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Home , Abkhazia, Frozen conflict, Transnistria

SPECIAL REPORT

03/14/2019

POST-SOVIET FROZEN CONFLICTS: A CHALLENGE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

Warsaw Institute POST-SOVIET FROZEN CONFLICTS: A CHALLENGE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

Frozen conflicts occur in regions of the countries that are no longer controlled by the central authorities. Such zones remain under the of separatists who conduct a peace dialogue with state officials in a bid to empower their own governments. The lack of nonvio- lent solutions to the problem does not lead to broader armed operations while conflicts are doomed to persist unsolved. This results in a weakened position of the central authorities, also inciting other states that back the separatists to interfere in their affairs, either directly or not. Frozen conflicts in the territories of the former Soviet pose a great chal- lenge to establishing international ties in Eastern and the South . Owing to the lack of full sovereignty over their provinces, countries such as , and cannot pursue an independent foreign policy. They are all within the control of so-called „proto-states” tasked with introducing Russian-imposed policies as the Kremlin secures their safety while implementing an economic assistance program. So far Moscow has taken steps to obstruct -Atlantic aspirations of those states as neither the North Atlantic Alliance nor the allows membership to countries that are unable to seize full authority over their territories. Particular attention should be drawn to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh as an interesting example of without Moscow’s direct participation.

MAP OF CONFLICTS IN THE POST-SOVIET AREA

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Comparative analysis of selected conflicts

Although relatively pacific, the dissolution of the posed numerous challenges Although relatively while delimiting borders of some of the newly- -created republics. In the case of the Moldova- pacific, the dissolution - conflict, the opposition of the of the Soviet Union latter region’s residents to the domination of Chisinau was tied to concern over the status of posed numerous the Russian and Russian-speaking population challenges in Moldavia. Back in 1989, forces of the Popu- lar Front of Moldova political movement in while delimiting Moldovan Soviet Socialist (Roma- nian: Frontul Popular din Moldova) won a borders of some landslide victory, which led to the further of the newly-created escalation of the conflict. The movement called for declaring the Romanian as the official state republics. language while its ultimate goal was to unify Moldova and . to retrieve full control over its territory and whose authorities uphold the separatist Mechanisms comparable to those observed in „quasi-state”, also known as the Nagorno-Kara- Moldova’s Transnistria later took place in the bakh Republic. Here, Moscow’s involvement conflicts in South and in the comes as rather indirect as the Kremlin provides Georgian territory. Following the collapse of military support to Armenia, as evidenced by the Soviet Union, both republics faced a Russian military facilities at Gyumri and Erebuni. dilemma of whether to join the newly created The fight over Nagorno-Karabakh is chiefly of Georgian state or to fight for independence. geopolitical importance; on the one hand, it , Abkhazia and Transnistria emerges as a local while, on the declared their willingness to remain part of the other, its eventual settlement proves propitious Soviet Union, attempting to retain considerable for neighboring states. receives both they enjoyed as former Soviet economic and military aid from , one of republics. the major powers located close to the Caucasus whereas Armenia enjoys support both from The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict stands in stark and as the latter and Azerbaijan contrast to the above ones because it concerns compete for influence over the region. Moreover, two neighboring countries. Ethnically, Nagor- a populous Azeri minority inhabits the northern no-Karabakh is a territorial enclave in Azerba- part of Iran. The governments in and ijan inhabited by the Armenian population. are involved in a diplomatic row over the The dispute involves Azerbaijan that is trying region’s territorial belonging.

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The in eastern Ukraine has not yet evolved interest for Europe’s public opinion paying into a frozen conflict. Nonetheless, it may scant attention to its progression and efforts develop into what is now taking place in made to enfranchise the separatist authorities Transnistria, especially given that it is of little in and .

Russia’s actions as part of frozen conflicts

SOURCE: VECTORNEWS.EU

In some conflicts, Russia took step intending to states from making a rapprochement with develop a peace-making process provided that Western political and military structures. Moscow gained full control over both the separatist territory and the state to which it In the case of the Moldova-Transnistria con- officially belonged. flict, Russian army backed the region’s resi- dents with the aim of defending the Russian- After came to power in 2000, -speaking population in Moldova. From the Russian foreign policy focused on retaining Kremlin’s perspective, Romania’s annexation of former Soviet republics within the Kremlin’s Moldova would be the principal threat, exclu- sphere of influence. All Russian pursuits ding the latter from Moscow’s sphere of influ- towards former Soviet republics in Eastern ence. For Russia, Transnistria is a tool for Europe and the Caucasus were to prevent these exerting political pressure on Moldovan

