Putin's Hybrid Wars: a Comparative Analysis of Russian

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PUTIN’S HYBRID WARS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN INCURSIONS INTO GEORGIA, UKRAINE, BULGARIA, AND SYRIA

A thesis submitted to the Kent State University Honors College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for University Honors

Joshua Haynie

May, 2020

Thesis written by

Joshua Haynie

Approved by

______, Advisor

______, Chair, Department of Political Science

Accepted by

______, Dean, Honors College

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTON...... 1 1. Research Design...... 4 II. LITERATURE REVIEW...... 6 1. Hybrid Warfare...... 6 2. Hybrid Warfare and Russian Thinking...... 15 3. Gerasimov and Non-Linear Warfare...... 16 4. Political Warfare and the Kremlin’s Playbook...... 21 5. Russian Foreign Policy...... 23 III. GEORGIA...... 31 1. Historical Background...... 31 2. Events Leading to Incursion...... 36 3. Hybrid Tactics Observed...... 39 A. Political Warfare...... 39 B. Conventional...... 42 C. Irregular...... 45 D. Information Warfare...... 46 4. Conclusion...... 48 IV. UKRAINE...... 50 1. Historical Background...... 50 2. Event’s Leading to Incursions...... 54 3. Political Warfare...... 56 4. The Annexation of Crimea...... 58 A. Conventional...... 58 B. Information Warfare...... 65 C. Criminality...... 69 5. War in Donbass...... 71

iii A. Political Warfare...... 71 B. Irregular...... 75 C. Transitory Period...... 77 D. Conventional...... 79 E. Information Warfare...... 81 6. Conclusion...... 85 V. BULGARIA...... 87 1. Historical Background...... 87 2. Hybrid Tactics Observed...... 90 A. Economic Warfare...... 90 B. Information Warfare...... 93 3. Conclusion...... 95 VI. SYRIA...... 97 1. Historical Background...... 98 2. Events Leading to Incursion...... 101 3. Hybrid Tactics Observed...... 104 A. Political Warfare...... 104 B. Conventional...... 105 C. Irregular...... 108 D. Information Warfare...... 110 4. Conclusion...... 113 VII. COMPARISON ANALYSIS...... 115 VIII. CONCLUSION...... 122

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 129

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my thesis advisor, Dr. Gabriella

Paar-Jakli. Dr. Paar-Jakli has not only supported me throughout this entire project but has been a valuable source of mentorship throughout my collegiate career. I would also like to extend my thanks to Dr. Julie Mazzei, Dr. Mary-Ann Heiss, and Dr. Don-John

Dugas for agreeing to participate on my Oral Defense Committee. I would also like to extend my thanks to my parents, Michael and Natalie Haynie, for their support over the last three years at Kent State University.

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I. Introduction

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a unipolar world dominated by the United States of America, most people expected the Russian Federation to embark on a path towards democracy and economic freedom that would promote stability in the international system. The result of nearly 25 years of modernization has produced the opposite outcome; a newly emergent Russian state that seeks to aggressively assert itself at both the regional and international levels. This assertion can be seen manifested in Russia’s incursions into Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria.

These incursions are defined not only by their military elements, but also by the political, economic, and technological intrusions that accompany Russia’s use of force. The result is a form of hybrid warfare, termed by some to be “New Generation Warfare” that blends soft and hard power together by combining political, economic, technological, cyber, and military elements in a comprehensive framework for conducting war.1

Russia’s “New Generation Warfare” has been a source of controversy and debate between scholars, pundits, policymakers, and even the military strategists seeking to must counter it. This debate originated when an article published in 2013, under the name of

1 Stefan Hadjitodorov and Martin Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power: Hybrid Dimensions of Russia-Bulgaria Relations," Connections: The Quarterly Journal 17, no. 1 (2018): 7.

the Chief of Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, seemingly foreshadowed Russia’s strategy in both Syria and Ukraine. Western commentators and scholars viewed the article as outlining the current Russian military doctrine and strategies, labeling the views authored by Gerasimov as the “Gerasimov Doctrine.” However, the existence of the

Gerasimov doctrine, and the organized hybrid warfare it describes, has been critiqued by various scholars. The original proponent of the notion of a Gerasimov doctrine, Mark

Galeotti, has even rejected its existence.2 Although much of this discussion has centered around what exactly Russia’s form of hybrid warfare is and whether it is a an entirely unique phenomenon, little debate has occurred surrounding the choices made by Russian leadership in conducting warfare characterized by its hybrid aspects and tactics. This thesis seeks to help fill the intellectual void by exploring what conduct is characterized as hybrid warfare.

This thesis examines how the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin employed

“New Generation Warfare" to achieve its geopolitical interests and by what mechanisms or strategies “New Generation Warfare” uses to achieve these goals. Four cases have been selected to explicate this phenomenon—Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria— because all share a set of common factors. First, each nation-state formerly belonged to

Russia’s sphere of influence, whether a part of the Russian Empire, the U.S.S.R., or as an ally. Both Georgia and Ukraine were absorbed by the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, as well as forcibly absorbed into the Soviet Union in the course of the Russian

2 Mark Galeotti, “I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine,’” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2018, 2, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/. 3

Civil War. Bulgaria aligned itself with Soviet Union during the Cold War, becoming highly dependent on Soviet patronage throughout this period. Syria, like Bulgaria, was a

Soviet ally against the Western powers during the Cold War and continues to maintain significant political, military, and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union’s successor. The second common factor is that each nation-state has been subject to various Russian intrusions, both military and otherwise. Both Georgia and Ukraine saw military conflicts arise with Russia in 2008 and 2014, respectively, while Bulgaria is currently undergoing the process of state capture through political and economic activity related to Russian interests. State capture, as defined by Vesna Pesic, involves the act of

“...any group or strata, external to the state, that seizes decisive influence over a state institutions and policies for its own interests and against the public good.”3 Syria is the site of a Russian intervention to bolster its ally, President of Syria Bashar al-Assad and his government forces. The last common factor is that the Russia incurred into each states’ incursion during the tenure of Vladimir Putin, while he served in the capacity of either President of Russia or Prime Minister of Russia.

The purpose of this study is to examine Russian hybrid warfare in an effort to determine the patterns, characteristics, and traits that define this seemingly new style of conflict. Additionally, this study examines Russia’s conduct through a realist paradigm and contemporary Russian assumptions on international relations in order to

3 Vesna Pesic, “State Capture and Widespread Corruption in Serbia,” CEPS Working Document No. 262, Center for European Policy Studies, March 2007, 5, http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct =true&AuthType=ip&db=edsupe&AN=edsupe.11664&site=eds-live&scope=site. 4

contextualize hybrid warfare in the greater scope of Russian foreign policy. Realism will be used as a paradigm to examine Russian hybrid warfare for its state-centric approach that posits that a state will use every available means to it in order to protect its own security. Given the scope of means employed in the course of hybrid warfare and organization required to enact these tactics, the state ought to be assumed to be the central actor within the international system or a case, who is continuing politics by any and all means available to it. In achieving this purpose, Russian incursions into Georgia,

Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria will be compared and contrasted against one another.

Additionally, this thesis will also examine Russian foreign policy trends and theory, as well as explore its basis in political realism.

1. Research Design

The method employed in this thesis will be the comparative case study of four specific countries, with attention being focused on their contemporary relations and or conflicts with the Russian Federation: Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria.

Comparative case studies are in-depth examinations of two or more cases that share a common focus and involve the synthesis and analysis of similitude, variance, and patterns between them.4 American behavioral scientist Alexander L. George defines a case as an

“instance of a class of events,” referring to any event of scientific interest.5 This method

4 Delwyn Goodwrick, Comparative Case Studies (Florence: UNICEF Office of Research, 2014): 1. 5 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007): 18. 5

requires the specific features of each case to be described at the beginning of the study to establish an analytic framework to be used in the cross-case comparison, highlighting similarities and differences between cases and their respective causes. Furthermore, with the focus on cases and their context, the method allows for one to accrue general knowledge regarding said context’s influence on the phenomena.

Comparison has long been employed in the discipline of Political Science and is a fundamental to any analysis in the field.6 Scholar David Collier, in his article “The

Comparative Method,” identifies the comparative method as playing a central role in forming concepts derived from a focus upon suggestive similarities and differences.7 A comparative case study of these countries draws attention to the similarities and differences between a limited number of occurrences or incidents, in this case, being the presence of a hybridized conflict by Russia in each respective nation-state.

In order to determine what tactics are employed as well as what patterns emerge in the occurrence of hybrid warfare, the hybrid tactics employed in each case will be identified and explored in detail. The source material for these cases will mainly draw upon a variety of secondary sources, consisting of books, articles, and periodicals, in order to detail the examples of hybrid warfare. Following the identification of hybrid tactics in each case, the cases will be compared and contrasted in an effort to identify the patterns associated with hybrid warfare.

6 David Collier, “The Comparative Method,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993): 105. 7 Collier, “The Comparative Method.” 6

II. Literature Review

1. Hybrid Warfare

Before one can examine potential examples of Russian incursions that have been characterized as hybrid warfare, one must first understand the meaning and scope of the term. In academic and military communities, a universally accepted definition for this concept has yet to emerge. As a result, hybrid warfare has been used interchangeably with a variety of different terms in an effort to better characterize the actions that are typical of the phenomena.

Hybrid warfare’s origins can be traced to an article by Lieutenant General James

N. Mattis and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman in 2005. Rejecting the technologically centered visions of the Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA), which considered the character and conduct of warfare to be fundamentally transformed by the innovative application of technology, Mattis and Hoffman posited that future conflicts would be characterized by hybrid warfare, an extension of General Charles Krulak’s “Three Block

War.”8 The concept of the “Three Block War” is based in the notion that, in an urban operating environment, a modern military force, like the United States Armed Forces, will be required to simultaneously conduct combat, humanitarian, and peacekeeping

8 James Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Proceedings Magazine, November 2005, 2. 7

operations in the span of three blocks or more.9 When conducting the plethora of operations, the United States faces four threats or challengers: the traditional, the irregular, the catastrophic, and the disruptive.10 Because the United States enjoys superiority in the gross majority of conventional conflicts, adversaries will increasingly seek to undermine such conventional superiority by seeking to employ unconventional tactics. Such unconventional tactics could include irregular methods, including terrorism, insurgency, unrestricted warfare, guerrilla war, or coercion by narco-criminals, being used to achieve small successes that are subsequently magnified through both media and information warfare in an effort to offset a conventional superiority.11 Mattis and

Hoffman predict that actors, both state and non-state, will examine the four threats to the

United States “...and select a combination of techniques or tactics appealing to them...” to yield a combination of novel approaches to war.12 This synthesis of different modes and means of war, write Mattis and Hoffman, is hybrid warfare.13 Mattis and Hoffman further emphasize the role of psychological and information warfare in hybrid warfare, wherein both the United States and its adversaries compete in broadcasting or communicating each belligerent’s respective “message.”14 Consequently, the authors introduce the information domain as the fourth block of a “Three Block War,” and urge the U.S. military to prepare for combating enemies in hybrid wars.

9 Walter Dorn and Michael Varey, "Fatally Flawed: The Rise and Demise of the ‘Three-Block War’ Concept in Canada," International Journal 63, no. 4 (2008): 968, http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.kent.edu/stable/40204431. 10 James Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” 1. 11 Mattis and Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” 12 Mattis and Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” 13 Mattis and Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” 14 Mattis and Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” 2. 8

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) was critical in forming Mattis and

Hoffman’s concept of hybrid warfare, identifying the four threats or challenges that lay hybrid warfare’s foundation. In 2005, the United States’ Department of Defense published the NDS, which recognized that the United States’ military’s predominance in traditional forms of warfare leads to potential adversaries adopting asymmetrical and unconventional capabilities to challenge the United States.15 As the document posits, the result is “...an array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities and methods threaten[ing] U.S. interests.”16 The document defines these challenges as follows:

Traditional challenges are posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict. Irregular challenges come from those employing “unconventional” methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents. Catastrophic challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects. Disruptive challenges may come from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.17

Each category overlaps with another, and actors able to efficiently harness and utilize threats from each category pose the greatest threat to U.S.’s interests. Successfully melding these categories creates an asymmetrical threat that effectively nullifies the

U.S.’s superiority in traditional forms of warfare. Although this framework realizes the diversification of threats in which a modern military must respond to beyond conventional ones, its focus on categorizing modern threats fails to capture the blurring of war and peace that so often characterizes hybrid warfare.

15 Donald Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2005), 2. 16 Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy, 2. 17 Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy. 9

Hybrid warfare, as conceptualized by Mattis and Hoffman, draws parallels to the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). Fourth Generation Warfare’s proponents, including William S. Lind and a cohort of military officers, argue that warfare has been evolving in generational shifts since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. First-generation warfare refers to ancient battles fought by uniformed combatants using massed manpower and employing line and column tactics. Second-generation warfare saw mass firepower replace massed manpower, fire and movement evolving from the line and column, and an increasing emphasis on indirect artillery’s ability to wear down an enemy through attrition. Second-generation tactics were summed up by French Marshal Henri

Petain, who stated “The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.” Third-generation warfare is based neither on firepower nor attrition, but maneuverability. Epitomized by the German blitzkrieg, third-generation attackers “...relied on infiltration and collapse the enemy’s combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them.”18 Defense was primarily conducted in depth and invited penetration, with the intended goal of overstretching an enemy and encircling them with counterattacks.19

According to 4GW proponents, third-generation warfare marked the end of linear warfare.20 Whereas linear conflicts are defined by “...a sequential progression of a planned strategy by opposing sides...nonlinear conflict is the simultaneous deployment of

18 William S. Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989): 8, https://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/lind/the-changing-face-of-war-into-the-fourth- generation.html. 19 Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War,” 10. 20 William S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” August 6, 2009, Antiwar.com, 11, https://original.antiwar.com/lind/2004/01/15/understanding-fourth-generation-war/. 10

multiple, complementary military and non-military warfare tactics.”21 War is no longer a shoving contest with each side vying for control of or advancing over a font line. With this shift in the nature of war followed an evolution in the culture of military institutions.

Rejecting strict obedience to orders and imposed discipline as the foundational methods to achieve an objective, third-generation warfare saw the decentralization of war and a greater emphasis being placed on individual initiative in achieving orders.22 Orders themselves merely stated what needed to be achieved, leaving the method and means of achievement to individual combat units and leaders. While characteristics like decentralization, initiative, and non-linearity carry over into the next generation of warfare, fourth-generation warfare is defined by the blurring between peace and war, as well as that of combatants and civilians.23 Central to this new generation of warfare is the weakening of the state as a governing mechanism, which results in the rise of non- state actors willing and able to challenge the state’s legitimacy and monopoly on the ability to conduct war.24 Non-state actors, in addition to the adapting state, employ a range of conventional and unconventional methods, including terrorism and information warfare, in an effort to undermine the state via the weakening of its political will and stimulating internal societal breakdown.25 According to Lind and his cohort, this generational warfare marks the return to the type of conflict present prior to the formation

21 Joshua Ball, “What Is Hybrid Warfare?” June 10, 2019, Global Security Review, 4, https://globalsecurityreview.com/hybrid-and-non-linear-warfare-systematically-erases-the-divide-between- war-peace/. 22 Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” 11. 23 Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” 13. 24 Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War (Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 18. 25 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War. 11

of the nation-state as a structure. However, the 4GW proponents are often criticized for ignoring the long history of irregular warfare and its presence throughout military history and in each of the generational shifts.

Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, two senior colonels from China’s People’s

Liberation Army, assert that military history is useless for understanding modern warfare.

The authors acknowledge that, in the wake of the Gulf War and the technology-centric military orthodoxy it spawned, war was no longer conceptualized around the usage of an armed regular force, utilizing speed and technology, to coerce an enemy to submit to their will. Rather, the new principles of war are that of “...using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”26 Qiao and Wang recognize that, given the variety of methods to coerce an opponent, the distinction between combatant and noncombatant becomes less clear as the entire society, and the interest-blocs that constitute it, are mobilized. As a result, the possible battlefields for conflicts becomes infinite, with “...financial warfare, trade warfare, cultural warfare, information warfare, and legal warfare”... all becoming viable stratagems to pursue interests.27 This approach is epitomized by Liang’s quote in the editor’s note, where he declares, “The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden.”28 In the paradigm offered by unconventional warfare is no longer an activity monopolized by the military

26 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 7. 27 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “A New Generation of Unrestricted Warfare,” April 23, 2016, War on the Rocks, 3, https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/a-new-generation-of-unrestricted-warfare/. 28 Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 2. 12

sphere. Rather, strategists must synthesize all resources available to a nation-state and employ them as a means to wage war. In essence, Liang and Xiangsui assert that military thinking should occur beyond the limits of traditional military thinking that recognizes the hard power of militaries as the only conduit of war.

The academic and military communities have yet to agree on a precise definition of hybrid warfare, with “hybrid warfare,” “fourth-generation warfare,” “unrestricted warfare,” and a variety of other different terms used interchangeably in an effort to characterize the same phenomena. This phenomena which typifies hybrid warfare and its related terminology is described by Frank G. Hoffman as the blending of “...the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.”29

According Hoffman, whose usage first popularized the term, hybrid warfare

“...incorporate[s] a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”30 Able to be waged by both states and a plethora of non-state actors, these activities are orchestrated and coordinated within the same battlespace to achieve “...synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of the conflict.”31

At the strategic level, regular and irregular forces have been components of conflicts historically. However, these forces traditionally operated in both different theaters and in different formations. In hybrid warfare, regular and irregular elements

29 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War, 57. 30 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War, 18. 31 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War, 8. 13

blur into a single force operating in the same battlespace.32 While integrated with a conventional force, the irregular elements becomes decisive in the success of an operation, rather than “...just protract[ing] the conflict, provoke[ing] overreactions or extend[ing] the costs of security for the defender.”33 Instead of facilitating the progression of confrontations with an enemy force with the intention of initiating a climactic and decisive battle, hybrid warfare seeks to achieve success by employing irregular tactics alongside the most efficient means available to achieve political goals, including terrorism. Criminal activity, rather than technology advancement, is used to sustain a hybrid force, alongside initiating general disorder and disruption in an opposing state.34 The combination and hybridization of methods are designed to either gradually wear down an opponent’s conventional opposition to achieve political goals, or the capitulation of the state and its infrastructure.

While Hoffman’s definition provides the most comprehensive overview of hybrid warfare, it is not the only one in use. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor define hybrid warfare as “...conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and non- state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose.”35 The authors view hybrid warfare as the extension of historical compound wars, with the combination of regular and irregular troops on the same battlefield being characteristic of a plethora of wars

32 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War, 29. 33 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War, 29. 34 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War, 30. 35 Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray, Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2. 14

throughout history. Lawrence Freedman, in his article “Ukraine and the Art of Limited

War,” defines hybrid warfare as “...as an approach that draws upon a number of types of force from across the full spectrum, including terrorism, insurgency and regular combat, along with the extensive use of information operations.”36 In essence, hybrid warfare is used to describe the apparent melding of conventional and irregular warfare, which is accompanied by any means at the state’s disposal to accomplish a political objective.

Hybrid warfare is often employed as a catch-all term that seeks to describe a variety of contemporary states’ activities. In surveying a variety of definitions that attempt to describe contemporary warfare, including hybrid warfare, it becomes evident that there exists little difference between each term in principle. Each is attempting to describe the same phenomena. As a result, several have criticized the term’s utility in acting as a paradigm by which to examine actors’ actions. As Matthew Rojansky and

Michael Kofman noted, “Hybrid’ simply denotes a combination of previously defined types of warfare, whether conventional, irregular, political, or information.”37 In simply indicating the combination of previously defined forms of warfare, the term neither establishes a new analytic framework, nor provides any precision as to what the characteristics and goals of such operations are. While hybrid warfare may describe tactics employed on the battlefield, it does little to explain the overarching strategy behind such tactic’s employment. In essence, critics of hybrid warfare view hybrid

36 Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” Survival 56, no. 6 (November 2, 2014): 8, doi:10.1080/00396338.2014.985432. 37 Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” April 2015, The Wilson Center Kennan Cable No. 7, 2, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents /publication/7-KENNAN CABLE-ROJANSKY KOFMAN.pdf. 15

warfare as a vague catch-all term for an actor’s actions that contributes little analytically in attempting to construct policy decisions, influences, and factors.

The criticism of hybrid warfare and its scope should not be ignored. Despite the subtle differences that exist amongst the several definitions of hybrid warfare and competing terminology, each seeks to describe Russia’s broad range of subversive activities and instruments employed in an effort to further its national interest. These activities include the deployment of military force and resources of a nonmilitary character in the pursuit of political goals. Therefore, hybrid warfare should be recognized as a shorthand term for Russian activities, rather than providing a coherent doctrine from which to examine past and future Russian activities.

