DOCSLIB.ORG

UN Targeted Sanctions

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
UN Targeted Sanctions UN Targeted Sanctions Qualitative Database June 2014 1 Al-Qaida/Taliban Overview Status: Ongoing Duration: 15 October 1999 – present (14 years +) Objective: Counter-terrorism Sanction types: Individual (asset freeze, travel ban), Diplomatic (limit diplomatic representation), Sectoral (arms embargo, aviation ban), Commodity (heroin processing chemical ban) - Territorial delimitation during EP2 (areas of Afghanistan under Taliban control) Non-UN sanctions: Regional (EU), Unilateral (US, UK, other) Other policy instruments: Diplomacy, legal tribunals, threat of force, use of force, covert measures Background In August 1998, the US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya were bombed. Afghanistan under the Taliban was mentioned as a haven for terrorists in UNSCR 1193 in August 1998. In November of the same year, Usama bin Laden was indicted by the US for his involvement in the bombings. UNSCR 1214 (December 1998) included a long list of grievances against the Taliban in addition to its provision of sanctuary to terrorists. Episode 1 (15 October 1999 – 19 December 2000) Summary The UNSC imposed targeted sanctions on the Taliban regime (in control of Afghanistan at the time) for its refusal to turn over bin Laden for prosecution (UNSCR 1267). Purposes Coerce the Taliban to turn over bin Laden, constrain the Taliban from engaging in a variety of proscribed activities (particularly as haven for terrorism), and signal the Taliban for its violation of a large number of norms (on terrorism, the cultivation of drugs, the ongoing armed conflict, kidnapping of diplomatic personnel, and the treatment of women). Sanction type Aviation ban on aircraft owned, leased, or operated by the Taliban and asset freeze on the Taliban regime. Effectiveness Coercion (Ineffective) Policy outcome: 1/5, Taliban refused to extradite bin Laden. UN sanctions contribution: 2/5, UN sanctions were not the primary tool for coercion; international diplomacy and US unilateral sanctions appeared more significant at the time (US legal proceedings were focused on bin Laden, not the Taliban). Constraint (Ineffective) Policy outcome: 2/5, Restrictions on Ariana Airlines forced the Taliban to find new sources of supply (Viktor Bout). 2 UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, UN sanctions multi-lateralized US unilateral measures (affecting the Gulf and western China). Signaling (Mixed effectiveness) Policy outcome: 3/5, UNSCRs (1214 and 1267) clearly articulated violation of norm against terrorism under Chapter VII, but degree of stigmatization was limited (Taliban increased their proscribed activities and became increasingly intransigent). UN sanctions contribution: 5/5, The UNSCRs were the principal mechanism for communicating the international norm against terrorism, and Taliban was strongly stigmatized. Unintended consequences Increase in corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, rally round the flag effect, increase in human rights violations, strengthening of political factions, humanitarian consequences. Episode 2 (19 December 2000 – 11 September 2001) Summary Following the continued refusal of the Taliban to turn over Usama bin Laden for prosecution, its reluctance to engage in a broader peace process, and its threats to destroy part of Afghanistan’s cultural and historical heritage, the UNSC passed UNSCR 1333 in December 2000, eXpanding the sanctions against the Taliban and broadening them to bin Laden and Al-Qaida. Purposes Coerce the Taliban to turn over bin Laden and close terrorist training camps on its territory, constrain both the Taliban and Al-Qaida from engaging in proscribed activities (particularly terrorism), and signal both the Taliban and Al-Qaida about a growing number of norm violations. Sanction type Expansion of the existing aviation ban (from aircraft owned by the Taliban to landing anywhere in the territory controlled by them) and individual/entity asset freeze (to bin Laden and Al-Qaida as an organization). Newly imposed arms imports embargo on the Taliban (and areas of the country controlled by them), diplomatic sanctions on the Taliban (closure of Taliban offices in MS territory), and a ban on a substance used in the processing of heroin (acetic anhydride). Effectiveness Coercion (Ineffective) Policy outcome: 1/5, Taliban refused to eXtradite bin Laden and indeed became more closely aligned with him during this episode. UN sanctions contribution: 0/5, Additional sanctions pushed the Taliban closer to bin Laden. Constraint (Mixed effectiveness) Policy outcome: 3/5, Ariana Airlines was fully grounded during this episode, but the other sanctions appeared to inconvenience, rather than constrain, the targets. 