Explaining Ethnic Conflict in the South Caucasus: Mountainous Karabagh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia
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Explaining Ethnic Conflict in the South Caucasus: Mountainous Karabagh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia by Cory D. Welt B.A. International Relations Stanford University, 1995 M.A. Russian and East European Studies Stanford University, 1995 SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY SEPTEMBER 2004 © 2004 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved. Signature of Author: ______________________________________________________ Department of Political Science August 6, 2004 Certified by: ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Van Evera Professor of Political Science Thesis Supervisor Accepted by: ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Ansolabehere Professor of Political Science Chairman, Committee for Graduate Students Explaining Ethnic Conflict in the South Caucasus: Mountainous Karabagh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia by Cory D. Welt Submitted to the Department of Political Science on August 6, 2004 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science ABSTRACT This dissertation investigates the origins of ethnic conflict in the South Caucasus. It explains the mass mobilization of regional groups in Mountainous (Nagorno) Karabagh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia from 1987 to 1989, variation in the goals of these groups (and of other regional groups in the USSR), and the start of the conflict-spirals that ultimately led to ethnic war. The dissertation examines three aspects of mass mobilization: group motivation, the commitment problem, and perceptions of opportunity. Utilizing historical memories, leadership rhetoric, signals of opponent intentions, and evidence of shifting capabilities, the dissertation assesses four hypotheses for group motivation: fear of violence, cultural extinction, demographic shift, and economic discrimination. It concludes that all three groups were mainly motivated by a fear of future demographic shifts and economic discrimination. The dissertation argues that the three regional groups also shared a political commitment problem—the absence of a mechanism that guaranteed union republic opponents would protect their demographic and economic interests after they agreed to a compromise. Contemporary signals of intent and historical precedents led groups to believe their opponents were committed to state centralization, not the expansion of regional autonomy. Regarding opportunity, two regional groups believed their demands coincided with Mikhail Gorbachev’s commitment to rectify “deviations” from the early Soviet path of state development and could thus persuade the central government to accommodate their demands. The third regional group did not and so pursued a more modest political goal. The dissertation applies the above findings to cases of regional mobilization (and its absence) elsewhere in the USSR and finds that a focus on opportunity provides the best explanation for the presence or absence of mass mobilization. Finally, the dissertation argues that conventional state security concerns best explain the start of escalation. Union republic opponents, Azerbaijanis and Georgians, perceived regional mobilization to be manifestations of broader “interstate” conflicts pitting Azerbaijan and Georgia against, respectively, Armenia and Russia. They did not consider the actions of regional groups to be a product of group insecurities. The dissertation concludes by applying the above findings to the practice of conflict resolution. Thesis Supervisor: Stephen Van Evera Title: Professor of Political Science BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Cory Welt is a Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In 2003-2004, he was a visiting fellow at CSIS. He received his Ph.D. in political science from MIT in 2004 and received an M.A. in Russian and East European Studies and a B.A. in international relations from Stanford University in 1995. He has received Foreign Language and Area Studies and National Science Foundation fellowships, as well as research and writing grants from the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Social Science Research Council, and the Center for International Studies at MIT. He was also a Raoul Wallenberg Scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1995-1996). For Tamuna Contents List of Maps and Tables xiii Acknowledgments xv Maps xix-xxiii Part One: Introduction Chapter 1: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in the South Caucasus 25 Chapter 2: Three Campaigns 59 Part Two: Testing Motivations for Mass Mobilization Chapter 3: Violence and Cultural