DOCSLIB.ORG

Privacy and Security: a Modern and Transparent Legal Framework

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Privacy and Security: a Modern and Transparent Legal Framework Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 3 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 12 March 2015 HC 1075 © Crown copyright 2015 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: [email protected]. Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/government/publications Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] Print ISBN 9781474116237 Web ISBN 9781474116244 ID 10031502 03/15 47945 19585 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum Printed in the UK by the Williams Lea Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT The Rt. Hon. Hazel Blears, MP Dr Julian Lewis, MP The Rt. Hon. Lord Butler KG GCB CVO Ms Fiona Mactaggart, MP The Rt. Hon. Sir Menzies Campbell CH CBE QC, MP The Most Hon. The Marquess of Mr Mark Field, MP Lothian QC PC The Rt. Hon. George Howarth, MP The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, MP The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) is a statutory committee of Parliament that has responsibility for oversight of the UK intelligence community. The Committee was originally established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994, and has recently been reformed, and its powers reinforced, by the Justice and Security Act 2013. The Committee oversees the intelligence and security activities of the UK, including the policies, expenditure, administration and operations1 of the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The Committee also scrutinises the work of other parts of the UK intelligence community, including the Joint Intelligence Organisation and the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office; Defence Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence; and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office. The Committee consists of nine Members drawn from both Houses of Parliament. The Chair is elected by its Members. The Members of the Committee are subject to Section 1(1)(b) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 and are routinely given access to highly classified material in carrying out their duties. The Committee sets its own agenda and work programme. It takes evidence from Government Ministers, the heads of the intelligence Agencies, officials from the intelligence community, and other witnesses as required. The Committee is supported in its work by an independent Secretariat and an Investigator. It also has access to legal, technical and financial expertise where necessary. The Committee produces an Annual Report on the discharge of its functions. The Committee may also produce Reports on specific investigations. Prior to the Committee publishing its Reports, sensitive material that would damage national security is blanked out (‘redacted’). This is indicated by *** in the text. The intelligence and security Agencies may request the redaction of material in the Report if its publication would damage their work, for example by revealing their targets, methods, sources or operational capabilities. The Committee considers these requests for redaction carefully. The Agencies have to demonstrate clearly how publication of the material in question would be damaging before the Committee agrees to redact it. The Committee aims to ensure that only the minimum of text is redacted from the Report. The Committee believes that it is important that Parliament and the public should be able to see where information had to be redacted. This means that the published Report is the same as the classified version sent to the Prime Minister (albeit with redactions). The Committee also prepares from time to time wholly confidential reports which it submits to the Prime Minister. 1 Subject to the criteria set out in Section 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013. CONTENTS KEY FINDINGS ......................................................................................................1 OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................3 1. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................9 2. THE AGENCIES’ USE OF INTRUSIVE CAPABILITIES ............................... 13 The Human Rights Act 1998 ................................................................................ 14 The HRA ‘triple test’ ............................................................................................ 15 3. TARGETED INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS .............................. 17 How do the Agencies carry out Targeted Interception of Communications in the UK? ........................................................................................................... 17 Authorisation of Targeted Interception of Communications .................................... 18 What does an 8(1) warrant look like? .................................................................... 19 Thematic warrants ............................................................................................... 21 Collateral intrusion .............................................................................................. 23 4. ‘BULK’ INTERCEPTION: CAPABILITY ....................................................... 25 Choosing which communications links to access ................................................... 27 Selection of communications to be collected ......................................................... 28 Deciding which of the collected communications to examine or read ...................... 30 Does bulk interception work? ............................................................................... 32 5. ‘BULK’ INTERCEPTION: LEGAL AUTHORITY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS ...................................................................................................... 35 Objections to collection in principle ...................................................................... 35 Legal framework: 8(4) warrants and the Certificate ................................................ 37 Legal framework: ‘external’ and ‘internal’ communications ................................... 39 Storage and security ............................................................................................. 44 Oversight and audit .............................................................................................. 45 6. COMMUNICATIONS DATA ............................................................................ 47 Why do the Agencies need access to CD? ............................................................. 47 What categories of CD do the Agencies collect? .................................................... 48 How do the Agencies collect CD? ......................................................................... 48 Key issues ........................................................................................................... 50 7. BULK PERSONAL DATASETS........................................................................ 55 Authorisation ....................................................................................................... 56 Internal controls ................................................................................................... 57 8. OTHER AGENCY CAPABILITIES .................................................................. 61 a) Surveillance ..................................................................................................... 61 b) Interference with Property and Wireless Telegraphy ........................................... 63 c) Reading Encrypted Communications................................................................. 67 d) Covert Human Intelligence Sources .................................................................. 69 9. AUTHORISATIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY .............................................. 73 Authorisation: Ministers or judges? ...................................................................... 73 Authorisation: official level .................................................................................. 76 Retrospective audit: the Commissioners ................................................................ 77 Complaints: the Investigatory Powers Tribunal ...................................................... 78 Parliamentary oversight ........................................................................................ 80 10. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ............................................................ 83 a) Interaction between legislation .......................................................................... 83 b) Class Authorisations ........................................................................................ 87 c) Exchanging information with overseas partners ................................................. 90
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Can Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence Be Considered More Open Government Than Accountability?
