Case 1:10-Cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 1 of 316

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 1 of 316

Chapter 6

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³7KH:KDOH´EHFDXVHLWVDSSHDUDQFHZDVVLPLODUWRDKLOODWWKH 1DWLRQDO7UDLQLQJ&HQWHU 17& DW)RUW,UZLQ&DOLIRUQLDZKLFKIRUGHFDGHVKDGEHHQNQRZQ E\WKHVDPHQLFNQDPH227KHYDOOH\UXQVQRUWKHDVWWRVRXWKZHVWDQGKDVWZRSULPDU\HQWUDQFHV H[LWV7KH¿UVWLVRQWKHQRUWKHQGRIWKHYDOOH\DQGHQWHUVIURPQRUWKZHVW7KHRWKHUODUJHU HQWUDQFHHQWHUVWKHYDOOH\IURPWKHVRXWKZHVWSDVWWKHYLOODJHRI6XUNL7KH(DVWHUQ5LGJHZDV GRPLQDWHGE\RQHSDUWLFXODUO\WDOOPRXQWDLQNQRZQDV7DNXU*KDUORFDWHGDFURVVWKHYDOOH\ DGMDFHQWWRWKHVRXWKHUQHQWUDQFH 7KHVWHHSQHVVRIWKHZKROHULGJHOLQHPDGH¿QGLQJVXLWDEOHKHOLFRSWHUODQGLQJ]RQHV +/= IRULQVHUWLQJDLUPRELOHWURRSVGLI¿FXOW7KHWHUUDLQZDVVXFKWKDWWURRSVFRXOGEHODQGHGRQ WRSVRISHDNVRUORZLQWKHIRRWKLOOVEXWODQGLQJRSWLRQVLQEHWZHHQZHUHIHZ$GGLWLRQDOO\ WRVXUPRXQWWKHPRXQWDLQVWKHKHOLFRSWHUVKDGWRFDUU\IHZHU6ROGLHUVDQGRUOHVVHTXLSPHQW SHUORDG7KH(DVWHUQ5LGJHDQGWKH:KDOHZHUHSRFNPDUNHGZLWKFDYHVDQGIROGVWKDWZHUH LGHDOKLGLQJSODFHVDQGGHIHQVLYHSRVLWLRQV,IWKHHQHP\ZHUHWRJHWWRWKHKLJKJURXQGDQG GHIHQGIURPWKRVHSRVLWLRQVWKH\ZRXOGLQGHHGEHGLI¿FXOWWRGLVORGJHRUNLOO3RVLWLRQVRQWKH ULGJHVZRXOGDOVRJLYHHQHP\JXQQHUVFOHDUVKRWVDWDQ\VORZPRYLQJDLUFUDIWWKDWHQWHUHGWKH YDOOH\ 7KHGLI¿FXOWLHVSUHVHQWHGE\WKHKDUVKWHUUDLQZHUHH[DFHUEDWHGEHFDXVH&RDOLWLRQLQWHO OLJHQFHRI¿FHUVKDGRQO\WKHYDJXHVWLGHDRIWKHHQHP\VLWXDWLRQLQWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\ (DUO\HVWLPDWHVRIWKHHQHP\VWUHQJWKVSDQQHGWKHUDQJHIURPDVIHZDVWRDVKLJKDV 7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGD¿JKWHUV7KH¿QDOLQWHOOLJHQFHHVWLPDWHLVVXHGMXVWSULRUWRWKHRSHUDWLRQ VHWWOHGRQDQXPEHURIWR¿JKWHUVDQGDSSUR[LPDWHO\YLOODJHUV¿JKWHUV¶IDP LO\PHPEHUVDQGRWKHUQRQFRPEDWDQWVLQWKHYDOOH\7KHHQHP\DSSHDUHGWREHFRQFHQWUDWHG SULPDULO\LQWKUHHVPDOOYLOODJHV²6KLU.KDQ.KH\O%DERO.KH\ODQG0DU]DN²ORFDWHGLQWKH VRXWKFHQWUDOSDUWRIWKHYDOOH\ &-7)MountainSODQQHUVDVVXPHGWKDWWKHHQHP\LQWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\OLNH7DOLEDQ DQGDO4DHGDIRUFHVHQFRXQWHUHGSUHYLRXVO\ZRXOGEHDUPHGSULPDULO\ZLWK$.V53*V PPPRUWDUVDQGDIHZROG6RYLHW'6K.PPPDFKLQHJXQVQLFNQDPHG³'LVKNDV´7KH WDVNIRUFH¶VLQWHOOLJHQFHRI¿FHUVEHOLHYHGWKDWWKHPRVWOLNHO\FRXUVHRIDFWLRQWKHHQHP\ZRXOG SXUVXHZRXOGEHIRUWKHIURQWOLQH¿JKWHUVWRUHVLVWRQO\ORQJHQRXJKWRDOORZWKHLUOHDGHUVWR HVFDSHWKHQWKH\WRRZRXOGDWWHPSWWRHVFDSHXVLQJWKHWUDLOV NQRZQDVUDWOLQHV WKDWZRXQG WKURXJKYDULRXVGUDZVOHDGLQJVRXWKDQGHDVWRXWRIWKHYDOOH\WRZDUG3DNLVWDQ7KH¿JKWHUV ZRXOGDWWHPSWWRHVFDSHE\PL[LQJLQZLWKWKHORFDOYLOODJHUVLQWKHUHIXJHHÀRZ7KHHVWLPDWH RIWKHPRVWGDQJHURXVFRXUVHRIDFWLRQKHOGWKDWWKHHQHP\ZRXOGGLVSHUVHUHFRQVROLGDWH DQGWKHQFRQGXFWJXHUULOODDWWDFNVDJDLQVWWKH&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVLQWKHQHDUIXWXUH([SHULHQFH ZLWKWKHHQHP\VLQFH2FWREHUDVZHOODVWKHLQWHOOLJHQFHJOHDQHGXSWRWKDWSRLQWLQWLPH VWURQJO\VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHOHDVWOLNHO\FRXUVHRIDFWLRQZDVWKDWWKHHQHP\ZRXOGGHIHQGDQG ¿JKWWRWKHELWWHUHQG24

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 2 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

