Critical military study of the Battle of Ayacucho, by Lt Col A. R. Martinez, Perurlan Amy.. Ccrnmand and General Staff College. 31 May 49.
This Docuntent IS A HOLDING OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENW
CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P2-17~)8-7 Mar 52-5M 13 Mar 51
' ..:.'~.'; l\).•. ;.:.:.... '... . ~ . ~...... •..-.~. .~ CRITICAL MILITtmy STUDY OF THE BATTLE OF llYlCUCHO
ALFREDO RODRIGUEZ ML'R.TINEZ Lieutenant Colonel
Peruvian Army CRITICAL MILIT..I.\RY STUDY OF THE
BATTLE OF AYlCUCHO
Table of Contents PAGE
Significance of the Battle of Ayacucho ------I
Composition of Both Armies ------I
The Patriot Arrow ------~ - - - 1
TIle Royalist Army ------1
Deployment of Troops ------2 The Royalist Army ------2
The Patriot Army ------2 . Preliminary Operations ------,------2
The Royalist Plan ---- ,------2
The Patriot Plan - -,------2
Movement toward Ayacucho ------2 Battle of Ayacucho ------4 Terrain ---- -' ------4 Plans of Both Opponents ------4 The Royalist Plan ------'4 Patriot Plan ------6 Development of the Battle ------_:------6 Conclusions ------9 Preliminaries of the Battle ------9
The Battle ------~ ------10 'CRITICAL MILl TARY S'IUDY OF THE
BATTLE OF AYA.CUCHO
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE OF AYlCUGHO The Battle of Ayacucho took place 9 December 1824 and the incident took place' on the highest regions of the Plndes in Peru.
This battle, limited in proportions by the small strength partici pating in it, has in spite. of this, the particular interest of demonstrating the manner in which an army of inferior strength, arms, and equipment was able to defeat a superior opponent, thanks to the ability of the command and the morale and good physical q~alities of its soldiers.
Morevoer, the triumph of this battle meant for Peru and, in general, for South America., definitive freedom from the dominion of
Spain.
COMPOSITION OF BOTH ARMIES
The Patriot Army.--This was the name given to the Army which received the mission of freeing Peru. It vvas organized as follows:
The Conunander: General Jose A Sucre
Chief of Staff: General Gamarra
Peruvian Division: Marshal La Mar
1st Colombian Division: General Lara
2d Colombian Division: General Cordova
Cavalry Division: General Miller
Total strength: 15,780 men
The Royalist Ar&.--This was the name givel1: to the Spanish
Army, and was organized as follows:
The Commander: The Viceroy La Serna
Advance Guard Division: Marshal Valdez
1st Division: Marshal Monet
2d Division: Marshal Villalobos
Cavalry Division: Brigadier Ferraz
Total strength: 19,320 men The difference in favor of the Royalist Army: 3,540 men and 14 pieces of artillery.
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE TROOPS (see Sketch 1)
The Royalist Army.--The Advance Guard Division, in the tovm of
Accha, with advanced elements on the line Capacmarca-Golquemarca.
The main body (of 1st and 2d Divisions) in Paruro.
The Caval~J Division was in Cuzco, where it was organizing.
The Patriot Army.--With general headquarters and 1st Division in Pichirhua.
The Cavalry and 3d Division in Cashinchihua.
The 2d Division in Challhuani. "
PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS (see Sketches 1 and 2)
The Royalist Plan.--The plan conceived by the Viceroy was
comprised of three phases:
First phase -- Overru~ng via th~ west and enveloping
the Patriot Army. This phase gave opportunity for the movement
towards Rajay.
Second phase - Return from Rajay towards the Pampas.
Third phase -- A. parallel march toward the north, ter
minating in the Battle of Ayacucho.
The Plan of the Patriots.--General Sucre was avvaiting for
reinforcements and had received precise orders not to engage his
troops in any battle. These circumstances, in spite of the fact
that this situation for"ced him to look for an outlet toward his
bases, compelled the Patriot General to confine his movement
cl.ose to the enenw, to gain time, making good use of the strong
position offered by the mountain ranges £or those that wish to
defend them.