2. Hybrid Warfare and Russian Thinking

The concept of hybrid warfare is a Western one. Though the term is often associated with Russian activities in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, the term is seldom used in Russian literature to describe Russian activities in the international arena. Russian

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club in November

2014, made the following statement regarding hybrid warfare:

It is an interesting term, but I would apply it above all to the United States and its war strategy – it is truly a hybrid war aimed not so much at defeating the enemy militarily as at changing the regimes in the states that pursue a policy Washington does not like. It is using financial and economic pressure, information attacks, using others on the perimeter of a corresponding state as proxies and of course information and ideological pressure through externally financed nongovernmental organizations. Is it not a hybrid process and not what we call war?38

38 Sergey Lavrov, “Remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the XXII Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy,” November 22, 2014, Valdai Club, 13, 16

To Lavrov, and other Russian elites, policymakers, and military strategists, hybrid warfare is a Western concept that ought to be applied to Western actions. Hybrid warfare, to these individuals, describes a Western effort to destabilize Russia and undermine its interests abroad. So-called “colored revolutions,” fifth-column regime changes, subversive use of social media and NGOs, and economic expansions all encompass the perceived threat to Russian sovereignty.

3. Gerasimov and Non-Linear Warfare

The term most often used in Russian literature to describe its perceived practice of hybrid warfare is non-linear warfare. Non-linear warfare’s usage was popularized by

Vladislav Surkov. A key political advisor to Vladimir Putin and the supposed architect of Russian’s annexation of Crimea, Surkov published a science fiction short-story under the penname Natan Dubovitsky in 2014 and in it described his conception of the future of war.39 Set during the “fifth world war,” the story follows a child orphaned in the course of the conflict. Beginning with hints of perpetual mobilization, which mirrors the

Kremlin’s narrative of perpetual war, Surkov introduces the fifth world war as being a war unlike ordinary conflicts, which he terms a non-linear war. Non-linear wars are described as being unlike the primitive and conventional conflicts of the nineteenth and

hhttp://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/remarks_by_foreign_minister_sergey_lavrov_at_the_xxii_assembly_of _the_council_on_foreign_and_defence/. 39 Peter Pomerantsev, “Non-Linear War,” March 28, 2014, LRB Blog, London Review of Books, 1, https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2014/march/non-linear-war. 17

twentieth century, which were defined by two sides, whether countries, groups of allies, or coalitions, competing with one another. Non-linear war is viewed as being all against all, and recognized that war, in the traditional sense, was a part of process, though not the most important part of the process, that comprises of non-linear conflicts.40 In Surkov’s fictional world, the warring parties are not clear, and warfare becomes secondary to other more efficient modes of conflict. While an act of fiction, Surkov’s short story provides insight into the strategic thinking guiding contemporary actions of the Russian state.

Specifically, that a paradigm is employed which recognizes that war is evolving away from a state of conflict, characterized by the presence of two defined parties in opposition to one another, to that of non-linear warfare.

In February 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the

Russian Federation Armed Forces, published an article titled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight” in the Russian newspaper Military-Industrial Courier, introducing

Western audiences to Russian conceptions of twenty-first century warfare. In the article,

Gerasimov writes that “In the twenty-first century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.”41 Rather than relying on traditional military means to wage a conflict, modern warfare sees the broad application of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures,

40 Pomerantsev, “Non-Linear War,” 5. 41 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January 2016): 23, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=f5h&AN=112783591&site =eds-live&scope=site. 18

supplemented by the use of force, to achieve political and strategic goals. The militaristic characteristics of war take on a concealed character, including the waging of an informational conflict and the deployment of special operations forces. The use of military elements openly occurs under the guise of peacekeeping or managing crises, only to guarantee success of a conflict when it is in its final stages. Under these new rules of war, “...a thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.”42 Traditional military means achieving geopolitical aims are recognized by Gerasimov as being inefficient to the greater, and often more effective, nonmilitary means.

In the West, Gerasimov’s article went unnoticed until it seemingly prophesized

Russia’s incursions into Crimea and Ukraine. In light of these conflicts, and the Russian intervention into the Syrian Civil War, Gerasimov’s article has often been interpreted as a proposal of a new form of Russian warfare, referred to as hybrid warfare, that blends conventional military elements with unconventional, nonmilitary assets. However, rather than presenting a comprehensive doctrine, Gerasimov’s article merely explains his view of the current environment that Russian military forces must operate in and how the nature of warfare is likely to evolve in the future.43

Gerasimov’s views, and the greater Russian consensus on warfare and regime change, were shaped by Western interventions into nations such as Yugoslavia, Iran, and

42 Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” 24. 43 Charles Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January 2016): 30, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329933852_Getting_Gerasimov_Right. 19

Iraq. In his article “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Charles Bartles explains that, “In the

Russian view, the patterns of U.S. forced regime change has been as follows: a military operation; finding an appropriate pretext such as to prevent genocide or seize weapons of mass destruction; and finally, launching a military operation to cause regime change.”44

However, this blueprint for regime change is considered by many in Russia to have been replaced by a new pattern of U.S.-forced regime change after observing the Arab Spring and “color revolutions.” This pattern, coined the use of smart power by Joseph Nye, is the skillful combination of both hard and soft power into an integrated strategy that relies of non-military means to achieve strategic objectives that are underscored by the support of military assets to supplement their usage.45 The U.S.’s supposed mastery of smart power, where the creation of a U.S.-dominated liberal international order backed by its military power solidified American control, placed the U.S. into a hegemonic role in the international system without relying on the excessive and unsustainable deployment of resources to achieve its own strategic objectives. As a result, American influence has expanded, and their actions legitimized through the proper use of smart power.

Rather than relying on an overt military invasion, the first offenses come from the creation and maintaining of political opposition through state propaganda, social media, the internet, and nongovernmental organizations in an instance of smart power. Through the creation of political dissent and internal political strife causes the legitimate state to experience difficulties maintaining order. As a nation-state continues to be destabilized,

44 Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” 32. 45 Richard Lee Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), 7. 20

opposition movements can be further strengthened with the addition of the covert deployment of special operations elements, conventional military forces, and private military contractors, who are introduced to battle a government to continue the destabilization of a region. As the legitimate state is forced to employ more drastic and aggressive measures to maintain control of a region, the U.S. is provided the pretext for the imposition of economic, political, and military sanctions, culminating in the deployment of military forces under the guise of peacekeepers to return the destabilized region to normalcy and, if desired, install a new regime friendly to the U.S’s interests.

Gerasimov’s description of the new forms and methods of achieving political and strategic goals, as practiced by the United States and the West, reveals a fundamental change in the understanding of how foreign-induced regime change occurs. Whereas regime change had previously been defined by the large-scale military invasions, regime change today arises from indirect and asymmetrical methods of coercion. As Michael

Koffman points out in his article, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” the

United States has pioneered an indirect approach to warfare that not only employs subversion, propaganda, social media, and sanctions to wage war, but also featured

“...humanitarian interventions, the use of Western special forces, funding for democracy movements, and the deployment of mercenaries and proxies[...].”46 Gerasimov recognizes that the Russian state no longer faces a threat emanating solely from the

West’s ability to wage a conventional conflict, but from the aforementioned asymmetrical

46 Michael Kofman, "Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts," March 11, 2016, War on the Rocks, 7, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/. 21

elements that define modern conflict. As a result, Gerasimov posits that Russian military doctrine must focus on fostering its capabilities to counter asymmetrical and indirect threats. Given the diverse array of tools available to the West while engaged in modern conflict, the means required to counter these tools will be equally diverse and of a similar nature, resulting in the prominence “...of undeclared conventional forces, peacekeepers, special operators, Cossacks, private military companies, foreign legionnaires, biker gangs, Russian-sponsored NGOs, and cyber/propaganda warriors.”47

4. Political Warfare and the Kremlin’s Playbook

The insights presented by Gerasimov are neither original nor new. American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan, in the early days of the Cold War, provided a similar evaluation and observations regarding the current operational environment and nature of war. In a 1948 memo to the National Security Council, Kennan argues for the inauguration of what he terms political warfare, which he defines as “...the employment of all means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objective... Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures, and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.”48 Kennan, recognizing

47 Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” 33. 48 George F. Kennan, 'The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare' [Redacted Version],” April 30, 1948, Wilson Center, 1, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114320. 22

that the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States was neither a state of outright war nor that of absolute peace, argued that the U.S. ought to work to counter the style of warfare already mastered by the Soviets through their mix of Soviet ideology with Clausewitz’s classic realism.

Political warfare, however, continues to be a tactic available to the Russian state to accomplish political objective. In a report titled The Kremlin Playbook, the Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) documented contemporary Russian political warfare in Central and Eastern Europe. Termed the “Unvirtuous Cycle” by CSIS,

Russian political warfare was characterized by the creation of channels of influence within Eastern European nations in an effort to undermine Russia’s geopolitical opponents in Europe, specifically the European Union and NATO. This process begins with the political and or economic penetration of a state, from which an opaque network of patronage evolves and expands to accrue influence and control over critical institutions, bodies, and the economy.49 The successful incursion into these sectors allows for Russia to shape national policy and decisions, resulting in the “…erosion of governance standards and the credibility of democracy as a model of governance, which in some instances leads to ‘state capture.”50 The entirety of this process is fueled by corruption, which allows for the exploitation of a state’s resources and the blurring of lines between public- and private-sector interests. In gaining and exerting influence over businesses, individuals, or institutions, Russia is able to effectively control the actions of

49 Heather Conley, The Kremlin Playbook, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2016), 1, https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook. 50 Conley, The Kremlin Playbook. 23

a state by successfully dominating the domestic environment. This antagonistic influence is most prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe, whose weaker democratic traditions and institutions make these states more vulnerable to Russian influence.

5. Russian Foreign Policy

In his book, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Jeffery

Mankoff describes how one of the central dilemmas facing modern Russia is the

“...tension between a tradition of relying on the ability to project power abroad as a means of asserting influence and a desire to harness the forces of globalization and integration to create a more competitive, respected state.”51 Traditionally, Russia was a

Great Power—one of the handful of fully sovereign states whose interactions within the international system defined the nature of international politics. However, the nature of international politics changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the two superpowers in constant competition with one another in a bipolar world. The result was a new world order that rejected concepts like balance of power and spheres of influence.

Long the foundation of Russia’s geopolitical thinking, the rejection of a world based around great powers forced the nation-state to transpose itself into a system grounded in globalization and international structures of law and government.

51 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012): 11. 24

Mankoff further posits that Russian foreign policy has long been shaped by

Russia’s historical experience, culture, and geography.52 Constantly surrounded by enemies and lacking defensible borders, consolidation at home and expansion abroad were fundamental to securing itself against Tatars, Turks, Poles, Germans, or any other foreign aggressor.53 Russia established buffer zones between itself and rivals, creating spheres of influence to shield itself from foreign aggression. For example, Ukraine was utilized as a borderland against the Turks and Tatars for centuries, while Poland served in the same capacity against the Germans from the nineteenth century until the end of World

War II. The Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellite states, after falling under the Iron

Curtain during the Cold War, protected the Soviet Union from any possible Western aggression until its collapse in 1991. The principle of establishing buffer zones to secure the Russian nation-state instilled a need for expansion into the Russian psyche. The

American Minister to Imperial Russia in 1852, Neill S. Brown, noted in a dispatch that

“A strange superstition prevails among Russians, that they are predestined to conquer the world, and the prayers of the priests in the church are mingled with requests to hasten and consummate this ‘divine mission.’54 The expansionist imperative, and the intrinsic fear of the outside world that is ingrained in it, have been characteristic of the Russian mindset since the formation of the Russian state, and with each setback, Russia, again, reemerges to carry out its “divine mission.”55 British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, in

52 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 12. 53 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy. 54 Douglas Boyd, The Kremlin Conspiracy (Hersham: Ian Allan, 2010), 23. 55 Boyd, The Kremlin Conspiracy. 25

his analysis of Russian actions in the nineteenth century and before, stated that “The policy and the practice of the Russian government has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and far as the apathy or want of other governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it met with decided resistance and then to wait for the next favorable opportunity.”56

The collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 temporarily paused

Russia’s traditional foreign policy. The Russian Federation was a shadow of both the historical Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Its frontier shrunk to its seventeenth- century borders, while Soviet’s massive army collapsed with its armaments and manpower divided between various successor states.57 As a result, Russia was stripped of its great power status with the collapse of its empire and loss of puppet states. No longer feared by its neighbors and the larger international community, Russian geopolitical interests were increasingly ignored. The transformation of Russia’s international status was accompanied by domestic turmoil as well. The collapse of the authoritarian Soviet system caused the erosion of law and order within the country.

While crime surged throughout the country, a civil war broke out in Chechnya, further destabilizing the Russian state.

During this time, President Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev pursued a Western-oriented foreign policy that attempted to integrate the fledgling

56 Boyd, The Kremlin Conspiracy, 33. 57 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 3. 26

Russian state into the established liberal international order.58 Although the country’s leadership abandoned its Great Power status and the power it commanded internationally,

Kozyrev was able to assert its interests in post-Soviet areas through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other international institutions without undermining its relationships with the United states and its allies. In effect, Russia was able to balance its own immediate and limited interests with the expectations of the Western-dominated international system that was antagonistic to Russia’s traditional interests of expansion and security.

The post-war phase of international relations initiated by Boris Yeltsin and Andrei

Kozyrez ended with the NATO-led military action in Kosovo in 1999. Alexei G.

Arbatov, a Russian political scientist, argues that the U.S.-led campaign undermined the post-Cold War security infrastructure that was “...based on an enhanced role for the

United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe

(OSCE)” within the international system.59 This international system “...assumed strict conformity with the UN Charter, compliance with international law, respect for existing agreements between Russia and the West, and a partnership between Russia and

NATO.”60 The bombing campaign against Serbia had occurred without UN and OSCE approval and saw the employment of military force to resolve ethnic conflicts and problems in an effort to achieve the alliance’s interests. Arbatov argues that this

58 Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 1 (2001): 7, www.jstor.org/stable/826237. 59 Aleksej Georgievič Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya (Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, 2000), 1. 60 Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine. 27

perceived violation of international norms and the emerging security structure caused

Russia to reshape its foreign policy to mimic Western actions in Yugoslavia:

The main lesson learned is that the goal justifies the means. The use of force is the most efficient problem solver, if applied decisively and massively. Negotiations are of dubious value and are to be used as a cover for military action. Legality of state actions, observation of laws and legal procedures, and humanitarian suffering are of secondary significance relative to achieving the goal. Limiting one’s own troop casualties is worth imposing massive devastation and collateral fatalities on civilian populations. Foreign public opinion and the position of Western governments are to be discounted if Russian interests are at stake. A concentrated and controlled mass media campaign is the key to success.61

Yugoslavia forced Russia to reexamine its approach to relations with the West. Rather than striving for a genuine security and military partnership, certain Russian elites began to recognize NATO as the country’s primary defense concern.

These lessons most underpinned the foreign policy legacy left by Evgenii

Primakov on modern Russia. Serving as both the Russian Foreign Minister from 1996 to

1998 and Prime Minister of Russia from 1998 to 1999, Primakov posited that, rather than accepting a unipolar world organized by a singular global power, Russian foreign policy ought to strive for the achievement of a multipolar world organized into several concerts of great powers, including Russia, China, India, and the U.S., who manage their respective spheres of influence.62 Instead of confronting the United States directly,

Moscow should seek to counterbalance U.S. unilateral power with assistance from a concert of other great powers. Primakov envisioned Russian relations with the United

States as a zero-sum game, with each great power attempting to establish its own sphere

61 Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine, 21. 62 Eugene Rumer, “The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action,” June 2019, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/05/primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-inaction-pub-79254. 28

of influence at the expense of other competing powers.63 As such, Russia is required to insist on its primacy in the post-Soviet space, with efforts to integrate such regions into

Russia’s sphere of influence becoming a focal point in the nation’s foreign policy.

Furthermore, Russia must not only actively oppose the expansion of NATO, which continues to expand up to Russia’s sphere of influence, but also persistently “...weaken transatlantic institutions and the U.S.-led international order...” in an effort to transform it.64 Primakov’s ascension to the post of Foreign Minister was reflective of an emerging consensus concerning the Russian state’s identity and role within the new global system.

This identity was rooted in the notion that the state ought to occupy a leading role in economic and political life in Russia, and that the national interest of the Russian state ought to be measured in accordance to the well-being of the state rather than that of the people living under its rule.65 Power, thus, becomes the metric from which to judge the health of a state. Maximizing the power of the Russian state while minimizing the power of competing states in the international system became the central premise of Russian foreign policy under Primakov.

Although Russia’s current political and economic elites lack the nuance of

Primakov, who was able to strike a balance between international and national interests, many subscribe to Primakov’s vision of a multipolar world that recognizes Russia as a great power. Given the Russian Federation’s weak formal institutions and fluctuating

63 Ariel Cohen, The ‘Primakov Doctrine’: Russia’s Zero-Sum Game With the United States (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1997), 3, https://www.heritage.org/report/the-primakov-doctrine-russias-zero- sum-game-the-united-states. 64 Rumer, “The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action,” 4. 65 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 63. 29

political system, these elites are increasingly able to influence the foreign policy of the

Russian state.66 The presidencies of Yeltsin, Medvedev, and Putin failed to institutionalize any formal methods of regular foreign policy creation, resulting in a highly centralized governing apparatuses only accessible to a small number of elites directly connected to Russia’s ruling regime. With these elites seeking the reassertion of old foreign policy patterns, despite lacking a unified ideology and seeking to pursue different national interests, they coalesced around Russian President Vladimir Putin who led the Russian state on a more confrontational path. Emboldened by the rapid growth of

Russia’s economy, the Russian state helmed by Putin was able to assert its interests more forcefully on the international level.

Putin embodied the collective view and preferences favored of Russia’s elite, despite the appearance that he exerted complete and total control over the state’s foreign policy.67 However, the Putin regime strengthened the siloviki, who were former members of the Soviet KGB or a member of the various internal security forces descended from the KGB. Under Putin, who himself was a member of the KGB, the siloviki were not only appointed to various administrative positions within the Russian government, but were given control over lucrative economic sectors, like in the energy and media sectors.

The KGB had been considered to be a kind of intellectual elite, and that status was inherited by the various internal security organizations that succeeded it.68 The elites originating from the security forces not only shared the great power aspirations of their

66 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 53. 67 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 3. 68 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 58. 30

peers, but also emphasized the danger and threat that the expansion of NATO posed to

Russian national interests. As a result, the siloviki’s influence throughout the state and economy increased significantly, challenging the pragmatic and non-ideological approach of the foreign policy of Russia under Vladimir Putin.

III. Georgia

On August 7th, 2008, tens of thousands of Russian soldiers marched into Georgia.

The culmination of a period of declining relations between the two states, the Russo-

Georgian War lasted five days before a negotiated ceasefire brokered by the European

Union went into effect. This chapter examines the variety of elements and means employed by the Russian state leading up to and during the Russo-Georgian War against its southern neighbor. This study will first be conducted by describing the historical and political background of Georgia and its relations with Russia, as well as describing the timeline leading up to the outbreak of the conflict. Second, the study will seek to identify and describe the elements and means employed by the Russian state against Georgia.

1. Historical and Political Background

Georgia, roughly covering a territory of 69,700 square kilometers and having a population of approximately 4 million people, has long been the battlefield for warring empires. Located in a strategic transit corridor between the East and the West in the

Caucuses and separating the Caspian and Black Seas, Georgians were destined to be beholden to the historical powers which strove to control the region. Whether it be

Alexander the Great’s Seleucids, the Persian Empires, the Byzantines, Muslim Arabs and

Turkic Ottomans from the south, or ever-expanding Russian Empire to the north, Georgia 32

has been coveted and conquered by outsiders for millennia.69 Eventually absorbed by the

Russian Empire in the nineteenth century, it would remain part of the Russian sphere until 1917, when Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia formed the short-lived Transcaucus

Democratic Republic in an effort to stymie an Ottoman invasion into the Caucuses.

Sponsored by the Kaiser in Germany, Georgia declared independence from the union, forming its own republic helmed by the Menshevik government of Noe Jordania.70

Georgia’s existence as the Democratic Republic of Georgia was short-lived.

Bolshevik forces from the Soviet Union swiftly suppressed the republic, forcing its

Menshevik government into exile, purging whatever supporters who remained, and forcibly annexed the state.71 As a Soviet Republic, Georgia contained three autonomous territories: Adjara, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Adjara was an autonomy “...designed to accommodate ethnic Georgian Muslims, who were not a nationality at all, but a religion- based community” within Georgia.72 Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, were home to ethnically distinct minorities that enjoyed “...some manner of the Soviet-style official self-determining status... of the USSR...” which granted them autonomy from the

Georgian government.73 Given South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s close relationships with the Soviet state and the autonomy it brought, both regions feared that the collapse of the

69 Thomas Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise: Georgia's Descent into Chaos,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 11. 70 Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise,” 11. 71 Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise,” 13. 72 Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise,” 14. 73 Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise,” 16. 33

Soviet Union would result in the revocation of their special status and autonomy by the

Georgian government.74

On April 9th, 1991, Georgia declared its independence from the collapsing Soviet

Union. Georgian nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia rose to power, rallying support under the vision of a “Georgia for the Georgians.”75 Gamsakhurdia’s policies stripped

Georgia’s minorities of their autonomous status and attempted to subjugate the previously autonomous polities to the nationalist Georgian government. Gamsakhurdia’s nationalists fostered ethnic discord through the establishment of Georgian as the official language and the banning of the Ossetian “Popular Front” organization.76 The South

Ossetians and Abkhazians, who previously sought to remain a part of the Soviet Union and not the newly established Georgian state, resisted nationalist attempts in an effort to circumvent Georgian rule. This conflict would eventually culminate in the deployment of armed Georgian militias into South Ossetia and its capital of Tskhinvali, setting off the

South Ossetia War. The number of deaths in the ensuing violence is contested, with estimates ranging from only scores to over one thousand dead. While the South Ossetia

War was being raged, a different conflict was brewing in Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi. The nationalist Gamsakhurdia became increasingly viewed as a fascist, despot, and “nuts” in the words of U.S. President George W. Bush.77 An armed opposition, led by former

Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze, demanded Gamsakhurdia’s

74 Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise.” 75 Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise.” 76 Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise,” 18. 77 Goltz, “The Paradox of Living in Paradise,” 19. 34

resignation on December 22nd, forcing Gamsakhurdia into exile. This coup d’état sparked off the Georgian Civil War, which involved Gamsakhurdia loyalists combatting

Shevardnadze’s newly established government. Concurrent to these skirmishes, South

Ossetian and Abkhazian separatist, backed by Russian authorities, broke away from the

Georgian government in a bid to maintain their autonomy from the politically unstable

Georgian state. After three years of sporadic violence, Russia, Georgia, and South

Ossetia signed a ceasefire agreement to freeze the interethnic conflict, a status to be maintained by the presence of a Russian peacekeeping force in South Ossetia.

