Domestic Intelligence and National Security Reform Proposals

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM PROPOSALS

Fayza Elmostehi Michael D. Vozzo

In the post-September 11th era, a variety of measures have been advo- cated to improve domestic counterterrorism intelligence. These efforts are due to the restricted and haphazard procedures for intera- gency information sharing in the United States preceding the terrorist strikes.1 A majority of the criticism focused upon the procedures within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter, FBI), and some called for the establishment of a new domestic security service that would focus on prevention, rather than simply investigating terrorist acts once they occur.

The supporters of creating a domestic intelligence agency (hereinafter DIA) draw parallels between its proposed structure and the United Kingdom’s Security Service.2 The Security Service, better known as MI-5 (hereinafter, MI-5) is an intelligence agency staffed by civilians whose responsibility is simply domestic intelligence.3 MI-5 personnel cannot initiate law enforcement activities or cases and cannot arrest or detain law enforcement suspects.4 Critics of the concept claim that it would add needless complexity to the system, slow down rather than promote information flows among agencies, and threaten civil liberties.5

Ultimately, the Bush Administration chose instead to press reforms within the FBI and new bureaucratic arrangements within other parts of the federal government, which purport to provide the country with a more robust, comprehensive, and rationalized structure for the analysis and dissemination of terrorism information.6 Steps have been taken to overhaul the intelligence function of the FBI, including

1 a common analysis of business practices regarding how information and act on the importance of separating the intelligence collection is gathered, shared, analyzed, and distributed, which could lead to the function from the law enforcement function, providing information to development of an overarching national plan for the sharing of infor- those agencies that have the authority to take action. mation and intelligence among all levels of government and with the private sector.7 Another advocate for DIA is Senator John Edwards. Senator Edwards proposed legislation that would create such an agency, entitled the Several aspects of the reform process, however, remain problematic “Homeland Intelligence Agency (HIA),” in February 2003, in the or raise additional issues of concern. These issues relate to the effica- Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act (hereinafter, cy of changes enacted within the FBI, the development of viable FICIA). The thrust of the FICIA is removing intelligence functions structures of accountability and oversight to mitigate more intrusive from FBI and placing them in a new HIA.13 domestic information gathering, the incorporation of local law enforcement in federal efforts to combat terrorism, the coordination Senator Edwards’s HIA would focus on information gathering, not of national intelligence structures, and the unintended consequence law enforcement, so it could better perform the job of tracking terror- that much of the enforcement for certain types of criminal activity has ist operatives in this country and coordinating intelligence with local been shifted from the FBI back to state and local law enforcement.8 law enforcement and other federal agencies.14 “As long as the end Therefore, these anticipated problems may find a solution in the game at FBI continues to be law enforcement – opening investiga- development of an independent DIA. tions, arresting suspects, and putting them in jail – FBI will never be able to do successfully what a true intelligence agency must do: col- The general purpose of a DIA would be to protect the country from lect the right information, fit it into a bigger picture, provide it to ana- internal threats to national security, espionage, and subversive acts. lysts and policymakers, and help design a range of appropriate solu- Vesting responsibility for both domestic intelligence collection and tions.”15 operational activity in a law enforcement agency has thus far proven to be ineffective. Former Virginia Governor James Gilmore, chair- HIA would be established as part of the Department of Homeland man to The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities Security (DHS) and its responsibilities would be the collection of for- for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (“the Gilmore eign intelligence inside the United States, analyzing that intelligence, Commission”), said there is a need for an intelligence “fusion center,” and then disseminating the information to all appropriate Federal, independent of any current department or agency, which would serve state and local officials. Senator Edwards stressed that the DHS with- to bring together information from a number of different sources to out the aid of a new agency and the Terrorist Threat Integration “connect the dots” and prevent attacks. 9 Furthermore, the Gilmore Center (TTIC) will not be able to accomplish the domestic intelli- Commission posits that a separate domestic intelligence collection gence task. Specifically, Senator Edwards believes the TTIC’s mis- agency might allow the FBI to return to a context in which a criminal sion is too specialized because it is focused on intelligence analysis, predicate is once again a prerequisite for law enforcement activity.10 whereas HIA would incorporate collection as well.16 See Appendix A The DIA would provide a clearer context in which to evaluate and for a graphic depiction of Senator Edwards’s model. address concerns that relate specifically to the collection of intelligence inside the United States, separate and apart from the issues The FICIA states the mission of the HIA is to support the Director of related to what enforcement actions the government can take based on Central Intelligence in discharging the responsibilities of the Director that information.11 And at all times there would be a clear distinction as the head of the intelligence community by serving as the entity between intelligence collection authority and law enforcement within the U.S. government solely responsible for the collection and power.12 The main focus of such an agency would be to recognize analysis of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence inside the

