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Is Russia a Partner to the EU in Bosnia? by Tomas Valasek

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Is Russia a Partner to the EU in Bosnia? by Tomas Valasek Is Russia a partner to the EU in Bosnia? By Tomas Valasek # The EU and Russia are ostensibly partners in building a viable government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), but for much of 2007-08, Moscow publicly opposed EU-sponsored police reforms and encouraged Bosnian politicians to resist the EU proposals. # Russian policy in BiH was fundamentally opportunistic – it was not about expanding spheres of influence but about using crises in the region to weaken the credibility of the West. # Russia’s ability to undermine western policies towards BiH would be greatly reduced if the outside powers replaced the multinational consortium that oversees Bosnia with an EU-led mission. # Western ambitions for integrating BiH into the EU are failing – but this is due not to Russia but to Bosnia’s and the West’s own errors. The EU needs to pay more attention to Bosnia and make clear that it will not tolerate talk of any part of it breaking away. Where do the Balkans fit in the broader picture of EU- undermine western efforts to build a viable government Russian relations? Since the August 2008 war in in the country. But Russia’s actions were not the sole or Georgia, Eastern Europe – the borderland between the even the main cause of Bosnia’s instability and its EU and Russia – has been at the centre of attention. In failure to make greater progress towards EU 2008, President Dmitry integration; local opposition and the shortcomings of 1 Andrew Kramer, ‘Russia Medvedev declared Eastern western policy towards BiH are the chief reason. This claims its sphere of Europe Russia’s ‘sphere of brief concludes that Moscow’s policy towards Bosnia is influence in the world’, privileged interests’.1 And in the not aimed at building any ‘zone of influence’ in the New York Times, August 31st 2008. same year the EU launched a Balkans. Russia’s behaviour in the region in 2007-08 new programme, an ‘eastern was fundamentally opportunistic: Moscow’s goal was partnership’, to align the region’s economies and to weaken the authority of NATO, the US and the EU, political systems more closely with the EU’s. and the Balkans served as a convenient platform for this broader goal. Few people have paid attention to the impact that a more confrontational EU-Russia relationship could have on the Balkans. But it was here, in 2007, that The EU’s stake in Bosnia European countries fell out with Russia over the question of Kosovo’s independence. And for much of The EU has taken the lead in efforts to rebuild Bosnia, 2007 and 2008, Moscow and the West also in which a total of 55 countries and agencies have 2 squabbled over the future of been involved. Since the end of the 1992-95 civil war, While the country’s full Bosnia,2 which, more than ten the EU has contributed billions of euros to Bosnia’s constitutional name is ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’, years after the end of the civil reconstruction. It commands the 2,500-strong ‘Bosnia’ is widely used. war, remains unstable and peacekeeping mission in the country, called EUFOR. poorly governed. The international community’s ‘high representative’ to Bosnia doubles as the EU’s special representative. This policy brief will focus on EU-Russian tensions in The high representative has vast powers under BiH in 2007-08. It argues that Russia sought to international law, including the right to impose or Centre for European Reform T: 00 44 20 7233 1199 14 Great College Street F: 00 44 20 7233 1117 London SW1P 3RX UK [email protected] / www.cer.org.uk 2 repeal legislation (the so-called Bonn powers). Few functional. It is probably right – but thanks to, among other places in the world have received as much other things, Moscow’s intervention, constitutional attention or money from the EU over the past decade reforms seem out of reach. as Bosnia. As things stand, most of the power resides with local The EU has a strong interest in turning BiH into a governments dominated by nationalist leaders. At the functioning country. It wants to see its financial and end of the war, a peace conference in the US city of political investments protected. Its credibility as a Dayton split Bosnia into two ‘entities’, the Republika foreign policy actor is on the line. And it wants to make Srpska (RS), populated mostly by ethnic Serbs, and the sure that Bosnia does not become a failed state, which Federation, itself containing two ethnic groups: the would radiate crime and instability to the rest of Bosnian Croats and Bosnia’s majority ethnic group, the Europe. So it matters greatly to the EU that in recent Muslims or Bosniaks. A weak central government years, BiH has made little progress towards stability technically presides over the entities but it is ineffective; and EU integration, and that Moscow’s actions are the