SDA Discussion Paper
Assessing the security implications of Balkan integration
Event report and discussion paper
SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA
A Security & Defence Agenda Report produced in collaboration with the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, and the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Rapporteur: Stephanie Carnes, Security and Defence Agenda Photos: David Plas Year of publication: 2009
SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA Bibliothèque Solvay, Parc Léopold, 137 rue Belliard, B-1040, Brussels, Belgium T: +32 (0)2 737 91 48 F: +32 (0)2 736 32 16 E: [email protected] W: www.securitydefenceagenda.org
SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA
SDA Event Report and Discussion Paper
CONTENTS
Evening debate programme p. 5
Evening debate report p. 6
Foreword p. 8
Discussion paper p. 11
Franz-Lothar Altmann p. 12 Spyros Economides p. 14 Kenneth Huffman p. 16 Tacan Ildem p. 17 Dimitris Kerides p. 20 Alexander Kitroeff p. 21 Branislav Milinkovic p. 22 Christian Schwarz—Schilling p. 23 Nikolaos Tzifakis p. 25
The SDA thanks the Czech Presidency of the EU for its support in the publication of this text.
Disclaimer: the opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the opinions of the SDA or its publication partners, or the official position of the Czech Presidency of the EU.
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Security implications of Balkan integration
COULD BALKAN NEWCOMERS TO NATO AND THE EU AF- FECT THE SECURITY OF THE WEST?
An evening debate organised by the Security & Defence Agenda, the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy
March 2, 2009, Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels
16:30 Registration
17:00-18:30 Debate
18:30 Cocktail Reception
With Croatia on the threshold of EU membership, and along with Albania and Former Yugoslav Repub- lic of Macedonia headed for NATO too, the day when Balkan countries will have an important influence on Western security policies is fast approaching. Although it’s nearly a decade and a half since the Day- ton Accord that brought peace to the region, and ten years since NATO intervened over Kosovo, dan- gerous tensions persist. How great is the risk that old enmities and rivalries between Balkan newcom- ers to the EU and of NATO will spill over into wider policy areas? The argument for stabilizing Balkan countries through integration into the EU and NATO remains strong, but with Euro-American relations still badly scarred by last year’s disagreements over the advisability of Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership, how deep are the pitfalls?
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Panel speakers
Admiral Giampaolo di Paola, Chairman of the Military Committee, NATO
Doris Pack MEP, Chairwoman of the Delegation for relations with the countries of South-East Europe
Jamie Shea, Director for Policy & Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO
Co-moderators
Giles Merritt, Director of the Security & Defence Agenda (Brussels)
Peter R. Weilemann, Director of the European Office, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Agenda (Brussels)
H.E. Robert Hunter, former US Ambassador to NATO (Washington, DC)
VIP discussants
H.E. Tacan Ildem, Permanent Representative, Delegation of Turkey to NATO
H.E. Kire Ilioski, Ambassador, Mission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to NATO
H.E. Artur Kuko, Ambassador, Mission of Albania to NATO
H.E. Branislav Milinkovic, Ambassador, Mission of Serbia to NATO
H.E. Igor Pokaz, Ambassador, Mission of Croatia to NATO
H.E. Nikola Radovanovic, Ambassador, Mission of Bosnia-Herzegovina to NATO
H.E. Thrasyvoulos Terry Stamatopoulos, Permanent Representative, Delegation of Greece to NATO
H.E. Veselin Sukovic, Ambassador, Mission of Montenegro to NATO
Dr. Nikolaos Tzifakis, Head of the International Cooperation Department, Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy
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component of preventing the resurgence of Event Report nationalism since it would help politicians from the region work together with others who have Co-moderating with SDA Director Giles different opinions but the same goals. Citing Merritt, Peter Weilemann, Director of the the past successes of EU forces in Bosnia, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s European Office, she said she was happy that the EU remained kicked off the debate by stressing that engaged within the framework of NATO and European security was inextricably linked to – saw existing NATO structures as facilitating and dependent on – a stable and peaceful EU efforts in the region. Balkan region.
Admiral Giampaolo di Paola, Chairman of the Giles Merritt then asked the panellists for their NATO Military Committee, agreed, saying that opinions on a recent Gallup poll which integration was not only in the interest of both revealed that between 10 and 15 percent of Balkan states and international institutions, but people in all Balkan countries think that a also that integration would provide a strong resumption of conflict is either certain or stimulus for democratic transformation. He probable, which he saw as evidence of stressed that as part of Euro-Atlantic disconcerting levels of tension in the region. institutions states not only gain rights, but they While he agreed with Admiral di Paola that also acquire certain responsibilities such as NATO member states are more likely to settle adopting similarly democratic values. disagreements through mechanisms within the Describing integration as having a mitigating Alliance framework, he wondered whether effect on regional instability, di Paola foresaw new member states would use their member- a time when Balkan states would provide ship as leverage against potential member more security to the alliance then they would states in long-standing disputes like the consume. Cyprus situation
Questioning di Paola’s seemingly rosy depiction of the current climate in the Balkans, Giles Merritt reminded the audience of the recent border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia as an example of how latent tensions between Balkan states can pose security issues for Europe as a whole. Di Paola acknowledged that while the border dispute in question could potentially pose a short delay to the accession process, it did not represent a fundamental problem. He also said that as members of the Alliance, states facing such disputes have strong incentives for resolution. Admiral di Paola
Speaking next, Doris Pack, described by Merritt as the foremost MEP on EU-Balkan Speaking next, Jamie Shea, NATO’s Director issues, called for a differentiation between NATO and EU membership processes and for Policy & Planning in the Private Office of urged policymakers to remember that once a the Secretary General, said that NATO had state has fulfilled pre-defined membership been good for the Balkans and vice versa, conditions, more conditions cannot be with critical lessons learned in the Balkans imposed. Although she expressed concern currently being applied in Afghanistan. He that Bosnia was becoming increasingly more went on to comment that the comprehensive ethnically divided, she did not believe that war approach currently used in Afghanistan – in would break out again. She saw integration which NATO works collaboratively with other into international institutions as a critical regional and international organisations – was developed during NATO’s experiences in the
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Balkans. He saw the Alliance as owing a the Ambassadors of the Western Balkan political debt to finish what was started in the states to NATO. Speaking first, Turkish Am- Balkans almost exactly ten years ago by bassador Tacan Ildem lauded the compre- bringing the western Balkan region into hensive approach of the international commu- Euro-Atlantic structures. Concerned that nity in Kosovo and hoped that EULEX would strategic neglect could give rise to a focus intensified efforts on creating an effi- resurgence of nationalist forces, he cient Kosovo Police Service. On Bosnia, he highlighted the importance of continued called for vigilance in combating what he saw attention and pressure from the international as increased nationalist rhetoric and he urged community as internal momentum for the EU not to be too hasty in the decision to integration was still lacking. He reminded the transfer responsibility and downsize audience that nationalist forces still exist, operations in the region. particularly in Bosnia, and it was essential that stakeholders not only found the political space to evaluate the Balkan situation, but also Serbian Ambassador Branislav Milinkovic acted in a preventive – rather than reactive – agreed with di Paola that Balkan states were manner. already contributing to security in the region and thanked Doris Pack for differentiating between the EU and NATO accession processes, particularly given Serbia’s desire for EU membership in the near future. Although Serbia was not aspiring for NATO membership, he saw the possibility of broader security cooperation between NATO and the EU not only as beneficial to regional stability, but also potentially helpful in solving what he described as NATO’s “identity crisis.”