2 3 17 United States. Like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the HIA Summary of the Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act 18 would have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers. Of 2003 (S.410) 20 Additionally, the head of the organization, the Director of Homeland Intelligence (“DHI”), would provide for prompt and efficient dissem- Issue Bill Provisions ination to the other elements of the intelligence community, agencies Organization Establishes HIA as a new member of the U.S. Intelligence of the United States government as the President may designate, and Community (USIC) within the Department of Homeland the entities of State and local governments performing first responder Security. The primary mission of HIA would be the collection and law enforcement roles in connection with terrorist activity.19 and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence inside the United States, including the plans, intentions and capabilities of international terrorist groups operating in the United MI-5 and Senator Edwards’s proposed HIA share similar characteris- States. tics. In 1909 the United Kingdom established the Secret Service Powers Limits the powers of HIA to domestic intelligence collection, Bureau, which would later become MI-5, to conduct counter subver- analysis, exploitation, and dissemination. The organization sion operations against Germany and the Soviet Union.21 The office would not have any police, subpoena, or law enforcement pow- operated under the direction of the government until 1989 when its ers, except as explicitly authorized in HIA Office of Inspector functions became statutory within the Security Services Act of 1989 General and HIA Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties Protection. These functions generally pertain to the conduct of 22 (SSA). The SSA described MI-5’s mission as the “protection of internal HIA audits and the means of ensuring all necessary and national security and, in particular, its protection against threat from related HIA information is made available in these pursuits. espionage, terrorism, and sabotage, from the activities of foreign powers, and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parlia- Staff Staffs HIA with new personnel and law enforcement or other personnel from other agencies, including FBI. All new personnel 23 mentary democracy by political, industrial, or violent means.” would be trained as Intelligence Officers, and the training would be modeled on CIA training of Intelligence Officers within its This act was amended in 1996 to respond to the end of the Cold War Directorate of Operations. and the Irish Republican Army temporary cease-fire and address the growing domestic criminal threat.24 The amended act extended MI- Functional Transfers the related HIA mission functions now found in FBI, Transfers CIA, National Security Agency (NSA), and the Office of the 5’s authority to include supporting law enforcement but MI-5 could National Counterintelligence Executive to HIA. The bill would not act as an “independent law enforcement agency.”25 MI-5’s direc- also prohibit FBI from carrying out foreign intelligence, counter- tors are also required to report to Britain’s home secretary, the coun- intelligence, and internal security functions, except as in support try’s chief law enforcement official, and its operation is also subject of its law enforcement mission. The bill would also abolish the existing FBI position of Executive Assistant Director to the oversight of a Parliamentary intelligence and security commit- Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence. tee.26 State and Establishes within HIA an Office of Federal, State, and Local local Law Enforcement Coordination to provide information to feder- Although there are important parallels regarding function, oversight, connectivity al, state and local law enforcement officials. Consistent with all and jurisdiction between the proposed HIA and MI-5, there are also appropriate regulations, statutes, and guidelines – including the very important distinctions. First, there is a clear difference in the protection of intelligence sources and methods – classified information would be shared with state and local officials who would British form of democratic governance, a unitary parliamentary receive security clearances and training on classified information democracy, versus the U.S. presidential/congressional system with a protection. The Secretary of Homeland Security and Director of strong tradition of federalism. As a result of the primacy of the Central Intelligence would determine which state and local per- Cabinet and the Parliament, the British executive has fewer con- sonnel may be designated as eligible for security clearance appli- straints in policy development and implementation than has the U.S. cations.