Movement toward Ayacucho.--The Viceroy initiated his opera
tions on 22 October 1824, leading his troops tow'ard the high grounds
of Mamara, Which he reached on 31 October. At this place he knew
that the· Patriots were moving toymrd the north, so decided to
2 continue his march. On 18. November he reached Rajay, where he found out that the Patriots had not even appeared in that region.
Sucre, in fact, counting on the courage of his troops, and using all resources available in the zone-he was crossing, ordered not to rush the march toward the north. From 14 to 19 November, the Patriots were stationed between Talavera and Anda huaylas.
The results of the first phase of the operation was as follaw's: The Viceroy couldn t t cut the enemy retreat and under stood that the Patriots knew how to malte good use of the terrain anq. woulcln' t give up ground on any minor feint.
Gene;ral Sucre received news that the Royalists were in
Huamaga and, for this fact, had cut off his lines of comnnmica tiona; he decided to adopt a position of defense on the high ground of Bombon to hold up the possible offensive by the Royalists.
After being informed in Rajay that the Patriots had only advanced as far as Andahuaylas, the Viceroy realized that he had exaggerated the extent of his envelopment and returned to occupy
Bombon before General S~cre, but he was too late -- the Patriots already were occupying this position.
The second phase of maneuver by the Viceroy consisted of taking a defensive position astride of the line of the Patriots' retreat, but also failed.
The Viceroy, knowing that it would be very hard to attack that position, issued a proclamation saying that he was retreating toward the coast to receive strong refnforcements. General Sucre partly believed this news, assuming that it might endanger the out come of the whole campaign.
These circumstances initiated what we call the third and last phase of -the Viceroy's opera.tion, which was to conduct both opponents to the Battlefield of Ayacucho.
The troops of both opponents remained on sight from
3 20 to 24 November, without any decision by the Viceroy to attack the strong position of the Patriots.
The Royalist Army initiated its movement toward the north on 25 November with the idea. of making the Patriots leave their position. General Sucre, knowing -this, confined himself to observ ing the movements of the Royalists and maneuvering with moderation in order not to get engaged in action under these bad conditions.
This is how both opponents made their movements toward
the north, vvith no more actions than small encounters between rear
guards and reconnaissance patrols, arriving at Quinua on 6 December, the place where, days later, the Battle of Ayacucho took place.
THE BlTTLE OF AUCUCHO
Terrain.--The pampa of Quinua is located about 12 kilometers from Huamanga., was given the name of tlAyacucho ff by the natives.
This pampa is an esplanade with easy declivity which prolongs the
skirts of the Condorcunca, a mountain that projects out of the
occidental chain of mountains. Descending the Condorcunca from east to west, and continuing by the pampa, which has 6 kilometers
in that direction, you reach the town of Quinua, loca.ted at the
end of the esplanade. The pan:y;>a is not more than 3 kilometers at
its "Wider places and is limited on the north by a gorge and on the
south by a very deep ravine; half-vmy down the pampa was another
ravine "With deep sloping borders that cuts the field from north to
south.
Plans of Both Opponents (see Sketch 3)
The Royalist Plan.--8everal considerations to modify the display of battle influenced the Viceroy's thoughts; on one hand,
his offensive was almost worn out by the long and fast marches
undertaken; the -shortage of arms and equipment, and his strength
had decreased on account of long periods of operations in mountains.
And on the other hand, the possibility of cutting off the retreat of
the Patriots had disappeared.
4 Due to these circtUllStances, the Viceroy judged that the strategic phase of the operations had been effected and it was only necessary to orient his forces as to their employment in order to look for the decisive action.
With this object in mind, the Viceroy conceived a plan "Which comprised two consecutive phases: The first phase con sis'ted of deployment in attack formations, thanks to the capture of some determined advanced objectives, the possession of which would give the necessary space for his troops that were occupying the high ground of Condorcunca, to descend; and the second phase, after on
general attack with all his forces.
