Clio | 1 2 | Clio

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chief Editor Caverlee Dahill Assistant Editors Kate Brady Gabriella Zavala Cover Art Zidan Zhu

Introduction...... 3 Dr. David Morgan

Magic in the Pacific: Human vs Signals Intelligence...... 5 Charlotte Canterbury

Nixon vs the Intelligence Community: The Huston Plan...... 8 Nicholas Villela

Economics vs Ideology: American Policy Towards Allende’s Chile...... 12 Gabriella Zavala

The CIA Manhunt for Che Guevara...... 16 Marcus Vondrak

The Cryptographic Trojan Horse: Operation Condor...... 19 Henry Moyes

High Stakes Poker: The Chinese-American Rapprochement...... 22 Jennifer Fang

Powerless Superpower:The Iranian Hostage Crisis...... 26 Mason Smith

The Moral Education of William Colby: Confronting the Phoenix Program...... 29 Abigail Barber

Over the Moon: America’s Cold War in Space...... 33 Jacob Tybor Clio | 3

INTRODUCTION I’m very proud to introduce this first volume of Clio, The History Journal of St. Michael’s Catholic Academy, a collection of student papers based on primary research written for the Advanced Placement American History course, selected, edited and compiled by student editors led by Ms. Caverlee Dahill. The selection process was based on the quality of “Over the Moon” on exorbitantly priced Moon bases, research and writing, as well as a consideration of the to the efficiently prosaic, such as Henry Moyes’s paper general interest invoked by their subjects. Almost all “The Cryptographic Trojan Horse” on the creation of of the research was based on the electronic records of a front organization to sell cryptographic equipment the National Security Archive of George Washington to third world countries that would—unknowingly to University, which has been conducting an ongoing their buyers—relay their secrets directly to the CIA. process of receiving, cataloging, digitizing and Many of the papers contain new insights both small and reviewing materials declassified under the Freedom large into the thinking and motivation of many of the of Information Act. Therefore, these papers represent Cold War’s leading actors. One of the most fascinating original research by their student authors based on revelations regarding Chinese thinking about the newly released sources, some of which have not yet been new relationship with America is provided in Jennifer synthesized and published by professional historians. Fang’s “High Stakes Poker: The Sino-American Most of the papers in this collection deal with foreign Rapprochement,” based on Chinese documents. One and domestic security and intelligence issues from of China’s leading military leaders compared the the Second World War to the 1980s. Many of them, negotiations with the United States favorably to the because they represent the most recent releases, concern “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”, the agreement between the presidency of Richard Nixon, 1969-1974. In many Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s Nazi Germany that ways they shed an interesting light on the inconsistent partitioned Poland and led to the beginning of World evolution of Nixon’s relationship to the Cold War War II in Europe. This is a particularly surprising struggle with the Soviet Union and the People’s historical comparison, since two years later Hitler Republic of China, from hunting down real and would betray the treaty, attack the Soviet Union and imagined Communist dissidents beginning with Joseph kill over 20 million of its citizens; begging the question McCarthy and ending with his demands for invigilation why not instead reference the Grand Alliance between of the Anti-war movement, to the initiation of the Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin that led to the victory era of détente with the U.S.S.R. and the diplomatic over Nazi Germany in World War II? Could it be that recognition of Communist China. They span the whole to satisfy Chinese Communist ideology Richard Nixon gamut, from the surrealistic, with Jacob Tybor’s paper needed to be compared to Adolf Hitler? Another 4 | Clio remarkable insight in the ideological fluctuations of the Program”, an infamous campaign of political murder Cold War is provided by Gabriella Zavala’s “Economics carried out by the agency during the Vietnam War. or Ideology: American Policy toward Allende’s Chile,” which reveals that the economic recession of the All of these papers represent a tremendous amount of 1970’s played as much a role in the foreign policy of effort by their authors and a similar amount of effort both the United States and the Soviet Union as their by the editors. It is a testament to the quality and competing ideologies. Finally, one of the most moving dedication of these students fostered by the academic contributions is Abigail Barber’s “The Moral Education environment at St. Michael’s Catholic Academy. of William Colby”, which documents the attempt of this career CIA officer, who later became the chief of the agency, to come to terms with the “Phoenix David Morgan Clio | 5

MAGIC IN THE PACIFIC: HUMANS VS SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE Charlotte Canterbury In the 1930’s, the United States Navy Intelligence infiltrated the Japanese Magic system, the United acquired enough information about Japan’s Magic Box to States would both lose a major advantage and have begin decoding Japanese secret messages. The cryptonym an added target on its back. To keep this knowledge for this operation became known as “Operation clandestine, the United States did not even tell their Magic”, nicknamed for the U.S.’s attempt to break into own allies. Intelligence did not want to risk revealing any Japanese Central Intelligence during World War II. The information that could somehow be used against them Magic Box looked and acted essentially like a complex if they lost allies. The United States was careful with typewriter. This apparent typewriter was programmed how this information was used; by figuring out when to automatically translate messages in Japanese into a and where Japan was planning to attack, the U.S. now secret code decipherable only by Japanese intelligence. knew Japan’s exact plan down to their precise formations Extensive codebooks were created by the Japanese and charted routes (“Magic” Diplomatic Summary Government to teach officials how to decode the 1204). They would simply inform their allies that Japan messages. Before the start of World War II, the United was planning an attack on them, without revealing any States Navy began to spy on the Japanese government specifics. The Allied Powers, however, were suspicious and collect information on how the system worked. The of how the United States had acquired this information. United States Army Signals Intelligence Section and the The U.S. would lie and say that spies had discovered that Navy Communication Special Unit worked diligently to Japan was planning an attack, keeping the codebook decrypt the messages and decipher precisely what Japan’s operation a secret. (“Magic” Diplomatic Summary war plans were (“Magic” Diplomatic Summary 1204). 1204). Intelligence could not risk telling the truth about This was not the first time the United States had how they had gotten this information in case one of their gotten hold of a Japanese codebook. Before Operation allies was conquered by the Axis or turned into an axis Magic, in 1923, a United States Naval officer stole a copy partner. Also, as to not make Japan suspicious about why of the Japanese “Imperial Navy Secret Operating Code,” all their attacks had failed, the US would occasionally not which was used in World War I. (“Magic” Diplomatic act on the information deciphered from the codebook Summary 1210). The information extracted from the and knowingly accept defeat. If every single one of Japan’s codebook provided details of planned attacks. The attacks failed, they would have suspected that there was a acquisition of the Japanese Magic System gave the United flaw in the system that was disclosing information, or that States unique insight into Japan from the beginning of an Allied power had cracked their code system. World War II through the end of the war. This enabled Japan spent years developing this allegedly the US to be cognizant of Japan’s every move and lead to “uncrackable” coding system. They had their most an Allied victory. capable central intelligence team working to create an The United States kept Operation Magic top secret. encryption system that would supposedly be impossible If any of the Axis Powers discovered that the US had to ever break. After a great deal of hard work developing 6 | Clio this system, they believed it was the most secure hand, but found they could not. Then, the codebreakers encryption system to ever be made. Magic was how Japan realized that it was not a manual additive or substitution communicated with their allies (the axis powers) to plan code like RED and BLUE, but a machine-generated war strategies. They planned attacks on Europe and the code similar to Germany’s Enigma cipher. The decoding U.S. using Magic to come up with formations, surprise process was slow and much of the traffic was still hard to attacks, and the specifics of their planned attacks. What break. By the time the traffic was decoded and translated, Japan never knew was that the US had naval and army the contents were often out of date (“Magic” Diplomatic spies in Japan getting information and breaking into the Summary 1205). Japanese systems. (Consultant “Armed Forces Security PURPLE was the code Japan used when planning Agency”). The US had sent their most intricately trained Pearl Harbor. The United States codebreakers worked spies to get information about the exact workings of day and night to decrypt each message, but the task was Magic and how to decrypt the messages. U.S. spies near impossible. Japan had made the codes too complex would steal paper copies of these messages, as well as the to decrypt by hand, and even they had to use a slow codebooks, and send them back to the United States to decoding machine to read them. By the time the U.S. be decrypted (“Japanese Peace Offer”).There was an elite finally finished decrypting the messages about Pearl group of American geniuses working in Japan to steal the Harbor, it was too late and Japan had already attacked messages, as well as back in America to decrypt them. The (Consultant “Armed Forces Security Agency”). The United States was able to decrypt the messages at a steady messages were not in the hands of American agents by enough rate to learn about the Japanese plans right before the time the attack was over. No matter how fast and how they happened, effectively keeping up with the Japanese. hard the U.S. codebreakers worked, they could not have Because the U.S. never actually stole one of the Magic stopped the worst attack on U.S. soil by a foreign country. boxes, just messages and codebooks, Japan never knew a However, this only encouraged the United States to thing about America hacking into Magic. become quicker and more efficient in their decoding. As the United States learned more about Japan’s They worked to create faster machines that would decode evolving complex cryptonym over the decade preceding PURPLE messages in time to stop another disaster such World War II, the American intelligence agents designed as Pearl Harbor (“Magic” Diplomatic Summary 1204). a multi-layered system for understanding and decoding Setbacks such as Pearl Harbor were devastating to not different types of Japanese codes. In 1923, a US Navy only to the US, but to the Allies as a whole. However, officer acquired a stolen copy of the Secret Operating no matter the setback, they still ended up winning the Code codebook used by the Japanese Navy during war. Many would argue that a primary reason the Allies World War I. America had stolen photos straight won the Pacific war, and maybe even World War II, was from the codebooks on Japanese research desks. These because of American intelligence being able to steal and photographs were kept in RED files, which led this decrypt essential information from Japan. A definitively kind of decoding to be given the name RED. In 1930, crucial element in winning the war was that the US had the Japanese government created a more complex code hijacked Magic, and was able to stop many of the planned that was codenamed BLUE. Once again, the United attacks by Japan and the Axis powers. Because of this, States stole photographs and easily decrypted these more and because of the Enigma being decoded by the British, complicated coded messages. The final and most complex the allies always had an upper hand in the war, often code was PURPLE. It was very similar to Enigma, knowing the exact thoughts and plans of Japan and its Germany’s famous secret coding system. PURPLE, allies. Operation Magic gave the United States the exact like Enigma, began its communications with the same information that America needed to win the war in the line of code but then became an unfathomable jumble. Pacific-and after almost four years of fighting Japan, they Codebreakers tried to break PURPLE communiques by did just that. Clio | 7 WORKS CITED Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security. . Encyclopedia.com. 16 Oct. 2020 .” Encyclopedia.com, Encyclopedia.com, 14 Nov. 2020, www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and- maps/operation magic.

