DOCSLIB.ORG

Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence Updated December 30, 2020 Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence The Intelligence Community (IC) is charged with providing Intelligence Program (NIP) budget appropriations, which insight into actual or potential threats to the U.S. homeland, are a consolidation of appropriations for the ODNI; CIA; the American people, and national interests at home and general defense; and national cryptologic, reconnaissance, abroad. It does so through the production of timely and geospatial, and other specialized intelligence programs. The apolitical products and services. Intelligence products and NIP, therefore, provides funding for not only the ODNI, services result from the collection, processing, analysis, and CIA and IC elements of the Departments of Homeland evaluation of information for its significance to national Security, Energy, the Treasury, Justice and State, but also, security at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. substantially, for the programs and activities of the Consumers of intelligence include the President, National intelligence agencies within the DOD, to include the NSA, Security Council (NSC), designated personnel in executive NGA, DIA, and NRO. branch departments and agencies, the military, Congress, and the law enforcement community. Defense intelligence comprises the intelligence organizations and capabilities of the Joint Staff, the DIA, The IC comprises 17 elements, two of which are combatant command joint intelligence centers, and the independent, and 15 of which are component organizations military services that address strategic, operational or of six separate departments of the federal government. tactical requirements supporting military strategy, planning, Many IC elements and most intelligence funding reside and operations. Defense intelligence provides products and within the Department of Defense (DOD). services on foreign military capabilities, plans and intentions, orders-of-battle, disposition of forces, and the political, cultural and economic factors influencing the Statutory IC Elements environment in areas of actual or potential military DOD Elements: operations. Military Intelligence Program (MIP) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) appropriations fund military service intelligence personnel, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) their training, and tactical military intelligence programs National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and activities. National Security Agency (NSA) U.S. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance National and defense intelligence are not discrete (AF/A2) enterprises. The 17 organizational elements of the IC are U.S. Army Intelligence (G2) required to collaborate closely to address intelligence gaps U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and disseminate products to appropriately cleared personnel Enterprise (MCISR-E) across the government in a timely manner. The IC also U.S. Naval Intelligence (N2) cultivates ties to international partners to address mutual Non-DOD Elements: national security concerns. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Who Does What? Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Executive Order (EO) 12333, codified in 50 U.S.C. §3001, Department of Energy (DOE) intelligence component: Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (I&CI) establishes general duties and responsibilities for each Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence components: element of the IC. Other laws, executive orders, and policy Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and U.S. Coast Guard issuances may establish additional duties and Intelligence (CG-2) responsibilities for particular IC elements. Department of Justice (DOJ) intelligence components: the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of National Security Intelligence DIA is a DOD combat support agency that collects, (DEA/ONSI) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation‘s Intelligence analyzes, and disseminates foreign military intelligence Branch (IB) to policymakers and the military. DIA serves as the Department of State (DOS) intelligence component: Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) nation’s primary manager and producer of foreign Department of Treasury intelligence component: Office of military intelligence, and a central intelligence producer Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) and manager for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commands. Source: 50 U.S. Code §3003(4); ODNI. NGA produces geospatial intelligence products and National and Defense Intelligence services in support of policymakers, warfighters, other National intelligence addresses the strategic requirements intelligence agencies, and first responders. of national security policymakers such as the President and Secretaries of Defense and State. National intelligence NRO builds and operates satellites and ground stations programs and activities are funded through National whose main purpose is collecting imagery and signals https://crsreports.congress.gov Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence intelligence to support other agencies’ intelligence Strategic, Operational, and Tactical products and services. Intelligence Table 1 provides an overview of the intelligence NSA specializes in cryptology, encompassing signals corresponding to what the DOD refers to as the strategic, intelligence and information assurance, and is operational and tactical levels of war. responsible for computer network operations in support of national security requirements. Table 1. Levels of Intelligence Military service intelligence elements collect and Strategic Intelligence assists senior military and civilian