World Bank Document

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Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00002758 Public Disclosure Authorized

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-4310-ANG)

ON AN

OPERATION

Public Disclosure Authorized IN THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT SDR67.5 MILLION

(US$102 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

FOR AN

EMERGENCY MULTISECTOR RECOVERY PROGRAM PHASE-II

Public Disclosure Authorized May 28, 2014

Public Disclosure Authorized

Transport Sector Country Department AFCW1 Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective May 31, 2013)

Currency Unit = Kwanza SDR 1.00 = US$0.67 US$ 1.00 = 95.00

January 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

EDA Estacção de Desenvolvimento Agrícola (Agriculture Develpment Station) EIA Environment Impact Assessment EMRP Emergency Multisector Recovery Program EMRP-1 Emergency Multisector Recovery Program - Phase 1 EMRP-2 Emergency Multisector Recovery Program - Phase 2 ERR Economic Rate of Return GoA Government of Angola ICR Implementation Completion Report ISN Interim Strategy Note IDA International Development Association IDA Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário (Agrarian Development Institute) IIA Instituto de Investigação Agronomica (Agronomy Research Institute) ISR Implementation Status Report M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MTR Mid-Term Review MOP Ministry of Planning NGO Nongovernmental organization NPV Net Present Value PDO Project Development Objectives PMIU Project Management and Implementation Unit PPMRRP Priority Phase Multisector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program ROC Regional Operations Committee SENSE Serviço Nacional de Sementes (National Service of Seeds) TTL Task Team Leaders UNDP United Nations Development Program UNLP United Nations Laissez-Passer US$ United State Dollars XDR Special Drawing Rights

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Gregor Binkert Sector Director: Jamal Saghir Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Project Team Leader: Jose Domingos Diogo Lopes Chembeze ICR Team Leader: Mônica Sawyer

REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Emergency Multisector Recovery Project Phase II (EMRP II)

CONTENTS

B. Key Dates ……………………………...……………………………………………….i C. Ratings Summary ……………………………………...……………………………….i D. Sector and Theme Codes ………...……………………………………………………ii E. Bank Staff ...... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ...... iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ……………………………………………...vi H. Restructuring (if any) ………………………………...... vi I. Disbursement Profile ...... vii 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 7 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 14 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 20 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 21 6. Lessons Learned: ...... 23 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/ Implementing/ Agencies/ Partners ...... 24 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...... 25 Annex 2. Outputs by Component...... 27 Annex 3: Evaluation of the Emergency Multisector Recovery Program ...... 33 Annex 4. Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 41 Annex 5. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...... 48 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ...... 50 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 51 Annex 8. List of Supporting Documents ...... 62 MAP ...... 63

DATASHEET

A. Basic Information

ANGOLA EMERGENCY Country: Angola Project Name: MULTI-SECTOR RECOVERY - PHASE 2 Project ID: P095229 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-43100 ICR Date: 05/28/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: ANGOLA Original Total XDR 67.50M Disbursed Amount: XDR 50.90M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 58.81M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Planning Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 01/30/2004 Effectiveness: 01/28/2008 01/28/2008 Appraisal: 11/18/2005 Restructuring(s): 06/30/2011 Approval: 05/22/2007 Mid-term Review: 04/01/2010 04/01/2011 Closing: 06/30/2011 05/31/2013

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Quality at Entry: Government: Moderately Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Moderately Satisfactory

Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Unsatisfactory Performance:

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status:

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General public administration sector 15 5 General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 30 43 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 30 40 Transmission and Distribution of Electricity 25 12

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) City-wide Infrastructure and Service Delivery 24 35 Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 25 1 Decentralization 13 4 Education for all 13 Rural services and infrastructure 25 60

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Gregor Binkert Michael Baxter Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Jose Domingos Diogo Lopes Project Team Leader: Abdelmoula M. Ghzala Chembeze ICR Team Leader: Monica Sawyer ICR Primary Author: Monica Sawyer

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective of the EMRP-2 was to assist the government to: (a) facilitate agricultural marketing in specific areas with high agricultural potential that have been affected by the conflict; (b) reconstruct and rehabilitate critical infrastructure; and (c) strengthen the capacity of participating ministries and agencies for improved governance and transparency, and of local governments for future decentralization. EMRP-2 was the second phase of the EMRP program, designed to assist Angola in post war recovery efforts to build the foundation for long-term reconstruction, economic rehabilitation, and the reestablishment of state administration throughout the country.. The latter objectives built on the objectives and activities undertaken within Phase 1 of the EMRP (EMRP-1) and were consistent with the Estratégia de Combate a Pobreza (ECP), the Poverty Reduction Strategy, and the Priority Phase Multisector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (PPMRRP).

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) There were no changes during the life of the project

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Kilometers of targeted roads in good condition in selected provinces. Value quantitative or 0 600 503 Qualitative) Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 Comments 373 km in the Malanje province (financed by GoA) and 130 km in the Bié (incl. % Province of the targeted 600km was completed (83 percent completed). achievement) Indicator 2 : Primary road linking Lucala and Negage rehabilitated and in good condition. Value Good condition Good Condition quantitative or Poor Condition (150km) (150km) Qualitative) Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 Comments This was fully achieved, with Government of Angola (GoA) support within the (incl. % framework of the program (100 percent). achievement) Medium and low-voltage distribution systems in Medium and low-voltage Indicator 3 : distribution systems in N'Dalatando, Uige, Malanje, Luena, Kuito, and Luanda have been rehabilitated and are operating continuously. Rehabilitation Malanje, Value Only half of the installed completed and N'Dalatando and quantitative or capacity is operational. service operating Luanda operating; Qualitative) continuously Kuito, Luena and

iii

Uige installation 67 percent completed by closing date 05/30/2013 Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 This is partially achieved with the systems in Malanje, N'Dalatando & Luanda Comments rehabilitated and operating, financed by GoA within the framework of the (incl. % program. The rehabilitation of the systems in Kuito, Luena and Uige was achievement) ongoing at the closing date -67% Number of people in Malange with access to improved water services through Indicator 4 : house connections and rehabilitated standpipes rises. 200,000 individuals benefitting from 40,000 benefitting Value 3,200 house from (2,500 house quantitative or 0 connections, 45 connections and Qualitative) standpipes, and 40 standpipes) 77.6 km of pipes installed Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 Comments Achieve more than forecasted. The original target beneficiaries were exceeded (incl. % by 400 percent, household connections by 28 percent, and pipes installed by 98 achievement) percent. Number of people in N'Dalatando with access to improved water services Indicator 5 : through house connections and rehabilitated standpipes rises. 150,000 individuals benefitting from 59,000 benefitting 2100 house Value from (1,600 house connections, 93 quantitative or 0 connections and standpipes, 42 km Qualitative) 93 standpipes) of pipes, an intake station and water treatment facility. Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 Comments Achieve more than forecasted. The original target beneficiaries exceeded by 155 (incl. % percent, household connections by 31 percent. All standpipes were installed. achievement) Intake station and treatment facility were completed but not forecasted. System of procurement and financial management in the ministries and agencies Indicator 6 : involved in the project improved, according to the World Bank. Procurement risk Value World Bank procurement assessment shows Procurement risk quantitative or risk assessment shows the risk to have has declined Qualitative) risk to be high declined Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 Comments Achieved. During the life of the projects, procurement legislation was approved (incl. % by the GoA and implementing agencies received procurement capacity therefore achievement) reducing the risk. Fiscal transfer mechanisms for decentralization being implemented in some Indicator 7 : provinces. Value No fiscal transfer Implementation Fiscal transfer Not

iv quantitative or mechanism in broad use underway in three monitored. Qualitative) throughout the country selected provinces Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 Comments This indicator was not included in the ISRs, therefore it was not monitored. (incl. % There are fiscal transfer mechanisms within the provinces but cannot be achievement) attributed to the project.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : 600 kilometer of feeder/rural roads rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 600 km 503 km or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 Comments 373 km in the Malanje province (financed by GoA) and 130 km in the Bié (incl. % Province of the targeted 600km was completed (83 percent completed). achievement) Indicator 2 : 150 km of trunk road rehabilitated. Value 150 km of high 150 km of high (quantitative 0 Km rehabilitated traffic roads traffic roads or Qualitative) rehabilitated rehabilitated Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 Comments (incl. % 100 percent achieved, paralleled financed by the GoA. achievement) Indicator 3 : Kilometers of water network in Malanje and N’Dalatando rehabilitated Malange peri-urban completed, Value Malange : 50 Km N'Dalatando (quantitative 0 km rehabilitated N'Dalatando: 35 completed and or Qualitative) Km water distribution system completed. Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 This was 155 percent achieved, as the project exceeded targets. Malanje: target Comments for pipes exceeded by 55.2 %; N’Dalatando: target for pipes exceeded by 20% (incl. % and intake station and treatment facility were constructed; Kuito: 60 km urban achievement) network constructed Capacity of Ministry of Energy and Water to carry out public expenditure Indicator 4 : tracking studies improved. Capacity is Value Capacity is weak, stronger, Capacity (quantitative according to World Bank according to strengthened or Qualitative) Assessment World Bank Assessment

Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 100% achieved. The requisite skills were developed and retained within the Comments Ministry of Energy and Water. The Ministry now has an actions plan to invest (incl. % US$5.9 billion to expand and upgrade water pumps, purification systems to 120 achievement) municipalities by 2017. Capacity of ministry and agencies participating in the project implementation to Indicator 5 : implement projects transparently improved. Capacity is Value Capacity is weak, stronger, (quantitative according to World Bank according to Stronger capacity or Qualitative) Assessment World Bank Assessment Date achieved 05/23/2007 05/23/2007 05/30/2013 100% achieved. The developed capacity supported the Recipient ministries and Comments agencies have developed sector-specific plans such as Water For All and Energy (incl. % For All, which aim to guide a major expansion in access to public goods and achievement) services by 2017.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 09/08/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 01/23/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 12/29/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.23 4 06/22/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 13.16 5 12/16/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 20.58 6 06/30/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 23.06 7 04/02/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 24.14 8 01/11/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 31.12 9 11/15/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 56.06 Moderately 10 06/12/2013 Moderately Satisfactory 66.67 Unsatisfactory

H. Restructuring (if any)

ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions Extension of closing date to 06/30/2011 N S MS 24.85 May 31, 2013 to accommodate project delays

I. Disbursement Profile

vii

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. In April 2002 the representatives of the Government of Angola (GoA) and of União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) agreed to a ceasefire and signed what became known as the Lusaka Protocol. The latter restarted the implementation of the previously stalled Bicesse Accord,1 and included the reintegration of the UNITA forces into the Angola Armed Forces. The conversion of UNITA into a recognized political party created a unique opportunity to rebuild after four decades of war and lay the foundations for economic recovery.

2. The nearly 40 years 2 independence and civil war had devastated Angola’s economy, infrastructure, and the quality of life of its inhabitants. During the conflict, the Angolan economy virtually collapsed.3 By 2004 Angola had one of the world’s highest levels of income inequality. The extractive sector, which represented 6.3 percent of GDP in 1966, grew to represent 67 percent in 2000, partly due to its expansion, but primarily reflecting the catastrophic decline of the other sectors of the economy. The resulting economic problems were also compounded by poor governance and economic mismanagement.

3. The physical infrastructure was essentially destroyed, leaving, in the transport sector specifically, the vast majority of the bridges, roads and airstrips unusable, and in need of urgent reconstruction and rehabilitation. A similar situation was manifest in most other infrastructure sectors. In addition, a further legacy of the conflict was the millions4 of landmines which remained buried throughout the nation, restricting movement and posing an ongoing threat to the lives and welfare of Angolans.

4. The conflict led to the displacement of approximately 4 million people, roughly one-third of its entire population, and the average life expectancy fell to just 44 years of age, according to United Nations (UN) estimates as of April 2003.5 Internally displaced

1 The Bicesse Accord (named after the Portuguese town) signed between People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) on May 31, 1991. This comprehensive agreement includes four documents: (a) a ceasefire agreement, (b) fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola, (c) concepts for resolving the issues still pending between the Government (MPLA) and UNITA, and (d) the Protocol of Estoril which includes elections, military monitoring, internal security, political rights of UNITA, administrative structures and formation of the Angolan Armed Forces. 2 The independence war (1961 to 1975) was followed by the civil war (1975-2002) 3Source: Transitional support strategy 4 http://www.our-africa.org/angola/land-mines There were approximately 10 million mines in Angola. http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/angola 5 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7299.doc.htm - Some 750,000 Angolans (7% of the populations) died from conflict- related causes, including famine or diseases. Life expectancy was 44 years,

people (IDPs) moved into informal settlements in overcrowded urban and semi-urban areas, with limited access to essential services, particularly in the capital region. With the advent of peace, many IDPs returned to their former home provinces, placing new strains on communities and administrations already struggling with the legacies of conflict.

5. After the cessation of the conflict, the priority of the GoA was to re-establish central and local administration, restore basic infrastructure, and provide assistance to the resident population and IDPs in affected areas. The framework for the concomitant interventions, with the support of the development partners, was defined in a Poverty Reduction Strategy 6 (PRSP). This Strategy, which included a Priority Phase of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (PPRRP) for the period from 2003-05, was later extended to 2011. The specific objectives of the PPRRP were to: (a) address the immediate needs of the poorest people and displaced population (including facilitating the return and resettlement of an estimated 3 million people who were voluntarily returning to their regions of origin); (b) improve the quality of life of people living in both rural and urban areas by expanding access to vital public services; (c) reestablish critical transportation links throughout the country and, in particular, in provinces most affected by war; (d) enhance food security and start to revive the rural economy, especially in the provinces most affected by war including Bié, Huambo, Moxico, Luanda Norte and Luanda Sul, Uíge, Cuando Cubango, and Malanje; and (e) to strengthen capacity of government at all levels to formulate, prepare, implement, and manage medium and long-term development programs.

6. The resources to implement the GoA strategy were to come from domestic funds, primarily revenues from the oil sector, and assistance from the development partners. The EMRP (Phases 1 and 2) were designed to support the delivery of these resources, within the framework of the PPRRP.

7. Rationale for Bank Assistance. At the time of project design, the Transitional Support Strategy 7 in place envisioned a number of emergency operations to address Angola’s immediate post-conflict needs. By approval, the World Bank Group’s Interim Strategy Note (2007 – 2008)8 (ISN) acknowledged that whilst the growing oil revenues allowed Angola to attract non-concessional finance, there remained solid justification for the continued involvement of the International Development Agency (IDA). The ISN cited the Independent Evaluation Group's 2007 Country Assistance Evaluation, which stated that: "the Bank's knowledge and analytical capacity to provide government with

and some 30 percent of all children died before reaching the age of five. Among the most vulnerable social group were the rural populations, female heads of households, children and persons with disabilities.

7 Report No. IDA/R2003-0027, approved on March 27, 2003, the TSS aimed at (i) enhancing the transparency, efficiency, and credibility of public resource management; (ii) expanding service delivery to war-affected and other vulnerable groups; and (iii) preparing the ground for broad-based pro-poor economic growth. 8 Approved by the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank on March 4, 2003 (Report No. 25471- ANG).

policy advice and support in relevant areas such as poverty alleviation strategies in a post-conflict, resource-rich, unequal and extremely poor society..." was a key reason for continued IDA engagement. The ISN identified the role of the World Bank Group as helping Angola to recover and develop by: “(a) strengthening public sector management and government institutional capacity; (b) supporting the rebuilding of critical infrastructure and the improvement of service delivery for poverty reduction; and (c) promoting growth of non-mineral sectors.” The EMRP was designed originally as an emergency intervention to realize these objectives.9

8. The EMRP-2 subsequently supported the reconstruction of critical infrastructure, the promotion of agriculture, and the strengthening of human and institutional capacity.