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withdraw from the plan, Moscow did not Russian foreign policy perform any tasks aimed at recognizing the focused on retaining sovereignty of Transnistria or annexing the territory from Moldova. This emerges as a former Soviet republics logical explanation, all the more so that there is no direct land link between Transnistria and within the Kremlin’s Russia. Also, after recognizing Transnistria’s sphere of influence. independence, Russia could no longer yield control over Moldova while an essential part of officials incapable of seizing full power over the Kremlin’s strategy consists of maintaining their state territory, which blocks the country’s the Transnistria-Moldova conflict at its present accession to the North Atlantic Treaty and the stage. The victory of Moldova’s pro-European European Union. With both political and coalition constituted a political challenge for military control over the authorities in Tira- Russia that threatened to recognize Transni- spol, Moscow is sustaining a peace dialogue, stria’s statehood, attempting to force Moldova hoping to retain political jurisdiction over to abandon plans to integrate with the Europe- Transnistria and Moldova. Presented in 2003 an Union. by Russia, the so-called constituted the most serious proposal for the Among other instances of Russian activities in conflict settlement over the past twenty years. the post-Soviet zone, there is also the Kremlin’s Under the plan, Moldova would become a involvement in the Armenian-Azerbaijani federal state, along with Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Moscow does not (the latter of which is an autonomous intend to directly engage in the dispute, hoping territory recognizing Chişinau’s domination) to retain its power in both countries while as two self-governing administrative units assuming the role of just one of several local having a veto over major state decisions. powers with interests in the region. Moscow Moreover, Chişinau would not be entitled to backs Armenia militarily yet it strives to exert interfere in local legislation in these areas. more pressure on Yerevan. Back in 2012, the Kremlin forced Armenia to reject the Associa- The recommendations listed out in the Kozak tion Agreement with the European Union Memorandum proved unfavorable for Moldo- while prompting the country to join the Eura- va’s central authorities, meaning that pro-Rus- sian Union, or Moscow’s geopolitical project sian autonomous entities operating within the whose members are , , federation could block all decisions on the and Russia. If to take into account country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Such a the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, the latter scenario would encourage Moscow to use its party enjoys a considerable advantage over the economic and political influence in Transni- former, both militarily and economically, stria and Gagauzia to exert pressure on the whereas assistance from such great partner as government in Chişinau intending to incorpo- Russia is conducive to maintaining a relative rate Moldova into the Eurasian structures. balance of power in the neighborhood. Despite the failure of the Kozak Memorandum Moscow’s actions in Abkhazia and South and Moldova’s final decision to eventually Ossetia were of a different nature: first and

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foremost, both republics have land borders with the Russian Federation, hence their Moscow conducted potential incorporation seems possible from a an armed intervention political and economic point of view. on the pretext of defen- Following the victory of Georgia’s Rose Revo- lution of 2003, the country reoriented its ding the autonomy foreign policy in a more pro-Western direc- of two separatist regions, tion, thus dropping the hitherto pro-Russian course. Georgia’s new ruling team sought to in fact intending to block introduce pro-democracy reforms in the Georgia’s Atlantic ambi- country in a bid to make it independent of Russia’s influence. Facing such changes, addi- tions. tionally fuelled by a risk of Georgia joining the North Atlantic Alliance, Russia took advantage while recognizing both breakaway entities as fully of separatist moods in Abkhazia and South independent. Russia’s operation came as a respon- Ossetia to fulfill its geopolitical purposes. This se to the earlier declaration of the North Atlantic was first manifested by Moscow’s decision to Alliance at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, hand out Russian to Georgian-born thus when Georgia and Ukraine received an residents of the two republics. Russia’s efforts invitation to join the Alliance. Nonetheless, were a pretext to commence a military opera- Russia’s military interference in Georgia in Au- tion aimed at protecting the country’s citizens gust 2008 ultimately put an end to the country’s in a dispute between the separatists and the further integration with NATO structures. Mo- Georgian army. Georgia’s conflict with Abkha- scow conducted an armed intervention on the zia and South Ossetia reached its apogee in pretext of defending the autonomy of two separa- August 2008, along with Mosco’s military tist regions, in fact intending to block Georgia’s offensive whose main goal was to preserve the Atlantic ambitions. sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

A perspective of frozen conflict in Ukraine

The conflict in broke out in response western Ukraine. In consequence, Yanukovych to actions performed in Kiev by Ukraine’s was overthrown and forced to leave the country opposition against , who in February 2014. Meanwhile, in eastern Ukra- was president at that time. After he refused to ine, pro-Russian separatist rebels overtly decla- sign the Association Agreement with the red support for the toppled leader while putting European Union, the country became a coun- forward an idea of an alliance with Russia. As a try gripped by a wave of anti-government result, Moscow-backed Donetsk People’s Repu- demonstrations that later transformed into a blic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic revolution both in Kiev and other cities of (LPR) were established yet Russia refrained from

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SOURCE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

hand full control over the disputed area to the For Moscow, incorpora- OSCE. Drafted in February 2015, the Minsk II ting the Donetsk Agreement constituted another attempt to lay the foundation for peaceful solutions to the and Luhansk People’s conflict. The deal compelled Minsk and Kiev to discuss details, including issues related to Republics into Russia withdrawing all heavy weapons from the would be equivalent region.