Greek Ambassador Thrasyvoulos Terry Stamatopoulos spoke of the rules governing Doris Pack NATO enlargement – the enlargement study of 1995 -- and reminded the audience that Shea also saw the increasing relevance of the under these rules, NATO enlargement should EU in the region, and a need for NATO and occur according to its own security needs; EULEX to manage with joint responsibility. He NATO’s security was not necessarily pointed to a shift from the security paradigm secondary to the security of the applicant of the 1990s as addressed by the NATO state. He agreed with his Serbian colleague campaign to greater engagement of the EU that Bosnia needed to be monitored closely vis à vis civil society issues; visa issues, and echoed his Turkish counterpart’s economic development, and education were reluctance to see any sort of withdrawal or priorities. downsizing of the force in Kosovo. Turning to the subject of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), he spoke of the Responding to this shifting focus from military Greek commitment to remaining fully engaged action to civil society development, Peter in the United Nations process of mediation Weilemann found the perspective of and he added that Greece has made signifi- membership tied to soft power striking, but cant compromises in the framework of UN reminded the audience that hard security negotiations in hopes that the FYROM would power was still needed in the region. He also do the same. called for ownership of accession campaigns as an internal stimulus combined with continued support from international actors. Linked to Washington, DC by satellite, the debate was then opened to questions from participants at the Atlantic Council of the A first right of response was then afforded to United States. Speaking first, Robert
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Beecroft, former Special Envoy for the debate, the audience then heard from Bosnian Bosnian Federation at the US Embassy in Sa- Ambassador Nikola Radovanovic, who rajevo and former Head of Mission for the stressed the importance of integration as OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina, described facilitating the process of post-conflict a climate of political cynicism amongst reconstruction and democratic transformation. politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina as He said that security was key for Bosnia and causing a running “identity crisis” predicated Herzegovina and as a result, NATO on ethnic divisions. He also referenced a membership was a priority. He concluded by recent poll in Bosnia and Herzegovina which saying that while the process of reconstruction found that European Union membership is not and integration wasn’t fast enough for some seen by many people as an incentive to citizens, Bosnia was a better country today reconciliation. He then asked what leverage than five years ago. EU countries planned to exercise to “motivate, or even coerce” the politicians of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and whether or not the political Nikolaos Tzifakis, Head of the International Cooperation Department of the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, echoed Doris Pack’s calls for political reform, but stressed that the current political problems were symptomatic of an ineffective institutional framework. Ambassador Veselin Sukovic from Montenegro called for greater regional cooperation and hoped for a more prominent role for Montenegro in Euro-Atlantic integra- tion. Albanian Ambassador Artur Kuko as- sured his colleagues from the Western Balkans that with Albania as a full member of NATO, they would be getting a constructive Giles Merritt and Peter Weilemann representative voice in the Euro-Atlantic insti- tutions as well as a friendly voice in the region. He agreed with his Turkish counterpart that will to use such leverage existed within the there was great potential for Western Balkan EU. states to promote stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Doris Pack said that very few politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina were actually committed to reforming the state and emphasised that the EU needed to adopt a strong position to address this problem. She also called financial help from the EU the “red card” and a necessary component of progress in the region. Jamie Shea agreed with the need for increased international involvement, saying that progress would only occur with the permanent engagement of external actors to move the process of integration forward: “They have to feel the hot breath of the Jamie Shea international community on the back of their necks.” To prevent the resurgence of nationalism, he called for international aid to Speaking on behalf of the Former Yugoslav be linked to multi-ethnic cooperation. Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Ambassa- dor Kire Ilioski expressed frustration over the name dispute which has impeded the With Bosnia and Herzegovina a hot topic of FYROM’s process of accession to NATO,
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particularly since the FYROM had fulfilled all other necessary criteria for membership.
Admiral di Paola responded by saying that even when the accession criteria had been met, the decision to join the Alliance was one that was reached consensually. Doris Pack disagreed, emphasising again that extra con- ditions cannot be imposed on membership candidates to block accession: “You cannot be blackmailed by neighbours who have other interests.” She went on to say that such membership processes should not fall victim to bilateral problems such as the disputes between the FYROM and Greece and Croatia and Slovenia.
Jamie Shea called for more strategic dialogue with the region as a whole to replace the current approach of liaising with countries bilaterally. He concluded the debate by describing Balkan progress and integration as “do-able”, particularly compared to other regional problems.
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Security implications of Balkan integration
Map courtesy of the European Commission
Note from SDA Director Giles Merritt
On March 2nd, the SDA welcomed a wide range of stakeholders in the region to discuss the Euro- Atlantic future of the Balkans and the security implications of integrating Western Balkan states into NATO and the European Union.
