The Role of Algeria in the Iran Hostage Crisis, 1979-1981

Home , Algiers Accords, Black Friday (1978), Canadian Caper, Iranian frozen assets, Operation Eagle Claw, Ulric Haynes

People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research Larbi Ben M’hidi University-Oum El Bouaghi

Faculty of Letters and Languages Department of English

A Mémoire Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Arts in Anglo-American Studies

By: Berhail Wafa

Board of Examiners:

Dr. Maameri Fatima, Supervisor

Mr. Dalichaouech Abderahmane, member

2016-2017

Abstract

The role of Algeria in the Iran Hostage Crisis is rarely tackled by researchers, thus the importance of this research lies in its highlighting of such a role. Although Algeria played an important role in solving the diplomatic crisis between Iran and the United

States, its role has been neglected by the latter. It entered as a mediator between Iran and the United States at a time when the two parties refused to sit at the negotiating table. Despite this important intervention, there is no evidence that the United States political scene showed any gratitude, especially the Reagan administration. The

Hollywood movie Argo (2012) is told from an American-based point of view, thus it ignores the Algerian role in the Iran Hostage Crisis. Our descriptive and analytical study has come to the conclusion that the successful Algerian role in the Iran Hostage

Crisis has been neglected by the United States because of the latter’s promotion of

American exceptionalism.

Keywords: Iran Hostage Crisis, Algerian role, American exceptionalism

Résumé

Le rôle de l’Algérie dans la crise des otages Américains en Iran est rarement abordé par les chercheurs, donc l’importance de cette recherche repose dans l’insistance sur ce rôle. Bien que l’Algérie ait joué un rôle important pour la résolution de la crise diplomatique entre l’Iran et les Etats-Unis, son rôle était négligé par les Etats-Unis.

L’Algérie a entré comme un médiateur entre l’Iran et les Etats-Unis à une période quand les deux parties ont refusés d’asseoir à la table de négociations. Malgré cette importante intervention, il n y’a aucune évidence que la scène politique des Etats-Unis a montré n’importe quel gratitude; notamment l’administration de Reagan. Argo

(2012) est raconté d’un point de vu Américain, dont il ignore le rôle de l’Algérie dans la crise des otages Américains en Iran. Notre étude descriptive et analytique est venue de la conclusion que le rôle de l’Algérie dans la crise des otages Américains en Iran a

été négligé par les Etats-Unis à cause de l’encouragement d’exceptionnalisme

Américain par ce dernier.

Mots clés: La crise des otages Américains en Iran, rôle Algérien, exceptionnalisme

Américain

ملخص

إن دور الجزائر في أزمة الرهائن األمريكيين في إيران نادرا ما يعالج من طرف الباحثين، مما يجعل أهمية هذا

البحث تكمن في تسليطه الضوء على هذا الدور. بالرغم من أن الجزائر لعبت دورا هاما في حل األزمة

الدبلوماسية بين إيران و الواليات المتحدة، هذا الدور متجاهل من قبل األمريكيين. لقد دخلت الجزائر كوسيط بين

إيران و الواليات المتحدة في وقت كان فيه الطرفان يرفضان الجلوس على طاولة المفاوضات. و لكن بالرغم من

هذا التدخل المهم، ال يوجد أي دليل يثبت أن الوسط السياسي األمريكي قد أظهر أي امتنان خاصة عهدة ريغان.

في ما يخص فيلم هوليوود آرغو )2012(، بما انه قد حكي من وجهة نظر أمريكية إذا فهو يتجاهل الدور

الجزائري في أزمة الرهائن األمريكيين في إيران. إذن، دراستنا الوصفية و التحليلية وصلت إلى أن دور الجزائر

في أزمة الرهائن األمريكيين في إيران متجاهل من قبل الواليات المتحدة بسبب الترويج لالستثنائية األمريكية من

قبل هذه األخيرة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: أزمة الرهائن األمريكيين في إيران، الدور الجزائري، االستثنائية األمريكية

Dedication

To the Memory of Mohamed Seddik Benyahia who sacrified his life to spread peace

To my parents and my brother

iii

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Maameri Fatima for her guidance as well as for correcting my drafts. Also, words cannot express my gratitude to my parents who inspired me to find the topic of this Mémoire. I thank the following people whose emotional support accompanied me through the conduct of this

Mémoire: my grandfather Berhail Belaid, my grandmother Naoun Bahria, my brother Berhail Fethi, my cousin Mehtali Khawla and Bougoufa Said who holds the position of a father in my heart. Finally, I thank my family and my following friends:

Zerara Zina, Yousfi Chaima, Chaoui Maroua Yakouta and Lamraoui Meriem Sara with whom I share the best memories throughout my university years.

List of acronyms

AIOS: Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

NFL: National Liberation Front

JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization

SAVAK: Sāzemān-e Ettelā'āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar ( Iranian Organization of

Intelligence and National Security)

SIS: Secret Intelligence Service

UNCHR: United Nations Commission on Human Rights

List of illustrations

Figure1: The Arrival of the American Hostages to Algiers……..………………….28

Figure2: Warren Christopher and Mohamed Seddik Benyahia…………………….30 vi

Table of Contents

Abstract

Dedication…………………………………………………………………………. ii

Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………….. iii

List of acronyms…………………………………………………………………... iv

List of illustrations………………………………………………………………….v

Table of contents…………………………………………………………………...vi

Introduction………………………………………………………………………...1

Chapter I: Iran-United States Relations during the Carter Administration

I. The United States Relations with Mohammed Reza Pahlavi: A Background……7

II. The Iranian Revolution, 1979……………………………………………………9

III. The Iran Hostage Crisis………………………………………………………...12

IV. Operation Eagle Claw and its Consequences…………………………………..15

Chapter II: Algeria-United States Relations: The Role of Algeria in the Iran

Hostage Crisis

I. Algerian-American Relations after 1962: An Overview…………………………20

II. The Diplomatic Strategies of Algeria in the Iran Hostage Crisis………………...23

III. The End of the Crisis……………………………………………………………27

IV. The Impact of the Algerian Mediation on the Algerian-American Relations…..30

Chapter III: Argo (2012): A Critical Analysis

I. The Representation of Historical Events by Hollywood…………………………34

II. Argo: The Plot…………………………………………………………………..37 vii

III. Argo: An Overview of Film Criticisms……………………………………...... 40

IV. Argo: Film Analysis…………………………………………………………....43

General Conclusion…………………………………………………………….....48

Endnotes…………………………………………………………………………..50

List of Works Cited……………………………………………………………….53 1

Introduction

The Iran Hostage Crisis was a diplomatic crisis that occurred between Iran and the United States during which a number of Americans were hold hostages by a group of Iranian students. The diplomatic relations between the two countries started to break down after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 that led to the overthrow of Shah

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The latter took refuge in the United States which declined to return him back to Iran; more, it refused to recognize the new government which resulted from the Iranian Revolution. Consequently, a group of Iranian students took over the United States embassy in Tehran. By doing so, fifty- two American diplomats were held hostages for 444 days under the supervision of the new Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Many attempts were made by the United States president

Jimmy Carter in order to free the hostages; however, all of those attempts failed until

Algeria acted as a mediator between the two countries. The negotiations continued until 19 January 1981 when the hostages were released under the terms of the Algiers

Accords.

In 2012, a Hollywood movie named Argo was produced. Claiming to be based on a true event, the Iran Hostage Crisis, the movie tells the story of six

Americans who escaped during the seizing of the American embassy in Tehran. It has caused controversy among scholars and film critics who claim that the movie lacks historical accuracy. Throughout the movie, it is noticeable that the Algerian role, which is going to be tackled in this research, is neglected by its producer Ben

Affleck. 2

The importance of this topic lies in its focus on the Algerian role as a mediator between the United States and Iran. It presents the Iran Hostage Crisis from a perspective that is rarely tackled by scholars and researchers. Hence, it introduces the readers to the importance of the Algerian role in freeing the American hostages held in Iran. Also, it introduces the readers to Mohammed Seddik Beniahya’s efforts to ensure the success of negotiations between Iran and the United States.

The main focus of this Mémoire is the neglection of the Algerian role by the

United States. Algeria interfered between the two parties at a critical time, when negotiations between them reached a complex point. Such mediation resulted in the release of the hostages held for almost 14 months. Hence, although Algeria played an important role in solving the diplomatic crisis between Iran and the United States, its role has been underlooked by United States politicians and filmmakers.

Through the use of relevant sources, this research’s main aim is to shed light on the Algerian efforts that were made in order to solve the Iran Hostage Crisis.

Because of the complexity of the situation between Iran and the United States, certain diplomatic efforts were required in order to set negotiations between the two parties. Those efforts were mainly made by Mohammed Seddik Benyahia, Algeria’s

Minister of Foreign Affairs, who presented a great example of a developed Algerian diplomacy. Thus, this research’s second aim is to stimulate researchers to produce more writings about Algerian diplomacy and political figures. Considering the fact that filmmaking plays an important role in our present time, Algerian filmmakers should produce a movie that tackles the Algerian mediation in the Iran Hostage

Crisis. 3

Since the most important issue raised by this Mémoire is the role undertaken by Algeria in the Iran Hostage Crisis, certain research questions are raised about this subject. Algeria’s mediation came after the failure of an American military operation named Operation Eagle Claw, which worsened relations between the United States and Iran. Hence, the following research question is raised: What are the diplomatic strategies undertaken by Algeria which led to the release of the American hostages, thus solving the Iran Hostage Crisis? Also, since the Algerian role is neglected by

American politicians and Hollywood; the following research question is raised: What is the reason which stands behind the fact that the role of Algeria in the Iran Hostage

Crisis is neglected by Argo particularly? Hypothetically speaking, the interference of

Algeria in the Iran hostage crisis is neglected by the United States because of

American beliefs in their own superiority, which is known as American exceptionalism.

