil- ence in Armenia. During our interviews and lages, cooperation between Armenia and informal talks, we found no empirical evi- Turkey’s Yezidis is inter-tribal and personal dence of a PKK presence in Armenia. PKK is in character. Despite their affi liation to the a political organization with strong military same tribes, relations between Armenia’s elements that is recognized as terrorist or- Yezidis and Turkey’s assimilated Kurds ganization by Turkey and many other states, were disrupted due to religious differenc- so its presence in Armenia would not be es. However, some interpersonal communi- welcome in the country today. In addition, cations have been restored. In an interview Armenia’s Kurdish/Yezidi community has with the authors of this policy memo, the little interest in the PKK and its activities. president of “Sinjar” Yezidi National Union However, there is some evidence that the NGO in Armenia, Boris Murazi, stated that PKK is implementing a “soft power” policy he has visited the Yezidis’ refugee camp in towards Armenia’s Kurds/Yezidis. During Batman, Turkey several times, and he has our interviews, several Kurds/Yezidis stat- personal contacts there and cooperates with ed that the PKK uses Kurdish organizations the refugees. He stated that there is cooper- based in European countries, such as the ation between Yezidis in Armenia and Tur- Institute Paris de Kurdes, Kurdish Institute key, but not on a regular basis. of Brussels, etc. to infl uence young Yezidi/ On the other hand, in recent years cooper- Kurds by offering them education and jobs ation appears to be growing between Arme- in Europe. Several Yezidis also said that var- nian and Iraqi Yezidis both on the state and ious European Kurdish organizations have personal/social levels. Formal meetings be- offered them fi nancial support to spread the tween Armenian and Northern Iraqi states- ideologies of PKK and its leader Abdullah men periodically take place in Yerevan and Ocalan. The Yezidis not only refused; they Erbil. In addition, in the context of developing were deeply offended by the proposal. They political and economic cooperation between viewed the suggestion as a dishonor to their Armenia and Northern Iraq, there are plans identity and religion and an attempt to force to open an Armenian consulate in Erbil. them to assimilate. On the other side, during The closed border between Turkey and informal meetings, Brussels-based pro-PKK Armenia makes any direct communication Kurds expressed their concerns about Ar- between them diffi cult, which is why evi- menia’s Kurdish/Yezidi community, argu- dence indicates most communication among ing that Yezidis should recognize they are 53 ethnic Kurds, and Yezidism is the original in the most active Kurdish institutions, In- religion of ancient Kurdish people. stitute Kurde de Paris in France and Kurd- This illustrates that the PKK seeks to use ish Studies Institute in Brussels, as well as ethnicity, rather than religion, as a powerful held meetings and informal workshops “soft power” tool to infl uence the Armenian with Kurdish community leaders and rep- Kurdish/Yezidi community. resentatives, academicians and journalists. PKK’s main interest towards Armenia’s We found that Kurdish, pro-PKK organi- Yezidi community is its desire to promote zations are represented in a larger group its ideology, to use the community in pro- and are present in France, Belgium, Swe- PKK projects, with the future creation of den, Germany and Austria. Moreover, most Kurdistan - and the opportunity of using of the EU-based Kurdish organizations are the Armenia’s “Kurdish factor” - in mind. propagating PKK ideology and Kurdish However, as noted above, this has proved to nationalism. Their main target groups are be unsuccessful so far as Armenians prefer Kurds/Yezidis living in EU, Turkey, Syr- emphasizing their ethno-religious identity ia, Iraq and Iran. Armenia is also targeted, as an established and respected national mi- but not as much, due to the small number nority in Armenia. and lack of integration of Kurdish/Yezidi This means that one of the main obstacles community in the country, as well as the for cooperation between Kurds/Yezidis in lack of the expected outcome. According Turkey and Armenia is the major religious to personal meetings and workshops in In- discourse between them, to even a greater de- stitute Kurde de Paris and Kurdish Studies gree than Yezidism vs Sunni Islam, which in Institute in Brussels, these organizations are turn affects identity perceptions and creates more interested in Kurds living in Turkey, an even larger ideological gap between them. rather than those living in Armenia. Mean- Concerning the relations between Arme- while both have personal contacts with the nia’s Kurds (not Yezidis), the PKK and Tur- Armenian Kurdish/Yezidi community and key’s Kurdish parties, there might be some try to occasionally implement unambitious contacts on a personal level, but there are no educational projects and student exchanges formal connections to that organization. This to attract Armenian Kurdish/Yezidi. How- is proved by the disappointment expressed ever, the reaction in Armenian Kurdish/ by European Kurdish NGO members with Yezidi minority has been limited because Armenia’s Kurdish community, which is the larger and stronger Yezidi community not willing to cooperate with them. often rejects any EU- based pro-PKK Kurd- In conclusion we can state that religion ish organization support, opting instead for is used as a soft power both towards and more developed cooperation with the Yezidi by Kurdish/Yezidi people. The Kurdish/ communities in Northern Iraqi and Germa- Yezidi transnational organizations, such ny. European Yezidis are mainly based in as NGOs, private universities and schools, Germany, where they provide support for foundations, media, etc., try to implement Yezidi identity formation and have become a “state-like” policy towards the Kurdish/ a marker against Kurdish nationalist identi- Yezidi population, often using “soft power” ty formation during the past several years. elements. That is usually realized through One of the main barriers for realizing EU-based organizations, due to the rather this “soft power” policy is the identity of large and infl uential Kurdish/Yezidi com- Yezidism, which is a closed community munities in Europe. We have done research and not open to foreign infl uence. Turkey’s 54 Kurdish organizations and those based in munity is not of great interest for non-Ar- EU countries, to varying degrees, are trying menian Kurds due to its small size. While to use a consistent “soft power” policy on Ar- “non-Armenian Kurds” are more interest- menia’s Yezidis in order to convert them to ed in Yezidis, who are the largest minority Kurdish identity using ideological, cultural group in Armenia, foreign outreach to the and linguistic factors as psychological tools. Armenian Yezidis has not been successful On the other hand, Armenia’s Kurdish com- so far due to their strong religious identity.

Conclusion Kurds’ religious differences (Naqshban- nal “soft power” concept, as they are not di, Nurcu, Yezidi, Alevi) are potent ways to state-directed and continuous. infl uence and gain leverage over the Kurd- PKK and Kurdish transnational organi- ish community and are used both by the zations support Kurdish ethno-nationalism. Turkish authorities and external powers Referring to Turkey’s policy towards its mi- to control and guide Kurdish processes for norities, we can state that in recent years, a their own political gains and interests. This new tendency has developed concerning the is especially relevant in the communities acceptance of religious minorities, including that are still in the process of identity shap- Yezidis and Alevis. This could result in di- ing. Fluid identities are the main targets for viding the larger Kurdish community into “soft power” policy efforts. smaller subgroups, thus acting against na- “Soft power” as a concept originally un- tional consolidation around the PKK. Reli- derstood as an element of a state’s foreign gion is used as a “soft power” policy instru- policy is not quite applicable to this study ment within the ideology of the ruling AKP’s in one sense, because Kurds do not have a Kurdish policy, which tends to separate the state. However, the analysis shows how reli- Kurdish community from the PKK. There- gion becomes an element in international re- fore, Turkey is implementing a fl uid and lations, including for non-state actors. Thus situational policy towards Kurds and Kurd- we can claim a specifi c case of “soft power” ish trans-national organizations using the transformation and make the following con- “factor of Islam” as a “soft power” tool. The clusions: unclear and fl uid ethnic and reli- Armenian state supports Yezidi identity as gious identity markers can be divided based a specifi c ethno-religious identity. As a con- on the regional political situation. Some sequence, Yezidis are integrated into Arme- existing cases or political situations are not nian society and do not cooperate with the always applicable to Joseph Nye’s origi- larger, pan-regional Kurdish community.