This peacekeeping agreement brought a decade of relative peace to Georgia, in addition to the quasi-domination of the Georgian state by Russia. During this decade,

Shevardnadze, who ascended to the presidency during the civil war, transformed the nation-state into one of the largest beneficiaries of per capita aid from the United States.

Shevardnadze, cognizant of the influence Russia exerted over Georgia, attempted to break free of its northern neighbor’s sphere. Shevardnadze surrounded himself with pro-

Western advisors, who helped facilitate the creation of pro-Western political structures parallel to the established Russian political and security apparatuses. For example, in

1999, Shevardnadze’s government enacted a bilateral military agreement with the United

States.78 A $64 million project, the Georgia Train and Equip Program also saw the deployment of 100-150 American advisors to Georgia. The program resulted in an

American military presence directly on Russia’s border, fostering tensions between

78 Thornike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 43. 35

Georgia and Russia. This program was part of a greater reorientation away from Russia by Georgia and towards the West. In 1999, the Shevardnadze government announced that it would close all Russian military bases located within Georgia’s territory. As part of this process, Georgia left the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty and began to prepare itself for rapprochement with NATO.

By 2003, Shevardnadze’s government had readily embraced a pro-Western political orientation without alienating either the Soviet elites still residing in Georgia or the Russian government. In the course of a balancing Western and Russian interests,

Shevardnadze’s government created a limited system of authoritarianism.79 Facilitated through informal mechanisms of corruption, Shevardnadze was able to act as a critical arbitrator between competing Russian and Western interests, allowing him to accumulate power for both him and his party, the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG). Within

Georgia’s political system, opponents of the CUG were allowed to create their own political parties, each with their own platforms and agendas. Eventually, these opposition parties, which were often both liberal and pro-Western, came to accrue more power than

Shevardnadze’s CUG. In a desperate attempt to maintain power, the November 2nd, 2003 elections were rigged, with large numbers of voters were turned away from the polls, ballot boxes were stuffed, and several precinct and district election commissions blatantly falsified results.80

79 Niklas Nilsson, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: The Break with the Past,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 85. 80 Nilsson, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution,” 87. 36

As the scale of Shevardnadze and the CUG’s election fraud became known, rallies were fostered in downtown Tbilisi in an effort to coerce Shevardnadze’s government to acknowledge the real election results. Eventually, these rallies grew in both size and scope, spreading throughout the country. When the Central Election

Commission announced that Shevardnadze’s coalition had won the elections on

November 20th, opposition protesters were infuriated. On November 23rd, as

Shevardnadze was delivering an opening speech to the newly convened parliament, opposition protesters stormed parliament with roses in their hands.81 These protests, known as the Rose Revolution, forced Shevardnadze to resign on January 4th, 2004.

Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of Georgia’s reformists, was subsequently elected

Georgia’s president as a result of the Rose Revolution.

2. Events Leading to Incursion

Saakashvili and his government put Georgia on a path to conflict with Russia.

Reform-oriented, Saakashvili’s government focused on economic liberalization, anticorruption, and institution building.82 Another key priority of Saakashvili was the reestablishment of Georgia’s sovereignty over both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose autonomous status was backed by the Russian state. Furthermore, Saakashvili sought membership in both NATO and the European Union, marketing the Rose Revolution as a

81 Nilsson, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution,” 88. 82 Nilsson, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution,” 89. 37

complete break from its historical, cultural, and strategic ties to Russia. In essence,

Georgia’s new government framed the nation-state’s future in the context of European security, in an effort to fully break away from Russia’s sphere of influence through the establishment of a strong Georgian state. Georgia’s western course was incompatible with the Russian government’s interests in the region, where it sought to exercise exclusive influence.83 Consequently, the Russian government began to coerce Georgia into moderating its territorial objectives. However, these efforts were largely unsuccessful, and Georgia maintained its objective of reintegrating South Ossetia and

Abkhazia. Shortly after the election of Saakashvili, Russian authorities enacted an energy blockade against Georgia, which would be expanded in March to include wine imports. On October 10th, 2006, the Russian Federation suspended “...postal, automobile, aviation, marine and railway connections with Georgia.”84 Deportations of Georgians from Russia followed, and the harassment of Georgians and Georgian businesses was encouraged within Russia. Russian authorities, furthermore, strengthened their control over both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

By 2008, tensions between Russia and Georgia had reached a tipping point. On

April 16th, 2008, President Vladimir Putin signed a presidential decree directing Russian state agencies to establish official ties with the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and

83 Brian J. Ellison, “Russian Grand Strategy in the South Ossetia War,” Demokratizatsiya 19, no. 4 (Fall 2011): 347, http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType =ip&db=edb&AN=79656447&site=eds-live&scope=site. 84 Thea Morrison, “A Chronology of Russian Embargoes on Georgia,” Georgia Today, June 24, 2019, 10, http://georgiatoday.ge/news/16199/A-Chronology-of-Russian-Embargoes-on-Georgia. 38

Abkhazia.85 This diplomatic act was viewed in Tbilisi as a step towards the recognition of the regions, or even as the first steps towards direct annexation. Tensions escalated between the two neighbors on April 20th, when a Georgian drone was shot down by a

Russian Mig-29 fighter place over Abkhazia.86 Shortly afterwards, the Russian government, claiming that Georgian forces were being deployed in mass on Abkhazia’s border, began to increase the number of peacekeepers and military equipment deployed to the region. On July 15th, Russian forces took part in the Kavkaz-2008 military exercises on the Russian-Georgian border. The exercises involved over 8,000 Russian soldiers, who remained in the area even after the conclusion of the exercises. Concurrent to these exercises, reporters from Moscow-based media outlets were flown into

Tskhinvali, South Ossetia’s capital, while hundreds of South Ossetians, primarily women and children, were evacuated out of the breakaway region’s capital.87

On August 7th, 2008, Georgian forces shelled Tskhinvali in a miscalculated attempt to protect its territory. In response, Russia launched an invasion of Georgia involving the 58th Army and its 80,000 servicemen.88 Outnumbered and unprepared for an invasion of that scale, the Georgian army was defeated by the Russian military, which successfully occupied half of the country in five days. A ceasefire, brokered by the

85 Johanna Popjanevski, “From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali: The Path to War in Georgia,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 145. 86 Popjanevski, “From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali,” 145. 87 Popjanevski, “From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali,” 149. 88 Pavel Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 163. 39

European Union, brought the conflict to a conclusion, but heavily favored Russia’s interests and destroyed Georgia’s aspirations towards joining NATO or the EU.

3. Hybrid Tactics Observed

A. Political Warfare

Russia’s incursion into Georgia began with a series of diplomatic and economic actions, the most prominent being the Russian government’s passport offensive. In

December 2000, the Russian government enacted visa requirements targeting Georgians working in Russia, specifically those who sent remittances home to their relatives.89 In theory, Russian authorities believed that they could force Georgia into bankruptcy and

Shevardnadze’s government to collapse. However, the entirety of this strategy was based on the incorrect assumption that millions of Georgians lived in Russia, when in reality only half a million Georgians resided in the country. Furthermore, authorities underestimated the willingness of corrupt local officials to make deals enabling

Georgians to stay in Russia.90 As a result, the visa law had only a moderate effect on

Georgia, though it did challenge Georgia’s territorial integrity. Visas were not required to move in or out of Georgia’s secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, treating them independent of the territory supposedly governing them.

89 Marcel H. Van Herpen, Putin’s War: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 644, https://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf. 90 Gordadze, “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s,” 45. 40

In December 2002, this diplomatic pressure became even more antagonistic when

Russian authorities began the wholesale distribution Russian passports to the inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By providing Russian passports to individuals in these breakaway republics, Russian authorities created Russian citizens where none had previously existed before.91 In bestowing citizenship in mass to a population recognized as living in Georgian territory, Russia could intervene in Georgia under the auspices of defending its newly minted citizens. While the proliferation and distribution of Russian passports was the most obvious component of Russia’s “passport offensive,” it was not the sole component. Abkhazia had also begun to issue its own passports to those living within its borders, allowing for upwards of 80% of the population to have both

Abkhazian and Russian citizenship.92 Russia’s passport offensive left Russian authorities with the option of either annexing breakaway republics or preserving their independence from Georgia.

In addition to the Russian government’s passport campaign, Russian authorities began an anti-Georgian campaign within their nation-state. Government officials, including President Putin, likened Georgia’s government and policies to that of the KGB during the reign of Joseph Stalin.93 With support from Russian government officials,

Georgian businesses within Russia were raided and illegal immigrants expelled. Moscow

91 Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism, 645. 92 Emil Aslan Souleimanov, Eduard Abrahamyan, and Huseyn Aliyev, “Unrecognized States as a Means of Coercive Diplomacy? Assessing the Role of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Russia’s Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus,” Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies 18, no. 1 (March 2018): 81, doi:10.1080/14683857.2017.1390830. 93 Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism, 650. 41

police went to local schools and demanded lists of students with Georgian names, while also sponsoring raids against Georgian migrants and traders.94

Russia’s policy on visas and passports was part of a greater and more cohesive political and economic campaign designed to keep Georgia within Russia’s sphere of influence. Economically, the Russian Federation launched a series of trade wars with

Georgia that eventually culminated in the Russian government embargoing all Georgian goods in 2005, with special emphasis placed on Georgia’s agricultural sector.95 At the time, Georgia’s agricultural sector was highly dependent on the Russian market and was significantly impaired by the sanctions as a result.96 On January 22nd, 2006, Russian economic coercion expanded to the energy sector.97 When the main gas pipeline into

Georgia from Russia exploded, the entirety of Georgia was left without power for days.

As a result, Georgia was forced to diversify its energy sector to meet its energy needs, eliminating Russia’s political leverage in the strategic economic area. In March 2006,

Russia expanded its embargo to include wine imports from Georgia, resulting in the loss of $153 million.98 Later that year, Russia would suspend all air, rail, and road traffic between the two countries, further placing a strain on the Georgian economy.

94 Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism, 651. 95 Lesia Dorosh, Olha Ivasechko, and Jaryna Turchyn, “Comparative Analysis of the Hybrid Tactics Application by the Russian Federation in Conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine,” Central European Journal of International & Security Studies 13, no. 2 (July 2019): 63, http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=tsh&AN=13 8302975&site=eds-live&scope=site. 96 Morrison, “A Chronology of Russian Embargoes on Georgia,” 5. 97 Morrison, “A Chronology of Russian Embargoes on Georgia.” 98 Morrison, “A Chronology of Russian Embargoes on Georgia,” 9. 42

B. Conventional

The most obvious component of Russia’s incursion into Georgia was its conventional invasion. Russia’s full-scale invasion sought to decimate and destroy the

Georgian state, a goal that required the mobilization of tens of thousands of Russian servicemen from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. By August 2008, from 25,000 to

30,000 ground troops were deployed to Georgia, supported by over 1,200 pieces of armor and artillery. Accompanying Russia’s ground forces in the invasion were 200 aircraft and 40 helicopters.99 Though not deployed directly to the conflict in Georgia, the crews of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Air Force, and logistics personnel brought the total force involved in Georgian operations to 40,000. This force was deployed in overwhelming numbers against Georgian forces, which numbered only 17,000 and lacked experienced officers. Leaving little to chance, Russia’s conventional forces overwhelmed Georgian troops through sheer volume, a strategy reminiscent of that employed in Chechnya.100

After Georgian forces shelled Tskhinvali and began moving further into South Ossetia,

Russian armed forces, supported by airstrikes and elements of the Black Sea Fleet, counterattacked. Penetrating deep into Georgia, Russian forces were able to drive towards Georgia’s capital of Tbilisi. At the same time, another front was opened in

99 Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War,” 175. 100 Lionel Beehner, Analyzing the Russian Way of War: Evidence from the 2008 Conflict with Georgia (West Point: Modern War Institute, 2018), 50, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct =true&AuthType=ip&db=cat02286a& AN=kent.b5819525&site=eds-live&scope=site. 43

eastern Georgia when Russian and Abkhaz forces launched a joint-offensive.101 Unable to properly respond to the Russian-Abkhazian incursion and withstand a two-front war,

Georgian forces were forced to surrender after five days of fighting.

The majority of Russian troops were moved into Georgia’s separatist regions under the cover of military exercises, specifically the Kavkaz-2008 exercises that occurred in the vicinity of South Ossetia.102 According to Georgia’s Ambassador to the

UN Alexander Lomaia, several thousand Russian troops were moved into South Ossetia via the Roki tunnel.103 Russian authorities, in an effort to conceal the scale of the troop movement into the area, purposefully underestimated the number of troops involved in the exercises, causing Georgian officials to believe they could defend against any Russian incursions related to the Kavkaz-2008 exercises. In Abkhazia, the movement of Russian troops was concealed under the guise of peacekeeping operations. Army, airborne, and naval forces moved into Abkhazia under the guise of supporting the already present

3,000-strong Russian peacekeeping operation.104 Part of the forces sent to support the peacekeeping mission were 400 railroad soldiers, who, since May, repaired critical railway infrastructure that would be required to mobilize the Russian military. In totality, the Russian troop movements into both South Ossetia and Abkhazia were obfuscated in a deliberate effort to conceal Russian intentions in the region.

101 Heidi Tagliavini, International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report. Volume I (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2009), 10, https://web.archive.org/web/2009100703013/http:/www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf. PDF. 102 Vicken Cheterian, “The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border Wars,” Central Asian Survey 28, no. 2 (June 2009): 163, doi:10.1080/02634930903056768. 103 Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War,” 163. 104 Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War,” 173. 44

The heavy reliance on Russian conventional forces during the operation revealed a number of significant flaws in the Russian military. First and foremost, the Russian military was largely a paper-tiger. According to Russia’s First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff General Nikolai Makarov, only 20% of the army was combat ready while the majority of the Russian armed forces’ divisions were comprised solely of officers without any men to lead.105 Many of these officers, furthermore, could not be expected to effectively lead soldiers in combat because they lacked experience. The

Russian forces, additionally, were issued with largely outdated equipment. Russian tanks and armored personal carriers often broke down, slowing the Russian advance. Russian aircraft, lacking modern equipment, were unable to conduct precise airstrikes or operate in bad weather, significantly hampering their utility. As the conflict in Georgia progressed, it became obvious that the two most serious deficiencies of Russia’s conventional force were its communication and command systems.106 Commanders of ground forces often were forced to rely on the use of cellular phones, which in turn relied on Georgian telephone providers to function, to communicate with not only the elements under their command but with one another as well. Many of the inexperienced commanders and soldiers of the Russian military often found themselves confused in the warzone and commonly refused to obey orders from their superiors. In totality, Russia’s conventional elements faced a plethora of deficiencies and mishaps, hampering their effectiveness and quality in the campaign.

105 Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War,” 167. 106 Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War.” 45

C. Irregular

Supporting Russian conventional forces were a variety of irregular forces. The most common of these irregular elements were the military and paramilitary forces mustered by both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Abkhazia raised a regular army, led and equipped by Russian officers and the Russian government respectively, of 10,000 soldiers and several hundred pieces of armor and artillery.107 Both Abkhazia and South

Ossetia also fielded militias, which comprised an additional 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers.

Also supplementing the large-scale deployment of separatist forces and militias were

Cossack volunteers and experienced Chechens, many of whom served in the Russia’s

Vostok Battalion—a special forces unit organized by GRU, the Russian foreign military intelligence agency. In the Georgian Civil War and related South Ossetian-Georgian conflict, these irregular forces were the primary opponents of Georgian forces. In the

Russia-Georgia War, irregular forces acted as both a vanguard and auxiliary to the main conventional Russian force.108 At the beginning of the conflict, irregular militias would be used to engage and draw out Georgian forces and then shift the responsibility of combat to Russian regular troops. Subsequently, irregular forces would support Russian forces in their future offenses, performing rear-guard duties and combatting Georgian forces whenever necessary. These irregular forces, furthermore, played a critical role in

107 Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War,” 173. 108 Felgenhauer, “After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War,” 162. 46

escalating the violence that occurred prior to official hostilities breaking out between

Russia and Georgia.

D. Information Warfare

Though not critical to Russia’s success in the war, the Russian government waged a robust and comprehensive information war before, during, and after the actual invasion of Georgia. Rather than attempting to destabilize the Georgian and government, this campaign sought to legitimize Russia’s own aggressive actions.109 Reflective of this goal, Russia’s information campaign centered around three major themes: that Georgian

President Saakashvili and the Georgian state “...was the aggressor, that Moscow had... no choice but to intervene in the defense of its citizens and their human rights... and... that the United States and NATO has no basis for criticizing Russian actions because of

NATO’s earlier actions in Kosovo...”110 Russia’s creation of a competing narrative was created and fostered through the plethora of resources available to the Russian state, including state-controlled media, general state apparatuses, and the presence of Moscow- based journalists on the ground. Days before the Georgian forces marched into South

Ossetia, forty-eight Russian journalists were based in Tbilisi to report on the conflict.111

Moscow’s state-controlled media was similarly prepared to report on the outbreak of

109 Dorosh, Ivasechko, and Turchyn, “Comparative Analysis of the Hybrid Tactics Application by the Russian Federation in Conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine,” 65. 110 Paul A. Goble, “Defining Victory and Defeat: The Information War Between Russian and Georgia,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 183. 111 Goble, “Defining Victory and Defeat,” 186. 47

armed violence in Georgia, having elaborate graphs prepared and strict talking points concerning the war. These talking points not only accused President Saakashvili of aggression, but the Georgian state of both genocide and ethnic cleansing. Though unintended, Russian broadcasts presented such a distorted view of reality that many domestic viewers turned to Western news sources in an effort to obtain a more accurate version of events.

Moscow’s information war in Georgia was waged with the intention of creating both misinformation and disinformation. Though misinformation, being the spread of knowingly false reports, was quickly identified and challenged, disinformation posed a different and more unique challenge. Disinformation occurs when carefully selected truths are mixed with falsehoods in order to create a plausible truth or reality, or one that is impossible to check or empirically reject. As a result, it becomes especially problematic once it becomes disseminated by a reliable media outlet, as the disinformation begins to gain credibility as it is used by these media outlets in good faith.112 The creation and proliferation of disinformation led the establishment of

Moscow’s competing narrative that held Georgia as the aggressor. This narrative, because of its dissemination by reliable media sources, came to dominate several

European countries, like Germany, whose policies reflected Georgia’s perceived malevolence.

The Russian state also employed a primitive cyber campaign in an effort to cripple the Georgian institutions. Organized via state-backed or state-employed

112 Goble, “Defining Victory and Defeat,” 190. 48

organizations, hackers engineered denial of service (DOS) attacks on Georgian government sites.113 These attacks, which began in July 2008, overloaded and effectively shut down Georgian websites by overloading their servers. One such site of DOS attacks was the website of the Georgian president, which was rendered inoperable for over 24 hours. After the invasion, Georgian websites came to be replaced with Russian propaganda, which included images of Saakashvili alongside the images of 20th century dictators. The likening of Saakashvili to the fascist and totalitarian leaders of the 20th century was a common motif in Russian propaganda at the time. In addition to the DOS attacks, internet traffic from Georgia was redirected to Russian firms, from whence future attacks would originate and be controlled. Additionally, Russian websites, like stopgeorgia.ru, made the software to launch a DOS attack on Georgia available on a public domain. In crippling Georgia’s internet infrastructure, the cyber-attacks isolated not only individual Georgians from their state but the Georgian state from the greater international community.114

4. Conclusion

When the Georgian state pursued policies that looked likely to fulfill its aspirations to join NATO and the European Union, it placed itself on a collision course

113 Michael Koffman, “Russian Performance in the Russo-Georgian War Revisited,” September 3, 2018, War on the Rocks, 29, https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/russian-performance-in-the-russo-georgian-war- revisited/. 114 Dorosh, Ivasechko, and Turchyn, “Comparative Analysis of the Hybrid Tactics Application by the Russian Federation in Conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine,” 63. 49

with the Russian Federation’s desire to secure its sphere of influence in the Caucasus.