analyze strategic, operational and tactical intelligence leaders in developing national strategy and policy; monitors the supporting the requirements of the military services international or global situation; assists in developing military jointly or separately. Tactical and operational plans; assists in determining major weapon systems and force intelligence supports military commanders and deployed structure requirements; and supports the conduct of strategic warfighters. National military service intelligence operations. organizations such as the Navy’s Office of Naval Operational Intelligence focuses on military capabilities and Intelligence specialize in threat analysis and strategic intentions of enemies and adversaries; analyzes the operational intelligence assessments that can support defense environment; identifies adversary centers of gravity and critical platform and weapons systems development. vulnerabilities; monitors events in the joint force commander’s area of interest; and supports the planning and conduct of joint CIA collects, analyzes, evaluates, and disseminates campaigns. foreign intelligence and counterintelligence in support of a broad range of senior national security consumers Tactical Intelligence supports military commanders in the including the President, NSC, and military. In addition planning and execution of battles, engagements, and other joint to its clandestine and open source collection activities, force activities; provides commanders with information on CIA has been the leading agency in conducting covert imminent threats to their forces and changes in the operational action as directed by the President. environment; and provides commanders with obstacle intelligence. Other Non-DOD elements within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Source: CRS adapted from Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence, October 2013, p. I-24. Treasury provide intelligence supporting national requirements particular to the expertise of each department. They also contribute valuable strategic Relevant Statutes analysis of cross-cutting issues such as treaty Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 21 – DOD Intelligence Matters compliance, counterterrorism, transnational finance, and transnational organized crime. Title 50, U.S. Code, Chapter 44 – National Security IC Leadership Together, the DNI and Under Secretary of Defense for CRS Products Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) coordinate programs CRS In Focus IF10523, Defense Primer: Under Secretary of and activities across the IC to promote an integrated Defense for Intelligence and Security, by Michael E. DeVine approach to intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. CRS In Focus IF10524, Defense Primer: Budgeting for National and Defense Intelligence, by Michael E. DeVine Director of National Intelligence (DNI) CRS In Focus IF10574, Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to The DNI is the principal advisor to the President on Military Operations, by Michael E. DeVine intelligence matters. Created by the Intelligence Reform CRS Report R45175, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 (P.L. 108- the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief, by 458), the core mission of the DNI and, by extension, the Michael E. DeVine Office of the DNI (ODNI), is “to lead the IC in intelligence integration” and ensure the 17 elements are appropriately integrated. Other Resources Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and DOD, Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence, October 22, 2013 Security (USD(I&S)/Director of Defense DOD, Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Intelligence (DDI)) Support to Military Operations, July 5, 2017 The USD(I&S) position is dual-hatted. When acting as the USD(I&S), the incumbent reports directly to the Secretary (Note: This
Load more

Recommended publications
  • National Insider Threat Task Force Mission Fact Sheet
    NATIONAL INSIDER THREAT TASK FORCE MISSION FACT SHEET _________________________________ Why was the NITTF established? The National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) was established after the WikiLeaks release of thousands of classified documents through the global media and internet. Its mission is to deter, detect, and mitigate actions by employees who may represent a threat to national security by developing a national insider threat program with supporting policy, standards, guidance, and training. Who runs the task force, and which agencies are involved? Under Executive Order (E.O.) 13587, the NITTF is co-chaired by the U.S. Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. They, in turn, designated the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Counterintelligence Executive to co-direct the daily activities of the NITTF. The NITTF comprises employees and contractors from a variety of federal departments and agencies (D/A), and its work impacts more than 99 federal D/As that handle classified material. Currently, the following D/As have representatives on the NITTF: FBI, National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Transportation Security Administration. The NITTF responds directly to the Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee, which was also established under E.O. 13587. The steering committee comprises representatives from largely Intelligence Community agencies with extensive access to classified networks and materials, including the Departments of State, Energy, Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security, CIA, FBI, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, NCSC, National Security Agency, DIA, the Program Manager—Information Sharing Environment, Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council Staff, and the Information Security Oversight Office.