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. “Soviet Policy toward Japan during World War II.” Cahiers du monde Russe. Russie - Empire Russe - Union Soviétique Et États Indépendants, Éditions De L’EHESS, 11 Sept. 2012, journals.openedition.org/ monderusse/9333.

John Weckerling, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, July 12, 1945, to Deputy Chief of Staff, “Japanese Peace Offer,”National Security Archive, 13 July 1945, Top Secret Ultra (40)

“Magic” – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1210National – Security Archive, July 17, 1945, Top Secret Ultra (42)

“Magic” – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1204National Security Archive, – July 12, 1945, Top Secret Ultra (2)

“Magic” – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1205National – Security Archive, July 13, 1945, Top Secret Ultra (41)

“The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II.”National Security Archive, 20 Oct. 2020,nsarchive.gwu.edu/ briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2020-08-04/atomic-bomb-end-worl d-war-ii.

William F. Friedman, Consultant (Armed Forces Security Agency), “A Short History of U.S. COMINT Activities,” National Security Archive, 19 February 1952, Top Secret (1)

Wilmoth Lerner, Adrienne. “Operation Magic.” Encyclopedia.com, 2 Dec. 2020, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_ (cryptography) . 8 | Clio

THE HUSTON PLAN: RICHARD NIXON VS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Nicholas Villela The 1960s and 1970s will always be known as a a heavy supporter of the war, but it was clear to him time of turbulence and social unrest in the United and everyone else it would have to remain a priority. In States. It was a time where antiwar protests were 1965, American Marines touched down on the shores happening all over the nation and a desire for social of South Vietnam, and so marked the beginning of change was increasing in the younger generation. a long, horrible war overseas. To say that Americans Fearing violent conflict and foriegn infiltration, the were angry with the war would be an understatement. Nixon administration felt it was necessary to evaluate Not only were they outraged with the tragic death of the extent of the threat, what the government was thousands of young American men, they were frustrated doing to suppress the threat, and in what ways they with the lack of transparency from the US government could improve on fighting those security threats. This and President Johnson. There was an aura of deception, plan, known as the Huston Plan, proposed numerous and the people knew it. The Nixon presidency only suggestions, many of which involved infringing on the made the situation worse. Although Nixon began his rights and privacies of American citizens. The Huston presidency by withdrawing some troops from Vietnam, Plan was an absolute symbol of the Nixon presidency he nonetheless kept US soldiers in Vietnam. Nixon was as a whole: illegal activities, lack of transparency and an extremely paranoid and unpredictable president. communication, and disputes between political leaders. He spent the entirety of his first term under belief that To fully understand the motives behind the actions the US was being infiltrated by various Communist of the Nixon administration while forming the Huston regimes, and that many of the antiwar protests were plan, it is important to note that the 1960s marked being funded by the Cubans, Soviets, and the Chinese. the first time in American history that there was a real The administration was worried that there was a feeling of untrustworthiness of the President among direct connection between the communists on the American citizens. It started with Lyndon Johnson, international front and the black civil rights/new leftist who took over the presidency after John F. Kennedy’s movements on the domestic front. assassination in 1963. Under Kennedy, the United States To begin to assess the situation, the Interagency had already become involved in South Vietnam, sending Intelligence Committee was formed on June 5th, 500 Green Berets in 1961. The United States followed 1970, made up of the directors of the CIA, FBI, NSA, up with numerous bombings, military aid to South and DIA. Deputy FBI Director William Sullivan Vietnam, and in November 1963, ousted and assasinated was appointed by Nixon to be the chairman of the South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm, installing newly formed committee. The day before their first a new regime. After Kennedy was shot in Dallas on scheduled meeting, Sullivan wrote a memo to the other November 22nd, new President Lyndon B Johnson was agency directors outlining the goals Nixon wanted left with a heavy task on his hands. Johnson was never the committee to accomplish. He made it clear the Clio | 9 committee needed to, “assess the overall nature of the be a peaceful protest organization. While the Black problem…examine the resources of each Agency… and Panthers were involved in numerous violent incidents devise coordinated procedures designed to penetrate with law enforcement, the report overlooks the fact the current nebulous areas of subversive activities here that their membership was small. As for the outside and abroad as they relate to our domestic problems.” threats from communist countries, there is no denying (Sullivan, pg.2, Document 8). While the agencies shared that these foriegn governments proved a threat to the many of the same goals as Nixon, namely maximizing US outside the country, but internally there was little coverage and intelligence of both foriegn and American evidence they were actually behind any movements revolutionary leaders and groups, they were all hoping to in the US. The report even states that, “There have establish a system where intelligence could be shared and been no substantial indications that the communist evaluated easily between the agencies. intelligence services have actively fomented domestic Before the 1960s, the agencies were able to operate unrest” (Hoover, pg.20). It also states, “There is little mostly independently, “the nature of the problem was likelihood that the Communist Party, USA, will such that it left [us] to a marked degree free to operate instigate civil disorders or use terrorist tactics in the independently in regard to [their] respective problem foreseeable future” ( Hoover, pg. 20). The report, in areas.” (Sullivan, pg.2, Document 8). Now, though, with addition to identifying perceived threats, also outlines new domestic threats, that old system was not going to gaps in intelligence coverage and what can be done work. The drafting of an initial report went smoothly. to improve. The Committee felt that it needed to On June 18th, 1970, Sullivan wrote a memo to another intensify electronic and mail surveillance, but should FBI leader, summarizing the previous two meetings of also be cautious about certain mail surveillance the committee. He noted that while the talks were civil techniques and finding live informants on college and progress was made, he feared that the controversial campuses and in organization leadership. However, it nature of their meetings would cause disagreements. It is clear that the Committee was willing to go around is also important to note that Sullivan admits that the the law in every direction in order to accomplish what committee had no power. (Sullivan, pg.2 Document 8). Nixon wanted from them. Ultimately, Nixon was the only one who had any FBI Director J.Edgar Hoover was not pleased with real authority during the early stages of negotiations. the White House’s response to the report, which would On June 20, 1970, after several more meetings, the later be known as the Huston Plan (named after White committee finally created a final draft of their report. House member of Staff Tom Huston, who coordinated While Nixon never approved of the report directly, it the communication between the White House and the was done on his behalf by White House Chief of State Committee). Hoover had made objections to nearly all H.R Haldemann. From the opening statements of of the proposed plans for surveillance expansion, most the report, the language is of paranoia and suspicion. importantly objecting to the demand for increased mail The report outlines the groups that it considered to surveillance: “The FBI is opposed to implementing any be the primary origins of civil unrest: The Student covert mail coverage because it was clearly illegal and it Mobilization Committee (SMC), the New Left, the is likely that, if done, information would leak out of the Black Panthers, and outside communist revolutionary Post Office to the press and serious damage would be groups. There is nothing wrong with being prepared done to the intelligence community” (Hoover, pg 37). for a threat before it happens. However, it is unwise to Hoover was worried about the reputation of not only act on a threat that one has false or little information his agency, but of the federal government as a whole. He about. Such was the case for these three “dangerous” knew that many of the changes the plan proposed were groups. The report gives the impression that the SMC illegal, and that the kind of power it wanted to execute was a violent terrorist group responsible for riots could not be done by the President alone. Hoover’s and bombings, but in reality the group was meant to objections were not met with a positive response, 10 | Clio obviously. In a memo to HR Haldemann, Tom Huston is likely that Nixon actually knew very little about how was upset: “He had his say in the footnotes and RN the final version of the plan came out because he never [Richard Nixon] decided against him. That should actually approved of the plan directly, but it was done put a close to the matter and I can’t understand why on his behalf by Haldemann. the AG [Attorney General] is a party to reopening it” The Huston Plan was a short lived plan, and it was (Huston, pg.4, Document 11). Huston was ready to never fully implemented. Nonetheless, it held great move forward with the Plan, despite Hoover’s valid significance in that it was the perfect symbol of the objections. However, from late July to August 1970, the Nixon presidency as a whole. The entire plan was plan to move forward was in limbo because of Hoover’s written on the basis of inferences made by the Nixon objections and refusal to accept the plan. administration and not concrete evidence. The agencies On September 18, 1970, new presidential counsel withheld information from the president and his John Dean was assigned to help advance the Huston advisories because there were other things they were Plan into action. In a memo to Attorney General hoping to accomplish. J Edgar Hoover objected to the Mitchell, Dean outlines the first steps that should be plan only because he was worried that the committee taken is to form an interagency unit to help facilitate was going to be caught. The CIA gave Tom Huston all aspects of the plan. Dean also points out that taking false information. Finally, the proposed actions the this first step would “bring the FBI on board” and plan outlined were for the most part, illegal, or needed be “an appropriate first step to guarantee the prosper multiple procedures to go through before they could be and full participation of the program” (Dean, pg.1). put into motion. It included mail opening, increased Despite more talks to further the plan’s execution, the illegal wiretaps, and lowering the age of potential plan was essentially dead by year’s end. However, in informants even though the voting age at the time the spring of 1973, the plan had a new significance. was still technically 21. During the Watergate scandal, The plan had come to light in the investigation of the Nixon, Huston, and others involved with the plan Watergate scandal, and congressional investigators were denied having specific knowledge about the plan or if eager to unearth the plan, and potentially use it as more it was ever properly voided. The duplicity on the part evidence of Nixon’s illegal actions. The plan was being of the committee also symbolized the increasing divide looked into the source for the numerous break-ins, and between the increasing power of government and the investigator Fred Buzhardt probed Nixon to find out people of the United States.The lack of transparency what he knew about the plan. Nixon claimed that he and absence of communication that marked the Nixon approved the plan but later voided it and rescinded it. It presidency also marked the Huston Plan. Clio | 11 WORKS CITED Author Unknown. “The National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records 1966-1969”. Swarthmore College. September 2, 2015. https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/DG051-099/dg075nmc. htm#:~:text=The%20National%20Mobilization%20Committee%20to,City%20and%20in%20San%20 Francisco.