to admitting to being The conflict in Donbas seems to remain at the a topmost aggressor same stage as that in Transnistria. Although its military phase has not yet come to an end, the in the Ukrainian conflict. global public opinion ceased to treat the dispute as potentially related to the matter of taking official actions, as was the case of the mutual relations between Russia and the West. Moldova-. The Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lu- Despite the Minsk Protocol of September 2014, hansk People’s Republic, or the Russian-backed discussed later by the representatives of Ukra- separatist „quasi-states”, maintain their domi- ine, Russia, and , known as the nation over the territory they manage. It seems Normandy format, the conflict failed to bring that Moscow’s goal consists of offering conti- the expected results. Under provisions of the nuous support for both entities, making them agreement, the parties to the conflict were equal partners for Kiev in a further discussion obliged to halt their military operation and on the future of Ukraine. From Moscow’s point

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of view, incorporating these territories into enabling to initiate negotiations on a joint Russia would appear little beneficial for the federation with the authorities in Kiev. Last but Kremlin, putting it at risk of losing authority not least, the Kremlin will make efforts to ease over other parts of Ukraine, as exemplified by relations with Western states and to lift sanc- the Moldova-Transnistria case. Moscow finds tions imposed so far. Russia is therefore unlike- it more profitable to back the independence of ly to incorporate both republics into its territo- Ukraine’s self-proclaimed people’s republics, ry, which could be equivalent to admitting to providing both of them with adequate tools being a topmost aggressor in the Ukrainian conflict.

Frozen conflicts and Euro-Atlantic integration

SOURCE: NATO

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine reoriented their foreign policies towards closer ties with Georgia and Moldova the European Union and the North Atlantic will not be admitted Alliance. Frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova and the still active one in eastern into the EU and NATO Ukraine come forth as a starting point for without prior resolution negotiations with the European Union as all unsolved disputes pose a threat to the security of their internal disputes.

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ensure security in the immediate vicinity of the Russia maintains community. The governments in Kiev, frozen conflicts and Chisinau will first and foremost strive to develop solutions that appear beneficial from in the post-Soviet zone the perspective of their processes. As a defensive alliance, NATO had because such a solution no mandate to negotiate in conflicts that take impedes further place in non-member states. NATO’s main activities in this respect involved the suspen- development sion of military cooperation with Russia after of Euro-Atlantic the latter performed a disproportionate milita- ry action in Georgia in 2008. Nonetheless, this integration of the region. did not regard mutual cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. A few years later, NATO’s of the community’s immediate neighborhood. response emerged after Russia annexed None of these countries will be admitted into and launched military operations in eastern the EU and NATO structures without prior Ukraine in 2014, prompting the Allianceto resolution of their internal disputes. suspend all forms of cooperation with Moscow.

This is due to concerns over engaging both Russia maintains frozen conflicts in the post- organizations in direct conflict with the Rus- -Soviet zone because such a solution impedes sian Federation. It seems that many European further development of Euro-Atlantic integra- countries pay more attention to maintaining tion of the region. Their central authorities do correct relations with Russia rather than not dispose of adequate financial means or getting involved in peripheral disputes. From military capabilities to enforce the reintegra- the European Union’s perspective, it is vital to tion of separatist-ruled „quasi-states”.

Russia’s strategic goals in selected conflict zones

Russia strongly opposed to the events in Geor- gia (2003), Moldova (2009) and Ukraine (both Recently Russia has been in 2004 and 2013/2014), all of which were unable to put forward linked to sweeping pro-European elites to po- wer in the aftermath of so-called color revolu- a better economic tions. By maintaining the status of unresolved territorial disputes, Russia could have an impact aid offer than on their further development thanks to suppor- that proposed ting separatist authorities in Abkhazia, the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Luhansk People’s by the European Union. Republic, South Ossetia and Transnistria.

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SOURCE: MOLDOVA ORG

Russia takes advantage of frozen conflicts in South Caucasus as its exclusive sphere of the former Soviet republics to uphold its influence. Thanks to retaining control over sphere of influence mainly because the Kremli- their separatist entities, the Kremlin is able to n’s integration offer is scarcely interesting for keep restricted authority over the said states the countries of the region. Following econo- while pushing away the perspective of their mic sanctions imposed by the European Union integration within the European Union and and the , fuelled by a drop in the NATO. For Russia, Euro-Atlantic integration of energy resources prices (as estimated, Russia and the South Caucasus is the might have lost a total of $140 billion in 2015), greatest threat to its own security as the acces- Moscow has not been able to put forward a sion of the region’s countries into the European better economic aid offer to the neighboring Union and NATO would push out Russia’s countries than that proposed by the EU. geopolitical influence from this part of Europe. Still, Moscow sees Eastern Europe and the

Author: Jakub Lachert Jakub Lachert is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. His research interests include: European Union neighborhood policy, including, in particular, Eastern policy, , Western in the process of integration with the EU.

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The opinions given and the positions held in materials in the Special Report solely reflect the views of authors.

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