The most important primary sources used in this Mémoire have opposite views on the Algerian role in the Iran Hostage Crisis. Warren Christopher, the

American Secretary of State and chief negotiator during the crisis, has constantly praised the Algerian role. He stated in his book American Hostages in Iran that “The

Algerians served an indispensable function in interpreting two widely disparate cultures…” (9). Argo, however, does not include any reference to the Algerian mediation in the Iran Hostage Crisis. At the end, the movie states that “The Iran

Hostage Crisis ended on 20 January 1981, when all remaining hostages were released” (01:50:26 - 01:50:30) without providing the viewer with any information about the process of freeing the hostages and the role of Algeria in that. 4

Some of the secondary sources, on the other hand, have varied opinions about the Algerian role. Some researchers underestimated the Algerian role such as Greig and Diehl in their book International Mediation who stated that “Algeria was significantly weaker than the two sides that it mediated during the hostage crisis, and therefore it lacked the resources to leverage concessions from the two sides…” (84).

Other researchers share the point of view presented in this Mémoire, such as Looney who claimed in his book Handbook of the US-Middle East Relations that “Insensitive to the positive mediating role Algerians had played in resolving the Iranian hostage crisis, the US showed no gratitude” (224). Along with these sources, a variety of others has been used. In order to cite them, the seventh edition of Modern Language

Association format is used.

The following Mémoire is divided into three chapters, which include the use of descriptive and analytical methods of research. The first chapter describes Iran-

United States relations since 1953. The first point tackled in this chapter depicts the

United States role in organizing the 1953 Iranian coup d’état, which set the pro-

American Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as the Shah of Iran. The second point describes the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which came as a result of the Shah’s pro-American attitude, as well as his deeds toward Iranian people. The third point tackles the event of the Iran Hostage Crisis that came as a consequence of the United States support for the Shah. The last point tackled in this chapter is about the military rescue mission Operation Eagle Claw and its consequences on the Carter administration and negotiations between Iran and the United States, which resulted in Algeria’s entrance as a mediator. 5

The second chapter describes the role of Algeria in the Iran Hostage Crisis.

The first point presents an overview on Algerian-American relations after 1962, which were characterized by inconsistency until Algeria’s entrance as a mediator to free the American hostages. The second point demonstrates the diplomatic strategies displayed by Algeria to solve the Iran Hostage Crisis. The implication of those strategies resulted in the end of the crisis, which is described in the third point. The fourth point examines the impact of the Algerian mediation on Algerian-American diplomatic relations, which witnessed a certain improvement. The Algerian role, however, seems to be underlooked by American politicians.

The third chapter presents the practical part of this Mémoire; it includes a critical analysis of Argo (2012). The first point tackles the manner of representing historical events by Hollywood, which seems to fictionalize such historical events and show them from an American perspective. The second point offers a detailed description of the movie’s plot in order to project it with the real event. The third point makes use of the film criticisms about Argo, and agrees on its lack of historical accuracy and its American-based perspective. The last point presents an analysis of the movie in order to discover the reason behind its neglection of the Algerian role in the Iran Hostage Crisis.

In conclusion, this Mémoire shows that the Algerian role in the Iran Hostage

Crisis is underlooked because of the United States’ promotion of American exceptionalism. Through the examination of some declarations made by American politicians, the American political scene shows little gratitude to such a role. In addition, the critical analysis of Argo shows that it maximizes the role of the CIA; thus, it led to the neglection of other parties that were involved in the Iran Hostage 6

Crisis and most importantly Algeria. As a consequence, it is fair to say that such a neglection comes as a result of promoting American exceptionalism.

CHAPTER I

Iran-United States Relations during the Carter Administration

Introduction:

The diplomatic relations between United States and Iran have worsened since

1981, the year which witnessed the end of a crisis between the two countries and a beginning of long disconnected diplomatic relations. What is known as the Iran

Hostage Crisis came out as a result of a series of events which took place in Iran; yet it took place under the influence of the United States policy. Starting from the 1953

Iranian coup d'état till the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the United States was definitely under the spotlight through the course of these events that led to the Iran Hostage

Crisis which in turn left a long lasting mark in the history of the diplomatic relations between the two nations.

I. The United States Relations with Mohammed Reza Pahlavi: A Background

Before highlighting the relations between the Carter administration and

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s reign, it is important to present a brief overview about the 1953 Iranian coup d'état through which Pahlavi succeeded in placing himself on the throne with the help of the United States and the United Kingdom. Unlike the latter, the former released classified documents which prove its organization of the coup d’état against the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadegh. After his election in 1952, it became clear that Mosadegh’s policy was against any external intervention in the Iranian oil industry. Thus, he issued “the Iranian Oil

Nationalization Act to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company1” (Rieffer- 8

Flanagan 25). As a result, both London and Washington expressed their dissatisfaction with such a decision that, according to them, threatened their presence in the area. Moreover; being in a Cold War against the Soviet Union, the United

States feared “a communist takeover of the Iranian government” (Rieffer-Flanagan

25) due to Iran’s strategic position and oil resources.

The Shah was also against Mosadegh’s policy of nationalization; yet, he was unable to react about such a decision for it had gained much popularity among

Iranians. Refusing to stand still, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency and the British Secret Intelligence Service coordinated a coup d’état codenamed

Operation Ajax to overthrow Mosadegh and restore Mohammed Reza Pahlavi who took refuge in Rome. The United States received internal assistance from the

Rashidian family2. It also gained the approval of Fazlollah Zahedi, a general who helped to overthrow the Iranian Prime Minister through offering military assistance for the coup. He replaced Mosadegh after arresting him 19 August 1953 (Rieffer-

Flanagan 26). Three days later, the Shah returned to Iran and restored his throne while expressing his gratitude to the United States by addressing one of the operation leaders, Kermit Roosevelt: “I owe my throne to God, my people, my army … and to you” (qtd. in Rieffer-Flanagan 27). As a consequence, the Shah received financial and military support from the United States and certainly the subsequent Carter’s administration was not an exception.

During the early 1970s, the American President Jimmy Carter established close ties with the Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. As stated by Richard

Rosecrance: “Internationally, the 1970s brought Iran much prominence and support

…. The United States chose Iran as its regional ally” (137). Indeed, Carter gave the 9

Shah access to the most advanced American weaponry on which the latter spent billions of dollars. Also, the Iranian military and SAVAK were trained by American advisors. Moreover, Carter’s speech in Tehran on the New Year’s Eve of 1978 was certainly a crucial speech which crystallized his country’s relations with Iran. Carter said: “Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world” (qtd. in Murray 19). Knowing that the

United States was securing its interests in the area in exchange for its support for the

Shah, the Iranian people were unwilling to accept such a relation, which meant that a revolution was on the horizon.

II. The Iranian Revolution, 1979

As has been stated previously, by the beginning of 1978, Iran was on the verge of making a revolution to overthrow Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The latter’s close relationship with the United States can be considered as the primary reason behind this revolution. He did not only make sure to keep special diplomatic relations with the United States, but he was even influenced by the American way of life to the extent that he wanted to implement it on his people by launching what is known as the White Revolution (Amuzegar 49). This caused an anti-American attitude adopted by Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution, and

“his Islamic followers” who received a major support from the Iranian people. The latter believed that “Iranian money was spent to protect Washington’s interests in the region … it was essentially a nationalistic [attitude] in both tone and substance”

(Amuzegar 49).

Furthermore, although the following reason was not as important as the previously mentioned one, it had an effect on the decision of revolting against the 10

Shah. The latter’s unsuitable economic policies throughout the years between 1973 and 1978 led to a major outrage mostly among the middle class since it was the class that was most affected by the economic decline. This is to say that “the rapid rising of oil prices in 1973” should have been a benefit for the Iranian economy since it had highly increased the latter’s wealth. However, the Shah mismanaged this wealth by wasting it on different projects for the next five years as well as constantly changing his economic plans (Clawson, sec. 2). As stated by Clawson, this led to “a great deal of a social disruption” because of the increased prices of the products, inflation and the Shah’s lifestyle which seemed that it was not affected by the economic difficulties that the country was witnessing (sec. 2).

Driven by political, economic and social motives, the Iranians were ready for making a change. In September 1978, a large number of Iranians estimated at one hundred thousand people engaged in a protest against the Shah which took place in

Jaleh Square, Tehran. On September 8, the Shah decided to put an end to the protest which lasted for three days and declared martial law3. The military force took action by shooting the protesters which led to a number of victims estimated by 88 deaths; this brutal action is referred to as the Black Friday. By doing so, the Shah ended any chances for a compromise as stated in Wagner: “The events of Black Friday [were] a critical turning point for moderate Iranians who had hoped for a peaceful resolution to the crisis” (63).