Burns, Ken and Lynn Novick. “ How the Vietnam War Broke the American Presidency.” The Atlantic. October 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/how-americans-lost-faith-in-the- presidency/537897/

Buzhardt, Fred. “Transcript between Richard Nixon and Fred Buzhardt”. National Security Archive. May 17, 1973. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/documents/spying-americans-new-release-infamous-huston-plan/22a.pdf PDF Download.

Dean, John. “White House Memo to The Attorney General”. National Security Archive. September 18, 1970. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/documents/spying-americans-new-release-infamous-huston-plan/14a.pdf PDF Download.

Hoover, J Edgar. “Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)”. National Security Archive. June 25, 1970. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/documents/spying-americans-new-release-infamous-huston-plan/01a.pdf PDF Download.

Huston, Tom Charles. “Domestic Intelligence”. National Security Archive. July 23, 1970. https://nsarchive.gwu. edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2020-06-25/spying-americans-new-release-infamous-huston-plan PDF download.

Huston, Tom Charles. “Domestic Intelligence”. National Security Archive. August 5, 1970. https://nsarchive.gwu. edu/documents/spying-americans-new-release-infamous-huston-plan/11a.pdf PDF Download

Sullivan, William. “Memo on Interagency Intelligence Committee”. National Security Archive. June 6, 1970. https:// nsarchive.gwu.edu/documents/spying-americans-new-release-infamous-huston-plan/02a.pdf PDF Download.

Sullivan, William. “Meeting of The Working Subcommitee”. National Security Archive. June 9, 1970. https:// nsarchive.gwu.edu/documents/spying-americans-new-release-infamous-huston-plan/03a.pdf PDF Download.

Sullivan, William. “Meeting of The Working Subcommitee, June 18 1970”. National Security Archive. June 18, 1970. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/documents/spying-americans-new-release-infamous-huston-plan/04a.pdf PDF Download.

U.S. Senate, Church Committee, “National Security, Civil Liberties, and the Collection of Intelligence: A Report on the Huston Plan,”. National Security Archive. April 14, 1976. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/documents/spying- americans-new-release-infamous-huston-plan/29a.pdf PDF Download. 12 | Clio

ECONOMICS OR IDEOLOGY : AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD ALLENDE’S CHILE Gabriella Zavala Richard Nixon and his administration played strong in his beliefs against socialism. He believed that an important role in destabilizing the Allende-run the nation should be run with a capitalist economy, Chilean government for fear that this new regime which strongly contradicted the beliefs of the socialist would cause the country to become socialist. Prior to Allende. Throughout his presidency, he made decisions Allende’s presidency, Chile was run by Eduardo Frei where the United States would benefit regardless of the Montalva from 1964-1970. Montalva was a member cost it had on other countries, such as Chile (Kissinger of the Christian Democratic Party, while Allende was a Memorandum, 1). Similar to Nixon, Kissinger socialist and was elected in 1970. Within the decision also believed in a capitalist economy. Together, the making circles of the United States, there was a fear two regularly showed these beliefs by voicing their that Allende’s political views would turn that nation diminishing opinions of Allende and the way in which socialist. This fear came out of the belief that, as a result he ran his government. This disregard was witnessed in of Chile becoming socialist, they would no longer be conversations with American senators when discussing involved in investments with the United States. This the matter of Allende. Allende, on the other hand, was would harm America’s economy as a result. This fear also an extreme socialist who was against the United States stemmed from the idea that Chile becoming socialist (Helms Briefing, 2). As a result, Chile, under the rule of would encourage other Latin American countries to lean Allende, viewed their foreign matters with a very anti- towards socialism (Presidency). Due to this fear, Nixon United States lens. This clash of ideologies resulted in a and Kissinger deemed it necessary to initiate a plan mutual dislike between the countries, which fueled the to destabilize the Chilean government under Allende United States Administration’s decision to establish a in order to discourage and prevent the transition to plan to overthrow Allende. socialism from occurring. Nixon and Kissinger were Not only was the United States worried about the the primary people involved with the plan, although lasting effects of Allende in office, but Argentina and the there was a sense of concern in other countries, such Soviet Union were also concerned about the potential as Argentina and the Soviet Union. Over the years, ramifications of his rise in power. The United States was the United States came up with a variety of plans to worried about the economical consequences if Chile was overthrow Allende, but ended up narrowing their pushed into socialist beliefs--a worry rooted in the fact options down to the one they deemed to be the best. that America had over one billion dollars invested with The primary people involved in the destabilization Chile at the time. Of this billion, they were only insured were Richard Nixon, president of the United States, for 293 million dollars in the event of loss (Helms and Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor. Their Briefing, 14). Therefore, if America was to lose economic primary goal was to target Salvador Allende and remove relations with Chile, it would be a monumental loss, one him from power. Nixon was a Republican who was that would have been immeasurably harmful to their Clio | 13 economy because the United States was undergoing not create as much tension that could be advertised the Great Inflation at the time. The country was in the media. By maintaining this strategy, America experiencing the highest inflation rates in their history would continue to have positive public relations with (Krammer). If Chile were to become socialist, it would Chile while simultaneously preventing Chile from have been a devastating loss for the United States. becoming socialist. The second plan was referred to as Similarly, if Chile had become socialist, they would the Hostile Approach; it had two main aspects. The have encouraged other socialist countries to back out of first one was known as Overt Hostility. This plan was economic deals with America, resulting in greater loss. one which would have gained international attention The United States was not the only nation preoccupied and have the power to interfere in foreign affairs with Chile becoming socialist; this view was also shared (Nixon Memorandum, 1). The Hostile Approach within Argentina (Helms Briefing, 15). During this involved was very aggressive, and involved ending all time, the country of Argentina was undergoing the positive and beneficial interactions with Chile. It also Argentine Revolution, a period of societal and political included rallying international allies to help execute upheaval. With the internal stability of Argentina this plan of action, and, in the process, turning them was in “shreds’’ due to their internal disputes, the risk against Chile as well. This plan was considered to be of decreasing the already crumbling stability would the most hostile in addition to the most overt plan. be greater with Chile becoming socialist. As a result, If this plan was executed, the United States would Argentina was worried about the Chilean government. have gained numerous allies through their shared goal This concern spread to the Soviet Union, where of destabilizing the Chilean government. A second there was caution in dealing with the new Chilean alternative was known as the Cold Approach. This plan government. As another socialist state, the Soviet Union was similar to that of the Hostile Approach, but was was concerned that Chile would become too dependent more placid. This one involved forcing pressure upon on them for success. In order to appeal to their internal Allende and requiring him to ask for international domestic affairs, the Soviet refrained from establishing assistance. When asking for support, the countries that close ties with Chile. However, in order to create would be willing to assist would secretly be in alliance leverage within their relations, Russia leant Chile $57 with the United States (Nixon Memorandum, 2). This million that was never used (Helms Briefing, 16). This plan of action involved a great risk, as well as a great increased the likelihood of Chile becoming socialist and reward. It would have decreased trading between Chile the resulting tension between the Chilean government and other countries, and, in the process, would have and other countries around the world, regardless of helped America prosper. For this plan, one of the main political beliefs. contenders for allying with the United States was the The United States created multiple plans to threaten adjacent country of Argentina who was already known Allende, the two most well known being the Modus to dislike the beliefs of Chile. This common enemy Vivendi Approach, and the Hostile Approach. The would be beneficial to the United States in their fight Modus Vivendi approach was one in which America against Chile. came to terms with the fact that they could not force Out of all the plans, the one that ultimately was Allende to fail, but rather would work in union with chosen was the Cold Approach. The United States kept Allende for the betterment of the United States, their strong dislike for Allende out of the news, and even if Chile was weakened in the process (Kissinger proceeded to increase the pressure and tension put on Memorandum, 5-7). A cornerstone of this plan was that Allende in office. This plan began on November 10, eventually it would weaken the Chilean government 1970, just six days after Allende began his presidency internally, causing disputes. This strategy was favored (Helms Briefing, 12). This plan was chosen by the by the American government. In their opinion, this Department of State after careful consideration by the would be the most effective strategy because it would National Security Council. The first aspect of this plan 14 | Clio included strengthening relationships between America against Allende led by Agusto Pinochet. This began a and adjacent Latin American countries (Kissinger period of military dictatorship within Chile that lasted National 1-3). Furthermore, they considered ways in until 1990. The combined efforts of internal dispute, which they could maximize their power. They had to which resulted in a coup, and the efforts of the United encourage other countries to sever economic ties with States, ultimately became too much for Allende, who Chile. As a result of this, Chile would be forced to rely turned to suicide. The belief within the rebellion was on their own nation for all of their products. This would that the reason they overthrew Allende was that under stifle the growth and decrease the stability of their his leadership the country was in a period of disarray, country, since the majority of the goods manufactured and was in desperate need of change. Under Pinochet, in the nation were wood and fishing supplies (Chile). Chile experienced a regime of torture that killed tens Since the country primarily relied on other countries of thousands of innocent people, especially since for their products, the result of countries terminating one of his main philosophies was to exterminate all economic ties with them would have further caused Democratic or leftist beliefs within Chile (Augusto). their country to destabilize and increase the amount of The efforts of the United States played an extremely war within. important role in destabilizing the Chilean government Allende’s presidency ended on September 11th, under the rule of Allende, ultimately resulting with 1973, with a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the Pinochet taking power and creating a vengeful reign in head. This was a result of the second attempt at a coup Chile from 1973-1990. Clio | 15 WORKS CITED “Augusto Pinochet.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 16 November 2020. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Augusto_Pinochet. Web. 16 November 2020.

“Chile.” Heritage. https://www.heritage.org/index/country/chile?version=132. 19 November 2020 Helms, Richard. “Briefing for the National Security Council 6 November 1970, Chile, Secret, 05 November 1970. National Security Archive. 3 November 2020, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=7281125-National- Security-Archive-Doc-2-Director-of, 9 November 2020.

Kissinger, Henry and Nixon, Richard. “NSC, Telecon “President/Kissinger” [Conversation about Chile Between President Nixon and Henry Kissinger], 09 November 1970. National Security Archive. 3 November 2020, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=7281129-National-Security-Archive-Doc-6-NSC-Telcon, 11 November 2020.

Kissinger, Henry. “NSC National Security Decision Directive 93, “U.S. Policy Toward Chile,” TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY, 09 November 1970. National Security Archive. 3 November 2020, https:// nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=7281128-National-Security-Archive-Doc-5-NSC-National. 11 November 2020.