9. This Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) addresses the activities supported by second phase of the EMRP Program, which closed on May 31, 2013. A summary of the findings and conclusions from the ICR 10 forEMRP-1 is provided in Annex 3.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

10. The project development objective of the EMRP-2 was to assist the government to: (a) facilitate agricultural marketing in specific areas with high agricultural potential that have been affected by the conflict; (b) reconstruct and rehabilitate critical infrastructure; and (c) strengthen the capacity of participating ministries and agencies for improved governance and transparency, and of local governments for future decentralization. EMRP-2 was the second phase of the EMRP program, designed to assist Angola in post war recovery efforts to build the foundation for long-term reconstruction, economic rehabilitation, and the reestablishment of state administration throughout the country.

11. Key indicators. EMRP-2 comprehensive list of the key performance indicators is attached under Annex 2, including activities funded by IDA and GoA.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 12. The PDO was not revised during project implementation. As elaborated in Section 2.2, implementation delays, the emergency nature of the activities, and increased public resources led the GoA to parallel finance activities scheduled under EMRP-2. At the request of the client, new activities, consistent with the existing framework, were

9 regional operations committee (ROC) meeting provided the authorization to proceed under OP/BP 8.50 - Emergency Recovery Assistance, on January 2004. Appraisal was concluded on November, 2005 but due to IDA-14 resource constrains the project was divided into two phases.

10 Implementation Completion and Results Report for EMRP-1 Report No. ICR00001872

introduced during the implementation of the project. These changes were recorded in the Aide Memoires, and in the subsequent Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISR). Nonetheless, as a restructuring was not processed, the key performance indicators were left unchanged.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. The primary beneficiaries of EMRP-2 were the resident population in the conflict- affected provinces of Bié, Moxico, Kwanza Norte, Uíge, Huambo and Malanje. The project was to support essential investment in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the following critical infrastructure: (a) tertiary roads and bridges which would restore access to the rural communities along their length; (b) water and electricity supply in the peri- urban areas of Malanje, N’Dalatando, Kuito, Luena; Uíge; (c) agricultural development stations for the benefit of small farmers in the municipalities of Andulo, Camacupa, Catabola Chinguar, Nharea, and Kuito in Bié Province, and Cacuso, Calandula, Caculama, Cangandala, Kiwaba Nzoge, and Malanje in Malanje Province. In addition, the project researchers at University Agostinho Neto through improvement to the Seeds Institute, Agriculture Development Center and Agriculture Research Institute. The EMRP-2 project document suggested that scope and scale of the envisaged support estimated that approximately 58 percent of Angola’s population, including 30 percent of all IDPs returning home11, would benefit from the EMRP-2 interventions. The project was also to contribute to the improvement of capacity for the participating line ministries12 and agencies13 at a central and local level.

1.5 Original Components (as approved) 14. The EMRP-2 included the following parts:

Part A: Rural Development and Delivery of Social Services

1) Rehabilitation of three hundred (300) kilometers of rural (tertiary) roads in the Bié Province.

2) Rehabilitation of three hundred (300) kilometers of rural (tertiary) roads in the Malanje Province.

3) Supervision of the civil works under part A of the Project.

11 See Report No.: P7666, EMRP-2 Memorandum and Recommendation of the President, paragraph 24, page 5. 12 Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Energy and Water 13 Instituto de Estradas de Angola (INEA- Angola Road Institute); Direcção Nacional de Águas (DNA- National Water Agency); Empresa de Distribuição de Electricidade (EDEL – Electricity Distribution Company); Empresa Nacional de Electricidade (ENE – Electricity National Company); Direcção Nacional de Electricidade (DNE – National Electricity Agency); Instituto de Investigação Agronômica (IIA- Institute for Agronomic Research), Serviço Nacional de Sementes (SENSE- National Seeds Services); and Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário (IDA- Agronomic Development Institute)

Part B: Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Critical Infrastructure:

1) Road Sector. Rehabilitation of 150 kilometers of primary (high traffic) road and bridges linking the cities of Lucala and Negage.

2) Electricity Sector. (a) Reconstruction of medium- and low-voltage power distribution systems in the provincial capitals of Luena, Malanje, N’Dalatando, Kuito and Uige; and (b) Reconstruction of seventy (70) kilometers of powerline network in Luanda.

3) Water Sector. a) Repair of water services systems in: i) the provincial capital of N’Dalatando, including: (A) rehabilitation of about thirty five (35) kilometers of water distribution network, (B) connection to water services for about three thousand five hundred (3,500) households, and (C) construction of about fifty (50) community standpipes; and

ii) rural areas of the Moxico province, including (A) construction of about seventy (70) boreholes with hand pumps, (B) rehabilitation of about five (5) small water distribution systems, and (C) renovation of about fifty (50) water points; and

b) Restoration and expansion of water services in the provincial capitals of Malanje, Kuito, and N’Dalatando.

4) Urban Sanitation Sector:

a) Carrying out of feasibility studies to determine the type of works needed on Luanda’s drainage and sewerage collection systems to prevent sewage overflows.

b) Carrying out of a program, including, civil works and corresponding supervisory activities for the improvement of Luanda’s drainage and sewerage collection systems, based on the recommendations of the feasibility studies.

c) Carrying out of a program in the Moxico province, including, designs, civil works, supervisory activities, acquisition of equipment, and provision of consultant services to assist with erosion control measures in areas prone to natural disasters.

d) Supervision of Part B of the project.

Part C: Sector Development Strategies and Strengthening of Human and Institutional Capacities

1) Design and implementation of strategies to develop key infrastructure areas, including electricity, transport and water services.

2) Provision of technical assistance and training to Line Ministries, Line Agencies, and Ministry of Planning (MOP) to strengthen their capacities in infrastructure development matters.

3) Provision of technical advisory services to both central and local governments to: (a) develop fiscal transfer mechanisms with appropriate management and operating procedures; (b) design procedures for municipal-level strategic planning; and (c) monitor revenue generated by local governments.

4) Carrying out of an environmental and social assessment in connection with the implementation of the Project.

5) Provision of grants to finance goods, works, services, resettlement and compensations, as provided in the environmental and social mitigation system referred to in Paragraph 5 (b) of Section I of Schedule 2 to this Agreement.

6) Provision of grants to finance goods, works and services for Local Governments’ decentralization and social development projects.

Part D: Management, Monitoring and Evaluation of Project Implementation

1) Provision of technical advisory services and goods for purposes of:

a) supporting the management, monitoring, and evaluation of the implementation of activities carried out under the project;

b) carrying project studies, including, inter alia, performance reviews and impact evaluations.

1.6 Revised Components

15. The EMRP-2 was approved by the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank on May 22, 2007. The project was declared effective on January 28, 2008, a delay of eight months, after the Bank’s legal department required the GoA to re-sign the legal documents since the original signing did not adhere to the national requirements. This was 26 months since appraisal on November 18, 2005.

16. Over the intervening period, Angola’s fiscal situation changed dramatically, reflecting the significant increase in revenues from the oil sector. The increased resources allowed the GoA to expedite and expand the most urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction activities originally programmed under the framework of the EMRP-214 A comprehensive list of these interventions is provided in Annex 2. The Bank responded positively to this development, and worked in a cooperative manner with the

14 ISR #3 dated December 29, 2008 states that: “Borrower (central or regional governments) unilaterally decided to implement outside the project in order to expedite their launching and/or full implementation.”

implementing agency and the main stakeholders in the GoA to identify, and implement with the financial support of the project, additional interventions consistent with the framework designed for the EMRP, and which would support the realization of the PDO.

17. To strengthen agricultural marketing, it was agreed that the EMRP-2 would fund the reconstruction of those Agricultural Development Stations (Estação de Desenvolvimento Agrícola- EDAs) which remained to be completed after EMRP-1 and the rehabilitation of rural (tertiary) roads in the provinces of Bié. Furthermore, it was also agreed that EMRP-2 would focus on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of water and electricity services in the peri-urban areas of selected capital cities to maximize the poverty alleviation impacts of Bank financed interventions. .

18. Although the project continued to evolve, given the nature of the Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL), the resulting changes in the activities to be implemented were introduced promptly and quickly 15 endorsed by Bank Management. The nature of these changes necessitated a Level 2 restructuring, and the Bank team sought a formal request from the GoA to undertake such a restructuring, including necessary revisions to the legal agreement. Despite numerous proposals, the formal request for a restructuring of the project was never received from the GoA since it considered it as fungible resources part of the overall PPRRP framework.

1.7 Other significant changes

19. Extension of Closing Date. The delay in the approval of the EMRP-2, and the concomitant changes in the activities to be financed through the project, together with the lack of familiarity of the implementing agency with the procurement policies of the World Bank, led the GoA to request an extension of the closing date of the project. The original project closing date was extended one time by 23 months from June 30, 2011 to May 31, 2013 by approval of the Country Director on June 29, 2011. This extension allowed for the completion of the agricultural infrastructures.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 20. The background analysis undertaken during the preparation stage of the program shared certain deficiencies with other emergency operations of a similar nature in a conflict constrain, such as the absence of robust, up-to-date data. The only available demographic data was from a 1975 census, which was undertaken prior to independence, and as a result there was a complete lack of basic demographic knowledge, such as

15 ISR #3 dated December 29, 2008 states that: ISR #3 dated December 29, 2008 states that: “the Borrower has now concluded that the existing institutional set-up is not conducive to a rapid implementation of some of the originally planned multi-sector urban infrastructure activities (sanitation, roads, electricity). Concentrating the Credit proceeds on the more dynamic activities/sectors should increase the developmental impact and visibility of the Bank's assistance program in Angola”

average household size, the percentage of female-headed households etc. As a result, neither an economic analysis nor a cost effectiveness analysis of the project components was possible – a situation that is not unusual for emergency operations.

21. A further complication was that neither the staff of the Project Management and Implementation Unit (PMIU) nor any member of the Bank team was able to access the proposed project sites due to security concerns at the time. This required that reliance be placed on the local authorities in the beneficiary communities, despite the limitations of those organizations mentioned earlier, to gain insight into the exact condition of the infrastructure on the ground. Given the nature of the intervention, it was determined that speed was of the essence, placing the focus squarely on prompt intervention to restore the critical infrastructure to facilitate the restoration of livelihoods for the inhabitants and returning IDPs.

22. The EMRP aimed to address critical reconstruction and rehabilitation infrastructure needs in Angola following the conflict. The components in the project supported the reestablishment of livelihoods for the resident population in the conflict affected provinces, through improving access, and agricultural production and marketing, and restoring water and electricity services in the main urban areas of the same provinces. As such, the components were both very relevant to the needs of the residents of the conflict affected provinces at that time, and suitable for inclusion in an emergency operation.

23. The EMRP-2 was designed to address reconstruction needs in several sectors and over a large geographical area under the framework of the GoA’s Priority Phase of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program. As an ERL (then under OP 8.50), the EMRP-2 was designed in form and scope to address the rapidly evolving and challenging circumstances, with the emphasis placed on speed of implementation and flexibility to change direction as required during implementation within the reconstruction framework.

24. Linkage with other Bank Projects. The Transitional Support Strategy16 in place during the EMRP appraisal envisaged a number of emergency operations to address Angola’s immediate post-conflict needs. The Economic Management Technical Assistance Project (EMTA) 17 focused on enhancing public resource management and pro-poor growth. The Angola Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project18 the Third Social Action Fund 19 and the HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB Control Project (HAMSET)20 supported expanding service delivery to vulnerable groups. Together with

16 Report No. IDA/R2003-0027, approved on March 27, 2003, the TSS aimed at (i) enhancing the transparency, efficiency, and credibility of public resource management; (ii) expanding service delivery to war-affected and other vulnerable groups; and (iii) preparing the ground for broad-based pro-poor economic growth. 17 Economic Management Technical Assistance Project, P072205, approved on March 27, 2003 18 Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, P078288, approved on March 27, 2003 19 Social Action Fund-III, P081558, approved on July 29, 2003 20 HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis Control Project, P083180, approved on December 21, 2004

the EMRP, these operations provided the cornerstone of the Bank’s support to Angola’s recovery, laying the ground work for the ISN, and single operations in the sectors supported by EMRP.

25. Adequacy of the Government’s Commitment. The EMRP-2 PMIU was headed by the Vice Minister of Planning throughout project design and preparation. The project was prepared after broad consultation with existing government agencies, stakeholders, NGOs, and provincial administrations and framed by the GoA’s Priority Phase of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program. The commitment to the project is illustrated by the decision of the GoA, at central or local level, to fund certain of the activities planned for EMRP-2 from their own resources to ensure no delay, given the hiatus in the commencement of EMRP-2 implementation.

26. Assessment of Risks. EMRP-2 was designed as an emergency operation conducted in an immediate post conflict environment. At appraisal, the overall risk rating of “Substantial” reflected the weak capacity of the public administration and difficulty of working in a post-conflict environment.21 The difficulty in accessing project sites in conflict-affected areas was not identified as a risk at preparation, but proved to be a major obstacle for Bank staff, PMIU staff, and contractors during implementation. Another risk not identified was the difficulty in obtaining entry visas for international staff at the PMIU, resulting in a disorganized procurement process; and delaying implementation support missions.

Quality at Entry by Quality Assurance Group (QAG) 27. No QAG review was carried out at project entry.

2.2 Implementation 28. Board approval of the EMRP-2 was delayed by 14 months while the Bank reviewed non-concessional borrowing by the GoA. The review recommended hardening the lending terms for Angola during IDA-14 period and EMRP-2 was eventually approved by the Board on May 22, 2007. Effectiveness was also delayed to wait for publication of the credit in the official gazette. The Credit Agreement was re-signed on December 19, 2007 and became effective on January 28, 2008.

21 See technical annex Page 30, Part 5 on “Benefits and Risks”. Since EMRP-2 was designed as an emergency recovery operation, and a Memorandum and Recommendation of the President was prepared supported by the Technical Annex on a proposed IDA credit in the amount of SDR 67.5 million (US$102 million equivalent) was prepared, which was approved by the Board on May 22, 2007. In addition An Appendix to the Technical Annex was also prepared which included twelve appendixes and it provided further detailed information on project costs & financing; each sector sub-component under EMRP-2: project cost and financing; rural development, decentralization and local development, transport and roads, electricity, water, urban services and infrastructure, infrastructure strategies and private sector participation, procurement assessment and proposed arrangements, financial management assessment and proposed arrangements, and procurement plan.

29. Delayed Board approval as a result of the non-concessional borrowing by the GoA, slow progress on procurement under EMRP-1, and the delayed effectiveness of EMRP-2 appear to have contributed to the government’s decision to implement priority activities within the framework of the program using their resources. Facing urgent reconstruction needs and bolstered by oil revenues, the GoA began to implement priority investments originally planned to be funded under the EMRP-2. These included: (a) the rehabilitation of about 150 km of primary roads and bridges linking Lucala with Negage; (b) the reconstruction of about seventy (70) kilometers of power lines network in Luanda; (c) the reconstruction of medium and low-voltage power distribution systems in the provincial capitals of Luena, Malanje, N’Dalatando, Kuito, and Uige; (d) the rehabilitation of 373 km of rural roads in the province of Malanje, and (e) the undertaking of the design, civil works and corresponding supervisory activities, for the improvement of Luanda’s drainage and sewerage collection systems as well as Moxico’s erosion22. GoA also contributed funding for the rehabilitation and completion of further 70 km of rural roads in the province of Bié, which were ongoing at the closing date of the project. Table 1 summarizes the parallel financing provided by the GoA, within the framework designed by the program.

Table 1: Parallel Funding by GoA

Financed by GoA USD Million

Urban services 11.55 Luanda Drainage 5.38 Luanda Sewage 6.17

Lucala - Negage (150km) 26.5

Rural Road 5.78 Caculama -Cabundi (110km) 1.70 Malage- Mangando (158km) 2.45 Calandula - Massango (105km) 1.63

Electricity 35.43 Distribution Network for Luanda 3.09 Urban distribution (Provincial Capitals) 32.34

Rural Roads in the Bié Province 13.42 Total 92.68

22 Report No. T766, Technical Annex, states on paragraph 20 that: “lack of maintenance and problems with drainage and erosion have undermined many urban streets, leaving many pavements in the main urban centers in a state of virtual collapse. Lack of proper drainage also contributes to landslides, which threaten life and damage property.”