Extinction: Red Herrings of Regional Mobilization 73 Chapter 4: Population Shift and Economic Discrimination: 115 A Foundation for Regional Mobilization Part Three: The Failure to Negotiate Chapter 5: A Problem of Commitment 163 Chapter 6: An Opportunity for Success 205 Part Four: From Mobilization to Conflict Chapter 7: A Wider War 255 Chapter 8: Implications for Conflict Resolution 283 Bibliography 305 List of Maps and Tables Maps Map 1: The South Caucasus xix Map 2: Mountainous Karabagh xx Map 3: Armenia and Azerbaijan: xxi Nakhichevan, Zangezur, and Mountainous Karabagh Map 4: Abkhazia xxii Map 5: South Ossetia xxiii Tables Table 3.1: Summary of Motivations for Mass Mobilization: 114 Violence and Cultural Extinction Table 4.1: Population of Mountainous Karabagh: 1921-1989 158 Table 4.2: Population of Abkhazia: 1897-1989 159 Table 4.3: Population of South Ossetia: 1926-1989 160 Table 4.4: Summary of Motivations for Mass Mobilization: 161 Demographic Shift and Economic Discrimination Table 4.5: Ranking Motivations for Mass Mobilization 162 Table 5.1: Contemporary Signals and Historical Precedents 203 Table 6.1: Historical Promises and Political Goals 252 Table 6.2: Presence/Absence of Mass Mobilization 253 Acknowledgments This dissertation is the product of years of curiosity regarding the formation of ethnic and national identities, the historical creation of state borders, and the relationship between central governments and regional ethnic groups. It is also the product of a longstanding fascination with the rich ethnic and historical mosaic of post-Soviet Eurasia. Needless to say, I have incurred numerous debts of gratitude along the way. My first thanks go to friends and colleagues at Stanford University. Ian Bremmer, whose early friendship, enthusiasm for his subject, and invitations to come on research trips to Kiev, Yerevan, and Tbilisi set me down the path that has resulted in this dissertation. David Hoffman was a stalwart comrade in Moscow, Kazan, and Almaty; our discussions and travels continue to shape my thinking today. I have been enriched by conversations and arguments about identity and politics with David Blood that began at Stanford and continued later in the coffeehouses of Tbilisi and Baku. Ronald Berry, N’Gai Croal, Michael Nichols, Eric Selmon, and Ben Schalet offered many evenings of discussion and debate, lasting friendships, and much support. At MIT, I was fortunate to be surrounded by an extraordinary set of kind, generous, and intellectually curious colleagues. Particular thanks go to Daniel Metz and Jeremy Pressman for always being ready to critique my work and engage in lengthy conversations on identity, history, and conflict. In addition, Matthew Bidwell, Danny Breznitz, Sarah Lischer, Sara Jane McCaffrey, Jessica Piombo, and Amos Zehavi provided the best cohort a graduate student could hope to have. Thanks also go to Jeremy Teichman for his friendship, late night discussions, and constant good cheer. I owe a special debt to my thesis committee. David Woodruff stunned me from the first day of studies with his ability to combine the most important issues of social science with the complexities of history. I thank him for sharing his knowledge and insights of Soviet history and politics and for his constant personal support. Frederic Schaffer taught me the material I valued most from my graduate studies; his ideas on culture, language, and political mobilization regularly inform my thinking. I am grateful to Melissa Nobles for insisting that I not forget the fundamental comparative politics nature of my topic and introducing me to a body of literature that expanded my geographical horizons and considerably sharpened my argument. Finally, chair Stephen Van Evera took interest in my topic from the start, forced me to clarify my thinking at every stage of the dissertation writing process, and offered consistent and enthusiastic support. I have only just begun to take up his welcome challenge to satisfactorily address questions of nationalism, mythmaking, and ethnic conflict. I also wish to thank Roger Petersen, who joined the MIT faculty too late for me to engage his talents more fully but who eagerly discussed issues of historical memory and ethnic mobilization with me and whose creative works on the subject continue to inspire. I am grateful for the education and hospitality many individuals provided during my travels and research in the Caucasus and Central Asia. I especially wish to thank my Georgian-language teachers, Rusiko, Nana, and Tamriko, and my warm and welcome host families in Tbilisi, Baku, and Tashkent. Special thanks also goes to Mark Mullen and Joe Taggart, formerly of the NDI office in Tbilisi, who went out of their way to provide me with insights into Georgian politics and, of far greater importance,