Kissinger, Henry. “The White House, Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, “NSC Meeting.” November 6- Chile” National Security Archive. 3 November 2020, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/ dc.html?doc=7281124-National-Security-Archive-Doc-1-The-White-House, 5 November 2020.

Kramer, Leslie. “How the Great Inflation of the 1970s Happened.” Investopedia. 1 October 2020. https://www. investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/1970s-great-inflation.asp#:~:text=The%201970s%20saw%20 some%20of,this%20decade%20of%20high%20inflation. 14 November 2020.

Nixon, Richard. “NSC, Memorandum of Conversation, “NSC Meeting- Chile (NSSM 97),” Secret, 06 November 1970. National Security Archive. 3 November 2020, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=7281127- National-Security-Archive-Doc-4-NSC-Memorandum, 10 November 2020.

“Presidency of Salvador Allende.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 7 November 2020.https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Presidency_of_Salvador_Allende#:~:text=During%20his%20tenure%2C%20Chilean%20 politics,failed%20coup%20in%20June%201973.&text=On%2011%20September%201973%2C%20 a,overthrew%20the%20government%20of%20Allende. 17 November 2020. 16 | Clio

THE CIA MANHUNT FOR CHE GUEVARA Marcus Vondrak Under President Johnson, the CIA and State Presence of Ernesto “Che” Guevara). They had no Department may have overestimated the strength of concrete evidence of this, only witness testimony, but Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s revolutionary movement in the possibility of Guevara’s involvement increased the Bolivia, but, nonetheless, acted swiftly in assisting the gravity of the situation for the CIA. National security Bolivian government in neutralizing the threat posed by advisor Walt Rostow believed Guevara was present; him and revolutionaries under his command. Guevara he wrote to President Johnson that there was a good arrived in Bolivia in 1966 (after failing to incite a chance that Guevara was alive and operating in the revolution in the Congo the previous year), intending Bolivian mountains (Rostow “Memo to President to form an armed revolutionary group that would use Johnson”). guerilla warfare to begin a revolution similar to the one Once the CIA confirmed Guevara’s involvement he and Fidel Castro had led earlier that decade in Cuba. with the Bolivian revolutionaries, they feared that if It took many months, but Guevara eventually formed the movement were to gain momentum, the Soviet a small militia force of nearly 60 insurgents in the Union might begin funding the group, leading to Bolivian mountains, many of whom were not Bolivian. another global conflict and the possibility of a leftist By April of 1967, the Bolivian Army had noticed the leader replacing Bolivia’s current regime. (Cuban- small insurgency force in the mountains and notified Inspired Guerilla Activity). Anticipating Guevara the United States. After evaluating the information and his experience in guerilla warfare, the CIA sent a given to him by the Bolivian Army, U.S. General team of experts and specialized equipment to organize William Tope concluded that the guerillas were well- another Ranger-type Battalion and help the Bolivian organized and potentially funded by the USSR. The Army track down Guevara (Rostow “Suspecting U.S. determined that sending assistance to the Bolivian Che”). In June 1967, the CIA concluded the group Army was necessary (Guerilla Situation - Bolivia). The operating in the mountains of Bolivia was composed U.S. began exporting supplies to the Mobile Training of approximately 60 well-armed insurgents (Crisis Team, or MTT, in Bolivia after discovering the band Management in Bolivia). Organizing and training an of guerillas, demonstrating that the threat was taken entire battalion to fight a group of 60 guerilla fighters seriously and needed to be eliminated promptly was excessive. Guevara’s group was small, poorly (Bowdler “Counter-insurgency Memo”). Until this funded, inexperienced, and easy to subdue. The CIA point, the U.S. had not suspected Guevara was leading and Bolivian Army would eventually demonstrate this the group. In fact, he was presumed dead by U.S. dramatically. intelligence as he had not made a public appearance On June 26, 1967, the Bolivian ambassador formally since 1965. The CIA had acquired information requested the United States to aid in training the through the interrogation of captured guerilla fighters Bolivian Army in counter-guerilla tactics in order to that Guevara was leading the group in Bolivia (The fight Guevara.(Bowdler and Bolivian Ambassador). Clio | 17 The following month, another captured guerilla fighter the Bolivian Army’s custody, and the remaining guerillas confessed that he had been under the command of a were either captured or killed (Rostow to President Cuban man he believed to be Che Guevara. This claim Johnson October 9, 1967). Following his death, a was taken seriously and was even relaid to President La Paz radio broadcast claimed that Guevara died of Johnson (Bowdler “Guerilla Band in Southeast wounds sustained in battle and that his diary had been Bolivia”). The United States soon became frustrated captured in the process (Transcripts of Press Reports with the Bolivian government’s inaction, and led on Che’s Death). Two days after Guevara’s death, the the CIA to believe that the revolutionary’s activities CIA produced a memo stating that Guevara was in was due to the Bolivian military’s ineptitude to stop stable condition when he was captured, only sustaining them (Bowdler “Bolivian Guerilla Movement”). The a wound in his leg, but had later died by execution reality was that the group was not domestic and led by following an order from Bolivian Army H.Q. This order Argentinian-born Guevara. had come following Guevara’s refusal to give up the rest In September of 1967, the Bolivian Army killed of his group’s whereabouts, who had fled during the ten insurgents and took one prisoner, securing their confrontation (Helms “Capture and Execution of ‘Che’ first major victory over Guevara’s forces. Interestingly Guevara”). President Barrientos of Bolivia insisted that enough, only two of the dead were Bolivians, with Guevara be executed immediately to prevent his escape the other eight being Cuban or Argentinian (Rostow or any public trial. He was executed by the burst fire of “Insurgency in Bolivia”). It was rumored that many of an M-2 automatic rifle to the chest to make it appear he the insurgents traveled with Guevara to fight in Bolivia had died during the fire-fight. after fighting alongside him in the Cuban Revolution. The U.S. was upset with the Bolivian order to execute In addition to the victory, the CIA had amassed Guevara, especially the CIA, who believed they could captured intel, including two counterfeit passports have extracted vital information from him prior to his with Guevara’s likeness, which he probably used to death. However, they did understand the Bolivians’ get into Bolivia and the Congo (Bowdler “Captured need to promulgate the revolutionary’s death to Documents in Bolivia”). The U.S. and Bolivian discourage other revolutionary movements (Rostow governments carefully handled the captured documents “Death of ‘Che’ Guevara”). U.S. officials believed from Guevara’s camp and contemplated releasing them the death of Guevara would end fighting in Bolivia, publicly or officially asking the U.S. to help analyze contrary to Guevara’s claim that the revolution would them, resulting in severe ramifications (Oliver). continue, even after his death. The Bolivian government After months of tracking and battling with the released a statement to the CIA stating that before his militia, on October 8, 1967, the US-trained Bolivian death, Guevara declared he had not been a believer in battalion engaged in a fire-fight in the mountains where the communist ideology until after the success of the they believed they had captured Guevara (Bowdler Cuban Revolution (Helms “Statements by Ernesto’ “Regarding Capture of Guevara”). The man suspected Che’ Guevara”). This contradicted the popular belief was in critical condition following the battle and was in of President Kennedy’s staff that during the Cuban the custody of the Bolivian Army (Capture of Ernesto Revolution, Guevara had always been a dedicated “Che” Guevara”). On October 9, Guevara died while in communist. 18 | Clio WORKS CITED Bowdler, William. “Captured Documents in Bolivia.” National Security Archive, 6 Sept. 1967.

Bowdler, William. “Counter-Insurgency Memo.” National Security Archive, 25 Apr. 1967.

Bowdler, William. “Guerilla Band in Southeast Bolivia under the Command of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara.” National Security Archive, 28 July 1967.

Bowdler, William. “Regarding Capture of Guevara.” National Security Archive, 9 Oct. 1967.

Bowdler, William. “The Bolivian Guerilla Movement: An Interim Assessment.” National Security Archive, 1 Sept. 1967.

Bowdler, William. “William Bowdler and Bolivian Ambassador Sanjines-Goytia.” National Security Archive, 29 June 1967.

“Capture of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara De La Serna by Bolivian Second Rangers.” National Security Archive, 9 Oct. 1967.

“Crisis Management in Bolivia: Government Flounders but Keeps Its Footing.” National Security Archive, 23 June 1967.

“Cuban-Inspired Guerilla Activity.” National Security Archive, 14 June 1967.

Helms, Richard. “Capture and Execution of ‘Che’ Guevara.” National Security Archive, 11 Oct. 1967.

Helms, Richard. “Statements by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara Prior to His Execution in Bolivia.” National Security Archive, 13 Oct. 1967.

Oliver, Covey T. “Handling of Documents Relating to Cuban Intervention Captured in Bolivia.” National Security Archive, 2 Sept. 1967.

“The Presence of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara with the Bolivian Guerillas.” National Security Archive, 10 May 1967.

Rostow, Walt. “Death of ‘Che’ Guevara.” National Security Archive, 11 Oct. 1967.

Rostow, Walt. “Insurgency in Bolivia.” National Security Archive, 5 Sept. 1967.

Rostow, Walt. “Memo to President Johnson .” National Security Archive, 11 May 1967.

Rostow, Walt. “Suspecting ‘Che’ Is in Bolivia.” National Security Archive, 23 June 1967.

“Transcripts of Press Reports on Che’s Death.” National Security Archive, 11 Oct. 1967.

