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Home , Abkhazia, Abkhazian railway, Alexander Ankvab, Georgian Railway

CORE POLICY BRIEF 05 2013 VisitingAddress: Hausmanns gate 7 BoxPO 9229Grønland, NO PeaceResearch Institute Oslo(PRIO) Opening the Russian– link

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0134 Oslo,

through

A challenging Georgian governance initiative

[email protected] www.projectcore.eu Europeand (CORE) Culturesof Governance and ConflictResolution in

Soon after the parliamentary elec- Key Questions tion in 2012 ’s new gov-

ernment declared its willingness to  How important is the restoration of the railway link for Georgia and Abkha- reconstruct and reopen the former zia, and particularly for the purpose of railway communication link with conflict resolution between the two? through Abkhazia, which  What are the political risks involved in the railway project?

ISBN: ISBN: www.prio.no was interrupted as a result of the  Does the new initiative meet the in-

978 978 Georgian–Abkhaz war in 1993. terests of all countries in the

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82 82

- - With its confidence-building charac-

7288 7288 region?

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515 516 ter, the initiative is part of a broader

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0 7

(print) Georgian foreign policy strategy aimed at re-establishing political and

(online)

economic relations with Russia, a development that would represent a

significant geopolitical challenge for the countries of the South Cauca- sus. The initiative will test ’s ability to prevent any changes to Abkhazia’s current political status and to keep the project purely eco- nomic in nature.

Nona Mikhelidze Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

Opening the railway: A confidence- building measure

The victory of Bidzina Ivanishvili’s coalition in the 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia has brought about a fundamental change to the Georgian–Abkhaz peace process. Unlike its predecessor, Georgia’s new government has recognized Abkhazia as an existing reality, one that has its own voice regarding its future, with which Georgia will have to find a way of engaging. Thus, Abkhazia has been recog- nized as a party to the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict, at least unofficially, although Geor- gia’s Minister for Reintegration Paata Zakareishvili has declared that the Georgian government will continue to maintain its policy of non-recognition of the separatist entities that are currently seeking to secede from the Georgian state.1 This is the context within which Tbilisi launched a new initiative for the restoration of the Georgian–Abkhaz railway. The aim is to develop economic rela- tions between the conflict parties and through such an approach to increase the mutual trust between them.2 However, before such highly Passenger train in Psyrtskha, Abkhazia. Photo: Sergei Rubliov desirable aspirations can be realized, the project will have to deal with a number of key ‘We need to promote the restoration of traffic been willing to sacrifice Abkhaz national geopolitical and geo-economic challenges. through Abkhazia [in order to] give Abkhazia interests. The Abkhaz also question whether The opening of the railway is not a new idea. an alternative so that its economic and trans- Georgia is prepared to reopen the rail link Indeed, several attempts were made in 2004– portation systems would not be tied only to with no preconditions attached (e.g.in the 2005 to restore communications between Russia,’ Zakareishvili declared.4 In addition, absence of an agreement on the return of Georgia and Abkhazia through the railway he emphasized that ‘restoration of the railway refugees, for example). However, Abkhazia’s link. In 2005, the parties agreed that a re- would help refugees return home and solve president, , has search group consisting of Georgian, Abkhaz many problems [in the long run]. Especially expressed an interest in examining the issue and Russian experts would visit , since the development of transport ties will more closely. According to him, at the time of and Ochamchireto study the state of the rail- contribute to the economic development of the , there were 24 freight and 12 way line there. The negotiations foundered in Abkhazia.’5 Generally, the Georgian minister passenger trains using the railway (carrying 2005, however. And, if the project failed in hopes that economic cooperation will increase 13–15% of all goods crossing the Caucasus), 2005, why should it succeed today? There are the chances of a solution to the Georgian– but the current benefits that Abkhazia might two main reasons why the new initiative Abkhazian conflict. However, if it is to be reap from a reopened rail link would need to might be more successful. First, because in successful, any initiative will need to be free of be properly assessed. In 2005, when the pro- 2004 Tbilisi was hoping to negotiate the issue explicit political connotations and to be ject was being negotiated with the Saakashvili only with Russia, without engaging Abkhazia couched solely in economic terms.6 The rail- government, the Abkhaz hoped that they as a party to the conflict. Second, the former way initiative has found a positive echo in would be able to collect customs and transit Georgian government made its offer condi- Georgia. According to a poll conducted by the duties for cargo travelling between Russia and tional: in exchange for the opening of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), 68% of Georgia. According to their calculations, Ab- railway, Tbilisi demanded the right of return respondents said they would welcome the re- khazia would have received somewhere in the for Georgian internally displaced persons and establishment of the rail link.7 region of US$500,000–800,000 per month.8 refugees who left Abkhazia after the war in As for Abkhaz attitudes towards the Georgian 1993. The current Georgian government’s Political risks proposal, initially scepticism prevailed, insofar approach is different: Tbilisi has declared its as the project touches upon Abkhaz–Russian The rail-link initiative can be viewed as a willingness to negotiate the issue with Abkha- relations. The Abkhaz recall that in the 1990s, compromise from the Georgian side. In order zia directly, as well as with other actors, with- in order to reopen the railway and thus a to promote economic relations with Abkhazia out imposing any preconditions.3 possible connection with , Russia had and build confidence, Tbilisi is prepared to CORE POLICY BRIEF 05 2013 www.projectcore.eu

