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Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council

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Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council United Nations S/2013/99* Security Council Distr.: General 9 March 2013 Original: English Note by the President of the Security Council In paragraph 10 (d) of resolution 2040 (2012), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) to provide a final report to the Council with its findings and recommendations. Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report dated 15 February 2013 received from the Panel of Experts (see annex). * Reissued for technical reasons on 12 April 2013. 13-25443* (E) 160413 *1325443* S/2013/99 Annex Letter dated 15 February 2013 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council On behalf of the members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Panel prepared in accordance with paragraph 10 (d) of resolution 2040 (2012). (Signed) Salim Raad Coordinator Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) (Signed) Simon Dilloway Expert (Signed) Theodore Murphy Expert (Signed) Giovanna Perri Expert (Signed) Savannah de Tessières Expert 2 13-25443 S/2013/99 Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya Contents Page Summary ..................................................................... 5 I. Background ................................................................... 7 A. Mandate and appointment ................................................... 8 B. Methodology .............................................................. 8 C. Cooperation with stakeholders and organizations ................................ 9 D. Political and security context ................................................. 10 II. Implementation of the arms embargo .............................................. 12 A. Challenges to countering weapons proliferation.................................. 12 B. Security and disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities ..................... 13 C. Transfers of military materiel to Libya during the revolution in support of the parties to the conflict.............................................................. 15 D. Transfers of materiel leaving Libya............................................ 24 III. Travel ban .................................................................... 39 IV. Implementation of the asset freeze................................................. 40 A. General overview .......................................................... 40 B. Monitoring the asset freeze .................................................. 41 C. Listed entities ............................................................. 43 D. Listed individuals .......................................................... 48 E. Investigations in progress.................................................... 49 F. Findings .................................................................. 53 V. Recommendations .............................................................. 56 A. Arms embargo ............................................................. 56 B. Travel ban ................................................................ 56 C. Assets freeze .............................................................. 57 Annexes I. Countries visited by the Panel during the mandate.................................... 58 II. List of institutions and individuals consulted ........................................ 59 III. Panel official outgoing correspondence log ......................................... 61 IV. Level of responsiveness to requests for information from the Panel...................... 65 13-25443 3 S/2013/99 V. Rebuttal from the State of Qatar................................................... 67 VI. Export licence delivered by the Albanian authorities .................................. 69 VII. Delivery verification certificate from the United Arab Emirates......................... 71 VIII. End-user certificate Ukraine-United Arab Emirates ................................... 72 IX. Ayk Avia flight plans............................................................ 73 X. Arms and ammunition from Libya confiscated by the Tunisian authorities in 2011 and 2012... 74 XI. Cases of violations of the arms embargo reported to the Panel by the Algerian authorities 75 between April 2011 and March 2012 ............................................... XII. Letfallah II registry certificate .................................................... 76 XIII. Arms and ammunition seized on board the Letfallah II ................................ 77 XIV. Pictures of different types of materiel seized on board the Letfallah II ................... 78 XV. Guidance on the notification of exemptions to the asset freeze measures ................. 84 XVI. Council of Minister’s Decision No. 34 of 2012, predicated on Law No. 87 of 1971......... 88 XVII. Saadi Qadhafi financial association chart ........................................... 92 XVIII. False Malian identification and passport of Abdullah Al-Senussi ........................ 93 4 13-25443 S/2013/99 Summary The final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), and extended pursuant to resolution 2040 (2012), presents an analysis of the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1970 (2011), including the arms embargo and asset freeze, and the modifications contained in subsequent resolutions — 1973 (2011), 2009 (2011), 2016 (2011) and 2040 (2012), respectively — for the period since its appointment on 18 April 2012 until the date of the present report. The report also outlines the Panel’s findings and presents eight recommendations to the Security Council, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, the Government of Libya and other Member States to improve the implementation of the relevant measures. The Panel also seeks to highlight instances of non-compliance based on substantiated data and information obtained. The Panel’s assessment is based on information received from Member States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties during the period under review. The Panel also conducted several assessment trips to Libya and the subregion during the period, where it met key stakeholders, including the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. The Panel visited 15 countries and travelled to Libya 10 times. The consultations held with individuals, regional organizations and relevant United Nations bodies, coupled with the information received from various Member States, afforded the Panel the opportunity to obtain extensive information in pursuance of its mandate, including on the evolution of the political and security context in Libya and its impact on the subregion. Implementation of the arms embargo Some notable efforts notwithstanding, most of the challenges to the implementation and enforcement of the arms embargo highlighted in the Panel’s previous report persist today. Most Libyan stockpiles remain under the control of non-State actors, while the State security sector, in particular with regard to border control management, continues to be rebuilt. In the past 12 months, the proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially, the Horn of Africa. Cases of illicit transfers from Libya, both proven and under investigation, include trafficking by land and sea to more than 12 countries. Illicit flows from the country are fuelling existing conflicts and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-State actors in the region and beyond. In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 2009 (2011), a number of Member States have notified the Committee of transfers of military materiel and other security- related support to the Libyan authorities for security assistance. The Panel is, however, concerned by the absence of any official procurement mechanism within Libya and by the transfers of lethal materiel to end users whose identities remain unclear. The Panel has continued to investigate cases of transfers of arms and ammunition to Libya during the uprising and has secured additional evidence of violations of the embargo during that period. The Panel is also investigating cases of materiel that entered Libya in breach of the embargo more recently. 13-25443 5 S/2013/99 Implementation of the asset freeze In accordance with the provisions of resolution 2040 (2012), while maintaining the asset freeze imposed by resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), as modified by resolution 2009 (2011), the Security Council directed the Committee, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, to review continuously the remaining asset freeze measures imposed by those resolutions with regard to the Libyan Investment Authority and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio and to delist those entities as soon as practical to ensure that their assets were made available to and for the benefit of the people of Libya. The focus of the Panel’s efforts regarding the asset freeze measures has been directed towards the hidden assets of the Libyan Investment Authority, the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio and the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company and towards the assets of the listed individuals, most of which are believed to be held abroad in various names. A single body
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