Junín, a Baile of Centaurs. the Continent's Freedom Sealed in Ayacucho (1822-1824)
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CITIAPTER XVI Junín, a Baile of Centaurs. The Continent's Freedom Sealed in Ayacucho (1822-1824) Afrer the victories of Bombona and Pichincha Bolívar again evidenced bis disinterestedness md bis generosity in praising bis officers. He reiterated bis desire to resign bis power. He expressed in a letter the need he felt for rest, md a belief that a period of repose might restore bis former energy, wbich he felt slipping away from Hm. Writing to a friend about Iturbide, he said: "You rnust be aware that Iturbide made himself emperor through the grace of Pío, ftrst sergeant.1 1 am very much afraid that the four boards covered with crimson, and wbich are termed a throne, cause the shedding of more blood and tears and give more cates than rest. Sorne beieve that it is very easy to put upon one's head a crown and have all adore it; But 1 believe that the period of rnonarchy is pass and that thrones will not be up- to-date in public opinion until the corruption of men chokes love of freedorn." 1. Augustin de Iturbide was proclaimed Emperor of Mexico as the result of a mutiny lcd in Mexico City by a sergeant called Pio Marcha. 131 Regarding the battle of Pichincha, he said: "Sucre is the Liberator of Ecuador." No better praise could be given bis worthy lieutenant. Once in Quito, he received the alatming news from Perú, wbich province had been left by San Martín, that several serious defeats had been suffered by the independents. He irnmediately made ready to free the viceroyalty from Spain, realizing that while Perú remained under Spain the independence of Colombia would be in danger. The viceroy of Perú had 23,000 European soldiers and all the resources necessary to carry on war. Perúwas the last SouthAmerican country to proclaim its independence. Although diere had been sorne movernents of insurrection in 1809 in Alto Perú (now Bolivia), they were soon quelled and the country once more placed under the dorninion of Spain. As a result, Perú was in position to send reinforcements to the royalists in Chile and was a constant menace to Colombia. The patriots of Chile, after obtaining their freedom, organized San MartínMartíns expedition to invade Perú. When San Martín entered Lima early in July, 1821, the viceroy (Pezuela) was deposed by an assemb!y, and Laserna was appointed to take bis place. Once in Lima, San Martín entered upon a period of inactivity which resulted in heavy losses to the independents. He was even ready to cornmunicate with the Spaniards in order to arrange for the establishment of a regency in Perú, awaiting the arrival of a European prince to govern the country. He even appeared ready to go to Spain, bimself, to beg for a prince. The viceroy established bis residence in Cuzco, the o!d capital of the Incas, and the Spanish officers obtained several parfia! victories. The defeats of the independent forces brought about the dissolution of ajunta which had taken cbarge of the government. At that time, Bolívar decided to intervene to help Perú gain her independence. He decided to send 3,000 men at once md to follow himself witb 3,000 more to undertake tbis last part of bis important work. As we have said, bis decision in this matter 132 was based, among other tbings, on the realization that the freedom of Colombia was in constant danger while the royalists occupied Perú. While making preparations for te carnpaign, he received news from Santander, the vice-president of Colombia, that the Spanish general, Morales, was advancing from Mérida to Cúcuta with a powerfúl army. He decided to send Sucre to Lima to handie the situation there and to go, himself, to Bogotá to defend bis own country. He would have been unable to go to Lima irnmediately anyway, for he Fiad not yet obtained permission from the Colombian government to do so. Qn bis way to Bogotá he learned that the reports of the movements of Morales were very much exaggerated and that bis forces were not so large as at first thought. Meanwhile, te Perúvians were insisting that Bolívar come to assist them, and dic Constitutional Congress of Perú even instructed te President to ask the Libertador Presidente to inforni bis honie government that the government of Perú ardently besought bim to lend bis assistaiice. Aware of the inefficient organization of te Peruvian forces, Bolívar strongly advised tbat attacks should not be made at once in order to see whether negotiations could bríng about te desired results, or to allow time lii which to improve te condition of te army. 1-le argued that no movement should be made until it was certain that independence