    [Show full text]
  • KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING to IDEALISM Idealism As a Philosophy
    KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING TO IDEALISM Idealism as a philosophy had its greatest impact during the nineteenth century. It is a philosophical approach that has as its central tenet that ideas are the only true reality, the only thing worth knowing. In a search for truth, beauty, and justice that is enduring and everlasting; the focus is on conscious reasoning in the mind. The main tenant of idealism is that ideas and knowledge are the truest reality. Many things in the world change, but ideas and knowledge are enduring. Idealism was often referred to as “idea-ism”. Idealists believe that ideas can change lives. The most important part of a person is the mind. It is to be nourished and developed. Etymologically Its origin is: from Greek idea “form, shape” from weid- also the origin of the “his” in his-tor “wise, learned” underlying English “history.” In Latin this root became videre “to see” and related words. It is the same root in Sanskrit veda “knowledge as in the Rig-Veda. The stem entered Germanic as witan “know,” seen in Modern German wissen “to know” and in English “wisdom” and “twit,” a shortened form of Middle English atwite derived from æt “at” +witen “reproach.” In short Idealism is a philosophical position which adheres to the view that nothing exists except as it is an idea in the mind of man or the mind of God. The idealist believes that the universe has intelligence and a will; that all material things are explainable in terms of a mind standing behind them. PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALE OF IDEALISM a) The Universe (Ontology or Metaphysics) To the idealist, the nature of the universe is mind; it is an idea.
    [Show full text]
  • Inside Russia's Intelligence Agencies
    EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN BRIEF POLICY RELATIONS ecfr.eu PUTIN’S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Mark Galeotti For his birthday in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was treated to an exhibition of faux Greek friezes showing SUMMARY him in the guise of Hercules. In one, he was slaying the • Russia’s intelligence agencies are engaged in an “hydra of sanctions”.1 active and aggressive campaign in support of the Kremlin’s wider geopolitical agenda. The image of the hydra – a voracious and vicious multi- headed beast, guided by a single mind, and which grows • As well as espionage, Moscow’s “special services” new heads as soon as one is lopped off – crops up frequently conduct active measures aimed at subverting in discussions of Russia’s intelligence and security services. and destabilising European governments, Murdered dissident Alexander Litvinenko and his co-author operations in support of Russian economic Yuri Felshtinsky wrote of the way “the old KGB, like some interests, and attacks on political enemies. multi-headed hydra, split into four new structures” after 1991.2 More recently, a British counterintelligence officer • Moscow has developed an array of overlapping described Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) as and competitive security and spy services. The a hydra because of the way that, for every plot foiled or aim is to encourage risk-taking and multiple operative expelled, more quickly appear. sources, but it also leads to turf wars and a tendency to play to Kremlin prejudices. The West finds itself in a new “hot peace” in which many consider Russia not just as an irritant or challenge, but • While much useful intelligence is collected, as an outright threat.
