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Putin's Hybrid Wars: a Comparative Analysis of Russian

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Putin's Hybrid Wars: a Comparative Analysis of Russian PUTIN’S HYBRID WARS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN INCURSIONS INTO GEORGIA, UKRAINE, BULGARIA, AND SYRIA A thesis submitted to the Kent State University Honors College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for University Honors by Joshua Haynie May, 2020 Thesis written by Joshua Haynie Approved by _____________________________________________________________________, Advisor _______________________________________, Chair, Department of Political Science Accepted by ___________________________________________________, Dean, Honors College ii TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTON.............................................................................................................1 1. Research Design...................................................................................................4 II. LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................................................6 1. Hybrid Warfare....................................................................................................6 2. Hybrid Warfare and Russian Thinking..............................................................15 3. Gerasimov and Non-Linear Warfare.................................................................16 4. Political Warfare and the Kremlin’s Playbook..................................................21 5. Russian Foreign Policy......................................................................................23 III. GEORGIA....................................................................................................................31 1. Historical Background.......................................................................................31 2. Events Leading to Incursion..............................................................................36 3. Hybrid Tactics Observed...................................................................................39 A. Political Warfare...................................................................................39 B. Conventional.........................................................................................42 C. Irregular.................................................................................................45 D. Information Warfare.............................................................................46 4. Conclusion.........................................................................................................48 IV. UKRAINE...................................................................................................................50 1. Historical Background.......................................................................................50 2. Event’s Leading to Incursions...........................................................................54 3. Political Warfare................................................................................................56 4. The Annexation of Crimea.................................................................................58 A. Conventional.........................................................................................58 B. Information Warfare..............................................................................65 C. Criminality............................................................................................69 5. War in Donbass..................................................................................................71 iii A. Political Warfare...................................................................................71 B. Irregular.................................................................................................75 C. Transitory Period...................................................................................77 D. Conventional.........................................................................................79 E. Information Warfare..............................................................................81 6. Conclusion.........................................................................................................85 V. BULGARIA..................................................................................................................87 1. Historical Background.......................................................................................87 2. Hybrid Tactics Observed...................................................................................90 A. Economic Warfare................................................................................90 B. Information Warfare..............................................................................93 3. Conclusion.........................................................................................................95 VI. SYRIA........................................................................................................................97 1. Historical Background.......................................................................................98 2. Events Leading to Incursion............................................................................101 3. Hybrid Tactics Observed.................................................................................104 A. Political Warfare.................................................................................104 B. Conventional.......................................................................................105 C. Irregular...............................................................................................108 D. Information Warfare...........................................................................110 4. Conclusion.......................................................................................................113 VII. COMPARISON ANALYSIS...................................................................................115 VIII. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................122 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................129 iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my thesis advisor, Dr. Gabriella Paar-Jakli. Dr. Paar-Jakli has not only supported me throughout this entire project but has been a valuable source of mentorship throughout my collegiate career. I would also like to extend my thanks to Dr. Julie Mazzei, Dr. Mary-Ann Heiss, and Dr. Don-John Dugas for agreeing to participate on my Oral Defense Committee. I would also like to extend my thanks to my parents, Michael and Natalie Haynie, for their support over the last three years at Kent State University. v 1 I. Introduction With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a unipolar world dominated by the United States of America, most people expected the Russian Federation to embark on a path towards democracy and economic freedom that would promote stability in the international system. The result of nearly 25 years of modernization has produced the opposite outcome; a newly emergent Russian state that seeks to aggressively assert itself at both the regional and international levels. This assertion can be seen manifested in Russia’s incursions into Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria. These incursions are defined not only by their military elements, but also by the political, economic, and technological intrusions that accompany Russia’s use of force. The result is a form of hybrid warfare, termed by some to be “New Generation Warfare” that blends soft and hard power together by combining political, economic, technological, cyber, and military elements in a comprehensive framework for conducting war.1 Russia’s “New Generation Warfare” has been a source of controversy and debate between scholars, pundits, policymakers, and even the military strategists seeking to must counter it. This debate originated when an article published in 2013, under the name of 1 Stefan Hadjitodorov and Martin Sokolov, "Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power: Hybrid Dimensions of Russia-Bulgaria Relations," Connections: The Quarterly Journal 17, no. 1 (2018): 7. 2 the Chief of Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, seemingly foreshadowed Russia’s strategy in both Syria and Ukraine. Western commentators and scholars viewed the article as outlining the current Russian military doctrine and strategies, labeling the views authored by Gerasimov as the “Gerasimov Doctrine.” However, the existence of the Gerasimov doctrine, and the organized hybrid warfare it describes, has been critiqued by various scholars. The original proponent of the notion of a Gerasimov doctrine, Mark Galeotti, has even rejected its existence.2 Although much of this discussion has centered around what exactly Russia’s form of hybrid warfare is and whether it is a an entirely unique phenomenon, little debate has occurred surrounding the choices made by Russian leadership in conducting warfare characterized by its hybrid aspects and tactics. This thesis seeks to help fill the intellectual void by exploring what conduct is characterized as hybrid warfare. This thesis examines how the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin employed “New Generation Warfare" to achieve its geopolitical interests and by what mechanisms or strategies “New Generation Warfare” uses to achieve these goals. Four cases have been selected to explicate this phenomenon—Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Syria— because all share
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