“‘Guerilla Situation - Bolivia’ .” National Security Archive, 22 Apr. 1967. Clio | 19

THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC TROJAN HORSE: OPERATION CONDOR Henry Moyes During the Cold War, the Central Intelligence using the devices to easily crack foreign messages Agency secretly and extensively monitored the (Kornbluh). The CIA and BND secretly bought large communications of several “Condor” countries, i.e. stakes in the company, allowing them closer access Latin American Republics. The information obtained to the machines. For Hagelin’s part of the deal, some through this was crucial for the success of Operation of his family members were given jobs in the United Condor, a campaign backed by the United States States government and military (Friedman 21). In early involving the assassinations and repression of opponents 1955, Friedman introduced Hagelin and the CIA to within South American dictatorships. The United the devices so that they could easily crack the codes and States took interest in these countries once Salvador read communications between other countries without Allende, a Chilean socialist candidate, won the Chilean their knowledge. (Friedman 21). The inner mechanisms election, bringing Marxist ideology to South America. of the devices that were sold were tampered with. The CIA helped stage a coup to overthrow Allende and The instruction manuals were changed so that the effectively paved the way for a military dictatorship full capability of the machines could not be accessed, that imprisoned and killed its political opponents. making it considerably easier for the NSA, CIA, and This system eventually became international and many BND to decode the messages. Throughout the 1970’s South American countries, including Brazil, Argentina, and 1980’s, the CIA and BND gained massive intel Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay, became dictatorships. from all over the globe through these devices. This deal The United States intercepted communications from allowed the CIA to not only spy on enemy countries the Condor countries through a company called but also allied countries. The CIA owned Crypto AG Crypto AG, a cryptography agency owned by Boris until it was sold in 2018, with their involvement not Hagelin (Kornbluh). The company sold cryptography becoming public knowledge until 2020 (Miller). These equipment to the United States during World War II. devices were crucial in monitoring the communications The CIA and BND, the German Intelligence Service, and intelligence of the Condor countries in the 70s and took interest in their equipment and used the devices 80s. to decrypt communications from rival and even allied The Condor countries ordered the devices as intelligence agencies. a communication system for their newly formed After World War II, the CIA became interested dictatorships. On November 28, 1975, the intelligence in the machines and decided to make a deal with the services of the Condor countries came together for company’s owner Boris Hagelin. The current chief a meeting and to discuss future actions. One of the cryptologist for the CIA was William Friedman, who future actions they considered was getting a new happened to be a good friend of Hagelin. In the 50s, cryptographic system to keep in contact without Friedman and Hagelin came to an agreement about foreign countries knowing of their actions, this 20 | Clio opened the door for Crypto AG to provide the cipher regime in Argentina were imprisoned and thrown out devices (Kornbluh). In 1977, Brazil agreed to provide of a plane into the Atlantic Ocean. It is approximated the communication devices for each of the nations’ that almost 30,000 people were killed in this way. intelligence communities. The agreement stated that This would not have been known without the help of commercial equipment would not be used. It also stated the Crypto AG devices. During the Falklands War in that Condor communications could be monitored Britain, the CIA received intelligence of an Argentinian by other Condor countries (CIA Report). About threat occupying the Falkland island (Theveßen et al). 3 months later, Brazil chose to provide the Crypto The CIA warned the British and the British Prime AG machines for the Condor dictatorships, more minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher, and used the specifically, the CX-52, which was very similar to one information to attack and take down the Argentinian of the machines shown to the NSA 20 years earlier threat. She made a statement involving the Swiss (Friedman). The CX-52s were given to each Condor cryptology company, which made the Argentinians country to use as their cipher system until the end of immediately suspicious of the security of their the Cold War, when the regimes fell (CIA Cable). cryptology systems (Theveßen et al.). The Condor countries were unknowingly giving away Throughout the decades, the true nature of the their secrets to the CIA, who had the resources to machines and the company was nearly exposed through effortlessly crack their messages, as a result of the deal many different incidents. In 1975, an ex-CIA operative they made with Hagelin in the 50s. With the Condor named Phillip Agee published a book called Inside countries having acquired cipher machines that were the Company - A CIA Diary (Cryptology and the secretly owned by the CIA, many of their secretive Watergate Era 2). In his book, he claimed that the communications were not only read by the intended NSA was using the Swiss-built machines to spy on recipient but by the CIA as well. In 1978, Ecuador communications. These claims were unproven until joined the Condor countries, effectively expanding their 2020, when the CIA’s involvement was made public. dictatorships. Once joined with the other dictatorships, In 1982, a man named James Bamford wrote a book Ecuador received Crypto equipment from Argentina on the NSA, called Puzzle Palace. That book referred until they could purchase their own devices (Ecuador to the Crypto AG deal with Hagelin and William Joins Condor). This grew the web of intelligence that Friedman’s visits. The source of the information came the CIA was able to leech off of and gain access to from some letters that were donated by Friedman. The through Crypto AG. CIA quickly went out and heavily censored the letters, The selling of these devices did not stop there. hiding them from the public eye. In the early 1990s, a Condor countries continued to use Crypto AG Crypto AG employee was kidnapped by Iranians, who devices, further allowing the CIA to monitor their were trying to discover the truth of the machines. The communications and to find out more information employee had no idea of the CIA and NSA’s deal with about Condor actions. In 1977, almost one year after the company and was let go a year later after his bail was Brazil agreed to provide the CX-52s for Condor paid. The cipher machines were still effectively being countries, Argentina introduced these countries to a utilized at this time and any information getting out new machine, the H-4605, a cipher machine that was would be disastrous for the CIA. In 1995, an article was very similar to the H-460 (DIA Intelligence Appraisal). published claiming that the NSA had been spying on The H-460’s inner workings were designed by the other countries’ communications through the use of the NSA themselves, so the CIA knew enough of the inner Crypto AG machines. The NSA neither confirmed nor workings of the H-4605 to be able to decrypt messages. denied the claims, and the Crypto AG system started to Many communications and operations were become less efficient due to new technologies. intercepted through the Crypto AG machines. In the The CIA’s secret ownership of this Swiss cryptology 1970s, it was discovered that opponents of the military company led to multiple internal affairs of the Condor Clio | 21 countries and their operations. The United States gained into the affairs of countries in other parts of the world, access to information that had the potential to prevent like Iran and Libya. Today, the complete extent to which wars and save lives. Whether the CIA or United States Crypto AG infiltrated the world’s intelligence agencies is acted on all of the information gained is unknown. The unknown, though more documents and reports may be ownership of the company also led to other revelations declassified in the future.

WORKS CITED CIA cable, “Communications System Employed by the Condor Organization,” Secret, February 1, 1977.

“CIA Report, ‘Counterterrorism in the Southern Cone,’ Secret, May 9, 1977.”

CIA Weekly Situation Report, “Ecuador Joins Condor,” March 1, 1978.

DIA Intelligence Appraisal, “Latin America: Counterterrorism and Trends in Terrorism,” August 11, 1978.

Friedman, William. “NSA ‘[Draft] Report of Visit to Crypto A.G. (Hagelin) by William F. Friedman,’ Top Secret, March 15, 1955.” 1955.

Kornbluh, Peter. “The CIA’s ‘Minerva’ Secret.” National Security Archive, 20 Feb. 2020, nsarchive.gwu.edu/brief- ing-book/chile-cyber-vault-intelligence-southern-cone/2020-02-11/cias-minerva-secret.

Miller, Greg. “The CIA Secretly Bought a Company That Sold Encryption Devices across the World. Then Its Spies Sat Back and Listened.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 11 Feb. 2020, www.washingtonpost.com/ graphics/2020/world/national-security/cia-crypto-encryption-machines-espionage/.

NSA Cryptologic History, “Cryptology and the Watergate Era,” 1998.

Theveßen, Elmar. “‘Operation ‘Rubikon’”: #Cryptoleaks: Wie BND Und CIA Alle Täuschten.” ZDF, Politik, 11 Feb. 2020, www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/cryptoleaks-bnd-cia-operation-rubikon-100.html. 22 | Clio