3 UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, Sanctions appear critical to grounding of Ariana Airlines. Signaling (Mixed effectiveness) Policy outcome: 3/5, Clear articulation of violation of norm against terrorism and further isolation of the Taliban, but degree of stigmatization felt by the targets was limited. UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, EXpansion of sanctions against Taliban and extension to Al-Qaida was the principal mechanism for diffusing the international norm. However, Taliban behavior also contributed to its stigmatization internationally. Unintended consequences Increase in corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, rally round the flag effect, increase in human rights violations, strengthening of political factions, humanitarian consequences. Episode 3 (11 September 2001 – 17 June 2011) Summary Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the UNSC passed several important resolutions (all unanimous) significantly enhancing its efforts to counter terrorism. UNSCR 1368 broadly authorized military intervention (“take all necessary steps to respond”), 1373 established the global CT regime (with innovative new monitoring and enforcement measures), 1386 legitimized ISAF intervention, and 1390 added an indefinite travel ban and arms embargo on AQ. There was a significant increase in the number of individuals and entities designated during this period from 156 to more than 500 at one point during the episode, beginning with the first round of new designations made on 8 October 2001. Following litigation in a number of key implementing states over due process violations associated with the individual designation process, the UNSC passed a series of resolutions introducing procedural reforms and increasing the transparency of its operations. UNSCR 1617 (29 July 2005) spelled out explicit criteria for listing, UNSCR 1730 (December 2006) created a focal point mechanism within the Secretariat to receive petitions for de-listing, UNSCR 1822 (June 2008) mandated periodic reviews of all designations, and UNSCR 1904 (December 2009) created an Office of Ombudsperson to review petitions for de-listing. Each of these resolutions was adopted unanimously. This episode represented an attempt to focus the targeting of the regime and increase/maintain its legitimacy. There was also evidence of an emerging differentiation between Al-Qaida and the Taliban that picked up pace toward the end of the episode. Targeted assassination campaigns through drone attacks by the United States became more prominent in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (especially toward the end of the episode), considerably harming the senior leadership of Al-Qaida. In May 2011, Usama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan in an attack by US Special Forces. Purposes Constrain AQ from being able to commit additional acts of terrorism and signal AQ and the global community about the unacceptability of acts of terrorism. At the same time, 4 reassure domestic constituencies that something was being done about global terrorism, and address domestic human rights communities that adequate due process measures were in place. Sanction type Continuation of previously imposed asset freeze and arms imports embargo on Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida, Taliban, and associates. Diplomatic sanctions (closure of Taliban offices in MS territory) and ban on chemical used in heroin processing (acetic anhydride) eXpired in December 2001 and aviation ban was lifted in January 2002 (following Taliban overthrow in November 2011). Newly imposed travel ban on Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida, Taliban, and associates. Effectiveness Coercion (N/A) Policy outcome: N/A, Individuals and supporters became the principal focus of coercion, but in order to constrain AQ/T. Individuals designated became unable to access their funds in some countries, others were deterred from providing continuing support. UN sanctions contribution: N/A. Constraint (Effective) Policy outcome: 5/5, AQ had very limited access to formal sector financial institutions; had limited funds to transfer; complained of limits on funds; moved to decentralized, locally sourced financing; change of strategy of Al-Qaida, both in its sources of financing (toward crime and local sources) and in the location of many of its attacks (increasingly in the developing world); at the beginning of the episode, AQ was still directing and financing attacks (Bali 1); by the middle, there was no evidence of direct command and control or financing from AQ central (Bali 2, Madrid, London); there was evidence of disruption of plots due to financial intelligence; AQ central virtually disappeared as a command and control center during this episode. UN sanctions contribution: 3/5, Other factors, such as the NATO military intervention, clearly played a key role in the disruption of the organization and its change of strategy (at least at the outset);
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Save the Arms Embargo Peter Wallensteen 100 Hesburgh Center P.O