The events of Black Friday stimulated Iranians to take more actions in order to overthrow the Shah. The latter seemed to be on the verge of losing his throne; however, he was ready to fight for it until his last breath. The next decision taken by the Shah “cost[ed] him his throne” (Bergman, chap. 1). Under the Shah’s request, 11

Iraq deported Khomeini to France after it agreed to take him in. By doing so,

Khomeini received the attention of the Western media unlike the case when he was in Iraq. Also, he was able to maintain a constant communication with his supporters in Iran; thus, “hundreds of thousands of Iranians were marching in Tehran’s streets every day” (Bergman, chap. 1). Consequently, it seemed that the Shah’s removal from power was nothing but a matter of time despite his different attempts to preserve his position.

The Iranians’ increased intention to overthrow the Shah was demonstrated in the streets through different organized marches. Nevertheless, it was the marches of

Tasu’a and Ashura, organized by a great number of Iranians on December 10 and 11, that led to the surrender of the Shah to his people’s will. Also, the latter was even under an external pressure to leave the country. The Americans, for example, were pushing him to leave Iran. As viewed by Alikhani, “the American ambassador warned the Shah to leave the country as soon as possible” (19). Thus, 16 January

1979, the Shah left Iran heading to Egypt and Khomeini returned to Iran 10 February

1979, announcing the beginning of a new era in Iranian history.

What is important in American-Iranian relations after Khomeini’s assumption of power is his deep hatred toward the United States. As a result, it was not surprising that the relations between the two countries would take another path. As stated by Thigpen, the Americans who were staying in Iran were asked to leave; thus,

“45.000 Americans, most of whom were employees of American firms doing business in the country, were evacuated” (181). In addition, the Shah’s demand for asylum to the United States was accepted on the claim that it was for the sake of his treatment from cancer led to a pro-revolutionists’ outrage. They believed that the 12

United States was being disrespectful toward the Iranian Revolution by accepting the

Shah as a political refugee which set the basis for an action that would lead to an overturning moment in the relations between the two countries.

III. The Iran Hostage Crisis

The decline of relations between the United States and Iran leads one to wonder about the reason behind it. Research shows that the day of 4 November 1979 marked the beginning of a crisis that left a deep impact on the relations between the two nations for more than a quarter-century afterward. First, it is important to note that the action taken on the previously mentioned date was not the product of deep plannings; yet, it took an unexpected turn. When a group of Iranian students decided to take over the United States embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979, they did not anticipate that their decision would lead to a diplomatic crisis. One of the Iranian students’ leaders that took over the American embassy stated in an interview with Al

Jazeera correspondent Soraya Lennie:

That idea [taking over the US embassy] was just for a short while, for

48 hours. We said we would go there and stay for two days and then

everything would be over and we would protest. Then people from all

over the country swarmed around the embassy and then the event

turned into a student protest movement and then a national

movement… And the White House’s precipitancy in solving the

problem transformed a student movement into a chronic problem,

which enslaved Iran and America’s relationship for 444 days.

(Asgharzadeh) 13

As their group’s name suggests, the so-called Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Path4 were highly influenced by Khomeini. So, driven by their anti-

American position, the students believed that the United States was intervening in the

Iranian internal affairs. Also, they saw that since the Shah had betrayed his country, he had to be judged by Iranian courts for his deeds. Consequently, besides being supported by the people, the students got the support of Khomeini himself who praised their action and saw it as an opportunity to bring the United States down

(Bearce 57).

Undoubtedly, breaking in the United States embassy had never been expected even by the embassy employees themselves. Despite the fact that the latter were used to the unstable situation of the country, as well as the deep hatred held by the

Iranians toward the United States, they were surprised by the students’ action. Yet, this did not prevent them from destroying some secret documents before being caught. Most of the documents were completely destroyed; still some of them were torn up with a paper shredder which enabled the Iranians to restore them through

“taping them back together” (Karimianpour 189). For sure, destroying the documents by the employees reinforced Iranians’ suspicions about the United States. Indeed, they saw that this act was no more than a proof that the Americans were spying on

Iran (Karimianpour 191).

As for the reaction of the United States, the seizure of its embassy in Tehran, to say the least, was a horrifying deed for both the government and the people.

President Carter’s immediate reaction was to condemn this act and to consider it as a terrorist one. Moreover, he refused to return the Shah for trial and declared that the freeing of the sixty-two hostages would not be accomplished through military means. 14

His different attempts to free the hostages peacefully, however, would fail, which led eventually to a military action. It seems that the United States found itself helpless from the early days of the crisis. On November 7, just after four days from the seizure of the American embassy, Carter sent a delegate, Ramsey Clark, to negotiate the hostages’ release. Unexpectedly, Khomeini refused to meet the latter and ordered that no meetings with US delegates would be held in the future. Despite this, the

United States sought to make an “indirect contact with Khomeini” through the

Palestine Liberation Organization5 which convinced the Iranian leader to free

“thirteen female and black hostages whom the Iranian authorities did not consider to be spies” (Hemmer 63, 64).

On February 17, a secret attempt for negotiations was made in Paris by the

Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who assumed a moderate position to the hostage crisis, and Carter’s Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan. The two talked about the Iran-United States relations since 1900 and even referred to the relations of the two countries after the hostages’ release to which Ghotbzadeh ensured that Iran would remain an ally of the United States against the Soviets. Thus, the meeting between the two, to say the least, was optimistic and held unrealistic aims especially when the United Nations Commission on Human Rights6 was not permitted to see the hostages which meant that their release was not on the horizon (Bowden 361,

366).

With each day passing, Carter was definitely under a growing pressure from his own people besides being in the spotlight with the whole world anticipating the release of the hostages. On November 14, the American President “issued an executive order that froze all Iranian assets and deposits in United States’ banks and 15 their overseas branches” (Prins 311). By doing so, it became evident that the relations between the two countries were taking a turn for worse which had certainly affected the possibility for negotiations. Thus, believing that the United States had to pave the way for negotiations, the Carter administration pressed the Shah to leave the country, so he left for Panama on December 15. Being anxious that Panama would hand him over to Iran, he took refuge in Egypt in 1980 (Prins 312).

With the refusal of Khomeini to meet American delegates, it seemed that

Carter was in a weak position. The United States sought to impose its control over the Gulf region for a long period of time; however the position taken by Khomeini as well as the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union threatened such a strategy. As a reaction, “Carter sent some thirty naval vessels … into the Gulf of

Oman, the largest American naval concentration ever gathered in the region”

(Razoux 75). Consequently, such a decision taken by Carter indicated the possibility of executing a military action.

IV. Operation Eagle Claw and its Consequences

Throughout the year 1979 and the early months of 1980, Carter made many attempts in order to release the remaining hostages. As he failed, and continuing to his previous pledge of not using a military force to free the hostages, Carter opted for a military operation. Thus, the military intervention was Carter’s remaining solution by holding strong beliefs that the professional, well trained and well equipped

American army would certainly be successful in bringing back the hostages with the help of the CIA. Unquestionably, the organized rescue mission known as “Operation

Eagle Claw” entered American history, but it was a failed operation. 16

On 23 April 1980, President Carter launched that rescue mission to save the

remaining 53 hostages. As it was planned, the rescue mission was to last for two days

during which the hostages were supposed to be freed. The rescue mission was

planned as following:

The plan called for eight U.S. Navy RH-53 helicopters to depart from

the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz, positioned 100 km off the coast of Iran.

The helicopters were to fly to predetermine refueling site near Yazd,

code-named Desert One, 430 km southeast of Tehran…. After being

refueled at Desert One by Air Force C-130 airplanes staged out of

Oman, the helicopters were to continue the mission toward Tehran.

(Harmon et al. 51)

Unexpectedly, the execution of the mission did not go as planned. On its way to Desert One, because of a mechanical failure, one of the helicopters was abandoned in the desert. After a while, another one returned to Nimitz because of technical problems caused by a sandstorm. Consequently, only six helicopters arrived at Desert

One. When they arrived, the crew found out that one of the remaining six helicopters had severe technical problems, too, because of that sandstorm. These problems, in addition to the presence of Iranian civilians in the area, caused the operation to be cancelled. Worse, on leaving, an explosion caused the death of eight American soldiers. The rest of the crew took off “leaving behind the bodies of eight American servicemen, a small library of secret documents, five intact helicopters, and America’s military reputation” (Koehl and Glick, par. 11).

The Americans attributed the failure of Operation Eagle Claw to bad weather conditions and the unfamiliarity of the American army with sandstorms. Some, 17 however, see that such a justification is inappropriate for the supposedly world’s strongest military power. Ironically, an officer who directed the CIA support for the rescue mission said in his memoirs “… it was clear that God and Lady Luck were not with us in Iran” (Hart 104). Others presented more reasonable explanations for the failure: For Glick and Koehl, the crew and the equipments used did not match “the rules of commando operations” (par. 15). That is to say, the chosen helicopters for example were not powerful enough for such a mission. As for the crew, it lacked the appropriate training to execute such a complex operation; in addition, it lacked professionality which is shown through the personal items found with the bodies.

Glick and Koehl argued that the crew was not ready to handle the element of surprise which is necessary in any operation as shown by the unexpected presence of civilians in the area (pars. 15-17).

Obviously, Carter had to face two extremes: his people’s response toward the failed secret rescue mission that ended up with the death of eight soldiers and the

Iranian response to such an act. On April 25, Carter informed the American people about the details of the mission calling it a “humanitarian mission” for saving the hostages. The failed mission, however, negatively affected Carter’s reelection for the presidency. As stated by Senator Robert Byrd, “The Ayatollah Khomeini doesn’t just have fifty-three hostages, he also has the President hostage” (qtd. in Glad 269).