Speakers and participants generally agreed that the integration of Western Balkan states into the European Union and NATO would be beneficial to broader Euro-Atlantic security in the long run. Integration was seen as a critical component of sustainable security and democratic transformation in the region and most agreed that more focused and consistent involvement of the international community was necessary.
Some speakers went as far as to see such involvement as a repayment of political debt to a region ravaged by conflict over a decade ago, while others stressed the importance of renewed American interest in the region through existing structures like the Office of the UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Concern was voiced, however, about whether or not Western Balkan states would export issues like border disputes, ethnic nationalism, corruption and other internal tensions. Some speakers reminded participants that although soft power initiatives were certainly beneficial, the continuing role of hard security power in the region should not be overlooked.
These are issues that cannot be fully addressed in a brief discussion. The following reflective commentaries by academics, diplomats, and other experts on the region represent a continuation of this timely – and indeed necessary – debate through this Discussion Paper.
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Foreward
Peter Weilemann, Director of the European Office, Konrad-Adenaur-Stiftung (KAS)
Europe’ soft power is not enough to stabilise a When it broke apart two decades ago, the region so deeply ridden by ethnic difference Republic of Yugoslavia plunged back into the dark shadows of its history. The key question and territorial conflicts. Hard power is still was whether the long-standing rivalries needed, and that means a military presence that carries with it an implicit willingness to between Yugoslavia’s constituent nations and intervene militarily should that ever become ethnicities would once again flare into violent necessary again. The spectre of outside conflict. We know, of course, that these fears interference is still needed in the Balkans, even quickly hardened with grim reality, but we also if Balkan nations rightly reiterate the mantra of know that the nations of the European Union, “ownership”, of policymaking and governance. together with the United States, did not The clash between aspirations and reality also succumb to the same instincts that had becomes very evident if one asks about the determined events in the 19th century, for the security implications of the Western Balkans for conclusions they drew were to unite their forces and embark on a common strategy. The the Euro-Atlantic Community. In the long run, essence of this new policy was to bring the Europe will not be able to look forward to a secure and peaceful future until the Balkan region into Euro-Atlantic structures, and in nations are integrated into the European Union 2004, the European Union offered through the and NATO. Having them as members will be in Thessaloniki process the possibility that the itself a security asset, but in truth the Balkan countries of the region might aspire to full nations are still so far net importers of security. membership in the EU. It was a policy stance To turn their memberships into a security that NATO had also initiated, comparable added-value for NATO and the EU means that enlargement policy which would see the there is much political homework still to be accession of Croatia and Albania in spring done. The articles assembled here will, I 2009. believe, help raise awareness of this challenge, identify the key issues, and stimulate the Both the goals and the outlook for the region debate on the solutions. It is a much-needed are clear enough, and its new-found stability is and worthwhile undertaking. unquestioned. But of the political processes of the Balkans are nevertheless characterised by duality. The EU’s commitment to enlargement is reiterated in almost all official communiqués, yet at the same time accession negotiations are being hampered for a number of reasons. First, there is enlargement fatigue, reflecting the sense that the European Union as presently constituted has reached the limits of its absorption capacity. Then there are bilateral inter-Balkan disputes such as those between Croatia and Slovenia or Greece and Macedonia (FYROM). There is also a lack of progress on transformation in countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The eventual prospect of EU membership may well be the main force pushing the region towards transformation, but the reality is that
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NATO and EU integration beneficial, but not a cure-all for internal tensions
Dr. Franz-Lothar Altmann
ranks much lower than accession aspirations. Instability, nationalistic rhetoric, recurring More importantly, the perspective of EU waves of inter-ethnic tensions, unresolved membership had been one of common points territorial and/or border issues, weak political institutions, organized crime, the absence of between the Slavic and the Albanian citizens in the rule of law: these are all issues attributed to Macedonia. Sacrificing European membership policy for the name issue can be extremely the Western Balkan region. Although one detrimental to the cohesiveness and thus the cannot deny the presence of these characteris- internal stability of Macedonia. tics, the question remains as to how much of a danger they pose to the stability of not only the region, but also to NATO and the EU. Albanians will be tempted to petition more intensively for regional autonomy, maybe even
It is important to make the distinction between as an intermediate step towards final secession inter-state conflict and intra-state tensions. It from Skopje. Such a development would further complicate the situation in the Western seems that after the experiences of conflict in Balkans: the vision of a greater Albania the Western Balkans during the 1990s, the encompassing Albania proper, northwestern recurrence of such inter-state conflicts in the Macedonia and Kosovo could become much region has become rather improbable, more realistic than politicians in Tirana and although some tensions still undoubtedly Pristina are willing to admit. But where is Mace- persist. donia left in such a scenario? If this realign- ment is perceived as negative, then the only The Greek-Macedonian name dispute does not conclusion can be to stabilize the latter by carry the potential for violent conflict; however, granting membership in the Euro-Atlantic it has already become a divisive issue in structures as soon as possible. If Greece is Macedonian society with potentially dangerous serious, then it should be interested in a stable consequences. It is misused by the ruling and democratic northern neighbour. Slav-Macedonian party VMRO to intensify nationalistic slogans which are not assumed by Other inter-state rivalries and quarrels in the the Albanian coalition partner DUI. The Western Balkans seem of lesser gravity, Albanian community seems increasingly to be making them presumably easier to settle. The losing patience with the government’s policy of estranging the country from the support of the ongoing border and sea access dispute US and the majority of EU countries. The latter between Slovenia and Croatia is unfortunate and blocks Croatia’s advancement in its EU have displayed a lack of understanding of membership negotiations, but is not expected Greece’s policies towards Macedonia to rise to the level of violent conflict. The worst (breaching even the Interim Accord of 1995 possible outcome is a resurgence of when it blocked Macedonia’s NATO antagonistic feelings in both nations towards aspirations), hoping that Skopje would react each other; however, no serious conflict prudently and not enter take action to further situation should develop from such tensions. escalate tensions such as the renaming of airports and freeways. The Albanian citizens of