4 5 President. Additionally, the U.S. has a formal, written constitution issue a warning and twenty-four British nationals were killed in the securing rights for individuals, while the U.K. does not. Within the Bali bombing. In January of 2003, the Chief Inspectorate of US, the end result of statutory interpretation rests with the Supreme Constabulary wrote a report expressing concern over organizational Court deciding the constitutionality of U.S. laws, including those tensions (between the police and MI-5) surrounding chief jurisdiction involving governmental intrusion into the lives of its citizens in the of certain joint operations.34 name of security and domestic intelligence. The U.K.’s Parliament has final authority.27 The problems of information sharing inadequacies are already present within the current framework of the US government as evidenced by Many critics view HIA as way for the government to spy on its own the jurisdictional dispute over national security information between citizens and are concerned with the implications for civil liberties.28 FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). If the UK has a DIA In Gregory F. Treverton’s, “Terrorism, Intelligence, and Law already in place and is still experiencing similar problems that the US Enforcement: Learning the Right Lessons,” the author says it is is without one, Treverton’s notion of “little gain” is an important fac- important to screen a proposed security measure through to determine tor to consider. whether or not it will fix the current problem.29 The questions being, is there too much pain for very little gain in the areas of citizen con- A further approach to the intelligence dilemma is to create an agency venience and personal privacy and what are the costs, specifically, to called the domestic intelligence service (DIS) but incorporate it into civil liberties?30 an already existing entity: CIA. This is the suggestion of former CIA Director, John Deutch, who testified before the 9/11 Commission on Despite the UK’s established system for the prevention of government October 14th, 2003.35 abuses, MI-5 has experienced a checkered past concerning the protection of civil liberties. MI-5 conducted intrusive investigations of polit- At the 9/11 Commission hearing, Mr. Deutch expressed concern over ical activist groups such as National Union of Mineworkers and the the fact that the Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter DCI) Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament based on their opposing political “has little executive authority” over intelligence programs they, them- views to administration policies.31 In the case of the mineworker’s selves, are responsible for. Executive authority for the DCI exists only party, MI-5 actually targeted the group’s leaders and conducted a over CIA. However, FBI and the Defense Department conduct intel- counter-subversion operation which consisted of false accusations of ligence activities without the DCI having proper authority in key deci- embezzlement and corruption.32 MI-5 abuses, if replicated within the sion making. Mr. Deutch defined “executive authority” as a combina- US may be too much “pain” for the US to bear on its democratic tion of two functions: budget/resource allocation and the everyday shoulders. In a decision of the Supreme Court of Israel, President management of operations. He stressed that although this executive Barak stated, “This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are authority exists for foreign intelligence collection, there is a substan- acceptable to it and not all practices employed by its enemies are open tial amount of domestic intelligence CIA should be controlling.36 before it.”33 Mr. Deutch urged the Commission to understand his most important Operational failures are also an issue when examining the cost-bene- change would be to give the DCI executive authority for domestic fit analysis of a separately placed DIA. In 1995, police sources intelligence collection where U.S. persons are concerned. He called it claimed MI-5 ignored “coded warnings” about an Irish Republican a “Domestic Intelligence Service” and said it would report to and be Army bomb received an hour before the actual detonation. Two peo- responsible to the DCI in the same fashion as the current structure of ple were killed and 100 were injured. MI-5 also possessed informa- CIA.37 See Appendix B for a graphic depiction of John Deutch’s tion regarding the October 2002 terrorist attacks in Bali but did not model.