    [Show full text]
  • CIA Best Practices in Counterinsurgency
    CIA Best Practices in Counterinsurgency WikiLeaks release: December 18, 2014 Keywords: CIA, counterinsurgency, HVT, HVD, Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan, Thailand,HAMAS, FARC, PULO, AQI, FLN, IRA, PLO, LTTE, al-Qa‘ida, Taliban, drone, assassination Restraint: SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) Title: Best Practices in Counterinsurgency: Making High-Value Targeting Operations an Effective Counterinsurgency Tool Date: July 07, 2009 Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Author: CIA Office of Transnational Issues; Conflict, Governance, and Society Group Link: http://wikileaks.org/cia-hvt-counterinsurgency Pages: 21 Description This is a secret CIA document assessing high-value targeting (HVT) programs world-wide for their impact on insurgencies. The document is classified SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) and is for internal use to review the positive and negative implications of targeted assassinations on these groups for the strength of the group post the attack. The document assesses attacks on insurgent groups by the United States and other countries within Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan and Thailand. The document, which is "pro-assassination", was completed in July 2009 and coincides with the first year of the Obama administration and Leon Panetta's directorship of the CIA during which the United States very significantly increased its CIA assassination program at the
    [Show full text]
  • Is AI Intelligent, Really? Bruce D
    Seattle aP cific nivU ersity Digital Commons @ SPU SPU Works Summer August 23rd, 2019 Is AI intelligent, really? Bruce D. Baker Seattle Pacific nU iversity Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.spu.edu/works Part of the Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Comparative Methodologies and Theories Commons, Epistemology Commons, Philosophy of Science Commons, and the Practical Theology Commons Recommended Citation Baker, Bruce D., "Is AI intelligent, really?" (2019). SPU Works. 140. https://digitalcommons.spu.edu/works/140 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ SPU. It has been accepted for inclusion in SPU Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ SPU. Bruce Baker August 23, 2019 Is AI intelligent, really? Good question. On the surface, it seems simple enough. Assign any standard you like as a demonstration of intelligence, and then ask whether you could (theoretically) set up an AI to perform it. Sure, it seems common sense that given sufficiently advanced technology you could set up a computer or a robot to do just about anything that you could define as being doable. But what does this prove? Have you proven the AI is really intelligent? Or have you merely shown that there exists a solution to your pre- determined puzzle? Hmmm. This is why AI futurist Max Tegmark emphasizes the difference between narrow (machine-like) and broad (human-like) intelligence.1 And so the question remains: Can the AI be intelligent, really, in the same broad way its creator is? Why is this question so intractable? Because intelligence is not a monolithic property.
    [Show full text]
  • MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PB 34-04-4 Volume 30 Number 4 October-December 2004 STAFF: FEATURES Commanding General Major General Barbara G
    MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PB 34-04-4 Volume 30 Number 4 October-December 2004 STAFF: FEATURES Commanding General Major General Barbara G. Fast 8 Tactical Intelligence Shortcomings in Iraq: Restructuring Deputy Commanding General Battalion Intelligence to Win Brigadier General Brian A. Keller by Major Bill Benson and Captain Sean Nowlan Deputy Commandant for Futures Jerry V. Proctor Director of Training Development 16 Measuring Anti-U.S. Sentiment and Conducting Media and Support Analysis in The Republic of Korea (ROK) Colonel Eileen M. Ahearn by Major Daniel S. Burgess Deputy Director/Dean of Training Development and Support 24 Army’s MI School Faces TRADOC Accreditation Russell W. Watson, Ph.D. by John J. Craig Chief, Doctrine Division Stephen B. Leeder 25 USAIC&FH Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned Managing Editor (OIL) Process Sterilla A. Smith by Dee K. Barnett, Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Editor Elizabeth A. McGovern 27 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Intelligence Operations Design Director SSG Sharon K. Nieto by Michael A. Brake Associate Design Director and Administration 29 North Korean Special Operations Forces: 1996 Kangnung Specialist Angiene L. Myers Submarine Infiltration Cover Photographs: by Major Harry P. Dies, Jr. Courtesy of the U.S. Army Cover Design: 35 Deconstructing The Theory of 4th Generation Warfare Specialist Angiene L. Myers by Del Stewart, Chief Warrant Officer Three (Retired) Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelli- gence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the Military DEPARTMENTS Intelligence Professional Bulle- tin quarterly under provisions of AR 2 Always Out Front 58 Language Action 25-30. MIPB disseminates mate- rial designed to enhance individu- 3 CSM Forum 60 Professional Reader als’ knowledge of past, current, and emerging concepts, doctrine, materi- 4 Technical Perspective 62 MIPB 2004 Index al, training, and professional develop- ments in the MI Corps.