Concerned with the expansion of NATO to its borders and the Georgian government’s adoption of a pro-Western political orientation, Russia sought to employ a variety of tactics leading up to and during the Russo-Georgian War. Rather than employing these tactics simultaneously in the manner prescribed by the proponents of hybrid warfare, the

Russian state engaged in a series of escalations that would eventually culminate in a conventional war. Russia first used political and economic means to coerce the Georgian state to enact pro-Russian policies. When these means failed to terminate Georgia’s westward motion, the Russian government laid the groundwork for a conventional military invasion. When this invasion was launched, Russian forces relied on both its superior firepower and sheer numbers to overwhelm Georgian defenses and occupy half the country in five days. Supplementing Russian regular forces were irregular elements comprised of separatist militias, Cossacks, and Chechens, who acted as auxiliaries to the regular Russian forces. During the war, the Russian government’s use of both political and conventional warfare, informational strategies were employed simultaneously to forward its own narrative.

IV. Ukraine

Following the Euromaidan protests and the resignation of Ukraine’s president in

2014, Russian soldiers lacking insignias seized strategic positions within Crimea. Shortly after the territory was annexed, pro-Russian demonstrations escalated into an armed and protracted conflict, eventually culminating in a Russian intervention. This chapter will examine the variety of elements and means employed by the Russian state leading up to and during both the annexation of Crimea and the War in Donbass. This study will first be conducted by elaborating on the historical and political background of Ukraine and its relations with Russia, as well as describing the timeline leading up to the outbreak of the conflict. Second, the study will seek to identify and describe the elements and means employed by the Russian state against Ukraine. The elements present in the annexation of Crimea and the War in Donbass will be identified in their own distinct and separate sections.

1. Historical Background

Since achieving independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has been a nation torn between East and West. The Eastern European country is home to 45 million people who, since the twelfth century, have been dominated and controlled by external 51

powers, including the Golden Horde, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the

Crimean Khanate. Since 1654, when the Cossack Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky swore allegiance to the Russian Czar in his uprising against the Polish Crown, Ukraine has been dominated by the Russian state. This dynamic created and perpetuated a unique relationship between the two nations. Both Russian and Ukraine “...share language;

Russian media are popular in Ukraine; there are family ties; many Ukrainians work in

Russia; and Russians have billions of dollars invested in Ukraine.”115 Ukraine was the birthplace of the region’s Orthodox religion, and the nation played an integral role in the

Russian Empire. Arguably, Ukraine was also the most important republic within the

USSR after Russia. Alongside Russia, Ukraine was one of the founding states of the

Soviet Union, “...where Ukrainian men were pivotal in the Soviet defeat of the German army in World War II.”116 With the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and Ukraine’s subsequent independence, this special relationship, though at times strained, continued.

With its newfound independence, the Ukrainian government under Leonid

Kravchuk initially attempted to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy, stressed its place within the European, rather than Eurasian community, and began reinstituting symbols associated with the post-World War One Ukrainian public.117 Although the government attempted to establish a new Ukraine free from Russian influence, it inherited from the

115 Krishnadev Calamur, “Why Ukraine Is Such A Big Deal For Russia,” February 21, 2014, NPR, 3, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/02/21/280684831/why-ukraine-is-such-a-big-deal-for-russia. 116 Calamur, “Why Ukraine Is Such A Big Deal For Russia,” 5. 117 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “Independent Ukraine,” by Lubomyr A. Hajda et al, last modified March 5, 2020, 3, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Independent-Ukraine. 52

Soviet Union a “... a legacy of state control and endemic corruption...,” which stalled many of the state’s attempts at democratization and Westernization.118

Poor relations with Russia, coupled with rampant corruption and economic difficulties, led to Leonid Kuchma winning the 1994 presidential election, replacing

Leonid Kravchuk. The results of the 1994 election revealed a deep political and cultural divide within Ukraine. Kuchma had won most of the Russophone regions of Eastern

Ukraine, which was mostly Russian speaking and of the Orthodox religion. In contrast,

Kravchuk had done particularly well in Western Ukraine, whose population spoke primarily Ukrainian, was increasingly nationalistic and distrustful of Russia, and whose

Church acknowledged the supremacy of the Roman Catholic Pope.119

Kuchma pursued a policy wherein Ukraine “...sought membership in NATO and the European Union while also pursuing closer relations with Russia,” which was a delicate balancing act with domestic and international consequences.120 As his presidency continued, Kuchma’s relationship would grow increasingly strained with the

West as his administration became mired in corruption scandals.121 Although he put

Ukraine on the paths for EU and NATO membership, his low popularity abroad forced

118 “The World Factbook: Ukraine,” February 1, 2018, Central Intelligence Agency, 1, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html. 119 William Schneider, “Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution,’” The Atlantic, December 14, 2004, 1, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/. 120 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “Independent Ukraine,” by Lubomyr A. Hajda et al, last modified March 5, 2020, 22, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Independent-Ukraine. 121 Oleksandr Sushko, “The International Implications of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” PONARS Policy Memo No. 356, November 2004, 4, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos- pdf/pm_0356.pdf. 53

Kuchma to turn to Russia for political and economic support, culminating in the formation of a joint economic space known as the Single Economic Space in 2003.122

In 2004, Ukraine’s trajectory changed significantly with the Orange Revolution.

In the 2004 presidential elections, Kuchma’s chosen successor and Russian President

Vladimir Putin’s preferred candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, defeated opposition leader

Viktor Yushchenko, who ran on an anticorruption, anti-cronyism, and pro-Western platform, in a run-off election. Much like the 1994 elections, the candidate’s supporters were divided into two camps: the nationalistic, Ukrainian-speaking western half of the nation-state voted for Yushchenko, who favored stronger ties to the West and Europe; and the Russophilic eastern half of Ukraine supported Yanukovych, the pro-Moscow candidate.123 However, in the run-off election, observers detected massive discrepancies.

According to the National Democratic Institute, observers reported nearly 1 million extra votes being cast in Yanukovych’s favor.124 As a result, Yushchenko’s supporters began mass protests, adopting the color orange as a symbol against Yanukovych. After two months of protests, the Ukrainian Supreme Court order a new election, bringing the pro-

West Yuschenko to power in Ukraine.

122 Sushko, “The International Implications of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” 4. 123 Schneider, “Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution,’” 5. 124 Schneider, “Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution,’” 6. 54

2. Events Leading to Incursions

In 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was elected president. The pro-Moscow candidate, who was ousted in the Orange Revolution, ascended to the presidency after President

Viktor Yushchenko’s governing coalition collapsed, due in part because of the dissent of his Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko. Under Yanukovych, Ukraine began to reorient itself towards Moscow. In exchange for a reduction in the price of imported Russian natural gas, “...Ukraine agreed to extend Russia’s lease of the port at Sevastopol.”125

Relations with Russia were further improved when Ukraine announced that it would officially no longer pursue NATO membership.126 At the same time, the rule of law deteriorated within the country. Yanukovych’s political enemies, like former Prime

Minister Tymoshenko and her interior minister, Yuri Lutsenko, were imprisoned as a result of politically motivated trials.127 Because of policies pursued by Yanukovych,

Ukraine’s pro-European trajectory was placed in danger.

By 2012, the European Union and Ukraine had negotiated a treaty to lower trade barriers, launch reforms to meet EU standards, and begin the mechanisms that could lead to Ukraine achieving membership with the EU. Known as the European Union

Association Agreement, the treaty was incredibly popular with students throughout the

125 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “Independent Ukraine,” by Lubomyr A. Hajda et al, last modified March 5, 2020, 27, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Independent-Ukraine. 126 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v. “Independent Ukraine,” by Lubomyr A. Hajda et al, last modified March 5, 2020, 27, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Independent-Ukraine. 127 Associated Press in Strausburg, “Yulia Tymoshenko Imprisonment 'Politically Motivated,” The Guardian, April 30, 2013, 1, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/yulia-tymoshenko-jailing- politically-motivated. 55

country, who viewed their future as being tied to European integration and the elimination of corruption.128 While under pressure from Russia, Yanukovych suspended negotiations regarding the association agreement on November 21st, 2013. In place of this agreement, Yanukovych accepted a Russian multibillion-dollar economic bailout package, signaling closer ties to Russia and the end of Ukraine’s pro-European trajectory.

The effects of Yanukovych’s policy reversal were immediate. The day that

Yanukovych announced the cessation of talks, several hundred activists gathered in

Kiev’s main square the Maiden square, to protest. On November 30th, after days of continuous protest, riot police, known as the Berkut, violently cracked down on the protestors who were camped out on the square.129 The images of police brutality against the peaceful demonstrators shocked and angered the nation. The following day, “...the protest had swelled to hundreds of thousands as people poured in from across the country...” to demand the resignation of Yanukovych, sparking the Euromaidan

Revolution.130 As months dragged on, and as violence developed into battles leaving scores killed, Yanukovych was forced to flee Kiev and a pro-Western government was formed. 131 A few days later, Russian troops began to surround Ukrainian bases in

Crimea, beginning a new phase of the crisis.

128 “Ukraine's Euromaiden Revolution,” June 2017, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 2, https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Ukraine_Euromaidan_CCP_ii.pdf. 129 “Ukraine's Euromaiden Revolution,” 6. 130 “Ukraine's Euromaiden Revolution,” 4. 131 “Ukraine's Euromaiden Revolution,” 8. 56

3. Political Warfare

In the wake of the Orange Revolution and Yanukovych’s initial defeat, the

Russian government under Vladimir Putin, began to influence and mobilize its nonmilitary means in order to guarantee Ukraine’s pro-Russian trajectory. These means included the use of economic and political assets in an effort to solidify and guarantee

Ukraine’s position within Russia’s sphere. Through the use of Gazprom, Russia’s state- owned global energy company, the Russian government was able to strike Ukraine at its will without the use of physical force. In both 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, leading to the eventual collapse of the Yuschenko government. Additionally,

Gazprom’s provision of gas supplies became an important bargaining chip between

Ukraine and Russia. When Yanukovych’s government in 2010 began pursuing pro-

Russian policies, Ukraine “...a 30% discount on gas prices and a reduction of the amount of gas that Ukraine was obligated to purchase.”132 The Russian state also emphasized the economic benefits that a positive relationship with Russia offered. When relations deteriorated under pro-Western regimes in Kiev, Putin’s government instructed Russian customs officials to intensify inspections of Ukrainian goods into the country, resulting in the flow of Ukrainian goods into Russia being effectively stopped without the use of embargoes or tariffs.

132 Jeffrey V. Dickey et al., “Russian Political Warfare: Origin, Evolution, and Application” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 214. 57

Since the turn of the century, the Russian government’s political influence over

Ukraine was solidified through the funding of pro-Russian political parties and leaders, the enhancement of the abilities of NGOs, and the strengthening of the Russian Orthodox

Church.133 Russian President Vladimir Putin gambled on the support of Yanukovych and his Party of Regions to facilitate pro-Russian policies in Ukraine. In return for Russian political support and $600 to $900 million in funding it brought, Yanukovych’s government pursued policies beneficial to the Russian state, including the adoption of

Russian as the official language of Ukraine, the allowance of dual citizenship, and the abandonment of Ukrainian rapprochement towards NATO.134 Non-governmental organizations promoted anti-Western and anti-democratic sentiment through the creation of political structures parallel to Western ones. Also, the Russian Orthodox Church promoted pro-Russian parties and Yanukovych specifically. The church publicly endorsed Yanukovych, politicizing their sermons to support his pro-Russian policies and using its finances to fund his campaign.135

133 Todd C. Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 8, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports /RR2237.html. 134 Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence, 215. 135 Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence, 211. 58

4. The Annexation of Crimea

A. Conventional

Russian conventional capabilities, with a huge boost in funding following the

Georgian War, played an important role in Russia’s incursion into Crimea, and Ukraine in general. Between 2010 and 2014, Russian defense spending rose significantly.

According to a report in Jane’s Defence Weekly, Russia’s military expenditure increased

92.3% during the aforementioned period. In nominal terms, Russian defense spending had reached $69.3 billion, a 18.4% increase from its defense expenditure of 58.2 billion the previous year.136 This increase in defense spending allowed for the Russian military to be modernized and brought up to par with its Western counterparts. Professional, well-trained contract soldiers began to exceed the number of conscripts, allowing Russia to conduct small to medium- scale military operations by employing these professional troops. Not only did Russia produce qualitatively improved personal, but the Russian government also created a new command and control system, modernized communication equipment, improved situational awareness, made mobility the focal point of its operations, and introduced precision weaponry to all branches of its armed forces.137 The increase in funding, coupled with the modernization of its military,

136 Craig Caffrey, “Russian Commits to 18% Budget Rise,” March 24, 2014, Jane’s 360, 1, https://www.janes.com/article/35911/russian-commits-to-18-budget-rise. 137 Anton Lavrov, Russian Military Reforms from Georgia to Syria (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018), 14, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs- public/publication/181106_RussiaSyria_WEB_v2.pdf?sM_hVtQ0qs4_TTU9rSTS_sDJJvcB.IPg. 59

allowed for Russia to challenge the West and its periphery that encroached upon its perceived sphere of influence.

This newly modernized and efficient Russian military played a critical role in

Russian operations in Crimea, threatening Ukraine and the West with a massed conventional attack, as well as its contract troops and special forces leading operations on the peninsula. Primarily a means to flex its military abilities to the West, snap exercises occurred along the border of Ukraine. Since he returned to the presidency in 2012,

Vladimir Putin had ordered several of such exercises to occur.138 However, these inspections were also used to disguise troop movements as well as to create a distraction near Ukrainian borders. In a RAND Corporation report titled Lessons from Russia’s

Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, it was noted that on February 26th, 2014,

“Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a snap inspection involving 150,000 troops from parts of the Central and Western District,” shifting Russian military forces throughout the county and moving special forces closer to Ukraine.139 On March 13th, another snap exercise was ordered, resulting on nearly 8,500 pieces of artillery and 1,500 paratroopers being deployed to the border.140 These snap exercises were supplemented by large-scale operations involving navy, air, and ground troops throughout the entirety

138 Steve Gutterman, “Putin Puts Troops in Western Russia on Alert in Drill,” Reuters, February 26, 2014, 3, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-military/putin-puts-troops-in-western-russia-on- alert-in-drill-idUSBREA1P0RW20140226. 139 Michael Kofman et al, Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), 8, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html. 140 Kathy Lally and Carol Morello, “Russian Troops Gathering at Ukraine Border for Exercises as Standoff Continues,” The Washington Post, March 13, 2014, 8, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian- troops-gathering-at-ukraine-border-for-exercises-as-standoff-continues/2014/03/13/39f42508-aaa1-11e3- adbc-888c8010c799_story.html. 60

of Russia during the crises. Given the massive troop movements that directed Russian forces to the border of Ukraine, these exercises raised the threat of the Russian government escalating the conflict via a conventional military invasion, as well as allowing for the sustained build-up of combat-ready troops in close proximity to the

Ukrainian border while obfuscating their movements in general.

These conventional forces, who enjoyed a significant boost in funding and whose movement into the region was obscured by large Russian military drills, were the primary actors in the annexation of Crimea. Russian KSO special forces, whose limited numbers were supplemented by elements from the Spetsnaz-GRU and marines from the 810th

Independent Naval Battalion based at the Black Sea Fleet base near Sevastopol, were the primary drivers of Russian actions within Crimea. According to the report Lessons from

Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, “...several units from the 810th

Independent Naval Infantry Brigade arrived in armored personal carriers in

[Sevastopol]...” after the city council appointed a Russian citizen as mayor.141 The conventional characteristics of Russian operations was exemplified again on February

27th, when a group of “...50 special-forces operators from the KSO unit pretending to be a local ‘self-defense militia’ seized the Crimean Parliament and raised a Russian flag over the building.”142 These forces, though limited in number, quickly diffused throughout Crimea, quickly seizing critical infrastructure and key roads in the peninsula.

141 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 52. 142 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 8. 61

These professional Russian soldiers subsequently erected checkpoints and roadblocks in their newly conquered territory, cementing their control over the territory.143

The Russian forces engaged in operations in Crimea lacked the heavy firepower required to engage in a prolonged conflict. As a result, Russian military elements

“...leverag[ed] mobility, speed of action, surprise, and capability...” to “...quickly seize control of the peninsula.”144 Equipped with high-maneuverable light utility vehicles and armored personal carriers, Russian forces used their mobility to surrounded and blockade a number of Ukrainian military facilities while facing little resistance from their garrisons.145 Following the successful proliferation of Russian professional troops through the peninsula, a conventional troop buildup of regular Russian forces occurred.

Beginning on March 6th, the Russian government ferried units of “...motor rifle brigades, towed artillery, a variety of air-defense units, and antiship missile batteries...” across the

Kerch straight into eastern Crimea to supplement the Russian forces already conducting operations there.146 At this point in Russian operations, the peninsula was largely under the control of Russian military elements.

With Ukrainian military bases on the peninsula encircled and besieged by Russian forces, Ukraine’s military presence in Crimea was effectively neutralized. With

Ukraine’s response to Russian actions unlikely to originate from troops on the peninsula, the recently arrived Russian regulars prepared for a Ukrainian counterattack to arrive

143 John Simpson, “Russia's Crimea Plan Detailed, Secret and Successful,” BBC, March 19, 2014, 3 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26644082. 144 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, xi. 145 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 9. 146 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 10. 62

from mainland Ukraine. Simultaneous to these defensive preparations, Ukraine’s navy stationed on Crimea came under attack by conventional Russian naval elements. A third of Ukraine’s warships were effectively blockaded in their in their port when “Russian forces... blocked their only exit point to the Black Sea by sinking two ageing vessels there...” while Russian missile cruisers patrolled the waters near the fleet.147 At the time, neither Ukrainian troops stationed on bases in Crimea nor the fleets docked there responded to Russian aggression with force. Without any immediate response by the

Ukrainian military to the aforementioned international transgressions, Russian conventional power proved crucial to the annexation of Crimea.

While the Russian forces deployed to Crimea were of a conventional nature, these elements employed a variety of unconventional tactics in order to establish authority over the peninsula. The most obvious manifestation of these irregular tactics was the sudden appearance of “little green men” or “polite people” in Crimea. Termed “little green men” or “polite people” by the media, these masked Russian soldiers wore green army uniforms lacking national or unit patches and were equipped with modern Russian weaponry.148 In interactions with the local population, Russian troops behaved in a professional manner and claimed to be local “self-defense” militias unaffiliated with the

Russian state or other external strata. These “little green men,” who hid their faces and

147 Andrew Osborn, “Ukraine Facing Loss of Its Navy as Russian Forces in Crimea Dig In,” Reuters, March 8, 2014, 2, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-naval-fleet/ukraine-facing-loss-of-its- navy-as-russian-forces-in-crimea-dig-in-idUSBREA270M920140308. 148 Oleg Manko and Yurii Mikhieiev, “Defining the Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Based on Analysis of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine,” Information & Security: An International Journal 41 (August 2018): 15, doi:10.11610/isij.4107. 63

lacked any official national affiliation, were employed in an attempt to obfuscate their relation to the Russian state and the nature of their actions.149

Another example of Russian conventional forces employing unconventional tactics can be found in their reliance on psychological warfare. Because of the limited deployment of Russian troops in the peninsula, the Russian state sought to cultivate defections from the Ukrainian Armed Forces in an attempt to supplement its limited invasion with indigenous manpower.150 Russian troops, consequently, limited their use of force in Crimea and instead “...applied psychological pressure, propaganda tactics, and promises...” of power, wealth, and promotion in an effort to coerce Ukrainian commanders and their units to defect.151 These tactics were especially effective on

Ukrainian security forces, such as the Berkut, who defected due to “combination of propaganda, pressure and financial incentives.”152 Additionally, several high profile

Ukrainian military commanders defected as well, such as the commander of the

Ukraine’s navy, Denis Berezovsky.153 Though some defections accompanied these military commanders, the overall number of defections amongst Ukrainian service members failed to provide a major and stable source of manpower for conventional operations in the manner originally envisioned by Russian military planners.154

149 Manko and Mikhieiev, “Defining the Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” 16. 150 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 26. 151 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 9. 152 Johann Schmid, “Hybrid Warfare on the Ukrainian Battlefield: Developing Theory Based on Empirical Evidence,” Journal on Baltic Security 5, no. 1 (2019): 9, doi:10.2478/jobs-2019-0001. 153 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 9. 154 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 27. 64

As it became apparent that Ukrainian forces stationed in Crimea would not respond to Russian operations with force, local pro-Russian militias were organized to supplement Russian troops either by Russian intelligence services or pro-Russian elements within Crimea.155 Although these auxiliaries varied in background, equipment, and organization, they always functioned to police the local populace. These irregulars included pro-Russian local militias, the Night Wolves motorcycle club, former members of the Berkut, Cossack paramilitaries, and the Chetnik Guards.156 Unlike the supposed

“self-defense” militias wearing modern Russian military uniforms and carrying advanced weaponry, these pro-Russian militias comprised of “...men often dressed in civilian clothes — though they are increasingly in surplus military camouflage — distinguished by black and orange ribbons or red armbands.”157 Driven by “... an affinity for Russia and a general disdain for Kiev’s revolutionary movement and its right-wing factions...,” these militias embraced the role of local citizens guards who performed police functions for Russian forces.158

155 “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Fort Bragg: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2015), 58, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=cat02286a&AN=kent.b5683867&si te=eds-live&scope=site. 156 “Little Green Men,” 44. 157 “'We Don't Want War Here': Pro-Russia Militias Patrol Crimea,” NBC News, March 5, 2014, 2, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/we-dont-want-war-here-pro-russia-militias-patrol- crimea-n45246. 158 “’We Don’t Want War Here’: Pro-Russian Militias Patrol Crimea,” 6. 65

B. Information Warfare

Prior to, during, and following Russian military operations in Crimea was an information campaign designed to generate domestic support and local acquiescence, while simultaneously creating plausible deniability at the international stage. Whereas

“The Russian media always maintained some coverage on events in Crimea for its own domestic public...,” their coverage of the peninsula intensified as violence grew between

Maidan protestors and pro-government forces in Kiev.159 Already the subject of an intense manipulation and disinformation campaign by the Russian state, the Euromaidan movement energized the Russian media, which began to push an anti-EU and anti-

Western narrative to its domestic audience.160 Following the ouster of President

Yanukovych, “...Russian media outlets and government officials began to disseminate the narrative that Yanukovych was forced out of power by Ukrainian fascists supported by the West.”161 In addition to attempting to discredit the new Ukrainian government, this narrative sought to emphasize the danger that ethnic Russians in Ukraine faced and displayed broad support for the return of Crimea back to Russia.162 This narrative was often forwarded by Russian political figures and elites, who called for a Russian intervention to protect said nationals in Crimea.163 In fostering the narrative that the new

159 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 12. 160 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations. 161 Fighting in the “Grey Zone”: Lessons from Russian Influence Operations in Ukraine, 1st sess, 2017 (115th Cong.), statement of Dr. Michael Carpenter, Senior Director, Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement, 4. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Carpenter_03-29-17.pdf. 162 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, xii. 163 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 13. 66

Maiden government is fascist and seeks to marginalize Ukraine’s Russian minority, the

Russian media and governing elites successfully justified their incursion into Crimea to the domestic Russian populace.