    policy brief No. 14, January 2008 Save the Arms Embargo Peter Wallensteen 100 Hesburgh Center P.O. Box 639 One of the first measures contemplated by the United Nations when confronting a new University of Notre Dame security crisis is to institute an arms embargo. Since the end of the Cold War – which Notre Dame, IN 46556-0639 liberated international action from the constraints of major power confrontation – there have been 27 such embargoes. In addition to these UN embargoes, there are also Phone: (574) 631-6970 unilateral measures: The United States imposes its own arms sanctions on some Fax: (574) 631-6973 countries (including Cuba), as does the European Union, sometimes directed at the E-mail: [email protected] same targets, notably Burma/Myanmar and Zimbabwe. Are they used at the right Web: http://kroc.nd.edu moment, and do they have the effects the UN would want? The list of failures is, indeed, long. The most striking is the arms embargo on Somalia, which has been in place since 1992 without any settlement in sight. Is it time to forget about this meas- ure? Or is it time to save the embargo? If it is time to save the embargo, as this brief contends, what lessons can be drawn about the optimal use of embargoes, and under what conditions can they work? Gerard F. Powers The appeal of the arms embargo to the sender is obvious: It means that “we, the Director of Policy Studies initiators,” are not supplying means of warfare and repression to regimes we think should not have them.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Press Statement on the Central African Republic
    Code: SC/PR 1/1 Committee: Security Council Topic: The crisis in the Central African Republic Security Council Press Statement on the Central African Republic The members of the Security Council support the results of the presidential elections of 27th December 2020 in the Central African Republic and the officially elected president. They express their concern over the deteriorating military and political situation and the threat of government overthrow. Further, they confirm the importance of restoring state power throughout the entire territory of the country. The members of the Security Council express their deepest concern about the new outbreak of the Ebola disease in the Central African Republic. They urge the international community to provide vaccines and medical equipment to the people of CAR to combat the disease. The Security Council strongly opposes the violence and crimes committed by certain rebellious groups with the support of former President François Bozizé trying to undermine the electoral process, and condemns the violations of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, signed by the Government of the Central African Republic and armed groups in Bangui on 6th February 2019. The Security Council urges all signatory parties to fully honour their commitments and join the path of dialogue and peace. The Security Council recalls that individuals or entities who are threatening the stabilization of the country may be targeted under a Security Council sanctions regime. Violence fueled by disinformation campaigns is also strongly condemned. The Security Council stresses the urgent need to end impunity in the CAR and to let justice prevail over perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and of violations and abuses of human rights.
    [Show full text]
  • Trafficking in Transnistria: the Role of Russia
    Trafficking in Transnistria: The Role of Russia by Kent Harrel SIS Honors Capstone Supervised by Professors Linda Lubrano and Elizabeth Anderson Submitted to the School of International Service American University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with General University Honors Bachelor of Arts Degree May 2009 Abstract After declaring de facto independence from the Republic of Moldova in 1992, the breakaway region of Transnistria became increasingly isolated, and has emerged as a hotspot for weapons and human trafficking. Working from a Realist paradigm, this project assesses the extent to which the Russian government and military abet trafficking in Transnistria, and the way in which Russia uses trafficking as a means to adversely affect Moldova’s designs of broader integration within European spheres. This project proves necessary because the existing scholarship on the topic of Transnistrian trafficking failed to focus on the role of the Russian government and military, and in turn did not account for the ways in which trafficking hinders Moldova’s national interests. The research project utilizes sources such as trafficking policy centers, first-hand accounts, trade agreements, non-governmental organizations, and government documents. A review of the literature employs the use of secondary sources such as scholarly and newspaper articles. In short, this project develops a more comprehensive understanding of Russia’s role in Moldovan affairs and attempts to add a significant work to the existing literature.
