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Human Rights in Iran Under the Shah Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 12 Issue 1 Article 7 1980 Human Rights in Iran under the Shah Richard W. Cottam Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard W. Cottam, Human Rights in Iran under the Shah, 12 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 121 (1980) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol12/iss1/7 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Volume 12, Number 1, Winter 1980 COMMENT Human Rights in Iran Under the Shah by Professor Richard W. Cottam* I. INTRODUCTION FOR ANY ADVOCATE of human rights, the events surrounding the Iranian revolution must be a source of continuing agony. But for any- one interested in gaining a sharper understanding of some of the basic issues concerning human rights, the dramatic developments in Iran should be highly instructive. The early summary executions in Iran and the later public trials conducted by revolutionary Islamic courts were properly condemned by western human rights advocates as failing to ap- proach the requirements of due process. Yet the great majority of those who were tried and executed were charged with terrible violations of the most elemental human rights; and the testimony of the accused, so rich in detail and so internally consistent as to be credible,1 tends to confirm the worst charges against the Shah's regime. The testimony also points to both direct and indirect complicity of western governments, particularly the United States and Israel, in constructing the Shah's instruments for administering terror.2 Spokesmen for the Shah's regime argued that Iran was moving with optimal speed toward a society in which the more exquisite manifesta- tions of human rights-those concerned with individual and political freedom-would be accommodated. But before this stage could be reached, they insisted that more basic human needs had to be addressed and the Iranian people educated to the point that they could understand and support a free political system. After all, the argument always goes, Iranians have no tradition of freedom. 3 This view found easy acceptance in the West. But was such a tutorial period necessary? Were the Shah and his western supporters in fact rendering this tutorial service? And what are the prospects for an observance of human rights in its varied manifestations in Iran today? * Professor of Political Science, The University of Pittsburgh. B.A. (1948), University of Utah; M.A. (1952), Harvard University;, Ph.D. (1954), Harvard University. 1 The testimony of the accused is reported in full detail in the Tehran press. 'See the testimony of General Amir Hossein Rabii published in Ettelaat, Apr. 13, 1979. 3 Hoveyda, Not all Clocks for Human Rights are the Same, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1977, at A25, col. 1. CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. Vol. 12:121 II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN IRAN IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT To address these questions sensibly the Iranian revolutionary move- ment must be placed in a historical context. The lay reader of western newspaper accounts of the revolution in Iran could hardly avoid the con- clusion that the revolution was in essence anti-modernist. It was depicted generally as the response of a traditional people led by an exotic, reac- tionary, and vengeful religious leader against a regime that had tried to modernize too rapidly. The Shah, we were told, had erred mainly in un- derestimating the time required to tutor his "child-like" people into an appreciation of modern values. In fact, the Iranian revolutionary move- ment is a conglomerate of elements, none of which opposes rapid change, but which have opposed the traditional order in Iran throughout the twentieth century. However, the various elements differ sharply in the particular direction they want the forces of change to follow; in other words, they operate from different definitions of modernization. At the heart of their philosophical differences lies the varied areas of emphasis each places on the range of concerns concealed under the umbrella term human rights. A. The ConstitutionalRevolution of 1906 The success of the revolution in 1979 marked the third time in this century that the revolutionary allies achieved power in Iran. The first time was in 1906 when the so-called constitutional revolution forced Mozaffar al-Din Shah to accept a constitution modeled on that of Belgium. The revolutionary forces consisted basically of three elements. There was first a group of secular intellectuals, many of whom were the sons of the traditional aristocracy. These persons, whose influence is most clearly reflected in the constitution of 1906, looked for inspiration to the French Enlightenment. They were most concerned with the rights of na- tional self-determination and individual freedom. Given their social sta- tus, it is not surprising that they failed to emphasize the individual's right 4 to basic human needs. A second major force behind the constitutional revolution was Ira- nian merchants. They were stirred to revolution by the willingness of the Qajar shahs, rulers of the previous dynasty, to grant enormous economic concessions to foreign financial interests and by the lack of governmental interest in creating conditions in which trade and commerce could flour- ish. Hence, their concern for the rights of national self-determination was I E. G. BROWNE, THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION: 1905-1909, (2d ed. 1966). This book will give the reader a general account of the revolution. 1980 HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN highly congruent with self-interest. Their primary emphasis, naturally,. was in the area of right to property and associated concerns with en- trepreneurial, commercial and financial freedoms. The third element, the only one with a substantial mass following, consisted of religious leaders who advocated a revitalized Islam. Far more than their allies, the religious leaders were sensitive to the basic human needs of the Iranian masses. They believed the eclipse of Islam by Chris- tian imperialists must be a temporary phenomenon and that Islam could serve as the moral guide in a rapidly changing world. Their concern in the rights area is embraced by the term, social justice, which they saw as cen- \tral to the teachings of Mohammad. They were far less interested in indi- vidual rights and freedom per se and valued tolerance far less than their secular intellectual allies.5 These internal differences were profound. Basic disagreements quick- ly surfaced whenever the revolutionary allies achieved or were close to achieving power. This first manifestation of the Iranian revolution suf- fered defeat at the hands of foreign powers, one of which, Great Britain, professed to value the liberalism, humanism and nationalism that gave color to the Iranian movement in the first instance. Why then, did the British along with the Russians turn on this movement? The answer, to that question provides much of the basis for an understanding of twenti- eth century Iranian history, including the revolution of 1979. The key is to be found in Iran's strategic geographical position. In the nineteenth century, Iran and Afghanistan occupied the meeting point of Russian and British imperialism. Russia moved steadily south and east through the Caucasus and across the Central Asian steppes, while Britain consolidated its hold on the Indian sub-continent. Neither power wanted to pay the price-in terms of costs of occupation and risk of war-of oc- cupying Iran. Yet, neither wished to allow the other preeminence in Iran. There followed decades in which the Russians and British competed for commercial concessions and political influence in Iran. Iranian govern- ments under the traditional-minded Qajars exploited the situation by pursuing a policy of "negative balance"-never allowing either power clear predominance and exacting a high price for each political or com- mercial concession. The result was an equilibrium that was expensive and uncomfortable for both Russia and Britain, but still preferable to war.6 At first, neither Britain nor Russian regarded the revolutionary For a general understanding of the religious role in the revolutionary period see H. ALGAR, RELIGION AND STATE IN IAN, 1785-1906, (1969); H. ALGAR, MRZA MALKOM KHAN: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IRANIAN MODERNISM (Berkeley, 1973); N. KEDDME, RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN (London, 1966). 6 See F. KAZEMZADEH, RussIA AND BarrAIN IN PERsIA 1864-1914, (1st ed. 1968). CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. Vol. 12:121 movement in Iran as a serious threat. 7 Despite its initial success the Brit- ish viewed it in a benignly patronizing way.' Within a year, however, both Britain and Russia recognized the Iranian constitutional movement as dangerously destabilizing. The constitutionalists, as Iranian nationalists, could not play the negative balance game with the ease of the Qajar shahs. Furthermore, the situation in Iran under the new political leaders quickly grew chaotic. Even under the best of circumstances, this essen- tially modernist elite would have required a great deal of time to learn how to handle an overwhelmingly traditional society. Probably no more than one or two percent of the population really understood the nature or implications of the political changes in their country. Had the populace understood the true import of the situation the constitutionalists would probably have had to retreat from their early goals to survive politically. But they were never tested. Both Britain and Russia, particularly the latter, feared that the chaos in the country would be used by the other to gain control of Iran.
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