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HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT Caspian Studies Program FEDERALIZATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: DISCUSSING ALTERNATIVES FOR THE GEORGIAN- ABKHAZ CONFLICT By Bruno Coppieters, Tamara Kovziridze, and Uwe Leonardy Working Paper Series, No.2 October 2003 Federalization of Foreign Relations: Discussing Alternatives for the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict Bruno Coppieters Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel Tamara Kovziridze Researcher, Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel Uwe Leonardy Former Head of Division, Mission of Lower Saxony to the Federation of Germany Caspian Studies Program, 2003 Preface Dear Colleague, Georgia’s stability and security are essential factors to the success of the east-west corridor pipeline projects and the country’s economic development . Resolution of the secessionist conflicts affecting Georgia is vital to ensuring the state’s security and regional prosperity. Enclosed is a Caspian Studies Program Working Paper that addresses potential models of federalization that could encompass the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This paper focuses on the specific topic of the consequences of the various federation models for the foreign policymaking process. This paper is a very detailed study geared toward the specialist focusing on the conflicts affecting Georgia, as well as the student of conflict resolution and federation who is interested in studying the theoretical implications of the Georgian case. This paper is based on extensive field research conducted by the authors, Bruno Coppieters, Tamara Kovziridze, and Uwe Leonardy. In preparation of this paper, they discussed these federation models with Georgian and Abkhaz officials, politicians, scholars, journalists, and representatives of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community, and this paper reflects those discussions. The paper is also intended to stimulate discussion among Georgians, Abkhaz, and South Ossetians. The results of these discussions may be helpful in optimally resolving their conflicts. Regards, Brenda Shaffer, Ph.D. Research Director Caspian Studies Program Federalization of Foreign Relations Federalization of Foreign Relations: • Discussing Alternatives for the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict• By Bruno Coppieters, Tamara Kovziridze, and Uwe Leonardy Since its declaration of independence on April 1991, Georgia’s sovereignty has been challenged by civil war and by secession attempts on the part of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Negotiations on the reintegration of these two entities through federalization have failed. The Russian Federation, the United Nations (UN), and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe were involved in a series of negotiations on a federal division of powers between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, but these negotiations did not achieve practical results. The positions between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz authorities concerning the status of Abkhazia have been moving even further apart. Negotiations between the Georgian government and the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been focused thus far on the theoretical nature of sovereignty and the distinction between federation and confederation. They have not included any concrete views on institution building. This paper makes an attempt to go beyond these abstract discussions by presenting two possible models of a federalization of Georgia that would include Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It analyzes the practical consequences that a federal model of government would have on foreign policymaking. The authors of this paper have discussed these federation models with Georgian and Abkhaz officials, politicians, scholars, journalists, and representatives of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community.1 This working paper reflects some of the results of those discussions. The following paper received the financial support of the European Union’s TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) Programme, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. We want to thank the members of the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Development and Democracy for their support in the preparation of this paper. We are further thankful to Brenda Shaffer, Michael Waller, David Darchiashvili, Irakli Laitadze, Paula Garb, Alexander Kukhianidze, Stéphane Cools, Herbert Tombeur, Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, John Grennan, and Susan Lynch for their comments to this paper. The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the European Commission, TACIS Programme, or any other organization that supported the project. 1 The first discussion took place on November 4–15, 2000. The two federal options of foreign policymaking were discussed in Tbilisi (by the three co-authors) and Sukhum(i), the capital of Abkhazia, (by Bruno Coppieters and Uwe Leonardy). Bruno Coppieters had further discussions on this paper with Georgian and Abkhaz experts on the seminar “State-Legal Aspects of the Settlement of the Conflict,” organized by the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in Sukhum(i) on February 12– 13, 2001, with the participation of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). Coppieters was one of the experts for the Venice Commission. Kovziridze and Coppieters also had the opportunity to present a summary of this paper to Georgian journalists, officials, and politicians at the conference on “Human Rights and Regional Cooperation in the Caucasus: the Role of Georgia,” organized in Rome by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (Rome), the Tbilisi 2 Federalization of Foreign Relations The two constitutional models presented in this paper are based on the normative preference for a federation over a confederation. This preference is based on a number of observations. Conflicts within a confederation are ultimately resolved by the principle that each state retains supreme authority over its own affairs and may take decisions unilaterally, or even withdraw from the common polity. This type of institutional inflexibility makes it difficult for confederations to address severe ethno-political conflicts, including the kinds of conflicts that exist in Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Federations, on the other hand, are able to create an institutional balance between the principles of national self-determination and territorial integrity that respects the equal rights of the constituent nations. Constitutions of federations allow for the realization of the right of national self-determination on both the domestic and international levels. The paper discusses, from these various perspectives, two models for a federalization of Georgia that would include Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the consequences that these forms of government would have on foreign policymaking. It consists of nine sections: (1) Introduction (2) The current situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the conditions put forward by Georgian, Abkhaz, and Ossetian leaders for a future peace settlement. (3) The current situation of local and regional self-government in Georgia. (4) The different mechanisms of foreign policymaking in federations and confederations. (5) The different types of competences that need to be taken into account when designing a federation in order to avoid conflicts between federal levels as well as an analysis of their practical consequences. (6) Various forms of treaty-making and cross border cooperation in the European Union. (7) Descriptions of both an asymmetrical and a symmetrical model of federalization for Georgia that would include Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their characteristic forms of foreign policymaking. (8) Georgian and Abkhaz discussions about models of federation with the authors in 2 Tbilisi and Sukhum(i). School of Political Studies, and the Center for European Policy Studies (Brussels) on May 11–12, 2001. Parts of this draft have been discussed at the conference “The Development of Trans-border Cooperation Policies,” organized by the Georgian Parliament with the support of TACIS, Tbilisi, December 15, 2001, and at the conference “Federalism and Distribution of Powers in Abkhazia,” organized by the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, the Friedrich Ebert Fund in Georgia, and the Regional Institute of South Caucasus Security, Tbilisi, November 11–12, 2002. 2 The capital of Abkhazia is called Sukhumi by Georgians and Sukhum by Abkhaz. We write Sukhum(i). 3 Federalization of Foreign Relations (9) Conclusions and perspectives: an analysis of the opportunities that could emerge from the federalization of foreign policymaking in Georgia, including the possibilities of cross border cooperation. The main part of the paper is devoted to a comparison between two potential models of federalization of foreign policymaking. Its aim is to stimulate discussion between Georgian and Abkhaz scholars, officials, and political representatives on institutional mechanisms and models for a future peace settlement. This paper is not an attempt to present prefabricated solutions. Rather, it goes beyond the highly abstract discussions that have taken place until now on the basic principles of common state structures and focuses on the practical consequences that various federal choices may have on concrete policy issues in the field of foreign relations.3 This paper is not designed to analyze how federations have to address the fears and uncertainties that still remain