Organizing the Fighting Force 7KHSHUFHLYHGPRVWOLNHO\HQHP\FRXUVHRIDFWLRQWKHWHUUDLQRIWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\ DQGWKHPL[RIIRUFHVDYDLODEOHWR&-7)MountainGLFWDWHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHSODQIRU $1$&21'$ 6LQFH WKH H[SHFWHG7DOLEDQ DQG DO4DHGD UHDFWLRQ ZDV HVFDSH WKH SODQQHUV DW&-7)MountainNQHZWKH\QHHGHGPRUHJURXQGIRUFHVDQGUHVRXUFHVRWKHUWKDQWKH2'$ WHDPVDQG$IJKDQPLOLWLDXQLWVXQGHU-627)1¶VFRQWURO+DJHQEHFNDVNHGIRUDQGUHFHLYHG RSHUDWLRQDOFRQWURO 23&21 RIDQXPEHURIFRQYHQWLRQDOXQLWVWKDWKDGEHHQÀRZLQJLQWRWKH WKHDWHUVLQFH2FWREHU 7KH ¿UVW RI WKHVH XQLWV ZDV 7) Rakkasan FRPPDQGHG E\ &RORQHO )UDQFLV ³)UDQN´ :LHUFLQVNL7KH7)FRQVLVWHGDWWKDWSRLQWRIWKH+HDGTXDUWHUVG%ULJDGHVW$LUERUQH 'LYLVLRQWZRLQIDQWU\EDWWDOLRQVDQDYLDWLRQEDWWDOLRQDQGDVVRUWHGVXSSRUWXQLWVDOOORFDWHG DWWKH.DQGDKDU$LU¿HOG7KH¿UVWEDWWDOLRQZDVWKHG%DWWDOLRQWK,QIDQWU\ ,1 FRPPDQGHG E\ /LHXWHQDQW &RORQHO &KDUOHV$ ³&KLS´ 3UH\VOHU 7KH ,1 ZDV RQH RI :LHUFLQVNL¶VRUJDQLFLQIDQWU\EDWWDOLRQVIURP)RUW&DPSEHOO.HQWXFN\DQGKDGDUULYHGLQPLG -DQXDU\7KHRWKHUEDWWDOLRQZDVWKHG%DWWDOLRQ3ULQFHVV3DWULFLD¶V&DQDGLDQ/LJKW,QIDQWU\ 33&/, ZKLFKKDGMXVWDUULYHGIURP(GPRQWRQ&DQDGDGXULQJWKH¿UVWZHHNRI)HEUXDU\ %RWKEDWWDOLRQVZHUHHPSOR\HGLQFRQGXFWLQJVHFXULW\DQGIRUFHSURWHFWLRQRSHUDWLRQVDWWKH .DQGDKDU$LU¿HOG $QRWKHURI:LHUFLQVNL¶VEDWWDOLRQVWKHVW%DWWDOLRQWK,QIDQWU\ ,1 ZDVDOVR FRQGXFWLQJVHFXULW\DQGIRUFHSURWHFWLRQRSHUDWLRQVEXWDWWKH6KDKED]$LU%DVHLQ-DFREDEDG &RPPDQGHGE\/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO5RQDOG&RUNUDQWKH,1UHSRUWHGGLUHFWO\WR&)/&& )RUZDUG QRWWR:LHUFLQVNL7KHEDWWDOLRQKDGEHHQFRQGXFWLQJLWVPLVVLRQDW-DFREDEDGVLQFH PLG1RYHPEHUEXWLWVVXERUGLQDWHXQLWVKDGDOVRFRQGXFWHGDIHZTXLFNUHDFWLRQIRUFH 45) DQG66(PLVVLRQV26

3/101

1-187 2-187 1-87 (Reserve) ME L (OPCON)

A 1-187 A 2-187 A 1-87 L B 1-187 B 2-187 B 1-87 L C 1-187 C 2-187 C 1-87 L D1-187D2-187

Figure 20. TF Rakkasan task organization for Operation ANACONDA.

