sign in sign up
<<
Home , Abkhazia, Adjara, Irakli Alasania

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Georgia and Caught between and WP S Turkey’s Changing Relations with Russia and the West in 2015–2016 and Their Impact on and Abkhazia Andrea Weiss and Yana Zabanova

Following seven months of severely strained relations, Turkey and Russia began to mend ties in late June 2016, when President Erdogan sent a conciliatory letter to his Russian counterpart. After the attempted coup d’état in Turkey three weeks later, Russian Presi- dent Putin called Erdogan to express his support, providing added impetus to the nor- malisation process. By contrast, delayed and cautious reactions by Western leaders, as well as their criticism of the measures taken by the government after the failed coup, have caused disappointment in Turkey, where anti-Western sentiment is on the rise. While these developments have largely been discussed in terms of their implications for the Middle East, they have also affected Turkey and Russia’s shared neighbourhood in the South , including Georgia and its breakaway region of Abkhazia. The Turkish-Russian crisis called into question Abkhazia’s strong ties with the large and active Turkish Abkhaz diaspora, an important economic and societal actor in the de- facto state. In Georgia proper, the impact has been more ambivalent, with potential implications for the country’s -Atlantic integration processes.

Relations between Turkey and Russia have Because Abkhazia enjoys only limited long influenced their shared neighbour- recognition by the international com- hood, the Caucasus. From the 18th century munity, the entity, its authorities, offi- up until their demise, the Russian and Otto- cials and government are all considered man Empires vied for influence and terri- “”. To avoid redundancy, this torial control in the region. For publication does not use the qualifier and Abkhaz, this meant being repeatedly in all instances, a pragmatic decision tossed between the two rival powers, a that should not be interpreted as taking legacy that has left its imprint on their com- a substantive stance on the issue of plex relations with both Russia and Turkey. Abkhazia’s independence. During the Cold War, Turkey’s Western- oriented foreign policy largely ignored the

Andrea Weiss and Yana Zabanova are researchers in the EU-funded project ISSICEU (Intra- and Inter-Societal Sources of SWP Comments 54 Instability in the Caucasus and EU Opportunities to Respond). The views expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect December 2016 the views of the European Commission.

1 Caucasus, then part of the . It fundamental civilisational rifts. Turkey is was only after the collapse of the USSR that perceived first and foremost as a Muslim Turkey sought a more prominent role in the and culturally alien country. There are also region, first in the early 1990s and then from very few civil society contacts between the 2002 onwards, in line with Ahmet Davu- two nations. By contrast, there is still a toglu’s “strategic depth” doctrine, which strong sentiment of cultural proximity to calls for an “an activist engagement with Russia, although the latter is viewed as a all regional systems in Turkey’s neighbour- hegemonic power and, because of its recog- hood”. Intent on becoming an energy and nition of Abkhazia and South and transport hub, Turkey has prioritised co- its military presence there, as an “occupier.” operation with and Georgia on Turkey does not recognize Abkhazia and major regional infrastructure projects, such has never lifted its trade and transportation as oil and gas pipelines and the -- embargo, imposed in 1996. However, Tur- rail link (currently under construction). key’s large and well-organized Abkhaz dias- Today, Turkey and Georgia describe their pora has defied legal restrictions by carry- mutual relationship as a strategic partner- ing out trade and investment activities in ship; Turkey’s role in the economic sphere the , with Russia’s tacit consent. As is accurately described as that of a “merchant a result, Turkey accounts for some 18 per- hegemon” (a term coined by the Caucasus cent of Abkhazia’s total trade turnover, expert Michael Cecire). Ever since Georgia’s second only to Russia. in 2003, Turkey has been The Turkish-Abkhaz diaspora of around its leading trade partner and a major inves- 500,000 (by its own estimates) dates back to tor, playing an important role in softening the mass exile of ethnic Abkhaz to the Otto- the impact of the 2005 Russian trade em- man Empire in the 1860s and 1870s. It has bargo. A free trade agreement between been an active advocate of Abkhaz interests Georgia and Turkey came into force in in Turkey since the early 1990s, lobbying for 2008, and visa requirements were bilateral- the restoration of a direct transport link ly abolished in 2009. Turkey has consistent- with Abkhazia, organising Abkhaz-themed ly voiced support for Georgia’s territorial events in Turkey, facilitating the visits of integrity. From the mid-1990s onwards, it Turkish businesspeople, MPs, municipal offi- has also engaged in military cooperation cials and journalists to Abkhazia, and even with Georgia, providing military aid and organising the polling process in troop training and modernising Georgian in the 2014 Abkhaz presidential elections. military facilities such as airfields. The Abkhaz authorities, in turn, view The depth of Turkish-Georgian military the diaspora as an important political ally, cooperation has nevertheless largely been as well as an economic and demographic determined by Turkey’s relations with Rus- resource, and have encouraged Turkish sia and the West. Because of Turkey’s tradi- Abkhaz to resettle in Abkhazia. Today, the tional reluctance to see a NATO or US pres- number of Turkish-Abkhaz “returnees” in ence in the , it expressed reserva- the republic is estimated at 3,500, with the tions about Georgia’s accession plans at the first official census expected to take place 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit and invoked in 2017. As residence in Abkhazia is not a the Montreux Convention during the 2008 requirement for Abkhaz citizenship (which Russian-Georgian war to limit the passage is open to all ethnic Abkhaz worldwide), of US naval ships into the Black Sea. the number of diaspora representatives Despite the thriving intergovernmental holding Abkhaz is much larger cooperation (which has largely remained (probably around 7,500). Many of them do unaffected by political changes in Georgia), business in Abkhazia. It is this special rela- for Georgian society the geopolitical divi- tionship that the Russian-Turkish crisis in sions between Turkey and Russia also reflect 2015–2016 put to the test.