    [Show full text]
  • Arms Embargoes Chapter
    Sanctions Sans Commitment: An Assessment of UN Arms Embargoes By David Cortright, George A. Lopez, with Linda Gerber An impeccable logic makes arms embargoes a potentially powerful instrument in the array of United Nations (UN) peace- and security-building mechanisms. By denying aggressors and human rights abusers the implements of war and repression, arms embargoes contribute directly to preventing and reducing the level of armed conflict.1 There could hardly be a more appropriate tool for international peacemaking. Moreover, in constricting only selected weapons and military-related goods and services, and in denying these to ruling elites, their armies, and other violent combatants, arms embargoes constitute the quintessential example of a smart sanction. Not only do arms embargoes avoid doing harm to vulnerable and innocent civilian populations; the better the embargoes’ enforcement, the more innocent lives are likely to be saved. This powerful logic may explain why arms embargoes are the most frequently employed form of economic sanction. Since 1990, the UN Security Council has imposed mandatory arms embargoes in twelve of its fourteen sanctions cases. See the table “Selected Cases of Arms Embargoes, 1990-2001” for a complete listing of Security Council arms embargoes in the past decade. Only in the cases of Cambodia and Sudan did the Security Council choose not to apply a restriction on arms imports. In most cases arms embargoes were part of a broader package of sanctions measures. In some cases (Angola, Rwanda since 1995, and Sierra Leone since 1998) arms embargoes have been targeted against rebel movements fighting against an established government. In all other cases arms embargoes were applied against governments deemed to be violating human rights and posing a threat to international peace.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States Arms Embargo Against South Africa: an Analysis of the Laws, Regulations, and Loopholes
    Comment The United States Arms Embargo Against South Africa: An Analysis of the Laws, Regulations, and Loopholes Raymond Paretzkyt Introduction With reports of violence and unrest in the Republic of South Africa a daily feature in American newspapers, public attention in the United States has increasingly focused on a variety of American efforts to bring an end to apartheid.. Little discussed in the ongoing debate over imposi- tion of new measures is the sanction that the United States has main- tained for the past twenty-three years: the South African arms embargo. How effective has this sanction been in denying South Africa access to items with military utility? Are there ways to strengthen the arms em- bargo so that it achieves greater success? An evaluation of the embargo is complicated by the fact that there is no one place in which the laws implementing it can be found. Rather, the relevant regulations have been incorporated into the existing, com- plex scheme of U.S. trade law. This article offers a complete account of the laws and regulations implementing the embargo, analyzes the defects in the regulatory scheme, and recommends ways to strengthen the em- bargo. The first part outlines the background of the imposition of the embargo, while the next three parts examine the regulations that govern American exports to South Africa and explore the loopholes in these reg- ulations that hinder their effectiveness. Part II discusses items on the t J.D. Candidate, Yale University. 1. Congress recently imposed various sanctions on South Africa. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub.
    [Show full text]
  • The U.S. Arms Embargo of 1975–78 and Its Effects on The
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2014-09 þÿThe U.S. arms embargo of 1975ÿ–1978 and its effects on the development of the Turkish defense industry Durmaz, Mahmut Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43905 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE U.S. ARMS EMBARGO OF 1975–1978 AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY by Mahmut Durmaz September 2014 Thesis Advisor: Robert E. Looney Second Reader: Victoria Clement Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED September 2014 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS THE U.S. ARMS EMBARGO OF 1975–1978 AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 6.
    [Show full text]
  • EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
    EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments This list is subject to the legal notice at http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm European Union Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force (Regulations based on Article 215 TFEU and Decisions adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy) This list has been updated on 7.7.2016 Related links: (previous update: 20.4.2016) Sanctions Overview Financial sanctions: Electronic consolidated list EU restrictive measures in force (updated 7.7.2016) 1/114 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments This list is subject to the legal notice at http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm Introduction Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides a legal basis for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of the Union’s economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, where such restrictive measures are necessary to achieve the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This list presents the European Union's restrictive measures in force on the date mentioned on the cover page. It comprises: the legislative measures based on Article 215 TFEU and those based on the relevant provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community (in the years prior to 1 December 2009: Articles 60 and 301) and the relevant CFSP Decisions and (prior to 1 December 2009) Common Positions, including those which merely provide for measures for which no specific Regulation was made, such as restrictions on admission. In Union law Regulations are directly applicable in all EU Member States.