    CAN PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE BE CONSIDERED MORE OPEN GOVERNMENT THAN ACCOUNTABILITY? Stephen Barber ABSTRACT The nature of openness in government continues to be explored by academics and pub- lic managers alike while accountability is a fact of life for all public services. One of the last bastions of ‘closed government’ relates to the ‘secret’ security and intelligence ser- vices. But even here there have been significant steps towards openness over more than two decades. In Britain the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament is the statutory body charged with scrutinising the agencies and since 2013 is more ac- countable itself to Westminster. This was highlighted by the first open evidence sessions involving the heads of the agencies which coincided with the unofficial disclosure of secret information by way of the so-called ‘WikiLeaks world’. This article examines scrutiny as a route to openness. It makes the distinction between accountability and open government and argues that the ‘trusted’ status of the ISC in comparison to the more independent Parliamentary Select Committees weakens its ability to hold govern- ment to account but, combined with the claim to privileged information and the acqui- escence of the agencies, makes its existence much more aligned to the idea of open gov- ernment Keywords - Westminster Select Committees, Intelligence and Security Committee, MI5 and MI6, scrutiny of public agencies. INTRODUCTION When the three heads of Britain’s security and intelligence services, Sir Iain Lobban (Director of GCHQ), Andrew Parker (Director General of MI5) and Sir John Sawers (Chief of MI6), appeared in Westminster on 7 November 2013, a new marker was set for open government.
    [Show full text]
  • Inside Russia's Intelligence Agencies
    EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN BRIEF POLICY RELATIONS ecfr.eu PUTIN’S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Mark Galeotti For his birthday in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was treated to an exhibition of faux Greek friezes showing SUMMARY him in the guise of Hercules. In one, he was slaying the • Russia’s intelligence agencies are engaged in an “hydra of sanctions”.1 active and aggressive campaign in support of the Kremlin’s wider geopolitical agenda. The image of the hydra – a voracious and vicious multi- headed beast, guided by a single mind, and which grows • As well as espionage, Moscow’s “special services” new heads as soon as one is lopped off – crops up frequently conduct active measures aimed at subverting in discussions of Russia’s intelligence and security services. and destabilising European governments, Murdered dissident Alexander Litvinenko and his co-author operations in support of Russian economic Yuri Felshtinsky wrote of the way “the old KGB, like some interests, and attacks on political enemies. multi-headed hydra, split into four new structures” after 1991.2 More recently, a British counterintelligence officer • Moscow has developed an array of overlapping described Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) as and competitive security and spy services. The a hydra because of the way that, for every plot foiled or aim is to encourage risk-taking and multiple operative expelled, more quickly appear. sources, but it also leads to turf wars and a tendency to play to Kremlin prejudices. The West finds itself in a new “hot peace” in which many consider Russia not just as an irritant or challenge, but • While much useful intelligence is collected, as an outright threat.