SWP Comments 54 December 2016

2 Abkhaz sanctions as a companies in infrastructure investment declaration of loyalty to Russia projects financed by Russia; and on the Few took notice when, in 2016, the activities of Turkish-registered NGOs (effec- tiny Abkhazia with its estimated popula- tive 1 March 2016). In December 2015, the tion of 240,000 announced its decision to authorities had already announced that impose sanctions on Turkey, becoming they would ban the lease of Turkish fishing Russia’s only ally to do so. With less than vessels, on which Abkhaz fishing companies 50 million EUR worth of imports from tended to rely. Turkey in 2014, Abkhazia’s impact on the To justify the introduction of these Turkish economy is close to zero. On the restrictive measures, the Abkhaz authori- contrary, it was the Abkhaz economy that ties pointed to Article 4 of the Treaty on was more likely to suffer from disrupted Alliance and Strategic Partnership with links with Turkey. It would be easy to jump Russia (2014), which obliges Abkhazia and to the conclusion – as some observers did – Russia to coordinate their foreign policies. that Abkhazia was forced to sever its ties to Incidentally, the final text of the Treaty Turkey under pressure from Russia. Yet the (originally entitled “On Alliance and Inte- way in which the sanctions were designed gration”) was itself the product of compro- and implemented (or not implemented) mise after fierce protests in Abkhazia over strongly illustrates the importance of paying such controversial provisions as opening attention to the existing leeway for balanc- Abkhaz citizenship to and merging ing and to local practices, instead of simply the Russian and Abkhaz armed forces. focusing on grand geopolitical narratives. The Abkhaz announcement came two weeks after , President Implications for Abkhaz-Turkish Putin’s aide in charge of relations with economic ties Abkhazia and , travelled to A closer look at the design of the sanctions Sukhum(i) in late December 2015. (Since and their subsequent implementation Georgia and Abkhazia use different ver- reveals the Abkhaz authorities’ desire to sions of many place names, e.g. vs minimise negative outcomes for the econo- Sukhum, this publication opts for status- my. The sanctions did not target such major neutral alternatives.) At a press conference import categories from Turkey as construc- with the Abkhaz leader , tion materials, fuel or textiles. Food im- Surkov warned that “some circles in Turkey ports from Turkey, although important, view Abkhazia as their zone of interests”, had already suffered the previous year as a signalling that Russia was intent on putt- result of the strong US dollar and weaken- ing Abkhazia’s loyalty to the test. Whilst ing Russian rouble, the currency used in acknowledging the diaspora’s special role, Abkhazia. With the price of Turkish food Surkov stressed the need to ban Turkish imports nearly doubling, many Abkhaz contractors from participating in infra- entrepreneurs had decided to switch to structure projects financed with Russian Russian products. The restrictions on Turk- money, and to develop other restrictive ish NGOs were moot as well: virtually none measures. Locally, the news was met with are present and active in Abkhazia. The surprise and consternation by those con- truly important partners for the Abkhaz cerned about the sanctions’ potentially authorities – the Abkhaz diaspora organi- negative impact on the Abkhaz economy sations – do not have official branches in and its ties with the diaspora. Abkhazia and mainly organise their events The full list of sanctions was made public in Turkey, inviting Abkhaz participants. on 20 January 2016. It includes restrictions The ban on leasing Turkish fishing ves- on the import of Turkish fish, fruits and sels, however, was potentially far more vegetables; on the participation of Turkish problematic. Hamsa, or European anchovy,