could be gained only through te success of arms. Whiile Bolívar was still undecided, a powerful royalist army approached Lima, and te insurgents had to leave te capital and take shelter in te near-by port of Callao. Sucre, to whom dic command of te united army had been offered, but who had not accepted tbis conimission, directed te retreat. In Callao he assumed power, organi2ed te insurgents of te city, and undertook oter military operations. The royalists remained lii Lima for a short while only, and ten their opponents reoccupied te city. Once more Bolívar was obliged to leave Guayaquil, tbis time to go to Quito to defend te city against thepastusos, who Fiad again rebelled. After punisbing tem, he sent men to the city of Pasto to finish te work of pacification, and he returned to Guayaquil in January, 1823, where 133 he was met by a commission sent from Perú to insist upon his taking command of the Perúvians. Upon receipt of authorization from the Colombian government, he proceeded to Callao, where he arrived on the first of September, 1823. Congress conferred upon Bolívar the titie of Libertador, and placed in his hands supreme military authority over all the forces of the country. In order to insure close coóperation between the civil administration and te military operations, he was vested with political and executive authority. Bolívar accepted friese powers with great modesty, and remarked: "1 do for Perú more than my ability permits, because 1 count upon the efforts of my generous fellows-in-arms. The wisdom of Congress will give me light in the midst of the chaos, dlifficulties and dangers inwbich 1 see myself . .1 left the capital of Colombia, avoiding te responsibililties of civil government. My repugnance to work in governmental affairs is beyond all exaggeration, so 1 have resigned forever from civil power so far as it is not closely connected with military operations. The Congress of Perú may count, nevertheless on all te strengtb of Colombian arms to give te country unlimited freedom. By protecting national representation 1 have done for Perú te greatest service a man could do for a nation." There were elaborate fesfivifles in honor of Bolívar, and bis moderaflon, as well as bis other personal qualifications, was recognized and admired. General O'Higgins of Chile was present on that occasion. At one of te banquets, Bolívar proposed a toast voicing the hope that the cbildren of America might never see a throne raised in any of its territories, and that, as Napoleon was exiled in the middle of the ocean, and the new emperor, Iturbide, thrown out of Mexico, all usurpers of te rights of te people might fail, and that not one of them might remain throughout the New World. 134 Bolívar had many difficulties to overcorne in the work of organizing the elements of the country for the final struggle. Perúvians had not been hardened by constant fighting as had Venezuelans and New Granadians, and although they were patriotic and amcious to obtain their freedorn, yet they lacked the ardor that only Bolívar knew how to Idndle in rnen's hearts. He decided to hasten the advance of the Colombian reinforcernents, knowing that he could trust thern to forrn a strong nucleus around which he could organize the Peruvian campaign. In the midst of bis incessant work, he would say: `We must conquer or die! And we will conquer, for Heaven does not want us in chains." In January, 1824, Bolívar became very UI with fevet Before he bad fully recovered he began to direct the preparations for the campaign, and wbile convaiescing displayed remarkable energy in bis work.1 At times, though, he showed sorne signs of discouragernent. He had already said he felt that bis energy was diniinisbing, and in a letter to General Sucre he wrote: "1 am ready to meet dic Spaniards in a battle to end war in America, but nothing more. 1 feel tired, 1 am oid, and 1 have notbing to expeci." 1-le had sometbing to expect: the last and final victories, and then the ingratitude of bis fellow citizens. Perhaps at that time he was beginning to feel the advances of the illness which caused bis death.2 1. When he was sdll very weak, sitdng ghost-likc in an arrnchair, bis friend don Joaquín Mosquera, who had been bis ambassador to the countries of the South, askcd him, "And now, what are you going to do?" "To conquer," answered Bolívar. 2. Tuberculosis. 135 Then an event occurred which almost destroyed all of Bolivar's well- made plans. Sorne troops sent from the River Plata started a rebellion in Callao, and, before anything could be done to correct te situation, te Spanish flag was hoisted over the fortress and messages had been sent to te viceroy offering to deliver the city.