30. A discussion at effectiveness of EMRP-2 was required to formulate how to the freed up resources could be allocated within project. Displaying considerable flexibility, the Bank team and GoA identified additional urgent reconstruction needs, consistent with the framework of program design and the project development objectives, which could be funded by the project. In lieu of those activities financed by the GoA, EMRP-2 financed the rehabilitation of the essential infrastructures in the peri-urban areas of the provincial capitals, and 15 buildings to function as agricultural development stations in priority provinces. Despite the addition of these activities, there remained an unallocated amount of SDR 8,685,369.16, which was cancelled as of May 29, 2013. By project closing the undisbursed amount is SDR 7.916.216,46. Section 3.2 elaborates on the activities funded by the project in support to the achievement of the PDO.

31. The Bank and the GoA agreed not to proceed with a second extension of closing date for EMRP-2. The closure of the project allowed for the strategic recommitment of the cancelled funds to the Learning for All Project (P122700) in the context of the Country Partnership Strategy. All activities not finalized within the closing date period would continue with the provision of parallel support from the GoA.

32. Factors outside the control of government or implementing agencies. Initially, the PMIU, as well as contractors and consultants, faced extensive logistical difficulties when visiting the provinces due to inadequate transport infrastructure, the presence of unmarked land mines, and the tense security situation in the country. These conditions gradually improved throughout the life of the project.

33. Factors generally within the control of Government. Inefficient administrative procedures led to extensive delays, particularly long bureaucratic procedures in arranging entry visas for consultants, contractors, and Bank staff in charge of supervising the project.

34. Factors generally within the control of Project Management and Implementation Unit (PMIU). A number of factors under the control of the PMIU contributed to initial implementation delay but were remediated by the end of the project. These included: (a) logistics difficulty in coordination in the overall management of project activities, including preparation of work plans; (b) fragmented approach to the submission of procurement requests by the PMIU, which created confusion and delayed approvals; and (c) inadequate arrangements for the collection of project-related data needed for the agreed monitoring and evaluation procedures. For example, in April 2011, The PMIU engaged an international individual consultant to carry out the mid-term review (MTR) for the project. After several failed entry visa applications, the consultant was unable to produce an MTR report.

35. Following the incomplete MTR, the Bank team and the PMIU jointly undertook an assessment of project implementation and prepared an action plan to mitigate existing problems. The assessment found that fiscal decentralization, which increased the independence of the line ministries and local authorities by giving them greater control over their own budgets, contributed to lack of coordination between the PMIU, line ministries and local authorities. The action plan recommended establishing a steering

committee, restructuring the project, and extending the closing date. As recommended, a project steering committee was established to facilitate coordination but the steering committee lacked the authority to take decisions, had difficulties convening, and was only partially effective. The project was extended, but as discussed earlier, a more comprehensive restructuring never occurred as the GoA failed to submit the formal request.

36. Initial implementation delays were promptly addressed. The main causes for the initial implementation delays were: (a) an overestimated implementation schedule; (b) delay in selecting the contractors/consultants due to the lack of procurement capacity; (c) weak coordination among several sectors under the PMIU; and (d) difficulties accessing project sites on account of security problems and poor road conditions. These were addressed by the MTR action plan. As a result of these delays the project closing date was extended from June 30, 2011 by 23 months to May 31, 2013.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 37. M&E Design. The M&E design utilized the results-based approach. Based on experience with a similar multi-sector emergency reconstruction project in the Democratic Republic of Congo, key performance indicators were specified for each subcomponent of the project. The project monitoring framework under the Technical Annex included 13 indicators. Seven key performance indicators were designed to measure achievement of the PDOs and six intermediary indicators were linked to the components. In the life of the project core indicators were added and some indicators were not monitored. The indicators focused on measuring whether or not improvements in capacity and physical infrastructure were implemented. Indicators for assessing gains in capacity were structured so that any gain in capacity represented achievement of the indicator rather than defining clearly measurable targets. Fifteen indicators are included in the ISRs, including six key performance indicators and nine intermediate indicators.

38. M&E Implementation. On account of inadequate institutional capacity of the project implementing agencies and limited access to project sites in six provinces (Bié, Kwanza North, Luanda, Malanje, Moxico and Uíge), it was difficult for the PMIU to collect the appropriate data required for adequate monitoring, analyze it, and develop an appropriate action plan for improving project performance. The PMIU provided quarterly reports on the financial management of the project and documented the completion of activities funded by the project. Quarterly reports did not include detailed measures of progress towards completion of indicators, such as specifying the number of households affected by improvement of water infrastructure. The PMIU provided more detailed accounting of achievement of indicators at the end of the proj ect.

39. M&E Utilization. Despite limited collection of data by the PMIU in the 6 provinces benefitting from the project, the local and national water authorities provided data since the works have been completed and the water system was in full operation. Data regarding the beneficiaries of electricity and rural (agriculture and roads) is limited considering that these activities were not fully completed by the closing date of the project.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 40. Environment and Social issues. EMRP-2 was implemented as an emergency recovery operation processed under World Bank OP/BP 8.50.23 A ROC Meeting held on January 30, 2004 endorsed the project as environmental assessment Category B since it focused on rehabilitation and reconstruction of existing infrastructure and on delivery of basic services, and noted that, as for operations processed under OP 8.50, the environmental and social assessment would be prepared and disclosed during the first year of project implementation. The program triggered the following policies: the environmental policy (OP 4.01), the pest management policy (OP 4.09) as EMRP-1 included procurement of pesticides, and the involuntary resettlement policy (OP 4.12) because of the potential for land acquisition or loss of livelihoods.

41. The Environment and Social Management Framework (ESMF) for the program was disclosed in country and at the World Bank InfoShop on March 4, 2008, two months after EMRP-2’s effectiveness date. Local capacity for environmental and social management was weak. As agreed at project preparation, an environmental consulting firm was engaged to manage and oversee the execution of the ESMF. The PMIU and the consultants worked closely with the ministries and agencies concerned to ensure that contractors complied with Bank safeguard policies and using the methodologies and procedures for implementation of the project specified in the ESMF. Environmental and social safeguards were rated Satisfactory in the ISRs throughout the implementation of the project.

42. Financial Management (FM). EMRP-2 carried out all financial management functions including reconciliation of accounts, external audits of project accounts, and the necessary actions were taken to address identified weaknesses. Quarterly reports by the PMIU provided details on the financial aspects of each activities funded by the project. Throughout the implementation of EMRP-2, external audits were provided in a timely fashion and all were unqualified. Rating is Satisfactory.

43. Procurement. Low procurement capacity in the line ministries and local authorities resulted in the submission of poor quality, incomplete, and disorganized procurement documentation to the PMIU, which in turn, submitted incomplete packages to the Bank, leading to substantial procurement delays. There was considerable confusion at the PMIU when the automated procurement system (PROCYS) was introduced, aggravating an already imperfect system and causing additional delays. After 2010, a new Program Coordinator was appointed by the GoA who, together with a newly appointed Task Team Leader, provided new stimulus to the EMRP-2 with hands on guidance and clearing of the procurement backlog. As a direct result, the EMRP-2 disbursed more funds over the period April 2011 to May 2012 than the project had disbursed since the effectiveness of the Credit (January 2008 to March 2011).24 Despite these improvements,

23 See Technical Annex, page 35, paragraph 145, section I on “Environmental aspects and compliance with the World Bank Safeguard Policies” 24 ISR #9

the preparation of tender packages remained a constant challenge: For example, as a result of these problems tender for the feasibility study for the peri-urban areas of Luanda (municipalities of Vianna), including construction of a new 60/15kv substation with 2 x 20mva transformers, was only completed towards the end of the project in March 2013. Despite the problems, the Bank procurement rules were followed without exception.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 44. The EMRP-2 focused on the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure destroyed during the extensive conflict, such as roads and bridges near the most fertile lands in Angola. The completion and implementation of the unfinished activities would be funded by the government. 25 The GoA is funding the finalization of the installation and connection to the grid of the medium and low-voltage distribution systems for the peri- urban areas of Kuito, Uíge and Luena cities, which is 60 percent complete. The rehabilitation of the 200km of rural (tertiary) roads in Bié province was 65 percent complete, with completion and maintenance funded by the GoA.

45. The GoA continues to build on successes of EMRP-2 with further investments in the agriculture sector. Restoration of the agricultural economy and supporting the livelihoods of the displaced as they return to their home provinces were critical objectives supported by EMRP-2 project. The furniture and equipment for the operation of the agricultural development centers financed by EMRP-2 are being provided by IDA through the Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project.26

3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Relevance of the Objectives: High 46. The Project Objectives remain highly relevant and aligned with Angola’s 2010- 2015 Strategy to Combat Poverty. Priorities for the country were formulated with community consultations and include inter alia: (a) agriculture and food security; (b) economy, markets, and commerce; (c) public works; and (d) public administration.

47. The objectives of EMRP-2 continue to remain a priority for the GoA as highlighted in the Bank’s 2013 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Angola approved on September 26, 2013. The CPS aims to assist the country with transition from IDA to IBRD financing, and to support the GoA in building on its emerging strong record of own-management of its development. The CPS focuses on inclusive development. A Foundation Plank is the basis for building human and institutional capacity. Pillar One supports the integrated national economic diversification by revitalizing rural economies toward greater competitiveness and employment and Pillar Two foster enhancing the quality of service delivery to improve the quality of life of the population.

25 Annex 2, Table 2.1 provides the list of activities completed under EMRP-2. 26 Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project, Project P093699, approved on July 31, 2008.

Relevance of Design: Significant 48. The multi-sector design, although complex and ambitious, was considered vital to addressing the deficiencies in the condition and scope of the basic infrastructure in the post-conflict period. The project provided a framework for the delivery of resources to meet the varied challenges facing Angola at that time. Despite challenges in implementation, the line ministries and local authorities participating in EMRP-2 have continued to develop sector strategies and plans to further Angola’s development.

49. Though ambitious, the post-conflict context, the project design and implementation offered a flexible mechanism for achieving the Country’s immediate development goals and therefore laid the groundwork for future improvements. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict rural agricultural workers were unable to bring produce to market; restoration of the agricultural economy rested on the initial investment in improving the access infrastructure provided by EMRP-2. The rehabilitation financed by the project aimed at the restoration of essential services including the provision of water and energy services, and access to rural and agricultural communities with the finalization of feeder roads.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating Moderately Satisfactory

50. Activities completed under EMRP-2 supported the successful achievement of the PDOs for the following reasons.

51. Project Development Objective 1: Facilitate agricultural marketing in specific areas with high agricultural potential that have been affected by the conflict. The achievement of this objective is considered Satisfactory. The project obtained substantive achievements in facilitating agriculture in the areas most affected by the conflict with rehabilitation of rural roads and agricultural development centers.

52. Rural Roads. Between 2005 and 2009, GoA made large investments to rehabilitate the interstate road network. Large investments are still required to improve rural roads to link agriculture production areas to markets.27 Rehabilitation of about 300 km of the feeder/rural roads in the province of Malanje, originally planned to be financed under the EMRP-2, was deemed a priority for the authorities and funded by the GoA when unexpected oil revenues became available. Original segments of feeder/rural roads in the province of Bié (300 km) were reevaluated by the PMIU in 2008, and the costs assessed to exceed the available funds. The PMIU, after consultations with the Provincial Governments of Malanje and Bié, and the Ministry of Agriculture, proposed the construction of 200 km of rural roads segments within Bié Province as an alternative: (a) Kuito-Chicala-Capolo with one bridge (58 km); (b) Chicala-Mutumbo with one bridge (63 km); (c) Kuito-Thrumba-Chilonda with one bridge (39.50 km); and (d) Nharea-

27 Angola Country Partnership Strategy Report No. 76225-AO, Annex 6, page 48

Catabola with two bridges (50 km). Segments of feeder/rural roads completed at project closing were already having a positive impact on rural communities. For example, before the project travel on the Chicala-Mutuvo segment took over 3 hours and the route was accessible by motorcycle only. After the project travel time was reduced by 50 percent28 and traffic increased significantly once the road was accessible to all vehicle types, including trucks. Communities continue to build dwellings by the road side to improve access transport services for goods and people. New markets have sprung at strategic locations, providing a wider variety of produce and goods.

53. Agriculture. Twelve agriculture buildings were rehabilitated to function as Agriculture Development Offices (EDAs) in war-affected provinces as part of the project. Rehabilitation and construction occurred in the provinces of Bié (Nharea, Andulo, Camacupa, Catabola, Chinguar, and Kuito) and Malanje (Cacuso, Calandula, Caculama, Malanje, Kiwaba Nzoge, and Cangandala). In the Huambo Province three agricultural facilities were rehabilitated at the University Agostinho Neto, including: the Seeds Institute, Agriculture Development Center and Agriculture Research Institute. Furnishing and equipment for these buildings would be provided by IDA though the Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project (P093699) and the GoA. The EDAs are vital for improving the lives in rural communities by promoting smallholder agriculture, providing innovative participatory agriculture methods and distributing inputs. It is estimated that approximately 1,200 smallholder groups and associations with 100 members would benefit from their work. Agriculture continues to on the forefront of Angola’s plans for diversifying its economy and aims to food security.

54. Project Development Objective 2: Reconstruct and rehabilitate critical infrastructure. The achievement of this objective is considered Satisfactory. EMRP-2 made significant progress towards reconstruction of Angolan infrastructure. rehabilitation and construction of infrastructure continues to be an integral part of the Bank’s strategy for Angola29.

55. Water Sector. The water sector surpassed expectations, exceeding all targets for construction and rehabilitation of water infrastructure. The following activities were completed in Malanje, N’Dalatando and Kuito peri-urban areas: Intake station, treatment facility, reservoirs, distribution network, standpipes and household connections. Over half a million poor people in peri-urban areas have benefitted from water services as a result of the project. A significant decrease in the incidence of cholera and other water borne diseases following implementation of the project is an external benefit not reflected in the formal results framework.

56. Electricity. EMRP-2 financed rehabilitation of medium and low-voltage distribution systems for the peri-urban areas of provincial capitals of Kuito, Uíge and

28 Interview with Mr. Avelino Januário Sandala; teacher at the primary education at the Mutumbo Community, a frequent traveler on the road using his 125cc motorcycle - July 21, 2013. 29 See CPS, Results Area 1: Rural and Spatial Development; and Results Area 2: Energy Sector Support

Luena. EMRP-2 financed preparation of the tender documents for a feasibility study for the peri-urban areas of the Province of Luanda (municipalities of Vianna), including construction of a new 60/15kv substation with 2 x 20 mva transformers. By project closing, all materials had been purchased, delivered and installation was 60 percent complete in the peri-urban section of Kuito, Uíge and Luena cities. Funding for finalization of the installation is being provided by the GoA. This sector would benefit approximately 100,000 households and businesses in these selected cities.

57. Urban and Sanitation Services. Due to the limited capacity of the provincial authority in Moxico and difficult access, a study of erosion control budgeted under EMRP-2 was not completed. However, the project did fund the preparation of tender documents for feasibility studies and detailed designs for community participation in prevention and maintenance measures to reduce erosion in areas prone to natural disasters in Luena city. The GoA also funded a feasibility study and implementation of improvements to Luanda’s drainage and sewage collection system, considering the urgency of reconstruction in the national capital.

58. Project Development Objective 3. Strengthen capacity of participating ministries and agencies for improved governance and transparency of local governments for decentralization. The achievement of this objective is considered Moderately Satisfactory. EMRP-2 strengthened the capacity of the local authorities and line ministries participating in the project, which entered project implementation with extremely weak capacity. For instance, the water sector trained local authorities and community leaders on water treatment, distribution, management and sanitation practices. Institutional and human capacity strengthening continue to be supported as a foundation plank on the CPS.30

59. The EMRP-2 funded technical assistance and training for the Ministry of Energy and Water, and Ministry of Transport to develop sector strategies. The GoA has developed sector-specific initiatives such as Water For All and Energy For All, which aim for major expansion in access to public goods and services by 2017. The Ministry of Planning also benefited from capacity building activities to strengthen their planning for infrastructure development. This led to improved knowledge on technical tenders, evaluation of bids, and supervision of the projects.