6 7 John Deutch’s model for DIA also shifts the balance of authority Several initiatives are already underway by Federal, and many state between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. There are three main and local entities attempting to address the needs of domestic intelli- intelligence initiatives for the US: the national foreign intelligence pro- gence and information sharing. gram (which the DCI controls), the joint military intelligence program, and the tactical intelligence program. The DCI does not have opera- The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) is under the direction tional control over two out of the three listed programs because they of the Director of Central Intelligence and started operations on May exist within the Department of Defense. Some of the most important 1, 2003. The center analyzes terrorist-related information collected divisions within the Department of Defense that the DCI doesn’t have domestically as well as internationally to form a comprehensive authority over are the National Security Agency, the National Imagery “threat picture.” It is centralized so that information from all sources and Mapping Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the is shared, integrated, and analyzed. The TTIC is staffed by members National Reconnaissance Office. To fix this dilemma, John Deutch of CIA, FBI, DHS, the Department of Defense, and other federal would have the Secretary of Defense would retain control over the agencies. A senior U.S. government official heads the agency and “day-to-day” management of the agencies whereas resource allocation reports to the Director of Central Intelligence. The operational advan- authority would be vested in the DCI. 38 tage is the TTIC combines the efforts of FBI’s Counter Terrorism Division, the DCI’s Counter Terrorism Center, and places them in one CIA is a foreign intelligence collection and analysis agency. Deutch’s facility.42 proposal merges domestic and foreign responsibilities under one umbrella. Regarding inconsistent goals, FBI was not alone in its failure Many major metropolitan centers have Joint Terrorism Task Force to protect America. CIA’s function of gathering and analyzing foreign Centers. (JTTF). JTTF divisions consist of FBI, state, and local intelligence clearly included facts and events surrounding September authorities. Before September 11th, there were only 33 JTTF offices 11th which were never properly relayed to FBI. In June of 2001, mem- around the country and now there are 66.43 There is also a JTTF infor- bers of CIA met with FBI officials from the New York Field Office mation sharing initiative that was piloted in St. Louis, Missouri working on the USS Cole bombing in Yemen. CIA knew two men between the FBI, Illinois State Police, St.Louis Metropolitan Police attending a meeting in Malaysia with a suspect in the USS Cole case Department , and other law enforcement entities.44 This initiative were now in the US and refused to release that information. The two combines investigative records of federal, state, and local entities men, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were hijackers involved within a single database. The data base gives the actual text of inves- with the September 11th terrorist plots.39 What indication is there CIA’s tigative records and allows the cross-referencing of names, addresses, domestic arm would be any more effective at releasing vital informa- phone numbers, scars, marks, and other criteria. Each agency that tion than its parent agency was with vital foreign intelligence? enters data will be able to access it through four levels of security access.45 Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, John J. Hamre, testified before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States Domestic Intelligence is an idea many government officials hope will that a division should be created within FBI to handle counter terrorism prove to be a permanent solution to our nation’s security needs. The intelligence work.40 And although it would be under FBI its everyday difference in opinion arises, however, in where to place this DIA and management would fall under the responsibility of the DCI subject to how to structure it. There are several frameworks being proposed. As approval and direction of the Attorney General. This would keep discussed above, Senator Edwards believes that a DIA should exist domestic intelligence responsibility at the same place it is now, within under the DHS. John Deutch wants to transfer the Department of the Justice Department.41 See Appendix C for a graphic depiction of Defense to the CIA and establish a domestic arm of the CIA. And John Hamre’s model. John Hamre believes the most efficient response will be to enhance

8 9 liberties. information sharing between authorities, and protect American’s civil by US policy makers one thing is certain, it must be efficient, foster establish their own measures, as well. Whatever model is decided on with domestic intelligence. State and local authorities are rushing to the powers of Justice Department and give FBI another chance 10

Various local and statewide initiatives are listed and described in the table below36 Initiatives and Efforts to Share More Information Name Lead Agency Participants Type and Purpose Statewide Anti- Massachusetts Massachusetts; SATURN was developed to collaborate the efforts of com- Terrorism Unified Executive Office of Massachusetts state bating terrorism by unifying and improving response from Response Network Public Safety and local agencies; public, fire, emergency, management, and police officials (SATURN) federal entities. from communities across the state as well as key community, leaders, state agencies, and federal entities. This network’s goals are to educate about, prepare for, respond to, and prevent acts of terrorism.