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 3 of 316

Chapter 6

7KH¿QDOFRQYHQWLRQDOIRUFHFRPPLWWHGE\0DMRU*HQHUDO+DJHQEHFNWRWKHLQLWLDORSHUD WLRQVLQWKHYDOOH\ZDVDEDWWDOLRQWKDWKHDOUHDG\RZQHG²WKHVW%DWWDOLRQWK,QIDQWU\ ,1 FRPPDQGHGE\/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO3DXO/D&DPHUD/LNHWKHRWKHUEDWWDOLRQVWKH,1 KDGEHHQLQYROYHGLQDLU¿HOGVHFXULW\DQGIRUFHSURWHFWLRQRSHUDWLRQVDW.VLQFHHDUO\2FWREHU 8QOLNHWKHRWKHUEDWWDOLRQVKRZHYHUWKH,1KDGEHHQUXQQLQJDVSOLWRSHUDWLRQ EHWZHHQ.DQG%DJUDP$LU¿HOGQHDU.DEXO6LQFH1RYHPEHUWKHEDWWDOLRQKDGPDLQWDLQHGD FRPSDQ\DW%DJUDPWRSURYLGHVHFXULW\WRWKHIRUZDUGWDFWLFDORSHUDWLRQVFHQWHU 72& VHWXS WKHUHE\-627)1/D&DPHUD¶VEDWWDOLRQKDGDOVRUXQYDULRXV45)PLVVLRQVDQGKDGEHFRPH LQYROYHGLQERWKWKHHIIRUWVWRTXHOOWKH4DODL-DQJL3ULVRQXSULVLQJDQGLQGHWDLQHHRSHUDWLRQV DW6KHEHUJKDQ3ULVRQ27(YHQWXDOO\WKHVHWKUHH86$UP\EDWWDOLRQVZRXOGEHEULJDGHGWRJHWKHU XQGHU7)RakkasanIRUWKHRSHUDWLRQ&RQWURORI33&/,ZRXOGUHYHUWWR&-7)Mountain +DJHQEHFNDOVRKDGWDFWLFDOFRQWURO 7$&21 RIDZLGHDUUD\RI62)7KH¿UVWDQGIRUH PRVWRIWKH62)RUJDQL]DWLRQVZDV0XOKROODQG¶V-627)1ZKLFKZRXOGH[HUFLVH23&21 RISDUWLFLSDWLQJJURXQG62)RUJDQL]DWLRQVQRWDFWXDOO\SDUWRIWKHVSHFLDORSHUDWLRQV7))RU $1$&21'$-627)1FRPPLWWHGDWOHDVW¿YH2'$VIURPWKHWK6)*² DQG²WRWKHRSHUDWLRQ7KUHHRIWKH¿YHZHUHDVVLJQHGWKHWDVNWRSUHSDUHSDUWLFLSDWLQJ $IJKDQPLOLWLDXQLWVIRUWKHPLVVLRQ 23&21 WR -627)1 ZDV &-627)6 D FRPELQHG DQG MRLQW RUJDQL]DWLRQ FRQVLVWLQJ RI WKHG%DWWDOLRQG6)* 6)* 861DY\6HD$LU/DQG 6($/ WHDPVDQG62)WHDPV IURPYDULRXV&RDOLWLRQQDWLRQVWRLQFOXGH'HQPDUN)UDQFH*HUPDQ\DQG1RUZD\287KH 6)*DOVRDOORFDWHG¿YH2'$V WRWKHRSHUDWLRQRIZKLFKWKUHHZHUH DVVLJQHGWRKHOSSUHSDUHWKHSDUWLFLSDWLQJ$IJKDQPLOLWLDXQLWV$OVR23&21WR-627)1ZDV 7)WKH$XVWUDOLDQ6$6XQLW 7KH$IJKDQPLOLWLDIRUFHVWKDWZRXOGEHFRPHLQYROYHGLQ$1$&21'$FRQVLVWHGRIWKUHH 3DVKWXQXQLWV7KH¿UVWIRUFHOHGE\&RPPDQGHU=LD/RGLQFRQVLVWHGRIDSSUR[LPDWHO\ PHQ2'$VDQGDGYLVHGDQGWUDLQHG=LD¶VIRUFHZKLFKZRXOGEHFKRVHQWREHWKHPDLQ HIIRUWDQGGHVLJQDWHG7)HammerIRUWKHXSFRPLQJRSHUDWLRQ7KHRWKHUWZR$IJKDQXQLWV ZHUHOHGE\=DNLP.KDQDQG.DPHO.KDQDQGHDFKFRQVLVWHGRIDERXWWR¿JKWHUV 2'$VDQGSDUWQHUHGZLWK=DNLP¶VIRUFHDQG2'$VDQGZRUNHGZLWK.DPHO¶V XQLW7KHVHWZRIRUFHVZRXOGEHGHVLJQDWHGDV7)AnvilIRU$1$&21'$29 ,QVKRUWWKHFROOHFWLRQRIXQLWV+DJHQEHFNKDGDYDLODEOHIRUWKHRSHUDWLRQZDVGLYHUVHLQ RULJLQDQGFDSDELOLWLHV7KHIRUFHFRQVLVWHGRIHYHU\WKLQJIURPHVVHQWLDOO\XQWUDLQHGLUUHJXODU PLOLWLD¿JKWHUVWRKLJKO\VNLOOHG62)VROGLHUVFRQVLGHUHGWKHZRUOG¶VHOLWH7KHWURRSVFDPH IURPDWOHDVWQLQHGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHVZKLFKUHÀHFWHGWKH&RDOLWLRQQDWXUHRIWKHRSHUDWLRQ $1$&21'$ZRXOGDOVREHDMRLQWRSHUDWLRQLQYROYLQJXQLWVIURPWKH86$UP\1DY\DQG $LU)RUFH7KHOHDGHUVKLSDQGRSHUDWLRQDOFKDOOHQJHVIDFLQJ+DJHQEHFNDQGKLVVXERUGLQDWH FRPPDQGHUVZRXOGEHPDQLIROG The Final Scheme of Operation ANACONDA ,QWKLQNLQJDERXWWKHVFKHPHRIPDQHXYHUIRU$1$&21'$WKH&-7)Mountain VWDII ORRNHGIRUKLVWRULFDOLQVLJKWV7KH\QRWHGWKDWZKHQFRQGXFWLQJRSHUDWLRQVLQWKH6KDKL.RZW 9DOOH\6RYLHWJURXQGXQLWVW\SLFDOO\HQWHUHGWKHYDOOH\WKURXJKHLWKHUWKHQRUWKHUQRUVRXWKHUQ HQWUDQFHV$WOHDVWWZLFHLQWKHVWKH6RYLHWVXVHGWKHVHDYHQXHVRIDSSURDFKDQGVXIIHUHG KHDY\FDVXDOWLHVERWKWLPHV&-7)MountainSODQQHUVDQWLFLSDWHGWKDWWKHHQHP\H[SHFWHGWKH

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 4 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

&RDOLWLRQWRXVHWKHVDPHURXWHV,QIDFW&RDOLWLRQSODQQHUVGLGLQWHQGWRDGYDQFHLQWRWKH YDOOH\IURPWKRVHGLUHFWLRQVZLWKWZRIRUFHVWKDWZRXOGFROOHFWLYHO\DFWDVD³KDPPHU´%XW EHFDXVHWKH\EHOLHYHGWKDWWKHDO4DHGDHQHP\ZRXOGEHWU\LQJWRHVFDSHWKH\KRSHGWRSXWLQ SODFHDQ³DQYLO´FRQVLVWLQJRIDQXPEHURIIRUFHV²$PHULFDQDQG$IJKDQ²LQEORFNLQJSRVL WLRQV %3V DORQJWKHKLJKJURXQGRQWKHHDVWHUQDQGVRXWKHUQVLGHVRIWKHYDOOH\ 8VLQJWKDWFRQFHSWDVWKHLUIRXQGDWLRQEHWZHHQDQG)HEUXDU\SODQQHUVDQGVWDII SHUVRQQHO IURP &-7) Mountain -627)1 DQG RWKHU DJHQFLHV SXW WRJHWKHU WKH RSHUDWLRQV SODQ IRU$1$&21'$$V WKH GD\V SURJUHVVHG DQG WKH RSHUDWLRQ EHFDPH PRUH FRPSOH[ &-7)MountainDQG0DMRU*HQHUDO+DJHQEHFNDVVHUWHGFRPPDQGDXWKRULW\RYHUWKHSODQ QLQJ8OWLPDWHO\+DJHQEHFNDVVLJQHGWKHIROORZLQJPLVVLRQWR&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVLQYROYHGLQ WKHRSHUDWLRQ 2QRUGHU&-7)MountainDWWDFNVWRGHVWUR\ FDSWXUHRUNLOO $4>DO4DHGD@ YLFLQLW\ 2%- 5HPLQJWRQ 6KLU .KDQ .KH\O DQG WR LGHQWLI\ RU GLVUXSW$4 LQVXUJHQF\ VXSSRUW PHFKDQLVPV DQG H[¿OWUDWLRQ URXWHV LQWR 3DNLVWDQ %37 >%HSUHSDUHGWR@FRQGXFWIROORZRQRSHUDWLRQVWRFOHDUVHOHFWHGREMHFWLYHVDQG LQWHUGLFW$4PRYHPHQWVLQ$2/LQFROQ )XUWKHUWKH&-7)MountainFRPPDQGHUGH¿QHGVXFFHVVE\DUWLFXODWLQJKLVSURSRVHGHQGVWDWH IRUWKHRSHUDWLRQ+DJHQEHFNYLHZHGWKHRSHUDWLRQDVDYLFWRU\RQO\ZKHQDOODO4DHGDIRUFHV LQWKH*DUGH].KRVWUHJLRQZHUHNLOOHGRUFDSWXUHG 10th MT Afghanistan and OP ANACONDA Brief ANACONDA Afghanistan and OP 10th MT Figure 21. The village of Shir Khan Kheyl.