HIGH STAKES POKER: THE CHINESE-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT Jennifer Fang Contrary to popular belief, China initiated the celebrated the proletariats’ advancements and Sino-American Rapprochement. Thanks to a union of indignation against the monopolizing bourgeoisie. interests, there was a significant change in the way that Marxist theory caused Mao to vigorously paint the United States and China viewed their relationship imperialism as destructive and the United States as after Richard Nixon, president of the United States, and predatory. The People’s Daily characterized Nixon as Mao Zedong, Chairman of China’s, met on February forever against the revolution in China, and concealing 21st, 1972. Initially, China rejected imperialism and his aggression from the American public with his was stubbornly averse to ideologically agreeing with promotion of the ideals of “solidarity, peace, and spirit” the United States. However, China was also heavily coupled with the non-existent freedom and welfare pressured by the political tension with the Soviet Union offered to his own people. Mao characterized Nixon’s under Brezhnev. China, therefore, sought to establish inaugural address as the last chance of an imperialism a sense of security in the world by aligning themselves destined to doom—perfectly reaffirming ideas expressed with the United States. Many of China’s tactics used in The Communist Manifesto (“Desperate Self- in the rapprochement were founded on its historical Confession”). Additionally, because of the Khrushchev’s precedents, which viewed the signing of neutrality acts de-Stalinization campaign in the 1960’s, the magazine as earnest and significant. On the other hand, Nixon, depicted the tension between the Soviet Union and who was not entirely in agreement with those around China, attacked the Soviets’ “modern revisionism”, and him, was determined to draw China out from seclusion. portrayed the Soviet working class as outraged. The United States was also fighting in Vietnam at the The pressure from the Soviets drove China to time, whereas China was a great ally of the Vietnamese. advance its relations with the United States. Later This only added complexity to the Sino-American in the 1990s, when Xion Xianghui, an official in the relationship. Communist party, was describing China’s strategic In the beginning stages of the relationship, China policy in 1969, the four marshals—under Mao’s viewed the United States as immensely corrupt and leadership—leaned towards better relations with diametrically opposed to the Communist party. In the United States, especially after the border fight January 1969, one magazine commentator from the intensified with the Soviets (Xiong 56). The leaders People’s Daily, a newspaper under the control of of the Chinese military developed a policy based on the Communist Party, portrayed Nixon’s inaugural the cultural concept and historical precedence of “ address as a desperate self-confession and characterized 三国鼎立 [San Guo Ding Li],” which is literally an capitalist America as being on the verge of destruction. ancient Chinese cooking cauldron with three legs that As portrayed to the Chinese citizens, the concept forms a tripod (an idea that developed during the three of capitalism’s destruction in America essentially kingdoms period), that became a description of the Clio | 23 relationship of China, the Soviet Union and the United Nixon’s offer to meet in Beijing. After Zhou reported States. Marshal Ye Jianying compared China, the Soviet Nixon’s interest to Mao, Mao welcomed Nixon and Union, and the United States situation to the ancient looked forward to his arrival; Mao was even willing to three kingdoms of Wei, Shu, and Wu. Another one of talk directly with Nixon and stated that the meeting the four marshals, Chen Yi, suggested incredibly that should prioritize solving key issues in Sino-American China’s attempt at a rapprochement with the United relations, like the removal of U.S. troops in Taiwan States could be favorably compared to how Stalin and and the Taiwan Strait. Zhou later welcomed Kissinger Hitler had signed the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in for a secret meeting through Islamabad to Beijing’s 1939(Xiong 81). A strange analogy given that Hitler secret airport; he even began making concrete plans later betrayed the agreement launching a surprise attack regarding the resources to ensure the secrecy of the on the Soviet Union. After presenting Stalin’s tactics— meeting (Zhou, 29 May 1971). The Sino-American the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—Chen’s suggestion relationship that had begun with antagonism had begun was that China should let go of its reluctance to reject a metamorphosis within less than three years. the United States’ hostile force and instead provide While establishing communications with the United a justification for Mao’s rapprochement with the States, President Yahya conveyed to Nixon that China United States. At this stage, however, the four marshals also faced pressures from the Soviet Union and India. collectively suggested avoiding making a concrete Nixon independently thought that China should not plan detailing how they were going to manipulate the be isolated if Asia sought advancement (“Memo Hilaly unstable Soviet-United States relation during the Sino- and Saunders, 28 August 1969”). At this stage, Nixon American rapprochement (Xiong 81). opened a gateway to advance America’s relation with China continued its symbolic actions throughout China through neutral Pakistan. After the United the Sino-American rapprochement. The People’s Daily States ping pong team took a visit to China, Nixon and depicted Edgar Snow, a left-leaning author responsible Kissinger decided that they must lift travel and trade for the Communist Party’s early stages of recognition restrictions on China. They predicted that Taiwan, in the western world, visiting Mao as a symbol of the of course, would be potentially unsatisfied with this bettering of the U.S. and China’s relationship. On action. However, Nixon and Kissinger were highly National Day, 1 October 1970, Mao said, “Everyone determined to advance the relationship with China in the entire world including citizens of the United (“Kissinger and Nixon Telcon, 14 April 1971”). Around States are our friends” (“Chairman Mao Zedong”). two weeks later, Nixon and Kissinger received the The headline was a superficial message to the domestic message delivered by Pakistan. In their conversation, it audience in China, but one that signaled an advancing became clear that Kissinger believed that establishing relationship with the U.S. Later in 1971, Premier Zhou relations with China could end the Vietnam War in Enlai of China indicated to President Yahya of Pakistan 1971. However, since relations with China were still that a high-level discourse should be conducted to considerably tense, Nixon decided against telling advance Sino-American relations with the renewal of the American public about their UN membership, contacts between the citizens of each country. (Zhou, the Two-China Policy, and the subject of Taiwan 21 April 1971). This message passed through Pakistan (“Kissinger and Nixon Telcon, 27 April 1971”). indicated that China was interested in establishing a Due to the complexity of the relationship, Zhou meeting with either Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State and Kissinger’s communication had to be kept highly William Rogers, or even president Nixon (Zhou, 21 confidential. These secret meetings were a significant April 1971). As soon as Zhou received the response step in creating mutual trust. In Kissinger’s assistant from Nixon, delivered by Pakistan, Zhou thanked Winston Lord’s record of Zhou and Kissinger’s Pakistan’s delivery and indirectly and happily accepted conversation, Zhou began carefully by laying the 24 | Clio responsibilities over Taiwan and Indochina with and the United States, they would not have carried Nixon’s predecessors. (Lord 1). Although Nixon was out a series of diplomatic exchanges that took the previously reluctant to give up land in Taiwan, he did rapprochement from theory to pragmatism, and this note that the United States’ step back was necessary kind of conciliation would have not occurred. China’s to rapprochement. Kissinger indicated a likelihood urgency to establish safety led to the inconceivable of accepting restoration of Taiwan to China, and first shift to more cordial relations with America. Because displayed Nixon’s interest in meeting with Mao in of their urgency and desperate situation, Mao’s four Beijing. Zhou, in response, thanked Kissinger and his marshals’ referenced the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, attention to China, showed optimism to the Sino- which justifies the Sino-American relation and American Relationship, and declared that the meeting maintains Mao’s authoritarian status (Xiong 81). The would be fulfilled (Lord 13). results of Mao and Nixon’s meeting were evident; China A year later, the meeting was finally realized. Nixon benefited significantly from this diplomatic exchange confidentially recognized that Taiwan was a part through the general reduction of its global hostile of China (“Memo, 22 February 1972”). Kissinger forces, a gradual reduction of the United States forces in conducted conversations with Marshal Ye to discuss Taiwan, and the United States’ support on restraining military resolutions. He guaranteed the Chinese Japanese forces. The United States, on the other hand, military leadership information about the Soviets realized that communist forces were not that hostile (“Memo, 23 February 1972”). The rapprochement as previously perceived. Although the U.S. did not by this point, although still secret, was practical end the Vietnam War in 1971, like Kissinger declared and no longer theoretical. The confidential military (“Kissinger and Nixon Telcon, 27 April 1971”), this information that Kissinger disclosed assured China of conversion of perspective played a role later in 1975, the United States’s sincerity. when the United States dealt with its relation with If there was no conflux of interest between China Vietnam. Clio | 25 WORKS CITED

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Editor. “Desperate Self-Confession [走投无路的自供状].” People’s Daily [人民日报], 28 January 1969, p.1, https:// nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/01.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2020.

Lord, Winston. “Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Zhou, 9 July 1971, 4:35-11:20 PM, with cover memo to Kissinger, 29 July 1971.” National Security Archive, 21 December 2004, https://nsarchive2.gwu. edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/09.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2020.

“Memorandum of Conversation Between Ambassador Agha Hilaly and Harold H. Saunders, 28 August 1969.” National Security Archive, 21 December 2004, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/02.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2020.

“Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972.” National Security Archive, 21 December 2004, https://nsar- chive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/NZ-1.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2020.

“Memorandum of Conversation, 23 February 1972.” National Security Archive, 21 December 2004, https://nsar- chive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/10.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2020.

“Record of Nixon and Kissinger Telephone Conversation, 14 April 1971.” National Security Archive, 21 December 2004, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/05.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2020.

“Record of Nixon-Kissinger Telephone Conversation, 27 April 1971 8:18 p.m..” National Security Archive, 21 De- cember 2004, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/07.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2020.

Xiong, Xianghui. “The Prelude to the Opening of Sino-American Relations 打开中美关系的前奏[ ].” CCP History Materials [中共党史资料 Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao], June 1992, No. 42 excerpts, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/03.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2020.

Zhou, Enlai. “Message from Zhou Enlai to Nixon, 21 April 1971, Rec’d 27 April 1971, Responding to Nixon’s 16 December 1970 Message.” National Security Archive, 21 December 2004, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/06.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2020.

Zhou, Enlai. “Message from Zhou Enlai to Nixon, 29 May 1971 [周恩来总理给尼克松总统的口信].” National Se- curity Archive, 21 December 2004, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/08a.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2020. 26 | Clio

POWERLESS SUPERPOWER: THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS Mason Smith On November 4, 1971, a group of Iranian students to be returned to Iran. Khomeini’s strategic move stormed the U.S. embassy gates in Tehran, taking over allowed him to have power over the U.S. without having ninety hostages, including sixty-five Americans. The to break any international laws (“Iran: Understanding unprecedented siege would begin a four hundred and the Shi’ite Islamic Movement”). In response, U.S. forty-four-day hostage crisis. During the crisis, three President Jimmy Carter sent two negotiators to meet military operations planned to rescue the fifty-two with Khomeini, but Khomeini refused the meeting, remaining American diplomats held hostage, with only leading Carter to freeze all Iranian assets in U.S. banks. one proving successful. These failed rescue missions By November 17, 1971, Khomeini ordered the prove that even global superpowers are vulnerable release of all female and African- American hostages, to attacks from undeveloped countries once foreign leaving fifty-three remaining hostages. Unknown to the intelligence and military strategy becomes ineffective. students and Iranian government, six U.S. diplomats The Muslim Student Followers of Imam’s Line, who escaped during the siege were hiding in the the group who led the siege, were a radical religious Canadian embassy. Canadian and U.S. intelligence group who supported the Iranian revolution. That day, agencies collaborated on a plan that would allow the students were protesting the United States’ acceptance diplomats to flee the country without alarming the of the former Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s asylum. Iranian government. The mission involved using fake The Shah, who was exiled as a result of the Iranian Canadian passports and a fake Canadian action movie. revolution, was dying of cancer and asking to receive For the plan to work, the diplomats would have to treatment from American doctors. However, the learn their fake identities as members of a film crew students wanted the U.S. to return the Shah to Iran and Iranian customs. From Tehran, they would fly to to be jailed or executed. The protest quickly became Switzerland and then on to the United States (Jervis). violent as embassy guards tear-gassed protesters, leading The rescue mission took nearly four months to plan the demonstrators to storm the embassy (Gwertzman). but ultimately proved successful. Carter celebrated The Americans viewed hostage-taking as a violation this successful rescue mission and promised that the of international law, including the Vienna Convention, remaining hostages would be brought home soon which granted diplomats immunity from arrest and (Special Coordination Committee). Although this made it illegal to raid embassies. The Americans initially secret mission was hazardous, the rescue proved that avoided taking military action because the U.S. expected proper intelligence and planning could save lives. that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah However, as for the other remaining fifty-three hostages, Khomeini, would denounce the siege and order the the Carter administration had yet to develop a viable hostages to be released. Instead, Khomeini supported plan. the students’ actions, calling for the Shah and his assets By April 1980, President Carter had cut all Clio | 27 diplomatic ties with Iran and ordered all Iranian Operation Critical Sport was put together diplomats to leave the United States. As negotiations immediately after the tragedy of Eagle Claw. The stood at a halt, military personnel began finalizing mission involved landing a large aircraft on an Iranian a second rescue attempt. Operation Eagle Claw’s soccer field near where the hostages were being held. mission was for Special Operations helicopters to fly However, to accomplish this, a new kind of aircraft in darkness at low altitude, in formation, across hostile needed inventing. This aircraft would have to be large Iranian territory, and then meet up with C-130 aircraft enough to extract all fifty-two hostages, but more on a base near Tehran. Although the operation took importantly, it would have to be able to land and over four months to plan, military personnel had take off within one hundred and twenty yards, very doubts about whether it would work. On April 24, uncommon for most aircraft (Document 6). This new the mission was a go, as the six helicopters took off aircraft was a modified C-130 airplane equipped with despite the multiple dust storms that had appeared. rockets at the bottom to aid with takeoff and landing. These dust storms appeared in the weather report, The modification had only been done once before and but military planners supposedly underplayed their had not been thoroughly tested. This proposed rescue severity (Holloway). Visibility through the dust became attempt was a long shot based upon the mission’s so precarious that two of the six helicopters had to logistical difficulties, and the operation was eventually turn back. The mission was aborted due to the early abandoned (McNally). developing problems and the helicopters returning to After four hundred and forty-four days of captivity, base. As the aircraft were landing, two of the helicopters the remaining fifty-two hostages were released after collided, killing eight service members and injuring signing the Algiers Accords. Although Khomeini won many others. In a press conference the next day, Carter the revolution, Americans resented him. However, took responsibility for aborting the mission and urged a Khomeini won his nation’s respect because of his peaceful return of the hostages amidst the tragedy (CBS unprecedented power over the U.S. during the hostage News). The failed mission was a devastating blow to crisis. The hostages were released on Ronald Reagan’s the Carter administration by giving Khomeini first say inauguration day, considered the final blow by the in the negotiations. Although plans for a third rescue Iranian government against Carter. The Accords would operation developed while negotiations continued with require new sanctions on American involvement in the Iranian government, Operation Eagle Claw was the Middle East, but more importantly, it would end a the last military rescue attempt during the Iran hostage period of fear and helplessness (The New York Times). crisis because of its fatal outcome. Military overview The Iranian hostage crisis and the unsuccessful rescue committees analyzed the failed mission described it missions that followed still shape foreign intelligence as “ill-prepared and ill-informed.” This would become and special military operations today. The successes a recurring theme throughout the crisis (Special and failures that the U.S. endured during this crisis Coordination Committee). showed that even the biggest world superpower with As the hostage crisis reached the three hundred the strongest army and intelligence agencies could be day mark, Khomeini set new terms for the hostages’ rendered utterly powerless under the right (or, in this release, including returning the late Shah’s wealth and case, wrong) circumstances. unfreezing Iranian assets. In response, the U.S. sent a delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to work through mediators in Algeria to negotiate the release of the hostages. While these negotiations continued, the U.S. military planned a third and final rescue mission in the event the negotiations fell through. 28 | Clio WORKS CITED Gwertzman, Bernard. “GOVERNMENT IN IRAN VOWS HELP IN SIEGE.” The New York Times, 5 Nov. 1979, www.nytimes.com/1979/11/05/archives/government-in-iran-vows-help-in-siege-us-is-uncertain-despite. html?searchResultPosition=10.