IIRAN’SRAN’S SSOFTOFT PPOWEROWER IINN GGEORGIAEORGIA – WWEAKEAK FFOROR NNOW,OW, BBIGGERIGGER POTENTIALPOTENTIAL FFOROR THETHE FUTUREFUTURE

MARIAM GABEDAVA KOBA TURMANIDZE

Iran as a political actor in Georgia: insigniﬁ cant on the surface As Iran attempts to overcome its interna- of a shared border presents an obvious hur- tional isolation and the economic damage dle. Secondly, Georgia’s traditional align- caused by decades of sanctions, it may be in- ment with the West is an obstacle. Thirdly, terested in intensive engagement with Geor- Georgia’s dominant Orthodox faith and the gia. There are many reasons why Georgia general wariness of the Church and large is attractive to Iran: their geographic prox- sections of the population towards Islam imity, Georgia’s status as the South Cauca- and Muslims is a factor. Iran in particular is sus hub for international investment and popularly seen as an old imperial subjuga- economic development, and its economic tor, and this legacy, combined with the fear and political openness and access to Euro- of Islamic fundamentalism, could be a major pean markets. Additionally, unlike Europe- deterrent for the broader Georgian public in an countries, the Georgian government and welcoming close ties. Additionally, the need population seem to welcome ties with Iran. to avoid antagonizing Russia may be the Iran and Georgia are not major trade or in- single most important factor in determin- vestment partners by any measure. Still, giv- ing Iran’s policy and involvement with the en the recent removal of decades-long sanc- South Caucasus, particularly in Georgia. tions on Iran, realistic grounds exist for more Because of all the above factors, Iranian mutual trade between the two countries. engagement in Georgia is likely to be most Of the three South Caucasus countries, intensive with the population it has the most Iran’s relations with Georgia are the least in common with: the ethnic Azeri Shi‘a Mus- developed for three reasons. Firstly, the lack lim minority in Georgia. Georgia’s ethnic Azeri minority

Georgian Azeris are overwhelmingly Shi‘a that is all too eager to offer its help. Muslims, as are most Iranians. While religion Besides religious kinship, there are other was very much discouraged and persecuted factors that make Georgia’s ethnic Azeri mi- for the 70 years of Soviet rule, religiosity has nority a good target for potential inﬂ uence. thrived in Georgia since its independence. This This group is a good illustration of the fail- has included a revival of Islam. As there is little ings of Georgia’s minority policies, which opportunity for religious education in Georgia, means most types of foreign support are Iran is seen as a resource in this regard, and one likely to be welcomed.

Marginalization and its consequences

Georgia’s Azeri minority currently makes of ethnic Georgians, along with the ultra-na- up about 6.5 per cent of the population and tionalistic Georgian Orthodox Church and has a high birth rate. It is predominantly the state, suspicious of them. Muslim and concentrated close to the bor- According to measurable criteria, the der with its kin-state Azerbaijan. The Azeri Azeri population’s socio-economic situation minority has a very low level of knowledge does not differ much from that of the rest of of the Georgian language, and generally a Georgia; however, Azeri citizens perceive low level of integration in the Georgian state their poverty as more acute. and society. All of this makes the majority The reported religiosity of Azeris is much 59 lower than in the rest of the population – ital) from Georgian society. Lack of access only 10% say they attend religious services to Georgian TV and the absence of minority at least once a month, compared to 36 % of language programming means that minori- the rest of the population. It is interesting ty-heavy regions are receiving their news that when asked to identify their religion, a and entertainment from their kin-states sizable portion of Kvemo Kartli Azerbaijanis across the border or from Russian TV chan- identify as Muslim, without Sunni or Shi’a nels. This inevitably leads to minorities be- labelling. This points to minimal observance ing integrated into the information spheres of Islam beyond it being one nominal facet of foreign states and disengaged from Geor- of their default identity. gian political and social discourse. The majority of Kvemo Kartli Azeris don’t Alienation and discrimination are not have even a basic knowledge of the Geor- openly discussed by the Azeri community. gian language. The lack of language skills While this can be attributed to a desire not to contributes to an effective withdrawal of stand out too much, it can also be an indica- minorities (especially those living in the mi- tion of their withdrawal from the Georgian nority-populated regions, far from the cap- public sphere.

Minority policy in Georgia

Georgia’s policy regarding religious mi- as creating more potential security challeng- norities is heavily shaped by the strong po- es in the long run. Excluding various Mus- litical infl uence of the Georgian Orthodox lim groups from the offi cial leadership may Church. The Orthodox Church has been push their activities underground and make funded since the signing of the Concordat in controlling or engaging them more diffi cult 2002, as a form of restitution for the damage for the state. infl icted by the Soviet regime. For the same Given the low religiosity of the popula- reason, other “traditional” religious groups tion, the Georgian Muslim community does have also received state funding since 2014: not seem to have any clear leadership with the Muslim community, the Armenian signifi cant grassroots legitimacy. Instead, it Church, the Catholic Church and the Jew- is the secular local elders and leaders who ish community. The state does not provide have infl uence, rather than any national or a rationale for the specifi c amounts granted local religious fi gure. to each group. This lack of transparency, as State funding notwithstanding, human well as the potential for state control of the rights groups point to a worsening minority religious groups, has been criticized by local rights situation. The state’s unwillingness to civil society organizations. prevent violence and effectively investigate The creation of the Administration of all violent incidents illustrates an environment Muslims of Georgia (Mufti Administration of impunity regarding the violation of reli- of Georgia) in 2011is largely seen as orches- gious rights. This is also a potent signal for trated by the state. It can be interpreted as Shi’ite Muslims, among other minorities, the state’s attempt to make it easier to man- that the Orthodox Church’s dominance per- age the security threats that the Muslim meates not only the personal beliefs of the population may entail, and curb the foreign Georgian population, but the civil service as liaisons of local Muslim groups. However, well, and may be placed above the rule of this security-based approach is also viewed law in practice. 60 Tools of infl uence: Islamic education in Georgia