60. Under EMRP-2 financing the PMIU engaged in training through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which provided capacity building and support for the Angola decentralization program and provided direct vocational training to local communities in order to improve employment opportunities. Harmonization of methodologies for planning, budgeting, and public management was completed in 5 provinces (Uíge, Bengo, Kwanza Norte, Malanje and Bié) and 163 municipalities.31 The

30 Foundation Plank of the CPS will revolve around building human and institutional capacity approaching the levels common in the middle-income countries, complementing the two strategic Pillars. 31 As reported in the UNDP - Decentralization and Local Governance, Final Report dated July 2013.

envisaged grants program to finance goods, works, and services for local governments did not take place under the project.

3.3 Efficiency Rating Moderately Satisfactory 61. The emergency nature of the EMRP-2 and the lack of reliable demographic data did not permit the undertaking of a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) to identify the Net Present Values (NPV) or Economic Internal Rate of Return (ERR) at the time of appraisal, or even the undertaking of a simple cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). Whilst up-to-date demographic data is now available, the capacity to undertake robust project appraisal to inform investment decisions remains a systemic weakness in many sectors. In the transport sector specifically, regular traffic counts are not carried out on any level of the network, and travel times, fleet size and composition remain uncertain. There are similar limitations in both the electricity and water sector. As a result, neither a CBA nor a simple CEA have been calculated either ex-ante or ex-post for this emergency operation.

62. While economic analysis of project activities is not possible due to data constraints, a qualitative assessment of the economic impact of EMRP-2 activities performed for this ICR (as detailed in Annex 4) found the project’s activities produced improvements in quality of life, livelihoods, health, and education through improvements in transport, electrification and water supply and sanitation. The analysis found that provision of basic services in most affected areas would have further declined from the already serious post-conflict situation, making the population worse off than it is “with the project”.

63. The efficiency of the project can be evaluated on the basis of how effectively the GoA and Bank prioritized funding of activities to support the PDOs and the Priority Phase for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programs that allowed for parallel financing of project activities by the GoA. The focus on supporting agriculture and agricultural marketing by funding rehabilitation of rural roads and other agricultural facilities was an efficient prioritization of available resources as per the government framework aiming for the revival of the agricultural economy for diversification of revenues and restoration of livelihoods. Likewise, in the context of reconstruction, it was sensible for the GoA and Bank to prioritize rehabilitation and construction of water and electrification infrastructure in peri-urban areas affected by war after the GoA had moved forward with parallel financing of similar public works in urban centers.

64. The network of rural roads financed by the project generates major direct and indirect net benefits. Increased traffic reflects the decreased costs of travel resulting from road rehabilitation. This brings increases in agricultural productivity, improved access to markets, and increased overall access to services for the rural population. Specifically, the traffic levels increased from nearly non-existent levels in the post-conflict

environment to almost 1,000 vehicles per day on the 42 km section rehabilitated under the EMRP-2 between Kuito and Chilonda in Bié province.32

65. The water sector was responsible for major improvements and expansion of the number of individuals benefitting from water services. For instance, in the peri-urban areas of Malanje the network of pipes targeted by the project increased from 50km to 77.6 km. In addition, considering that some activities planned for EMRP-2 were funded and completed by the GoA, the project used the efficiencies gained by not funding these activities, to finance commitments made under the EMRP-1 implementation that would have to be cancelled at closing of the EMRP-1 and moved them to EMRP-2 (See Annex 1 Table C).

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

66. The overall outcome rating for the project is Moderately Satisfactory based on relevance, efficiency, achievement of the PDOs, and the delivery of interventions within the framework of program design far in excess of original targets. See prior sections for details.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

67. The poverty reduction impact of the EMRP-2 is palpable. The number of families with access to water and electricity improved their livelihoods by increasing their ability to provide services. Access to health centers, school and markets for rural communities increased with the rehabilitation of the rural roads. EMRP-2 has been the Bank’s main vehicle for contributing and supporting Angola in rebuilding the foundation for long-term reconstructing, improving access to social services and reestablishing the state administrations. EMRP-2 strengthened the initial engagement between the Bank and Angola that led to sector specific operations subsequently in agriculture, water, health, education and local development.33

68. The PDO targets were set at sector level and did not focus explicitly on the wider themes of poverty reduction, gender aspects and social development. Nonetheless, The EMRP-2, in partnership with the UNDP, supported decentralization and local governance capacity. Training was carried out in several topics ranging from micro-entrepreneurship for individuals to participatory planning cycles for municipal representatives. In partnership with the Ministry of Family and Woman Platform for Action, the EMRP-2

32 Traffic count provided by the road construction contractor, taken on August 8, 2013, at 60 percent completion of the works. 33 See Market Oriented Smallholder Agriculture (P093699), Water Sector Institutional Development (P096360), Municipal Health Service Strengthening (P111840), Local Development Program (P105101) , and Learning for All Project (P122700).

supported training for public servants in 73 municipalities in gender assessments for a pro-poor and gender sensitive municipal plans and budget.34 Vocation training for youth groups in response to high youth unemployment in selected municipalities35 was also supported by the project.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

69. Strengthening institutional capacity ensured sustainability of the project investments. Thought the implementation of the EMRP-2, institutional strengthening was noted amongst the implementing agencies: (a) improved capacity in procurement and financial management; (b) enhanced coordination; and (c) increased usage of M&E systems for the preparation of new projects. For instance, the improved capacity at Direcção Nacional de Águas – (Water National Directorate) led to significant increase at the delivery of water services under the project and the elaboration of water specific framework Água para Todos (Water for All) aim for major expansion in access to potable water and services by 2017.

70. At the local level, the UNDP coordinated several activities under Component C to promote sector development strategies and strengthening of human and institutional capacity through a Decentralization and Local Governance Project (18 months period) that provided training in planning, budgeting, reporting, and management at 163 municipalities.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 71. No beneficiary surveys or stakeholder workshop were conducted.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate

72. Post-conflict conditions existing at the time of EMRP-2 appraisal have been replaced by a fast-growing middle-income economy. Despite continued high levels of poverty, inequality, and infrastructure deficit, the GoA has been building on its record of successful self-managed development. Angola’s national capacity has been strengthened and authorities continue to set visions for an equitable and inclusive development captured in three overarching strategic frameworks: (a) Vision 2025; (b) National Development Plan (2013-2017); and (c) Poverty Reduction Plan (Estratégia de Combate a Pobreza) (ECP) (2010-2015).

73. Throughout the EMRP-2, the GoA has shown its strong commitment to the project activities. The GoA has developed sector-specific initiatives such as Water For

34 Page 10, Decentralization and Local Governance Project – Final Report, dated July 2013, produced by United Nations Development Program in Luanda. 35 Page 10, Decentralization and Local Governance Project – Final Report, dated July 2013, produced by United Nations Development Program in Luanda.

All, and Energy For All, funding major expansion in access to public goods and services. For instance, the Ministry of Energy and Water, has an ambitious Action Plan for Energy and Water Sectors, 2013-2017 and it is investing US$5.9 billion to expand and upgrade water pump and purification systems to supply 120 municipalities by 2017. Thus, risks to the EMRP-2 development outcomes are considered modest.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

74. Bank Performance during project entry was moderately unsatisfactory. Originally conceived as one all-encompassing emergency multi-sector recovery operation to restore essential services in a post-conflict environment, the EMRP was subsequently divided into two overlapping projects due to IDA 14 resources constraints. Approval delays because of the evaluation of non-concessional borrowing by the Bank also contributed to limiting the full utilization of the project resources.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

75. The Bank team displayed flexibility and worked in partnership with the GoA, adjusting the project activities funded by EMRP-2 within the framework of the PPRRP while maintaining the project objectives. This lead to the successful achievement of the PDOs and lasting results for the country.

76. As an emergency operation, the supervision missions were planned twice a year, but due to the persistent challenges in obtaining entry visas for Angola even with the United Nations Laissez-Passer (UNLPs), missions were irregular. The ISRs were prepared in a timely fashion after each mission. The few supervision aide-memoires filed in the Bank’s document repository identified the key problems and agreement action plans to address them.

77. The Bank team overcame several challenges during implementation. Starting at effectiveness36 the Bank team identified the need to restructure the EMRP-2 to reflect the project changes accordingly. Therefore, Bank performance during the project supervision is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

78. Despite the general difficulties of implementation in a post conflict environment,

36 Starting with ISR #3 and continuing to ISR #9.

the Bank team (a) responded promptly to the country needs by preparing an emergency recovery project, although the scope of recovery efforts contributed for the complexity during the implementation phase, (b) was flexible, cooperative and proactive in allowing adjustment in activities; (c) provided innovative supervision strategies and solutions, and (d) ensured adequate transition arrangements by transferring on-going activities from EMRP-1 to EMRP-2 while maintaining the focus on the PDOs. Nonetheless, (a) extensive delays in procurement approvals, (b) failures to complete a mid-term review and (c) inability to formalize responses to the changing needs of the Borrower by restructuring the project early on justify the Bank’s overall performance rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

79. The GoA had a framework for its rehabilitation and reconstruction under the PPRRP. The authorities were proactive in adjusting how to finance the programed activities displaying considerable commitment during project preparation and implementation of the EMRP-2. The GoA was flexible with resources of funding the PPRRP, whenever the project implementation was lagging the GoA identified new activities to be funded by the EMRP-2 consistent with its PDOs and the PPRRP framework. Although the GoA considered the EMRP-2 an integral part of the PPRRP, it did not recognize the need to process a restructuring of the project in order to formalize the changes. In addition, the GoA was unable to facilitate the provision of timely entry visas for consultants, contractors and Bank staff supporting the implementation of EMRP-2. Therefore, the performance of the Government during the project is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

80. The Project Management and Implementation Unit for the EMRP-2 was promptly put in place under the guidance of the Vice-Minister of Planning. Initially staffed with a cadre of internationally and nationally recruited staff, it provided good guidance to all the implementing agencies considering the complex, post-conflict environment in the country. Coordination amongst line ministries and local agencies were sometimes challenging, but the implementing agencies benefitted from training, office equipment and technical assistance to carry out specialized sector studies. The PMIU played a key role in identifying priority activities financed by the EMRP-2 and initial shortcomings in procurement were overcome. Therefore the rating for PMIU is Moderately Satisfactory.

81. Based on the combination of the two ratings above, the overall Borrower performance is Moderately Satisfactory.

6. Lessons Learned:

82. The preparation and implementation of the EMRP-2 has provided a number of lessons for similar operations in future:

83. Project complexity and its impact on implementation progress. There are both external pressures, the critical needs in many areas, and internal incentives, constraints on resources to prepare and support multiple emergency operations that can lead to the preparation of overly complex projects. This is despite all the evidence indicating that complex projects are harder to implement, take longer, and disburse slower. These problems are exacerbated in a post-conflict environment, with widespread and systemic weakness in the public agencies, and limited experience in working with the World Bank, or any other development partner. This lesson is once again clearly highlighted in this case – emergency operations should be designed to be as simple as possible, with clear and unambiguous implementing arrangements, facilitating prompt implementation.

84. Emergency Operations in a Post Conflict – Oil Rich Country should also provide a framework for parallel finance: A second key lesson from this project is that when preparing an emergency operation, consideration should be given to not only the immediate pressing needs, but also to the provision of a broad framework for a wider investment program that could be supported from public investment, or other development partners in parallel. This does not necessarily imply greater complexity, but a more strategic assessment of needs, and a designed response to those needs.

85. Emergency Projects are designed to be implemented quickly. An emergency operation, by definition, is designed to meet urgent and pressing needs, and as such are usually implemented within a period of 36 months. If there is a lengthy delay in preparation, approval or effectiveness, amounting to a significant proportion of that period, consideration should be given to converting the emergency operation into a more traditional investment operation, focusing on the emerging mid-term needs of the country.

86. Project Monitoring and Evaluation. Key performance indicators should always be designed to assess sector performance, and should be well matched with the PDOs and adequately monitored during project implementation. It is critical to reach agreement with the client on a well-designed M&E results framework with emphasis on: (a) good linkages between the objectives and indicators; (b) ensuring reliability of data used; (b) conducting appropriate baseline studies; (c) setting realistic target values within the agreed timeframe; and (d) ensuring the clear responsibilities of the key staff who will drive this process.

87. The lack of a Midterm Review proved to be a missed opportunity for adjustment. EMRP-2 did not benefit from a midterm review and it was not restructured. Just after effectiveness it was clear that the project would benefit from a restructuring. In addition, several changes in TTL and in the PMIU leadership left the project in a hiatus. A midterm review in 2010 would have forced the new TTL and PMIU to address issues flagged on the ISRs and take corrective measures in the components and indicators to

reflect the reality.

88. Project Design and Flexibility. Flexible, innovative and coordinated responses are critical in a post conflict-oil rich country where the Government can fund many activities but lacks the planning and implementation expertise. This project had broad objectives to allow for adjustments and accommodations of a changing environment, while using Bank guidelines and standards to enhance capacity and experience.

89. Close coordination between the Bank and Government. Challenges with complexity and delays and the changed circumstances and environment throughout the life of the project, foster the close partnership between the Bank and Government team, working together to identify new activities for the project. This allowed for the prioritization of the project funds for activities that would provide maximum result.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/ Implementing/ Agencies/ Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies Not Applicable

(b) Cofinanciers Not Applicable

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

Table 1.1: Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) (a) Project Disbursements (GoA amounts estimated from project documents) IDA GoA Cost of component Total Funding (estimated)

A. Rural Development and Delivery of Social Services $42.20 1. Rural Development $11.90 $19.20 $31.10 2. Agriculture $11.10 $11.10

B. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of critical infrastructure $123.83 1. Transport $26.50 $26.50 2. Roads and Bridges $0.00 3. Electricity $16.20 $35.43 $51.63 4. Water $33.90 $33.90 5. Urban Infrastructure & Services $0.30 $11.50 $11.80

C. Sector development strategies and strengthening of human and institutional capacity $2.50 Sector Dev. Strategies $1.90 $1.90 Environmental. and Social Assessments $0.00 Training Sector Ministries $0.60 $0.60 Decentralization $0.00

D. Management Monitoring and Evaluation of project implementation $2.10 Operational Cost $1.50 $1.50 TA and Training $0.60 $0.60

Total Project Disbursement $78.00 $92.63 $170.63

(b) Financing

Appraisal Actual Percentage Source of Type of Percentage Estimate (USD Estimate (USD of Funds cofinancing of Revised millions) millions) Appraisal International Development $102.00 $78.00 $0.77 $0.46 Association (IDA) Counterpart Borrower $30.00 $92.63 $0.23 $0.54 Funds

UNDP Parallel $0.50 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 AFD* Parallel $0.50 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Total $133.00 $170.63 * Funding did not materialized

Table 1.2: Activities moved from EMRP-1 to EMRP-2 Description Firm/Consultant Value of Contract Works ( Category 1a) $ 6,216,801.94 Construction and Rehabilitation of EDAs at the province of SAFRI, LDA $1,761,859.66 Bié (Kuito, Camacupa, Catabola e Chinguar) Construction and Rehabilitation of EDAs at the province of Malanje (Municipalities of Cacuso, Malanje, Caculama, IMOVIAS $1,722,547.00 Kiwaba Nzoge) Construction and Rehabilitation of EDAs at the province of SAFRI, LDA $773,157.80 Malanje (Municipalities of Cangandala) Construction and Rehabilitation of EDAs at the province of TRANSPORTE A & B $136,464.00 Malanje (Municipalities of KALANDULA) Construction and Rehabilitation of EDAs at the province of POLIOBRA $1,822,773.48 Bié e Huambo (Andulo, Nharea e Chianga Huambo) Consultant Services ( Category 3) $1,078,427 Supervision EDAs in Bié: Kamacupa, Kuito Chinguar e Arqº Nelson $38,240 Catabola Antunes Supervision EDAs in Bié: Kamacupa, Kuito Chinguar e Engº Anastasio $10,264 Catabola Bongo Supervision EDAs: Cacuso, Caculama, Malanje, Kiwaba Arqº Nelson Antunes $83,476 Nzoge Engº Manuel Supervision EDAs Andulo, Nharea, Chianga Huambo $81,570 Fonseca Supervision of rural roads, 200kn in Bié province – SAI SAI India $484,929 Erosion Control Study of Moxico NIP, SA $379,948 Goods (Category 5) $962,477 Cars for PMIU - UNOPS UNOPS $100,196 School Material AGMIN ITALY $12,281 12 seed processor machines $850,000 TOTAL $8,257,706

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Table 2.1: The list of activities agreed at project appraisal and the output achieved at Project closing

Co Indicators Name Baseline (2007) Target Agreed Comments re PROJECT DEVELOMENT OBJECTIVES PDO 1. Improve rural access to markets in specific areas with high agricultural potential that have been affected by the conflict.