SWP Comments 54 December 2016

3 is the main commercial fish species in Ab- cated border formalities at until late khazia, and fish products are among the 2015. Travelling through Georgia also top export categories to Turkey. As Abkha- entails a risk. According to its Law on Occu- zia does not have its own ships, it has been pied Territories (2008), it is a crime to con- a common practice to lease them from duct economic activities in Abkhazia with- Turkey (with a much smaller share coming out the Georgian government’s permission. from Crimea in recent years). The ban was So is merely entering Abkhazia from Russia announced abruptly at the beginning of the (which many diaspora representatives have hamsa fishing season, which usually lasts done). Both are punishable by very steep from December until March, leaving busi- fines. In addition, the southern crossing nesses no time to adjust. The original plan over Inguri bridge is located far from major to use Russian ships as substitutes failed airports and is poorly equipped. because the latter lacked the capacity to fill However, diaspora Abkhaz from Turkey the catch quotas. In the end, the ban was who have obtained Abkhaz passports have quietly ignored. not been affected by the changes in the visa In addition, references to “Turkish com- regime. They can exit Turkey with their panies” or “Turkish citizens” in the text of Turkish passports and enter Russia with the the sanctions are legally ambiguous. The Abkhaz ones, since Russia recognizes Abkha- diaspora Abkhaz, who conduct most Turk- zia and has a visa-free regime with it. This ish trade and investment activities in fact may increase the demand for Abkhaz Abkhazia, hold Abkhaz passports and are passports among the diaspora representa- viewed exclusively as Abkhaz citizens under tives with regular contacts with Abkhazia. Abkhaz laws, which makes them exempt The resilience of societal and economic from the restrictive measures. Moreover, ties between Turkey and Abkhazia and their companies with Turkish capital are usually potential to adapt do not mean that the im- registered as Abkhaz companies rather pact of the Russian-Turkish crisis has been than joint ventures, which means that the negligible. The tensions, uncertainty and sanctions do not apply to them either. political risks resulting from the crisis Apart from the Abkhaz sanctions per se, lowered incentives for potential investors Russia’s reintroduction of the visa require- from Turkey to enter Abkhazia’s closed mar- ment for Turkish citizens from 1 January ket. Russian visa requirements for Turkish 2016 has created an obstacle to diaspora citizens continue to be an obstacle to busi- contacts with the homeland. To travel to ness and social exchange. Although the Abkhazia, Turkish Abkhaz use Air- Abkhaz sanctions were either not imple- port in Russia, located some 10 km from mented or had a limited effect, they did the border crossing at the River Psou. In- raise transaction costs. As one Turkish- stead of the usually uncomplicated pro- Abkhaz businessman complained in an cedure, diaspora visitors now have to apply interview with the authors, the most direct for a double or multiple-entry Russian visa result for him was the higher costs of pro- in advance. At the peak of the crisis, some cessing cargo at Turkish customs. Many of were subjected to lengthy interrogations these obstacles persist despite the ongoing upon arrival in Sochi or at the Psou border normalisation in Russian-Turkish relations. crossing. In principle, it is possible to circumvent the need for a Russian visa by entering Ab- The diaspora’s balancing strategy khazia from the south via Georgia proper, The Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey reacted for which Turkish citizens do not require a with great concern to the Russian-Turkish visa. This option is not used by the diaspora crisis. The Federation of Abkhaz Associa- Abkhaz, however, and many are not aware tions (Abhaz Dernekleri Federasyonu, or Abhaz- of it at all, having relied on the uncompli- fed), which is the leading diaspora organi-