The Azeri population of Kvemo Kartli is of the fi ve-year course, the institution offers not particularly religious. However, in re- the possibility to attend graduate-level stud- cent years there appears to be growing inter- ies in Qom itself. However, the institution is est in a religious way of life. Given the lim- not accredited by the Georgian educational ited willingness of the Georgian state and authorities and its diploma is not recognized society to go beyond their declared “toler- by the state as a certifi cate of higher educa- ance” of diversity, very little of this interest tion. Still, with its reported aim of supplying is facilitated by the state. a cadre of people to serve the religious needs There are limited opportunities to receive of the Muslim community in Georgia, the ci- an Islamic education in Georgia. Madrasas vilian concerns of diploma recognition may that provide basic religious instruction do not be crucial. exist, but outside the national education It appears that Iran’s involvement in edu- system. The lack of qualifi ed instructors is cation is welcomed by locals, although some mentioned as the main reason for the low are noticeably suspicious of the motivations level of religious education among Muslims behind it. Many talked about the need for in Georgia. Currently, no accredited Geor- education in “traditional Islam”, as opposed gian educational institution offers a course to the teachings of various radical sects, par- in Islamic studies and the only real sources ticularly the Wahhabis. They maintained of education are foreign. that unlike the fundamentalist groups, who Out of the three main countries provid- are using religion only as a cover for their vi- ing educational opportunities for Georgian olent activities, followers of traditional Islam Muslims – Iran, Azerbaijan and Saudi Ara- are peace-loving and benevolent. According bia - Iran is cited as the most active. These to them, supporting such teaching would learning opportunities are not only religious. leave little space for the wayward sects and While these are not offi cially tied to foreign ensure both spirituality and national securi- governments, the Iranian Embassy in Tbilisi ty. The sceptics are not in favor of Iranian is said to be actively engaged and providing religious activism and would much prefer if funding in cash, to avoid documented ties. relations were strictly secular, related to the Several Iranian religious organizations are economy and secular education. reportedly working in Georgia, particularly It seems that the state is not particularly in the town of Marneuli. Among them, Alhi pleased with the level of Iranian involve- Beyt was the only one named by our inter- ment either, though it does recognize that viewees. It is active in supporting the madra- it must be able to offer alternatives before sas and providing them with religious litera- it can restrict the current situation. At this ture. The organization was also reported to be stage, there are no alternatives for religious active in Tbilisi, where it provides free classes education in Georgia, because there is a defi - in Farsi and supports religious teaching. cit of qualifi ed Islamic theologians. The state The Al-Mustafa International Universi- appears to be watching the situation careful- ty of Qom in Iran has operated a Georgian ly for now, but no active steps are currently branch since 2011. It offers a fi ve-year Aze- being taken. Meanwhile, both the state and ri language program of theology, which is the local expert community consider for- free, and provides accommodation for all eign-educated Muslims to potentially serve students free of charge. Upon completion the interests of those foreign countries. 61 The effects of Iranian activities: piety vs. practicality

Despite Iran’s efforts, the ethnic Azeri pub- the economic sphere. In their opinion, Geor- lic in Kvemo Kartli does not seem to be won gia should strive to have good relations with over. Both the public opinion survey and the all its neighboring countries, including Iran, in-depth interviews show that Iran is not cur- and should try to benefi t from Iran’s huge rently viewed as a model to aspire to. Its prod- domestic market. ucts and universities are not highly respected, According to our survey, Iran’s infl uence nor do Iranians seem to be favored as busi- is very low in the region. The majority of ness or personal partners. This is a crucial im- those surveyed would rather not buy Irani- pediment to Iran’s soft power in the region, as an products and Iran ranks low as a destina- the local population attaches far more impor- tion to receive an education. This comes in tance to worldly goods than religiosity. Fac- stark contrast to the apparent good standing ing the more pressing needs of employment, and infl uence of Turkey, as well as, predict- education, economic development and social ably, their kin-state Azerbaijan. services, Georgian Azeris are compelled to be Only a small number of students go to more practical and judicious in their prefer- Iranian universities, most study religion and ences for friendships and alliances. all of them return to Georgia upon gradua- Religious ties, including pilgrimage, and tion, mostly to get involved with religious medical tourism were mentioned by local institutions. Given the existing discrimina- community leaders as the most developed tion and a lack of employment opportunities ties at the moment. Several people men- for Kvemo Kartli Azeris, the religious realm tioned that some medical visits are at least is seen as the only sphere where they can partially paid for by the Iranian side, which fully realize their knowledge and potential. seeks out poor patients to receive such help. In contrast, nearly all interviewees noted the The population of Kvemo Kartli rates the relatively high number of students going current state of Georgian-Iranian relations to Turkish universities, graduates of which as not very intense and almost all say they apparently have much better chances of suc- would welcome deeper ties, particularly in cess in secular activities.

Conclusion

Iranian soft power infl uences are current- easy by a shared language. However, Iran’s ly low, but there is some potential for future energetic efforts toward teaching and reviv- development. Iran has some potential for in- ing religiosity in this population and the ev- fl uence, primarily through the Azeri Shi‘ite ident material rewards of association with population of Kvemo Kartli. For now, the Iran may eventually help overcome this ob- local population is more interested in the stacle. Additionally, the high social prestige social and economic aspects of bilateral rela- of Iranian-trained religious leaders in the tions. Religious relations are given relatively community indicates that Iran’s soft pow- low weight. The main obstacles to Iran’s in- er may gain more substance in the future. fl uence are the Azeris’ current low religiosi- Iran’s expected persistence and long-term ty and their access to Turkey as a destination planning may well turn Iranian soft power for work and education, made particularly from a possibility into a reality.

62 IIRAN’SRAN’S SSOFTOFT PPOWEROWER PPOLICYOLICY IINN AARMENIA:RMENIA: CCULTURALULTURAL DDIPLOMACYIPLOMACY AANDND RRELIGIONELIGION