Kilometers in good condition for targeted 0km 600km 200km 373 km in Malange and 130km in Bié completed roads in selected provinces

Agriculture Infrastructed

a. Malanje Province Cacuso COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR (rehabilitation) Calandula COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR (rehabilitation) Caculama COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR (rehabilitation) Malanje (construction) IDA COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR and IIA Kiwaba Nzoge COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR (Construction) Cangandala COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR (Construction) b. Bié Province Nharea COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR (Construction)

Co Indicators Name Baseline (2007) Target Agreed Comments re Andulo COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR (Construction) Camacupa COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR (Construction) Catabola COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR (Construction) Chinguar COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR (Construction) Kuito (Construction) COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR c. Huambo Province (University Angostinho Neto) Seeds Institute COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR Agriculture COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR Research Institute Agriculture Development COMPLETED-Transferred from EMRP-1, not in the ISR Institute Medium and low-voltage distribution Only about half Rehabilitation Electricity to the systems in N’Dalatando, Uige, Malanje, 67% completed, will connect approximately 100,000 of the installed complete and peri-urban area of Luena, Kuito and Luanda rehabilitated and households and businesses in peri-urban areas of Uíge, capacity is service operating Kuito, Uíge and operating continuously (reduction in power Luena and Kuito operational continuously Luena losses TBD). 40,000 (2,500 Number of people in Malanje with access to households and 40 System being managed by local authorities: 43kms pipes, improved water services delivered through 0 standpipes), as 3200 household connections, 45 standpipes, 200.000 house connections and rehabilitated monitored in the beneficiaries, as monitored in the ISR standpipes rises. ISR Number of people in N’Dalatando with Delivered to local management since 2010. Completed: 59,000 (1,600 access to improved water services delivered Intake station, completion of water treatment, 5000m3 0 households and 93 through house connections and rehabilitated reservoir, 42kms pipes, 93 standpipes; 150,000 standpipes) standpipes rises beneficiaries

Co Indicators Name Baseline (2007) Target Agreed Comments re World Bank Systems of procurement and financial Procurement risk procurement risk Procurement capacity of the ministries working with management in the ministries and agencies assessment shows assessment Bank projected has improved. There was no involved in the project improved, according risk to have shows risk to be misprocurement throughout the project. to World Bank assessment declined. high No fiscal transfer Fiscal transfer Fiscal transfer mechanisms for mechanisms in mechanisms being Included in the MOP, page 35. Not monitored and decentralization being implemented in board use Dropped implemented in 3 dropped. targeted provinces throughout the selected provinces country Number of people in urban areas provided with improved water services under the X 0 150,000 Values refer only to N'Dalatando project INTERMEDIATE RESULTS INDICATOR BY COMPONENT A. Rural Development and Delivery of Social Services 373 km in province of Malange (funded by GoA) and 130 A.1 Feeder roads 600 Km of feeder 0 Km 600 Km 200 km km of rural roads in the province of Bié (funded by the rehabilitated roads rehabilitated rehabilitated rehabilitated EMRP-2) were rehabilitated Roads rehabilitated, Core indicator added 2009 as a Bank wide. Monitored but X 600 Km 200 Km Rural (Kilometers) not formally added to the project. Kuito-Chicala-Capolo 87% completed Bridge installed. Raining season delayed with one bridge 0 58 Km the completion- GoA will finance the completion (58Kms) Chicala-Mutumbo 54% completed. Raining season delayed the completion- with one bridge (63 0 63 Km GoA will finance the completion. Bridge purchased but Km), not installed

Kuito-Thrumba- 70% completed. Raining season delayed the completion - Chilonda with one 0 40 Km GoA will finance the completion. Bridge purchased but bridge (39.50 Km) not installed

Co Indicators Name Baseline (2007) Target Agreed Comments re

Nharea-Catabola with 70% completed. One bridge completed other yet to be 0 50 Km two bridges. installed. Raining season delayed the completion- GoA will finance the completion. B. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Critical Infrastructure 150 Km of high B.1. Trunk roads 150 Km of trunk roads 0 Km traffic road 0 km DROPPED - Funded by the GoA rehabilitated rehabilitated rehabilitated rehabilitated Roads rehabilitated, Core indicator added 2009 as a Bank wide exercise. Non-rural X 0 km DROPPED (Kilometers) B.2. Access to Water network serving water in peri- No baseline Included in the MOP, page 35. Not in the ISR. Funded by the peri-urban areas of No target provided urban areas of provided the GoA - DROPPED Luanda rehabilitated Luanda increased

B.3. Access to Malanje: 77.6 Km network, 4,600 home connections, 103 Kilometers of the water in the three Malanje: 50 Km; standpipes, (400.000 Beneficiaries) ; Kuito 60 Km urban water network in provincial capitals 0 Km N'Dalatando 35 network, Reservoir of 4000m3, 2000 home connections, Malanje, Kuito, and of Malanje, Kuito, rehabilitated km; No target for 60 standpipes (150.000 Beneficiaries); N'Dalatando: N’Dalatando and N’Dalatando Kuito water capture, water treatment facility, Reservoir of rehabilitated. increased. 5000m3; 93 standpipes (150.000 Beneficiaries)

New piped household water connections that are resulting from the X 0 4,100 8,200 Core indicator project intervention added 2009 at (Number) Bank wide Malanje X 0 2,500 4,600 N'Dalatando X 0 1,600 1,600 Not monitored in Kuito 0 2,000 the ISR

Co Indicators Name Baseline (2007) Target Agreed Comments re Improved community water points constructed or X 0 93 256 rehabilitated under the project (Number) Malanje X 0 40 103 N'Dalatando X 0 0 93 Kuito 0 40 60 C. Sector Development Strategies and Strengthening of Human and Institutional Capacities Strategies for the Transport, C.1. Sector Sector strategies for electricity and strategies provide electricity, roads, and No strategies The GoA drafted several sector strategies: Water for All, water sector the basis for new water prepared and produced. Education for All, Electricity for All complete and investments approved. approved by the government. C.2. Capacity of Ministry of Capacity Ministry of Electricity and The Ministry of Energy and Water has an ambitious Electricity and Water Capacity is weak Capacity is Water to carry out action plan for sectors with the investment of US$5.9 to carry out public according to wb stronger according public billion to expand and upgrade water pump and expenditure tracking assessment to Bank assessment expenditure purification systems to supply 120 municipalities by 2017 studies improved. tracking studies improved. D. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation of Project Implementation Capacity of Ministries D.1. Management, and agencies There has been much improvement in the capacity of Monitoring and participating in the Capacity is weak Capacity is ministries to plan. However, it was strengthened at the Evaluation of project to implement according to wb stronger according CPS approved in September 2013, that building human Project the project assessment to Bank assessment and institutional capacity remains a priority for the Implementation transparently authorities and the Bank. improved.

Annex 3: Evaluation of the Emergency Multisector Recovery Program

1. The Emergency Multisector Recovery Program (EMRP) supported the Government of Angola (GoA) to implement a Poverty Reduction Strategy37 (PRSP) that included a Priority Phase of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (PPRRP) for 2003-08 and later extended the program to 2011. The EMRP was designed and appraised as a single project but due to less than expected funding under IDA 13, the EMRP was split into two concomitant operations: EMRP-1 38 funded by IDA13, and EMRP-2 financed under IDA 14.

2. EMRP aimed to build the foundation for long-term reconstruction, economic rehabilitation, and the reestablishment of state administration throughout consolidate peace, and reestablish state administration and public services to the provinces most affected by the war: Bié, Huambo, Moxico, Luanda Norte and Luanda Sul, Uíge, Cuando Cubango, and Malanje. The specific objectives of the program were to assist the government to: (a) improve rural incomes and enhance food security in the provinces most affected by the conflict; (b) improve access to essential education and health services in the provinces most affected by the conflict; (c) reconstruct and rehabilitate critical infrastructure; and (d) strengthen capacity of government at all levels to formulate, prepare, implement, and manage medium and long-term development programs.

3. EMRP-1 focused on supporting activities that address the most urgent needs and could be implemented quickly. These included: (a) activities to restart agriculture, particularly production and multiplication of seeds and planting material); (b) provision of essential drugs, logistical support, and refresher courses for nurses and auxiliary nurses to improve health services; (c) provision of teaching and learning materials and assistance to initiate teachers’ training; and (d) support to restore water services in Luanda and three provincial capitals. Additionally, EMRP-1 provided: (a) technical assistance and capacity building for sector ministries and agencies involved in implementing the program and the project; (b) initial training programs; and (c) technical assistance to build local capacity to prepare for decentralization; and (d) preparation of the environmental and social impact assessment for the overall program and preparatory activities for Phase 2, such as detailed designs and tender documents. The EMRP-1 included a Grant in the amount of SDR 16.9 million (US$25.8 million equivalent) and a Credit 39 of SDR 16.3 million (US$24.9 million equivalent).

4. EMRP-2 focused on upgrading infrastructure, supporting rehabilitation or

37 http://www.angolaemb.se/Actualidades/Combate%20a%20pobreza.pdf, accessed on March 18, 2013 38 The ICR for EMRP-1 (Report No .00001872) was completed in December 30. 2011 39 The Credit was on standard IDA terms, with a maturity of 40 years, including 10 years grace period, and service charge at 0.75%.

construction of feeder roads, trunk roads (including bridges), electricity services, rural water supply, water supply in a provincial capital, and urban infrastructure. It would also support the preparation of the medium-term sector strategies, capacity building, decentralization and local development, and continue support for program and project management (a) facilitate agricultural marketing in specific areas with high agricultural potential that have been affected by the conflict, (b) reconstruct and rehabilitate critical infrastructure, and (c) strengthen capacity of participating ministries and agencies for improved governance and transparency and of local governments for future decentralization. EMRP-2 was funded by a Credit40 in the amount of SDR67.5 million (US$102 million equivalent).

5. EMRP-1 and EMRP-2 had extensive delays due to: unrealistic implementation schedule compounded by unforeseen technical difficulties; delay in selecting the contractors/consultants due to the lack of procurement capacity; weak coordination among several sectors under the PMIU in a multi-sector environment; difficult access to project sites on account of security problems and road transit difficulties; and TTL transitions that were not smooth and contributed to procurement delays.

6. Nonetheless, the PMIU and Bank’s team cooperation, innovation and flexibility allowed for the best use of the project finances for achieving the PDOs. Transfer of activities between EMRP-1 and EMRP-2 allowed for the completion of committed contracts. The Government of Angola was extremely committed to rehabilitation and contributed much more than the required counterpart fund.

7. The social benefits of the activities implemented by the EMRP are already apparent but it has not yet reached its full potential. But one can already see evidence by the road side, attracting new residents, emerging rural markets with a wide variety of produce and new business for transportation of such produce, use of house water connections to start business and a general rise in income in the rural areas.

Table 3.1: EMRP Development Objectives

PDO Relevance Efficacy Efficiency Outcome Rating To help to build the foundation for long-term Substantial Substantial Modest Moderately Satisfactory reconstruction, economic rehabilitation, and the reestablishment of state administration throughout the country. EMRP-1 Specific Objective 1 Substantial Substantial Modest Moderately Satisfactory To assist the government to (a) improve rural incomes and enhance food security in the provinces most affected by the conflict. Specific Objective 2 Substantial Substantial Substantial Satisfactory To assist the government to, (b) improve

40 The Credit was on hard IDA terms, with a maturity of 35 years, including 10 years grace period, and service charge at 4.75%.

access to essential education and health services in the provinces most affected by the conflict,

Specific Objective 3 Substantial Modest Modest Moderately To assist the government to Unsatisfactory reconstruct and rehabilitate critical infrastructure,

Specific Objective 4 Substantial Substantial Modest Moderately Satisfactory To assist the government to strengthen capacity of government at all levels to formulate, prepare, implement, and manage medium and long-term development programs. Rating for EMRP-1 Substantial Substantial Modest Moderately Satisfactory EMRP-2 Specific Objective 1 Substantial Substantial Modest Satisfactory Facilitate agricultural marketing in specific areas with high agricultural potential that have been affected by the conflict. Specific Objective 2 Substantial Substantial Modest Satisfactory Reconstruct and rehabilitate critical infrastructure

Specific Objective 3 Substantial Modest Modest Moderately Satisfactory Strengthen capacity of government at all levels to formulate, prepare, implement, and manage medium and long-term development programs Rating for EMRP-2 Substantial Substantial Modest Moderately Satisfactory

Table 3.2: EMRP-1 activities agreed at appraisal and the output achieved at closing

Outputs achieved at Project Activities Remarks Closing

A. Rural Development and Delivery of Social Services 1. Agriculture

Production of basic and pre-basic 120 tons of seeds procured and Completed seeds for farmers delivered to farmers

The CESO CI has provided technical assistance to the three Improving knowledge by undertaking Institutes of the component of Partially completed strategic studies Agriculture until 28th February, 2011, corresponding to a cycle 1. Cycle 2 was moved to Phase 2

Started in Phase 1 and moved to Rehabilitation of EDA Moved to EMRP-2 Phase 2

10 SENSE technicians benefit from Capacity building for technicians Partially completed training in Israel

30 Computers and 30 Printers were acquired for EDAs. The goods were purchased in 2006. It’s are in Acquisition of agriculture equipment use in the Agriculture Component, in the and inputs Provinces of Luanda, Malanje, Huambo and 6 trucks, 2 tractors, 16 pickup cars, Bié. 5 jeeps 4x4 and 20 motorcycles

2. Health

Four (4) ambulances, four (4) SAV, eight (8) bicycles and eight (8) Increasing the number of ambulances Completed motorbikes delivered to Malanje, Kwanza-Norte, Bié and Moxico

i) Training Workshop on Medicines Management and Logistics; (ii) Training of Hemotherapy Training of health care providers Completed Technicians; (iii) part of training for First Line Health Units Managers held in Moxico. Improving child health care Moved to Phase 2 Dropped Lots 1, 2 and 3 for medicine acquisition for Health Centers and Completed Posts, and Referral Units were acquired: Malanje Province received: 1) 375 Kits of medicines for Health Centers; 2) 1505 Kits of medicines Completed of Health Posts; 3) 135 Kits of medicines for Referral Centers; Kuanza-Norte Province received: 1) 348 kits of medicines for Health Providing essential drugs kits to Centers; 2) 735 kits of medicines for Completed health centers Health Posts; 3) 85 kits of medicines for Referral Centers; Bié Province received: 1) 290 kits of medicines for health centers; 2) 560 kits of medicines for health Completed posts and 3) 51 kits of medicines for Referral Centers; Moxico Province received: 1) 448 kits of medicines for health centers, 2) 1080 kits of medicines for health Completed posts; and 3) 113 kits of medicines for Referral Centers. Training health care technicians Moved to Phase 2 Dropped Strengthening health information Dropped Sector did not show interested system 3. Education

The sector did not cooperate although the Training new teachers Dropped consultant for that was identified and a report and training manual prepared.