SWP Comments 54 December 2016

4 sation, established in 2010, has been known Georgia. A programme aired by the private for its generally pro-Russian stance. In the Georgian TV channel Maestro on 26 Novem- wake of the rift between Russia and Turkey, ber 2015 is illustrative of a debate that by Abhazfed publicly stated its loyalty to the and large did not take place in the open. Turkish government, yet refrained from The broadcast discussed the question of criticising Russia directly. Shortly after Tur- whom Georgia should side with in the con- key’s downing of a Russian military jet on flict, rather than inquiring into the impli- the Syrian border, Abhazfed representatives cations of the crisis. visited the Russian Ambassador in Lasha Bugadze, a writer and the main to discuss future relations and promote guest in the programme, challenged the dialogue. In April 2016, diaspora activists formulation of the question. He argued that and Turkish think-tank analysts took part the TV programme makers deliberately in a round table in Sukhum(i) with the drew on popular perceptions of Russia and participation of Abkhaz officials, as well Turkey as civilisational fault lines, and thus as Russian MPs, businesspeople, and pro- tacitly embraced the propagandist logic government experts, to discuss options for of the Kremlin. Further, such a question a improving Russian-Turkish relations. It is priori precludes an alignment with Euro- likely that the Abkhaz diaspora’s concilia- pean values, which should be seen as sepa- tory stance towards Russia protected it rate from the EU and its exclusive claim to from harsher repercussions. represent them, similarly to Orthodoxy As for the domestic situation in Turkey from Russia. after the attempted coup, including the The TV programme and its framing clearly crackdown on the Gülen network, its im- showed how narratives grounded in geo- pact on Abkhazia has been limited. The political interpretations prevail in Georgian Gülen movement does not have a strong public discourse. According to these narra- presence in Abkhazia; the only Gülen tives, the small country of Georgia has been boarding school that ever existed in the torn between two powers in a centuries- republic (Basharan Lyceum) was closed in long struggle. While Russia is represented 2010. Although several members of the as the aggressive Goliath, Turkey plays the Abkhaz political elite, including the For- Muslim menace that may no longer con- eign Ministry’s representative in Turkey, quer territories, but exercises power through Inar Gitsba, are Basharan graduates, they cultural and economic means instead. do not maintain strong ties with the move- The Georgian framing of relations with ment and have not been affected. Diaspora Russia and Turkey in terms of civilisational organisations in Turkey have largely con- alignments exposes a number of fault lines, tinued business as usual as well. If anything, one of them between a large majority of the Turkey’s post-coup intensification of co- population and a liberally-minded minority operation with Russia has been welcomed constituted by parts of the political elite. in Abkhazia and among the diaspora. The former harbours anti-Muslim and anti- Turkish sentiments in line with narratives prevalent in national historiography and Between trade and Turkophobia: with dominant currents in the Georgian Georgia’s geopolitical and economic Orthodox Church. By contrast, out of libe- orientations ral convictions and above all pragmatic For Georgia, unlike Abkhazia, the crisis in considerations, the minority tends to wel- Turkish-Russian relations was of less imme- come and encourage close (and ever closer) diate importance. With few exceptions, the economic, political and military ties with Georgian media, political establishment Turkey. Yet another fault line runs between and civil society abstained from specifically business preferences and perceived cultural discussing the implications of the crisis for proximity. According to a 2015 Caucasus