TATEVIK MKRTCHYAN

Introduction

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the provided by non-governmental organizations, Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged as one of estimate the number of Muslims in Armenia to the most reliable allies of the Republic of Arme- be around 8,000, about 80 percent of which are nia. Iran recognized Armenia’s independence resident non-citizens who stay in Armenia for three months after its declaration in 1991, and extended periods of time. The majority of these over the years the two countries have strength- Muslims are from Iran; others come from else- ened their political and economic ties through where in the Middle East and India. Most of economic, cultural and educational projects. In them are businessmen, students or diplomats. addition, they cooperate in many other sectors, The ratio of Shi‘as to Sunnis is about 3:1. including energy, sport, environmental protec- Alongside the diasporas, Armenia-Iran tion, healthcare, and agriculture (Ministry of partnership is reasoned by geopolitical and Foreign Affairs 2012). economic factors. Armenia’s main southern The two countries’ history of good rela- transit route and strategic access to Asia and tions creates the potential for stronger bilat- the Middle East passes through Iran. Arme- eral ties, especially since they do not have nia cannot access these strategic regions via any disputes over their shared border - or Azerbaijan and Turkey due to closed borders. any ethnic or religious tensions. The religious aspect in Armenia-Iran Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the de- relations is worth noting: the two govern- velopment of positive neighborly relations be- ments like to emphasize the capability of the tween Armenia and Iran is based on a number “Christian Armenia” and “Islamic Iran” to of components with two major aspects: their maintain positive relations as well as peace- respective diasporas and the geopolitical con- ful coexistence of the two that the two coun- stellation. Both diaspora communities pro- tries managed to have for centuries. vide an economic and cultural link between the This policy memo focuses on the role of two countries. In particular, the presence of the religion as one of the cultural variables of Armenian community in Iran is an important Iran’s soft power in Armenia. Iran’s soft element of Tehran’s bilateral relationship with power in Armenia is part of Iran’s broader Armenia. For centuries, a sizeable and fairly Islamic-cultural foreign policy, which is im- prosperous Armenian community has resid- plemented through socio-cultural and schol- ed in Iran. The Armenian community of Iran arly activities. By analyzing the motives and has continuously enjoyed a certain amount of factors affecting Iran’s cultural policy in Ar- political, religious and cultural protection. Ar- menia, which can be considered cultural di- menians in Iran are recognized as a religious plomacy, one can identify the specifi c ways rather than national minority, including guar- religion is integrated into this policy. anteed representation in the parliament and on In considering Iran’s activities, we will local councils. There are more than 200 church- look at the instruments Iran deploys in Ar- es across the country. In contrast, The Iranian menia. In particular, we will analyze reli- community in Armenia is small. According to gion’s role and the way it is implemented in the 2011 census, which included an optional Iran’s cultural diplomacy. Given that there question on religious affi liation, there are 812 is not a signifi cant Islamic community in Muslims in Armenia, which is 0.027 per cent Armenia Iran’s policy cannot be considered of the total population. However, various re- to primarily support Shi’ism in the country. search publications, as well as information Furthermore, the basis for missionizing in 65 Armenia is low compared to other coun- relations with Armenia illustrates that Iran’s tries with large Muslim populations. The soft power is enhanced by cultural diploma- case of Iran’s soft power policy in Armenia cy and activities with a gradually expanding will demonstrate that the role of religion in religious component. Simultaneously, the transnational relations can be limited to cul- tendency towards further relations provides tural and civilizational relations. a platform for increasing soft power capabil- The analysis of Iran’s long-term cultural ities and resources in Armenia. Soft power and cultural diplomacy In this policy memo we use the Joseph also includes aid for changing the policies or Nye’s defi nition of soft power: “soft pow- political environment of the target nation, er draws on the national resources that can which in turn prevents, manages and miti- lead to a country’s ability to affect others gates confl ict with that country. through the co-optive means of framing the One of the diffi culties in the literature re- agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive lated to soft power is that it focuses on the attraction in order to obtain preferred out- attempts to infl uence and/or on the results comes.” The purpose of cultural diplomacy, of soft power. Both are diffi cult to measure, as a type of soft power, is for the people of a especially in terms of infl uencing how a for- foreign nation to develop an understanding eign country sets its agenda or its preferenc- of the nation’s own ideals and institutions, es, as we cannot know for sure what lead to in an effort to build broad support for its a change in these areas. I argue that one can economic and political goals. learn more about a country’s foreign policy Thus, cultural diplomacy revolves around from its soft power capabilities and activi- the themes of dialogue, understanding and ties than from its de facto infl uence (such as trust. The goal of Iran’s cultural diplomacy agenda setting which is diffi cult to observe). is to infl uence Armenian society and use Thus, this policy memo focuses on the re- that infl uence, which grows with time, as a sources and capabilities of Iranian soft pow- sort of goodwill reserve to win support for er in Armenia. In this memo soft power is policies. It seeks to induce a positive view viewed as one of the tools that Iran uses in of the country’s people, culture and politics. its foreign policy. Iranian culture, including Through its cultural diplomacy in Armenia, its religion, is the medium through which Iran engenders greater cooperation between the Iranian state supports a positive percep- the two nations. Iranian cultural diplomacy tion of itself in Armenia. Cultural diplomacy and religion Backed by the two factors of diaspora re- The importance of such intercultural rela- lations and geopolitics, Iran has developed tions has always been stressed by both par- specifi c tools of cultural diplomacy and soft ties. The main idea behind this cultural di- power in Armenia. Armenians and Irani- plomacy is that ‘the relations formed in the ans are presented as people who have long sphere of culture provide a solid foundation lived together peacefully and are nations for the development and deepening of Ar- with cultural and civilizational proximity, menia-Iran relations in political, economic although they fought in the 5th century. and other spheres.’1 The deep-rooted inter-

1 Meeting (9 July 2015) of President Serzh Sargsyan and Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance of Iran Ali Janati (Ar- menian News 2015, Armedia 2015). 66 cultural relations between Iran and Armenia philosophical aspects of Shi’ism. In almost ev- were also stressed during a meeting of the ery speech by Iranian supreme leader, presi- Catholicos of All Armenians and the Minis- dent, cultural attaché or ambassador, one ter of culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran will hear of universal and common values on 11 July 2015 (Armenianchurch.org 2015). for humanity (justice is one common theme). One possible reason for mutual respect be- For example, Iranian Ambassador Seyyed tween the two peoples is the fact that Shi‘a Kazem Sajjad said at the commemoration of Islam and Christianity are both considered Ashura in 2016 in the Blue Mosque: ‘The Ira- minority cultures in the respective coun- nians respect the moral values and struggle tries. Consequently, there is no fear of pos- for the justice (...). The aim of today’s’ event sible inﬂ uence, at least in terms of rhetoric. is to show the whole world that Shi’ite Mus- Moreover, while promoting and spreading lims are very peaceful and that they live next religious content in Armenia, Iranian efforts to Christian Armenians very peacefully and mainly emphasize the universal values and respect mutual religious rituals.’ Means and performance of Iran’s cultural diplomacy in Armenia

Interestingly, Iran’s approach to public di- individuals through scholarships, exchanges, plomacy is not a simple image-making pol- training/teaching, seminars, conferences and icy. It is largely cultural and mostly reﬂ ects access to media channels. The Blue Mosque on Persian heritage with some references to and events organised in the Mosque (Farsi Shi‘a Islam that is the focus of our memo. courses, religious ceremonies, Quran read- The cultural centers that constitute the ings and teaching classes, and etc.), publica- backbone of Iran’s cultural diplomacy are all tion activities, radio broadcasting, academic sub-branches of the Islamic Cultural Relations conferences and other cultural activities (ex- Organization (ICRO). Through this organi- hibitions, concerts) including the Nowruz zation the Supreme Leader of Iran dispatch- festival in Yerevan are the main events which es representatives to cultural organizations are organised by the Iranian Cultural Centre and Islamic centers abroad. In general, these and the Embassy of IRI in Armenia. centers share the same general framework, As Armenia itself supports constructive though the activities vary from country to relations with Iran in terms of geopolitics country: in Armenia and partly in Georgia, and economy, Iranian cultural diplomacy they normally organize cultural events, lan- in Armenia is based on a positive grounds/ guage courses, bilingual translations, journal bases. This policy involves presenting a publication, conferences, and interreligious comprehensive understanding of Islam and and intercultural dialogue, while in Azerbai- Iranian culture and civilization, promoting jan the religious aspect is given a special focus. ethics and Islamic sciences, introducing ce- The Cultural Centre of the Embassy of lebrities and the grandeur of Islamic and the Islamic Republic of Iran in Armenia is Iranian history, building active contacts to a branch of the Iran-based ICRO, which or- strengthen the bonds of friendship, promot- ganizes the events for each year. In general ing knowledge of the Farsi language and lit- Iran-Armenia bilateral cultural relations con- erature, and last but not least encouraging sist of both routine and strategic communi- the understanding of mutual cultures and cation between the two countries and the human experiences. development of lasting relations with key The activities and initiatives of the main