    [Show full text]
  • Bout, Viktor Et Al. S1 Indictment
    United States Attorney Southern District of New York FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FEBRUARY 17, 2010 YUSILL SCRIBNER, REBEKAH CARMICHAEL, JANICE OH PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (212) 637-2600 DEA PAUL KNIERIM OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (202) 307-8244 U.S. ANNOUNCES NEW INDICTMENT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ARMS DEALER VIKTOR BOUT AND AMERICAN CO-CONSPIRATOR FOR MONEY LAUNDERING, WIRE FRAUD, AND CONSPIRACY PREET BHARARA, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and MICHELE M. LEONHART, the Acting Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), announced today the unsealing of an Indictment against international arms dealer VIKTOR BOUT, a/k/a "Boris," a/k/a "Victor Anatoliyevich Bout," a/k/a "Victor But," a/k/a "Viktor Budd," a/k/a "Viktor Butt," a/k/a "Viktor Bulakin," a/k/a "Vadim Markovich Aminov," and his associate RICHARD AMMAR CHICHAKLI, a/k/a "Robert Cunning," a/k/a "Raman Cedorov," for allegedly conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") stemming from their efforts to purchase two aircraft from companies located in the United States, in violation of economic sanctions which prohibited such financial transactions. The Indictment unsealed today also charges BOUT and CHICHAKLI with money laundering conspiracy, wire fraud conspiracy, and six separate counts of wire fraud, in connection with these financial transactions. BOUT has been in custody in Thailand since March 6, 2008. Since BOUT's arrest, the United States has been actively pursuing his extradition from Thailand on a separate set of U.S. charges. Those charges allege that BOUT conspired to sell millions of dollars worth of weapons to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the "FARC") -- a designated foreign terrorist organization based in Colombia -- to be used to kill Americans in Colombia.
    [Show full text]
  • The EU Arms Embargo on China: a Swedish Perspective
    The EU Arms Embargo on China: a Swedish Perspective JERKER HELLstrÖM FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden’s largest research institute. FOI gives its customers access to leading-edge expertise in a large number of fields such as security policy studies, defence and security related analyses, the assessment of various types of threat, systems for control and management of crises, protection against and management of hazardous substances, IT security and the potential offered by new sensors. FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency Phone: +46 8 555 030 00 www.foi.se FOI-R--2946--SE User report Defence Analysis Defence Analysis Fax: +46 8 555 031 00 ISSN 1650-1942 January 2010 SE-164 90 Stockholm Jerker Hellström The EU Arms Embargo on China: a Swedish Perspective Cover illustration: Dagens Nyheter 5, 6 June 1989, the Times 28 June 1989 FOI-R--2946--SE Title The EU Arms Embargo on China: a Swedish Perspective Report no FOI-R--2946--SE Report Type User report Month January Year 2010 Pages 60 ISSN ISSN 1650-1942 Customer Swedish Ministry of Defence Project no A12004 Approved by Maria Lignell Jakobsson FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys Department of Defence Analysis 164 90 Stockholm SE-164 90 Stockholm Summary This report highlights the background of the EU arms embargo on China; how the issues of the design and the possible lifting of the embargo have been handled in Brussels; and in what respect political interpretations and economic interests have influenced exports of military equipment to China from EU member states.