11 Regional Domestic Florida (Florida Various Florida state Established in each of the seven state operational regions. Security Task Department of Law agencies The task force is composed of subcommittees including Force (RDSTF) Enforcement) Health/Medical, Emergency Medical Management, Law Enforcement, Fire Services, and Public Affairs. The RDSTF works to improve Florida’s ability to detect and prevent terrorist threats by collecting and disseminating intelligence information, promoting security audits and vulnerability assessments, and the protection of critical infrastructure. CATIC California Department Federal, state, and This is the state’s clearinghouse for all terrorist-related activ- of Justice local law enforcement ities and investigations. It collects, analyzes, and dissemi- nates info to its 100,000 law enforcement officers, other law enforcement agencies, and, FBI. DIA is working to connect it with the NYPD’s division of counter terrorism. Judiciary Liberties Protection HIA of Office Privacy and Civil General Inspector HIA of Office Agents and Staff Domestic Intelligence Homeland Intelligence Agency Homeland Intelligence Department of Homeland Security National Required judicial approval before the most secretive and invasive investigations of religious and political groups. Director of Intelligence Type and Purpose Type response to the department’s to enhance This was established The department security. on local homeland potential threats and federal, state, county, with other works in conjunction Early Terrorism The similar mission. local agencies with the as a subdivision of the Sheriff’s Group was created Warning shared information and This group Department in 1996. and local entities to between federal, state, focused efforts to acts and ability to respond Angeles County’s enhance Los threats of terrorism. FBI, the NYThe committee comprises Public of Office State intelligence The committee shares and the NYPD. Security, training exercises. It has five subcom- and assists with joint subcommittees is Intelligence and mittees. One of those is working to create a data base of all Investigations which individuals by metropolitan law interactions with suspicious enforcement agencies. Works to assess vulnerabilities, threats, and targets of interest on to assess vulnerabilities, threats, and targets Works MDAthe water. intelligence, is the comprehensive information, waterways that America’s and knowledge of all entities within and environment. economy, security, our safety, could affect Appendix: A 13.html. AAgency Domestic Intelligence United States Intelligence Community Intelligence United States Participants Local law enforce- county, ment, state, agencies and federal state, local, Various and federal law enforcement agencies Initiatives and Efforts to Share More Information, continued More Information, to Share Efforts and Initiatives ds.senate.gov/speeches/2003/FICIA_02- Based on Senator John Edward’s Model for a Homeland Intellegence Agency Model for a Homeland Intellegence Based on Senator John Edward’s U.S. Coast Guard Los Angeles Los Angeles County Department Sheriff’s City law York New enforcement agencies Lead Agency State Department State http://www.edwar Department of Defense National Security Agency National Security Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Federal Bureau of Investigation Maritime Domain (MDA) Awareness New York Metropolitan Counter-Terrorism Committee Name Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office Department: of Homeland Security All information taken from: “Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003,” S.410 Collection Improvement Intelligence “Foreign All information taken from: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United “Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Masse, Specialist in Domestic Intelligence May 19, 2003. Todd Report to Congress, States.” Code RL3920) “Senate Floor Domestic Social Policy Division. (Order and Counterterrorism, Act of 2003.” Senator John Edwards, Collection Improvement Intelligence Speech: Foreign February 13, 2003. 12 13 OR Security Transfer Department Transfer of Defense responsibility and personnel to the CIA Responsibility for resource Responsibility for all intelli- management in the U.S. gence programs Department of Homeland A free-standing agency. new, terrorism Division National Security Agency National Security Defense Intelligence Agency Defense Intelligence FBI’s Intelligence Division and Counter- FBI’s as well as the Domestic Intelligence Service. as well as the Domestic If it becomes evident that the FBI lacks the capacity to law enforcement as well as domestic intelligence opera- Day-to-day management of the following agencies, Day-to-day management successfully operate two functionally different agencies: successfully operate two functionally different tions, the existing division could split away from the FBI. Appendix B Appendix the CIA Appendix C and personnel to Transfer specific Transfer FBI responsibility Service Day-to-day Domestic management. AAgency Domestic Intelligence Intelligence