SWP Comments 54 December 2016

5 Barometer survey, 61 percent of Georgians Erdogan told NATO Secretary General approved of doing business with Turks, Stoltenberg, Russia’s massive military build- while a mere 27 percent approved of Geor- up following the 2014 annexation of Crimea gian women marrying Turks. was turning the Black Sea into a “Russian The existence of anti-Muslim and anti- lake”. Turkish stereotypes and prejudices consti- At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, tutes a tool box for political mobilisation, NATO decided to explore options for ex- as could be seen, for instance, in the 2012 panding its presence in the Black Sea. Al- parliamentary election campaign in the though many predicted that Turkey would of . Situated withdraw support after its reconciliation on the Black Sea coast at the border with with Russia, at the October 2016 meeting of Turkey, Adjara boasts a significant Muslim NATO defence ministers in Brussels, Turkey population as a result of centuries-long was one of the six NATO members to express Ottoman rule, along with a significant a willingness to contribute to strengthen- presence of Turkish companies of all sizes, ing NATO’s presence in the Black Sea “on a lively entertainment industry (including land, at sea and in the air”. A more detailed casinos, which are banned in Turkey), and discussion is expected to take place in a sizeable Turkish expatriate community. January 2017. In the campaign for the October 2016 par- The announcement was duly welcomed liamentary elections, these issues once in Georgia, but the actual shape of the pro- again resurfaced on a national scale. David posed force remains to be seen. Turkey’s Tarkhan-Mouravi, the leader of the Alliance relations with NATO remain ambivalent for Patriots, a right-wing oriented party (there are both pro-NATO and pro-Eurasian- bloc, claimed in an election debate that ist factions within the Turkish military and Turkey was an enemy not only to Georgia, political elites), and President Erdogan has but to the whole civilised world. He com- hinted at applying for full Turkish member- pared the roughly 20 percent of Georgia’s ship in the Russian- and Chinese-led Shang- territory that Russia has occupied to the 33 hai Cooperation Organisation. percent of Georgian territory that Turkey The failed coup d’état in Turkey has had “occupies”, referring to areas with Georgian a more immediate impact on Georgia than populations in Eastern Turkey, including the Russian-Turkish crisis. Georgia’s Prime the historical Georgian province of - Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili incidentally . The implication was that Turkey became the first foreign head of govern- was gradually annexing Adjara. ment to visit Turkey after the July 15 events. Although his visit had been scheduled in advance, he used the occasion to strongly Turkey as a less predictable Euro- condemn the attempted coup and voice Atlantic partner for Georgia support for the Turkish government. Apart from valuing Turkey as a leading Since the failed coup, Ankara has called trade and investment partner, both the on a number of countries in the , and the United National Central and the Caucasus – including Movement governments have seen Turkey Georgia – to close down schools affiliated as a vehicle and vector of Georgia’s Euro- with the Gülen movement. There are seven Atlantic integration. After the crisis with such schools in Georgia, all of them oper- Russia broke out in 2015, Turkey ated by the Çağlar Eğitim Kurumları Asso- became a vocal supporter of Georgia’s ciation (three are located in Tbilisi, and one NATO membership. In April 2016, depart- each in Kutasi, , and Mar- ing from Turkey’s usual stance, President neuli). Yasin Temizkan, the Turkish consul Erdogan called for NATO forces in the Black in Adjara’s capital Batumi, blamed the Sea (where none are currently deployed). As Refaiddin Shahin College in Batumi for

SWP Comments 54 December 2016

6 “breeding” terrorists. However, the schools Conclusions have gone through lengthy accreditation The Russian-Turkish crisis and its after- procedures with the Georgian Ministry of math, as well as domestic developments Education and enjoy an excellent reputa- in Turkey following the failed coup of July tion among the Georgian middle class. So 2016, have affected Georgia and Abkhazia far, Georgia (unlike Azerbaijan) has largely in different ways. Their reactions to these resisted these calls. Although one school in events illustrate both the pervasiveness of Tbilisi was closed, pupils were merely trans- geopolitical narratives in the Caucasus and ferred to the two remaining schools. the importance of local practices and bal- While the post-coup developments in ancing. Turkey have undermined its role as Geor- While Abkhazia and Georgia have vastly gia’s Euro-Atlantic integration partner, the different relations with Russia, Turkey October 2016 Georgian parliamentary elec- plays a special role for both of them. Given tions have sidelined the most vocal domes- Abkhazia’s security and economic depend- tic advocates of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ence on Russia (which provides 70 percent path. The Republican Party and the Free of its state budget) and its close links to the Democrats headed by former minister of diaspora in Turkey, Abkhazia clearly has defence , which had left the much to lose from a Turkish-Russian con- Georgian Dream coalition in 2016 and 2014 frontation, which explains why the author- respectively, failed to pass the five-per-cent ities and local actors took some pains to threshold. The Alliance for Patriots, which contain the damage from the crisis. While toyed with anti-Turkish stereotypes and to the Turkish-Russian rapprochement has which some analysts ascribe a pro-Russian largely allayed Abkhaz fears of having to leaning, was able to enter parliament, but sever ties with the diaspora, some effects of scored only the required five per cent. the crisis persist, such as the sluggish roll- The Centrist party, which had openly cam- back of Russian sanctions, the visa require- paigned for Russian passports and pensions ments for Turkish citizens, and, finally, the to be distributed to all Georgian citizens, concern that the situation might repeat was banned from running in the elections itself in the future. After all, there are still by a court order. The race was dominated many significant disagreements between by the contest between the United National Turkey and Russia, the level of trust be- Movement and Georgian Dream, which tween the two nations is low, and Turkey won the majority of votes. feels threatened by Russia’s growing mili- The new Georgian Dream government tary presence in the Black Sea. is likely to maintain current relations with Although Georgia is in a different posi- Turkey in the economic and security spheres, tion, the benefits it might derive from continue attempts at a balanced relation- prolonged Turkish-Russian tensions are ship with Russia, and largely stick to the limited, while the costs – such as instability Euro-Atlantic direction. However, it is not in the larger neighbourhood or the poten- likely to push as hard for Euro-Atlantic tial for retaliation from Russia – could be integration as in the past, nor is Turkey high. Hence Georgia by and large welcomed going to play a significant role as a vector the normalisation of Russian-Turkish rela- in this regard. tions. Turkey will continue to be important All in all, developments in Turkish-Rus- to Georgia in many respects, above all eco- sian relations will keep affecting Georgia nomically. Yet Turkey’s growing ambiva- and its neighbourhood relations. Georgia’s lence about the West, as well as its crack- scope for action, meanwhile, is limited. down on democratic institutions, makes it a less predictable and committed partner for Georgia in its European and Euro-Atlan- tic aspirations. There is also some concern