Pedagogical materials supply: A total of 348.183 books were acquired for various subjects, namely: a) Malanje Province 74.945 Providing student guides books; b) Bié Province 111.175 Completed books; c) Uige Province 70.111 books; d) Moxico Province 44.758 books and e) Kuanza-Norte 47.194 books, for 1st to 6th grades.

A total of 617,072 student kits were purchased from, as follows: a) 132,901 student kits for the Province of Malanje b) 196,890 kits Providing text books, other supplies for the Province of Bié, c) 124,399 Completed and equipment kits for the Province of Uige, d) 79 204 kits for the Province Moxico e) 83,678 kits for the Province of Kwanza-Norte Strengthening institutional capacity through data collection, planning, and Partially completed. Partially completed management

B. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of critical infrastructure. Water supply and distribution in Completed Completed Malanje Water supply and distribution in Completed Completed Kuito Water supply and distribution in Completed Completed N’Dalatando

C. Sector Development and strengthening of Human and institutional capacities

Providing technical advisory services Not conducted Sectors did not show interested Training program Not conducted Sectors did not show interested Capacity building activities Not conducted Sectors did not show interested Pilot decentralization in selected partially completed Finalized under EMRP-2 provinces

D. Project Management and preparation of Phase II

Supporting M&E for the activities Completed Completed under the project Supporting National Demining Completed Completed Strategy Action Plan

Road Studies Completed Engineering studies and preparation of bidding documents for Phase 2. Erosion in Moxico Moved to EMRP-2 Electricity in Luanda Moved to EMRP-2

Table 3.3: EMRP-2 activities agreed at appraisal and the output achieved at closing

Output achieved at Activities Remarks Project closing PDO 1: Improve rural access to markets in specific areas with high agricultural potential that have been affected by the conflict.

A. Rural Development and Delivery of Social Services 1. Rural Roads

Malanje Province

Caculama -Cabundi (110km) 100% Completed GoA Parallel financing

Malage- Mangando (158km) 100% Completed GoA Parallel financing

Calandula - Massango (105km) 100% Completed GoA Parallel financing

Bié Province

Kuito-Chicala-Capolo with one bridge Bridge installed. Raining season delayed the 87% completed (58Kms) completion- GoA will finance the completion

Raining season delayed the completion- GoA Chicala-Mutumbo with one bridge (63 54% completed will finance the completion. Bridge purchased Km), but not installed

Raining season delayed the completion - GoA Kuito-Thrumba-Chilonda with one 70% completed will finance the completion. Bridge purchased bridge (39.50 Km) but not installed

One bridge completed other yet to be installed. Nharea-Catabola with two bridges (50 70% completed Raining season delayed the completion- GoA Km). will finance the completion

Camacupa-Rigoma (50 km), Dropped

Catabola-Chiuca (18 km) Dropped

N'harea-Cassumbe (83 km) Dropped

2. Agricultural Infrastructure (transferred from EMPR1) a. Malanje Province Cacuso (rehabilitation) Completed Calandula (rehabilitation) Completed Caculama (rehabilitation) Completed Malanje (construction) IDA and IIA Completed Kiwaba Nzoge (Construction) Completed Cangandala (Construction) Completed

b. Bié Province Nharea (Construction) Completed Andulo (Construction) Completed Camacupa (Construction) Completed Catabola (Construction) Completed Chinguar (Construction) Completed Kuito (Construction) Completed c. Huambo Province (University Angostinho Neto)

Seeds Institute Completed Agriculture Research Institute Completed Agriculture Development Institute Completed PDO 2: Reconstruct and rehabilitate critical infrastructure. B. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of critical infrastructure 1. Transport

Intermodal Transport Study Dropped No longer a priority for MoT

2. Roads and Bridges Lucala-Negage high traffic (150km) Completed GoA Parallel Funding 3. Electricity: rehabilitation of medium and low-voltage distribution systems in the provincial capital N'Dalatando - Urban Completed GoA Parallel Funding Uige - Urban Completed GoA Parallel Funding

Uíge - Peri-Urban 90% complete connecting over 3.990 families

Malanje - Urban Completed GoA Parallel Funding Luena - Urban Completed GoA Parallel Funding

Luena Peri-urban 90% Complete connecting over 2311 families

Kuito - Urban Completed GoA Parallel Funding

Kuito Peri-Urban 90% complete Connecting over 3584 families

4. Water Supply

N'Dalatando - works for water system This activity was not fully finance by EMRP1, Completed (Lute 1) approximately 30% was financed by EMRP2.

N'Dalatando - works for water system Completed Delivered to local management since 2010 (Lute 2)

Activity procured under EMRP1 but financed Malanje -works for water system Completed by EMRP2. System being managed by local (Lote1) authorities

Malanje -works for water system Completed (Lote2) peri-urban

Activity procured under EMRP1 but financed by EMRP2. At the ICR mission it was reported Kuito - works for water system Completed that over 2000 house connections and 60 standpipes are working

Works will be finance under the GoA program Moxico -works for water system Dropped "Water to All"

5. Urban Infrastructure Drainage & Sewage system in Luanda Completed GoA Parallel Funding Erosion study was completed and provided to Study of the erosion of Moxico Completed the National Director of National Infrastructure at the Ministry of Construction Preparation of the Tender for execution of the Works on the erosion of Moxico Dropped works was funded by the Project.

PDO 3: Strengthen capacity of participating ministries and agencies for improved governance and transparency and of local governments for future decentralization.

C. Sector development strategies and strengthening of human and institutional capacity National Department of Water, Ministry of Sector development of strategy Agriculture, Ministry of Territorial Completed formulation Administration and several local governments were supported by UNDP Technical Assistance to sectors and Completed Environment Management Training of sector Ministry and Completed Supported by UNDP Agencies Decentralization & support local Completed Supported by UNDP development D. Management Monitoring and Evaluation of project implementation Technical Assistance for Project Completed Management and Monitoring Support Project Management and Completed Training Operating Expense and Project Completed Management Expertise and support to demining Completed

Annex 4. Economic and Financial Analysis

Introduction

1. The overall objective of the EMRP was to help to build the foundation for long- term reconstruction, economic rehabilitation, and the reestablishment of state administration throughout Angola. The specific objectives of the program were to assist the government to (a) improve rural incomes and enhance food security in the provinces most affected by the conflict, (b) improve access to essential education and health services in the same provinces, (c) reconstruct and rehabilitate critical infrastructure, and (d) strengthen capacity of government at all levels to formulate, prepare, implement, and manage medium and long-term development programs. These were expected to be realized in two phases through improvements in physical infrastructure and delivery of social services in transport, urban and water services, electricity, agriculture, health, and education sectors in Bié, Moxico, Kwanza Norte, Luanda, Uige and Malanje provinces, as well as the strengthening of human and institutional capacities.

2. The economic and financial assessment of the EMRP at appraisal was not carried out as it was not required for ERL operations. Due to the limited capacity of the implementing agency and limited resources not yet built up in the post-conflict environment, no data has been obtained to allow estimation of ex-post benefits and costs either. Therefore, the net present value and economic rate of return have not been calculated either ex-ante or ex-post this emergency operation. However, the economic impact of the program’s primary interventions has been assessed on a qualitative basis.

3. The below assessment focuses on the program’s largest physical interventions in rural roads rehabilitation and water supply under the rural development and social services (component A) and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of critical infrastructure (component B) respectively. The analysis does not include the interventions in agricultural, health, electricity, and education sectors due to the absence of neither quantitative nor qualitative evidence and lack of robust M&E indicators, from which the impact of interventions can been inferred. Likewise, the activities on capacity building, institutional strengthening & sector development strategies (component C) and management and M&E (component D) are not assessed due to absence of sufficient information. However, the assessment provides some evidence on the overall wider impacts of the program as a whole on agricultural productivity, improved access to medical services and education, improved water supply, and improved accessibility to transport network. The Economic Impact of the Program

4. At appraisal, the primary benefits of the EMRP were identified as the following by sector:

(a) Health Sector: Prevention of further deterioration of health and loss of life of people who are living in extreme poverty by contributing to food security and delivery of health care and other basic services,

(b) Water Sector: Restoring water supply in the provincial capitals. (c) Electricity Sector: Restore electricity supply in provincial capitals and improve public health conditions in urban and rural areas. (d) Transportation: Increased competitiveness of goods through reduction of transport costs, and re-integration of the country through reestablished transport linkages between country’s provinces. (e) Rural and Agricultural Sector: Reduction of poverty among both agricultural producers and consumers through stimulation of agricultural production and reduction of costs and time of transporting food to markets. (f) Capacity building: Establishment of critical conditions for better governance through improved legal and regulatory framework and more stable and effective institutions. (g) Institutional strengthening: Laying out of the groundwork for future policy and institutional reforms and a future investment program for the country’s development.

5. Overall, the ex-post program benefits included the following, inter alia: (a) improved access to a safe source of water directly benefited the quality of life of the population in the project areas by reducing their vulnerability to diseases related to use of non-potable water; (b) provision of ambulance services, transport means (bicycles and motorbikes), training workshops and kits of medicines contributed to improved health services for the beneficiary population; (c) distributed books and student kits contributed to improved quality of education services; and (d) provision of seed to the ex-combatants being reintegrated to civil life reinitiated subsistence agricultural activities 41 . As mentioned above, there were no baseline indicators at the start of the project and there was no proper M&E conducted, making it difficult to quantify these impacts to provide supporting evidence.

6. The qualitative economic analysis of the EMRP focuses on the impact from the primary and most costly interventions, which were completed, such as rural roads and water supply by drawing on the following: (a) comparison of appraisal unit costs per output with the actuals for major infrastructure inputs; (b) comparison of targeted benefits at appraisal with the actual achievements; and (c) the empirical evidence from available studies on the actual benefits of investments in rural road infrastructure in other developing countries.

7. Considering that some interventions in trunk roads, electricity, agriculture, education, and health have not been fully completed and no anecdotal evidence and indicators are available to assess their impact on beneficiaries even qualitatively at this point of time, these interventions are not included in this analysis. Additional survey and/or M&E assessment of benefits would be recommended to evaluate the impacts from the following interventions under the program (a) distribution of textbooks under the

41 See ISR 9, dated December 2008

education sub-component, (b) benefits from constructed hospitals under the health sub- component, (c) benefits from construction of EDA buildings and seed distributions under the agricultural sub-component, and (d) rehabilitation of medium and low-voltage distribution systems under electricity sub-component. Conducting such an assessment at a later time might also allow for the benefits to realize to a greater extent, given that some of the outputs have not been put into full use yet (for instance, the hospitals constructed under the health sub-component are not yet fully operational).

Benefits: Appraisal Estimates and Actuals

8. Achievement of the outcomes for rural road and water sector interventions under the rural development component A and rehabilitation of critical infrastructure component B respectively was measured by the below key indicators. All of these indicators have achieved the set targets by project closing, and some even exceeded them, with the exception of the length of rural road rehabilitated, which was completed at only 33 percent of the target value due to substantial increases in unit costs for road works. a) Water Supply Sector Indicators: (i) Of 85 km of water network targeted for rehabilitation in Malanje, N’Dalatando and Kuito, the target exceeded with total of 179.6 km completed (77.6 km in Malanje, 42 km in N’Dalatando, and 60 km in Kuito). (ii) A total of 8,200 houses were connected to water as a result of the program interventions, which is almost a double of the appraisal target of 3,572 houses. (iii) Community water points construction or rehabilitation exceeded the target of 55 standpipes to be installed with 256 standpipes actually installed in total. (iv) Number of people in the provincial capital of Malanje with access to improved water services through house connections and rehabilitated standpipes has increased from zero to 400,000 people exceeding the original 90,000 target. (v) Number of people in the provincial capital of N’Dalatando with access to improved water services through house connections and rehabilitated standpipes has also increased from zero to 150,000 people exceeding the appraisal target of 49,000 people. (vi) Number of people in the provincial capital of Kuito with access to improved water services through house connections and rehabilitated standpipes has also increased from zero to 150,000 people exceeding the appraisal target of 49,000 people. (vii) In total, number of people in urban areas provided with access to Improved Water Sources under the project in the cities of N’Dalatando, Malanje and Kuito reached over 700,000 people, exceeding the original target significantly.

b) Rural Roads Sector Indicators: (i) Out of 600 km of rural and feeder roads targeted for rehabilitation at appraisal (300 km in each Bié and Malanje provinces), only 200 km in the province of Bié have been completed by the project closing, amounting to 25% of the target due to substantial increases in unit costs. No rural roads in the province of Malanje were rehabilitated as a result. (ii) Out of 600 km of roads targeted to be in good condition by the end of the program, only 20 percent has been achieved.

Costs: Appraisal Estimates and Actuals

9. Overall, the actual total program costs were lower: actual cost being US$ 113 million (US$ 35 mln in EMRP-1 and US$ 78 mln in EMRP-2) compared to total estimated cost of US$ 225 million at appraisal (US$ 92 mln in EMRP-1 and US$ 133 mln in EMRP-2). This difference is explained by the cancellation of part of the IDA credit, and by the fact that contribution from donors did not materialized 42, and the Government funded some activities out of their own resources. 10. Narrowing down to the specific interventions of interest for this analysis, the cost of the rehabilitation of rural roads, which accounted for about six percent of total financing at appraisal (in the amount of US$ 13 million), was lower than the actual costs, resulting in the net over-run of about US$ 7 million or about 150 percent. Due to increases in unit costs for rural road rehabilitation works, the actual cost per unit of output for rural road rehabilitation sub-component amounted to US$ 100,000 per km compared to US$ 21,700 per km estimated at appraisal. This attests to that either the costs were largely underestimated at appraisal or to the inefficiencies in the use of project resources, for which the reasons lie beyond the project’s scope. A careful sensitivity analysis to cost increases at appraisal could have helped to mitigate these inefficiencies.

11. Water supply intervention cost accounted for 34 percent of total program costs at appraisal (in the amount of US$ 76 million), which was higher than the actual costs of US$ 59 million (for both phases of the program combined). This resulted in the net under-run of about US$ 17 million or 22 percent. Accordingly, considering that all the interventions for this sub-component were fully complete, the actual cost per unit of output for water supply sub-component is below the appraisal estimate. This attests to the efficient use of project resources for this intervention.

Empirical Evidence of Benefits from Rural Road Investments

12. Despite the inefficiencies and cost over-runs, the network of rural roads that has actually been completed generates major direct and indirect net benefits in the form of increased traffic, increase in agricultural productivity, improved access to markets, travel time and transport cost reductions, and increased overall mobility of the rural population

42 There is no evidence that the European Development Fund (EdF) contribution or EMRp-1 materialized.

of Angola. Specifically, the traffic levels increased from nearly non-existent levels in the post-conflict environment to almost 1,000 vehicles per day on the 42 km section rehabilitated under the EMRP between Kuito and Chilonda in Bié province43.

13. While no implicit data is available to quantify all the benefits from EMRP’s investment in rural roads in Angola, there is considerable evidence of the benefit of improving rural road infrastructure in overcoming constraints to agricultural competitiveness. A number of studies have quantified the time savings and transaction cost reductions gained by rural households in improved access to product and factor markets, as well as the impact on generating rural job opportunities.44 Some studies have even shown that road access might even compensate for the absence of other public and private assets. 45 Access to roads and markets is particularly important for women’s participation in non-farm self-employment with assets.46 Boxes 1 and 2 summarize the key findings from relevant studies.

43 Traffic count provided by the road construction contractor, taken on August 8, 2013, at 60% completion of the works. 44 Lucas, David and Rikard (1996), Guimaraes and Uhl (1997), Liu (2000), Escobal (2000), Smith, Gordon, Meadows and Zwick (2001), Lanjouw, Quizon and Sparrow (2001), quoted in Escobal, J. and C. Ponce. 2002. “The benefits of rural roads: Enhancing income opportunities for the rural poor.” GRADE Working Paper 40. Lima. 45 Corral and Reardon (2001); de Janvry and Sadoulet (2001) and Escobal (2001) quoted in Escobal and Ponce (2002). 46 Dabalen, A., Paternostro, S. and Pierre, G. 2004. “The returns to participation in the nonfarm sector in rural Rwanda” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3462. World Bank. Washington DC.