Holloway, J. L. “‘Final Report of the Special Operations Review Group.’” The National Security Archive, National Security Archive, July 1980, nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=6536632-National-Security-Archive-Doc-10- Final-Report-of.

“Iran: Understanding the Shi’ite Islamic Movement,.” National Security Archive, 3 Feb. 1978,nsarchive.gwu.edu/ dc.html?doc=5734177-National-Security-Archive-Doc-03-U-S-Embassy.

Jervis, Robert. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs). 1st ed., Cornell University Press, 2011.

CBS News. “President Jimmy Carter - Statement on Iran Rescue Mission.” YouTube, uploaded by MCamericanpresident, 28 Mar. 2008, www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Km3dx7wppA.

McNally, Brendan, and Brendan McNally. “Credible Sport: The Super-STOL Hercules.” Defense Media Network, 9 May 2012, www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/credible-sport-the-super-stol-hercules.

New York Times. “TEXT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. TO RESOLVE THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.” The New York Times, 20 Jan. 1981, www.nytimes.com/1981/01/20/world/text-of- agreement-between-iran-and-the-us-to-resolve-the-hostage-situation.html.

Ode, Robert. “Iran Hostage’s Diary / Robert C. Ode - Research - The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum.” The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Jimmy Carter Library, 24 Nov. 1980, www. jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/iran_hostages_diary.

Special Coordination Committee. “‘Iran.’” The National Security Archive, 8 Nov. 1979, nsarchive.gwu.edu/ dc.html?doc=6536628-National-Security-Archive-Doc-06-Special

The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum. “Iran Update.”The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, 7 May 1979, www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/the_tehran_six. Clio | 29

THE MORAL EDUCATION OF WILLIAM COLBY: CONFRONTING THE PHOENIX PROGRAM Abigail Barber Part of the CIA’s “Family Jewels’’ document (those the CIA/US military, South Vietnamese military, records released by the CIA at the demand of the and Australian military to destroy the Viet Cong, Senate’s Church Committee investigating the agency’s an organization of armed communist insurgents misdeeds in the late 70’s) detailed the correspondence attempting to overthrow the Vietmanese government. between William Colby and Lloyd Shearer following Operatives from Operation Phoenix used torture, the release of an article written by Shearer claiming political assassination, and interrogation to strategically that the CIA used political assasination as a weapon infilatrate the political infrastructure of the Viet during Operation Phoenix. This correspondence is Cong. Operation Phoenix “neutralized” 81,740 significant because it shows Colby’s reluctance to reveal people, including the killing of between 26,369 and the CIA’s actions due to his personal involvement and 41,000 people. (“Phoenix Program,” Wikipedia). The pressure from his colleagues, and how he overcomes program was highly controversial and the United States’ it. This correspondence also set off a series of events involvement was terminated in 1973, but the South resulting in President Gerald Ford issuing an executive Vietnamese government continued Operation Phoenix order banning the use of political assassination by US as Plan F-6. In 1971, William Colby returned from government agencies. Vietnam and was appointed as Executive Director of William Colby began his career as an intelligence the CIA. officer for the Office of Strategic Services Division of Lloyd Shearer was a highly influential journalist the United States Army in 1941. Colby returned to the who used a question and answer style to explore United States in 1945, was hired by the CIA, and was controversial topics in his columns. On January sent undercover for 12 years. In 1958, Colby started his 9th, 1972, he wrote a column titled “Walter Scott’s first tour in Vietnam as the Chief of Station in Saigon, Personality Parade” in Parade magazine in which South Vietnam. While in Vietnam, Colby formed a he speculated that the CIA employed political close relationship with President Ngo Dinh Diem and assassination during Operation Phoenix. William helped increase South Vietnam’s ability to fight the Viet Colby decided to write a letter to Shearer, and to ask Cong insurgency. Upon his return to the United States Shearer to publish his letter as a rebuttal to Shearer’s in 1962, Colby became chief of the CIA’s Far East column. Colby consulted with many colleagues when Division before returning for a second tour in Vietnam drafting this letter, including a public relations official, in 1968. Legal Council, the Director of Central Intelligence, During his second tour in Vietnam, Colby oversaw a national security expert in Vietnamese affairs, and a Operation Phoenix as a part of Civil Operations Colonel. and Revolutionary Development Support, CORDS. Colby’s first draft of his letter to Lloyd Shearer Operation Phoenix was a cooperation between was typed on January 10th, 1972. In this letter Colby 30 | Clio stated that the United States has never used political implemented in his January 11th letter. The Deputy assassination, Operation Phoenix was not run by the Director for Plans (DDP), who’s name is not listed, CIA, and that it was not an assassination program. suggested some minor changes, some of which Colby Colby also claimed that any deaths were accidental implemented in his January 11th letter. Colonel White, and the result of resisting arrest or military operations, another recipient of the January 10th draft, thought the with the exception of minor abuses of power during letter said exactly what needed to be said and suggested Operation Phoenix. At the end of the letter Colby Colby send it along to another colleague. There is no asked Shearer to publish the letter as a rebuttal to record of any exchange between Colby and this other Shearer’s article (Colby, William). colleague. The first draft was sent to several people, including William Colby redrafted the letter on January Mr. Angus Thuermer, a CIA public relations official. 11th with a more specific but still brief explanation Thuermer suggested Colby remove the phrases of Operation Phoenix’s purpose and directly states describing the killings as a result of resisting arrest Operation Phoenix was not a political assassination and abuses of power because they weakened Colby’s program (Colby, William). This January 11th letter was definitive statement at the top of the letter, negating the sent to Lloyd Shearer without peer review. whole of Colby’s first draft. As a public relations official, Shearer responded on February 7th. Shearer’s letter Thuermer must have known that engaging with Shearer is witty and pokes fun at Colby, challenging Colby was a bad idea. He advised Colby to not write the letter to say under oath the CIA has never used political because it was unnecessary and would not convince assassination as a weapon (Colby, William). Shearer’s Shearer to publish the rebuttal. Thuermer also knew message was clear: he knew Colby was lying when he how the media would react to Colby’s choice of words. denied the CIA’s involvement in Operation Phoenix In a time of increased awareness of police brutality, and said that the CIA does not commit political Thuermer knew Colby’s claim that the deaths caused by assassinations. Shearer used humor and wit to show Operation Phoenix were of people who were resisting the extent to which he believed Colby was lying. He arrest would trigger a negative response from readers. challenged Colby to give his statement under oath Colby ignored Thuermer’s advice and left those claims because he was positive Colby would not be able to. in the letter. William Colby hand wrote the first draft of his Mr. George Carver, a national security expert second letter, which he revised without peer review who specialized in Vietnamese affairs, also received a before sending to Shearer. The first draft of the second copy of the January 10th draft and suggested Colby letter appears full of contradictions. Colby began be more detailed and specific when describing the by saying that he can testify that the CIA has not purpose and actions of Operation Phoenix in order to employed the use of political assassination, but as avoid speculation by readers. Carver’s vast wealth of the letter continues Colby admits the CIA has both knowledge as an expert in the Vietnamese affairs and entertained the idea of using political assassination intelligence led Carver to suggest a detailed response, on many occasions and almost carried out two instead of the vague acknowledgements that would assassinations, although the plans were stopped before be expected of a CIA agent trying to lie about a they could be executed (Colby, William). Colby ended covert operation. Colby was not as detailed as Carver the first draft by referring back to his original statement, suggested, but directly stated the deaths due to military which did not agree with the bulk of the letter. operations occured in a firefight. Any admission to entertaining or almost executing Colby also sent his January 10th draft to the General the act of political assassination was edited out by Council, who suggested that Colby explicitly state Colby in his second draft of the letter, which he sent the CIA was in coordination within the US military back to Shearer on February 29th. Colby confirmed through Operation Phoenix, a suggestion Colby that he will state under oath the CIA has never carried Clio | 31 out a political assassination. In this second draft, Colby article, the United States Senate Select Committee decided to mimic Shearer’s mocking attitude with to Study Governmental Operations with Respect an extension of Shearer’s joke at the end of the letter. to Intelligence Activities, the Church Committee, Colby did this to mask the seriousness with which the was created to investigate violations of the respective CIA and Colby were taking these allegations. charters of the CIA, FBI, and IRS on January 27, 1975. On April 30th, Shearer responded by telling Colby Hersh’s article spurred the formation of this Committee that he knows CIA agents take a secrecy pledge-one because unlike other articles, including Lloyd Shearer’s, that prevented Colby from speaking about the CIA’s Hersh had access to classified CIA documents when employment of political assassination tactics under writing his article. In 1976, the Church Committee oath. Shearer also continued to poke fun at Colby, and published an interim report detailing how the United pointed out that Colby was obviously lying (Colby, States Government Agencies, such as the CIA, had William). committed political assassinations, such as Operation After receiving Shearer’s second letter, Colby wanted Phoenix in Vietnam. In response President Gerald Ford to continue to try to convince Shearer to publish released Executive Order 11905 banning the use of Colby’s rebuttal. Colby consulted with Mr Thuermer, political assassination by the United States government who suggested that they move on, as he had been on February 18, 1976. suggesting to Colby from the beginning. Colby took This correspondence between William Colby and Thuermer’s advice and did not respond, refusing to give Lloyd Shearer is important because it shows Colby Shearer a confirmation that the CIA was using political is considering increasing transparency of the CIA’s assassination as a weapon. actions. This led to the creation of the “Family Jewels”, In May of 1973, under the newly appointed Director portions of which were leaked in an article by Seymore Willam Colby, the CIA began to assemble a collection Hersh. Hersh’s article caused the formation of the of all activities that violated the CIA charter or the Church Committee, who wrote a report stating that the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security CIA was violating their charter by committing political Act of 1947 restructured the US military, founded assassinations. This report motivated President Gerald the CIA and the National Security Council, and set Ford to release Executive Order 11905, which banned guidelines for how these organizations should be run. the use of political assassination by any United States This record of illegal activities would eventually become Agency. This correspondence also shows Colby’s moral known as the “Family Jewels”, and included Colby’s struggle, as he had to choose between revealing his correspondence with Mr. Lloyd Shearer. actions or being complicit in a coverup. Initially Colby Some of the CIA records, including documents caved to the wishes of his colleges and his own sense of containing what is now the “Family Jewels”, were leaked self preservation by covering up the CIA’s actions. Over to Seymour Hersh, who published an article in the New time the guilt wore Colby down, inspiring him to write York Times in 1974. In his article, Hersh claimed the the “Family Jewels” and reveal the CIA’s worst crimes. CIA was breaking its charter by spying on Americans The release of the “Family Jewels” changed both the and conducting other illegal and unethical activities, CIA’s transparency policies and how Americans think including political assassination. In response to Hersh’s of the CIA to this day. 32 | Clio WORKS CITED “Angus Thuermer, reporter turned CIA official, dies.” Neiman News, Published 14, May, 2010,https://nieman. harvard.edu/news/2010/05/angus-thuermer-reporter-turned-ciafficial-dies/. Accessed 19, November, 2020.