Crimea had long been a Russian media and cultural space, due in a large part to

Ukraine’s shared history with Russia and Crimea’s Russian ethnic majority. Russian television channels provide “...the main source of information for two-thirds of local residents.”164 When Russian forces stopped Crimea’s nine Ukrainian television channels from broadcasting on March 9th, those on the peninsula only had access to Russian televised media.165 For nearly two-thirds of the population, Russian television channels are the main source of information. At the time of its annexation, Crimea had 555

Russian-language schools compared to just six Ukrainian-language ones.166 When

Russian forces turned off the nine available Ukrainian television channels on March 9th, only access to Russian channels remained. As a result, the disinformation campaign and narrative creation occurring in Russia was occurring in Crimea simultaneously to an ethnic Russian population already oriented and supportive of Moscow. Without access to any other forms of non-Russian traditional media, the population of Crimea was constantly fed propaganda discrediting the new government in Kiev while Moscow was increasingly portrayed as messianic.

164 Wojciech Konończuk, “Russia's Real Aims in Crimea,” March 13, 2014, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27, https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/13/russia-s-real-aims-in-crimea-pub- 54914. 165 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, 13. 166 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations. 67

Complementing traditional media was both a grassroots movement and an online presence. Grassroots movements first emerged in Crimea to protest the actions of the

Maiden movement in Kiev, such as the Stop Maiden movement in Simferopol that

“...relied on visual outdoor ads...” to convey its anti-Maiden message.167 A majority of these anti-Maiden campaigns “...originated from the Russian-speaking population of

Crimea, although some alleged the Russian government... ” provided assistance to these pro-Russian movements in organizing protests in Crimea.168 These groups, through their use of advertising and petitioning, reinforced the Russian media narrative that the Maiden movement was fascist and posed a threat to Ukraine’s Russian minority.169 Online,

Kremlin-paid, pro-Russian agitators would spread disinformation on blogs, websites, or social media in a manner in which traditional media would conduct their disinformation campaign. These agitators claimed that Crimea always belonged to Russia, that Russian speakers need to be protected from Kiev’s fascists, and, after the annexation, that Crimea was never annexed but rightfully unified with Russia.170

One of the cornerstones of Russia’s information operations was the creation of plausible deniability. Throughout operations in Crimea, Russian troops maintained the bare minimum of deniability. At the operational level, the “little green men,” who were central to Crimean operations, removed their insignias and other identifying symbols

167 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 15. 168 Allison Quinn, “Why Moscow’s Anti-Maidan Protesters Are Putting on an Elaborate Pretence,” The Guardian, February 26, 2015, 2, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/russia-anti-maidan- protest-moscow. 169 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 15. 170Soňa Rusnáková, “Russian New Art of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine,” Slovak Journal of Political Sciences 17, no. 3-4 (October 1, 2017): 360, https://doi.org/10.1515/sjps-2017-0014. 68

from their uniforms and were ordered not to tell anyone their place of origin.171 These

Russian troops claimed to be local “self-defense” militias, denying any connection to the

Russian government. Russian government officials and elites, including Putin himself, denied the presence of Russian troops in Crimea as well. In a March 4th press conference, Putin not only publicly stated that there were no Russian troops present in

Crimea, in spite of the mounting evidence of their deployment, but also declared that

Russia had no plans to annex Crimea despite the ongoing events.172 Furthermore, Putin claimed that the snap military inspections, which masked troops movements and threatened both Ukraine and the West with an invasion, were not spurious but planned long beforehand.173 In creating plausible deniability, Russia obfuscates its involvement in the region. The resulting confusion in the international community commits them to inaction, allowing Russia to consolidate its gains and normalize the annexation of

Crimea.

Though not playing a decisive role in Crimea, Russia employed cyber technologies in its operations on the peninsula. In an effort to pressure besieged

Ukrainian troops, “...landline communications between the Ukrainian mainland and bases on Crimea” were severed and Russian forces employed ship-based cell phone jammers in order to mitigate contact with mainland Ukraine.174 Additionally, several instances of physical Russian attacks on cyber infrastructure were observed. For example,

171 Pierre Vaux, James Miller, and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Provocations, Proxies and Plausible Deniability,” The Interpreter, June 16, 2014, 5, http://www.interpretermag.com/provocations-proxies-and- plausible-deniability/. 172 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 14. 173 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 15. 174 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 10. 69

Urktelecom, the Ukrainian National Telecommunications Operator, experienced one of its office branches seized by armed men who proceeded to kinetically damage telecommunications cables present at the office.175 Also, Ukrainian government officials experienced cyber-attacks on their mobile communications originating from Crimea.176

Further cyber-attacks were launched on both governmental, departmental, bank servers, and military communications, disrupting the efficiency of the Ukrainian state.177

Although cyber-attacks did not play a pivotal role in Crimea, it is likely that the deployment of cyber techniques in Crimea accompanied more large-scale cyber operations occurring in Eastern Ukraine at the same time.

C. Criminality

After the initial covert and conventional phases of Crimean operations, the

Russian government mobilized criminal networks and its contacts as instruments of state policy. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Crimea and its cities were a center of criminal activity, acting as “...havens for smuggling, black marketeering, and a lucrative array of embezzlement schemes centering on the region's health spas and holiday resorts.”178 These Crimean criminal networks and their operations depended on their

175 Rusnáková, “Russian New Art of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine,” 361. 176 Rusnáková, “Russian New Art of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine.” 177 Manko and Mikhieiev, “Defining the Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Based on Analysis of Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine,” 17. 178 Mark Galeotti, “Crime And Crimea: Criminals As Allies And Agents,” RadioFreeEurope / RadioLiberty, April 23, 2019, 9, https://www.rferl.org/a/crimea-crime-criminals-as-agents- allies/26671923.html. 70

relations with Russian criminal networks, for “...dirty money was typically laundered through Russian banks and became all but untraceable for the Ukrainian police.”179 As protests against Yanukovych grew and his power subsequently waned, the Russian government reached out to potential clients among its contacts within Crimean criminal networks to mobilize their resources in support of its annexation of Crimea. As a result of this mobilization, Crimean criminal networks become instruments of Russian policy.180 The Kremlin’s appointed acting Prime Minister of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, was repeatedly connected to a cigarette-smuggling gang called “Salem” during the

1990s.181 Crimean parliament speaker, Vladimir Konstantinov, was persistently linked to organized crime groups and has been accused of fraud on numerous occasions.182 In addition to positions of leadership being filled by members of criminal networks, a portion of the Crimean “self-defense” forces were alleged to be manned by criminal gangs. According to an official of a local prosecutor, foot soldiers from rival criminal gangs joined together to strategic locations and erect checkpoints around the peninsula at

Moscow’s behest.183 Though crime and corruption have always been common to

Ukraine and Crimea, the criminal networks that perpetuated them were easily exploited by the Russian government to become instruments of state policy.

179 Galeotti, “Crime And Crimea,” 6. 180 Galeotti, “Crime And Crimea,” 7. 181 Galeotti, “Crime And Crimea,” 8. 182 Galeotti, “Crimea and Crimea,” 21. 183 Galeotti, “Crimea and Crimea,” 23. 71

5. War in Donbass

Concurrent to Russia’s military operations in Crimea were a series of protests in the Donbass region. When Ukraine began to crack down on these Donbass protestors in mid-April of 2014, Russia began to take a more active role in the brewing civil conflict, though still far from the direct, covert, and visible role it had in Crimea. Russia only intervened in the conflict in Donbass using conventional means at the end of May, when it became apparent that the pro-Russian separatist forces there were on the verge of collapse. This approach was successful in destabilizing the country and preventing the

Ukrainian government from asserting control over the wayward region. The War in

Donbass occurred in several distinct phases, each one of which involved a greater level of involvement by Russia in its efforts to achieve political goals and deserves to be examined in detail.

A. Political Warfare

Immediately after the Maidan protests forced Yanukovych to flee Ukraine, counter-protests began against the new pro-Western government in Kiev. On February

23rd, this new government “...voted to repeal the official status of the Russian language,” provoking fear and anger in the pro-Russian eastern half of the nation.184 Coupled with

Russia’s operations in Crimea, this measure “...encouraged the mobilization of both

184 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 20. 72

leftist and right-wing organizations in Eastern Ukraine” in opposition to Ukraine’s new

Western orientation and its immediate policy decisions.185 Initially, the protests gripping

Eastern Ukraine were both “...spontaneous and initiated by local populations.”186

Reflecting existing political divisions, a majority of these protesters were supporters of the ousted President Yanukovych and his political party, the Party of Regions, resulting in their collective dismay at his removal. With his ouster, many individuals felt anxiety that their political interests, which tended to be Russian-aligned, would no longer be pursued by the western-centric government in Kiev.

This collective anxiety culminated in a series of demonstrations throughout

Eastern Ukraine by unarmed pro-Russian protesters against the new government.187 In the city of Donetsk, one such protest escalated when a group of 100 protestors

“...[overran] a government building and proclaimed they have taken over the regional administration.”188 In Luhansk and Odessa, similar incidents occurred. A group of 400 protestors stormed the local administration building in Luhansk and hoisted a Russian flag atop the building.189 In Odessa, a group of 4,000 protestors skirmished with

Ukrainian nationalists, necessitating a police intervention to prevent an escalation between the two groups.190 As several commentators have recognized, the presence of

“...Russian military support for the installment of a Russian mayor in Sevastopol may

185 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 33. 186 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations. 187 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 34. 188 Oksana Grytsenko, “Pro-Russia Groups Take over Government Buildings across Ukraine,” The Guardian, March 3, 2014, 1, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/03/pro-russia-groups- government-buildings-ukraine. 189 Grytsenko, “Pro-Russia Groups Take over,” 5. 190 Grytsenko, “Pro-Russia Groups Take over,” 6. 73

have convinced these protestors they could have counted on Moscow’s backing,” resulting in their emboldened actions during this period.191 The calls for referendums that became common in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Odessa were attempts to pressure the government, in order to force the Ukrainian government to offer the concession of greater autonomy. The rise of the Maiden movement at the expense of the Yanukovych regime fueled feelings of disenfranchisement and resent amongst eastern Ukrainians, who increasingly viewed some level of autonomy or separation from Kiev as necessary.

Although the Russian government cannot claim responsibility for organizing the initial protests and displays of disdain for the new Western orientation, the Kremlin did assist in perpetuating them by further mobilizing the region’s anti-Western sentiments to its political advantage.192 In order perpetuate the protests in Eastern Ukraine and take advantage of the regions’ current circumstances, “Russia, together with vested Ukrainian oligarchs in the eastern regions, leveraged their influence to mobilize protests and advance those on the fringe of Ukraine’s politics.”193 Under Yanukovych and his predecessors, Ukrainian oligarchs informally exerted significant influence and control over regional politics within Ukraine. As a result of this influence, Ukrainian oligarchs had the ability to curb the threat of separatism as it emerged from Eastern Ukraine.

However, certain Ukrainian oligarchs, like Rinat Akhemtov and Oleksandr Yefremov, used the threat of separatism as a card in negotiations with Kiev’s new government to

191 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 35. 192 Schmid, “Hybrid Warfare on the Ukrainian Battlefield,” 10. 193 Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” 15. 74

preserve their own influence and authority, as well as playing into Russian interests in the event that Russia conducted operations similar to Crimea in the Donbass region.194

Much like local protestors, these oligarchs advocated for Kiev to delegate more authority to the regional governments, as well as giving these regional administrations greater control over finances in order to accrue more personal power.195 As a result, the agitations in Eastern Ukraine were tolerated by pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs, given the existing political divisions within the country. The Russian government sought to take advantage of these divisions by encouraging “...Russian citizens... to cross the border and participate...” in the unfolding events by traveling to Eastern Ukraine and protesting against the Maiden government.196 The Ukrainian government, in turn, accused the

Russian government of paying individuals cross the border and to partake in the agitations.197 As the threat of separatism continued to be fostered, Moscow sought to force Ukraine to federalize, which would effectively divide the country regionally and prevent Ukraine from moving in a western direction. This scheme would allow for power to be concentrated in the hands of regional governments and pro-Russian oligarchs with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.198

194 Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine's Oligarchs Accused of Double Dealing over Separatism,” Financial Times, April 15, 2014, 10, https://www.ft.com/content/76d548cc-c4a9-11e3-b2fb-00144feabdc0. 195 Olearchyk, “Ukraine's Oligarchs Accused of Double Dealing over Separatism,” 5. 196 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 34. 197 Andrew Roth, “From Russia, 'Tourists' Stir the Protests,” The New York Times, March 4, 2014, 3, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/europe/russias-hand-can-be-seen-in-the-protests.html. 198 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 36. 75

B. Irregular

The political warfare that characterized Russian activities in Eastern Ukraine transitioned into an insurgency when Ukraine arrested the separatist leaders who previously declared themselves governors and mayors of people’s republics and forcefully retook areas under the control of separatist demonstrators. Leading the aforementioned demonstrations were a variety of self-proclaimed “people’s mayors” and

“people’s governors.” While these individuals were undoubtably pro-Russian and anti-

Maiden, they were “...local and regional outsiders, adherents of extreme movements that exist on the margins of the political landscape.”199 The majority of these separatist leaders consisted of largely unknown individuals on the frisks of the separatist movement, or in essence, nobodies. Denis Pushilin sold shares in a pyramid scheme before becoming the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republics, while Vyacheslav

Ponomariov operated a soap factory prior to embracing the role of “people’s mayor” of

Slovyansk.200 At best, the original leaders of the separatist movement, men like Pushilin and Ponomariov, were “...local criminals, small businessmen, and ideological extremists colored by Russian nationalism...” who were universally poorly suited for the stewardship of the separatist movement in Ukraine.201

199 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations. 200 Griff Witte, “Pro-Russian Separatists in Eastern Ukraine Were 'Nobodies' - until Now,” The Washington Post, April 30, 2014, 17, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/pro-russian-separatists-in-eastern- ukraine-were-nobodies--until-now/2014/04/30/c504e687-cc7a-40c3-a8bb-7c1b9cf718ac_story.html. 201 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 37. 76

With the commencement of a crackdown by regional administrations against the pro-Russian movements in Eastern Ukraine, the “people’s mayors” and “people’s governors” were arrested and replaced. Their successors were better suited to leadership of the fledgling separatist movement as they were highly connected to Ukraine’s powerful oligarchs and their patronage systems that exerted influence in Ukraine. When

Yanukovych was forced out of office, the disgraced president and many of his associates fled to Russia, providing Moscow the opportunity to “...tap their patronage connections and business networks.”202 With the establishment of ties between Moscow and

Yanukovych’s existing patronage networks, the Russian state was able to facilitate the replacement of ousted “people’s mayors” and “people’s governors” with “...individuals with ties to Russian security services, military experience, and associations with business interests in Russia.”203 These new leaders of the separatist movement were no longer political outsiders but experienced militants with ties to Yanukovych, his patronage networks and Moscow, who effectively acted in accordance to Russian interests as

Yanukovych’s government had while in power.

The ascension of these individuals into roles of authority resulted in the establishment of an insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. This armed insurgency began and spread from April 6th to 23rd, when pro-Russian separatists “...employed groups of armed men to capture and hold the administration buildings...” previously lost to Ukrainian forces.204 Though it is unknown if the militias’ operations were coordinated with Russian

202 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations. 203 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 38. 204 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia's Operations, 39. 77

authorities, the militias were able to capture several regional administration buildings in

Eastern Ukraine. By mid-May, however, Russia employed its intelligence services to being coordinating the actions between the variety of actors and in the region.205 Russia, in addition to assisting with the coordination of separatist militias, supported local forces with detachments of “...paramilitaries, local recruits, and a unit of mercenaries, along with a good deal of defectors from Ukraine’s own security services.”206 At the time, the local forces of the separatist movement were predominately comprised of militias raised by local elites who strove to assure their own autonomy and interests. Though driven by the self-interested elite, the irregular warfare of this stage was also a product of Russian intelligence colluding with vested local interests and the Russian government supplying conventional equipment to Eastern Ukrainian militias.

C. Transitory Period

By the end of May, the irregular warfare had largely been abandoned by the

Russian state. In late April, the Ukrainian military, having reorganized and reintroduced mass conscription for men, mounted a serious campaign to isolate separatist strongholds in Eastern Ukraine. On May 2nd, Ukrainian government forces launched a successful offensive against separatist forces, seizing several cities and isolating Luhansk and

205 Rfe/rl, “Authorities Clear Occupied Kharkiv Building,” RadioFreeEurope / RadioLiberty, April 8, 2014, 11, https://www.rferl.org/a/kharkiv-operation-ukraine-terrorism-separatist-arrests/25324984.html. 206 Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” 17. 78

Donetsk from one another successfully.207 With it becoming clear to Russian authorities that the irregular forces deployed and supported by the Russian government were unable to resist the offensive by Ukrainian volunteers and a rejuvenated armed forces, Russia abandoned its dependence on irregular elements.208 In its place, Russia began a new phase of its intervention into Eastern Ukraine, characterized by the “...introduction of high-end conventional capabilities, and the intermixing of Russian units along with individual Russian soldiers among the separatist force.”209 As part of this new phase of operations, “mechanized equipment, armor, and advanced munitions...” began to be provided to Ukrainian separatists in mass by the Russian state. 210 The sophistication of certain weapon platforms, like that T-72B3 tanks and a variety of anti-air defenses, resulted in their operation by Russian units, which were attached to and deployed alongside irregular elements in a cohesive manner.211 Russian ground forces, as well, were deployed in a similar manner, intermingling with separatist militias to bolster their combat effectiveness.

The transition from irregular to conventional is most evident with the First Battle for the Donetsk Airport. During the battle, a large group of Russian “volunteers” arrived to reinforce the separatist militias in their siege of the airport, which recently fell to

Ukrainian paratroopers as part of the Ukrainian’s renewed offensive.212 These Russian

207 Roland Oliphant, “Ukrainian Troops Advance as pro-Russians Fight Back,” The Telegraph, May 4, 2014, 3, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10807529/Ukrainian-troops- advance-as-pro-Russians-fight-back.html. 208 Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” 17. 209 Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts.” 210 Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts.” 211 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 44. 212 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 43. 79

forces, who were deployed to support the separatist militias, were killed in a friendly fire incident by a separatist battalion, who mistook their Russian reinforcements as Ukrainian ones.213 The incident demonstrated the lack of efficient systems of communications that were inherent to the loosely-coordinated separatist militias who lacked a unified command structure, as well as the lack of coherent control that the Russian state had over the militias that Russian military elements were to support. While Russian elements increasingly intertwined and deployed alongside separatist forces, they failed to effectively coordinate in a successful manner due to the flawed structure unifying irregular elements, resulting in a largely ineffective response to the Ukrainian government’s successes.

D. Conventional

This transitional period would last only three months. The limited introduction of conventional elements alongside approach taken by Russia had failed to stem the

Ukrainian offensive, with the situation in Eastern Ukraine becoming critical for separatists as the Ukrainian military came closer to reasserting control the region.214

Despite the limited presence of Russian units and military systems, the Ukrainian army leveraged its numbers of manpower, artillery, and air power to launch a series of siege

213 Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” 22. 214 Woo Pyung Kyun, “The Russian Hybrid War in the Ukraine Crisis: Some Characteristics and Implications,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 27, no. 3 (2015): 392, http://search.ebscohost.com .proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=edskis&AN=kis3349183&site=edslive &scope=site. 80

campaigns, successfully encircling and destroying separatist strongpoints throughout

Eastern Ukraine. Though seeking to avoid a traditional conflict, a conventional invasion of Russian forces occurred in August 2014 to prevent the separatists from collapsing in the wake of continually successful Ukrainian offensive.215 An estimated 4,000 regular

Russian soldiers began to cross into separatist controlled areas with limited political and territorial objectives.216 At the Battle of Ilovaisk, Russian troops, backed by modern tanks and artillery, seized the central railyard at Ilovaisk in order to preserve the Russian logistical network that provided separatists forces with Russian aid, encircling and destroying a contingent of the Ukrainian military in the process. 217 Further offensives followed the Battle of Ilovaisk, with Russian conventional forces supported by separatist militias retaking territory that was previously lost in the Ukrainian offensive.

