Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: the Impact of Illicit Wealth On
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Third World Quarterly, Vol 22, No 3, pp 311–325, 2001 Diamonds are a guerrilla’s best friend: the impact of illicit wealth on insurgency strategy ASSIS MALAQUIAS ABSTRACT Current internal wars in Africa are increasingly being driven by the desire to control important sources of revenue, not by revolutionary ideals of redressing real or perceived injustices. It is not accidental that some of the nastiest wars in Africa are being fought in countries richly endowed with natural resources. This paper deals with Angola, a potentially rich country ravaged by war since independence. It suggests that control of important diamond producing areas has given the rebel UNITA group a new lease of life after suffering serious setbacks at both the national and international levels. The paper also highlights the political and military miscalculations committed by the rebels and attributes them to the quick infusion of large sums of money into rebel coffers. Diamonds have become African guerrillas’ best friends, especially since the end of the Cold War. These precious stones are formed within the Earth’s crust at a depth of 100–200 kilometers. Within the mantle, as this region is called, immense pressures combined with temperatures of up to 1000 degrees Celsius force carbon atoms to bond together. It is the regularity and strength of these bonds that make diamonds ‘the hardest, and one of the least volatile, naturally occurring substances on Earth’. 1 These stones, brought to the Earth’s surface through volcanic activity, have captured human imagination since they were first discovered in an Indian stream in the 12th century BC. India became the major source of the world’s diamonds until 1725 when important deposits were discovered in Brazil. In 1866 major discoveries took place in South Africa at a time when Indian and Brazilian deposits were nearing exhaustion. During the twentieth century, important deposits were discovered in Australia, Russia and Angola. The unique properties of diamonds, including their hardness and resistance to chemical attack, serve important industrial purposes. For example, their grit is used ‘as an abrasive for grinding and polishing all the other softer stuff in the world, while diamond-tipped tools make mighty fine cutters and drills’. 2 Alas, diamonds’ current value does not arise solely from their abrasiveness. Their rarity and durability, as well as clever manipulation of supply and demand, have made diamonds ‘a girl’s best friend’, a universal token of love and a global Assis Malaquias is in the Department of Government, St Lawrence University, Canton, NY 13617, USA. E-mail: [email protected]. ISSN 0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/01/030311-15 q 2001 Third World Quarterly DOI: 10.1080/01436590120061624 311 ASSIS MALAQUIAS symbol of luxury. Consequently, diamonds have become one of the most valuable commodities in the world. In 1999 world production of rough diamonds reached 111058 000 carats, valued at US$7.2 billion, while the wholesale value of polished diamonds coming out of the cutting centres (notably India and Israel) was $13 billion. The retail market for diamonds in 1999 was close to $56 billion. 3 Unlike those of other commodities, diamond prices are not determined by the market on the basis of supply and demand. The industry is dominated by mining colossus De Beers. In 1999 this company was responsible for 66% of global diamond sales. Historically, the company has held 80% of the global diamond market. The secret of De Beers’ success has hinged both on its ability to create and sustain a worldwide demand for diamonds and on its capacity to create an artificial scarcity of this rather plentiful commodity. High demand for diamonds is achieved by clever marketing. De Beers’ successful strategy has also involved controlling the global supply of diamonds, mainly by scooping up worldwide production. Invariably, this has meant buying diamonds from shady characters, including guerrilla groups involved in Africa’s new internal wars. Unwittingly, therefore, diamonds have also become a guerrilla’s best friend, an important source of revenue for insurgent forces in several African countries like Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone. For example, in Angola, the rebel União Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola ( UNITA) raised $3.7 billion through diamond sales between 1992 and 1997. 4 Although the rebels have recently lost some of the most productive mines to government forces, they are still able to mine diamonds from deposits scattered around the country. In 1999 they earned $300 million from such operations. 5 Fortunately for the rebels, diamonds ‘exist over much of Angola’ and industry experts claim that this country’s reserves are ‘virtually limitless’. 6 Production has taken place mainly in the northeast, where diamonds were first discovered in 1912. Historically Angola has produced mostly high quality diamonds, 97% of which are classified as gem or near gem quality. Angola’s diamonds are ‘ranked among the top three countries in the world in terms of quality’. 