    [Show full text]
  • National Security Capability Review: a Changing Security Environment
    House of Lords House of Commons Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy National Security Capability Review: A changing security environment First Report of Session 2017–19 Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report Ordered by the House of Lords to be printed 19 March 2018 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 19 March 2018 HL Paper 104 HC 756 Published on 23 March 2018 by authority of the House of Lords and the House of Commons The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy is appointed by the House of Lords and the House of Commons to consider the National Security Strategy. Current membership House of Lords Lord Brennan (Labour) Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (Liberal Democrat) Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Conservative) Lord Harris of Haringey (Labour) Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill (Labour) Baroness Henig (Labour) Lord King of Bridgwater (Conservative) Baroness Lane-Fox of Soho (Crossbench) Lord Powell of Bayswater (Crossbench) Lord Trimble (Conservative) House of Commons Margaret Beckett MP (Labour, Derby South) (Chair) Yvette Cooper MP (Labour, Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) James Gray MP (Conservative, North Wiltshire) Mr Dominic Grieve MP (Conservative, Beaconsfield) Dan Jarvis MP (Labour, Barnsley Central) Dr Julian Lewis MP, (Conservative, New Forest East) Angus Brendan MacNeil MP (Scottish National Party, Na h-Eileanan an Iar) Robert Neill MP (Conservative, Bromley and Chislehurst) Rachel Reeves MP (Labour, Leeds West) Tom Tugendhat MP (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Stephen Twigg MP (Labour (Co-op), Liverpool, West Derby) Theresa Villiers MP (Conservative, Chipping Barnet) Powers The Committee has the power to require the submission of written evidence and documents, to examine witnesses, to meet at any time (except when Parliament is prorogued or dissolved), to adjourn from place to place within the United Kingdom, to appoint specialist advisers, and to make Reports to both Houses.
    [Show full text]
  • Transcript of Panel 4: Innovation and Technology: Re-Writing the Rules? Margaret Thatcher Conference on Security Guildhall, London Tuesday 27 June 2017
    Transcript of Panel 4: Innovation and Technology: Re-writing the rules? Margaret Thatcher Conference on Security Guildhall, London Tuesday 27 June 2017 The video recording of this panel is available on the CPS YouTube channel. Deepak Lal: Good evening everyone. I'm Deepak Lal. We're going to talk about innovation and technology. This morning, we've been hearing a lot about social media and various other forms of new technology. Most of them seem to be threats. Anyway, we've got a very distinguished panel. On my immediate left is Commissioner Ian Dyson of the City of London Police, then there is ... Who's next? The Rt. Hon. Matt Hancock who's the minister of estate for digital, then Robert Hannigan who is a former director of GCHQ, and then Lara Poloni who's incoming Chief Executive of AECOM who is sponsoring this conference. I'm going to begin by getting Robert Hannigan to talk about it, because he can give us a global view. He's been in GCHQ for a long time. He just retired as Director. He can tell us what technology is doing to keep us safe or leading to us being attacked. Robert Hannigan: Thank you very much, Deepak. Great to be here. I thought what I'd do is just say a few words about the shifts in power that have been referred to in various sessions during the day, that are caused by, or accelerated by technology. And then say something about the impact that's having particularly on global security and then a couple of thoughts on how we might approach that.
    [Show full text]
  • Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence
    Updated December 30, 2020 Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence The Intelligence Community (IC) is charged with providing Intelligence Program (NIP) budget appropriations, which insight into actual or potential threats to the U.S. homeland, are a consolidation of appropriations for the ODNI; CIA; the American people, and national interests at home and general defense; and national cryptologic, reconnaissance, abroad. It does so through the production of timely and geospatial, and other specialized intelligence programs. The apolitical products and services. Intelligence products and NIP, therefore, provides funding for not only the ODNI, services result from the collection, processing, analysis, and CIA and IC elements of the Departments of Homeland evaluation of information for its significance to national Security, Energy, the Treasury, Justice and State, but also, security at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. substantially, for the programs and activities of the Consumers of intelligence include the President, National intelligence agencies within the DOD, to include the NSA, Security Council (NSC), designated personnel in executive NGA, DIA, and NRO. branch departments and agencies, the military, Congress, and the law enforcement community. Defense intelligence comprises the intelligence organizations and capabilities of the Joint Staff, the DIA, The IC comprises 17 elements, two of which are combatant command joint intelligence centers, and the independent, and 15 of which are component organizations military services that address strategic, operational or of six separate departments of the federal government. tactical requirements supporting military strategy, planning, Many IC elements and most intelligence funding reside and operations. Defense intelligence provides products and within the Department of Defense (DOD).