Russia’s conventional invasion resulted in the signing of the Minsk I ceasefire in early September, though sporadic shelling and combat continued.218 The lull in the fighting gave both Russian and Ukrainian forces time to rearm, train, and consolidate their gains. The ceasefire also provided the Russian military the opportunity to more rigorously equip and train the irregular elements that comprised of the separatist militias, with the intent of creating a more conventional and capable fighting force in the region.219 On January 13th, 2015, pro-Russian forces launched a second offensive against

215 Koffman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” 23. 216 Lucian Kim, “The Battle of Ilovaisk: Details of a Massacre Inside Rebel-Held Eastern Ukraine,” Newsweek, March 4, 2016, 41, https://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/battle-ilovaisk-details-massacre- inside-rebel-held-eastern-ukraine-282003.html. 217 Kim, “The Battle of Ilovaisk,” 38. 218 Kristian Åtland, “Destined for Deadlock? Russia, Ukraine, and the Unfulfilled Minsk Agreements,” Post-Soviet Affairs 36, no. 2 (2020): 130, doi:10.1080/1060586X.2020.1720443. 219 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 58. 81

entrenched Ukrainian forces. At Debaltseve, much like Ilovaisk, Ukrainian forces were encircled and defeated by pro-Russian armored columns and motorized troops. Ukraine, again, was forced to sign another ceasefire agreement, Minsk II, which resulted in terms highly favorable to Moscow’s interests. Minsk II obliged Ukraine to “...grant the separatist regions special status, amend its constitution for greater decentralization, and reintegrate them,” effectively denying Ukraine a path to both NATO and the EU.220

While Ukraine has slowly adopted some of the measures specified by the Minsk II agreements, fighting in Ukraine has not ceased. Since the beginning of the conflict, over

20 ceasefires have been signed, with each one being equally unsuccessful and used to the advantage of both Ukraine and Russia to rearm and consolidate their respective forces.

As of October of 2019, the conflict had reached a stalemate, with Russian-backed separatist forces and the Ukrainian military continuing to combat one another.

E. Information Warfare

Similar to Crimea, the Russian state waged an information campaign, accompanied by several cyberattacks, designed to generate domestic support and local acquiescence during Russia’s operations in Eastern Ukraine, while creating plausible deniability at the international stage. Like in Crimea, technology played a distinct, but not critical, role in Russia’s operations in Eastern Crimea. Denial of service attacks, or

DDoS attacks, were, and continue to be, common in Ukraine. Prior to the ouster of

220 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 63. 82

Yanukovych, DDoS attacks occurred on Euromaidan websites and domains, crippling their organizational abilities during the opening stage of the Euromaidan revolution. As recent as February of 2019, Russia was accused of launching cyberattacks in an effort to disrupt Ukraine’s presidential elections.221

In addition to cyber-attacks, social media became the medium not only by which the Russian state conveyed its propaganda but created and fostered a narrative which competed with the predominant Western one. The most popular social media platforms in Ukraine are VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, both of which are hosted on Russian servers.222 Prior to the conflict in Ukraine, “...as many as 67 percent of Ukrainian social media users had active VKontakte accounts, 54 percent had Odnoklassniki accounts, and

43 percent Facebook accounts.”223 Given that these platforms were hosted on Russian domains, Russian authorities had the ability to censor pro-Maiden pages and reveal the personal information of those who had interacted with the pages.224 Furthermore, social media platforms were used as “...a tool for soliciting contributions and recruiting...” for separatists in eastern Ukraine.225 As well, such platforms were deployed to capture and distribute the activities of Russian separatists, popularizing the violence of pro-Russian militias while also capturing “...the activities of the separatists [and] the Russian equipment being provided to them.”226

221 Sean Lyngaas, “Ukraine's President Accuses Russia of Launching Cyberattack against Election Commission,” CyberScoop, February 26, 2019, 1, https://www.cyberscoop.com/ukraines-president- accuses-russia-launching-cyberattack-election-commission/. 222 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 50. 223 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations. 224 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations. 225 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 51. 226 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations. 83

One important element of Russia’s information warfare was the use and popularization of the term Novorossiya.227 Novorossiya was a term which previously referred to a stretch of the Russian Empire that occupied what is today Southern and

Eastern Ukraine and is predominately Russian speaking.228 Though is contemporary usage was previously limited to those on the fringes of Russian politics, Putin and the

Russian government adopted the term as their own as leverage in the greater conflict, referring to the breakaway republics of Luhansk and Donetsk as Novorossiya. In the

West, its usage “...implied that the Russia intended to dismember Ukraine in pursuit of a larger irredentist cause” if it left Russia’s sphere of influence.229 Furthermore, the term

Novorossiya carried with it historical connotations that appealed to nationalists who longed for reunification of ethnic Russians separated by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In addition to its historical overtones, the term provided some legitimacy and justification to both the separatists’ claims and the Russian intervention. The concept of Novorossiya provided a just cause from which separatist leaders and Russian “volunteers” could be unified behind. In May 2014, the Luhansk and Donetsk republics joined together to form the Confederation of Novorossiya.230 Though the term soon fell out of favor of Russian authorities, the concept of Novorossiya still played an important role in unifying the loosely affiliated separatist militias behind the common ideology.

227 Ioana-Nelia Bercean, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” Online Journal Modelling the New Europe, no. 21 (December 2016): 162,http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true &AuthType=ip&db=poh&AN=121421008&site=eds-live&scope=site. 228 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 51. 229 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations, 52. 230 Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations. 84

Like in Crimea, one of the cornerstones of Russia’s information operations was the creation of plausible deniability. Given that Russia deployed its forces in Eastern

Ukraine with only limited political and territorial objective, Russia was able to avoid an overt and undeniable invasion. However, as Russia’s presence continued to grow in

Eastern Ukraine, it became nearly impossible to hide the scale of their involvement in the conflict. Despite overwhelming evidence put forward by NATO and Ukrainian authorities, the Russian government continued to quickly explain away or dismiss reports of Russian elements in Ukraine.231 Even when Russia’s conventional forces were deployed in mass to counter Ukraine’s successful offensive, Russian military and political leadership continued to deny their involvement.232 Much like in Crimea, the denial of operations contributes to a purposefully created atmosphere of confusion and disinformation.233 In creating this atmosphere, Russia obfuscates its involvement in the region. The resulting confusion in the international community commits them to inaction, allowing Russia to consolidate separatist gains in the Eastern Ukraine, as well as to continue to deploy it forces in a limited manner without repercussion for is actions.

231 Roger N. McDermott, Brothers Disunited: Russia’s Use of Military Power in Ukraine (Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), 26. 232 Bercean, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” 162. 233 McDermott, Brothers Disunited, 28. 85

6. Conclusion

Following the Euromaidan Revolution and the ouster of Ukraine’s pro-Russian

President Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Western government based in Kiev challenged the

Kremlin’s influence and supremacy over the state. Threatened by the possibility of

NATO expanding to Russian borders, the Russian government took advantage of the political instability and general weakness of the Ukrainian state to seize the strategic

Crimean Peninsula. As pro-Russian separatist movements emerged in Eastern Ukraine and developed into armed insurgencies, the Russian government began to support these movements in order to further destabilize the region. Both the annexation of Crimea and

War in Donbass were typified by Russia’s exploitation of the circumstances, providing the Kremlin with the opportunity to further destabilize the Ukrainian state. In doing so,

Russia effectively prevented Ukraine from leaving its sphere of influence.

Like in Georgia, Russia’s use of hybrid tactics in Ukraine was not simultaneous and synchronized with one another. Rather, Russia employed a series of escalating phases each of which was characterized by the reliance on a different tactic. In the

Donbass region, Russia’s escalating phases began as political warfare, transitioning to irregular warfare, and finally culminating in a conventional military invasion. While each phase of Russia’s incursion introduced new components to the intervention, an overarching disinformation campaign was observed in each phase. In the case of Crimea, however, Russia’s annexation of Crimea was a conventional military operation by

Russian regulars who employed unconventional tactics. After the conventional 86

operation, criminal networks and irregular elements were mobilized in order to normalize and solidify Russian influence over the peninsula, with a sophisticated information campaign being waged to justify Russia’s actions for its domestic population and obfuscating its actions at the international level.

V. Bulgaria

Following the worldwide recession of 2008 and 2009, Bulgaria became the poorest country in the European Union. In desperate need for foreign investment,

Bulgaria welcomed Russian investment with open arms in an effort to stimulate its economy. With Russian investment came Russian influence, eventually culminating in

Bulgaria experiencing a level of state capture.234 This chapter will examine the variety of elements and means employed by the Russian state during and after Bulgaria’s financial crises. This chapter will first describe the historical and political background of Bulgaria and its relations with Russia, as well as recount the events leading up to Russia’s incursion of the state. Second, this chapter will seek to identify and describe the elements and means employed by the Russian state against Bulgaria.

1. Historical Background

Bulgaria is a Slavic, Orthodox nation which has traditionally had strong historical, cultural, and economic ties with Russia. The two nations share a common heritage, both using the Cyrillic alphabet and practicing Eastern Orthodox religion, in addition to sharing the title of tsar to describe the respective nation’s emperor. The

234 Conley, The Kremlin Playbook, 44. 88

creation of formal ties between Bulgaria and Russia can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when the Russian Empire aided the Slavic, Orthodox nations of the Balkans against the Ottoman Empire. Bulgarian support for the Russian Empire during the

Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 would lead to the creation of a de-facto Bulgarian sovereignty, from which the foundations of the modern Bulgarian state would be expanded upon.235 Although an independent Bulgarian state would distance itself from the Russian Empire after the rule of several Germanophile governments during the twentieth century, its alignment with the Axis powers during the Second World War would result in the toppling of the pro-German government and the instillation of a

Soviet-aligned regime.236

During the Cold War, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union enjoyed the strengthening of relations with one another. Bulgaria, as a communist state ideologically aligned with the

Soviet Union, had an economic system which was both centralized and planned in a similar vein to the Soviet model. However, the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 90’s resulted in the nation undertaking “…significant structural economic reforms…” to create a “…more liberal, market driven economy.”237 These reforms included the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the liberalization of trade, and the strengthening of the tax system. While these policies would initially result in the nation-state facing some economic hardships, this liberalization process “…later helped to attract investment, spur

235 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v “Bulgaria,” by Francis William Carter and Loring Danforth. Last modified February 24, 2020, 10, http://www.britannica.com/place/Bulgaria/The-national-revival. 236 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v “Bulgaria,” by Francis William Carter and Loring Danforth. Last modified February 24, 2020, 21, http://www.britannica.com/place/Bulgaria/The-national-revival. 237 “The World Factbook: Bulgaria,” February 1, 2018, Central Intelligence Agency, February 1, 2018, 6, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bu.html. 89

growth, and make gradual improvements to living conditions.”238 These successful economic policies would lead to high GDP growth during the 2000’s, with the GDP increasing an average of 6% every year.239 This economic achievement allowed Bulgaria to join the European Union in 2007, although several policy issues have resulted in

Bulgaria not being able to join the Eurozone.

Underlying Bulgaria’s open economy and strong market growth, the Bulgarian economy has faced a variety of problems which became most obvious in the aftermath of the worldwide recession of 2008 and 2009. The recession marked a reversal of

Bulgaria’s liberalization process and slowed the state’s economic growth. As a result,

Bulgaria became the poorest nation in the European Union, with the average wage being

$3.80 an hour and average monthly salaries totaling only $390.240 The country’s GDP sits at $151.5 billion, which is only 47% of the EU average.241 To reach the EU average, the World Bank reports that Bulgaria would need to average a 4% GDP growth for the next 25 years. As it stands, Bulgaria currently only has a GDP growth of 3.6%, which is the result of domestic consumption and the absorption of EU funds which drive the

Bulgarian economy. For Russia, the economic stagnation and related recession provided the opportunity for Russian economic and political incursion.

238 “The World Factbook: Bulgaria,” 7. 239 “The World Factbook: Bulgaria.” 240 “Bulgaria's Economy: In a Rough Region,” The Economist, July 7, 2012, 4, https://www.economist.com/europe/2012/07/07/in-a-rough-region. 241 Nicholas Tenzer, “How Long Can Bulgaria Keep Facing Both East and West?” EUobserver, August 15, 2018, 8, https://www.euobserver.com/opinion/142574. 90

2. Hybrid Tactics Observed

A. Economic Warfare

Russian influence in Bulgaria takes the form of the domination and abuse of the state’s strategic sectors conducted via strategic investments. These strategic investments can be measured through the Russia’s economic footprint, which indicates the totality of

Russian-owned or controlled business in the overall economy.242 Russia’s economic footprint in Bulgaria is the largest in Europe, contributing 27% of the state’s GDP and controls the entire Bulgarian energy sector.243 While this economic footprint has declined in recent years due to oil prices, EU sanctions on Russia, and Russian countersanctions, Russia still dominates and is the sole provider of most of Bulgaria’s energy. Russia’s state-owned Gazprom is the sole natural gas provider in Bulgaria, providing 97% of Bulgaria’s gas needs and owns 50% of the country’s retail gas distribution company, Overgaz.244 As a result of Bulgaria being dependent on Russian oil and gas, a powerful political and business lobby exists within Bulgaria that advocates for energy projects that disproportionately favor Russia.

Furthermore, Bulgaria is entirely dependent upon Russia for the production of nuclear energy. Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear company, and its subsidiaries, have a monopoly on nuclear energy, responsible for both supplying fuel for Bulgaria’s

242 Conley, The Kremlin Playbook, XVIII. 243 Conley, The Kremlin Playbook, 44. 244 Conley, The Kremlin Playbook, 45. 91

reactors and disposing of the waste produced by them. Bulgaria is fully dependent on

Russia for nuclear fuel, which Rosatom provides and also ships spent fuel back to Russia for processing. The Russian-owned nuclear company, thus, produces 34% of the country’s electricity and 30 percent of the total final energy consumption.245 Lukoil,

Russia’s privately-owned oil major, fully controls Bulgaria’s sole oil refinery and 5% of the wholesale fuel market within the country. Additionally, Lukoil is the largest company in the state, making $3.3 billion in revenue and, as a result, is the largest taxpayer in the nation, indirectly controlling one-quarter of all budget revenue.246 In addition to Russia’s described domination of the Bulgarian energy sector, Russian foreign direct investment, or FDI, is concentrated in other key sectors other than energy.

Increasing fourfold since 2004, Russian FDI is focused in strategic sectors such as finance, telecommunications, real estate, and the media.247 Due to this investment and domination of Bulgaria’s energy sector, Russia has accrued a considerable amount of influence over the Bulgarian economy.

To maintain this economic dominance, Russian networks collude with government officials and oligarchs who change the course of governance to meet Russian interests. Operating via an opaque network of relationships, this influence is manifested through:

…the management of state-owned companies, the large energy infrastructure projects, the distribution of public procurement contracts, the approval process of mergers and acquisitions, the circumvention of EU law through legal changes, and the exploitation of corporate governance loopholes to block policy initiatives against Russian corporate and strategic interests.248

245 Conley, The Kremlin Playbook. 246 Conley, The Kremlin Playbook. 247 Conley, The Kremlin Playbook. 248 Conley, The Kremlin Playbook. 92

By gaining considerable influence over Bulgaria’s economy, Russia is able to use this dominant position to strengthen its relationships and cultivate new ones with corrupt businessmen and local oligarchs. These businessmen and oligarchs, accordingly, “…are linked to prominent politicians over whom they exert considerable control.”249 These politicians create deals with pro-Russian businessman and oligarchs which benefit both them and the politicians by increasing their power in the corrupt networks. From this relationship, Russia is able to then influence both Bulgarian norms of governance and even the government in order to align Bulgarian interests with Russian ones.

One of the largest problems fueling Bulgaria’s incursion is the systemic corruption rampant throughout the country. According to Transparency International,

Bulgaria is one of the most corrupt nations in Europe.250 Corrupt practices are deeply ingrained within Bulgarian culture, with “…more than one in five Bulgarian adults report having taken part in a corrupt transaction.”251 Its judiciary is far from independent and, as a result, rarely prosecutes individuals and officials who are involved in these illegal practices. Bulgaria’s rampant graft and failing judiciary are stalling the nation’s economic progress and scaring off foreign investors, who view Bulgarian society as being defined by a sense of pervasive lawlessness and impunity.252 As a result, the

Bulgarian economy is defined by its low productivity and an urgent need for greater

249 Conley, The Kremlin Playbook, 46. 250 Silvia Amaro, “Amid Brexit and Rising Populism - There's a European Country That's Still Desperate to Join the Euro,” CNBC, April 23, 2018, 20, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/23/bulgaria-the-european- country-still-hoping-to-join-the-euro.html. 251 Tenzer, “How Long Can Bulgaria Keep Facing Both East and West?,” 12. 252 Tenzer, “How Long Can Bulgaria Keep Facing Both East and West?,” 18. 93

foreign investment in an effort to spur economic growth. Russia has been increasingly able to meet this demand by investing heavily in into the nation, which Bulgaria has accepted willingly as a means to stimulate its struggling economy.

Similar phenomenon is observed in Bulgaria’s defense sector. While Bulgaria committed to modernizing its military prior to becoming a NATO member in 2004, very few improvements have been made and very few new capabilities have been procured for its armed forces.253 Bulgaria still primarily relies on Soviet era equipment and weapons, with attempts at procuring modern Western equipment often being stalled. For example,

Bulgaria’s air force has long attempted to acquire new fighter jets, specifically American- made F-16 fighters or Swedish Grippens. However, procedures that would facilitate the acquisition of these planes fell apart, largely as a result of the suspicion that lobbyists had promoted an offer that was not in Bulgaria’s interests.254 As a result, Bulgaria’s government agreed to return its Soviet-era MiG-29 to Russia for repairs. This cost of repairs, coupled with transportation, is considered by experts to be approximate to the costs of procuring planes.

B. Information Warfare

Pro-Russian media outlets in Bulgaria have played a critical role in facilitating the proliferation of Russian economic and political influence. These media outlets would

253 Hadjitodorov and Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power,” 34. 254 Hadjitodorov and Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power,” 16. 94

advocate for Russian economic projects, claiming that Russian investments in the country would result in the creation of jobs in Bulgaria. When projects failed, the pro-Russian media outlets would subsequently blame the European Union. The pro-Russian media also was instrumental in dismantling any agreements attempting to modernize Bulgaria’s media. For example, these outlets successfully convinced some segments of Bulgaria’s population that the procurement of new aircraft would be a mistake. These outlets were a traditional source of influence over a domestic population whose effectiveness was enhanced by misinformation and disinformation.255

This information campaign is not limited to economic measures, and the information distributed was successful in raising domestic political opposition to the EU and NATO. Pro-Russian political parties, like the nationalist party of Ataka, promoted a variety of Euro-skeptic and anti-NATO policies beneficial to the Russian state.

Additionally, the Bulgarian National Union “Shipka” epitomizes the ability of Russia’s information campaign to mobilize a population. The supposedly self-organized group, formed in the wake the migration crisis, seeks to protect the country’s southern border by combing through Bulgaria and apprehending any immigrants they encounter. “Shipka,” furthermore, considers NATO and the EU to be occupiers, and promoted an opportunity for individuals to train abroad, likely in Russia.256 Though the groups source of funding remains unclear, the pseudo-paramilitary organization is “...at the very least, a by-product of Russian propaganda and disinformation” that seeks to act

255 Hadjitodorov and Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power,” 16. 256 Hadjitodorov and Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power,” 18. 95

upon the information spread by pro-Russian media.257

In Bulgaria, cyber-attacks were also observed in the course of Russia’s state capture of Bulgaria. In 2015, Russian hackers launched a series of attacks against the

Presidency, the Central Election Committee, the Council of Ministers, and other government institutions on the day of national referendum and local elections.258 The

Bulgarian government at the time was both overtly pro-EU and pro-NATO and a vocal critic of the Russian state. The Kremlin, in turn, mounted a campaign to weaken the anti-

Russian government of Bulgaria by interfering in its elections and distributing disinformation in an effort to influence the results of the elections.

3. Conclusion

Russia’s incursion into Bulgaria did not include any hybrid tactics other than political and economic elements. When the Bulgarian economy collapsed in 2008, its economy was desperate for foreign investment of any kind. The Russian state viewed

Bulgaria’s need as an opportunity to expand its influence into a territory which was historically viewed as being part of its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. With the successful proliferation of Russian companies and securing of strategic economic sectors, the Russian state was able to reassert its influence over the Bulgarian state without resorting to conventional or irregular methods. Furthermore, Bulgaria’s membership in

257 Hadjitodorov and Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power.” 258 Hadjitodorov and Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power,” 17. 96

both NATO and the Europe Union limited Russia’s option to engage in more overt and direct forms of coercion, given the collective defense of NATO such tactics would likely incur.