67 Iranian organizations demonstrate that the tivities. In 2016 many Armenian and Yazidi Iranian community in Armenia has started guests were invited to publicly celebrate the to open its religious activities to the public very important festival of Ashura, with ex- revealing the approach showing that the tensive media coverage on Armenian public celebration of its religious festivals and cere- television. The 38th anniversary of Islamic monies in Yerevan holds a political meaning Revolution was celebrated on 9th of Feb- alongside the religious one. Through their ruary (2017) in Yerevan in a very large au- cultural activities, Iranians try to promote an dience with participation of the Armenian understanding of Iranian culture; they reach Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan and a lot out not only via language, literature and his- of high ranked politicians and representa- torical narratives, but also via religious actives of cultural and educational spheres.

Conclusion

The use of cultural elements in internation- main cultural tools for strengthening and al relations targets the emotions and subcon- developing bilateral relations. Religion and scious feelings of the audience. Religion is an religious differences are not used to divide; appropriate factor in this kind of foreign policy. rather religion is used by the Iranian gov- From a soft power perspective, Armenia ernment to strengthen its political relations as the only Christian neighbour of Islamic Re- with Armenia. Thus, the religious difference public of Iran, is a priority in Iran’s neighbour- in Iran-Armenia relations, while assisting hood policy, and Iran’s cultural policies suc- governments in their national interests, fa- cessfully enhance its soft power in Armenia. cilitates political and economic relations. The transfer of Iranian cultural knowledge, Moreover, the fact that the two countries’ art, ideas, beliefs and customs, while provid- religious differences do not hinder their al- ing a platform for mutual understanding and liance suggests that the soft power strategy intercultural communication, supports and holds an additional communicative value ensures Iran’s political and economic goals. providing basis for intercultural/interreli- Thus, this speciﬁ c political relationship gious dialogue. Iranian activities in Arme- between the two countries leads Iranian for- nia can be interpreted as proof that different eign policy to transform its religious mes- religions are not necessarily an obstacle to sage into a cultural and moral stance, by good bilateral relations. Moreover, both par- stressing the universal values and meanings ties always stress this in their rhetoric. Cul- of Iranian Shi’a Islam. For instance, a con- tural diplomacy in Armenia-Iran relations ference commemorating the death of Imam offers a counter-narrative in which diverse Khomeini or the Islamic Revolution is pre- peoples and their traditions can coexist, sented under the umbrella of the universal strengthening each other through mutual and humanistic character of Shi’a creeds and understanding and building new traditions beliefs. For now, Iranian soft power in Ar- together. For example, the annually celebra- menia does not show any intention of reli- tions of Islamic Revolution and commemo- gious inﬂ uence or proselytism, as both states rations of death of Imam Khomeini become have been tolerant towards their respective something which turns to be “tradition” so Muslim and Christian minorities. Thus, the this can be one of the indicator of increasing two cultures—including their religions— religious component of Iranian soft power in can be interpreted as proximate, and as the Armenia. 68 IIRANIANRANIAN SOFTSOFT RELIGIOUSRELIGIOUS PPOWEROWER IINN AAZERBAIJAN:ZERBAIJAN: OOLDLD NNEWEW TTHREATHREAT FFOROR BBAKUAKU