The operation should develop as follows: General
Valdez, who was in contact, would initiate the action by attacldng the Patriots t left flank; he should capture a little hill that was half-way dom the field in order to continue forWard. Vl.hile the attention was drawn to General Valdez's attack on that wing,
General Villalobos, who should descend from the high ground in front' of the right flank of General Sucre, would advance one bat
talion to get hold of a security zone sufficiently deep, in order
to help the cavalry and Artillery descend to the plans; the rest
of Villalobos I Division would form the second echelon to support
the maneuver of Valdez. General Monet, who formed the center of
the deployed formation, would remain on the alert in the plains
during the development of these preliminary operations, but as
soon as the Valdez Division had advanced sufficiently enough to
favor his march to the other side of the ravine, Monet should
cross it to occupy the west border with the object of interlocking
the attacks of the divisions on the flanks.
After effecting those preliminary operations, whose
object was to place the troops along a good line of departure, the
general attack would be launched. In this attack the main effort would be carried out by the Monet Division, llmich was in better shape and the Cavalry would execute its maneuver by the southern part of the pampa where the terrain was more favorable•
Patriot Plan.-Due to his inferior strength, General
,Sucre's plan was based on the selection of good terrain which facilitated him a defensive-offensive type of maneuver.
In fact, the selected terrain had extraordinary advantages for the action. ' The pampa, which separated him from his opponent, was limited by two deep ravines which secured the flanks of the deployed formation, abolishing aJ.l danger of envelop ment; these same circumstances deprived the Viceroy from deploying all of his troops; the terrain forced the Royalists to effect a frontal attack, which dimmed their probabilities for triumph.
Few inconveniences were against the execution of the
Royalist attack, and were as follows: first, having to cross the
ravine which was in the center of the field under the range of fire
of the enemy; and secondly, to descend'from high ground in sight of
the defenders.
Combining, the intention of General Sucre was to de
tain the Royalists and exploit their least mistake or error. For
that purpose he adopted the follo'Wing formations: On the right flank, the Cordova Di,,'ision; on the left
flank, the La Mar Division; in rear of the center, empty, he re
served at his disposal the Division Lara and all his Cavalry which were his most eff~cient troops. Development of the Battle.--The Royalist action cOlTl.mended at
1000 hours, 9 December 1824. The Division Valdez succeeded in cap
turing the high grol.Uld which was its first objective and forced back
the La Ma.r Division which occupied the left flank. On the right,
the patrols of the Cordova Division had to fall back due to the im
pulse of the attack of one of the battalions of the Villalobos Divi
sion, which was supported by a squadron of Cavalry.
6 Vfuile this was taking ,place,the Royalist artillery des cended the skirts of the Condorcunca, occupying positions in rear of the Villalobos 'battalion. Three cavalry squadrons of the
Royalists also succeeded in advancing towards this zone.
Up to this moment, the plan of the VicerojT vms compl:ted with. On the Royalist righ-{j flank, the artillery attached to the
Valdez Division opened fire,. supporting the attack of its Qivision, forcing the La Mar Division to fall back. In view of the importance of Valdez's attack, it seemed that the action was going to end on this sector and, logicalJ.y, the Division Lara, which remained in the center as the second echelon, received orders from General Sucre to proceed in that direction.
On the Royalist left flank, in the meantime, the ba"btalion commander of the Villalobos Division, whose only mission was to at tain a zone of security, advanced impe'\iuously and thoughtlessly to such an intensity that he found himself without any support of his artillery, allowing to be repulsed by the Cordova Division vd. t.1l great casualties.
General Sucre, .lIDO was observing the battlefield, seeing that the ROJ,ralist battalion was falling back in disorder, ordered
Cordova to exploit the exit, and sent him part of Miller's Cavalry.
The Cordova Division iaunched its atta.ck, pursuing the Royalist battalion; and.succeeding in its advance to attack the rest of the
Villalobos Division, which was unable to hold it back.
The Viceroy, seeing that the preparation of his attack was being lost due to the assault of the right flank by the Patriots and wishing to reestablish the situation, decided to engage the
Monet Division, giving him orders in order to a-htract the opponent
to the center with his attack. At the same time, General Canterac
conducted part of the reserve to detain General Cordova.,succeeded for a while, but later was enveloped and overYl/helmed by the Patriots.