Because of the success achieved with political and economic warfare, as well as the risks posed any possible aggression against a NATO member, Russia’s incursion was not characterized by its usage of conventional or irregular elements. Rather, Russia’s incursion was defined by political and economic warfare that was supplemented by a robust disinformation campaign. Because of the Bulgaria’s economic struggles, Russia has been able to invest heavily into the nation. In willingly accepting this investment as the means to stimulate its struggling economy, Bulgaria has made itself vulnerable to heavy domestic and economic influence. To maintain this economic dominance, Russian networks collude with government officials and oligarchs who change the course of governance to meet Russian interests. As a result, Russia has successfully captured the

Bulgarian state without the employment of conventional or irregular elements.

VI. Syria

In 2011, major unrest and discontent with the Syrian government escalated into an armed conflict, pitting the Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad against a coalition of diverse rebel groups. When the Syrian government appeared to be on the verge of collapse as the result of sustained offensives by both its domestic opposition and the

Islamic State, the al-Assad government sought assistance from Russia to prop up their crumbling regime. As a result, Russia began launching airstrikes against anti-Assad forces and ISIS in 2015, marking the beginning of their intervention into the civil war.

This chapter will examine the variety of elements and means employed by the Russian state leading up to and during its intervention into the Syrian Civil War. This study will first be conducted by describing the historical and political background of Syria and its relations with Russia, as well as describing the timeline leading up to the outbreak of the

Syrian Civil War. Second, the study will seek to identify and describe the tactics employed by the Russian state in Syria in the pursuit of its strategic objectives in the region.

1. Historical Background

The current relationship between the Russian Federation and Syria can be traced to early 1946, a few weeks before Syria ousted the French and declared independence.

On February 1st, 1946, the Soviet Union and Syria “...signed a secret treaty in which the

Soviets promised to support Syria internationally and help..” the fledgling state build “...a national army.”259 As part of this relationship, the promotion of economic and cultural relations was prioritized between the two parties, with the explicit goal of cultivating a strategic and ideological partner in the Middle East. In 1954, the Soviets sold the Syrian government 44 German Mark IV tanks at extremely favorable prices in an effort to bolster its military capabilities in the face of increasingly antagonistic neighbors, specifically Turkey and Iraq.260 This exchange was described as “...the most significant step in the development of relations between the two countries,” which took a distinctly economic character prior to 1956.261 Despite the military characteristics of the 1954 transaction, the economic relationship continued to occupy a central role in the greater relations between the Syrian state and the Soviet bloc. The Soviets agreed to fund the construction of the Euphrates Dam and several other projects worth an estimated $90 million in October 1957.262 In 1964, the Soviets pledged an additional $40 million more

259 Rami Ginat, "The Soviet Union and the Syrian Ba'th Regime: From Hesitation to Rapprochement," Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 2 (2000): 156, www.jstor.org/stable/4284075. 260 Ginat, "The Soviet Union and the Syrian Ba'th Regime,” 156. 261 Ginat, "The Soviet Union and the Syrian Ba'th Regime.” 262 Ginat, "The Soviet Union and the Syrian Ba'th Regime.” 99

in aid for infrastructure projects. As a result of Syrian and Soviet economic relations improving, Soviet exports to Syria increased significantly between 1956 and 1961.

In March 1963, the Ba’athist party, which adhered to an ideology grounded in both radical Arab nationalism and Arab socialism, seized control of the Syrian state in a coup. However, this regime would quickly be ousted, with new form of Ba’ath leadership taking power following a coup on February 23rd, 1966.263 Unlike its more ideologically rigid predecessor, the new Ba’ath leadership fostered “...an oligarchic regime led by an elite of Alawi origin...,” a minority ethnicity in Syria that enjoyed the support of the Syrian armed forces. The initial relations between the Soviet Union and the Ba’ath regime were marked by mutual distrust and suspicion, due to uncertainty regarding the political orientation of the new Syrian regime. As the socialist orientation of the new Ba’athist leadership became obvious, ties between Moscow and Damascus strengthened, presenting the Soviet Union with a foothold into the Middle East.264 By the early 1970’s, Syria became central to not only Soviet interests in the Middle East, but critical to its projection of power within the region.

In 1970, a third coup occurred in Syria called the Corrective Movement, bringing

General Hafez al-Assad and his followers to power within the Ba’ath party and Syrian government. With the Assad regime came the strengthening of relations between the two states, with the Soviets helping “...to develop Syria’s national industries, including oil,

263 Ginat, "The Soviet Union and the Syrian Ba'th Regime,” 150. 264 Ginat, "The Soviet Union and the Syrian Ba'th Regime,” 160. 100

agriculture, and transportation sectors.”265 In addition, “Soviet scientists, engineers, and military instructors were dispatched to Syria along with weapons and equipment...” to modernize the Syrian state’s economy and infrastructure.266 By 1985, the Soviets delivered almost $17 billion worth of weapons to Syria, accompanied by 3,000 military advisors and 2,000 personal comprising independent Soviet units within the Middle

Eastern country.267 As a result of the significant economic and military aid provided to

Syria, the Soviets received Syrian support in the international forum on a majority of issues, though enjoyed only limited influence on the Assad regime regarding domestic policy. During this period, a series of agreements and treaties established specific strategic ties between the Soviet Union and Syria. In 1971, Hafez Assad allowed

Moscow to open a naval base in Tartus, establishing a permanent military foothold in the

Middle East.268 In 1980, the two nation-states signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation, which formalized relations between the USSR and Syria. Despite the fostering of positive relations, by the mid-1980’s, relations between Russian and Syria cooled over both the Palestinian cause and the Iran-Iraq war.269 By the end of the decade, however, relations between the two normalized, and Moscow continued to provide economic and military aid to the Assad regime.

265 Ann M. Simmons, “Russia Has Been Assad's Greatest Ally - as It Was to His Father before Him,” Los Angeles Times, April 7, 2017, 13, https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-russia-20170406- story.html. 266 Simmons, “Russia Has Been Assad's Greatest Ally,” 11. 267 Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East (Washington: U.S., 1986), 13. 268 Simmons, “Russia Has Been Assad's Greatest Ally,” 15 269 Roy Allison, “Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis,” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 802. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12046. 101

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the concurrent First Gulf War,

Syria sought to align itself with the United States against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

Russia, the Soviet Union’s predecessor led by Boris Yeltsin, also sought to improve relations with its historical opponent. Though both attempted to improve relations with the United States by the end of the 1990’s, Moscow and Damascus inadvertently strengthened their relations with one another more so than Washington.270 This relationship was reinforced in 2005, when Russian President Vladimir Putin “...agreed to cancel almost 73% of Syria’s Soviet-era debt to Russia.”271 When Russia invaded

Georgia in 2008, it was of little surprise that Syria fully-backed Russian actions in the post-Soviet republic. Since then, Syria and the Assad regime have benefitted from both the military and economic support continually provided by the Russian government.

2. Events Leading to Incursion

Since President Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father, Hafez, in 2000, many

Syrians complained about the rampant unemployment and corruption that accompanied his despotic regime. In March 2011, while the Arab Spring gripped most of the Middle

East, pro-democracy protests broke out in the city of Deraa after a group of teens and children were arrested for writing political graffiti.272 When Assad’s government

270 Allison, “Russia and Syria,” 16 271 Allison, “Russia and Syria.” 272 “Why Is There a War in Syria?” BBC News, February 25, 2019, 3, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- middle-east-35806229. 102

employed deadly force in an effort to quell the demonstrations, protests demanding the resignation of Assad erupted throughout the country. As the protests spread and the ensuing crackdowns escalated, opposition supporters took up arms and began forcing security forces out of towns and villages. Assad, in response, vowed to crush the fighters. As violence between rebels and security forces intensified, the country descended into civil war.

The civil war first broke out when a variety of poorly organized opposition groups formed rebel brigades, many of which were created at the behest of foreign patrons, and seized key cities in Northern Syria, including Aleppo.273 Additionally, seven military officials defected from the Syrian government on July 29th and formed the Free Syrian

Army (FSA) as the main opposition group for Syrian military defectors. The FSA, by

November, was able to launch attacks on government forces in Damascus and Aleppo, providing some order and structure to the loosely organized rebel groups opposing the

Assad regime. As the Assad regime continued to lose ground to the FSA and other opposition forces into 2013, both Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard

Corps were deployed to Syria in an effort to prop up the Assad government.274

In 2014, the Syrian Civil War underwent a dramatic evolution caused by the introduction of the Islamic State (ISIS) and other hardline Islamist groups into the conflict. Groups like ISIS and the al-Nusra Front found support among local populations sympathetic to their cause and introduced legions of foreign fighters to the Syrian Civil

273 Mona Yacoubian, “Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad,” July 3, 2019, United States Institute of Peace, 3, https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/07/syria-timeline-uprising-against-assad. 274 Yacoubian, “Syria Timeline.” 103

War, who opposed both government forces and moderate rebels.275 The introduction of

ISIS and Islamist elements to the conflict provided a third front for the Assad regime to combat. As opposition forces in the north and ISIS in the east launched offensives against the Syrian government, the Syrian government and supporting militias were pushed back to regime strongholds. No longer capable of launching offensives outside of its most valuable territories, the Assad regime appeared to be losing its civil war.276

Complicating the civil war even further was the introduction of a U.S.-led coalition into the conflict, which directly intervened in an effort to destroy the Islamic State.

At the request of the Assad government for assistance, the Russian state intervened militarily in the conflict on September 30th, 2015. Though the Russian and

Syrian governments claimed that this intervention was limited to strikes towards Islamist targets, Russian forces primarily launched strikes against opposition forces.277 With the deployment of some of Russia’s most advanced and sophisticated weapons, the Assad regime was able to retake major swaths of areas throughout Syria. By the end of 2016, pro-Assad forces retook Aleppo, and by 2017 had retaken much of the Syrian countryside. By 2018, the Russian-backed forces seized Daraa, the birthplace of the civil war, reestablishing governmental control over the majority of the country.

275 Yacoubian, “Syria Timeline,” 4. 276 Charles Lister, “Why Assad Is Losing,” July 28, 2016, Brookings Institution, 5, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/why-assad-is-losing/. 277 Patrick J. McDonnel, W. J. Hannigen, and Nabih Bulos, “Russia Launches Airstrikes in Syria amid U.S. Concern about Targets,” Los Angeles Times, September 30, 2015, 3, https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-kremlin-oks-troops-20150930-story.html. 104

3. Hybrid Tactics Observed

A. Political Warfare

At the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Russia quickly established itself to be the main international patron of the Assad Regime. The Russian government not only supplied Syrian forces with arms and ammunition but deployed Russian personnel to man

Soviet and Russian-made missile defenses and military instructors to help modernize

Syria’s armed forces.278 In addition to supporting Syria militarily, Russia used its diplomatic capabilities in an effort to raise international support for, or tolerance of, the

Assad regime. The Russian government attempted to mobilize the international community to establish a coalition against the expanding Islamic State of Iraq and the

Levant (ISIS).279 This coalition would effectively back the Assad regime, who was perceived as a lesser evil than ISIS. At the same time, diplomatic appeals would be made to non-jihadist rebel forces in an effort to force them into negotiations with the Assad regime. The creation of a coalition with Western powers would not only legitimize the

Assad regime internationally but would also help to break Russia’s international isolation brought upon by its aggressions in Ukraine. Although Russia would successfully break its international isolation to an extent, it failed to establish a broad international coalition to support Assad, forcing the abandonment of the political means in the conflict.

278 Emil Aslan Souleimanov, “Russia's Syria War: A Strategic Trap?” Middle East Policy Council 25, no. 2 (2018): 3, https://mepc.org/journal/russias-syria-war-strategic-trap. 279 Souleimanov, “Russia's Syria War,” 6. 105

B. Conventional

When it became clear that a political solution with the West was unattainable and that the Assad regime was on the verge of collapse, Russia’s strategy in Syria shifted significantly. In response to the failures of political means, Russia’s engagement and intervention into the Syrian Civil War became conventional in nature.280 The intervention comprised of the large-scale deployment of regular military elements into

Syria primarily comprised of air assets. These air assets included “...3 to 4 Su-27 fighters, 12 Su-24 strike fighters, 12 Su-10 close support fighters, and Pchela-1T

UAVs.”281 In addition to the deployment of air assets, the Russian military transferred an undisclosed amount of new artillery weapons, “...six or more T-90 main battle tanks, 35 or more new BTR-82A/B wheeled armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) with 30mm cannon turrets, [and] an undisclosed amount of Humvee equivalents to Syria.”282 200 marines were deployed to Latakia, and with them came housing for an additional 3,500 personnel.283 These forces were concentrated at Russia’s port facilities in Tartus and at an expanding air base in Latakia, the Assad family’s ancestral homeland, from where

Russian forces had the capability to launch strike and close support aircraft against any mix of rebel or Islamist forces.284 This transfer of arms to Syria and military support

280 Michael Kofman, “A Tale of Two Campaigns: U.S. And Russian Military Operations in Syria,” Pathways to Peace and Security 52, no. 1 (2017): 166, doi:10.20542/2307-1494-2017-1-163-170. 281 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia in Syria: Hybrid Political Warfare,” September 23, 2015, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-syria-hybrid-political-warfare. 282 Cordesman, “Russia in Syria: Hybrid Political Warfare,” 6 283 Cordesman, “Russia in Syria: Hybrid Political Warfare.” 284 Brian Glyn Williams and Robert Souza, “Operation ‘Retribution’: Putin’s Military Campaign in Syria, 2015-16,” Middle East Policy 23, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 44, doi:10.1111/mepo.12232. 106

provided to the Assad regime is in line with Russian foreign policy and strategic thinking since the 1970’s, which recognized Syria as being a key ally in the Middle East.

Russia’s conventional air campaign was the most visible aspect of Russia’s intervention in Syria, where Russia’s forces launched ground attack and support missions in conjunction with Assad’s forces. Moscow’s bombing campaign was both relentless and indiscriminate, paving the way for Assad regime forces to counterattack and retake rebel-held territory. During its intervention, Russia launched nearly one air strike every

20 minutes that targeted ISIS militants, opposition forces, or civilians in rebel-held territory.285 According to the Russian defense ministry, between February 10th to the

16th, Russian airplanes performed 444 combat sorties and engaged in 1,593 “terrorist” objects through Syria.286 Not only were the number of airstrikes performed by Russian forces double that of their U.S.-led counterparts, but Russian strikes inflicted greater damage to its targets as well. This effectiveness can be attributed to the Russian forces use of cluster bombs. Rather than relying on precise airstrikes, Russian planes would carpet bomb a target area with unguided cluster bombs, which scattered explosives in an area the size of a football field or larger. The result was the indiscriminate killing of militants, rebels, and civilians in a target area. Despite the indiscriminate bombing of population areas, the airstrikes effectively supported regime forces, who steadily pushed

285 Vladimir Karnazov, “The Russian Air Campaign over Syria,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 41, no. 10 (December 2015): 22,http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType =ip&db=tsh&AN=111720488&site=eds-live&scope=site. 286 Karnazov, “The Russian Air Campaign over Syria,” 23. 107

back ISIS and rebel fighters that were unable to contest the Russian-back aerial supremacy throughout the country.

In addition to the deployment of conventional air forces, the Russian government also established a ground presence in Syria through the limited posting of ground forces in Syria. The most visible of these deployments was that of Russian naval infantry, specifically the 61st and 810th Naval Infantry Brigades, and a variety of special forces.

Prior to the official start of Russia’s intervention, 700 to 800 Russian marines were deployed to Syria’s western countryside, with the majority being stationed in Latakia and the remaining troops moved to Homs and Tartous in preparation for Russia’s intervention.287 As the Syrian Army began offensives into rebel and militant held territory, these contract troops participated in operations in Aleppo, Palmyra, the Idlib

Province, and Homs. Russia’s Naval Infantry Brigades are not only some of the best trained units in the Russian military, but also have combat experience in the Second

Chechen War, Russo-Georgian War, and Ukraine, resulting in crucial operations being entrusted to these combat-tested units. While a plethora of Russian infantry brigades have been identified as being present in Syria, these groups were regulated to rear-guard actions given their relative inexperience in combat. Additionally, Russian special forces units have also supplemented Syrian forces, though their presence is less overt than army and naval brigades. KSO elements, redeployed from Ukraine, assisted in coordinating

287 Leith Aboufadel, “Russian Marines Position Themselves in Eastern Latakia,” Al-Masdar News, September 8, 2015, 5, http://www.almasdarnews.com/article/russian-marines-position-themselves-in- eastern-lataki. 108

airstrikes against opposition and Islamist targets, in addition to protecting sensitive

Russian equipment, personal, and information.288

C. Irregular

Russia’s deployment of conventional air assets and limited ground forces occurred in an effort to support both the regular Syrian army and various irregular pro- government militias. In addition to the irregular forces serving under the Assad-regime, private military contractors comprised of the irregular elements of Russia’s strategy in

Syria. Russian mercenaries played a critical role in combat operations in Syria, both seeking out and engaging in combat simultaneous to conventional air support. In this capacity, the traditional role of irregular and regular forces is switched, as irregular mercenaries are used to directly engage in combat while the majority of Russian regular forces are predominately used in an auxiliary role.289

The most visible of the private military companies (PMC) in Syria is the Wagner

Group. Owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch in Putin’s inner circle, and led by Lt. Col. Dmitry Utkin, a former commander of a Spetsnaz-GRU unit, the Wagner

Group was deployed to Syria in an effort to provide Russian forces with a pool of

288 Bret Perry, “How NATO Can Disrupt Russia's New Way of War,” Defense One, March 3, 2016, 9, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/03/nato-russia-sof-ew-hybrid-war/126401/. 289 Sabra Ayres, “Russia's Shadowy World of Military Contractors: Independent Mercenaries, or Working for the Kremlin?” Los Angeles Times, February 18, 2018, 18, https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg- russia-mercenaries-20180218-story.html. 109

manpower whose casualties could not be linked to an official military institution.290 In

Syria, the more experienced and skilled Wagner PMCs are responsible for training specialized units of the Syrian military and pro-Assad militias, while the rest of the contractors are deployed on the front lines against ISIS and rebel forces. With regard to organization, the Wagner Group is organized in a manner similar to regular Russian forces. Groups of contractors are organized into battalion tactical groups, with contractors divided into officers and regulars.291 The various tactical groups present in an area of operations are be coordinated by military intelligence officers, who helped to arm, transport, and field contractors in combat operations. As a result, the Wagner Group has evolved into a form of public-private institution that Moscow is able to employ in order to achieve political and strategic objectives while creating plausible deniability in the process of their achievement of objectives.

Though the most visible, the Wagner Group is not the only private military corporation active in Syria. Despite Russian law proscribing the formation and existence of private military corporations, the Kremlin employs PMCs without officially acknowledging their existence. Before the Wagner Group dominated the battlefield in

Syria, the Slavonic Corps was hired to fight against Syrian rebels between Homs and

Deir Ez Zor.292 However, a contingent of 267 contractors were defeated by ISIS militants and forced to retreat. Because of their poor performance, in addition to the proof of their

290 Mike Giglio, “How A Group Of Russian Guns For Hire Are Operating In The Shadows,” BuzzFeed News, April 19, 2019, 16, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegiglio/inside-wagner-mercenaries- russia-ukraine-syria-prighozhin. 291 Giglio, “How A Group Of Russian Guns,” 42. 292 James Miller, “The Insane Story of Russian Mercenaries Fighting for the Syrian Regime,” HuffPost, January 25, 2014, 2, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-insane-story-of-russi_b_4317729. 110

illicit activity being recovered and disseminated by ISIS, the Russian government denied any knowledge of their presence in Syria and arrested the Slavonic Corps’ members responsible for the operation. After the Wagner Group brazenly attacked a U.S. outpost and hundreds of contractors were estimated to be killed or wounded, the organization similarly fell out of favor with Moscow.293 As a result, the Wagner Group was replaced with contractors from other PMC groups, like Shield, Patriot, and Vega. Given the

Russian state’s informal relations with contractor groups, these private military companies are able to be substituted as politically necessary to protect the Kremlin’s image domestically and internationally.

D. Information Warfare

During the Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War, the Russian state was engaged in extremely aggressive information operations designed to proliferate disinformation and create a narrative to compete with the dominant Western one.

Russian official discourse, in the course of the intervention, “...has sought to combat the loose coalition of Syrian opposition groups” that strive to topple the Assad regime.294 In accordance with this goal, Russian discourse has created a dichotomy among opposition forces. Groups either adhere to Russian-backed ceasefires and partake in a Russian

293 Neil Hauer, “The Rise and Fall of a Russian Mercenary Army,” Foreign Policy, October 6, 2019, 3, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/06/rise-fall-russian-private-army-wagner-syrian-civil-war/. 294 Julien Nicetti, Dazed and Confused: Russian “Information Warfare” and the Middle East – The Syria Lessons (Barcelona: EuroMeSCo, 2019), 5, https://www.euromesco.net/wp- content/uploads/2019/02/Brief93_Dazed-and-oncufsed.-Russian-information-warfare.pdf. 111

sponsored reconciliation processes or violate the ceasefire and be labeled terrorists regardless of the group’s political standing.295 In labeling all opposition forces terrorists, the Kremlin is able to justify their use of force against the opposition forces and characterize their activities as being counter-terrorist in nature.296 This discourse, reinforced via official channels, state-run media, and social media, both discredited moderate Syrian opposition forces and reduced “...the complexities of the conflict to a binary choice between the Assad regime...” or the establishment of an extreme Islamist state.297 As a result, Russia portrayed its intervention against Syrian rebels as a counterterrorism campaign designed to dislodged the Islamic State from the Middle East, despite the gross majority of its strikes occurring against moderate forces.