    [Show full text]
  • I,St=-Rn Endorsedb~ Chief, Policy, Information, Performance, and Exports
    NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE NSA/CSS POLICY 2-4 Issue Date: IO May 20 I 9 Revised: HANDLING OF REQUESTS FOR RELEASE OF U.S. IDENTITIES PURPOSE AND SCOPE This policy, developed in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense, implements Intelligence Community Policy Guidance I 07 .1 , "Requests for Identities of U.S. Persons in Disseminated Intelligence Reports" (Reference a), and prescribes the policy, procedures, and responsibilities for responding to a requesting entity, other than NSA/CSS, for post-publication release and dissemination of masked US person idenlity information in disseminated serialized NSA/CSS reporting. This policy applies exclusively to requests from a requesting entity, other than NSA/CSS, for post-publication release and dissemination of nonpublic US person identity information that was masked in a disseminated serialized NSA/CSS report. This policy does not apply in circumstances where a U.S. person has consented to the dissemination of communications to, from, or about the U.S. person. This policy applies to all NSA/CSS personnel and to all U.S. Cryptologic System Government personnel performing an NSA/CSS mission. \ This policy does not affect any minimization procedures established pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (Reference b), Executive Order 12333 (Reference £), or other provisions of law. This policy does not affect the requirements established in Annex A, "Dissemination of Congressional Identity Information," of Intelligence Community Directive 112, "Congressional Notification" (Reference d). ~A General, U.S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS i,st=-rn Endorsedb~ Chief, Policy, Information, Performance, and Exports NSA/CSS Policy 2-4 is approved for public release.
    [Show full text]
  • Nsa-Spybases-Expansi
    National Security Agency Military Construction, Defense-Wide FY 2008 Budget Estimates ($ in thousands) New/ Authorization Approp. Current Page State/Installation/Project Request Request Mission No. Georgia Augusta Regional Security Operation Center Inc. III - 100,000 C 202 Hawaii Kunia, Naval Security Group Activity Regional Security Operation Center Inc. III - 136,318 C 207 Maryland Fort Meade NSAW Utility Management System 7,901 7,901 C 213 OPS1 South Stair Tower 4,000 4,000 C 217 Total 11,901 248,219 201 1. COMPONENT 2. DATE NSA/CSS FY 2008 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM DEFENSE February 2007 3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION 4. COMMAND 5. AREA CONSTRUCTION COST INDEX FORT GORDON, GEORGIA NSA/CSS 0.84 6. PERSONNEL STRENGTH PERMANENT STUDENTS SUPPORTED TOTAL Army Installation OFF ENL CIV OFF ENL CIV OFF ENL CIV a. AS OF x b. END FY CLASS IFIED 7. INVENTORY DATA ($000) A. TOTAL ACREAGE B. INVENTORY TOTAL AS OF C. AUTHORIZED NOT YET IN INVENTORY 340,854 D. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM 0 E. AUTHORIZATION INCLUDED IN FOLLOWING PROGRAM 0 F. PLANNED IN NEXT THREE YEARS 0 G. REMAINING DEFICIENCY 0 H. GRAND TOTAL 340,854 8. PROJECTS REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM: CATEGORY PROJECT COST DESIGN PROJECT TITLE CODE NUMBER ($000) START COMPLETE 141 50080 Georgia Regional Security Operations Center 100,000 Jan 06 May 06 (FY08) (3rd Increment) (NSA/CSS Georgia) 9. FUTURE PROJECTS: a. INCLUDED IN FOLLOWING PROGRAM CATEGORY COST PROJECT TITLE CODE ($000) 141 Georgia Regional Security Operations Center (FY09) 86,550 (4th Increment) (NSA/CSS Georgia) b. PLANNED IN NEXT THREE YEARS CATEGORY COST PROJECT TITLE CODE ($000) 10.