Macedonia realise that their government’s policy is playing into the hands of Athens, There should not be any illusions that antago- which under these circumstances will remain nistic feelings between Western Balkans na- tions can be overcome in the foreseeable even more unwilling to lift its veto against future. The schisms created by the war-ridden Macedonia’s NATO and EU accession. On the 1990s, and the continued manipulation of Albanian list of priorities, the name question
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Western Balkans seems very bleak. NATO and nationalist sentiment is still part of domestic EU integration are seen as important stabilising political games. Of course, one is reminded of factors but are these ambitions realistic consid- the healing effects of European integration policies starting in the 1950s, but it should also ering internal conflicts? NATO membership be remembered that in the countries in should be regarded as a stabilising framework through which inter-state conflicts can be eradi- question, active anti-nationalistic, reconciliatory cated in the future. But for resolving internal policies have been enacted. Relying wholly on conflicts and tensions the effects of NATO and the harmonizing effects of EU membership EU membership are minimal. Did EU member- should not be the substitute for internal political ship facilitate the resolution of the Spanish- progress. Basque conflict or the Slovak-Hungarian and the Greek-Turkish Cyprus controversies? Even Major concerns remain about internal worse, EU membership enabled Slovenia to animosities and political tension threatening the revitalise its border dispute with Croatia and stability of almost all of the Western Balkans offered Greece the possibility to destabilise its countries, although democratically elected gov- northern neighbor Macedonia as well as to ernments are now in place. There is an obvious block Cyprus’ reunification. The lesson learnt is lack of the political culture of compromising, thus: do your homework first and do not import and at the same time, patronage, clientelism your internal problems into the EU. and ethno-centric thinking characterise Franz-Lothar Altmann is a Visiting Professor of domestic politics. Rampant corruption and a Economics at Portland State University. He is weakened rule of law estrange people from the author of 9 books and some 240 articles on politics. East- and Southeast-European economics and politics, transformation and European Bosnia and Herzegovina, jeopardised by integration. secessionist threats from the Serbian Republic, cannot be regarded as a viable state and must be seen as a de facto protectorate like Kosovo, which is in a transition that prevents any improvement on the political as well economic fronts. Serbian politicians have become so focused on the Kosovo issue that they are even willing to sacrifice EU-integrational politics while knowing that Kosovo is not likely to be reintegrated into Serbia. Concerns also remain that, should serious clashes between Serbs and Albanians occur in Northern Kosovo, paramilitary units from Serbia proper would try to interfere. The province of Voivodina’s autonomy continues and serious altercations within the Serbian Muslim community as well as a restive Albanian minority in South Serbia add to the volatile situation.
If one is also considers the political climate in Albania, the comprehensive picture of the
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Hurdles persist for Euro-Atlantic integration of Western Balkan states
Dr. Spyros Economides
integration. The FYROM’s NATO membership The Western Balkan region remains the last depends on the successful resolution of the outpost of South East Europe with respect to name dispute with neighbouring Greece as Euro-Atlantic integration. This results from at least three main factors. First, and for the most evidenced during the NATO summit in April part, Western Balkan states have found it 2008, where its membership was rejected by the Alliance. In a similar fashion, Serbia’s difficult to conduct internal reforms at a pace in tortuous relationship with both NATO and the line with the demands and conditions which EU is contingent on its behaviour not only in have to be met for integration into the EU and relation to ICTY indictees but also on its NATO. Second, ‘enlargement fatigue’ amongst position vis à vis Kosovo (which has also existing EU member states has precluded swift caused division among existing NATO allies enlargement to states in the Western Balkans and EU partners). We have also seen the direct as had happened, arguably, in the ‘Eastern obstruction of Croatia’s accession negotiations Balkans’ – that is to say Romania and Bulgaria. by Slovenia, adding to the host of bilateral Third, there still exist a series of bilateral and issues clouding the EU and NATO’s potentially multilateral differences and crisis points in the region which remain unresolved, enlargement agenda in the Western Balkans. providing obstacles to the induction of new members into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Ultimately, while the problems outlined above are serious hurdles for the region’s Euro-
Atlantic aspirations, the recent history of NATO With respect to the first factor, the EU has expansion and EU enlargement is a key played a leading role in cajoling and enticing indicator of the nature of the process. NATO’s Western Balkans states into the reform neces- sary to achieve the economic, political and so- enlargement into central and Eastern Europe cial conditions for EU candidacy. This has not has been met with hostility in Moscow which often translates into intransigence, if not out- been an easy task; one need only consider the right antagonism, a factor which cannot be lengthy process of reform and institution build- ignored either in Washington D.C or in the ing in Bosnia before it was even ready to sign a European capitals. In turn, an enlarged NATO Stabilisation and Association Agreement with has not always been conducive to smooth the EU, let alone be considered for member Transatlantic relations as seen in the ‘New’ candidacy. With respect to the second factor, versus ‘Old’ Europe acrimony in the context of referenda in France and in the Netherlands, Iraq. In the case of the EU, the evidence and subsequently in Ireland, have provided suggests that enlargement is not always the evidence of a deep-seated fear of and best medicine for the resolution of perennial objection to further enlargement. Such objection stems mainly from issues of culture conflicts (such as in the case of Cyprus), or for and identity arising from Turkey’s EU the normalisation of socio-political conduct within new member states (such as in the candidacy which entangle the states of the cases of Romania and Bulgaria with respect to Western Balkans in their sphere (especially corruption and criminality). when viewed in the context of the history of the region in the 1990s which provided the EU and NATO with serious policy dilemmas). And For these reasons, amongst others, Euro- lastly, with respect to the third factor, bilateral Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans will relations between Greece and the Former remain a path strewn with pitfalls. The hallmark Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), or of EU policy towards the region has been a issues relating to Kosovo’s independence reliance on containment and stabilisation, with which encompass a number of states in the an attempt to promote regional co-operation region, have posed major obstacles to further
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agenda (but without promising it to all). The relative success of this policy mix, in conjunc- tion with evidence of success of security sector reform in many Western Balkan states under the extremely watchful eye of NATO has resulted in a reduction in the potential for serious instability or conflict in the region. Nonetheless, the prospects for membership in NATO and the EU depend on a wider variety of factors which, in the short-term, are not favourable.