Box 1: The Economic Benefits of Rural Road Investment

Lowering transportation costs: • In Morocco, after implementation of a rural roads improvement project, the percentage of bigger lower cost trucks increased by 500% and led to a 50% reduction in transportation costs (Levy, H. 1996. “Morocco – Socioeconomic influence of rural roads: Fourth Highway project” Impact Evaluation Report. Operations Evaluation Department. World Bank. Washington DC.); • In Ghana, after a rural roads rehabilitation project, costs for transporting maize on the improved roads was 33% less on improved roads compared to unimproved roads; a shared taxi ride was 20% cheaper on improved roads compared to unimproved roads; and an emergency taxi cost 33% to 40% cheaper on improved roads compared to unimproved roads; and • An evaluation impact survey conducted after the first rural roads project in Peru showed that on average, car fares on control roads rose 33.5% compared to 13.9% for project roads; minibus fares rose 33.6% on control roads compared to 12.8% for project roads; bus fares rose 19.5% on control roads compared to 12.9% on project roads and truck fares rose 23% on control roads compared to 9% on project roads.

Increasing economic opportunities for the poor: • Research in Asia showed villages with better access to roads had 14% lower costs of fertilisers, 12% higher wages and 32% higher crop output; • In Zhengang district in Bhutan, a survey found that families within 0 to 0.5 days walking time of a road earned over two times more than families within 1 to 3 days walking time of a road; • In Bangladesh, a survey found that in a matched sample of sixteen villages with comparable soil and agronomic conditions, topography and water regimes, agricultural incomes in villages with better road access were around 24% higher, agricultural wages were about 12% higher, total wage income was almost doubled; • In Madagascar, construction of a road to a previously isolated village (only accessible by air and foot) led to a 35% increase in household disposable income; with 52% of this going to the poorest 10% of the population. Farmers living within 5 km of the road benefited 50% more than other more remotely located farmers; and • In the Philippines, a study of 586 out of 4,684 households affected by the construction of 6 rural roads showed a household income increase of 28% (40% for farmers, 20% for non-farmers). Production volumes of seven major marketable crops increased by almost 40% in 2 years since project completion; Average farm-gate prices rose 59%; market prices rose 29% one year after project completion. More importantly, before the project, 69% of the products were sold at the farm yielding lower prices for farmers but after the project, 60% of the products were sold at the markets where they were sold at higher prices.

Increasing the productivity of businesses: • Percentage of paved roads and road density both correlated with crop yield, with elasticity coefficients of 0.305 and 0.058 respectively. Percentage of paved roads and road density positively correlated with aggregated output with elasticity coefficients of 0.263 and 0.121 respectively; • From 85 randomly drawn sample districts in India, a rural income survey showed elasticity of bank expansions with respect to road density at 0.80, with a 23% increase in fertiliser demand and increases (13%-46%) in pump-sets, tracts, draught animals and milk animals over a 10 year period; • A study in India using data from the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid tropics from 1970 through 1974, with 5,450 observations of irrigated and non-irrigated districts, showed that for irrigated districts, road density (km roads/ 1000 sq. km cropped land) was strongly and positively correlated with agricultural output with a coefficient of 0.189; and • A study of 85 districts in thirteen states in India found that 7% of growth in aggregate output can be attributed to road investments through the increased access to markets by farmers.

Source: World Bank. 2013. “Ethiopia: Sustaining the Benefits of Rural Road Investments.” AFTTR, Africa Region, Washington, DC.

Box 2: The Social Benefits of Rural Road Investment

Improving education and the delivery of education: In Andhra Pradesh, India, the female literacy rate is 60% higher in villages with all season road access compared with villages with sporadic access; In Morocco, a study in 1985 before rural roads improvements and 10 years later after the improvements showed school enrolment rise from 28% to 68% and female enrolment more than tripled; In Bhutan, based on villages without access to a road to villages with access to a road, it is estimated that providing access to a road in a village translates to an increase in school attendance of between 75 to 100 people; In the Morocco study (1985, follow-up 1995) after the rural roads rehabilitation project, the number of schools increased from 3 to 13 for the project zones while the number increased from 2 to 3 for the control zones (Levy, 1996); In a rural roads project in Peru, an evaluation impact survey found that of 2,038 households impacted by a roads access project, 69% believed it had improved teachers’ willingness to teach, 63% believed it had a positive impact on teacher recruiting and 79% believed that it had improved female teachers’ safety when travelling; and Evidence from Pakistan showed an all-weather road may increase girls’ primary school enrolment by 50 percent.

Increasing access to health services and the delivery of health care In Jamaica, 73.1% of women noted mobility as being a major problem in accessing pre-natal care services; A study in the Philippines showed that a 10% increase in distance (by time) from a health care centre is associated with a 2% increase in mortality rates; and In Morocco, the 1985 and follow-up 1995 study following a rural roads rehabilitation and new roads project showed that the number of full time medical staff in affected health centres increased from 0 to 3 or 4 per health centre.

Benefits to Women The Morocco study (1985, follow-up 1995) showed the average number of women working outside of a farm in a project zone increased from 0.15 to 3; Women located in a village on a main road in Cameroon spent more time producing food to sell and made an average income of US$570, more than twice the US$225 earned by women in an isolated village;

Source: World Bank. 2013. “Ethiopia: Sustaining the Benefits of Rural Road Investments.” AFTTR, Africa Region, Washington, DC.

With versus Without the Project

14. Overall, the EMRP was a rescue operation without which the provision of basic services in the country would have further declined potentially leading to increased poverty and complete despair, making the population worse off than it is “with the project”. After 30 years of civil war, the country was at the critical point lacking provision of almost all basic services (health, education, water and sanitation) as well as transport and electricity. The program provided the urgent support needed at the time and addressed the country’s most critical needs quickly by restoring vital rural road links and preventing further decline of basic public services for the population such as access to water, electricity, health, and education. The EMRP also laid the ground and opened the door for other projects and development programs, which otherwise would not have been viable without the initial steps taken under EMRP in the post-conflict country.

Annex 5. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Lending Abdelmoula Ghzala Task Team Leader AFTTR C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Sector Manager AFTTR Theresa Marissa J. Gamulo Procurement Analyst AFTUW Laurence C. Clarke Manager AFMAO Maria Margarida Baessa Mendes Executive Assistant AFMAO Slaheddine Ben-Halima Consultant MNSHD Philippe Charles Benoit Sector Manager, Energy LCSEG Antonio L. Chamuço Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Eduardo Brito Country Lawyer LEGAF Jean J. De St Antoine Lead Health Specialist AFTHE Ntombie Siwale Program Assistant AFTTR

Supervision/ICR Abdelmoula Ghzala Task Team Leader AFTTR Boris Enrique Utria Task Team Leader AFTEG Jose Domingos Diogo Lopes Chembeze Task Team Lader AFTTR Inguna Dobraja Operations Officer AFMAO Fabio Galli Lead Transport Specialist AFTTR Theresa Marissa J. Gamulo Procurement Analyst AFTUW Olivier J. Lambert Sector Leader MIGOP Xiaoyan Liang Sr Education Spec. EASHE Elisabeth Maier Consultant AFTSP Lance Morrell Consultant TWICT Jonathan Nyamukapa Sr Financial Management Specia AFTFM Jenni Amanda Pajunen Consultant AFMAO Domingas de Fatima Rego Pegado Team Assistant AFMAO C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Sector Manager AFTTR Lucio Monary Sector Manager AFTEG Supee Teravaninthorn Sector Manager AFTTR Luiz Claudio Martins Tavares Lead Water and Sanitation Spec AFTUW Joao Tinga Financial Management Analyst AFTFM Subhash Seth Consultant – Highway Engineer AFTTR Jacqueline Beatriz Veloz Lockward Program Assistant AFTFW Philippe J. de Naurois Consultant MNSSD Eduardo Luis Leao de Sousa Senior Economist AFTAR Mônica Sawyer Operations Officer AFTTR

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands No. of staff weeks (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY04 0 0 FY05 0 0 FY06 8.73 35.30 FY07 6.90 32.87

Total: 15.63 68.17 Supervision/ICR FY07 0 0.00 FY08 10.76 35.18 FY09 18.46 51.00 FY10 20.98 48.01 FY11 21.51 43.34 FY12 31.06 44.99 FY13 24.77 38.21 FY14 5.65 16.48 Total: 133.19 277.21

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provided a report entitled “Decentralization and Local Governance Project – Final Report” dated July 2013. The report summaries the decentralization and local development, starting with the pilot program in four provinces: Uíge, Malanje, Bié and Luanda and 5 municipalities in 2004 and extended to five provinces and 23 municipalities in 2011. Training was carried out in the following areas:

A. Institutional capacity building, skills and competencies development of municipalities for service delivery – trained 120 municipal administrators, civil servants and technical experts on planning, budgeting and delivery of municipal services.

B. Strengthening local governments’ capacity for data collection, management an analysis capacity and effective planning, monitoring and evaluation – Organized a tow day international conference on decentralization with experiences from Mozambique, Cape Verde, Brazil and Portugal.

C. Effective local community and civil society capacity to promote pro-poor, gender sensitive, accountable and participatory planning, budgeting, and assessment (monitoring and evaluation) at the local level – Worked in five provinces with 72 municipalities to develop a municipal gender assessment. In 2011, 12 gender profile drafts were sent to the Ministry of Family and Women.

D. Development of Financial Management Systems for Municipal accounting and revenue management – Trained 68 staff in 18 municipalities on the Angola Financial Management System (SIGFIE).

E. Promote citizens participation in local governance and development – Trained 75 local journalists and carried out 10 round table debates that brought together community groups, women and youth, to total 1,600 people.

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1. PRESENTATION OF THE REPORT

The Final Report of the Emergency Multisector Rehabilitation project (EMRP), intend to report the current status of management and implementation of the EMRP-2 from the beginning (January 28, 2008) until closing on May 31, 2013 and present the activities performed and not performed, successes and constrains, impacts, and indicators for the implementation of the Project.

The agreed activities under the Financing Agreement signed between the Government of Angola and World Bank were not all concluded as proposed by the program at the closing date May 31, 2013, as per the first extension. The Borrower requested a second extension to February 2014, in order to conclude all activities. Unfortunately, lack of sensitivity within the World Bank, the request in question was rejected by the Bank.

The program was estimated at $ 102,000,000.00 (One hundred and Two Million U.S. dollars) and designed to cover the costs of the following components:

a. Rural Development and Provision of Social Services; b. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Critical Infrastructures; c. Development of the Sector Strategy and Capacity Strengthening Human and Institutional Capacity; d. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

1.1. The fundamental objectives of the EMRP The Program objective was to create sustainable conditions for reconstruction, economic rehabilitation and restoration of the administration of State throughout the national territory, helping to:

(i) Raising rural incomes and improve food security in the provinces most affected by conflict; (ii) Improving access to essential services such as education and health in those provinces; (iii) Rehabilitate and rebuild major infrastructure, and (iv) Strengthen the capacity of government at all levels to formulate, prepare, implement and manage programs to develop medium and long term.

2. PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT BY COMPONENTS AND SUB - COMPONENTS

2.1 PART A (Component A) - Rural Development and Provision of Social Services

Regarding this component were planned and carried out the following activities:

2.1.1 Construction and Rehabilitation of Agrarian Development Stations (EDAs) in the provinces of Malanje, Huambo and Bié. Relating to Agriculture Sector

In implementing the activities in this sector, we highlight the work of Construction and Rehabilitation of Agrarian Development Stations in the provinces of Malanje, Huambo and Bié, as follows: a. Malanje Province: were constructed and rehabilitated the following EDAs, amounting to USD 2,632,168.80 (two million six hundred thirty -two thousand, one hundred and eighty U.S. dollars and eighty cents):

1. City of Cacuso (Rehabilitation); 2. County Calandula (Rehabilitation); 3. City of Caculama (Rehabilitation); 4. city of Malanje (Construction of Buildings for IDA - Institute of Agrarian Development and IIA - Institute of Agricultural Research); 5. City of Kiwaba Nzoge (Construction); and 6. County Cangandala (Construction). b. Provinces of Bié and Huambo were constructed and rehabilitated the following EDAs, amounting to USD 3,584,633.12 (three million, five hundred eighty-four thousand, six hundred and thirty three dollars and twelve cents):

1. City of Nharea (Construction); 2. County Andulo (Construction); 3. City of Camacupa (Construction) ; 4. County Catabola (Construction); 5. City of Chinguar (Construction); 6. County Kuito (Construction); and 7. City of Huambo : • Construction of Grain Institute (SENSE ) ; • Construction and Rehabilitation of the IIA - Institute of Agricultural Research ; • Construction of IDA - Institute for Agricultural Development).

The infrastructure for the Agriculture Sector in the above referenced counties were completed in full by May 31, 2013 (closing date of the project) and give support to farmers and ranchers in the daily practice of agriculture, contributing in combating hunger and reducing poverty, subsequently, higher household incomes for rural people as well as the improvement of working conditions for field technicians who make their workplace.

Moreover, import emphasize that the implementation of the project of construction and rehabilitation of these infrastructures originally planned for Phase 1 of EMRP, however,

given the delays in the implementation of the tendering process and given the closure of Phase 1 on 28 February 2011 had to be transferred to Phase 2 . So is facilitated support given to farmers' associations due to the improvement of the infrastructure concerned families feel satisfied by the improvement of the assistance given to farmers.

2.1.1 Construction and Rehabilitation of 600 km of Rural Roads (Tertiary) in the provinces of Bié and Malanje, being: a) Construction and Rehabilitation of 200 km of road in the 300 km planned Bié Province:

1- Road Kuito - Chicala - Capolo (58 Km) and 1 Bridge - 87 % of the work completed by May 31, 2013, closing date of the Credit Bank. Contract Amount : USD 7,552,113.91 Disbursed amount of work carried out until 31/05/13 = USD 7,174,508.22

2- Road Chicala - . Trumbo (63 Km) and 1 bridge 54 % of the work completed by May 31, 2013, closing date of the Credit Bank. Contract Amount : USD 6,964,184.41 Disbursed amount of work carried out until 31/05/13 = USD 2,566,813.45

3- Road Kuito - Thrumba - Chilonda (39.50 Km) and 1 Bridge - 70 % of the work completed by May 31, 2013, closing date of the Credit Bank. Contract Amount : USD 4,496,035.51 Disbursed amount of work carried out until 31/05/13 = USD 3,078,826.21

4- Road Nharea - Catabola (50 Km) and 2 bridges - 70 % of the work completed by May 31, 2013, closing date of the Credit Bank. Contract Amount : USD 4,996,217.50 Disbursed amount of work carried out until 31/05/13 = USD 3,033,504.21 b) Construction and Rehabilitation of 300 km of road in Malanje Province: Faced with insufficient funds, this activity was not performed.

Therefore, the amount budgeted for the construction and rehabilitation of 600 km of rural roads in the provinces of Bié and Malanje was not enough for its implementation. Therefore, given the situation, the Project Coordination and the World Bank team consulted with the Ministry of Agriculture and decided to rehabilitate 200 km, equivalent to the 4 sections as listed above, which the project had sufficient budget. Thus 400 km of rural roads were excluded from the Project: 300 Km of Malanje Province and 100 km of Bié Province.

Although the roads are not yet complete, improvements in transportation and movement of people and goods are already tangible, thereby ensuring considerable trade between country and city.

Today there is already greater movement of trucks and other means of transport in sections under construction. People are resettling towards the improved road, creating new villages. Time or duration of travel is reduced to 50 % and the cost transport categorically reduced when compared to before the construction and rehabilitation of rural roads in the province.

To this end, we can say that after completion, the main objectives will be achieved expected, among which we highlight: (a) reducing the high cost of transporting people and goods, (b) connection and movement of people inter-municipal and provincial, and (c) assist the reintegration of the country.