    [Show full text]
  • Targeting Spoilers the Role of United Nations Panels of Experts
    Targeting Spoilers The Role of United Nations Panels of Experts Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt Report from the Project on Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings Future of Peace Operations January 2009 Stimson Center Report No. 64 2 | Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt Copyright © 2009 The Henry L. Stimson Center Report Number 64 Cover photo: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) peacekeepers conduct arms embargo inspections on government forces in western Côte d'Ivoire. Cover design by Shawn Woodley All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from the Henry L. Stimson Center. The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19 th Street, NW 12 th Floor Washington, DC 20036 telephone: 202.223.5956 fax: 202.238.9604 www.stimson.org Targeting Spoilers: The Role of United Nations Panels of Experts | 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................................4 Preface ..............................................................................................................................................5 List of Acronyms ..............................................................................................................................8 List of Figures, Tables, and Sidebars ..............................................................................................10 Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................11
    [Show full text]
  • THE ASSETS FREEZE LIST Last Updated on 23 December 2013
    THE ASSETS FREEZE LIST Last updated on 23 December 2013 LAST FIRST ALIAS DATE OF PASSPORT DESIGNATION/ NAME NAME BIRTH/ /IDENTIFYING JUSTIFICATION PLACE INFORMATION OF BIRTH BOUT Viktor BUTT, 13 JAN 21N0532664 Businessman, dealer and Anatolje BONT, 1967 29N0006765 transporter of weapons and vitch minerals. Arms dealer in BUTTE, (13 JAN 21N0557148 1970) contravention of UNSC BOUTOV, 44N3570350 resolution 1343. Supported SERGITOV former President Taylor’s Vitali Currently in regime in effort to federal custody in destabilize Sierra Leone the United States and gain illicit access to of America diamonds. pending trial. CHICHAK Richard Ammar M. 29 March SSN: 405 41 5342 A Syrian-born US citizen LI Ammar Chichakli 1959 or 467 79 1065 who has been an employee/ associate of Viktor Bout for POB: Syria Address: 225 about a decade. The UN Syracuse Place, identified Chichakli as Citizenship Richardson, Texas Viktor Bout’s Chief : US 75081, USA Financial Manager and, therefore, as one who acts 811 South Central at Bout’s direction. His Expressway own resume details his senior positions with several Bout-controlled Suite 210 Richardson, Texas companies. A certified 75080, USA public accountant and certified fraud examiner with more than 12 years of experience, plays a significant role in assisting 51 Churchill Ave. Jehad 10 July Bout in setting up and Reservoir VIC ALMUSTAFA 1967 managing a number of his 3073 key firms and moving Australia Jehad Deirazzor, money (both for acquisition ALMUSARA Syria of assets and reparation of Syrian passport # profits). In media Jhad 002680351 (issued interviews, reportedly has ALMUSTASA 25 April 2007, held himself out as expires 24 April spokesperson for Viktor 2013) Bout and his network.
    [Show full text]
  • Bout Indictment
    United States Attorney Southern District of New York FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE May 6, 2008 YUSILL SCRIBNER, REBEKAH CARMICHAEL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (212) 637-2600 DEA GARRISON COURTNEY OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (202) 307-7977 U.S. ANNOUNCES INDICTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARMS DEALER FOR CONSPIRACY TO KILL AMERICANS AND RELATED TERRORISM CHARGES MICHAEL J. GARCIA, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and MICHELE M. LEONHART, the Acting Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), announced today the unsealing of an Indictment against international arms dealer VIKTOR BOUT, a/k/a "Boris," a/k/a "Victor Anatoliyevich Bout," a/k/a "Victor But," a/k/a "Viktor Budd," a/k/a "Viktor Butt," a/k/a "Viktor Bulakin," a/k/a "Vadim Markovich Aminov," for, among other things, conspiring to sell millions of dollars worth of weapons to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the "FARC") -- a designated foreign terrorist organization based in Colombia -- to be used to kill Americans in Colombia. BOUT was arrested by Thai authorities on a provisional arrest warrant on April 9, 2008, based on a complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, charging conspiracy to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. BOUT has been in custody in Thailand since March 6, 2008. According to the Indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court: BOUT, an international weapons trafficker since the 1990s, has carried out his weapons-trafficking business by assembling a fleet of cargo airplanes capable of transporting weapons and military equipment to various parts of the world, including Africa, South America and the Middle East.
    [Show full text]