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EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments This list is subject to the legal notice at http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm European Union Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force (Regulations based on Article 215 TFEU and Decisions adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy) This list has been updated on 7.7.2016 Related links: (previous update: 20.4.2016) Sanctions Overview Financial sanctions: Electronic consolidated list EU restrictive measures in force (updated 7.7.2016) 1/114 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments This list is subject to the legal notice at http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm Introduction Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides a legal basis for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of the Union’s economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, where such restrictive measures are necessary to achieve the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This list presents the European Union's restrictive measures in force on the date mentioned on the cover page. It comprises: the legislative measures based on Article 215 TFEU and those based on the relevant provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community (in the years prior to 1 December 2009: Articles 60 and 301) and the relevant CFSP Decisions and (prior to 1 December 2009) Common Positions, including those which merely provide for measures for which no specific Regulation was made, such as restrictions on admission. In Union law Regulations are directly applicable in all EU Member States. They have general application and are binding in their entirety. EU Regulations take precedence over conflicting measures of a Member State. With a few exceptions, this list does not include: measures decided in the framework of European Political Cooperation (prior to November 1993), restrictions not enacted by a CFSP Decision, a CFSP Common Position or an EU Regulation based on the Articles of the Treaties referred to above, EU decisions on suspension or termination of bilateral agreements concluded by the EU and EU decisions on suspension or termination of cooperation between the EU and a third country. This list does not include the legislative or other measures that an EU Member State might take in response to CFSP Decisions and UN Security Council Resolutions. The CFSP Decisions and EU Regulations in this list are presented in English. They are published in the Official Journal of the EU in all official languages of the EU except Irish and all published versions are authentic. For CFSP Decisions and EU Regulations published after the date mentioned on the cover page, please consult the Official Journal of the EU. Links to the Official Journal of the EU: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/direct-access.html http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html (search form) EU restrictive measures in force (updated 7.7.2016) 2/114 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments This list is subject to the legal notice at http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm EU restrictive measures in force Table of contents AFGHANISTAN AL QAEDA and ISIL (DA'ESH) BELARUS BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BURMA BURUNDI CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CHINA DEMOCRACTIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO COTE D’IVOIRE EGYPT ERITREA REPUBLIC OF GUINEA (CONAKRY) GUINEA-BISSAU HAITI IRAN IRAQ IVORY COAST DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA LEBANON LIBERIA EU restrictive measures in force (updated 7.7.2016) 3/114 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments This list is subject to the legal notice at http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm LIBYA MOLDOVA MYANMAR NORTH KOREA RUSSIAN FEDERATION SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN SUDAN SYRIA TERRORIST GROUPS (FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS) TUNISIA UKRAINE USA (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) YEMEN YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) ZIMBABWE ___________ If you have a comment on this list of restrictive measures in force or a question about it, please contact the European Commission by sending an e-mail entitled 'restrictive measures in force' to the following address: [email protected] EU restrictive measures in force (updated 7.7.2016) 4/114 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments This list is subject to the legal notice at http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm EU restrictive measures in force Afghanistan Council Decision 2011/486/CFSP (OJ L 199, 2.8.2011, p. 57) Notice to listed natural persons (OJ C 227, 2.8.2011, p. 1) measures against the Taliban: - embargo on arms and related materiel - ban on provision of certain services - freezing of funds and economic resources - restrictions on admission implemented by: Council Implementing Decision 2012/167/CFSP (OJ L 87, 24.3.2012, p. 60) Notice to listed natural persons (OJ C 88, 24.3.2012, p. 7) - list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision 2012/334/CFSP (OJ L 165, 26.6.2012, p. 75) Corrigendum (OJ L 296, 7.11.2013, p. 56) Notice to listed natural persons (OJ C 186, 26.6.2012, p. 3) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision 2012/393/CFSP (OJ L 187, 17.7.2012, p. 52) Notice to listed natural and legal persons, entities or bodies (OJ C 210, 17.7.2012, p. 7) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision 2012/454/CFSP (OJ L 206, 2.8.2012, p. 11) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision 2012/745/CFSP (OJ L 332, 4.12.2012, p. 22) Notice to listed persons, entities and groups (OJ C 374, 4.12.2012, p. 9) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision 2012/809/CFSP (OJ L 352, 21.12.2012, p. 47) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision 2013/73/CFSP (OJ L 32, 1.2.2013, p. 21) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision 2013/145/CFSP (OJ L 82, 22.3.2013, p. 55) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups EU restrictive measures in force (updated 7.7.2016) 5/114 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments This list is subject to the legal notice at http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm Afghanistan - Decision 2011/486/CFSP Council Implementing Decision 2013/219/CFSP (OJ L 133, 17.5.2013, p. 22) Notice to listed persons, entities and groups (OJ C 138, 17.5.2013, p. 16) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision 2014/140/CFSP (OJ L 76, 15.3.2014, p. 42) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision 2014/142/CFSP (OJ L 76, 15.3.2014, p. 46) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision 2014/701/CFSP (OJ L 293, 9.10.2014, p. 37) Notice to listed persons, entities and groups (OJ C 356, 9.10.2014, p. 2) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2015/1332 (OJ L 206, 1.8.2015, p. 31) Notice to listed persons, entities and groups (OJ C 253, 1.8.2015, p. 1) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2015/2054 (OJ L 300, 17.11.2015, p. 29) Notice to the listed natural person (OJ C 382, 17.11.2015, p. 2) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Regulation (EU) No 753/2011 (OJ L 199, 2.8.2011, p. 1) Notice to listed natural persons (OJ C 227, 2.8.2011, p. 1) - freezing of funds and economic resources of natural or legal persons, entities and groups that are part of or associated with the Taliban - ban on provision of certain services to natural or legal persons, entities and groups that are part of or associated with the Taliban amended or implemented by: Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 263/2012 (OJ L 87, 24.3.2012, p. 1) Notice to listed natural persons (OJ C 88, 24.3.2012, p. 7) - list of persons, entities and groups EU restrictive measures in force (updated 7.7.2016) 6/114 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Service for Foreign Policy Instruments This list is subject to the legal notice at http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/legal_notices_en.htm Afghanistan - Regulation (EU) No 753/2011 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2012 (OJ L 165, 26.6.2012, p. 15) Corrigendum (OJ L 296, 7.11.2013, p. 56) Notice to listed natural persons (OJ C 186, 26.6.2012, p. 3) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 643/2012 (OJ L 187, 17.7.2012, p. 13) Notice to listed natural and legal persons, entities or bodies (OJ C 210, 17.7.2012, p. 7) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 705/2012 (OJ L 206, 2.8.2012, p. 5) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1139/2012 (OJ L 332, 4.12.2012, p. 1) Notice to listed persons, entities and groups (OJ C 374, 4.12.2012, p. 9) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1244/2012 (OJ L 352, 21.12.2012, p. 13) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 86/2013 (OJ L 32, 1.2.2013, p. 5) - amendment of the list of persons, entities and groups Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 261/2013 (OJ L 82, 22.3.2012, p.
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