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 5 of 316

Chapter 6

7RDFFRPSOLVKWKHPLVVLRQ&-7)MountainDVVLJQHGHDFKVXERUGLQDWHHOHPHQWWDVNVWKDW VXSSRUWHGWKHJRDO$ERXWGD\VSULRUWR'GD\ZKLFKZDVVHWIRU)HEUXDU\62)UHFRQ QDLVVDQFHWHDPVIURP&-627)6 ZRXOGPRYHLQWRWKH$1$&21'$DUHDZKHUHWKH\FRXOG REVHUYHWKHREMHFWLYHDQGRWKHUNH\ORFDWLRQVDQGUHSRUWHQHP\DFWLYLW\VWUHQJWKVDQGORFD WLRQV2Q)HEUXDU\7)AnvilZRXOGPRYHRXWIURP.KRVW .DPHO.KDQ DQGIURP2UJXQH =DNLP.KDQ DQGVHWXSWKHRXWHUULQJIRUZKDWZRXOGHYHQWXDOO\EHFRPHFRQFHQWULFULQJVRI %3V7KHLUPLVVLRQZDVWRNLOORUFDSWXUHDQ\HQHP\SHUVRQQHOZKRVXFFHVVIXOO\HYDGHGWKH LQQHUULQJRI%3VWKDWZHUHWREHHVWDEOLVKHGDWWKHVRXWKHQGDQGHDVWVLGHRIWKHYDOOH\ =LD¶VDSSURSULDWHO\QDPHG7)HammerZDVGHVLJQDWHGDVWKHPDLQHIIRUWIRUWKHRSHUDWLRQ 7KH7)HammerPLVVLRQZDVWRPRYHLQWUXFNVWKHQLJKWEHIRUHWKHDWWDFNEHJDQRQWKHURDG VRXWKIURP*DUGH]7KHIRUFHZRXOGVSOLWLQWRWZRDVVDXOWHOHPHQWVRQDSSURDFKLQJWKH:KDOH 2QHHOHPHQWZRXOGPRYHRQ$[LV&233(5LQWKHQRUWKDQGDSSURDFKWKHQRUWKHUQHQWUDQFH WRWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\XQWLOLWUHDFKHG3KDVH/LQH 3/ (0(5$/'7KHRWKHUHOHPHQW ZRXOGPRYHRQ$[LV%5$66LQWKHVRXWKDQGDSSURDFKWKHYDOOH\¶VVRXWKHUQHQWUDQFHXQWLOLW WRRUHDFKHG3/(0(5$/'$W(0(5$/'ERWKHOHPHQWVZRXOGKROGLQSODFHXQWLOWKH86 $LU)RUFHKDGDWWDFNHGVHYHUDOSUHVHOHFWHGWDUJHWVORFDWHGLQWKHYDOOH\DQGRQWKH:KDOH2QFH WKH$LU)RUFHKDGFRPSOHWHGLWVZRUNWKHQRUWKHUQHOHPHQWZRXOGVHWXSD%3LQWKHQRUWKHUQ HQWUDQFH=LD¶VPHQLQWKHVRXWKZRXOGWKHQSURFHHGWRDWWDFNLQWRWKHYDOOH\DQGFOHDUWKHWKUHH YLOODJHVRQ2EMHFWLYH5(0,1*721,IWKHHQHP\UHWUHDWHG=LD¶VIRUFHZRXOGSXUVXHDQG GHVWUR\WKHHQHP\E\UXQQLQJWKHPHDVWDQGVRXWKLQWRWKHJXQVRIWURRSVPDQQLQJWKHLQQHU ULQJRI%3V (VWDEOLVKLQJWKHLQQHUULQJZDVWKHPLVVLRQDVVLJQHGWR:LHUFLQVNL¶V7)Rakkasan7KH LQQHUULQJFRQVLVWHGRIVHYHQ%3VGHVLJQHGWRFORVHRIIWKHSULPDU\UDWOLQHVWKDWUDQWKURXJK WKHGUDZVLQWKH(DVWHUQ5LGJHOHDGLQJHDVWDQGVRXWKRXWRIWKHYDOOH\WRZDUG3DNLVWDQ7KH %3VZHUHQDPHGIRUWKHZLYHVDQGJLUOIULHQGVRIVHYHUDORakkasan6ROGLHUVDQGZHUHGHVLJ QDWHGDOSKDEHWLFDOO\IURPQRUWKWRVRXWK3UH\VOHU¶V,1WKHEULJDGH¶VPDLQHIIRUWZDV DVVLJQHGWKHIRXU%3VLQWKHQRUWK$0<%(77<&,1'<DQG',$1(*LYHQWKDW3UH\VOHU ZDVSURYLGHGRQO\WKUHH&KLQRRNVIRUWKHLQLWLDOOLIWKHVHOHFWHG&DSWDLQ)UDQNOLQ%DOWD]DU¶V& &RPSDQ\WRPDNHWKH¿UVWLQVHUWLRQDQGWRHVWDEOLVK%(77<&,1'<DQG',$1(WKHWKUHH %3VFORVHVWWRWKHREMHFWLYH$0

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 6 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

Diane Eve Heather Eastern Ridge Cindy Ginger Betty Amy Marzak Rak TAC Ridge ShirKhan Kheyl AQ Compound Babol Kheyl South Valley Entrance

North Valley Entrance ODA & The Whale Zia Lodin (ME)

ODA & Part of Lodin’s AMF

Blocking Position 0 approx. 1 Route of Air Assault mile Rakkasan Brief Figure 22. Concept of the Operation (Shahi Kowt Valley). EHFDXVH7)RakkasanKDGQRWGHSOR\HGZLWKLWVRUJDQLF¿HOGDUWLOOHU\EDWWDOLRQ7KXVWKHUH ZRXOGEHQRQHRIWKHLQGLUHFW¿UHVXSSRUWQRUPDOO\DYDLODEOHWRDEDWWDOLRQFRPPDQGHUIURP EULJDGHOHYHO %DFNDW)RUW'UXP,1¶VPRUWDUSODWRRQKDGUHFHQWO\JRQHWKURXJKWHVWLQJZLWKWKH QHZPPPRUWDUEHIRUHDFTXLULQJWKHV\VWHPDVSDUWRIDFKDQJHWRWKHEDWWDOLRQ¶VWDEOHRI RUJDQL]DWLRQDQGHTXLSPHQW 72( /D&DPHUDGHFLGHGWREULQJWKHZHDSRQVZKHQKLVEDWWDOLRQ ZDVGHSOR\HGRYHUVHDVWR.+HIXUWKHUGHFLGHGWREULQJRQHRIWKHPPWXEHVDORQJZLWK KLVPPPRUWDUVIRUWKHLQLWLDOLQVHUWLRQRI2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$ZLWKWKHLGHDWKDWKH FRXOGSURYLGHERWKKLVEDWWDOLRQDQG,1 ZKLFKZDVQRWEULQJLQJDQ\PRUWDUVLQRQWKH ¿UVWOLIW ZLWKLQGLUHFW¿UH7KHPPPRUWDUKDGDUDQJHRIRYHUNLORPHWHUVDQGFRXOG HDVLO\UHDFKXSWRDQGSDVW%3%(77