ANAR VALIYEV

Introduction The collapse of the Soviet Union and in- Azerbaijan’s rival, Armenia, providing fuel dependence of Azerbaijan paved the way and economic assistance to Yerevan during for establishing diplomatic, economic and the Karabakh war. Since 1993, relations be- political relations between Baku and Teh- tween Azerbaijan and Iran have fl uctuated. ran. During the early years of Azerbaijan’s However, neither side risked crossing the post-Soviet independence movement, Baku point of no return and both refrained from considered Tehran a natural ally. This sup- harsh actions. Today, Azerbaijani-Iranian port stemmed from Ayatollah Khomeini’s relations are among the most complicated in statement condemning the Soviet Army in- the region, having experienced radical trans- vasion of Baku in January 1990, the return of formations over the last 25 years. Cordial Azerbaijanis to their (mostly Shi’a) Islamic friends and brotherly nations at the end of roots, the opening of borders, and Iranian the Cold War, Baku and Tehran almost en- humanitarian assistance, all of which made gaged in armed confl ict in the Caspian Sea Tehran a hero in the eyes of average Azer- in summer of 2001, and relations have since baijanis. However, the situation changed remained tense. Azerbaijan and Iran in its during the rule of the second president of turn very often resorts to many tools to exert Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey. Proclaiming their soft power over each other that raise a Western, particularly Turkish orientation suspicions of political establishment. From and accusing Iran of violating the rights of this perspective, religious factor remains Azerbaijanis in Iran, he alienated the Iranian one of the most important tools of Iranian establishment. Iranians, in turn, supported soft power in Azerbaijan. Background As one of the fathers of the concept of soft litical orders. Although fatwas dare not le- power, Joseph Nye, states, soft powers refer gally binding, nevertheless, certain group of to “the capability of an entity, usually but people take these orders literally and follow not necessarily a state, to infl uence what oth- them. It is worth mentioning that the secu- ers do through direct or indirect internation- lar government can not present something al infl uence and encouragement”. From this against fatwas and only the secular nature of perspective the Shi’a heritage of Azerbaijan the country allows the government to min- represents the main source of Iranian reli- imize the infl uence of this very important gious soft power. There are several tools that tool of Iranian soft power. Iran successfully uses in Azerbaijan. Among An impact of Iranian religious soft power them, a Fatwa – religious order of some cler- can be also seen in the example of the Isla- ic – could be considered as one of the most mist Party of Azerbaijan (IPA). The party is effective tools of soft power. Although liter- one of the organizations in the country that ature does not look at these orders as part of has been very much infl uenced by Iran. Ira- soft power, nevertheless in our case we may nian religious missionaries have been ener- consider it as an important element. In Azer- getic in southern Azerbaijan, as well as in baijan a certain share of religious people fol- villages around Baku, where the population low the call of respected Iranian theologian is predominantly Shi’a Muslim. The party, in various issues, spanning from the time for the core member of which comes from the observing Ramadan to following certain po- village Nardaran, is infl uential in Baku vil- 71 lages. The case of social unrests in Nardaran Shi’a dominated societies. village in summer of 2002 and the shoot-out Iran tries to exert its soft power through re- in 2015 can serve as perfect examples of how ligious literature. For years, Iranian mission- the party was able to use its power in the vil- aries, as well as various organizations, could lage in order to push its own agenda. easily import and sell religious literature In November of 2015 the law enforce- in the specialized shops and on the streets. ment agencies of Azerbaijan were involved Translated into Azerbaijani language, this lit- in deadly clashes with the supporters and erature was able to shed the light on many is- followers of the recently established Mus- sues in religious affairs. From almost 1992 till lim Unity Movement of Azerbaijan. Its lead- 2010, much of the literature explaining Islam er, prominent Shi’a cleric Taleh Bagirzade, and religious issues came from Iran. Most spent several months behind bars before be- Azerbaijanis learned about religion from Ira- ing released in 2010. During the clashes in nian religious literature. However, since the Nardaran village several people were killed establishment of State Committee for Work while more than 20 were arrested. The Unity with Religious Organizations, it has become Movement was an organization that could more diffi cult to import literature. For exam- implement its religious agenda but not un- ple, by 2010 the committee reviewed more der the banner of Islamic Party. For a very than 18,000 books and banned around 348 short period, the Unity Movement was able titles from being sold in Azerbaijan. to attract many followers and promote itself. TV channels are also used as part of the With social media on the rise in Azerbaijan, propaganda machine about the Iranian life- the Movement was able to send its messag- style and its religious order in Azerbaijan. es across the all levels of society. Bagirzade The Iranian political regime and its unap- slowly became a leader who could unite the pealing entertainment industry (in com- Shi’a movement against the government. He parison with Turkish or Russian) is hardly acknowledged that, at this juncture, Azer- attractive for Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the baijan is not ready to become an Islamic re- Iranian government is actively seeking to public, but neither did he say he opposed the increase its cultural-humanitarian linkage to Iranian system. In fact, he has also publicly Azerbaijan. One tools for such cultural inter- noted that Azerbaijan was ruled by Sharia vention is Sahar TV, a TV channel broadcast- law up until the 19th century, while stopping ed from Iran to Azerbaijan. The TV channel short of calling for its re-introduction. It is is easy to access in south Azerbaijan. The interesting that events in Nardaran and ar- content of the TV programs is usually an- rest of Bagirzade in 2015 coincided with exe- ti-Azerbaijani and offi cial Baku constantly cution of Al Nimr in January of 2016, a Shi’a expresses its concern. Much of Sahar’s pro- cleric who lived in Saudi Arabia for many gramming deals with religion, which is a years and was given the death penalty. Ira- clear example of Iran exporting the ideals nian press and propaganda machine did not and values of Iranian Revolution. lose the moment to compare both leaders Finally, Iranian authorities also pay specif- and announce them as martyrs for the Shi’a ic attention to humanitarian ties with Azer- cause. Such tactic worked in Shi’a communi- baijan. Imam Khomeyni Imdad Committee ties across the world. But in Azerbaijan, due was one of the infl uential organizations in to the marginal nature of religious politics, it Azerbaijan in 1990s. The organization ap- is hard to expect that martyr role of Bagirza- peared in Azerbaijan in 1993 with the pur- de would trigger the same effect as in other pose of helping Azerbaijani displaced peo- 72 ple and refugees. In 2001 there were more ble for promoting the ideas of Khomeinism than 400 places in Azerbaijan where the and the Iranian revolution. Specifi cally in committee was distributing aid. Iranian aid the southern regions of Azerbaijan, one can organizations also distributed small grants easily fi nd the books by Iranian theologians and other assistance to refugees from the translated into the Azerbaijani language. In Karabagh region and to young families. Be- 2013 Azerbaijani offi cials closed committee fore it was closed in 2013, the amount of aid due to the fact that the Azerbaijani economy reached 25 million dollars. However, beyond was more developed and foreign charities providing aid, the committee was responsi- were no longer necessary. Implications Religion will continue to be the major solute interpreter of dogma or sacred law. vehicle of Iranian soft power in Azerbaijan. That is why, Iranian religious authorities However, here unfortunate paradox hap- could in theory enjoy more spiritual author- pens. Azerbaijani establishment curbs and ity among Azerbaijani Shiites, which may put obstacles for creation of independent partially explain why independent religious (from state) Shi’a clergy since it would im- communities reject the offi cial clergy’s spir- mediately fall under the infl uence of Iranian itual authority. Such a situation makes the theologians. Due to the fact that major Shi’a Azerbaijani Shi’a population vulnerable to schools are located in Iran, the new genera- infl uence from senior members from Iran. tion of Azerbaijani Shi’a clergy would need For example, Sheikh Fazlullah Lankarani, to follow certain rules or procedures estab- a very popular ayatollah among the youth lished by Iranian clergy. That could be dan- until his death. gerous for secular Azerbaijani government Most importantly, in line with what has to implement. Meanwhile, the population been suggested earlier and as indicated by distrusts the state clergy, who were educated recent polls, the potential for Islamization in Azerbaijan. Under this policy, the Azer- in Azerbaijan is weakly institutionalized baijani government has been obstructing the so far, in the sense that there are very few creation of an independent clergy, arresting religious leaders who can lead such move- pro-Iranian theologians and strengthening ment. Results of the several surveys also the state-controlled Shi’a bureaucracy that show that population does not know or does not enjoy a high level of public trust. trust those outside of their own communi- Having such situation we can expect the ty. Therefore, there is no single independent growth of Iranian soft power in Azerbaijan religious leader who can capitalize and mo- if Shi’a Islam to become a force that could bilize masses unlike in Iran. As shown, apart monopolize political and civil realms of the from a few isolated examples, to date there country. The situation has been exacerbated is not an independent Shi’a clergy in Azer- with the absence of independent and edu- baijan, and the development of such a clergy cated Azerbaijani clergy. Although Iran was seems to be dependent on growing Iranian naturally a source of spiritual guidance for infl uence. Recent arrests of the leadership Azerbaijanis right after independence, its of the Islamic Party and some independent infl uence gradually was limited through scholars from Nardaran area indicate that government actions. As a rule, Shi’a Mus- the government is also preventing the cre- lims do not have clerical hierarchy. Thus, ation of independent Shi’a groups. the Azerbaijani Sheikh ul-Islam is not an ab- The absence of independent religious 73 groups has negative and positive sides too. pluralism, a vibrant civil society and active On the positive side, the arguments are that party politics may further diminish the role no force can use religion for its own benefi ts. of IPA and any other pro-Iranian political And falling this independent clergy falling un- party. Today, IPA capitalizes on certain pro- der the infl uence of Iran could be problematic test elements and the image of “fi ghter with for the country. Meanwhile, it is bad for the regime”. With most of its leadership in jail, country that many young people lack a trust- the party still holds strong positions and be- ed role model or having heard nothing from come even stronger due to its active usage of their clergyman, follow fatwas from Iran. social media. If this party becomes involved The infl uence of Iranian religious soft in politics, it could be marginalized political power may decrease in the country if Baku party into political life may marginalize it or pursues a committed policy. This scenario transform into a mainstream party. Mean- envisions actives social policies and spread- while, the authorities hope that a national ing the oil revenues to a larger share of pop- version of Islam will emerge, erasing the al- ulation, which would decrease social dis- ready weak borders between Sunnism and satisfaction and diminish the social base of Shiism. This would be a victory for the gov- pro-Iranian elements. Moreover, political ernment.