Spyros Economides is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations and European Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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Balkan “differences” not an impediment to NATO accession
Kenneth Huffman
viability of others. While some Alliance A long-established NATO objective is to members express concern about importing achieve a “Europe whole, free and at peace.” Balkan issues into the Alliance, most of the In the mid-1990s the Alliance implemented Partnership for Peace as a vehicle for all Euro- major differences should have been resolved pean countries to either become members of before accession. Besides, NATO has dealt with and successfully accommodated most NATO or to associate themselves with the or- national differences of opinions among its ganization. In a similar vein, the European Un- members. ion has established procedures whereby Euro- pean countries can join the Union or benefit through a Stabilization and Association Managing the different expectations of Balkan Agreement. These procedures exist for all countries will be difficult. However, procedures European nations that elect to participate. The have been well established and used degree to which they participate is up to their effectively for the 12 previous former Warsaw governments. The path to membership is Pact members to join NATO. If the Balkan available provided the countries transform to countries have the political will to embrace the embrace the principles of democracy, free- Western European institutions and their market economies and pluralistic societies. principles, then the procedures for the path to membership will be available. NATO can work
with capitals to promote democratic NATO would like to consolidate the transforma- governance, rule of law, open market tion of Europe to extend as far as possible its economies, conflict resolution and collective area of integrated security. When achieved, a security, and secure cross-border collection of all like-minded European democratic nations would make the idea of transportation and energy links, regardless of intra-European war out of the question. From the institutional affiliation of countries in the Washington’s perspective, all Balkan nations region. should eventually become members of NATO as well as the EU. Not only NATO, but individual member states that have been through the accession process,
can help work with Balkan countries on Membership remains a challenge for a number defence reform, joint exercises and other of Balkan countries. While several nations have already become members of the Alliance, government initiatives. Additionally, organiza- there are others that have not achieved the tions associated with NATO, such as the Southeast Europe Defense Ministers and the necessary reforms to be seriously considered. Southeastern Brigade can help in this regard. Additionally, unless the issues that prevent Thus, the idea of all European nations consensus for an offer of membership can be eventually becoming members of NATO is resolved, it will like take a significant amount of realistic. However, the timetable for member- time before NATO’s overall transformation ship will be driven by a number of factors that objective is achieved. Border and sea access will be up to the nations themselves to resolve. disputes as well as name conventions stand in As has always been the case for Partnership the way of agreement to invite some nations, for Peace, membership in the Alliance also while respect for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia may stand in the way of becomes a matter of self-determination for the others’ membership. These international Balkan countries. issues can be compounded by lack of internal Kenneth Huffman is a Senior Fellow at the agreements within some Balkan countries as Atlantic Council of the United States. well as questions regarding the economic
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Turkey’s enduring role in Balkan security and transformation
H.E. Tacan Ildem
highlights these ties. The Balkan region has played a significant role in European history. In the past, the Balkans Turkey places special emphasis on its relations were associated with war and conflict. But with Balkan countries. Long-standing friendly times have changed. The region has clearly relations with the countries of the region, based moved ahead and is on its way to closer on mutual respect for independence, integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as non-interference in domestic affairs, constitute
a favorable basis for furthering relations in all This region also occupies a distinct place in fields. Turkey's foreign policy. This stems from the fact that Turkey itself is an integral part of Europe and the Balkans. Historical ties In geographical terms, the Balkans may not be between Turkey and the countries of the seen as particularly influential size-wise. Balkan region, and consequently the close However, since the diverse region relations between our peoples, are certainly encompasses many different ethnicities, important factors. As the Balkan region is religions, and languages, the situation Turkey’s gateway to continental Europe, there necessitates a common set of unifying values are peoples of Turkish origin in various Balkan and ideals to bring together the peoples and countries. There are also Turkish citizens nations of the Balkans. NATO and the whose grandparents or parents have European Union are probably the two most immigrated to Turkey from all over the Balkan important factors for the consolidation of peace, peninsula. Conflicts in this region often create security and stability in the region. serious consequences for Turkey particularly in terms of huge numbers of refugees pouring in after each major conflict. One may suggest that countries in the region have different degrees of engagement with NATO and the EU. NATO’s “open door” policy Therefore, Turkey’s interest in the fate of the has certainly proven its success in terms of Balkans region is strong; this is why Turkey promoting security and stability in the Euro- was at the forefront of international efforts to Atlantic area, particularly in the Balkans. The stop bloodshed and ethnic cleansing during the rules of the game are clear. Let us recall the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts. Turkish troops, provisions of the Washington Treaty: Any Euro- police officers and observers continue to serve pean country in a position to further the in various parts of the former Yugoslavia to principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and ensure the safety and well-being of civilians. contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area Turkey has provided substantial amounts of can be considered for membership of the assistance to war-torn Balkan nations to Alliance. In this context, the Euro-Atlantic facilitate reconstruction and rehabilitation integration process will be incomplete until it efforts. embraces all countries in the Balkans.