2.2 PART B (Component B) - Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Critical Infrastructures. This component consists of the following sub- components: 1- Transport; 2- Roads and Bridges; 3- Electricity; 4- Water Supply; 5- Urban Services Infrastructure.

2.2.1 Sub -Component - Transportation: This sub - component of the project was planned to conduct the Study of Multimodal Transport Strategy , which were not performed, because the sector have not shown interest in interacting with the Management Unit and Implementation of the Project despite contacts made by UGIP.

2.2.2 Sub -Component - Roads and Bridges: The rehabilitation of 150 km of roads and bridges, the section Lucala - Negage, was funded by the Government of Angola, hence the prospects were met. The Government of Angola carried out the works, because there was a need to have the rehabilitated section for ways to facilitate the conditions of movement of people and goods soon after the achievement of peace in 2002, had strong and urgent. The Government of Angola has decided to undertake the construction and rehabilitation to stretch Lucala - Negage with own funds.

2.2.3 Sub -Component - Electricity: In this subcomponent was provided Construction and Rehabilitation Supply Systems Electricity Distribution to five cities in Angola, being: (a) N’Dalatando, (b) Uige, (c) Malanje, (d) Luena, and (e) Kuito, whose studies were undertaken and completed in Phase 1 of the EMRP.

However, at the time of implementation of the studies for the planned in cities, the PMIU was informed that some local governments have already rehabilitated the electrical supply system, given the urgent need at the time of toasting the population with electricity. The cities of N’Dalatando and Malanje had the work done with their own

funds. However, the Project Coordination and ENE -EP (National Electricity Company - Public Company) took the decision to conduct such activities in peri-urban areas of the three other cities (Kuito, Luena and Uige) provided in the Financing Agreement.

The rehabilitation took its normal course of execution and by the closing date, 67 % of the work had been accomplished. Therefore, the portion of work that transcends the closing date of the Credit (May 31, 2013) will be the responsibility of the Government of Angola and supported with capital.

The contractual amount and initially signed for the three contracts, amounted to USD 26,103,514.60 (Twenty six million, one hundred and three thousand, five hundred and fourteen U.S. dollars and sixty cents). However, during the implementation for these tree cities, changes emerged, resulting in an additional amount of USD 3,751,941.00 (three million, seven hundred fifty -one thousand, nine hundred and forty-one U.S. dollars), making the total amount of 29,855,455.60 (twenty nine million, eight hundred fifty-five thousand, four hundred fifty-five U.S. dollars and sixty cents).

Regarding the electricity projects in three cities (Uige, Kuito and Luena), when the work is concluded (June 2014) it will supply electricity to following beneficiaries:

City of Uige = 3,990 beneficiaries; City of Luena = 2,311 beneficiaries; and City of Kuito = 3,584 beneficiaries.

At this time, we can categorically state that with the completion of these works, thousands of people will be benefited, among which appears for example, the electricity consumption in households, schools (especially those with night teaching programs), gas stations and medical centers in peri-urban areas. At the moment the areas concerned and social establishments are supplied by individual generators, thus bearing high resulting costs of buying fuel.

Concomitantly, remain the objectives of these project , which are (a) ensuring the sustainability of electricity services to the community for commercial matters, (b) normalize the distribution of electricity in the provincial capital permanently and acceptable quality of service, etc. .

Moreover, this subcomponent funded studies for the distribution of electricity in some areas of Luanda (Vienna) were also performed. Studies were completed on May 31, 2013 and delivered EDEL - EP (Public Electricity Distribution Company in Luanda). These studies will help EDEL solve the problem of electrical power peri- urban areas of Vianna in Luanda Province. The contract amount for the study was USD 462,220.11 (four hundred sixty -two thousand, two hundred and twenty U.S. dollars and eleven cents). However, given the delay in the delivery of the Reports of Studies for Electricity Distribution Company Luanda - Public Company (EDEL, EP) (to 31.05.2013 only), it was not possible to implement the acquisition of equipment envisaged in the project therefore coincided with the closing date of the credit by the World Bank.

2.2.4 Sub -Component - Water Supply:

The work of the Works Construction and Rehabilitation of Water Supply System to the cities of Malanje, Kuito and N’Dalatando, relating to Lot 1 of each of the cities, began on Phase 1 of the Project, which ended on 28 February 2011. Yet because of insufficient funds in Phase 1, the Project Coordination and the World Bank team took the decision to complete the work under cover of the Phase 2 funds. The amount involved contractually stood at USD 19,512,230.10 (nineteen million, five hundred and twelve thousand, two hundred thirty U.S. dollars and ten cents), of which USD 19,358,529.85 (nineteen million, three hundred and fifty eight thousand, five hundred and twenty nine U.S. dollars and eighty-five cents) refer to the Works and USD 153,700.19 (one hundred fifty-three thousand, seven hundred U.S. dollars and nineteen cents) to consulting services.

This Sub-Component, also funded the construction and rehabilitation of water supply and distribution system - Lot 2 - the city of N’Dalatando Province of Kwanza Norte. This contract involved an amount of USD 8,414,793.69 (eight million, four hundred and fourteen thousand seven hundred and ninety-three U.S. dollars and sixty nine cents). This project was planned for Phase 2.

Considered the availability of funds (resulting from the activities of the program met forecast) for the implementation of large-caliber project in the water sector and considering the dearth of this precious liquid in the peri-urban area of the city of Malanje, the Project Coordination and the World Bank team Coordinated by TTL, decided to implement the project Lot 2. This activity was not initially foreseen in the project. This contract involved an amount of USD 7,785,223.00 (seven million seven hundred and eighty-five thousand, two hundred and twenty three U.S. dollars).

Contrary to the benefits highlighted above and in view of the Draft Government called " Water for All " which aims to create infrastructure for water supply nationwide, the Water Supply Project in rural Moxico, in the initial project, not been achieved as a result of the decision taken by the direct stakeholders of the Project, and the Project Coordination, National Directorate of Water and the World Bank team, thereby avoiding duplication of services.

However, the Draft Constitution of Public Enterprises Water in three provinces, the provision of Technical Assistance to the DNA (National Water Directorate) for the strategic development of the sector and the Master Plan of the cities were not brought under EMRP therefore were transferred to PDISA Project, also funded by the World Bank and the Government of Angola to the Ministry of Energy and Water.

Today, we are witnessing great benefits with the installation of drinking water in the cities of Malanje, Kuito and N’Dalatando.

In the city of N’Dalatando Lot 1 was constructed as follows: • A water collection; • A station water treatment;

• A conduit pipeline; • A reservoir distribution of 5000m3; and • Beneficiaries: 150,000 people.

We should note that this number corresponds to recipient’s initial estimate, counted after the installation of potable water demand grew and the number of beneficiaries increased significantly with linkages to the resident.

In the city of Malanje , Lot 1 was constructed as follows: • About 42 km from the conduct; • Installation of 3,200 household connections; • Construction of 45 fountains in peri - urban areas; • Beneficiaries: 200,000 people

We should note that this number corresponds to recipient’s initial estimate counted after installation of potable water demand grew and the number of beneficiaries increased significantly.

In Kuito, Lot 1 was constructed as follows: • A capture station and water treatment; • A reservoir with a capacity of 4000m3; • 60 km network in the urban area; • 2,000 house connections; • 60 Fountains in peri-urban areas; • Beneficiaries: 150,000 people.

2.2.5 Sub -Component - Urban Services and Infrastructure

In this subcomponent, the studies were carried out to control erosion in Luena, in Moxico, once completed, were delivered to the National Infrastructure Directorate of the Ministry of Construction. This activity involved a contractual amount of USD 457,769.00 (four hundred fifty-seven thousand, seven hundred and sixty-nine U.S. dollars).

By the Project Coordination Team and the World Bank decision Projects Works in Luanda critical sanitation and drainage points were not performed, since in Luanda were several projects running under the jurisdiction of the Angolan Executive.

Work on the control of erosion in Luena Moxico were not performed for reasons of closure of the project May 31, 2013, and there was not time for the launch of the competition and consequently the award and implementation. Therefore, the delay in question was due to the indifference of the responsible industry at time of production of research.

2.3 PART C (Component C) - Development of the Sector Strategy and Capacity Strengthening Human and Institutional Capacity

2.3.1 This component was given technical assistance in the preparation and formulation of PDISA Project with the National Directorate of Water and Sanitation of the Ministry of Energy and Water. The contractual amount involved is USD 472,000.00 (four hundred and seventy-two thousand U.S. dollars).

2.3.2 Technical assistance in environmental impact assessment for all projects of the EMRP was provided. The contractual amount involved is USD 1,364,575.41 (one million, three hundred sixty-four thousand, five hundred and seventy-five U.S. dollars and forty one cents).

2.3.3 Through the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) training and capacity building aimed at some of the country Municipal Administrations. This training involved the transmission mechanisms of management, operation, procedures, planning and monitoring of activities, financial management were performed, procurement, project management and decentralization. The contractual amount involved is USD 1,800,000.00 (One million, eight hundred thousand U.S. Dollars).

2.4 PART D (Component D) - Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

2.4.1 Subcomponent - Technical Assistance to the Project Management and Monitoring.

For the operation of the Project, the employees were hired through the Public Tender to fill the positions mentioned below, with the exception of the Project Coordinator, who in accordance with the Agreement, was appointed or nominated by the Ministry of Planning of the Government of Angola:

1. Project Coordinator; 2. Financial Management Specialist; 3. Procurement Specialist; 4. Procurement Officer; 5. Project Accountant; 6. Accounting Assistant; 7. Secretariat of the Project; 8. Two Drivers Project.

Institutional support. The Project Management and Implementation Unit, worked for the Ministry of Planning and Territorial Development under the supervision of the Secretary of State for Public Investments and in tune with the sectors assigned to the Project as: Energy, Water, Agriculture, Construction and Provincial Governments Malanje, Kwanza- Norte, Huambo, Bié, Moxico and Uige.

This subcomponent involved an amount of USD 1,456,011.99 (One million, four hundred fifty-six thousand, eleven U.S. dollars and ninety nine cents).

2.4.2 Training

Regarding the training/capacity building, it is highlighted the specific and specialized training in (a) Financial Management, (b) Disbursement and (c) Procurement.

Local staff working directly in Project management benefited from training, including:

Delfina Manuel: financial management and disbursements in Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique Domingos Canda: financial management and disbursements in Malawi and Mozambique; Moises Siliveli: Procurement training in Kenya and Mozambique; Peter Viriato: financial management and disbursements in Malawi and Mozambique

These trainings have contributed to broadening the knowledge of Angolan staff on the standards of the World Bank and other donors for the implementation of project. We note that even with the closure of EMRP Project, these frameworks could be useful and valuable in implementing projects in other agencies with projects in Angola multilateral funding. The formation of these constitutes an asset for the country.

2.4.3 Disbursements

The Project, from effectiveness in January 28, 2008 to closing date on May 31, 2013, disbursed the amount of USD 67,899,021.13, representing 67 % of the (USD 102,000,000) of Project.

During the reporting period were disbursed 67,899,021.13 for Components , as follows:

• USD 13,202,301.22 - AGRICULTURE; • USD 34,325,707.86 - WATER; • USD 379,948.28 - URBAN; • USD 16,259,341.40 - ELECTRICITY; • USD 1,629,052.85 - SECTOR STRATEGY FORTAMENTO INSTITUTIONAL; • USD 2,102,669.52 - PROJECT MANAGEMEN;

And distributed in the following categories:

• USD 61,913,457.79 - WORKS ; • USD 175,860.00 - PROPERTY AND EQUIPMENT ; • USD 5,218,281.00 - CONSULTING ; • USD 32739.04 - TRAINING • USD 558,683.30 - OPERATING COSTS

3. MAIN CONSTRAINTS

During the Project implementation were noted some key constraints that have listed below:

1. Constant change the TTL of the Project by the World Bank; 2. The changing of the Project Coordinators by Government of Angola; 3. The recruitment of expatriate specialists without transmission of know-how to national technical; 4. Lack of dedication, commitment and interest among focal points in areas in lack of fees, compensation in the time devoted to the project, causing a huge bureaucracy in the provision of feedback to a particular subject; 5. Much bureaucracy and considerable delays in the process of obtaining funds for the project to cover the payments entered on Public Investment Projects was verified by the General Secretariat of the Ministry of guardianship (as Budget Unit); 6. Extensive delays in granting the "No Objection" to procurement processes TTL by the World Bank.

4. CONCLUSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS

Despite the constraints mentioned in section 2.4.1, among which we emphasize the length and lack of issuance of no objection from the Bank, which forced the project to stay for a period of approximately one year, without concluding procurement actions at the apse of the project causing extensive delays in implementation, we consider the implementation of Phase 2 of the Project since January 28, 2008 to May 31, 2013 as satisfactory.

Many huge impact and objectives were achieved with good results. Specially in the implementation of the project construction and rehabilitation of drinking water supply system in the cities of Malanje, Kuito and N’Dalatando; infrastructure to support rural areas, such as the Agrarian Development Stations (EDAs) in the municipalities of the provinces of Malanje, Huambo and Bié; construction and rehabilitation of rural roads, although that has not been completed, as facilitating the movement of people and goods inter-municipal; construction and rehabilitation of power supply systems, but also with works not yet completed, but that envision the possibility to come help serve The home electricity populations in peri-urban areas of the cities of Uige, Kuito and Luena, one since the Government has shown willingness and availability to the full completion of the project with their own funds.

We emphasize that the implementation of a multisectoral program is complex, since it involves many sectors, departments and technicians with several subordinations, which hinders the quick decision making in the face of massive bureaucracy.

We also conclude that the difficulties become even greater, because the technicians of various sectors involved in the project have not been awarded any salary compensation which led to recovery and priority of other services from which their monthly salaries, thus leaving part of the responsibilities being delegated to them by their superiors. For an example, we observed fewer constraints on component waters, because from the

beginning, have been recruited to a focal point right to remuneration. The focal point was a total commitment to the project, a situation which greatly helped the success of project implementation.

Among other difficulties, highlight the difficulty of staff from different sectors can adapt to different situations, such as: Procurement Standards of the World Bank (published in English, a language that few are versed on) versus Procurement Standards of the Government of Angola.

Moreover, one of the most important lessons is that we know against the need to recruit expatriates, it should be certain as to its high capacity to transfer the know-how to the local staff, as provided in the Agreement funding. This assistance from the local expatriate staff does not happen in many cases, thus resulting in a certain emptiness in the sustainability of what was done and the ability to continue working with good performance in case of termination of contract expatriate.

The assets acquired under the project, in the case of vehicles, computers and furniture will be delivered to the Ministry of Planning and Territorial Development (MPDT) while the goods found in the Project Management and Implementation Unit (PMIU) and those that are outside MPDT shall remain in their respective sectors, specifically in the ENE, EDEL Ministry of Agriculture and National Directorate of Water and Sanitation of the Ministry of Energy and Water.

Annex 8. List of Supporting Documents

1. Memorandum and Recommendation of the President, April 24, 2007

2. Technical Annex, Report No:T7666, April 24, 2007

3. Appendix to the Technical Annex. Report No: T7666, April 24, 2007

4. Projecto Multisectorial de Emergência e Reabilitação, Relatorio de Gestão do Projecto, May, 2013, by Project Management and Implemetation Unit.

5. Legal Documents related to the Project, Financing Agreement, Legal Opinion

6. Environmental Assessment, volumes I to IV, posted on Image Bank on March 4, 2008

7. Aide Mémoires: Implementation Supervision mission EMRP-2

8. Complete copies of ISRs 1 to 10.

9. IDA’s Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy: The Case of Angola, Report No. 39211, dated March 14, 2007

10. Decentralization and Local Governance Project – Final Report, July 2013 by UNDP- Angola

11. Final Project Report dated August 2013, “ Projecto Multisectorial de Emergência e Reabilitação - Fase 2 (PMER) (Crédito IDA N.º 43100 Ang – Fase 2) Agosto 2013

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