Certainly, the latter’s unpopularity was increasing with each day spent by the hostages in Iran; thus his days as a President seemed to be coming to an end.

As for Congress, its members were not pleased with the secrecy of the mission and claimed that Congress should have been consulted in such a matter. Some senators expressed their outrage by proclaiming that the “news media knew more 18 details of the rescue mission than did Congress” (Gambone 74). The chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee referred to the War Powers Act7, showing that hiding such information from Congress was inappropriate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff8 issued an official document about the failed operation, Holloway Report, in 1980.

Based on the conducted investigations, the report stated that “the decision to execute was justified” despite the hardships of the mission, however the lack of training for the staff could not be denied (Gambone 75).

The Iranian response to the military mission was undoubtedly more condemning to Carter. On April 25, Khomeini delivered a speech in which he denounced such a military action as well as attributing its failure of to Allah’s will.

Khomeini said: “They attacked our country with their helicopters and airplanes…

But the famous event happened in Tabas, and Allah, the Exalted, destroyed their prestige” (qtd. in Bearce 60). As for the Iranian people, the failure of the United States was considered as a happy occasion that needed to be celebrated. Thus, “thousands of

Iranians had again taken to their rooftops to shout over and over, Allahuakbar”

(Bowden 487). As for the hostages, the students saw that it became inevitable to change their location; hence, they were moved out of the embassy (Thigpen 239).

Meanwhile, the Shah died of cancer in Cairo which heightened the hopes of the Americans to revive the negotiations in order to release the hostages. Indeed, the probability of opening negotiations was taken into consideration by Iranians who still had concerns about their nation’s frozen assets and the unreceived military supplies which the Shah had paid for during his reign. Consequently, on September 12,

Khomeini “set the terms for the release of the hostages” which stated that the property of the Shah in the United States has to be regained, the frozen Iranian assets have to be 19 released and most importantly the United States should not interfere in Iranian affairs

(Alikhani 91).

Conclusion

Iranian-United States relations during the Carter administration had certainly set the basis for the current diplomatic situation between the two countries. The

United States ensured its interests in the area through the 1953 Iranian coup d'état; yet, it was not able to control the consequences of such a policy. Starting from the 1979

Iranian Revolution which resulted in overthrowing the pro-American Shah

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Iranian people sent a clear anti-American message to the world. However, the message was crystallized through the unplanned seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran which turned into a diplomatic crisis known as the Iran Hostage Crisis.

From what had been mentioned above, Carter’s administration was obviously unable to handle the Iran Hostage Crisis effectively. The different attempts made by

Carter seemed to heighten the complexity of the situation which had caused him much unpopularity in both the United States and Iran, especially after the failure of the rescue mission Operation Eagle Claw. However, the death of the Shah in the summer of 1980 gave the Americans a seed of hope to restore negotiation. Indeed, it did not take long for Khomeini to set new terms of negotiations. Yet, placing the two parties at the negotiating table needed the interference of a third party.

Chapter II

Algeria-United States Relations: The Role of Algeria in the Iran

Hostage Crisis

Introduction:

By the end of 1980, Algeria entered the scene by acting as a mediator between

Iran and the United States. The complexity of the situation which resulted in the failure of Operation Eagle Claw paved the way for such a mediation that ended the crisis by the signing of the Algiers Accords in 1981. Such a successful intervention has been a subject of controversy among researchers whose opinions vary between praising and minimizing the Algerian role. In order to analyze such a role, it is important to shed light on Algerian and American diplomatic relations prior as well as after the Algerian mediation. Also, it is important to highlight the Algerian diplomatic efforts that resulted in freeing the American hostages held for 444 days.

I. Algerian-American Relations after 1962: An Overview

After its independence from French colonialism in 1962, Algeria sought to establish close diplomatic relations with countries that supported the Algerian cause.

As stated by an American scholar: “Algerian leaders … judged others only by their comportment toward the Algerian cause” (qtd. in Looney 220). Thus, post- independent Algerian policy makers leaned toward revolutionary countries, such as

China and the Soviet Union due to the “support that Algerian nationalists obtained from these countries” (Looney 220). Taking such a pro-communist position led to 21 what can be considered as complex diplomatic relations between Algeria and the

United States.

Despite John F. Kennedy’s alleged support for Algerian independence, it was not considered as a motive toward establishing close relations with the United States.

This was mainly because of President Dwight Eisenhower’s attitude toward the

Algerian cause, which was not supportive as that of Kennedy. Since Eisenhower’s main goal was to ensure the United States’ interests, he was unwilling to lose his country’s alliance with France. As stated by Alexander: “In any event, Eisenhower made a strong statement of support for De Gaulle” (144). In addition, such an

American support for France came out from the fear that the Algerian independence would leave “a fertile ground for Soviet penetration of the Maghreb from which the

USSR had hitherto been barred” (149). Consequently, after its independence; Algeria preserved strict diplomatic relations with the United States for at least three decades.

It did not take long for the diplomatic relations between Algeria and the United

States to take a severe turn because of the Algerian position toward Cuba. The fact that both countries share a common anti-colonial attitude was demonstrated through the creation of diplomatic ties shortly after the Algerian independence. President

Ahmed Ben Bella’s visit to Cuba “defined Algeria’s socialist struggle as Castro-style socialism” (Allouche). Such an alliance, however, led the Kennedy administration “to grow uneasy with Algeria’s proximity to Cuba” (Allouche).

In addition to the Algerian anti-imperialist attitude, its anti-zionist position toward the 1967 Arab-Israeli War9 resulted in the breakdown of its diplomatic relations with the United States for seven years. As stated by Kamalipour: “The

United States and Algeria adopted strong opposition … Washington supported Israel 22 as its ally in the region. Algeria … supported the Palestinians … both military and otherwise” (105). Algeria’s position toward the Palestinian cause, however, transcended military support; it severed its diplomatic relations with the United States until 1974. After President Houari Boumediene’s speech in the United Nations in

April 1974 in which he called for a ‘new economic order’, “mutual mistrust between the two nations reached its peak level” (Kamalipour 105). However, the United States sought to reestablish diplomatic relations with Algeria believing that it became a threat for the United States, especially with its position toward capitalism which was clearly identified by President Houari Boumediene who adopted a socialist ideology.

It seemed that Algerian-American diplomatic relations were unstable during the 1970s. The different events that took place during that period of time had an impact on the two nations’ diplomatic relations. The Vietnam War which Algeria opposed to in addition to the intervention of the United States in the Western Sahara conflict10 led to the complexity of diplomatic relations between the two countries. As stated by McKenna: “Throughout the 1960s and 70s Algeria supported North

Vietnam, and from 1975 it supported Vietnam” (81). Such a position taken by the

Algerian government was considered by Washington as a disagreement to the United

States policy. This, however, did not prevent Algeria from expressing its anti- colonialist position that was clearly against the United States ideology.

As for the case of the Western Sahara conflict, the United States’ role was inevitable in such a conflict despite the fact that it was regional. “It [the United States] put pressure on Spain to cede its former colony to Morocco, and gave a green light to the latter to proceed with the occupation of the disputed territory” (Zoubir). By doing so, the United States proved its pro-Moroccan position in the dispute; thus, “it 23 contributed to poisoning relations between the two countries [Algeria and the United

States]" (Zoubir). Consequently, the different events that took place during the 1970s showed that Algeria and the United States have opposing positions and Algeria was considered by Americans as a threat to their interests.

The coming of the Carter Administration in 1977 marked the cooling of the diplomatic relations between the two nations. As proclaimed by Zunes and Mundy:

“[The] Carter administration initially toned down the overtly pro-Moroccan stance that had marked the Gerald Ford administration (1974-77)” (17). By doing so, Carter sought to improve the diplomatic relations with Algeria since, for him, it was an

“important commercial partner of the United States” (18). In 1980, with Algeria acting as a mediator to free the American hostages, the diplomatic relations between the two countries witnessed a significant improvement.

II. The Diplomatic Strategies of Algeria in the Iran Hostage Crisis

After the failed rescue mission Operation Eagle Claw, the hostages’ condition was jeopardized. However, Ayatollah Khomeini gave a seed of hope for initiating negotiations to release the hostages. Thus, a third party was chosen to transfer Iranian demands to Washington since Khomeini continued on his refusal to meet American officials. There were certain criteria that promoted Algeria to be chosen as a mediator:

“First, there had been other failed attempts at mediation, for example by Germany.

Second, Algeria had previous experience at mediating … Third, Algeria had a professional foreign service” (The Xiamen Academy 267).

It is alleged that it was Iran which chose Algeria as a mediator and the negotiations did not take action until the acceptance of the United States. According to many sources, what promoted Algeria to be a suitable mediator for the two parties was 24 the fact that “its Islamic and revolutionary history made it acceptable to Iran while its educated foreign service elite … [was] acceptable to the US” (The Xiamen Academy

267). However, according to Reza Malik who served as the Algerian ambassador to the United States during the crisis, it was the United States that chose Algeria to act as a mediator. Malik said: “Carter asked me for the Algerian mediation and my reply was that we are going to think about it, but he repeated his request by saying that the

United States will stand by the Polisario Front11 if Algeria agrees to help us solving the crisis” (qtd. in Belamri et al.).