    [Show full text]
  • Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States
    HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM and the INTELLIGENCE POLICY CENTER THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Homeland Security Program RAND Intelligence Policy Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies
    September 14, 2020 Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies Russia has an extensive internal security system, with Competition frequently leads to arrests and prosecutions, multiple, overlapping, and competitive security agencies often for real or imagined corruption allegations to undercut vying for bureaucratic, political, and economic influence. targeted organizations and senior leadership both Since Vladimir Putin assumed Russia’s leadership, these institutionally and politically. agencies have grown in both size and power, and they have become integral to the security and stability of the Russian Law Enforcement and Internal government. If Putin extends his rule beyond 2024, as is Security Agencies and Heads now legally permissible, these agencies could play a role in (as of September 2020) the leadership succession process and affect the ability of a transitional regime to quell domestic dissent. For Members Ministry of Interior (MVD): Vladimir Kolokoltsev of Congress, understanding the numerous internal security National Guard (Rosgvardiya, FSVNG): Viktor Zolotov agencies in Russia could be helpful in assessing the x Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON) prospects of regime stability and dynamics of a transition x Special Rapid Response Detachment (SOBR) after Putin leaves office. In addition, Russian security agencies and their personnel have been targeted by U.S. x Interior Troops (VV) sanctions for cyberattacks and human rights abuses. x Kadyrovtsy Overview and Context Federal Security Service (FSB): Alexander Bortnikov
    [Show full text]
  • APPENDIX D Common Abbreviations
    ABBREVIATIONS APPENDIX D Common Abbreviations BIS Bureau of Industry and Security (Department of Commerce) BW Biological Weapons or Biological Warfare CBP Customs and Border Protection (Department of Homeland Security) CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons CCDC Collection Concepts Development Center CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIFA Counterintelligence Field Activity (Department of Defense) CPD Counterproliferation Division (CIA) CTC Counterterrorist Center CW Chemical Weapons or Chemical Warfare D&D Denial and Deception DCI Director of Central Intelligence DCIA Director of Central Intelligence Agency DHS Department of Homeland Security DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DNI Director of National Intelligence DO Directorate of Operations (CIA) DOD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy DOJ Department of Justice DS&T Directorate of Science and Technology (CIA) FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service FIG Field Intelligence Group (FBI) FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence HUMINT Human Intelligence IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAEC Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 591 APPENDIX D ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Department of Homeland Security) INC Iraqi National Congress INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State) INS Immigration and Naturalization Services IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ISB Intelligence
    [Show full text]
  • RAGHIDA DERGHAM With: HE Sir John Sawer HE Brett Mcgurk HR Rania Al Mashat HE Ambassador Yue Xiao Yong
    TRANSCRIPT OF e-POLICY CIRCLE 10 July 8th, 2020 RAGHIDA DERGHAM With: HE Sir John Sawer HE Brett McGurk HR Rania Al Mashat HE Ambassador Yue Xiao Yong Youtube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQvByHy92Ho&t=921s Raghida Dergham: Good morning San Francisco, very good morning and early morning, good afternoon London, Croatia and Cairo. I am in Beirut, and welcome to Beirut Institute Summit e-Policy Circle number 10, and we have a great cast with us today, of course. Sir John Sawer, former Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), former Permanent Representative of the UK at the UN where I got the pleasure of knowing you. Of course, right now you are the independent non-Executive Director of BP Global and Executive Chairman of Newbridge Advisory. Brett McGurk, who joined us last year at Beirut Institute Summit in Abu Dhabi, welcome to the e-Policy Circle. He is former Special Assistant to President George W. Bush and Senior Director of Iraq and Afghanistan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq and Iran, Special Presidential Envoy for the United States campaign against ISIS under President Barack Obama. He is now a Payne distinguished lecturer at Stanford University. Her excellency Rania Al Mashat is Egypt's Minister of International Cooperation, Former Minister of Tourism and previously Adviser to the chief economist of the IMF. And we have Ambassador Yue Xiao Yong, I hope I didn't butcher that, he's a China foreign expert, former Ambassador to Qatar, Jordan, and Ireland, he's Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Studies at Redmond University of China, and he is now in Croatia, he's joining us from Croatia.