Turkey today enjoys exemplary political and Albania and Croatia are expected to join the economic relations with the Balkan countries Alliance as full members at the NATO both at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. In the meantime, it is Cultural ties are equally worth mentioning. unfortunate that Macedonia is not included in Besides what has been achieved in the past, this recent round of enlargement. At this point, the restoration work of both the Mostar Bridge it is important to recall that at the NATO and the Catholic church in Zenica also
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a year after Kosovo’s independence, it is Bucharest Summit held in April 2008, Allied encouraging to witness the process towards Heads of State and Government clearly the consolidation of peace and stability in this recognised the hard work done by all three Adriatic Charter countries, including country, thanks to the vigilance of KFOR. With Macedonia, as well as its commitment to the the implementation of its new tasks, KFOR’s significant contributions to consolidating peace, process. To put it shortly, there was a general security and stability in Kosovo and the region agreement among the leaders that Macedonia as a whole will continue. As one of the non-EU has fulfilled the criteria for joining NATO. The Allies contributing to EULEX, Turkey hopes that Allies also agreed that an invitation to EULEX will also contribute to KFOR’s efforts to Macedonia would be extended as soon as a ensure safe and secure environment in the mutually acceptable solution to the remaining region. issue has been reached. It is important to note that the resolution of this particular issue is not part of the accession criteria and therefore At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, the Alliance should not be seen as a prerequisite per se for will also celebrate the 10th anniversary of the receiving an invitation for membership. South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) which was Furthermore, NATO is party to neither the launched at the Washington Summit of 1999. problem nor the negotiation process. Through political dialogue and practical Nevertheless, NATO acts on a consensus rule, cooperation, SEEI has been playing an one of the core principles of this Alliance. important role in fostering regional cooperation, Obviously, this decision implies that it is equally building confidence and facilitating the Euro- incumbent upon both Greece and Macedonia Atlantic integration process in the Balkans. to find a mutually acceptable solution. It is their shared responsibility to act constructively and seek an early settlement. At the same time, all Turkey has traditionally aspired for Allies bear responsibility to encourage both reconciliation, stability and peace in the parties to find an expeditious settlement. In the Balkans at a regional level. Turkey’s role in meantime, NATO should increase its launching major initiatives such as the South- engagement with and assistance for eastern European Cooperation Process Macedonia. Turkey believes that the recent (SEECP), South East Europe Defence Minis- wave of enlargement will not be truly complete ters’ Process (SEDM) and the Multinational until Macedonia becomes a member of the Peacekeeping Force for Southeastern Europe Alliance at the earliest opportunity. is proof of the importance it attaches to forging closer ties among Balkan countries and to the creation of a lasting climate of understanding In the meantime, Turkey recognises and and peace. In this regard, Turkey is dedicated strongly supports the Euro-Atlantic aspirations to play its part in regional economic initiatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. We as well, and has been active within the South also welcome Serbia’s intention to increase its East Europe Cooperation Process, Regional engagement with the Alliance through various Cooperation Council (RCC) and the Southeast mechanisms under the Partnership for Peace European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). During Program. Serbia’s stability is critical for the its Chairmanship-in-Office starting in June whole region. 2009, Turkey will work to facilitate cooperation among the countries in the region in hopes of bringing lasting stability to South Eastern On the other hand, the Euro-Atlantic integration Europe. aspirations of Kosovo should also be recog- nised. Ten years after the 1999 campaign and
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It is Turkey’s firm belief that now is the right time to free the Balkans from its difficult past and demonstrate its commitment to mutual re- spect and peaceful cohabitation. The Euro- Atlantic integration process is essential to achieve these goals.
Tacan Ildem is the Turkish Ambassador to NATO
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SDA Event Report and Discussion Paper
An ‘Eastern Question’ for all time?
Dimitris Keridis
makers who strive to integrate the Western Balkan newcomers and would-be newcomers Balkans into the new Europe and turn Russia’s have affected and will continue to affect both “near abroad” into a European “neighborhood” the security of the West and the corresponding institutional architecture of Western security. In capable of full accession into the EU at some the 1990s, the Western Balkans emerged as a point in the future. This connection was particu- larly evident in August 2008 during the short primary battleground for the negotiation of post- war between Russia and Georgia. Cold War European and international order.
The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia pre- sented a major challenge for the European Un- Competing visions of Europe continue to collide ion that was, belatedly and partially, met by in the Balkans. A 19th century Europe of ethnic NATO and the United States. Much of the fail- antagonisms and great-power rivalry confronts ure had to do with the intellectual and subse- a 21st century post-modern, post-national quent policy confusion surrounding the relation- Europe of shared sovereignty and accelerating ship between state and human rights and the integration. Bosnia, Kosovo, the Former Yugo- role of humanitarian intervention. slav Republic of Macedonia, Cyprus, and Tur- key itself, the largest prize of them all, are all
parts of this struggle. The old “Eastern Ques- Despite some progress, an overall consensus tion” might have been transformed, but it is not on these vital matters remains elusive as differ- dead and it continues to keep diplomats busy. ent political forces, immersed in different tradi- It is quite ironic that a century since the fall of tions, continue to present conflicting argu- the old Ottoman imperial order, we are still ments. If NATO’s interventions in the former dealing with issues of nationalism, sovereignty, Yugoslavia were the product of left-of-center “liberal hawks” focused on applying military democracy and self-determination. power to the service of human good, the inter- vention in Iraq was designed by right-wing neo- Today, at the time of a deepening economic conservatives in search of redrawing the Mid- crisis, when isolationist and protectionist in- dle East according to US interests. However, stincts are on the rise and many in Brussels neither the operation in Kosovo nor the Iraqi feel that former Eastern Europeans were al- intervention were sanctioned by the UN Secu- lowed to enter the EU unprepared, Europe rity Council and, thus, both remain illegal under should resist introversion. The notion that by international law. turning inwards, the EU can be safe from eco- nomic hardship was and continues to be false. The weakening of Europe’s engagement with In Kosovo in particular, the West has under- the Balkans threatens to leave much of the taken a great gamble with unforeseen long- business unfinished and potentially unravel term consequences, with the understanding much of the progress achieved in the past ten that the return of the largely Albanian province years. to Serbia is not politically feasible. Politics aside, Kosovo continues to present a legal rid- dle at the very foundations of the evolving Dimitris Keridis is the Constantine Karamanlis European and international systems. The di- Associate Professor in Hellenic and Southeast- vided city of Mitrovica is one of the new flash ern European Studies at the Fletcher School, points of these systems. An exhausted Serbia Tufts University. and impoverished Kosovo do not have the ca- pacity to ignite a major confrontation that could threaten the stability of the wider region. But Kosovo continues to trouble Western policy-
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Security implications of Balkan integration
Security implications of Western Balkan integration in the EU and NATO: Greece’s role
Dr. Alexander Kitroeff