140 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 7 of 316

Chapter 6

DQG/D&DPHUDKDGWKHRSHUDWLRQZHOOLQKDQG:LHUFLQVNLWKHQSODQQHGWRPRYHWKH7$&EDFN WR%DJUDPDQGFRQWUROWKLQJVIURPWKHUHRUUHWXUQWRWKH$2ZKHQ,1ZDVFRPPLWWHG DFWLRQVDOOGHSHQGHQWRQKRZWKHVLWXDWLRQGHYHORSHG $VWKH&-7)MountainSODQQHUVGHYHORSHGDQG¿QDOL]HGWKHSODQWKHXQLWVWKDWZHUHWRH[H FXWHLWSUHSDUHGIRUWKHRSHUDWLRQ%HWZHHQDQG)HEUXDU\7)RakkasanXQLWVÀRZHGLQWR WKHLQFUHDVLQJO\FUDPSHG%DJUDP$LU¿HOG2QDUULYDOWKHXQLWVFRQGXFWHGGULOOVDQGUHKHDUVDOV LQFOXGLQJD³À\DZD\´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±.KRVWDUHDEHJLQQLQJWKHGD\RIWKH97&ZLWK)UDQNV7KHEOL]]DUGODVWHGIRUGD\V DQGGHOD\HGWKHGHSDUWXUHRIWKH$IJKDQPLOLWLDXQLWVDQGWKHLU2'$VDVZHOODVSUHYHQWLQJ WKH LQVHUWLRQ RI7) DQG RWKHU VXUYHLOODQFH WHDPV$V D UHVXOW VXUYHLOODQFH RI WKH 6KDKL .RZW9DOOH\GLGQRWEHJLQKRXUVSULRUWRWKHRSHUDWLRQDVSODQQHG,QGHHGWKHPRVWIRU WXQDWH WHDPV PDQDJHG WR EHJLQ WKHLU UHFRQQDLVVDQFH KRXUV EHIRUH$1$&21'$:KLOH WKHVHGHOD\VZRXOGKDYHDQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHRSHUDWLRQ²HVSHFLDOO\WKHODFNRIDFFXUDWH LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHHQHP\VLWXDWLRQ²WKH\GLGQRWVWRSWKHPLVVLRQIURPJRLQJIRUZDUG2Q 0DUFKWKHWZRKDOYHVRI7)AnvilPRYHGRXWIURPWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHORFDWLRQVWRHVWDEOLVKWKHLU %3V2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$ZDVXQGHUZD\ The Opening Phase $IWHUPLGQLJKWRQ0DUFK&RPPDQGHU=LDDQGWKHWURRSVRI7)HammerDFFRPSDQLHG E\2'$VDQGGHSDUWHG*DUGH]LQDFROXPQRIWUXFNVEXVVHVDQGRWKHUYHKLFOHV )URPWKHEHJLQQLQJWKHFROXPQH[SHULHQFHGGLI¿FXOWLHVWKDWWKUHDWHQHGWRGLVUXSWWKHRSHUD WLRQ7KHUHFHQWVQRZVDQGUDLQKDGWXUQHGWKHGLUWURDGVLQWRPXVK\VOLSSHU\TXDJPLUHVWKDW VLJQL¿FDQWO\VORZHGPRYHPHQWWKURXJKWHUUDLQWKDWZDVGLI¿FXOWWRQHJRWLDWHLQGD\OLJKW(Q URXWHVHYHUDOWUXFNVEHFDPHVWXFNDQGDWRQHSRLQWDODUJHEXVWXUQHGRYHULQMXULQJVHYHUDO ¿JKWHUV2QFHWKHLQMXUHGWURRSVZHUHHYDFXDWHGWKHFROXPQFRQWLQXHGWRPRYHXQWLOLWDUULYHG DWDVPDOOYLOODJHZHVWRIWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\7KHUHWKHIRUFHVSOLWDQGWKHVRXWKHUQHOHPHQW KHDGHGGRZQ$[LV%5$66WRZDUGWKHYLOODJHRI6XUNL7KHQRUWKHUQHOHPHQWXQGHUWKHGLUHF WLRQRI&KLHI:DUUDQW2I¿FHU6WDQOH\/+DUULPDQRI2'$KHDGHGIRU3/(0(5$/' DQGDVPDOOKLOOQHDUWKHQRUWKHUQHQWUDQFHWKDWKDGEHHQGXEEHGWKH³/LWWOH:KDOH´41 1RWORQJDIWHUWKHQRUWKHUQHOHPHQWVSOLWRIILWFDPHXQGHUZKDWZDVLQLWLDOO\EHOLHYHGWR EHHQHP\PRUWDU¿UH7KHOHDGKLJKPRELOLW\PXOWLSXUSRVHZKHHOHGYHKLFOH +00:9 ZDV VWUXFNE\DURXQGWKDWNLOOHG+DUULPDQDQGWZR$IJKDQV%\WKHWLPHWKHDWWDFNDEDWHGRWKHU 6)6ROGLHUVDQG$IJKDQVZHUHZRXQGHG,WVRRQEHFDPHDSSDUHQWWKDWWKHDWWDFNFDPHQRW IURPHQHP\PRUWDUVEXWDQ$&6SHFWUHJXQVKLSWKDWKDGDFFLGHQWDOO\LGHQWL¿HGWKHFROXPQ DVHQHP\DQGRSHQHG¿UH7KLVHYHQWIRUFHGWKHQRUWKHUQHOHPHQWWRVWRSDQGIRFXVLWVDWWHQWLRQ RQHYDFXDWLQJWKHZRXQGHGDQGFDXVHGWKHOHDGHUVRIWKHVRXWKHUQFROXPQWRDOVRKDOWDQG SRQGHUKRZWRSURFHHGZLWKWKHPLVVLRQ42 141 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 8 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