man mobility, trade and tourism in the re- gion. Thus, the railway could help to end Armenia’s current isolation. Such a situation, however, explains Azerbai- jan’s negative reaction to the initiative, as it fears that it would enable Russia to deliver weapons to Armenia and to use the military base in through Abkhazia. In addi- tion, fears that reopening the railway link via Abkhazia would undercut the im- portance of the existing Baku–– rail link largely promoted and imple- mented by .13 Such fears were heightened by the somewhat imprudent statement by Georgian Prime Minister Ivan- ishvili regarding the disadvantages of the Baku–Akhalkalaki–Kars rail link.14 Ivanish- vili’s remarks were later clarified, but still Photo: Nona Mikhelidze reveal the challenge posed by the Abkhaz rail link to Azerbaijan’s interests. run the risk that the project might in some take years to see implementation through. In Conclusions and recommendations way contribute to an upgrading of Abkhazia’s terms of conflict resolution, for Zakareishvili political status, facilitating its quest for inde- the first results will only be discernible in two Opening the Abkhaz railway would assist in pendence. From Georgia’s perspective, it will years, and at least seven years would have to the development of the economies of Georgia be difficult to keep economics separate from pass for reconciliation to become an irreversi- and Abkhazia and lead to an improvement in politics, and a particularly thorny issue will be ble reality. Hence, although conflict resolution Georgian–Russian relations. Furthermore, it the legal dimension of the current initiative. would occur only in the long run, ‘the more may contribute to confidence-building be- In 2005, Abkhazia’s then Deputy Prime Min- economic projects with Georgia’s participa- tween and by encour- ister Leonid Lakerbaia stated that ‘the ques- tion are being carried out in Abkhazia, the aging joint economic activity between them. tion of restoring railway communications is a greater is the chance to resolve the conflict’.12 More broadly, the railway would have a posi- purely economic problem and it ought not to tive influence on the economies of the coun- be accompanied by political demands. If Geopolitical challenges tries of the South Caucasus. It would end Georgians want to build trust between our Armenia’s isolation, no doubt causing Azer- The railway initiative is part of a broader peoples then it should happen through the baijan irritation. However, Azerbaijan needs Georgian foreign policy aimed at re- economy and without any additional political to acknowledge that the isolation imposed by establishing political and economic relations demands.’9 It remains to be seen whether Baku and upon Armenia has born no with Russia. Georgia seems ready to take Abkhazia will maintain such an approach – fruit to date in terms of conflict resolution in Russia’s interests in the region into account. that is, considering the project as purely eco- Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, the Abkaz Indeed, reopening the railway link is in the nomic, without demanding some kind of railway could also benefit Azerbaijan: via interests of both and . Cur- political recognition. Abkhazian officials have Abkhazia, Azerbaijan would be able to reach rently, Russia’s communications with Arme- already declared that ‘Abkhazia should be the , thus diversifying its access to the nia take place through the Georgian Military legal owner of its section of the railway’.10 West. Road crossing the Larsi checkpoint. Through Questions related to customs, border posts the , Russia would regain For its part, Georgia should make clear what and security (e.g. who will obtain the right of its connection with Armenia and . Gener- kinds of cargo would be transported through inspection on the border between Russia and ally, the rail link would increase Russia’s the link. As noted above, the restoration of the Abkhazia at the river) are thus bound to economic activities in the South Caucasus. railway would make it easier for Russia to become highly challenging issues. Given that Armenia’s borders with supply its military base in Gyumri, Armenia, Furthermore, opponents are concerned about and Azerbaijan are closed, and Abkhazia as well as to make military shipments to Iran. the possibility that economic projects like this offers the only way of linking Armenia and Tbilisi should consider the highly vulnerable may contribute to the reintegration of Abkha- Russia (and Western markets) by rail, this situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and avoid any zia into Georgian territory.11 Minister Georgian initiative would clearly improve kind of tensions with Azerbaijan, since Baku Zakareishvili is aware that such an objective is Armenia’s transport network, reducing signif- continues to be its strategic partner in the not immediately within reach. The railway icantly the cost of trade. Furthermore, it neighbourhood. Hence, rather than arguing project is only in its initial phase, and it would would contribute to the development of hu- that Georgia is ‘not going to sacrifice its inter-