Conclusion and recommendation Iranian soft power in Azerbaijan may take sectarian tensions in society. A national pub- various forms and can lead in different di- lic debate involving independent and offi cial rections. Taken into consideration the recent clerics, scholars and NGOs would then need softening of pressure on Iran, Tehran may to be organized to effectively guarantee reli- limit its soft power toward Azerbaijan and gious freedom. Independent religious com- began full fl edged neighborly cooperation. munities, in particular Salafi groups, would Once Iran feels secure enough and does not also need to to clearly warn their members perceive a threat from Azerbaijan, Iranian ac- of risks connected to terrorism and mili- tions to expand its soft power should slowly tants and engage in genuine dialogue with decrease. Nevertheless, there are many other offi cial clergy and Azerbaijani authorities. possible outcomes. Azerbaijani authorities Surprisingly, the source of Iranian soft pow- and various agencies understand that due to er depends on Azerbaijan itself. Iranian soft the nature of Iranian regime, Tehran capital- power will grow if Azerbaijani statehood izes on Azerbaijan’s vulnerability. The gov- becomes weaker and the country begins to ernment would have to gradually diminish experience economic problems. The future the infl uence of radical ideologies through of Iranian soft power, strangely enough, is tight control over foreign missionary work the result of Azerbaijan’s politics inside the and initiate a Sunni-Shia dialogue to reduce country.

74 ABOUT AUTHORS

Fuad Aliyev studied at Azerbaijan State ry and International Relations. She obtained Economic University, the Academy of Pub- her BA and MA from the Turkish studies de- lic Administration under the President of partment at Yerevan State University. Evoy- the Republic of Azerbaijan and Central Eu- an specializes in Turkey-Azerbaijan political ropean University (Budapest, Hungary). He relations and has more than ten academic is currently an adjunct professor at ADA publications. She has more than fi ve years University, Khazar University and Azerbai- of extensive academic research experience in jan University in Baku. His fi elds of exper- both local and international environments. tise are Islam in post-Soviet countries and Currently, Evoyan is employed as an offi cer Islamic political economy. Fuad Aliyev was in the International Relations Offi ce at Yere- the 2011-2012 Fulbright Scholar at the John van State University. She is fl uent in Arme- Hopkins University School of Advanced In- nian, Russian, English and Turkish. ternational Studies’ Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. He was also a Hubert Humphrey Mariam Gabedava is a researcher with fellow in 2005-2006 and was affi liated with the Georgian Institute of Politics. Mariam the University of North Carolina at Chap- obtained her Master of Public Policy from el Hill as well as the Brookings Institution. the Hertie School of Governance (Berlin, Fuad Aliyev is the author of several publi- Germany) and her MA in political science cations on Islamic economics and fi nance, from Central European University (Buda- political economy of transition and Islamic pest, Hungary). She also holds a BA in in- activism in Azerbaijan and abroad. ternational relations from Tbilisi State Uni- versity (Georgia). Mariam has worked in Eiki Berg is a professor of International Georgian civil service and civil society or- Relations at the University of Tartu. His re- ganizations. Her research interests include search has focused on critical geopolitics and corruption and corruption control, minority particularly the studies of borders and border policy and religion. regions. Among his recent research activities, most prominent have been studies about ter- Ansgar Jödicke is a senior lecturer at the ritoriality and sovereignty issues in contested University of Fribourg (Department of So- states. He has published widely in leading cial Sciences). His areas of research are reli- peer-reviewed journals on bordering prac- gion and politics, in particular political reli- tices, identity politics and power-sharing in gious education (politics) in Europe and the post-confl ict settings. He is co-editor of Rout- relationship between religion and politics in ing Borders Between Territories, Discourses the South Caucasus. Together with Alexan- and Practices (Ashgate 2003) and Identity der Agadjanian and Evert van der Zweerde, and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations he recently edited the volume Religion, Na- and European Integration (Ashgate 2009). tion and Democracy in the South Caucasus During the years of 2003-2004 he served as an (Routledge 2015). Ansgar Jödicke has co- MP in the Estonian Parliament and observer ordinated several research projects in the to the European Parliament in the EPP-ED South Caucasus and in Switzerland. Among faction, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hu- them, the SCOPES project ‘Religion and Soft man Rights, Common Security and Defence Power. Religious Communities in the South Policy. In 2012, he received a National Science Caucasus as Objects of External Infl uences’ Award in the fi eld of Social Sciences for his (2014-2017) lead to the results published in research on ‘Identities, Confl icting Self-De- this volume. termination and De Facto States’. Kornely Kakachia is a professor of Po- Lia Evoyan holds a PhD in World Histo- litical Science at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi 77 State University, Georgia, and Director of 2013), and author of numerous articles pub- Tbilisi based think tank Georgian Institute lished by Global Governance, International of Politics. His current research focuses on Spectator, European Regional and Urban Georgian domestic and foreign policy, secu- Studies, Problems of Post-Communism, rity issues of the wider Black Sea area and Demokratizatsiya, Journal of International comparative party politics. He was a recip- Relations and Development, Cooperation ient of IREX and OSI fellowships and was a and Confl ict, Europe-Asia Studies, Journal visiting fellow at Harvard University’s Black of Eurasian Studies, Turkish Foreign Policy Sea Security program, (2009– 2010) Harri- Review, Welttrends and other international man Institute, Columbia University (2011) journals, as well as book chapters in edited and The Johns Hopkins University’s School volumes published by Ashgate, Palgrave of Advanced International Studies. He is the Macmillan, Nomos, etc. co-editor of Georgian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Sustainable Security (2014). Tatevik Manukyan is a research fellow at the Armenian National Academy of Sci- Alar Kilp has been a lecturer in Compar- ences, specializing in the Kurdish issue in ative Politics at the University of Tartu since the Middle East. She teaches in the Chair 2004. His research specializes in religion and of Turkish Studies of the Faculty of Orien- politics as well as church-state relations in tal Studies at Yerevan State University and post-communist Europe. He obtained his in the Oriental Studies Department of the Ph.D. in political science at Tartu in 2012 International Scientifi c Educational Centre with a dissertation titled Church Authority of the NAS RA. Manukyan is the author of in Society, Culture and Politics after Com- more than ten scientifi c texts regarding the munism. He has co-edited a special issue on historical background, formation and devel- ‘Religion, the Russian Nation and the State: opment of the Kurdish confl ict in the Middle Domestic and International Dimensions’ East; Kurdish policy in Turkey; the Kurdish (Religion, State and Society 2013) and pub- elements in Azerbaijan; etc. lished articles in Religion, State and Society, Studies in Church History and Proceedings Salome Minesashvili is a doctoral student of Estonian National Defence College. His at the Berlin Graduate School for Transna- recent papers on religious nationalism and tional Studies at the Free University of Ber- legal regulation of same-sex relations have lin. She received master’s degrees in interna- appeared in volumes published by Brill. tional Political Theory from the University of Edinburgh and in Transformation in the Andrey Makarychev is a guest professor South Caucasus from Iv. Javakhishvili Tbili- at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Sci- si State University. For her dissertation, Sa- ence at the University of Tartu, Estonia. His lome is working on national identity change areas of expertise are Russia-EU relations, contextualized in similar foreign policies of post-Soviet countries, issues of biopolitics Georgia and Ukraine. Her research interests and mega-events in Eastern Europe and include international relations theories, for- Eurasia. His record of previous institutional eign policy analysis and transformation pro- affi liations includes George Mason Univer- cesses in the former Soviet Union. sity (Fairfax, VA), the Center for Confl ict Studies (ETH Zurich), the Danish Institute Tatevik Mkrtchyan is a PhD student and of International Studies (DIIS) and Nizhny junior researcher at the Centre for Civili- Novgorod Linguistic University. He is a zation and Cultural Studies (Yerevan State co-editor of the book Changing Political and University). She was a lecturer in Arabic lan- Economic Regimes in Russia (Routledge, guage at Yerevan Brusov State University 78 of Languages and Social Sciences, Armenia Currently, Koba is a doctoral candidate in (2011-2014). Her PhD thesis focuses on Shi‘a comparative politics at Central European religious doctrine and discourse in the Nahj University. Before joining CRRC-Georgia, al-Balagha. Her fi eld is Arabic and Islamic Koba worked in several civil society orga- Studies, with her most recent research inter- nizations, as well as in civil service. His re- ests being the Shi‘a religious political gov- search interests include authoritarianism, ernmental system of the Islamic Republic regime change and voting behaviour. of Iran and Iran’s relations with the South Caucasus. Anar Valiyev is an assistant professor at ADA University in Baku. He received his Vahram Ter-Matevosyan is the head of bachelor’s (1999) and master’s (2001) de- the Turkish Studies Department at the In- grees in history from Baku State University. stitute for Oriental Studies of the National From 2001 to 2003 he studied public policy Academy of Sciences of Armenia, and assis- at the School of Public and Environmental tant professor at the Department of Politi- Affairs at Indiana University in Blooming- cal Science and International Affairs at the ton, where he received his second master’s American University of Armenia. He holds degree. In 2007 he successfully defended his postgraduate and graduate degrees from dissertation at the Department of Urban and Bergen University (Norway), Lund Univer- Public Affairs of the University of Louis- sity (Sweden), the Institute of Oriental Stud- ville, KY. From 2007 to 2008 he was working ies (Armenia). He was a Fulbright Scholar at as an assistant professor at the Faculty of So- the University of California, Berkeley, and a cial Studies of Masaryk University in Brno, visiting professor at Duke University, NC. Czech Republic. Dr. Valiyev is the author of His main research interests include politi- numerous peer-reviewed articles and ency- cal Islam, Kemalism and Turkish domestic clopaedia entries. His areas of expertise are and foreign policy issues as well as regional democracy and governance, public policy security problems. His previous work has of post-Soviet republics and urban develop- been published in Turkish Studies, Mid- ment and planning. dle East Studies, Insight Turkey, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Alexandra Yatsyk is a visiting researcher Iran and the Caucasus, Études Arméniennes at the Centre for Russian and Eurasian Stud- Contemporaines, Turkish Review, Caucasus ies of Uppsala University in Sweden and the Analytical Digest and Contemporary Eur- director of the Center for Cultural Studies asia. He authored the award-winning mono- of Postsocialism at Kazan Federal Univer- graph Islam in the Social and Political Life of sity in Russia. She is an author and editor Turkey in 2008 and co-authored History of of works on post-Soviet nation building, Turkish Republic in 2014. sports and cultural mega-events, biopolitics and art, including Celebrating Borderlands Koba Turmanidze is the director of in a Wider Europe: Nation and Identities CRRC-Georgia, a non-profi t research orga- in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia (Nomos, nization. Koba earned a Master of Public 2016), Mega-Events in Post-Soviet Eurasia: Administration from American University Shifting Borderlines of Inclusion and Exclu- (Washington, DC) and an MA in political sion (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), New and science from Central European University Old Vocabularies of International Relations (Budapest, Hungary). He also holds a diplo- After the Ukraine Crisis (Routledge, 2016) ma in history from Tbilisi State University. and others.