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¶VDLUIRUFHVKDGSUHSDUHGWRODXQFKDPDVVLYHKRXUORQJ ERPEDUGPHQWRQWKHKLOO,QVWHDG&RDOLWLRQDLUFUDIWGHOLYHUHGRQO\VHYHQ-RLQW'LUHFW$WWDFN 0XQLWLRQV -'$0V DJDLQVWWDUJHWVRQWKH:KDOH $OHUWHGE\WKHDWWDFNVHQHP\PRUWDUFUHZVDQGULÀHPHQRQWKH:KDOHVRRQEHJDQGLUHFW LQJ¿UHDJDLQVW=LD¶VWURRSVDVWKH\DGYDQFHG³:KHUHDUHWKHSODQHV"´=LDNHSWDVNLQJKLV DGYLVRUV447KH2'$FRPPDQGHUFRXOGRQO\VKUXJKLVVKRXOGHUV7KH\RXQJ6)FDSWDLQKDGQR ZD\RINQRZLQJZKDWKDGKDSSHQHGZLWKWKHDLUVXSSRUW$IWHUVXIIHULQJVHYHUDOFDVXDOWLHV=LD DQJULO\ZLWKGUHZKLVPHQDQGUDOOLHGWKHPDWDSRVLWLRQQHDUWKHVRXWKHUQWLSRIWKH:KDOH )RUWKHWLPHEHLQJ=LD¶VWURRSVZHUHQRWJRLQJDQ\ZKHUHDQG7)HammerKDGFHDVHGWREH WKHPDLQHIIRUW TF Rakkasan Enters the Valley $V7)HammerVWUXJJOHGWKURXJKWKHPXGDQGGDUNQHVVHQURXWHWRWKHLUDWWDFNSRVLWLRQV WKHDVVDXOWWURRSVRI7)RakkasanJDWKHUHGDW%DJUDP$LU¿HOGDQGSUHSDUHGWRERDUGWKHLU KHOLFRSWHUV 0RUDOH ZDV KLJK DQG WKH WURRSV ZHUH H[FLWHG DERXW¿QDOO\ JHWWLQJ WR ¿JKW WKH HQHP\GLUHFWO\LQVWHDGRISXOOLQJVHFXULW\DWWKHUDPVKDFNOH.DQGDKDU$LUSRUW467KHQLJKWZDV H[WUHPHO\GDUNVR6ROGLHUVZHUHEXVLO\PRYLQJDURXQGWKHÀLJKWOLQHXVLQJQLJKWYLVLRQJRJJOHV 19* WRVHHWKHLUZD\WRWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHDVVHPEO\DUHDVDQGFRQGXFWODVWPLQXWHLQVSHFWLRQVRI ZHDSRQVDQGHTXLSPHQW477KHZHDWKHUZDVDOVRKXPLGFROGDQGFORXG\²SHUIHFWFRQGLWLRQV IRUK\SRWKHUPLD²DQGPDQ\RIWKH6ROGLHUVZHUHEXQGOHGXSZLWKFROGZHDWKHUJHDULQDQ DWWHPSWWRNHHSZDUP$WDERXWWKH&+&KLQRRNWUDQVSRUWKHOLFRSWHUVWRRNRIIDQG KHDGHGDOPRVWGXHVRXWKIRUWKHKRXUORQJÀLJKWWRWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\ 7KH &+V FDUU\LQJ 7) Rakkasan EHORQJHG WR 7) Talon FRPPDQGHG E\ /LHXWHQDQW &RORQHO-DPHV0DU\H$VWKHDLUFUDIWGHSDUWHG%DJUDPWKH\LPPHGLDWHO\UDQLQWRDWKLFNIRJ PDNLQJDQDOUHDG\GLI¿FXOWÀLJKWDOPRVWLPSRVVLEOH+RZHYHU0DU\HDQGKLVSLORWVIRXQGD OLWHUDOKROHLQWKHFORXGV&RUNUDQUHFDOOHGWKHÀLJKWDQGWKHDXVSLFLRXVPRPHQWZKHQDFOHDU SDWKZDVORFDWHG ,WZDVIRJJ\DQGWKHUHZHUHDORWRIFORXGVDQGWKHUHZHUHVHULRXVPRXQWDLQV ,GRQ¶WNQRZLI\RXKDYHEHHQWR%DJUDPRUQRWEXWLWLVIDLUO\LPSUHVVLYHRI KRZXJO\LWLVPRXQWDLQZLVHLQVWHDGRIJHWWLQJDQWV\>WKHSLORWV@IRXQGD VSOLWEHWZHHQWKHWZROD\HUVRIFORXGVOLNHVRPHWKHUPDOLQYHUVLRQWKLQJJRLQJ WKHUHWKH\IRXQGWKLVOD\HURIDERXWIHHWRIVSOLWWKDW\RXFRXOGVHH PLOHV48 7KH SLORWV &RUNUDQ VWDWHG ³ÀHZ WKDW FORXG OD\HU WKURXJK WKH PRXQWDLQV ULJKW XS WR WKH REMHFWLYH´49 $VWKH\OHIW%DJUDPWKHVL[&KLQRRNVKDGEHHQMRLQHGE\WZR8+%ODFNKDZNFRP PDQGDQGFRQWURO & KHOLFRSWHUVDQGVHYHUDO$+$SDFKHKHOLFRSWHUV$VWKHVHDLUFDIW