Significantly, Obama’s astronomically high There was a short period on the eve of approval ratings among Greeks have remained Yugoslavia’s break up in which international intact. organisations, and the IMF more specifically, balked at extending economic assistance to the faltering central government. This fatal choice The new “know thyself” attitude in Athens has has been examined in detail by Susan re-activated serious soul-searching over the Woodward in her Balkan Tragedy and by country’s policies in the Balkans and especially numerous other observers. What happened the increasingly untenable positions with regard next is history, as they say. The present to the Macedonian issue. Ironically, the moment, and the prospect of the integration presence of a more hard line administration in into the EU and NATO of the western Balkan Skopje may pave the way for a more tolerant states that emerged from the break up, attitude in Athens, attaining the moral ground presents a turning point in which history may being the last resort following failure to obtain repeat itself – or not. The current economic any real political results. A crucial component crisis and new administration in Washington, to a possible change in Greek intransigence is D.C. creates favorable circumstances for the the effects of the current economic crisis on emergence of a regional ‘political community’, a what is an overextended presence in the sense of common security, and financial Western Balkans. The quiet penetration of interests mediated and promoted by external Greek banks and companies in the region and intervention on the part of a hegemonic the economic and political implications of a European Union (EU) and NATO. reversal of fortune is now also something that is being publicly debated in Athens. The inter-
The record of these organizations in creating a national hegemon, to use international relations sense of common interests in the region until parlance, may be weaker than before, but the realities Greece is facing, and its stated now has been mixed to say the least. One of commitment to the West, give the EU and the stumbling blocks has been Greece’s foreign NATO significant leverage policy and the reciprocating policies from within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Yet Athens is a very good vantage Alexander Kitroeff is an Associate Professor of point from which to gauge the effects of the History at Haverford College in Pennsylvania, economic crisis and the change in Washington. USA. In particular, an announcement in March 2009 that President Obama would be visiting Turkey very soon and the reactions in Greece serve to highlight the deeper structures of Greece’s attitude to international involvement in the region and, by extension, the potential of EU and NATO involvement in the region writ large. The Obama visit to Ankara will be the first by a US president that does not combine a visit to Athens in the name of maintaining equal dis- tance, or proximity perhaps, to both these feud- ing capitals. This has triggered a cascade of articles in the Greek press acknowledging what was never acknowledged in public, namely that Turkey is in fact a more important strategic partner for the United States than Greece.
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EU accession ‘a priority’ for Serbia
H.E. Dr. Branislav Milinkovic
exercised in relation to violence against Kosovo Contrary to the last decade of the 20th century, Serbs especially in March 2004, and a during which developments in the Western pragmatic approach in developing substantial Balkans seriously undermined European security, it is safe to say that over the course of police cooperation with regional and European the past decade this situation gradually, partners are additional examples of how |Serbia, although faced with unprecedented steadily and clearly changed for the better. challenges, contributes to the security of Regional states have started to contribute to Europe. the security of the West: their democratic credentials have been confirmed, their transitions consolidated and their regional Future integration of the Western Balkans into cooperation intensified and diversified. Each of the European mainstream should confirm them has managed to achieve concrete an important positive shift in its perception as a progress towards integration into the European region that created and exported tensions, to a mainstream, which is usually identified with the region that actually improves stability of the EU and NATO membership. continent. From an economic point of view this region is a significant market in the middle of
the enlarged EU with a well-educated labor NATO is the key hard security organization in force and a rich tradition of entrepreneurship. the Euro-Atlantic space and is increasingly The Western Balkans can offer even more playing a global role. But it has to be when it comes to culture and ethnic diversity. acknowledged that NATO membership is neither a formal precondition to join the EU, nor the only way for individual European countries Bilateral tensions and disputes are in no way to contribute to European security. Participation specific feature of the Western Balkans only. in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, But it would be very helpful, because of short of full membership, is a formula already traditional image and recent history, if regional used by several EU members, like Austria, countries approach European integration in a Sweden, Finland or Ireland. Participation of mutually supportive manner. Each positive step Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzego- of any individual country should be regarded as vina in the PfP since 2006 has also positively a positive step for the entire region. Brussels contributed to regional security. should be forthcoming as well – the Western Balkans should be stabilised through Serbia’s priority is to join EU as soon as integration. This is the best recipe to ameliorate possible, but she does not aspire to NATO tensions. membership due to specific and sensitive reasons – ten years ago NATO waged combat Branislav Milinkovic is the Serbian Ambassador operation (its first ever) against Serbia without to NATO. the UN approval, while last year NATO decided to train so-called Kosovo security forces contrary to the UN SC Resolution 1244. How- ever, Serbia has developed cooperation with NATO in various fields, while good professional contacts between KFOR and Serbian armed forces are critically important for regional stabil- ity. Serbia’s moderate and well-measured response to the illegal proclamation of Kos- ovo’s independence in February 2008, restraint
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Re-invigorating the role of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Prof. Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling
The resignation of the High Representative of In support of the reengagement of the US, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Miroslav Lajčák at the international community’s role needs to be re- end of January 2009 further complicates the defined to end its paralysed and reactive state. already difficult situation in Bosnia and Political leaders of Europe, together with the Herzegovina and thereby creates a vacuum in US and Russia, must cooperate more closely governance. His resignation and the already- and harmonise their goals and political serious situation is a dangerous recipe for objectives. This support must start with a clear escalation of the conflict. Careful and vision and strong will at the highest political immediate action by the international level. community is thus necessary to ensure sustain-
able solutions which are in the best interests of The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) set the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. five objectives and two conditions to be met by
the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the political leadership of the two entities The role of the High Representative, who is the before the closure of the Office of the High highest civilian representative of the Representative (OHR) is feasible. Some of the international community established by the EU member states – supported by Bosnian Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), has been Serbs, as well as Russia – would like to see the weakened by diverging European positions and closure of the OHR to speed up the process, the growing disengagement of the United independent of the criteria established by the States. The “Bonn Powers”, which granted the PIC conference. However, this decision should High Representative executive powers to not be made lightly and should only be taken safeguard the implementation of the Dayton when the Bosnian leadership has met and im- Peace Agreement, are ineffective due to (a) plemented the PIC objectives and conditions. European indecisiveness, (b) a lack of US geopolitical focus, and (c) the ambitions of Russia to play a strategic role in the Balkans, It will be rather difficult for the EU to quickly which is becoming increasingly noticeable. identify a candidate with almost artistic diplo-