    [Show full text]
  • Artificial Intelligence and National Security
    Artificial Intelligence and National Security Artificial intelligence will have immense implications for national and international security, and AI’s potential applications for defense and intelligence have been identified by the federal government as a major priority. There are, however, significant bureaucratic and technical challenges to the adoption and scaling of AI across U.S. defense and intelligence organizations. Moreover, other nations—particularly China and Russia—are also investing in military AI applications. As the strategic competition intensifies, the pressure to deploy untested and poorly understood systems to gain competitive advantage could lead to accidents, failures, and unintended escalation. The Bipartisan Policy Center and Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), in consultation with Reps. Robin Kelly (D-IL) and Will Hurd (R-TX), have worked with government officials, industry representatives, civil society advocates, and academics to better understand the major AI-related national and economic security issues the country faces. This paper hopes to shed more clarity on these challenges and provide actionable policy recommendations, to help guide a U.S. national strategy for AI. BPC’s effort is primarily designed to complement the work done by the Obama and Trump administrations, including President Barack Obama’s 2016 The National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan,i President Donald Trump’s Executive Order 13859, announcing the American AI Initiative,ii and the Office of Management and Budget’s subsequentGuidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications.iii The effort is also designed to further June 2020 advance work done by Kelly and Hurd in their 2018 Committee on Oversight 1 and Government Reform (Information Technology Subcommittee) white paper Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence and its Growing Impact on U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Theory of Mind As Inverse Reinforcement Learning. Current
    Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Theory of mind as inverse reinforcement learning 1,2 Julian Jara-Ettinger We review the idea that Theory of Mind—our ability to reason think or want based on how they behave. Research in about other people’s mental states—can be formalized as cognitive science suggests that we infer mental states by inverse reinforcement learning. Under this framework, thinking of other people as utility maximizers: constantly expectations about how mental states produce behavior are acting to maximize the rewards they obtain while mini- captured in a reinforcement learning (RL) model. Predicting mizing the costs that they incur [3–5]. Using this assump- other people’s actions is achieved by simulating a RL model tion, even children can infer other people’s preferences with the hypothesized beliefs and desires, while mental-state [6,7], knowledge [8,9], and moral standing [10–12]. inference is achieved by inverting this model. Although many advances in inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) did not have Theory of mind as inverse reinforcement human Theory of Mind in mind, here we focus on what they learning reveal when conceptualized as cognitive theories. We discuss Computationally, our intuitions about how other minds landmark successes of IRL, and key challenges in building work can be formalized using frameworks developed in a human-like Theory of Mind. classical area of AI: model-based reinforcement learning 1 Addresses (hereafter reinforcement learning or RL) . RL problems 1 Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United focus on how to combine a world model with a reward States function to produce a sequence of actions, called a policy, 2 Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, that maximizes agents’ rewards while minimizing their United States costs.
    [Show full text]
  • Policy Directive 28: Signals Intelligence Activities
    PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD (U) Report to the President on the Implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 28: Signals Intelligence Activities TABLE OF CONTENTS (U) Part I Introduction .............................................................. .............................................. 1 (U) Part II Significant Changes in Practice due to the Issuance of PPD-28 .......................... 5 (U) Part III Analysis and Recommendations ........................................................................... 12 (U) Part IV Conclusion .. ... ... ............. ......................................................................................... 18 (U) Annexes: (U) A. Separate Statement by Board Members Rachel Brand and Elise beth Collins ............ 20 (U) B. Separate Statement by Board Members James Dempsey and Patricia Wald .. ........... 23 I. (U) Introduction (U) On January 17, 2014, President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive- 28, Signals Intelligence Activities ("PPD-28"), which provides principles to guide "why, whether, when, and how the United States conducts signals intelligence activities[.]"l The directive recognizes both that "[t]he collection of signals intelligence is necessary for the United States to advance its national security and foreign policy interests and to protect its citizens (U) See Presidential Policy Directive - 28, Signals Intelligence Activities (January 17, 2014) (h ereinafter "PPD-28"), available at https:/ j www.whitehouse.gov / the-press- office / 2014/ 01/ 17j presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities.
    [Show full text]
  • “We Will Crush You”
    “We Will Crush You” The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo Copyright © 2008 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-405-2 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org November 2008 1-56432-405-2 “We Will Crush You” The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo ................................................................ 1 I. Summary ............................................................................................................... 2 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 7 II. Recommendations ............................................................................................... 9 To the Congolese Government ............................................................................. 9 To the Congolese National Assembly and Senate .............................................. 10 To International Donors ..................................................................................... 10 To MONUC and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 10 III.
    [Show full text]