An important question about the reason behind the acceptance of Algeria to act as a mediator is raised. The decision of acceptance to enter the negotiations can have certain consequences that needed to be taken into consideration by the Algerian government. For Juillard, the case of a possible failure, for example; “would bring an unquestionable blow to its [Algeria’s] international prestige” (27). Algeria, however, accepted to act as a mediator because of humanitarian reasons on the first level. On a second level, “the success of its intervention would bring to it significant advantages in terms of its international prestige” (29). In addition, the success of such an intervention would lead Algeria to create “a model of peaceful settlement” that would be followed by other mediators (29).

On 3 November 1980, Algeria officially entered as a mediator between Iran and the United States, which considered such an intervention as a positive development. As stated by Sick: “One week later Warren Christopher [the Deputy

Secretary of State and the chief negotiator] … arrived in Algiers for the first formal discussion” (320). The discussion with the Algerian foreign minister Mohamed

Seddik Benyahia, acting as the chief Algerian mediator, included some modifications to the United States response to the Iranian demands. After transferring the United 25

States response by Algeria, Iran considered it as ambiguous and “asked either for a positive or negative response [to its demands]” (Sick 324).

The fact that Algiers became the meeting point of the two parties demonstrated the importance of the Algerian mediation. Such a step was taken into consideration by

Benyahia in order to ensure that Algeria would not be underestimated at any case. By following such a plan, Algiers “would function as an information center” (Juillard 29).

The negotiators from the two parties would transmit their messages in Algiers, which in turn transmits them whether to Iran or the United States.

There were certain diplomatic strategies followed by Algeria in order to secure the success of negotiations. Such diplomatic strategies undoubtedly demonstrate the significance of the Algerian mediation. For example, in the case of “the $24 billion misunderstanding12 … They [the Algerians] were induced to return only when the

United States persevered and, presumably, when Iran softened its stance” (Princen

58). This is to say that, Algeria threatened both parties to quit the negotiations if they do not agree on the financial sum of the Shah’s wealth. Certainly, “threats in the truly strategic sense are required for effective intervention” (Princen 58).

Another strategy followed by Algeria was to make sure that the messages transmitted between the two parties had to get the Algerian approval. As stated by

Beber: “The Algerians insisted that messages between the US and Iran were to be reviewed … which turned out to have a positive effect on negotiations” (401). Indeed, through the Algerian review some demands from the two parties were modified and certainly “they [Algerians] had the final word on what they would transmit” (qtd. in

Beber 402). Undoubtedly, such a strategy followed by Algeria shows that the latter 26 took an active role as a mediator. Unlike the case of Algeria, some mediators’ role is limited to serve as message transmitters without being consulted.

During December, negotiations almost came to an end especially with the

Algerian threat to withdraw. However, by the end of the month a new proposal was presented by the United States to which Algerians were asked to comment on. On

December 23, “U. S. Ambassador Ulric Haynes, Jr. was called to the Algerian Foreign

Ministry and informed that Algeria was prepared to proceed with its mediation efforts” (Sick 331). Consequently, Carter had a seed of hope that, with the help of the

Algerians, negotiations would come to an end before the end of his presidency and the inauguration of Ronald Reagan.

Continuing with their efforts to free the American hostages, Algerian diplomats visited the hostages on Christmas Day. The daily American newspaper, The

Washington Post, stated:

The visit to the hostages by Abdelkarim Gheraieb, Algerian

ambassador to Iran, and Mohammad Bel Hossein, an Algerian foreign

ministry official, was the first by outside diplomats in eight months.

The State Department noted that in its statement yesterday, saying it

was pleased that the visit “which we have constantly called for has

finally taken place”. (Peterson and Meyer)

This visit of the Algerian diplomats brought comfort to the hostages’ families,

President Carter and to the hostages themselves. Carter said: “That’s encouraging to me … That is reassuring to know that they are all alive and well” (qtd. in Peterson and

Meyer). As for the hostages and their families, such a visit seemed to pave the way for a coming release. 27

On New Year’s Eve, after long discussions between Algerian diplomats and

American negotiators in Washington, a final declaration was produced. It included several points which were the subject of debate between the two parties. The most important points were about returning the Shah’s frozen assets to Iran and the promise of non-intervention in Iranian affairs. The Algerian diplomats transferred the declaration to Behzad Nabavi, the Iranian chief hostage negotiator, who declared that

“an Iranian response would be forthcoming within two or three days” (qtd. in Sick

332). Meanwhile, the Americans were anticipating the Iranian response with a concern about the hostages, so “the Algerians … provided personal assurances from

Iranians that all fifty-two hostages13 were now in the hands of the [Iranian] government” (Sick 332). Despite these efforts, some consider the Algerian role of little importance. As stated by Greig and Diehl: “Algeria was significantly weaker than the two sides that it mediated during the hostage crisis …” (8).

III. The End of the Crisis

On 19 January, 1981, an agreement was signed by Iran and the United States to free the hostages after 14 months of capture. The so-called Algiers Accords, signed in

Algiers, included four major points of agreement:

An American promise of noninterference in Iranian affairs; Washington

would release Iranian assets that had been frozen in response to the

taking of the hostages; both countries agreed to respectively end

litigation and sanctions; and, the United States pledged that American

courts would recognize Iranian court decisions pertaining to the Shah’s

assets. (Gibson 51) 28

The hostages, however, were not released until 20 January, 1981; minutes after the inauguration of Ronald Reagan as the President of the Unites States. Such an act made by the Iranians was considered as a final knockout for Carter since the hostages were not released during his administration.

Figure1: The Arrival of the American Hostages to Algiers

Source: http://time.com: Joyous Photos of the Iran Hostages Going Free in 1981

Algeria provided the necessary means for the safe transfer of the hostages from

Tehran to Algiers. Mohamed Saleh Dembri, the Algerian foreign ministry Chief of

Staff, stated in a conference held at Annaba about the role of Algeria in the Iran

Hostage Crisis that Algeria organized a special plan to transfer the hostages. First, a plane was provided to transfer the 52 hostages, yet another one was provided for camouflage so that the plane taking the hostages would be unrecognizable. Second, the flight plan was kept secret to guarantee the safety of the hostages. Third, a medical 29 staff was put at the service of the hostages knowing that a medical examination was made for them before the take-off of the plane. Finally, the food provided for the hostages during the flight was brought from Algeria (“Conférence” 1:18:27).

Consequently, the plan shows that Algeria took the full responsibility of the safe transfer of the hostages as a last step to complete its role as a successful mediator.

For the hostages, Algeria symbolized freedom since the Algerian diplomats were the first ones to meet the hostages after months of capture. When the hostages arrived at the airport, the Algerian staff came to transfer them. As stated by one of the hostages in a BBC documentary: “ I happened to see this wave, someone waving at me and happened to be an Algerian, but to me it looked like someone saying you are free”

(1:30:40 – 1:30:49). When they arrived at Algiers, one of the hostages stated: “I like to say that the Algerians are very brave” (1:38:20 – 1:38:25).

The American chief negotiator Warren Christopher described his gratitude and admiration in several occasions. Just after the hostages landed in Algiers, Christopher addressed Mohammed Seddik Benyaha by saying: “Mister Minister, I am deeply indebted to you as my colleagues and friends around the room. We are deeply indebted to your government’s humanitarian role” (Kardenote 1:57). Also,

Christopher expressed his admiration by stating that: “The Algerians served an indispensable function in interpreting two widely disparate cultures” (9). Certainly,

Christopher carried his gratitude for the Algerian diplomats throughout the years. In his essay “A Shared Moment of Trust” published in 2006, he recalled the Algerian role by stating: “Although I had never before worked with the Algerian foreign minister, I had to rely on him …With his indispensable help, all 52 Americans came home safely”. It seems that the American chief negotiator had recognized the role of

Algeria which seems to be the opposite for the American government. 30

Figure 2: Warren Christopher and Mohamed Seddik Benyahia

Source: https://www.memoria.dz

IV. The Impact of the Algerian Mediation on Algerian-American Diplomatic

Relations

As mentioned previously, the Algerian-American diplomatic relations after

1962 were shaking until the Algerian mediation to free 52 American hostages held in

Iran. Such an important role played by Algeria leads one to wonder if it contributed to the improvement of the diplomatic relations between the two countries. In other words, the question of whether the United States sought to improve its diplomatic relations with Algeria is raised. Since Ronald Reagan’s administration coincided with the hostages’ release, it is the most important period that has to be brought under the spotlight to examine if there was any attempt to improve the two countries’ diplomatic relations. 31

After taking office, Reagan showed no interest in improving the United States foreign policy toward Algeria. In an article published in The New York Times, Gupte transferred the words of Colonel Slimane Hoffman, head of the Algerian foreign policy commission of the National Liberation Front. Hoffman stated: “We did not expect that after the crisis the bilateral relations between our countries would consequently improve dramatically. But what we saw was that … the United States was pouring arms into our neighboring countries" (qtd. in Gupte). Through this statement, it is apparent that Reagan was offering military support to Morocco and

Tunisia, an act which was considered by Algerians as a threat toward Algeria. Also, as stated by Looney: “… the Reagan administration showed no particular predisposition toward Algeria … Insensitive to the positive mediating role Algerians had played … the US showed no gratitude” (224).