At once, the Cavalry of Miller intervened and finished with the
7 demoralization and retreat of the Royalists on that flank.
From this moment, the Cordova Divisi.on was fighting with many scattered groups, through which a gap was made easily, suc ceeding in the capture of part of the Royalist artillery.
In the center, Monet pretended to cross the gorge which separated him from his opponent; as soon as General Sucre saw the initiation of this movement, he assumed that these troops would be
disorganized crossing the obstacle under the range of fire; so he
ordered the rest of the Cavalry 1nth part of t~e Lara Division" to attack the first brigade of Monet before the crossing "Was complet,ed.
The designated troops advanced rapidly in that direc'\;ion and over whelmed the first brigade at the moment that they were- finishing "the
crossing. The redeployment of this brigade prevented the crossing
of the second brigade; from that moment on, both brigades were
mixed up, being pursued by the Patriot Cavalry 'which had gained the
advance.
On the Royalist right flank, the backward movement of the
La Mar Division was limited, thanks to the intervention on part of
the reserve -which, as we have explained, was launched at the begin
ning as his support, reestablishing the 51tuation. General Valdez
cou.ld appreciate the failure that Monet had suffered and found out,
moreover, of the general advance of the Patriots'right flank; his
battalions then gave up the terrain, ·withdrawing in small disorderly
groups, following the general flow of the dispersion to-wards the
high ground.
At this point, General Sucre, ordered the pursuit of the
Royalist Army to be continued until cOD\Olete demoralization of the
opponent was obtained.
The fifth part of the combat strength engaged by both
belligerents was out of the fight; and the rest of' the Royalist .lrmy,
with the Viceroy at its head, surrendered and capitulated.
Such was the final battle for the emancipation of Peru,
8 which consolidated and effected the freedom of South America.
CONCLUSIONS
Preliminaries of the Battl~.--Vihen the Viceroy assembled his troops in the region of Cuzco, he conceived his plan with the funda mental idea of cutting off the Patriots t lines of conmninicat,ions.
With such objective, he sketched an envelopment maneuver against the rear guard of the opponent, to force General Sucre to a decisive battle. But in order for the execution of this operation to be complete, he failed to leave some elements for the purpose of draw ing the attention of the Pa-t,riots to his front.
Another grave error made by the Viceroy in conducting the operations was the fact of losing contact with the main body of the enemy troops, not obtaining any information during the march to the north, and remained without news of their movements. For this rea son, when the Royalists arrived in Rajay and could not find the
Patriots, they knew that they failed on the attenpt and they had to turn in the opposite direction to start over their -wasted maneuver.
The maneuver against the enemy rear guard is characterized by the selection a priori of a general direction of the offensive which permits the avoidance of guesses shortening the nmnber of directions needed to look for the enewJ• Now, to be successful in this battle, it is necessary to previously obtaLl'l two conditions:
The first is,the enemy should be fixed on the strategic ground by forces placed in front of him. In the Ayacucho campaign, that con dition did not exist,; the operation was developed as a simple provo
cation of battle with inverted front lines; allo"Wing General Sucre
to move his troops in accordance with the situation and taking all
the advantages offered by the mountains to he 'Who knows them.
The second condition which should be obtained for this
maneuver is, to place the opponent in a situation denying him access
to any recourse making him lose all hopes of saJ.vation. It is true
that the mere presence of the enemy in the lines of communication
9 demoralizes any forces, but this moral commotion has the most remarkable effects in tactics in the field.
However, on the strategic field, a general always has a way of getting out of the enclosure even by means of the attack before the presence of the enemy becomes threatening.
When the Royalists were threatening at Bombon, just what we aJxeady said happened, the Patriots being well protected by their positions and availing themselves of needed supplies, were not scared in spite of the fact that the enemy was cutting off all the exits, and were able to find adequate maneuver to get out of the menace, \ drawing the attention of' the Royalists towards Quinua.