mate and lawful exercise of these activities. Director of Central Intelligence Director of vidual will be held accountable for the legiti- Direction, approval, and oversight. The indi- Direction, approval, and oversight. AAgency Domestic Intelligence Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Database Collection Analysis and tic intellignece Department of Justice Based on Former CIABased on Former Intelligence Service Model of a Domestic John M. Deutch’s Director Attorney General Federal Bureay of Investigation Central Agency Counter-intelligence / Counterterrorism Division Counter-intelligence Intelligence the Central Intelligence Agency the Central Intelligence Director of Central Intelligence, for Director of the CIA Based on the Testimony of Dr. John J. Hamre’s Recommendations for Improved Domestic Intelligence Collection Analysis Recommendations for Improved Domestic Intelligence Collection John J. Hamre’s of Dr. Testimony Based on the A special division within the FBI to be responsible for domes- All information taken from: “Testimony before 9-11 All information taken from: “Testimony Commission.” http://www.9- 11commission.gov/archive/hearing4/9- 11commission_hearing_2003-10-14.htm#kerr All information taken from: “Sixth Public Hearing of the National Attacks Upon the United States.” Terrorists Commission on John J. Hamre, Dedcember 8, 2003. of Dr. Statement 14 15 ENDNOTES 18 See FICIA at (a)(2)(c) 19 See FICIA at (a)(2)(c) 20 Report for Congress - Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: 1 See “Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States. Pg. 3. May 19, 2003. Lessons.” Gregory F. Treverton, June 3, 2003. Todd Masse. 2 See The Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the 21 See National Intelligence Machinery, The Stationary Office, London, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism United Kingdom, September, 2001. Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 15, 2003, p. 30. http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/volume_v/volume_v.pdf 22 See http://www.mi5.gov.uk. 3 See Claire Feikert, Legislative Framework of the British Security Service, 23 See Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom. Library of Congress Law Library, Western Law Division and 24 http://www.mi5.gov.uk See Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom. 25 4 See Feikert and http://www.mi5.gov.uk See Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom. 26 5 See David Johnston, “F.B.I. Director Rejects Agency for Intelligence in the See “Domestic Intelligence, British Style” By Preston Mendenhall, United States,” Washington Post, December 20, 2002, p. A22; Larry M. September 2, 2003. http://.msnbc.com/news. Wortzel, “Americans Do Not Need a New Domestic Spy Agency to Improve 27 See Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom. Intelligence and Homeland Security,” Heritage Foundation Executive 28 Memorandum no. 848, January 10, 2003; and Ronald Kessler, “No to an See Wortzel, Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum no. 848, January American MI5,” Washington Post, January 5, 2003, p. B07. 10, 2003. 29 6 See Fifth Annual Report, p. 30. See Treverton, June 3, 2003. 30 7 See Fifth Annual Report, p. 30. See Treverton, June 3, 2003. 31 8 See Fifth Annual Report, p. 31. See “Domestic Intelligence Agencies: A Mixed Record,” January 27, 2003. Center for Democracy and Technology. http://www.cdt.org 9 See Panel endorses domestic intelligence Agency – Dec. 16, 2002. 32 www.cnn.com/2002/US/12/16/gilmore.commission/. See “Domestic Intelligence Agencies: A Mixed Record,” http://www.cdt.org. 33 10 See Fifth Annual Report, p. 31 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, 1999. 53(4) Israeli Supreme Court Reporter 817-848. 11 See Fifth Annual Report, p. 31 34 See “Domestic Intelligence Agencies: A Mixed Record,” http://www.cdt.org. 12 See Fifth Annual Report, p. 31. 35 See http://edwards.senate.gov/press/2003/1014-pr.html. 13 See, “New Domestic Intelligence Agency wins support at September 11 36 hearing,” http://edwards.senate.gov/press/2003/1014-pr.html See http://edwards.senate.gov/press/2003/1014-pr.html. 37 14 See http://edwards.senate.gov/press/2003/1014-pr.html See http://edwards.senate.gov/press/2003/1014-pr.html. 38 15 See http://edwards.senate.gov/press/2003/1014-pr.html See http://edwards.senate.gov/press/2003/1014-pr.html. 39 16 See http://edwards.senate.gov/press/2003/1014-pr.html See Treverton, June 3, 2003. 40 17 See Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003, S.410, See Sixth Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks §112(a)(1),(4). Upon the United States, December 8, 2003.

16 17 41 See Sixth Public Hearing, December 8, 2003. 42 See United States General Accounting Office, GAO-03-760. 43 See United States General Accounting Office, GAO-03-760, pg. 38-39. Appendix II: Selected Initiatives to Promote Information Sharing. Table 8. 44 See United States General Accounting Office, GAO-03-760. 45 See United States General Accounting Office, GAO-03-760. 46 See United States General Accounting Office, GAO-03-760.