Another component of the Kremlin’s narrative creation was the assigning of blame for the conflict on the West. In the Kremlin’s narrative, Islamism is a product of

Western countries, whose origins can be traced to the United States’ support of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980’s.298 The invasion of Iraq, according to Kremlin propogandists, only exasperated the issue, setting the foundation for the rise of the

Islamic State. Not only are the actions of the United States allegedly responsible for the rise of Islamism extremists, Moscow asserts that the West purposefully created the

Islamic State and is cooperating with them in order to further their own malevolent interests. Because Westerners are blamed for the outbreak of violence in the region,

295 Nicetti, Dazed and Confused. 296 Spyridon Plakoudas, “Putin, Assad, and Geopolitics,” MERIA Journal 19, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 36, http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=jss&AN=11 4346238&site=eds-live&scope=site. 297 Plakoudas, “Putin, Assad, and Geopolitics.” 298 Plakoudas, “Putin, Assad, and Geopolitics,” 6. 112

Russia is able to deflect Western criticism and accusations of war crimes. For example, on August 21st, 2013, a chemical attack in Ghouta killed over 1,400 civilians.299 By the end of the day, Russian officials dismissed Western accusations as being Saudi propaganda, eventually positing that the entire attack was fabricated by the West, an assertion reinforced through Russian state-media.300 In a similar manner, humanitarian organizations were dehumanized and condemned by the Kremlin in an effort to mitigate the fallout from the proliferation of the organization’s accrued information. This phenomenon can be observed with regard to the White Helmets, a group of Syrian volunteer rescue workers operating in opposition-held areas The victim of “...a massive, systematic and coordinated information campaign manipulation campaign,” the organization was accused of being a terrorist organization responsible for several false flag attacks.301 These specific attacks on the White Helmets, like Russia’s greater disinformation campaign, is directed at discrediting critics of Russia’s intervention into the region.

In addition to the creation of a competing narrative dependent on the proliferation of disinformation, Russian authorities created a structure of plausible deniability through their use of PMCs in Syria. Because PMCs are private organizations and not an official state institution, the actions of PMCs are able to remain a secret.302 Also, the role that the

Russian government has in planning or approving the actions of a PMC remains

299 Nicetti, Dazed and Confused, 6. 300 Nicetti, Dazed and Confused. 301 Nicetti, Dazed and Confused. 302 Andrew Linder, “Russian Private Military Companies in Syria and Beyond,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy, no. 16 (2018): 18, https://www.csis.org/npfp/russian-private-military-companies-syria-and- beyond. 113

unknown to the domestic or international community. Furthermore, the Russian government enjoys the ability to reject blame and claim that there exist no official ties between the PMCs and themselves because of the nature of privately-owned military forces. The presence of private military companies, therefore, obfuscates the extent of

Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict.

4. Conclusion

The Syrian Civil War provided Russia with the opportunity to engage and refine its conventional and irregular military forces, as well as to hone its political and information tactics. Since its rise to power, the al-Assad regime has long been Russia’s regional ally in the Middle East. Both governments long enjoyed strong military and economic ties with one another, which continued to be maintained after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s partnership with Syria provided the Russian state with the ability to project its power outside of post-Soviet regions and, specifically, in the Middle

East. When Russia’s influence in Syria was threatened by the possible collapse of the

Russian-allied Assad regime brought upon by the outbreak of a civil war in Syria, the

Russian state felt compelled to support its longtime ally and secure its interests in the prolonging of the Assad regime’s survival. Russia initially launched a political campaign to support the Assad regime internationally, as well as supporting its war efforts through arms sales. As rebel and Islamist forces gained ground against the Assad regime, Russia was forced to intervene to prevent the collapse of the regime. In the course of this 114

intervention, Russia deployed conventional air power and the irregular forces of PMCs simultaneously in order to support Syrian forces. As a result of Russia’s intervention, the

Assad regime has managed to recapture vast swathes of territory lost to rebels and extremists, cementing the regime’s prolonged rule over Syria.

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VII. Comparison Analysis

To reiterate, hybrid warfare is employed as a catch all term that seeks to describe and characterize a plethora of contemporary state activates in the international arena.

Furthermore, hybrid warfare is used to describe the apparent melding of conventional and irregular warfare, which is accompanied by any means at the state’s disposal to accomplish a political objective, termed hybrid tactics or elements. Specifically, this terminology is increasingly employed to characterize the efforts utilized by Vladimir

Putin’s Russian Federation on the regional and international levels to coerce states to pursue pro-Russian policies.

In Georgia, Russia first used political and economic means to coerce the Georgian state to enact pro-Russian policies. When political and economic means failed to terminate Georgia’s westward trajectory, the Russian government laid the groundwork for a conventional military invasion. When this invasion was launched, Russian forces relied on both overwhelming firepower and sheer numbers to overwhelm Georgian defenses and occupy half the country in five days. Supplementing Russian regular forces were irregular elements comprised of separatist militias, Cossacks, and Chechens, who acted as auxiliaries to the regular Russian forces. During the Russian governments use of both political and conventional warfare, informational strategies were employed simultaneously to forward its own narrative. 116

In Ukraine, two different incursions occurred; one in Crimea and one in Donbass.

Crimea was conventional military operation by Russian regulars who employed unconventional tactics. After the conventional operation, criminal networks and irregular elements were mobilized in order to normalize and solidify Russian influence over the peninsula, with a sophisticated information campaign being waged to justify Russia’s actions for its domestic population and obfuscating its actions at the international level.

In Donbass, Russia’s actions took the form of a series of escalating phases, transitioning from political warfare, to hybrid warfare, and finally culminating in a conventional military invasion. While each phase of Russia’s incursion introduced new components to the intervention, an overarching disinformation campaign was observed in all of the phases.

In Bulgaria, Russia’s incursion was characterized not by its usage of conventional or irregular elements, but by political and economic warfare that was supplemented by a robust disinformation campaign. Because of the Bulgaria’s economic struggles, Russia was able to invest heavily into the state’s economic sectors. In willingly accepting this investment as a means to stimulate its struggling economy, Bulgaria has made itself vulnerable to heavy domestic and economic influence. To maintain this economic dominance, Russian networks collude with government officials and oligarchs who change the course of governance to meet Russian interests. As a result, Russia has successfully captured the Bulgarian state without the employment of conventional or irregular elements. 117

In Syria, the Russian and Syrian governments enjoyed strong military and economic ties with one another, which continued to be maintained after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s influence in Syria was threatened only when the country collapsed into a civil war between the Russian-allied Assad regime and opposition forces.

Russia initially launched a political campaign to support the Assad regime internationally, as well as supporting its war efforts through arms sales. As rebel and

Islamist forces gained ground against the Assad regime, Russia was forced to intervene to prevent the collapse of the regime. In the course of this intervention, Russia deployed conventional air power and the irregular forces of PMCs simultaneously in order to support Syrian forces. As a result of Russia’s intervention, the Assad regime managed to recapture vast swathes of territory lost to rebels and extremists, cementing the regimes prolonged rule over Syria.

In examining these cases, several observable patterns emerge. First, Russian incursions tend to occur during times of political instability, especially with regard to the escalation of the scale of the incursion. This instability weakens both the strength of state institutions and social cohesion among a population. In weakening state institutions and a society’s social cohesion, Russian assets are allowed to be introduced into a state.

Additionally, these incursions occur in countries that already have segments of their population sympathetic to the Russian state. Many of the targets of Russian tactics either had sizable Russian minority, like in Ukraine, or had historical or cultural ties to the Russian state stemming from either the Russia Empire or the Soviet Union, like

Bulgaria, Georgia, and Syria. It was not required for the Russian state to build support 118

among the populations of target states as said states already have a sizeable and sympathetic portion of their population which provides justification for Russian incursions.

Throughout every case, Russia used both political means and information elements in an effort to coerce targeted states. In cases where irregular, conventional, and other means were introduced as part of the Russian incursion, some level of political and information campaigns continued to be employed. Political means, however, were relied upon far less once conventional and irregular forces were introduced as part of an incursion, while information means became geared towards concealing the scale of

Russian activities and creating a narrative that justified Russian actions.

Additionally, these information campaigns did not target the domestic population of states victim to Russian incursions once the intervention employed the use of force.

Rather, these information campaigns targeted Russia’s domestic population and the larger international community. In each case, the central aim of the information campaign was to create a narrative that competed with either the dominant Western one or the targeted state’s narrative. For Russia’s domestic population, the narrative helped to justify their government’s adventurism in—even invasions of—other nations. For the international community, this narrative created confusion and obfuscated Russia’s actions within a target state, hampering the international community’s ability to present a unified response.

With regard to Russia’s conventional assets, the Russian state typically relied on contract troops and special forces to achieve political objectives via military means. In 119

Donbass, Crimea, and Syria, the Kremlin relied on contract naval infantry and special forces to achieve political objectives. Unlike Georgia, where the Soviet-esque tactic of overwhelming an opponent with numbers and firepower was used, these limited deployments relied on the efficiency and effectiveness of small numbers of elite forces in achieving specific objectives. In Bulgaria, Russian military forces were never deployed, likely due of the success of low-risk political and economic maneuverings as well as high-risk posed by deploying military forces against a NATO member state.

Furthermore, the deployment of conventional military assets is the last expedient to be used in the achievement of the Russian state’s political and strategic objectives.

The use of conventional forces would only arise once nonmilitary means and irregular elements failed to achieve the desired political objectives. Rather than being deployed in a simultaneous, cohesive, and organized manner alongside other elements present from the outset of a Russian incursion, conventional elements were deployed as a last resort.

The use of direct force was used to achieve objectives only when political, economic, information, and irregular assets failed to achieve a desired goal. Additionally, conventional forces were employed only when the risk of repercussions was low.

Irregular forces were often relied on prior to and during the deployment of conventional forces. Typically, irregular elements comprised of separatist militias or

PMCs, who functioned as either the primary, regular force in the absence of conventional military assets or auxiliaries supporting Russian professional troops. Though they might be deployed to the same areas of operation at the same time, irregular forces and Russian conventional military assets would never act in a symbiotic manner. Conventional forces 120

would be employed as the primary combatants, while the irregular elements, offered by militias and mercenaries, would act as auxiliaries and support the conventional, regular force. While this dynamic and roles that regular and irregular elements occupied would be flipped in Syria, the supposed melding of regular and irregular forces characteristic of hybrid tactics was not observed. There still existed a distinct separation between regular

Russian forces and irregular PMCs.

The effects of cyber elements were largely negligible. Though employed on several occasions, Russia’s cyber capabilities never seriously threatened a targeted state’s infrastructure or its ability to perform functions of governance. Rather, cyber tactics resulted in the targeted harassment of websites, creating little more than a nuisance for these targeted nation-states. Normally, physical actions would be required to disrupt or disable critical state infrastructure.

From these patterns, a cohesive model of incursion emerges, based upon a series of escalating phases that increase in openly antagonistic means to accomplish political objectives in accordance to the risk posed by each corresponding action. The first phase is one characterized by tactics common to political warfare. This initial level of incursion employs political and economic means to coerce a state to pursue policies in accordance to the interests of Russia. If these measures are successful in compelling a targeted state to adopt the desired policies, then the subsequent political and governance structures created are fostered in order to maintain influence over the targeted state. The failure to achieve the desired goals results in the escalation of means employed to achieve the desired political outcome. Specifically, irregular forces are employed in an effort to 121

coerce a state. These irregular forces typically include domestic separatist groups, transnational non-organizations, like Cossack militias or the Night Wolves, and PMCs whose relationship cannot be directly tied to the Russian government. Following this phase, the limited deployment of regular Russian military forces in conjunction and alongside irregular elements presents a kind of phase which, though resembling hybrid warfare, lacks the melding and interconnectedness typical of conventional and unconventional elements in hybrid warfare. Finally, this transition prompts the escalation of the incursion into one of conventional military means. This conventional military intervention is carried out by professional contract troops and special forces, who are deployed in a limited manner to achieve the specific political and strategic objectives.

Throughout each level, and the escalating means utilized in each phase, a robust information campaign is waged. This information campaign, beginning at the same time as Russia’s initial incursion into a state, is designed to create a narrative that competes with the dominant Western one whilst simultaneously creating disinformation in an effort to blur the true role of Russia in the domestic activities of a targeted nation-state. In essence, hybrid warfare does not appear to be the blurring of regular, irregular, military, and nonmilitary means, but instead a series of escalating phases employing new and more coercive means, supplemented by information tactics, to achieve specific political and strategic objectives.

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VIII. Conclusion

The thesis has argued that Russian activities in the international arena termed hybrid warfare are characterized by distinct phases denoted by the state’s reliance on or the addition of a distinct mean of political achievement which, over time, expand in scope to incorporate new elements or means that the Russian state then relies on to accomplish its goals. Every additional element signals the beginning of a new, riskier phase in the achievement of strategic objectives. This observed process of escalation in accordance with risk is not a static phenomenon that is rigid in its application, but fluid and ever- changing in accordance to the circumstances of an intervention. This characterization challenges the common notion that Russia has adopted a coherent strategy of achieving its objectives through the simultaneous deployment of conventional and irregular elements, accompanied by that of political and information means, in a novel manner. In fact, the approach of escalatory phases employed by the Russian state is more sophisticated than what most attribute to hybrid warfare; while a strategy does exist, it follows a tailored pattern of action rather than a one-size fits all approach.

In all but one of the cases of the Russian state’s intrusions, this pattern of escalation in accordance to risk was observed. In Georgia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and

Syria, the Russian state initially employed political and economic means to coerce a target into pursuing policies in accordance to the interests of Russia. Upon the failure of 123

the political and economic measures to achieve the Russian state’s desired goals results, irregular forces would be employed in an effort to further coerce a state. As irregular forces would typically maintain a relationship that could not be directly tied to the

Russian government, risk for the act would be mitigated. Following this phase, a level of hybridization would occur between regular Russian military forces in conjunction and alongside irregular elements. Finally, the failure of hybrid tactics and means would prompt the escalation of the incursion into one of conventional military means. Though carrying the most risk, the use of traditional military means was relied upon extensively to achieve Russian goals and objectives in all four cases.

This pattern of escalation is not static, but changes based upon the circumstances in which Russian finds itself in a particular moment. In the case of Bulgaria, Russian incursions never escalated past the initial phase characterized by political and economic coercion, largely because of the success arising from the deployment of these elements.

Given that Bulgaria had effectively undergone the process of state capture by Russian economic and political incursions, further interventions were largely unnecessary.

Additionally, given the fact that Bulgaria is a NATO member and any invasion would be responded with a collective NATO response, invading the country using conventional means would have posed too great a risk to Russian security. Similarly, Georgia did not strictly adhere to the pattern of escalations, bypassing a phase characterized by hybrid tactics and instead opting to employ conventional military means in response to a

Georgian military excursion into Tskhinvali. Hybrid warfare, as used to describe Russian activities, does not prescribe a necessary pattern that must be adhered to by strategists nor 124

policymakers. The use of these elements, though always escalating in phases in accordance with their overtness and risk, is not determined nor guaranteed. Their use and reliance are dependent on the circumstances of the incursion, providing a flexible approach to foreign policy for the Russian state.

Furthermore, an examination of the cases demonstrates that the occurrence of hybrid warfare is used to achieve the historical foreign policy objectives of the Russian state. Much like its predecessors, contemporary Russian foreign policy continues to be driven by its historical xenophobia. For modern Russia, the continued expansion of

NATO poses an existential threat to the Russian nation, as NATO is recognized as the country’s primary defense concern by the collective decision-making elites within the nation-state. Like with the Tatars, Turks, Poles, Germans, or any other foreign aggressor, the Russian state sought to establish and foster spheres of influences to act as a buffer between itself and its rival NATO. Hybrid warfare, and the series of escalations present within it, acts as the means through which to undermine NATO expansion, expand

Russia’s defensive buffer, and to create areas that represent its own interests and to guarantee its security. This escalation of tactics and elements becomes the preferred method of expansion through which the Russian state is able to reassert its influence in its traditional spheres of influence, but not the mechanism to create new ones into Europe or in the Americas.

The conclusions presented are the result of the examination of several cases of

Russian incursion. These intrusions were compared with focus being placed on the means employed and the observable patterns that emerged. Recognizing that Russia has 125

sought to reassert its interests in post-Soviet states and former areas of influence, I selected several countries that either belonged to the former or latter to be examined.

Drawing off the works of Frank Hoffman concerning hybrid warfare, I sought to identify and examine both the irregular and regular elements of Russian incursions, in addition to identifying instances of political warfare and information warfare as well. I sought to place the use of these identified elements in an incursion into historical and political context, providing a general history of the case country’s relations with Russia and the events that precipitated the Russian intervention. The data used in the course of these case studies originated from a variety of sources, primarily emanating from both respected news sources and academic journals. Finally, I compared the observable characteristics of each case to investigate the patterns inherent to Russia’s use of hybrid warfare as a policy tool.

From the qualitative comparison of the cases performed, it becomes evident that

Russia has not adopted a coherent strategy of achieving its objectives through the simultaneous deployment of conventional and irregular elements, accompanied by that of political and information means, in a novel manner. Rather, the comparison demonstrates that Russian activities are characterized by distinct phases denoted by the state’s reliance on, or the addition of a distinct mean of political achievement. Over time, these phases expand in scope to include new elements, or means, that the Russian state then relies on to accomplish its goals. Moreover, the paradigm provided by realism cannot fully explain the phenomena observed. While Russian activities in the international arena are grounded in realism, they have the tendency to reflect 126

constructivist theories. The Russian state’s focus on constructing a competing narrative and the fostering of plausible deniability through Russia’s information campaigns draws parallels to constructionist thought. As such, realism itself cannot explain the Russian state’s strategy. In turn, it becomes necessary to draw on realist, liberal, and constructivist theory to form a nuanced and accurate view on the collection of Russian actions that encompass their practice of hybrid warfare.

These findings are susceptible to criticism. Given that the cases of Donbass,

Bulgaria, and Syria are on-going situations, it is possible that the evidence accrued from the case-studies is prone to change as time goes on. The relative recency of the cases of

Georgia and Crimea are susceptible to the same problem. Furthermore, the recency of the cases limits the amount of data available for examination, possibly resulting in an incomplete image of the scope of Russian activities related to hybrid warfare. Given that this thesis seeks to understand phenomena in the midst of its occurrence, the facts, observations, and analyses arising is subject to change as more events transpire and further information is accrued. Additionally, it would be difficult to reproduce these conclusions through quantitative analysis or study. Whether it be Hoffman’s works,

Gerasimov’s article, or this thesis itself, the phenomena of hybrid warfare as a concept is the product of qualitative observations of recent conflicts, primarily arising from the examination of Hezbollah’s actions in their 2006 war with Israel. Because of the nature of the concept, any quantitative research is would be difficult to enact on the topic, resulting in the certainty that arises from quantitative data being inaccessible. 127

Future research will be required in order to better understand the patterns of escalation employed by Russia to achieve its political and strategic goals. The research conducted suggests that hybrid warfare is not as much the melding of a variety of different elements and means simultaneously, but rather a distinct series of phases relying on, and dependent upon, specific means to achieve said goals. It would be important to determine whether this series of escalatory phases can be observed in other examples of hybrid warfare. Because of many Russian strategists and scholars adhering to the belief that the concept of hybrid warfare is product of the American military, it would beneficial to examine and compare both countries’ patterns and tactics in interventions to conclude if the Russian patterns of escalations are influenced by American stratagems.

Furthermore, it would be equally critical to determine whether this phenomenon constitutes a unique mechanism by which to achieve a nation-state’s objectives or whether it is merely a continuation of normal interactions between states whose interests are at odds with one another.

Additionally, because the scope of the research was limited to cases that had previously been a part of the Russia’s sphere of influence in the past, future research ought to examine the applicability of Russian tactics of zones of operation outside its historical reaches. Similarly, this thesis raises questions about the susceptibility of

NATO members to the most overt of Russian escalations and tactics, necessitating future research into the possibility of such an occurrence. As scholars and policymakers better understand the patterns and characteristics of Russia’s covert and overt coercive means 128

against international targets, the manner in which to effectively respond and rebut

Russian advances will become clearer to the international community.

In January 2014, the Russian state, led by Vladimir Putin, shocked the world when its “little green men” seized the Crimean Peninsula from its neighbor Ukraine, setting into action a chain of events that would embroil Russia’s neighbor into a civil war.

Ukraine was only one victim of an increasingly confident Russian foreign policy that emerged in the wake of Putin’s ascension to Russia’s leadership. Georgia, Bulgaria, and

Syria all experienced Russian incursions, ranging from economic and political intrusions to overt military interventions. With the Russian state outmaneuvering international opponents, it is successfully reestablishing its historical dominance over its spheres of influence. Without a more refined or nuanced understanding of these political and military maneuverings, it will be difficult for the international community to respond the

Russian government’s international aggression.

129

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