The Battle.-The conception of the Royalist Generals did not have the usual brilliance in the Battlefield of Ayacucho. Their at tack lacked of good preparation; the most simple foresight advices
-to facilitate the task of' the attacking troops to enable them to reach the opponent in an orderly manner. With this end, a garrison of security should have been established in the ravine that runs across the field facilitating the engagement of the units whose axis of attack crossed the obstacle. Monet should have worried also; to secure the outlet locale of his division on the other side
of the same terrain accident.
One of the elements of surprise is secrecy, and this is
obtained by displacement concealed from sight of the enemy. To ob
tain secrecy, nothing impeded the Royalist troops from moving during
the night and deploy for the attack tt1.e next morning on the other
side of the ravine. The need for secrecy was very imperative because
the t:roops were supposed to move toward their line of departure, not
only out of sight, but also out, of range of fire from the opponent.
It was necessary to previously obtain a more intense 'and firmly
organized security zone which would permit the passage and formation
of troops in the plains.
The piece-meal engagement, by successive echelons, of the
10 Villalobos Division, permitted the independents to progress against
them in an unexpected form.
On the Patriots' side, it is observed on the other hand
that there was good decision and good judgment in selecting the ter
rain and the idea of the defensive-offensive maneuver, due to its
inferior numerical strength.
During the conduct of the battle, the Patriot command
remained constantly well-informed and 'Was able to take advantage of
. all the errors made by his opponent to secure its triumph; demon
strating that it is possible to obtain a victory even against an
enewJ of superior strength.
11 ANNEX 1
Bibliography ANNEX 2
Sketches
Sketch 1 -- The lnitial Deployment o~ Troops and Preliminary Movements. Sketch 2 -- Movements Leading to the Quinua. Sketch 3 -- Battle of Ayacucho - Formations of Troops. C I / h10VI 1/ f
A'f/~CU{' c ()
I
L
s A I COt) AJ veha (Summary)
CRITICAL MILITARY SIDDY OF THE BlTTIE OF AYACUCHO
Significance of' the Battle of Ayacucho
The Battle of Ayacucho took place 9 December 1824, and the incident took place on the highest regLons of the Andes of Peru. This battle, very limited in numerical proportions, has, in spite of this, the particular interest to demonstrate the manner in which an Army of' inferior strength, equipment, etc, 'Was able to defeat a superior oppo nent, thanks to the ability of the 'command and the good qualities of their soldiers. Moreover, the triu.rrph of this battle meant for Peru, and also for South America, definitive freedom from the dominion of Spain.
COnq?osition of Both Armies Patriot Army
This name was given to the Army which received the mission of freeing Peru. Its commander 'Was General Jose A Sucre,and consisted of three Infantry divisions, one Cavalry division and some Artillery units: a total of 15,780 men.
Royalist Army
That was the name given to the Spanish Army. Its commander was
Viceroy La Serna. It was organized into three Infantry divisions, one Cavalry division, and Artillery units. The total strength reached
19,320 men -- a difference of 3,540 men and 14 pieces of Artillery in favor of the Royalist Army.
Formations of Trogps See Sketch 1.
Royalist Army
The main body of the Royalist Army was in the region of Paruro with advance elements on the line Capacmarca-eolquemarca. Patriot Army
The Patriot Army was in the regLon of Pichirhua with its advance elements along the Mamara River.
Preliminary Operations (See Sketches 1-2)
To initiate operations, the Viceroy made a plan of maneuvers based on the idea of' enveloping the Patriot Army from the vrest to cut off their line of communications and destroy them.
General Sncre, in turn, received precise orders not to get en gaged in any battle until the arrival of reinforcements. For this reason, he tried to keep himself well informed wit-l1. respect to the enemy in order to make good use of the advantages offered by the moun tainous terrain.
The operations to the north by the Royalists were started on
22 October. General Sucre ordered not to rush any movements, and days arter, also started his march toward the north. Both Armies were mov ing parallel to each other; the Roya.lists trying to attack the Patriots who in turn avoided the battle, protected by the terrain, until they reached the region of.' Quinva on 6 December where, at a later date, the
Eat'ble of llyacucho 1vaS to take place.