    [Show full text]
  • Uncorrected Transcript of Evidence
    INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE Given by Sir Iain Lobban Director, Government Communication Headquarters Mr Andrew Parker Director General, Security Service Sir John Sawers Chief, Secret Intelligence Service Thursday, 7 November 2013 2.00pm CHAIRMAN: Good afternoon. It is my pleasure to welcome you all here today at the first ever open evidence session of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I would like to welcome in particular our three witnesses: Sir Iain Lobban, the Director of GCHQ; Andrew Parker, the Director General of the Security Service, MI5; and Sir John Sawers, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6. Thank you, and we are delighted to welcome you, gentlemen. This session, of course, which we as a Committee first considered a year ago, is a very significant step forward in the transparency of our Intelligence Agencies. Having an open Parliamentary evidence session will be, I believe, of real value. Of course, we will not be asking our witnesses to reveal secret information in public. Nor will we today be able to discuss our current investigation into the tragic death of Lee Rigby in Woolwich in May, since obviously we cannot prejudice the trials of the accused which is to take place in the near future. The Intelligence and Security Committee, with its new powers, investigates the operations and scrutinises the capabilities of the Intelligence Agencies, but those sessions are held behind closed doors and must remain secret. This evidence session is being broadcast with a short time delay. This is a safety mechanism to allow us to pause the broadcast if anything is inadvertently mentioned which might endanger national security or the safety of those involved in safeguarding it.
    [Show full text]
  • Page 1 of 1 UN Security Council Debate on Iran Sanctions 11/30
    UN Security Council debate on Iran sanctions Page 1 of 1 Last updated at 10:11 (UK time) 10 Mar 2009 UN Security Council debate on Iran sanctions 10 March 2009 Statement by John Sawers, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Statement by John Sawers, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Thank you Mr President and I'd like to join others in thanking Ambassador Takasu for this, his first report to the Council, and express my Delegation's thanks to him and his team for accepting this important responsibility and for the excellent start that they have made in leading the Committee's work. Mr President, The United Kingdom continues to have serious concerns about Iran's nuclear programme. The latest IAEA report, which issued last month, makes clear that, in defiance of UN Security Council Resolutions, Iran has refused to suspend all its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, namely its uranium enrichment and related activities and various heavy water projects. The International Atomic Energy Authority reports that Iran now has more than 5,500 centrifuges installed, of which about 4,000 are actively enriching uranium, for which Iran has no plausible civilian use. Iran has also refused access to IAEA inspectors to the heavy water reactor at Arak, for the second time in a row. This is of particular concern because the reactor's design at Arak is ideally suited to producing plutonium, which could be used for nuclear weapons.
    [Show full text]
  • H Subject: Fw: Sawers / Telegraph Articles
    UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05795070 Date: 02/13/2016 RELEASE IN PART B1,1.4(B),1.4(D),B6 From: H <[email protected] > Sent: Friday, July 13, 2012 1:46 AM To: '[email protected]' Subject: Re: Sawers / Telegraph articles Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 02/13/2016 — Class: Gobsmacking! CONFIDENTIAL — Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D) — Declassify on: 07/13/2032 From: Sullivan, Jacob 3 [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2012 11:18 PM To: H Subject: Fw: Sawers / Telegraph articles See the article down the string. From: Sherman, Wendy R Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2012 09:25 PM To: Nuland, Victoria 3; Murad, Eshel William; Hammer, Michael A; Ventrell, Patrick H; Sullivan, Jacob 3; Einhorn, Robert 3; 'Benjamin_3._Rhodes <Benjamin_l_Rhodes B6 Cc: Grantham, Chris W; Lakhdhir, Kannala S Subject: Re: Sawers / Telegraph articles Yes, Chris Grantham on my staff sent me an Alert Iran that had this story. Most unfortunate on many levels to say the least. Where to begin... From: Nuland, Victoria J Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2012 09:08 PM To: Murad, Eshel William; Hammer, Michael A; Ventrell, Patrick H• Sullivan Jacob 3; Sherman, Wendy R; Einhorn, Robert 3; 'Benjamin J. Rhodes <Benjamin J._Rhodes B6 Subject: Fw: Sawers / Telegraph articles Fysa - this from my UK embassy contact. Sawers heads MI6. From: James.Barbour [mailto B6 Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2012 06:21 PM To: Nuland, Victoria 3 Cc: Toner, Mark C Subject: FW: Sawers / Telegraph articles Toria, 1.4(B) 1.4(D) B1 UNCLASSIFIED U.S.
    [Show full text]