SWP Comments 54 December 2016

7 among Georgia’s pro-Western elites that ises nearly all unauthorised activities in with Turkey stepping up its cooperation Abkhazia. Instead of reinforcing narratives with Russia and with Russia actively devel- of geopolitical incompatibility within Geor- oping a trilateral cooperation format with gian and Abkhaz society, EU policies should and Azerbaijan, new regional constel- aim at strengthening economic and inter- lations might emerge which could poten- societal ties between and across local actors. tially sideline Georgia, especially if the EU In the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian and US downscale their engagement in the war in 2008, the adopted a region. policy of “engagement without recognition” towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The policy is premised on the understanding Recommendations that isolation only pushes the breakaway This analysis points to several lessons to entities closer to Russia and solidifies their be learned. EU and German policy-makers negative attitudes towards Georgia and the

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und would be well-advised to be more sceptical West (which is in line with the findings of Politik, 2016 towards purely geopolitical interpretations Not Frozen!, a 2016 SWP Research Paper on All rights reserved of developments in the region. Instead, they unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet space). These Comments reflect should approach Georgia’s (and Abkhazia’s) Given Turkey’s links to both Georgia and the authors’ views. geopolitical framing and narratives as de- Abkhazia, it makes sense to include a Turk- SWP liberate attempts at “truth”-making. In ish component in the policy, something Stiftung Wissenschaft und terms of regional analysis, as the case of the that has not been done so far. Politik German Institute for Abkhaz sanctions demonstrates, it is abso- While the EU’s influence on the Turkish International and lutely essential to focus on local practices government is very limited, it may still co- Security Affairs (including at the micro level) and to take operate with Turkish civil society (includ- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 into account local knowledge and adapt- ing, but not limited to, the Turkish-Abkhaz 10719 Berlin ability. diaspora) on issues related to Georgia Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-200 As the EU’s leverage over Georgia is far and Abkhazia. One way of reinvigorating www.swp-berlin.org greater than its very limited influence in engagement without recognition could [email protected] Abkhazia, it should continue to engage be to facilitate Georgian-Turkish-Abkhazian ISSN 1861-1761 with Georgia in a variety of spheres and societal dialogue (with a special but not formats, rather than limit its involvement exclusive focus on young people) which to issues of stability which are so promi- remains much less developed than their nent in the revised European Neighbour- economic ties. Some topical issues for dis- hood Strategy. It should also pay attention cussion could include migration and re- to religious minority rights in Georgia, fugees, interfaith relations, or cross-border encouraging the authorities to react to environmental issues. While these meas- incidents of hate speech, harassment ures will not resolve the conflict, they may and attacks. It should closely monitor be useful in providing a fresh format for the changing regional environment in cross-border people-to-people contacts. the Caucasus, including the emergence of new actor constellations. The EU might also recommend that Georgia review some of the provisions of its Law on Occupied Territories. As the example of the Turkish-Abkhaz diaspora shows, the law disincentivises potential intermediaries with a prior history of en- gagement in Abkhazia from seeking co- operation with the Georgian authorities and local stakeholders because it criminal-

SWP Comments 54 December 2016

8