79 Soon to be released!

Religion and Soft Power in the South Caucasus

Edited by Ansgar Jödicke, University of Fribourg, Switzerland

Series: Routledge Studies in Religion and Politics

By exploring the role of religion in transnational relations between Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and their surrounding neighbours, this volume helps explain how transnational religious and political relationships intermingle in the South Caucasus. The concept of ‘soft September 2017: 234x156: 272pp power’ is the heuristic starting point of this investigation Hb: 978-1-138-63461-9 | £105.00 to define the importance of religion in the region. Drawing eBook: 978-1-315-20672-1 on a prestigious three year project supported by the Swiss National Foundation the book brings together academics from the South Caucasus and Western Europe to offer TABLE OF CONTENTS: original empirical research and contributions from Religion and Soft Power in the South Caucasus: An Introduction; Ansgar Jödicke; Part I: The Case of Georgia experienced researchers in political science, history, and Chapter 1: Turkish Soft Power Politics in Georgia: Making oriental studies. Sense of Political and Cultural Implications; Vahram Ter-Matevosyan Chapter 2: Common Faith in Scrutiny: Orthodoxy as Soft Power in Russia-Georgia Relations; Salome Minesashvili Chapter 3: Iran’s Soft Power Policy in Georgia; Mariam Gabedava and Koba Turmanidze; Part II: The Case of Hb: 978-1-138-63461-9 | £105.00 Azerbaijan Chapter 4: Iranian Soft Power in Azerbaijan—Does Religion Matter?; Anar Valiyev Chapter 5: Examining Salafism For more details, or to request a copy for review, please contact: Robyn Doyle, Author in Azerbaijan: Transnational Connections and Local Context; Marketing & Communications , [email protected] Kamal Gasimov Chapter 6: Islam and Turkey’s Soft Power in Azerbaijan: the Gülen Movement; Fuad Aliyev; Part III: The Case of Armenia Chapter 7: Religion as a Factor in Kurdish Identity Discourse in Armenia and Turkey; Lia Evoyan and Tatevik Manukyan; Chapter 8: Iran’s Soft Power Policy in Armenia: Cultural Diplomacy and Religion; Tatevik Mkrtchyan; Part IV: The EU – Russia Framework Chapter 9: Face to Face with Conservative Religious Values: Assessing the EU’s Normative Impact in the South Caucasus; Eiki Berg and Alar Kilp; Chapter 10: Russia as a Counter-Normative Soft Power: Between Ideology and Policy; Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk; Part V: Prospects Chapter 11: Prospects for Thinking Soft Power beyond Joseph Nye; Andrey Makarychev;

For more information visit: www.routledge.com/9781138634619