7 By the time it achieved independence from Portugal on 11 November 1975, Angola was the world’s fourth-largest producer of diamonds in terms of value. Diamonds from the northeast, together with oil from the Cabinda enclave in the northwest, have been the main sources of foreign exchange for the Angolan government. It is this important source of foreign exchange that UNITA rebels have been able to control almost uninterruptedly since 1992 and from which they have been able to obtain between $400 million and $600 million dollars per year in income. For example, as recently as 1999 ‘artisanal production’ in Angola was estimated at 2000000 carats, worth $400 million. A significant portion of this production still comes from ‘deposits under the control of UNITA’.8 Such substantial revenues enable UNITA to remain a powerful military machine. Diamonds are also playing a key role in the insurgencies taking place in the neighbouring and mineral-rich DRC. There, former President Laurent Kabila allowed his military allies to help themselves to Congo’s vast diamond resources while different rebel groups also relied on the precious stones to finance their insurgencies. The promise of considerable diamond wealth for the eventual winner in this civil war—often referred to as ‘Africa’s first world war’— has 312 DIAMONDS ARE A GUERRILLA’S BEST FRIEND helped to lure several other countries into the conflict. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe have ensured the survival of the Kabila dynasty, 9 while Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda have sided with the rebels. Similarly, in Sierra Leone control of the country’s diamonds is an important factor in the continuing strife. Sierra Leone’s coloured gems are particularly sought after around the world thanks to their size and beauty. As in Angola and Congo, Sierra Leone’s diamonds are mostly alluvial, making them easy to mine with rudimentary tools. Therefore they can be easily captured by various warlords who use the revenues to finance intermittent attempts to topple the government. Sierra Leone rebels are partly inspired by the experience of neigh- bouring Liberia, where the current president, Charles Taylor, funded his insur- gency war between 1989 and 1997 by seizing control of the diamond areas in the northern part of the country. African insurgent movements’ control of revenue-generating diamond areas comes at a time when the acquisition of military means to support guerrilla wars has become considerably less complicated. In the post-cold war era diamond smuggling from rebel controlled areas takes place within a context of unprece- dented worldwide proliferation of light weapons. While during the Cold War the USA and the former USSR often supported their respective clients with massive quantities of weapons, such support—whether for governments or liberation movements—took place mostly through ‘official’ channels. In the post-cold war era many states and manufacturers are eager to empty their warehouses and arsenals of weapons that are no longer needed, either because of the momentous global political changes of the previous decade or simply because they have been made obsolete by technological innovation. Since Africa remains one of the few areas in the world still affected by various low-tech conflicts, it is an irresistible market for arms traders. The widespread availability of the ubiquitous AK-47 rifle in Africa attests to this reality. The relatively easy availability of both diamonds and weapons has created a particularly nightmarish situation in Angola. This paper analyses how Angola’s insurgent movement, UNITA, has used its considerable diamond revenues to evolve from a guerrilla group into a quasi-conventional army, with near cata- strophic consequences for the government. But the paper also suggests that the availability of such enormous amounts of money created premature over- confidence within UNITA, leading the rebels to commit major military and political errors. Specifically, control of diamond revenues led to an illusion of military and politico-administrative capacity. This illusion, in turn, caused serious strategic and tactical miscalculations: UNITA used its newly acquired wealth to transform itself too rapidly from a guerrilla group into a quasi-conventional army. Ultimately, UNITA’s decision to use the conventional tactics of warfare—including the deployment of large infantry and mechanised units as well as heavy artillery —to face government forces proved nearly fatal for the rebels. They were simply not ready to confront Angolan government forces in successive conventional battles. After all, since coming to power in 1975, the government had moulded its own former guerrilla army into a powerful fighting force with the help of Cuba and the former USSR. Although UNITA had important advantages—a plentiful supply of seasoned and committed troops and, since the late 1980s, access to 313 ASSIS MALAQUIAS important sources of revenue—the rebels underestimated the government’s military advantages, ie a monopoly in air and naval power as well as important leads in artillery and logistics.