Another act which demonstrates the United States’ minimizing of the Algerian role is the gift offered to the Algerian government. Instead of improving its diplomatic, political or economic relations with Algeria, the United States offered a television series to Algeria in order to express its gratitude for the latter’s mediating efforts14. Regardless to the fact that such a gift did not match with the importance of the Algerian mediating role, it did not match with the Algerian culture as well. The

Algerian society is known to be conservative, especially during the 1980s when it was impossible for the Algerian family to watch such a series as a gathered group. So, it seems that the United States had an imperialistic aim behind such a gift because “for many critics, the American TV series Dallas had become byword for cultural imperialism in the 1980s” (Tomlinson 45). 32

Despite it is alleged that the Reagan administration did not show any gratitude to the Algerian role, the relations between the two countries witnessed a slight improvement during Reagan’s second term. This was due to President’s Chadli

Bendjedid’s visit to the United States in 1985 in which Reagan thanked Algeria for its mediation to free the American hostages. According to Looney: “President Chadli

Bendjedid’s official visit to the US in April 1985 … resulted in various trade and cooperation agreements in and in better communication between the two countries”

(225). As a consequence, the diplomatic relations between the two countries witnessed an improvement.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries took a better path during

Bouteflika administration. “In July 2001, President Bouteflika became the first

Algerian President to visit the White House since 1985” (USA International Business

28). Such an improvement in the two countries diplomatic relations was not related to the Algerian role in the freeing of the 52 American hostages. Consequently, if such an important role was neglected during the 1980s and 1990s, it was totally forgotten three decades later. In a recent interview conducted with Marco Rubio, a candidate for the

2016 American presidential election, the latter stated that the release of the hostages was thanks to Reagan. As he said: “…Ronald Reagan, where as soon as he took office the hostages were released from Iran” (qtd. in Holan and Jacobson).

Surprisingly enough, the United States Embassy at Algiers expressed its gratitude to the Algerian mediation in the 36th anniversary of the Algiers Accords signed in 1981. The press release stated that “The United States remains profoundly grateful to Algeria for its mediation efforts that led to the release of 52 American diplomats held hostage in Iran” (Embassy of the United States). In addition, different statements made by the American chief negotiator Warren Christopher are recalled in 33 the press release. This leaves an impression that he was the only American politician who expressed his gratitude to the Algerian role. This Mémoire does not cover all of the thankful statements that were made by American politicians; yet, it is fair to say that most, if not all, thankful declarations were stated by the previously mentioned diplomat.

Conclusion

American-Algerian diplomatic relations after Algerian independence were characterized by a constant shaking. The American position toward the Algerian War of Independence affected Algerian foreign policy toward the United States. Also, the

Algerian position taken toward different issues such as the Palestinian cause and the

Western Sahara conflict opposed that of Americans. Consequently, the diplomatic relations between the two countries were not as good as those of Tunisia or Morocco with the United States due to the fact that the latter were serving the American interests in the area, unlike the case of Algeria.

Such complex diplomatic relations between the two countries did not prevent

Algeria to act as a mediator in order to free 52 Americans hostages held in Iran. The role played by Algeria to ensure the success of negotiations between Iran and the

United States was of a great importance. The Algerian diplomats followed different strategies and plans which resulted in freeing the hostages under the terms of the

Algiers Accords of 1981. However, there is no evidence that the United States political scene showed any gratitude to the Algerian role, especially the Reagan administration. Moreover, it seems that the Algerian role was not only ignored by

American political actions, but it was ignored in Hollywood’s productions as well. 34

Chapter III

Argo (2012): A Critical Analysis

Introduction:

The minimizing of the Algerian role by the United States in the Iran Hostage

Crisis transcended politics to Hollywood productions. The Academy Awards15 winning movie Argo, released in 2012, was criticized for its minimizing of the

Canadian role in the rescue mission named the Canadian Caper, as well as the distortion of the Iranian image. The Algerian role to free 52 American hostages in the movie, however, is not tackled. The following chapter presents a critical analysis of the movie in order to examine if the latter is more or less a representation of a real historical event in which the Algerian involvement should not be ignored.

I. The Representation of Historical Events by Hollywood

As a part of popular culture, movies became a shaping tool of peoples’ opinions about different subjects. Among the subjects tackled in movies are real historical events, which led to a rising controversy among scholars and researchers.

This is because “the compression, invention and fictionalization of historical events inherent in popular filmic representations bring criticism from scholars and historians who champion the virtues of traditional modes of historicism” (Murphy 6). Such traditional modes, however, became unpopular with the increased influence of movie making. Hollywood movies, in particular, are the center of debate when it comes to the representation of real events. 35

The reason behind setting Hollywood under the spotlight when it comes to examining historical accuracy is its universality. When it comes to Hollywood as the world leading filmmaking industry, Winston Churchill’s saying that “history is written by the victors” is applied to. This is due to the fact that Hollywood does not only depict American history, but it transcends to world events. As stated in a documentary produced by Al Jazeera English: “It seems … that most of the movies nowadays that talk about Europe and talk about history happen to be American movies” (06:11 -

06:17). As a consequence, Hollywood became the focus of critics, historians and researchers when it comes to the matter of accuracy in its movies that are claimed to be based on true stories.

It is claimed that Hollywood movie makers are in need to fictionalize historical events for the purpose of entertainment. Since their aim is to make the movie interesting for the viewer, the historical accuracy of the event would be less important to those movie makers. Gutting claims that: “Since it is a dramatization, the filmmakers … are very likely at points within the film to exercise their right to override historical accuracy for the sake of better theater”. Thus, depending on such movies to acquire knowledge about a certain historical event would be inconvenient.

Still, those movies are considered as an authentic source of knowledge by most people once it is claimed that they are based on true stories.

Another reason behind the lack of historical accuracy in Hollywood movies made about true historical events is the fact that most of them are depicted from an

American perspective. Without a doubt, the fact that certain historical movies are produced in the United States by American filmmakers means that a certain level of subjectivity would take place. This is because, it is argued that “every nation adapts its 36 own version of history according to different political and social imperatives” (Raw and Tutan 153). For the United States, the urge to set itself as a leading power is what can be considered as its political imperative, which is achieved even through the film making industry.

When it comes to historical events, Hollywood can be used as a tool in order to reshape history so as to make it suitable for the American image. Knowing that the

American filmmaking industry has a strong effect on people’s opinions, it is used to create new backgrounds of historical events. As stated in Al Jazeera documentary:

“Based on a true story, Hollywood reshapes reality and those stories become the new history” (23:57 - 23:59). Consequently, other nations’ image is affected by

Hollywood’s American-based perception of history.

Such an American-centered point of view takes the shape of what is known as

American exceptionalism. This concept, developed through the years, promotes for the idea that “America’s values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration …. The United States is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage” (Walt, par. 2). This belief of superiority, however, seems to neglect the failures of the United States concerning its policies and history. The case of the Iran Hostage Crisis, for example, demonstrates that

“Americans take too much credit for global progress and accept too little blame for areas where the U.S. policy has in fact been counterproductive” (Walt, par. 24).

The belief of American exceptionalism is promoted by Hollywood movies, which affects the historical accuracy when it comes to the representation of real historical events. As stated by a critic: “There is hardly a single American movie that does not glorify Americans” (qtd. in Su). In the case of movies based on true historical 37 events that the United States took part of, the image of others nations is minimized in front of the American one. Whether politically, economically or militarily speaking, the United States is presented as a savior due to its power.

American Intelligence agencies collaborate with Hollywood in order to create a heroic image in people’s minds. It is known that American intelligence agencies in general, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in particular, operate on an international level; thus it involves in world historical events. As mentioned previously, for example, the CIA played an evitable role in the 1953 Iranian coup d’état. When it comes to the representation of this agency in Hollywood movies, however, another image is shown. As claimed by Jenkins: “The CIA claims that it began cooperating with Hollywood in the 1990s to help reverse its image … since the

Agency [was depicted] as a rogue, immoral outfit with a penchant for assassination and failure” (32). In addition, the positive depiction of this agency in Hollywood movies aims at showing its importance as a protector of Americans, which is demonstrated by the Hollywood movie Argo.

II. Argo: The Plot

In order to contrast between the real event and the story presented by Argo, it is important to present the movie’s plot. The movie begins by giving a brief overview about the 1953 Iranian coup d’état, along with a glimpse on Mohammed Reza

Pahlavi’s life style after taking the Iranian throne. The Shah’s taking asylum to the

United States after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 leads to an Iranian outrage, which ends up in seizing the American embassy in Tehran by a group of Iranian students. Six

American diplomats succeed to escape from the embassy, leaving behind their colleagues under the capture of Iranians. Meanwhile in the United States, the 38

Secretary of State, under a state of panic, receives news that the six escaping

Americans took refuge in the Canadian ambassador’s house in Tehran (01:00 –

13:40).

After 69 days from the embassy’s seizure; Tony Mendez, a CIA agent, is informed for the first time about the hostages’ condition. He is told that “The six of them [American embassy staff] went out a back exit. Brits [the British embassy] turned them away; Kiwis [the New Zealand embassy] turned them away, Canadians took them in” (14:28 – 14:32). The CIA explores options to transfer the six diplomats to the United States before the Iranians find out about their escaping. While looking for a plan, Tony Mendez is accidentally inspired by a science-fiction movie that led him to come up with a rescue mission (14:50 – 23:22).