142 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 9 of 316

Chapter 6

VSHGWKURXJKWKHVNLHV:LHUFLQVNLDQGRWKHURakkasanOHDGHUVOLVWHQHGWRWKHFKDWWHURQWKH UDGLR7KH\VRRQEHFDPHDZDUHWKDWWKHQRUWKHUQHOHPHQWRI7)HammerKDGWDNHQFDVXDOWLHV DQGWKLQJVZHUHQRWJRLQJDFFRUGLQJWRSODQ,QWKHFROGGDZQWKHOLQHRIKHOLFRSWHUVVRRQÀHZ RYHUWKHODUJHYDOOH\WRWKHZHVWRIWKH6KDKL.RZWSDVVHGWKHVRXWKHQWUDQFHDQGPDGHD GHJUHHWXUQEDFNWRWKHQRUWKHDVW$VWKH\DSSURDFKHGWKHYDOOH\WKHVL[&KLQRRNVVSUHDGRXW WRKHDGIRUWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH+/=VDQGZHUHVRRQRQWKHJURXQG 8SLQRQHRIWKH&DLUFUDIW/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO&RUNUDQDQGKLVVHFXULW\WHDPIHOWDVLI WKH\ZHUHIUHH]LQJWRGHDWK7KHKHOLFRSWHUGRRUJXQQHUVKDGWRNHHSWKH%ODFNKDZN¶VGRRUV RSHQDOOWKHZD\WRWKHREMHFWLYHDUHDVRWKH\FRXOGUHWXUQ¿UHLIQHFHVVDU\:KHQWKHKHOLFRSWHU WRXFKHGGRZQRQWKHKLJKULGJHZHVWRI%3+($7+(5&RUNUDQDQGWKHRWKHUVTXLFNO\H[LWHG &RUNUDQUHFDOOHG³,ZDVVRFROG,FRXOGQ¶WPRYHP\¿QJHUVZKLFKKDGRQO\EHHQFODGLQD SDLURIUDJJHG\QRPH[JORYHVVRWKDW,FRXOGZULWHDQGWUDFNWKHDLUDVVDXOWH[HFXWLRQPDWUL[LQ RXUDOWHUQDWH&DLUFUDIW´+HDGGHGWKDWDVKHOHIWWKHKHOLFRSWHUKHZDVWKLQNLQJ³2K*RG ,FDQ¶WHYHQPRYHP\¿QJHUV,¶PJRLQJWRGLHKHUHIXPEOLQJDURXQGZLWKP\IUR]HQKDQGVLI ZHPDNHFRQWDFW´ $VWKHVHFXULW\WHDPVFUDPEOHGWRVHFXUHWKH+/=IRU&RORQHO:LHUFLQVNL¶V%ODFNKDZNWKH 7)RakkasanFRPPDQGHUZDVVWXGLRXVO\REVHUYLQJWKHYDOOH\EHORZZLWKVRPHIRUHERGLQJ +HUHPHPEHUHG 9HU\HDUO\RQ,FRXOGWHOOWKHUHZHUHQRFLYLOLDQVLQWKRVHWKUHHWRZQV7KHUH ZHUHQRFRORUVQRVPRNHQRDQLPDOVQRKDQJLQJFORWKHVQRWKLQJWRLGHQWLI\ LW DV D SRSXODWHG DUHD ZLWK SHRSOH OLYLQJ WKHUH , ORRNHG GRZQ DQG DVNHG ³:KDW¶VZURQJZLWKWKLVSLFWXUH"´7KHUHZHUHQRFLYLOLDQVLQWKHUH7KH\KDG PRYHGWKHPRXW :KHQ:LHUFLQVNL¶V%ODFNKDZNDSSURDFKHGWKH+/=LWZDVVWUXFNE\VPDOODUPV¿UHDQGD JODQFLQJEORZE\ZKDWZDVSUREDEO\DQ53*7KHFKRSSHUZDVQRWVHULRXVO\GDPDJHGDQGZDV DEOHWRODQGWKHEULJDGH7$&DQGVWLOOWDNHRII 2QFH WKH SRXQGLQJ EHDW RI URWRU EODGHV KDG YDQLVKHG LQWR WKH GLVWDQFH WKH QLQH PHQ RIWKHEULJDGH7$&DQGWKHVHFXULW\WHDPZHUHTXLFNO\MRLQHGE\DWZRPDQ62) 6SHFLDO 5HFRQQDLVVDQFH 65 7HDPFDOOHG0DNR7KHZHUHQRZSRVLWLRQHGRQDKLJKYHU\VWHHS NQLIHOLNHULGJHWKDWZRXOGVRRQEHFRPHNQRZQDV5DN7$&5LGJH$V:LHUFLQVNLORRNHGRII WRWKHQRUWKKHFRQWLQXHGWRVWXG\WKHYLOODJHV,WQRZGDZQHGRQKLPWKDW³WKHUHZDVQRWKLQJ EXWEDGJX\VWKHUH7KHSODFHGLGQRWKDYHWKHORRNRIDQ\WKLQJHOVHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ,WKDGWKH ORRNRIDEDWWOH¿HOG´+HWKHQWKRXJKW³7KLVLVJRLQJWREHD¿JKW´ 6XGGHQO\RIIWRWKHVRXWKHDVWIURPWKHGLUHFWLRQRI%3+($7+(5WKH\KHDUGVPDOODUPV ¿UH:KDWLQLWLDOO\VRXQGHGOLNHDIHZUDQGRPVKRWVUDSLGO\EXLOWLQWRDFUHVFHQGRRIQRLVH &RUNUDQUHPHPEHUHGWKLQNLQJ³&RPHRQJX\V

HLZ 13A 7KHWKUHH&+VDOORWWHGWR/D&DPHUD¶V,1DSSURDFKHGWKHLUDVVLJQHG+/=VDWDERXW RQ0DUFK&URPELH¶V$&RPSDQ\ DQGWKHVFRXWVKHDGHGIRU+/=ORFDWHGRQD

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 10 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

