Intelligence and Security Committee – Annual Report

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Intelligence and Security Committee – Annual Report Intelligence and Security Committee – Annual Report 2011–2012 Intelligence and Security Committee – Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2011–2012 Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, MP Published by TSO (The Stationery Office) and available from: Online www.tsoshop.co.uk Mail, Telephone, Fax & E-mail TSO PO Box 29, Norwich NR3 1GN Telephone orders/General enquiries: 0870 600 5522 Order through the Parliamentary Hotline Lo-Call: 0845 7 023474 Fax orders: 0870 600 5533 Email: [email protected] Textphone: 0870 240 3701 The Parliamentary Bookshop 12 Bridge Street, Parliament Square London SW1A 2JX Telephone orders/General enquiries: 020 7219 3890 INSERT Fax orders: 020 7219 3866 BARCODE Email: [email protected] Internet: www.bookshop.parliament.uk TSO@Blackwell and other accredited agents Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2011–2012 Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, MP Intelligence Services Act 1994 Chapter 13 Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister By Command of Her Majesty July 2012 Cm 8403 £21.25 © Crown copyright 2012 You may re-use this information (excluding logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or email [email protected] Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] This publication is available for download at www.official-documents.gov.uk ISBN: 9780101840323 Printed in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ID P002500979 07/12 21937 19585 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum. From: The Chairman, The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, MP INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE 35 Great Smith Street, London SW1P 3BQ ISC 4.20/004 28 June 2012 The Rt. Hon. David Cameron, MP Prime Minister 10 Downing Street London SW1A 2AA I enclose the Intelligence and Security Committee’s (ISC’s) Annual Report for 2011–2012. This Report details the work and conclusions of the ISC for the period from June 2011 to June 2012. The Committee has held 28 formal sessions during this period. The majority of the Committee’s time was spent examining and taking evidence on the work of the three intelligence and security Agencies and the wider intelligence community. We report on these matters here. In addition to this work, the Committee has been conducting a number of other Inquiries this year: we will conclude these and report accordingly during the next session. Last year, the Committee put forward proposals to strengthen the independent oversight of the intelligence community, and these are reflected in the Justice and Security Bill currently before the Lords. Once the Bill is enacted, the ISC will have become a statutory Committee of Parliament independent of Government. It will have important new powers to obtain information from the intelligence and security Agencies and will provide proper oversight of their activities, including operations. MALCOLM RIFKIND THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, MP (Chairman) The Rt. Hon. Hazel Blears, MP The Rt. Hon. Paul Goggins, MP The Rt. Hon. Lord Butler KG GCB CVO The Rt. Hon. George Howarth, MP The Rt. Hon. Sir Menzies Campbell CBE QC, MP Dr Julian Lewis, MP Mr Mark Field, MP Lord Lothian QC PC The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is an independent Committee established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to examine the policy, administration and expenditure of the three UK intelligence and security Agencies: the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The Committee also examines the work of the Joint Intelligence Organisation and the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, Defence Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office. The Prime Minister appoints the ISC Members after considering nominations from Parliament and consulting with the Opposition. The Committee reports directly to the Prime Minister and through him to Parliament, by the publication of the Committee’s reports. The Prime Minister may ask us to look into a matter, but most of the time we set our own agenda. The Committee has an independent Secretariat currently hosted by the Cabinet Office. The Committee also has access to a General Investigator to undertake specific investigations covering the administration and policy of the Agencies; financial expertise from the National Audit Office; and a Legal Advisor to provide independent legal advice. The Members of the Committee are subject to Section 1(1)(b) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 and are given access to highly classified material in carrying out their duties. The Committee holds evidence sessions with Government Ministers and senior officials (for example, the Head of the Security Service). It also considers written evidence from the intelligence and security Agencies and relevant government departments. This evidence may be drawn from operational records, source reporting and other sensitive intelligence, or it may be memoranda specifically written for the Committee. The Prime Minister publishes the Committee’s reports: the public versions have sensitive material that would damage national security blanked out (‘redacted’). This is indicated by *** in the text. The intelligence and security Agencies may request the redaction of sensitive material in the Report which would damage their work, for example by revealing their targets, methods, sources or operational capabilities. The Committee considers these requests for redaction in considerable detail. The Agencies have to demonstrate clearly how publication of the material in question would be damaging before the Committee agrees to redact it. The Committee aims to ensure that only the bare minimum of text is redacted from the Report. We also believe that it is important that Parliament and the public should be able to see where we have had to redact information, rather than keeping this secret. Under the existing legislation the Prime Minister has the power to redact material without the Committee’s consent, making a statement to that effect when he lays the Report before Parliament. To date, this has never happened. CONTENTS THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE .............................................................................. 3 KEY THEMES.................................................................................................................. 4 THREAT OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................... 7 STRATEGIC DIRECTION .............................................................................................. 9 National Security Council ............................................................................................. 9 Joint Intelligence Committee (including Central Intelligence Review) ...................... 11 The ‘Arab Spring’ ........................................................................................................ 13 COUNTER-TERRORISM .............................................................................................. 20 International Counter-Terrorism ................................................................................. 20 The Olympic and Paralympic Games .......................................................................... 23 Review of Counter-Terrorism powers ......................................................................... 25 Northern Ireland-related terrorism .............................................................................. 28 Counter-radicalisation ................................................................................................. 29 CYBER SECURITY ....................................................................................................... 32 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS DATA ................................................................... 37 COUNTER-PROLIFERATION ...................................................................................... 40 INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ........................................................................... 43 Working with foreign intelligence services ................................................................. 43 The Detainee Inquiry .................................................................................................. 44 Libya ........................................................................................................................... 45 REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY .................................................. 46 Protecting intelligence in the courts ............................................................................ 46 Intelligence and Security Committee .......................................................................... 49 Defence Intelligence ................................................................................................... 52 National Crime Agency ............................................................................................... 56 RESOURCES ................................................................................................................
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