The Battle of Ayacucho
Terrain
It is a: pampa esplanade with easy declivity which prolongs the skirts of Cerro Coneorcunca; it is six kilometers from. east to l'feSt and on its 'Wider places is not more than three kilometers wide. It is very limited on the north by a gorge and on the south by a deep ravine; half-way dOlID the pampa was another ravine with deep sloping borders that separate the field from north to south.
Plans of_B~tp QPponen~s
Royalist Plan
The Royalist plan comprised two consecutive phases: first, to occupy a battle position by attaining some determined advanced objec tives, such a position would give sufficient place for troops occupying
-2... the high ground to march dovm and deploy; and secondly, to launch a general attack.
Patriot Plan
Due to his inferior strength, the plan of General Sucre was based on the selection of good terrain that facilitated for liUm a de rensive-offensive type of maneuver.
Developmen~ of the pBattle
The Royalist action commenced at 1000, 9 December 1824. The
VaJ.dez Division succeeded in capturing high ground which "WaS its first objective and forced back t,he La Mar Division whi.ch occupied the left flank of the Patriots. On the right flank the advance elements of the
Cordova Division had to fall back before the attack of the Villalobos
Division, but later succeeded in stopping it and made it fall back in disorder.
General Sucre, 'Who was observing the battle, seeing that the
Villalobos Division was falling back, ordered Cordova to investigate this s1tuation and sen~ him part of the Cavalry 'Which he had in re serve.
Faoing this critical situation on his lert flank, the Viceroy decided to employ. the Monet Division so that this attack would attract the enemy towards the center. Monet pretended to cross the ravine which separated him from his opponent, but didn't succeed because General Sucre, foreseeing this, sent part of the Lara Division and the rest of his Cavalry in that direction, forcing the Royalist Ar.n:w to fall back in disorder. On the Royalist right flank, General Valdez, seeing Monet's failure and the general advance of' the Patriot right flank, was forced to fall back and follow the general direction of the dispersion towards
'lihe high ground.
At this point, General Sucre ordered a pursuit of the Royalist I Arnr:y to be continued, until complete demoralization of the opponent was obtained.
-3 Conolusions Preliminaries. of the Battle An enveloping maneuver upon the enemy communicati.ons -was con
ceived by Viceroy La Serva, but hedee:i.,ded to fix the enemy with a
frontal attack and, also, committed another mistake in directing his
operations -- that of not maintaining contact, 'Which deprived him of badly needed information. Moreover, the maneuver against the rear guard was characterized
by the selection !priori of a general direction of the offensive.
In the .lyacucho campaign those conditiona did not exist: the
operation was developed as a simple provocation of battle with in
verted front lines, allowing General Sucre to move his troops in ac
cordance nth the situation and taking all the advantages offered by
the mountainous terrain to he who knows them. The Battle The Royalist plan sU£fered grave deficiencies. The attack
lacked good preparation; the most simple foresight advices to facili tate the task of the attacking troops to enable them to reach the op
ponent in an orderly manner. With this object, a garrison of security
should have been established in the ravine that runs across the field facilitating the engagement of the units 'Whose axis of attack crossed the obstacle. Monet should have worl"ied, also, to secure the outlet
locale of his division on the other side of the same terrain accident.
. One of the elements of surprise is secrecy, and this is obtained by displacement concea.led from sight of the enemy. To obtain secrecy, nothing impeded the Royalist troops from moving during the night .and deploy for the a-l:itack the next morning on the other side of the ravine.
The need for secrecy 'Was very imperative because the troops were sup
posed to move toward their line of departure, not only out of sight,
but also out of range of fire from the opponent. It was necessary to previously obtain a more intense and firmly organized security zone
1Vhich would permit the formation of troops in the plains.
-4 From the side or the Patriots, it is observed instead that there was good decision and good ·judgment in selecting the terrain and the idea of the defensive-offensive maneuver even being of inferior numerical strength. During the conduct or the battle,the Patriot command remained constantly well informed and ac'bing according to the circumstances, 'Were able to take advani;a;ge or all the errors made by his opponent to secure its tri'\l.UPh, demonstrating that it is possible to obtain a victory even against an enemy 'With superior strength.
-5