Mendez presents his rescue plan to the CIA. He suggests impersonating

Canadian filmmakers, along with the six runaways, who pretend to go to Iran in order to look for an exotic location for their science-fiction movie (23:25 – 23:46). After approving his plan, Mendez contacts John Chambers and Lester Siegel, two

Hollywood filmmakers who helped previously the Central Intelligence Agency, in order to put his idea into practice. After coordination and preparation, a fake movie is presented by the press under the title of Argo; with Mendez presented as its producer under the fake name of Kevin Harkins (23:50 – 42:00).

“The United States government has just sanctioned your science-fiction movie” (44:21 – 44:24). After this statement from the Secretary of State, Mendez flies to Iran for his cover mission. Meanwhile, Iranians discover the disappearance of the six Americans from the embassy. Mendez arrives to the Canadian embassy and meets with Ken Taylor, the Canadian ambassador, who provides him with fake Canadian 39 passports and identities. After meeting with the six escapees who doubt the success of his cover mission, Mendez convinces them to engage in it especially with the lack of alternative solutions. Claiming to be their intended filming location, they visit the bazaar of Tehran accompanied by an Iranian guide, but their visit takes a bad turn

(44:30 – 01:12:52).

Mendez receives a call in which he is ordered to abandon the mission because

“Joint Chiefs are planning a military rescue of the hostages” (01:16:48 – 01:16:52).

Mendez, however, refuses to do so and claims to take responsibility for his decision.

So, his boss struggles to restore the mission authorization. The Canadian ambassador leaves Iran with his wife. Meanwhile, Mendez and the six runaways face difficulties in the airport because their reservations to Zurich were not confirmed yet. After the latter’s confirmation at the last minute, a guard suspects the escapees; so he calls the movie’s production office in Hollywood to which Chambers responds at the last minute. In a rising suspense, Iranians reveal the six escapees’ identities. Guards try to stop them, but the plane has already taken off (01:22:35 – 01:41:30).

After the mission success, full credit is given to Canada for the escape of the six American diplomats. A Central Intelligence Agent says that “Only Canada takes the credit, or they [Iranians] retaliate against the hostages. Great Satan [The United

States as it is referred to by Iranians] wasn’t involved. No CIA” (01:45:21 –

01:45:28). The Canadian ambassador Ken Taylor is honored with the six American diplomats.; while Mendez gets the Intelligence Star, “The highest award of the

Clandestine Services in the United States” (01:47:56 – 01:47:58), in a secret ceremony. The movie ends by stating that “The Iran Hostage Crisis ended on 20 40

January 1981, when all remaining hostages were released … In 1997 … the Argo operation was declassified by President Clinton” (01:50:26 – 01:51:15).

III. Argo: An Overview of Film Criticisms

Before tackling film criticisms of Argo, it is important to highlight the difference between film reviews and film criticisms. For a film review, “[it] is an article that is published in a newspaper, magazine, or a scholarly work that describes and evaluates a movie” (“Movie”). A film criticism, however, “is written by a scholar or expert in film studies to discuss the movie within a historical, social, political, or theoretical context” (“Movie”). Hence, the following section includes an overview on criticisms conducted by film experts who offered their criticisms of Argo basing on the historical and political context of the Iran hostage crisis.

Since its release in 2012, especially after receiving seven Academy Awards nominations and winning three of them, Argo has caused controversy among film critics for its fabrication of a historical event. According to the movie, the six

American escapees took refuge in the Canadian embassy and were liberated due to the

Central Intelligence Agency efforts. In response to the criticisms which are going to be presented below, Ben Affleck, the movie director, stated: “It’s okay to embellish, it’s okay to compress, as long as you don’t fundamentally change the nature of the story and of what happened” (qtd. in Huff and Roth, chap. 8). So, the question of the extent of changes made by this movie to the real event is raised.

When projecting the movie with the real event, it is clear that it includes fictionalization. Since it is claimed that it is based on a true story, Argo’s most film criticisms are about fictionalizing the real event by this movie. As stated by the film critic David Edelstein: “… producer Lester Siegel, a fictional composite … The 41 scene’s other character [John Chambers] isn’t fictional” (par. 5). Also, Edelstein reveals the fact that the end scenes are fictionalized. He says: “… After all the movies assurances of realism, from the prologue to photos over the credits showing the actors side by side with photos of their real counterparts, those terrifying close calls are all invented” (par. 6).

It is claimed that Argo is presented from a merely American perspective. In Al

Jazeera documentary, Oliver Stone, an American film director, stated that: “Argo … tell[s] the history from an American interest point of view” (26:25 – 26:29).

Throughout the movie, the focus is on the Central Intelligence Agency role in exfiltrating the six American runaways. Thus, the subject of interest is to demonstrate the American power rather than focusing on the event itself.

To emphasize the previously mentioned idea, the movie is criticized for neglecting the Iran Hostage Crisis itself. Kevin B. Lee, a film critic and filmmaker, stated that: “Argo makes the Iran hostage crisis, one of the most cataclysmic episodes in U.S. foreign affairs in the last 50 years, a mere backdrop to a silver lining subplot”

(par. 5). That is, it seems that Argo covers the United States’ failure to control the Iran

Hostage Crisis by shedding light on an overrated covert operation. Consequently, the authentic depiction of the real event would be impossible since it is told from an

American point of view.

The movie’s American-based perspective led to the neglection of other parts such as the Canadian role in exfiltrating16 the six escapees. The underestimation of

Canada’s involvement has been the subject of criticism since the movie’s release; especially with the Canadian ambassador to Iran during the crisis Ken Taylor’s statements which confirmed this underestimation. Brian D. Johnson, a Canadian film 42 critic and filmmaker, said: “The movie rewrites history at Canada’s expense, making

Hollywood and the CIA the saga’s heroic saviors while Taylor is demoted to a kindly concierge” (par. 3). Unlike what is shown in the movie, Taylor claimed that “The departure went very smoothly. I bought the airline tickets … Mendez did not become involved until a month after we’d taken over” (qtd. in Johnson).

As for Iranian film critics, they accused the movie of distorting the Iranian image. According to them, Iranian people are depicted as savage and ugly. Speaking about this subject matter, the Iranian filmmaker Asghar Farhadi said: “… But the image that it creates about the Iranians will stay with its audience and this is unfortunately very bitter” (qtd. in Edwards 102). Farhadi believed that Argo was not qualified for being an Academy Awards nominee; however, it was nominated because

“The academy members … [aim] to damage other religions and cultures and foster one way of thought and life” (qtd. in Edwards 102).

In addition to causing a controversy about the Canadian role and the Iranian image, Argo was criticized for the distortion of Britain’s and New Zealand’s image.

As it is shown in the movie, the American escapees were turned down by the British and the New Zealand embassies. According to scholars, however, this is a fabrication of truth. Putting Argo in historical context, Mohsen Milani, a foreign policy analyst, said: “Some diplomats from Great Britain and New Zealand resentfully complain that the positive roles played by their respective governments were overlooked” (par. 6).

Consequently, film criticisms show that Argo’s fictionalization has caused an outage among different countries that were involved in the Iran hostage crisis. Hypothetically speaking, such fictionalization was introduced to the movie in order to demonstrate 43

American exceptionalism since different countries were ignored, while the United

States seemed as a victor.

IV. Argo: Film Analysis

Despite its Academy Awards’ winning, Argo received a large amount of criticism manly because it lacked historical accuracy. Criticisms presented above show the movie’s minimizing of different countries, yet an exaggeration of the Central

Intelligence Agency’s role in exfiltrating the six American escapees. This covert operation functions as a footnote when compared to the Iran hostage crisis in which

Algeria took a large part. Hence, it is fair to say that the Algerian role was ignored by this movie. As stated by Soltane: “This story [of the Algerian role] will never be adopted by Hollywood because Mohammed Seddik Benyahia is an Algerian. If he was an American diplomat, he would have been celebrated as a hero in … Ben

Affleck’s film (par. 3). In order to shed light on the reason behind such ignorance by

Argo, a film analysis is going to be presented below.

The movie’s prologue gives the impression that the movie is historically accurate. Based on the information presented in this research, the 1953 Iranian coup d’état was coordinated by the United States and Britain. The movie’s beginning stated that “… But in 1953, the U.S. and Great Britain engineered a coup d’état that deposed

Mosadegh and installed Reza Pahlavi as Shah” (01:06 – 01:15). Through this brief historical introduction, the movie seems to transfer the historical event accurately to the viewer, especially after the statement that followed this prologue.

The movie’s beginning is announced by a statement, through which the viewer anticipates an accurate presentation of the Iran Hostage Crisis. As it is stated: “[The movie is] based on a true story” (02:33 – 02:38). As a viewer who has a humble 44 historical background about the event presented by this movie, seeing this statement means that Argo is going to give an accurate presentation of the Iran hostage crisis.

Such a presentation should include all the parts involved in this crisis, along with an authentic description of their role in helping the American hostages held in Iran.

This research conducted here has found that the Iranians accused the American embassy workers of spying on Iran. The movie shows some embassy workers issuing visas for Iranians, which is supposed to be their regular job. When the embassy is stormed, however, the staff shouts: “Burn everything! Burn the classified! (05:48 –

05:50). Such an act proves Iranian accusations to the embassy workers of spying.

Consequently, this shows that the movie holds some facts about the Iran Hostage

Crisis.