national parliament passed only 22 laws in its first partly to blame. The EU and Russia are ostensibly two years of existence as the parties in it voted along partners; both are members of the ‘peace ethnic lines, which prevented majorities from forming. implementation council’ (PIC) which co-ordinates international assistance. Russia is also part (along with The Dayton agreement largely consolidated the Serbs’ the EU, US and others) of a smaller ‘steering board’, the military gains – for much of the war, Bosnian Serbs, 3 The steering board PIC’s executive arm, which armed and trained by neighbouring Serbia, purged oversees the work of the high previously Muslim, Croat or mixed territories of their members are Canada, 3 France, Germany, Italy, representative. But for nearly non-Serb inhabitants. Most of those territories now Japan, Russia, United two years, Moscow was at form part of Republika Srpska. Unsurprisingly, the Kingdom, United States, the loggerheads with its PIC Bosniaks despise Dayton. Their leaders consider the RS Presidency of the European partners. It began briefing local a product of genocide, and can barely bring themselves Union, the European media against PIC decisions. to talk to its representatives. Many Bosniaks would like Commission, and the During one of Bosnia’s worst the RS to be abolished, and for the country to be Organisation of the Islamic post-war crises, the 2007-08 unified under a central government in Sarajevo. That Conference (OIC), which is attempt at police reforms, Russia will not happen; Bosnian Serbs would rather secede represented by Turkey. The encouraged local politicians to than see the RS disappear. So the Bosniaks’ best hope is steering board provides the oppose western plans. During a to strengthen the government in Sarajevo and reduce high representative with visit to the country in the the powers held by the entities, thus eroding the political guidance. summer of 2008, every influence of the much-loathed Republika Srpska. European diplomat interviewed for this brief described Russian actions as “unhelpful”. The Bosnian Croats are also unhappy: they are locked in a federation with the Bosniaks but given the chance EU-Russia co-operation improved towards the end of the Croats would create an entity of their own – a 2008; EU diplomats say that Moscow has toned Croat version of the Republika Srpska. They feel little down criticism of European policies. But even today, allegiance to the central authorities in Sarajevo or, for Russia’s attitude to EU efforts in Bosnia can best be that matter, to Bosnia itself. They are pulled towards described as low-level opposition rather than support. neighbouring Croatia, which has prospered since gaining independence in 1991, and will likely join the EU-Russian squabbles have revolved around two EU in the next couple of years. Visitors to the ethnic questions. Russia has opposed EU-backed Croat parts of Bosnia will be hard pressed to find a constitutional reforms aimed at strengthening the single Bosnian flag; instead, the local supermarkets sell national authorities in the capital, Sarajevo. And the football shirts with colours of the Croatian national two sides disagreed about how much longer outside team. Customers can pay in Croatian kuna as easily as states and organisations should continue to exercise in the Bosnian konvertibilna marka. control over Bosnia’s legislation and politics. The Bosnian Serbs are wedded to the status quo. Dayton gave them control of most of the territories Bosnia’s arrested development acquired during the war, and nearly unlimited powers to govern in them. All major decisions affecting life in Constitutional reforms and foreign oversight may Republika Srpska – for example on privatisation of seem arcane but in the Bosnian context the issues are state-owned companies, education or healthcare – are highly political, and crucial to the EU’s Bosnia taken in the entity’s capital, Banja Luka, rather than strategy. The constitutional reforms are meant to in Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs tend to view the RS as bridge the divide between Bosnia’s ethnic groups. The a de facto independent state, and in conversations, outside world’s ability to dictate legislation, if they refer to Sarajevo as though it were a capital of a necessary, has been a key driver of constitutional neighbouring state rather than their official capital. changes. Twelve years after the war, Bosnia remains a deeply divided country. The EU believes that without Bosnia has made some progress since 1995; it is no further political reforms the country will never be longer as divided and unstable as it once was: “Today, 3 4 European Stability there are no troops marching, no The World Bank estimates that 6 World Bank, Initiative, 'The worst in radical nationalists beating up the war destroyed about 80 per 6 ‘Country Brief 2008’, class: How the international returnees, no houses being cent of Bosnia’s pre-war GDP.
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