“Church Committee.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, published 18, November, 2020, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Church_Committee. Accessed 19, November, 2020.

Colby, William. “The Family Jewels”.Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/ library/readingroom/. Accessed 17, November, 2020.

“Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, published 31, October, 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_Director_of_the_Central_Intelligence_Agency. Accessed 19, November, 2020.

“Executive Order 11905.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, published 11, April, 2020, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Executive_Order_11905. Accessed 19, November, 2020.

“Family Jewels.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, published 19, September, 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Family_Jewels_(Central_Intelligence_Agency) . Accessed 19, November, 2020.

“Lloyd Sherer.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, published 21, October, 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Lloyd_Shearer. Accessed 19, November, 2020.

“National Security Act of 1947.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, published 3, November, 2020, https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Act_of_1947. Accessed 19, November, 2020.

“Phoenix Program.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, published 19, November, 2020, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Phoenix_Program. Accessed 19, November, 2020.

“William Colby.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, published 28, October, 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/William_Colby. Accessed 19, November, 2020. Clio | 33

OVER THE MOON: AMERICA’S COLD WAR IN SPACE Jacob Tybor JFK and the American government’s interest in lunar it was a great symbol of American technological military bases during the space race had significant superiority and perseverance. Additionally, the world large scale effects, both positive and negative. The started to learn about nuclear power and as the research development of these bases would present many of the bases continued, nuclear propulsion became a advantages in research, military, and technological great option for generating power on the moon. Also, fields, but they also presented immense problems such many lunar resources were discovered and planned as cost and more importantly diplomatic relations. to be developed so that they could provide necessary Overall, these problems easily outweigh the advantages. resources such as oxygen and hydrogen to support The space race began in 1957 with the competition space operations(Johnson). This is important because between communist Russia and the United States. it would be using sources of energy on the moon; Some of America’s largest studies during this time were therefore, making military bases more cost efficient and Project Horizon, Lunex Project, and the Military Lunar sensible. Because of the interest in lunar bases, America Base Program. All of these moon projects were run by developed many advancements in space exploration. the Army and Air Force branches. In the end, no lunar Likewise, the establishment of military lunar bases military bases were ever built. would have given the US military control over the As a result of these bases, the United States gained world. Americans would have been able to view most incredible knowledge about the characteristics of of the earth from the moon with large telescopes and space flight and the possibility of sustaining life on thus been able to commence quick military action the moon. The US scientists had to develop state giving America an advantage with spying and secret of the art rocket propulsion, guidance, and control missions (Trudeau). Moon based military power would systems in order to create these bases, which would be extremely effective in wars and would be difficult to give them significant advantages later in the space combat because of the enemies limited point of view race. During the research and development of Project from earth (Trudeau). All of this would give America Horizon, American engineers and scientists created the advantages in war and diplomacy. If there would be a Centaur Rocket(Koelle). This, the first liquid hydrogen war anywhere in the world, America could easily take propellant rocket engine, was groundbreaking because out crucial points within the enemy lines without having it possessed a lot of thrust and would later propel many to place boots on the ground (Trudeau). This would probes, satellites, and the Surveyor 2 lunar lander help save lives and reduce the amount of money needed (O’Neill). Also, these technological advancements to train skilled soldiers. With regard to diplomacy, the helped develop the future of spaceflight for America United States would be able to apply pressure on the (Trudeau). A clear example was the Apollo missions, other countries because of its vast military presence which led to the first man on the moon being an on the moon. The US could develop effective alliances American which made the Russians very upset because with other countries because America would dominate 34 | Clio the battlefield. It is very clear based on these effects that forced to pay more and these expenses are unnecessary lunar bases would give America a clear advantage over all for the country. of the world in the aspects of military domination. The worst consequence from the lunar bases would In response to the vast research and development be the tension placed on diplomatic relationships that would be needed for the lunar bases, the United because of the excessive military power that America States would learn and gain knowledge on certain would have. Countries would be desperate to befriend aspects of space that would end up helping them till the United States and this could cause many problems this day. To understand how life works in a vacuum between other countries throughout the world. The and how to make it possible, scientists started creating military outreach from these bases would expand over closed environments to learn about this (Koelle). the whole world (Koelle). This would create tensions Making it possible to learn how life may be preserved between every country, big or small. Although the bases on the moon. In response to the different biological, would provide more power to the US defense, it would chemical, radiological qualities of the moon, scientists put America in a position of high responsibility from had to create ways to measure electromagnetic radiation the points of other countries (Koelle). Countries that and other dangerous chemical conditions for the safety don’t have strong military forces would have to rely on of astronauts. This led to the study of atmospheric America. This would put stress upon our services that regeneration and the development of non electric isn’t needed. Also, if the US put a base on the moon, signaling devices (Koelle). Additionally, scientists it might cause world panic (Koelle). Other countries developed ways to grow algae for the production of might think the US was planning to perform aggressive, food and ways to convert carbon dioxide to breathable violent actions, which could cause an economic crisis or oxygen(Koelle). These achievements have carried over paranoia among the people. Lunar military bases would to making life on earth better too, not just in space. end up crippling world relations and would force some Because of the extensive research of lunar bases, the US countries to experience disastrous events. has made the world a better place and learned how to It is undeniable that the research that went into keep people safe in dangerous environments. lunar military bases gave the United States valuable Although there are significant benefits of lunar information and advantages in the realm of space bases, many problems would have arisen from these exploration. Even the establishment of one of these lunar bases which overshadow the positive effects. lunar bases would have given America huge advantages The construction of a base would be extremely costly. over other countries. But if one of these bases would In 1959, Project Horizon was calculated to cost $6.1 have been placed on the moon, many terrible things billion for just the first eight and a half years (Koelle). would happen as a consequence. It is clear that the cost If we calculate the inflation rate since then, the present is too much to pay and the government could do a lot day cost would be around $54 billion. In April of of beneficial things with the amount of money that 1960, the cost of a ten year period was calculated to would be necessary to to pay for a base. Also, the panic be $7.7 billion (Johnson). The present day cost would and world turmoil that would occur is astronomical. be around $68 billion. In May of 1961, the cost of the Countries’ relationships would be ruined and people first ten years of the Lunex operation was $8.1 billion would be living with a constant fear of attack. It is in (Lulejian). The present day cost would be around $71 the world’s best interest that a lunar military base wasn’t billion. This puts in perspective how expensive these established because then we would have to deal with the bases would be. It is a good thing that JFK didn’t follow alarming consequences. through with these plans because taxpayers would be Clio | 35 WORKS CITED Johnson George, W.S. Military Lunar Base Program. Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, Apr. 1960. National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB479/docs/EBB-Moon03.pdf. Nov. 10, 2020

Koelle H, Heinz. Project Horizon Volume II. United States Army, 8 June 1959. National Security Archive, https:// nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB479/docs/EBB-Moon01A_sm.pdf. Nov. 9, 2020

Lulejian Norair, M. Lunex, Lunar Expedition Plan. United States Air Force, May 1961. National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB479/docs/EBB-Moon04.pdf. Nov. 13, 2020

O’Neill, Ian J. “Earth May Have Captured a 1960s-Era Rocket Booster.” NASA, NASA, 12 Nov. 2020, https:// www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/news.php?feature=7783. Nov. 16, 2020

Trudeau Arthur, G. Project Horizon Volume I. United States Army, 20 Mar. 1959. National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB479/docs/EBB-Moon01_sm.pdf. Nov. 11, 2020 36 | Clio