After seizing their embassy in Tehran, the first comments stated by workers in the Department of State demonstrate an implication of American exceptionalism. A

State Department worker says: “You think the Soviets would put up with this? They’d invade” (11:09 – 11:11). Such a statement gives an impression that the United States is the only country which is capable of controlling the Middle East region in general and Iran in particular. Also, it seems to demonstrate that although Iran is an unstable region, the United States took the risk of intervening in its affairs.

The movie seems to distract the viewer from the hostages kept in the embassy by shedding light on the six escapees. While debating about the embassy seizing, the

Secretary of State says: “We’ve got 60 in the embassy with guns to their heads right now” (12:12 – 12:15). A worker of the Secretary of State replies: “The whole world is watching the embassy. They’re safer than the six on the street” (12:16 – 12:19). This 45 proves that the next events are going to neglect the situation of the other hostages, while setting the viewer attention on the situation of the six escapees.

Tony Mendez is presented as an American hero during his first appearance in the movie. When wondering about the reason behind calling him to exfiltrate the six escapees, his boss says “So he [Director of the Central Intelligence Agency] can tell the State he ran it [the covert operation] by his best exfil guy” (15:46 – 15:49).

Through this statement, the viewer can already anticipate that Mendez is going to rescue the six escapees. Despite the fact that this is his first appearance in the film, the viewer is already acquainted of Mendez as Argo’s hero.

Mendez is presented as a hero through fictionalizing the events. In a long statement, the fictional character Lester Siegel addresses Chambers by saying: “You got six people hiding out in a town of 4 million people, all of whom chant ‘Death to

America’ … You want to set up a movie in a week … Then you are going to sneak

007 [Mendez] over here into a country that wants CIA blood …” (29:23 – 29:39).

Siegel demonstrates to the viewer that Mendez is engaging into an impossible mission like one of those of the super-spy 007 in which he is shown as the hero who succeed in his mission despite the risks he engages in. Consequently, it seems that Siegel’s role is to highlight Mendez’ heroism, as well as inject humor into the movie.

In addition to the previously mentioned character, another one highlights

Mendez’ heroism in a two seconds scene. While organizing a press conference for the fake movie Argo, Mendez says: “We are shooting in Iran” (39:16 – 39:17). Thinking that Mendez is going to shoot in Iraq, the character responds: “Iran with an N?” (39:17

– 39:18). This scene is not made randomly, however it displays the danger of Mendez’ mission to the viewer. It also aims at showing Iran as an anti-American country. 46

According to this movie, the United States seems to control the hostages’ situation. In a displayed scene which conveys a speech delivered by Jimmy Carter on television, the latter says: “They [Iranians] and all others must know that the United

States of America will not yield to international terrorism or to blackmail” (40:54 –

41:01). It seems that this statement is chosen to be displayed in this movie in order to show that the United States was not in a weak position during the crisis. This was not the case, however, because Carter made different attempts to free the hostages which ended up in failure. Thus, the American critical position during the crisis is not authentically demonstrated in Argo.

The CIA is credited by the movie for the mission’s success. According to Ken

Taylor, Canada ensured a smooth transfer of Mendez and the escapees from the

Iranian airport. If the viewer is not familiar with this information, however, it would seem that the Central Intelligence Agency is the hero of the story. The real event lacked an American hero, which led this film to create one. Within few minutes, the

CIA succeeds to receive Carter’s permission to finish the operation and confirm the plane tickets.

The ending scenes demonstrate an inclusion of dramatization. The confirmation of the tickets and the received call from the movie’s production company made at the last minute dramatize the story events. The Iranian guards chasing of the plane show the inclusion action to the events. Also, the air hostess announcement which comes as following: “Ladies and gentlemen, it is our pleasure to announce that alcoholic beverages are now available as we have cleared Iranian space” (01:42:29 –

01:42:34) presents a dramatic end to the story. 47

In addition to the dramatization of events, the movie sought to hide some facts from the audience. Information provided in the movie’s end does not reveal the failure of the organized rescue mission, which is mentioned during the course of events. Also, it is stated that “The Iran Hostage Crisis ended on 20 January 1981, when all remaining hostages were released” (01:50:26 – 01:50:30). It is not mentioned that the hostages were released after the signing of Algiers Accords. Hence, it is clear that the Algerian mediation was ignored by Argo.

Conclusion

From the film criticisms presented above, Argo lacks historical accuracy.

Different criticisms were offered because of the minimizing of different countries’ roles by this movie. The unawareness of the Algerian role as a mediator in this film, however, is not tackled by film critics. Consequently, one can suggest that an Algerian movie should be produced in order to highlight the importance of the Algerian role in the Iran Hostage Crisis.

Through the analysis of this movie, it became clear that it should not be taken as a reference of knowledge about the Iran Hostage Crisis. This is because, the humble historical background gained through the conduct of this research permitted one to project the film’s story with the real event. Hence, movies which claim to be based on a true event should not be regarded as a source of knowledge, especially when the viewer is not familiar with its historical context. Certainly, watching this movie as a simple viewer differs from watching it with a critical eye.

General conclusion

Throughout exploring the different attempts made by Jimmy Carter to free the

American hostages held in Tehran, it is found that he was unable to control the Iran

Hostage Crisis. This inability was demonstrated in the failure of the rescue Operation

Eagle Claw which led to the decline of negotiations between the United States and

Iran. Also, it caused him much unpopularity in both the United and Iran.

Consequently, his administration marked a cooling of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The Algerian role in the Iran Hostage Crisis holds a reasonable degree of importance, which should allow it to be recognizable by the United States. Algeria proved to be a successful mediator between Iran and the United States through the diplomatic strategies displayed by the Algerian Chief negotiator Mohammed Seddik

Benyahia. The latter ensured to make Algiers the meeting point of Tehran and

Washington. Also, by insisting on the Algerian commentary on the messages transmitted between Tehran and Washington, he ensured that Algeria plays the role of an active mediator. Consequently, these strategies resulted in the success of negotiations between Iran and the United States.

The neglection of the Algerian role in the Iran Hostage Crisis moved to

Hollywood productions. Based on film criticisms, Argo tells the story of the Iran

Hostage Crisis from an American-based perspective. The analysis of the movie and its projection with the real event support such criticisms. This is because different scenes show that the movie’s focus is on the CIA. It also hides some facts that serve to minimize the American image in the viewers’ eyes, such as the United States’ failure in Operation Eagle Claw. 49

This research came to the conclusion that the United States underlooked the

Algerian role in the Iran Hostage Crisis because of its intentions to promote American exceptionalism. The analysis of Argo supports such a conclusion since it focused on the United States efforts to exfiltrate six American escapees and neglected the event itself which is the Iran Hostage Crisis. Also, this research concludes that an agreement was reached between the United States and Iran due to the diplomatic strategies displayed by Algeria. Thus, one can suggest that an Algerian documentary or a movie should be produced in order to highlight such a role.

Endnotes

1 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company: A British Company founded to extract oil in Iran. It was known as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company once it was founded in 1938, and became known as the British Petroleum Company after the 1953 Iranian coup d’état.

2 Rashidian family: A wealthy Iranian family whose members were British agents.

Their role in the 1953 Iranian coup d’état was to intensify protests against Mosadegh through mobilizing thousands of Iranians in demonstrations to support Mohammed

Reza Pahlavi.

3 Martial law: The use of military force by the government to control civilians.

4 Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Path: The name given to the students who occupied the American embassy in Tehran. It demonstrates their support for

Khomeini.

5 The Palestine Liberation Organization: An organization, founded in 1964, which is considered as the official representative of the government of Palestine. Despite the fact that it considered it as a terrorist organization, the United States asked the organization to make an intervention during the Iran hostage crisis.

6 United Nations Commission on Human Rights: A United Nations’ assembly concerned with the protection of human rights around the world. It was replaced with the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2006. 51

7 The War Powers Act: A federal law issued in 1973. It states that Congress has to be consulted by the President in case of an armed action overseas.

8 The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Chosen seniors from the United States Department of

Defense to be consulted on military matters by different military branches, as well as by the President of the United States.

9 The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Know in Arabic as Naksa; was a six days war fought between Israel and most Arab nations during June of 1967, during which the United

States supported Israel.

10 The Western Sahara conflict: A conflict between the Polisario Front, supported by

Algeria, and Morocco over Western Sahara which was annexed by the latter in 1975 after the Spanish withdrawal from its lands.

11 The Polisario Front: A Western Sahara liberation movement which seeks to end the

Moroccan presence in its lands.

12 The $ 24 billion misunderstanding: A misunderstanding between Iran and the

United States over the worth of the Shah’s frozen assets. During negotiations, Iran claimed that the latter’s assets worth was $ 24 billion, which the United States refused to accept. Later on, the two agreed on an amount of $ 7 billion.

13 After releasing one hostage because of health problems on 11 July, the number of hostages was reduced to 52.

14 Dallas: An American television series that started to be aired in 1978. It gained a remarkable success in the United States during that period of time. 52

15 The Academy Awards: Also known as the Oscars. It is a set of awards presented by an American organization which includes representatives from different cinematic branches. It is considered one of the most valuable awards around the world, yet it does not prevent it from being the subject of criticism by film critics and filmmakers.

16 Exfiltrating: From the verb to exfiltrate, as defined by the Oxford dictionary:

“Withdraw (troops or spies) surreptitiously, especially from a dangerous situation”.

According to this definition, the American embassy workers in Tehran were indeed spies.

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