ests to the benefit of other countries’,15 the building confidence among the parties, most- Georgian government should take into ac- ly through recognition of Abkhazian agency in 11 Interview with several civil society representa- count the interests of all its neighbours. the peace process, and aimed at conflict reso- tives, Tbilisi, Georgia, 2013. lution in long run. Bearing in mind the difficulties of the geopo- 12 See note 4 above. litical context, the Georgian government 13 should start to consider a possible interna- The Baku–Akhalkalaki–Karsi railway would Notes connect with and thus represents tionalization of its railway project. For in- competition for Russia’s Trans-Siberian Rail- stance, Tbilisi could encourage the EU to 1 ‘No Plan To Solve Deadlock over Occupied way. contribute to the implementation of the pro- Georgian Regions’, Daily Monitor 14 ‘PM Says Construction of Baku–Kars Railway ject in the framework of its ‘engagement 9(227), 12 December 2013. Available at: without recognition’ policy towards the seces- “Triggers Questions”’, 21 December 2012. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1 Available at: sionist entities. Reconstruction of the railroad &tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40232. http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25575. would require significant funding. By inviting 2 Interview with a state official from the Ministry the EU into the project, Tbilisi could both 15 ‘Opening of Abkhazian Railway Meets the Inter- of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, Georgia, January ests of All South Caucasian Countries’, Public improve the economic feasibility of the project 2013. and allay Western fears regarding the gov- Radio of Armenia, 16 2012. Availa- 3 ble at: www.armradio.am. ernment’s rapprochement with Russia. Interview with a state official from the Ministry for Reintegration, Tbilisi, Georgia, January 16 ‘Georgia-Russia WTO Deal in Details’, 18 As for the legal implications that would 2013. November 2011. Available at: emerge around the railway project and the 4 ‘Georgia: The Railway to Abkhazia’, Georgia http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24158. difficulties Tbilisi could face regarding how Times, Analytics, 2 November 2012. Available 17 ‘Abkhaz leader on Georgia–Russia WTO deal’, 8 borders, customs and security issues are at: www.georgiatimes.info/en. regulated, the World Trade Organization December 2011. Available at: 5 ‘Kommersant: Georgia Ready To Create Rail http://www.georgiatoday.ge/article_details.php agreement between Georgia and Russia could ?id=9692. offer a way out. According to the deal, reached Link to Russia’,2 November 2012. Available at: http://en.gazeta.ru/news/2012/11/02/a_483895 18 ‘PaataZakareishvili: We Will Not Return Abkha- through Swiss mediation, trade at the borders 7.shtml. of disputed areas is to be monitored by a zia by Opening Railway Communication but neutral private company, which would be 6 Note 5 above. the Railway Will Be One of the Factors To Build Relations with Abkhazia’, 5 November accountable to the Swiss government, though 7 NDI-commissioned Public Opinion Survey, Civil 2012. Available at: 16 it would be hired by Georgia and Russia. In Georgia, Tbilisi, 12 December 2012. Available http://www.commersant.ge/eng/?id=3581. the same agreement, the Abkhaz territory is at: http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25539. defined as a ‘trade corridor’.17 8 ‘No One in the Leadership of Abkhazia Has Been Finally, returning to the broader question of Informed About the Resumption of Railway whether reopening the Abkhazian railway Communication’ [in Russian], , 18 might bring about a resolution of the current January 2013. Available at: http://apsnypress.info/news/8086.html. conflict, the Georgian government is under no illusions. As Georgia’s minister for reintegra- 9 ‘Georgia: Georgia–Abkhaz railway – Light at End tion himself recognizes: ‘We’ll not return of Tunnel?’, ReliefWeb report, 27 2005. Abkhazia [to Georgia] by opening the road Available at: http://reliefweb.int/. communication but the railway would be one 10 ‘Fast Tracking Regional Integration Through of the factors to build relations with Abkha- Georgian–Russian Railway Link’, Eurasia Re- 18 zia.’ In sum, reopening the railway is a new view, 24 December 2012. Available at: governance initiative that is seen as a tool for www.eurasiareview.com.

THE AUTHORS THE PROJECT

Nona Mikhelidze is Research Fellow at Isti- This policy brief is a product of the 7th

tuto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome and a Framework Programme project ‘Cultures of PhD candidate in Political Science at Istituto Governance and Conflict Resolution in Eu- Italiano di Scienze Umane (SUM) in Florence. rope and India’. The project analyses the

Email: [email protected] premises and operation of governance initia-

tives in conflict transformation processes through a combination of fieldwork, qualita- tive analysis and theory development. This Project is funded by the under the 7th Framework Programme

CORE POLICY BRIEF 05 2013 www.projectcore.eu