matic abilities, who is willing to take on the
combined position (OHR and EUSR) for an The combination of these three factors has uncertain time until the termination of the OHR created an alarming situation in which the and obligations from the Dayton Peace Agree- reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina has ment, and later on the merger of the double ground to a halt over the last several years and functions of EUSR and Head of EU Delegation consequently, the path to Europe is also more becomes possible. Bosnia and Herzegovina or less blocked. This situation demands swift needs a High Representative who knows the decisions and must be solved without further country and its issues and parties from the very delays. first moment, possesses the ability to give con-
structive and long-term advice and at the same
time has the capacity to coordinate interna- There is a great expectation that the times of tional action in order to use its mandate US disengagement and unpredictable politics including applying the “Bonn Powers” if have come to an end. Therefore, Washington is necessary. In this case, the international expected to send clear signals for Bosnia and community should consider bridging the gap by Herzegovina. bestowing the current Principal Deputy High
Representative, who is an American, with these
remaining duties and responsibilities of the
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SDA Event Report and Discussion Paper
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR. Independently from the OHR, the merger International Mediator for Bosnia and of the EUSR with the Head of EU Delegation Herzegovina, and Federal Minister of Post and should proceed as planned for this summer in order to prevent a political vacuum amongst Telecommunications, Germany. members of the international community and to strengthen the EU’s credibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
However, there is a lack of consensus today about Bosnia and Herzegovina’s path to Europe. Although all EU member states agree on the idea of eventual membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no uniform concept regarding the next steps or how to overcome the political stalemate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In conclusion, an American High Representative at this moment would bring many benefits while at the same time respect- ing the roles of the EU and Russia in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the transition of the political structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the way to Europe.
The American commitment to the region, and specifically to Bosnia and Herzegovina, must be clearly demonstrated. Furthermore, the EU should be able to shape its representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina independent from the future of the OHR. A possible Russian representation in an important and visible position within the OHR structure would give a joint impetus to all important Dayton Peace Agreement states for a stringent completion of the DPA obligations. Programs financed by the EU can become fully operational in 2009. An American High Representative will help balance US interests, European interests within EUFOR and the EUSR and their joint obligations from the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Christian Schwarz-Schilling is a former High Representative and EU Special Representative
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The security discourses on EU enlargement revisited
Dr. Nikolaos Tzifakis
At first glance one may be tempted to claim Security perspectives on EU enlargement can that the first approach is more oriented towards be analysed through two distinctive lenses. The the security concerns of the candidates, while first, in support of further rounds of EU expansion towards the Western Balkans and the second is primarily preoccupied with the Turkey, highlights the beneficial impact of the security of the Union. Nevertheless, the rela- tionship between different security discourses process on the candidate states. Enlargement on EU enlargement can be problematic. First of is routinely described as a very powerful all, the security of the Union and the neighbour- foreign policy instrument allowing the Union to ing candidate states is inextricably linked influence large parts of applicant states’ despite the absence of strong institutional ties. policies without infringing upon their Most contemporary threats to Europe are of sovereignty. Enlargement has thus been transnational nature (e.g., terrorism, organized portrayed as a form of temporary ‘external gov- crime, economic crises, pandemics and ernance’, or a means of asserting control over environmental degradation) and their conse- less-stable European regions as the candidates quences are hardly contained by the are called to implement reforms and apply rules that have been determined by the Union. This demarcation of political borders. Moreover, type of security discourse is largely situated according to thinkers such as David Campbell and Michael Dillon, security is not merely the within the realm of the ‘liberal peace’ thesis and main goal of a political subject (i.e., a state, or presumes that what is at play is a larger proc- the Union); it is rather the very principle of its ess of ‘Europeanisation’. The latter entails not formation. Security discourses primarily differ- only the compliance of the candidates with the entiate, classify and define what is to be acquis communautaire, but also those states’ secured. By staging threats coming from familiarization with and adherence to EU norms enemies or certain situations, these discourses and values. As a result, candidate states ulti- conserve or transform the identity of political mately resemble current EU member states subjects and, thus, they are constitutive of their and the enlargement of the Union also brings about the expansion of the Western pluralist very content. Therefore, in this view, divergent security community. approaches to the security implications of EU enlargement could also be seen as reflecting antagonistic attempts at determining the The second more skeptical approach revolves content of danger, identity and otherness in the around considerations of the Union’s European public sphere. absorption or integration capacity. Here the line
of argument goes as follows: enlargement will Nikolaos Tzifakis is Head of the International not lead to the ‘export’ of security to the EU Cooperation Department at the Constantinos aspirants. Many problems in these countries will fail to be resolved or neutralised during the Karamanlis Institute for Democracy. accession process and consequently will be imported at the end into the Union. Further rounds of enlargement would challenge the cohesion and effectiveness of EU institutions and would drain EU resources. When it comes to candidates such as Turkey, these security discourses also raise questions about the borders of Europe and the makeup of Euro- pean identity.
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About the Security & Defence Agenda
The Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) is the only specialist Brussels-based think-tank where EU in- stitutions, NATO, national governments, industry, specialised and international media, think tanks, academia and NGOs gather to discuss the future of European and transatlantic security and defence policies in Europe and worldwide.
Building on the combined expertise and authority of those involved in our meetings, the SDA gives greater promi- nence to the complex questions of how EU and NATO policies can complement one another, and how transat- lantic challenges such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction can be met.
By offering a high-level and neutral platform for debate, the SDA sets out to clarify policy positions, stimulate dis- cussion and ensure a wider understanding of defence and security issues by the press and public opinion.
SDA Activities: • Monthly Roundtables and Evening debates • Press Dinners and Lunches • International Conferences • Reporting Groups and special events
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The Security & Defence Agenda would like to thank its partners and members for their support in making the SDA a success
Centre for Studies in Secu- rity and Diplomacy (University of
Birmingham)
The SDA gratefully ack nowledges the generous support from the foll owing governments:
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