KLJKULGJHMXVWVRXWKRI%3(9(7KHRWKHUWZRFKRSSHUVKHDGHGIRU+/=V$DQGORFDWHG EHWZHHQ%3V*,1*(5DQG+($7+(57KHOHDG&KLQRRNFDUU\LQJ/D&DPHUD&&RPSDQ\ FRPPDQGHU&DSWDLQ.UDIWDQG.UDIW¶VVW3ODWRRQODQGHGDW$ZKLOHWKHRWKHUFDUULHGWKHG 3ODWRRQWKHEDWWDOLRQPRUWDUVHFWLRQDQGWKHEDWWDOLRQ60DMRU-DPHV+DOOZKRZDVOHDGLQJ WKHDOWHUQDWH7$&DW+/= 6SULQWLQJ RII WKH DLUFUDIW WKH WURRSV VSUHDG RXW DQG ODLG ÀDW RQ WKH JURXQG ZKLOH WKH\ ZDLWHGIRUWKHFKRSSHUVWRGHSDUW$W+/=$ZKHQWKH&KLQRRNZDVQRPRUHWKDQIHHW RIIWKHJURXQGWKHVPDOOJURXSWKDWLQFOXGHG/D&DPHUDDQG.UDIWEHJDQUHFHLYLQJVPDOODUPV ¿UHIURPWKHVORSHVRI7DNXU*KDUWKHKXJHPRXQWDLQWRWKHLUHDVW.UDIWUHFDOOHGWKDWWKH¿UH ³GLGQ¶W DSSHDU WR EH YHU\ ZHOO DLPHG7KHUH ZHUH EXOOHWV À\LQJ RYHUKHDG EXW QRWKLQJ WRR H[WUHPHLQP\RSLQLRQDQGQRWKLQJLQP\RSLQLRQWRFKDQJHDQRSHUDWLRQ´7KHFRPSDQ\ FRPPDQGHUJUDEEHGKLVVW3ODWRRQOHDGHUDQGRUGHUHGKLPWRPRYHRIIWRWKHZHVWDQGHVWDE OLVK%3+($7+(5 :LWKLQVHFRQGVRIJLYLQJWKDWRUGHUDKHDY\PDFKLQHJXQRSHQHGXSSLQQLQJGRZQWKH VW3ODWRRQ$Q53*VRRQIROORZHGWKHJXQ7HFKQLFDO6HUJHDQW-RKQ0F&DEHWKHEDWWDOLRQ¶V HQOLVWHGWHUPLQDODWWDFNFRQWUROOHU (7$& VDZWKHURXQGFRPLQJ³2XWRIWKHFRUQHURIP\ H\HLQVORZPRWLRQ,VHHWKLVREMHFWODQGULJKWLQIURQWRIXV´0F&DEHUHFDOOHG³,WZDVHLWKHU DPRUWDUURXQGRUDQ53*1RZDIWHUWKLQNLQJDERXWLW,WKLQNLWZDVDFWXDOO\DQ53*,WGXG GHGRXW²LWGLGQRWJRRII´ 'RZQDW+/=.UDIW¶VG3ODWRRQKDGDOVRFRPHXQGHU¿UH7KHSODWRRQOHDGHUFRQ WDFWHG.UDIWYLDUDGLRWRLQIRUPKLPDERXWWKHFRQWDFWDQGDVNIRURUGHUV7KHFRPSDQ\FRP PDQGHUUHDOL]HGWKHSODWRRQFRXOGDFWXDOO\GLUHFW¿UHRQWKHHQHP\SRVLWLRQVWKDWZHUHSLQQLQJ GRZQWKHXQLWVDW+/=$+HWROGKLVOLHXWHQDQWWRWDNHXSSRVLWLRQVDQGEHJLQVXSSUHVVLQJ WKHHQHP\$VKHZDVWDONLQJZLWKG3ODWRRQDQRWKHU53*URXQGVDLOHGLQWR.UDIW¶VSRVLWLRQ DQGODQGHGDERXWIHHWIURPZKHUHKHZDVNQHHOLQJ)RUWXQDWHO\LWWRRIDLOHGWRH[SORGH.UDIW UHPHPEHUHGWKDWKLVUDGLRWHOHSKRQHRSHUDWRU 572 ³ORRNHGXSDWPHZLWKH\HVELJJHUWKDQ \RXFDQLPDJLQHDQGVDLGµ6LUZHQHHGWRJHWRXWRIKHUH¶´ 6S\LQJWKHERZOVKDSHGGHSUHVVLRQZKHUHKHKDGSODQQHGWRSXWKLVFRPPDQGSRVW &3 .UDIWRUGHUHGWKHVW3ODWRRQWRPRYHLQWRLWE\XVLQJERXQGVDQGVXSSUHVVLYH¿UH:LWKLQD VKRUWWLPHWKHSODWRRQ.UDIW¶V&3DQG/D&DPHUD¶V7$&ZHUHDOOORFDWHGLQWKH³%RZO´7KLV ORZJURXQGSURYLGHGDPSOHFRYHUIURPWKHHQHP\¶V¿UHPRVWRILWQRZSDVVLQJKDUPOHVVO\ RYHUKHDG)URPWKH%RZO.UDIWFRXOGVHH+($7+(5DQGUHDVRQHGWKDWKHFRXOGVWLOOHVWDEOLVK WKDW%3ZLWKOLWWOHLQWHUIHUHQFHIURPWKHHQHP\RQ7DNXU*KDU+HLVVXHGRUGHUVDQGVRRQWKH VW3ODWRRQGHSDUWHGGRZQWKHULGJHWRVHWXSWKH%360 ,QGLVFXVVLQJWKHVLWXDWLRQZLWKKLVG3ODWRRQOHDGHUDQGNQRZLQJWKHLUSRVLWLRQRQWKH PDS.UDIWNQHZWKDWWKHSODWRRQFRXOGVWLOOFRYHUWKHORFDWLRQZKHUH%3*,1*(5ZDVWREH HVWDEOLVKHGHYHQLIWKHHQHP\SUHYHQWHGKLPIURPDFWXDOO\SXWWLQJWURRSVWKHUH+HFRXOGVWLOO EORFNWKHH[¿OWUDWLRQRIHQHP\¿JKWHUVDORQJ5RXWH-((3ZKLFKZDVZKDWKLVPLVVLRQFDOOHG IRU,WZDVQRWLGHDOEXW.UDIWGHFLGHGLWZRXOGKDYHWRGR61 $WDERXWWKHVW3ODWRRQOHDGHUFDOOHGWRWHOO.UDIWWKDW%3+($7+(5ZDVHVWDE OLVKHG1RVRRQHUGLG.UDIWJHWWKDWPHVVDJHWKDQKHOHDUQHGWKDWWKHSODWRRQZDVDOVRUHFHLYLQJ ¿UHIURPDPRXQWDLQWRWKHZHVW.UDIWTXLFNO\PRYHGRYHUWRWKDWVLGHRIWKH%RZODQGSHHUHG DFURVVWKHGUDZ8SRQWKHULGJHKHFRXOGVHHVRPHZKHUHEHWZHHQWRHQHP\WURRSVZKR

144 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 11 of 316

Chapter 6

ZHUHSUREDEO\DO4DHGDJLYHQWKHLUEODFNEDWWOHGUHVVXQLIRUPV$VWKH\PRYHGDORQJWKHULGJH VRPHRIWKHPZHUH¿ULQJDWKLVVW3ODWRRQ7KHVW3ODWRRQZDVUHWXUQLQJ¿UHDQGKLWWLQJPDQ\ RIWKHHQHP\¿JKWHUV.UDIWUHFDOOHGLWZDVOLNHZDWFKLQJDFDUQLYDOJDPH³ZKHQ\RXKDYHWKH GXFNVJRLQJDURXQGLQDFLUFOHDQG\RXVKRRWDQGWKH\JRGRZQDQGWKH\MXVWFRQWLQXHJRLQJ DURXQG,WZDVMXVWOLNHWKDW´62 BP EVE $WWKLVSRLQWWKHRSHUDWLRQLQWKHVRXWKHUQHQGRIWKHYDOOH\VHHPHGWREHZHOOLQKDQG HYHQLIWKHVXGGHQDQGLQWHQVHHQHP\FRQWDFWKDGVXUSULVHGWKH6ROGLHUVRI&&RPSDQ\.UDIW¶V XQLWZDVQRWWKHRQO\HOHPHQWRI,1WRPDNHFRQWDFWZLWKWKHHQHP\KRZHYHULWVEURWKHU FRPSDQ\WRWKHQRUWKKDGH[SHULHQFHGHQHP\FRQWDFWDVZHOO&URPELH¶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³7KH\ZHUH\RXQJSUREDEO\ \HDUVROG´&URPELHUHPHPEHUHG³,IWKH\ZHUHROGHUJX\VZHSUREDEO\ZRXOGKDYHKDGVRPH ELJSUREOHPVRQWKH/=EXWWKH\ZHUHSUREDEO\VFDUHGRXWRIWKHLUZLWV´7KH0JXQQHUV ¿UHGDIHZJUHQDGHURXQGVDQGDFFRUGLQJWR&URPELH³WKDWZDVLW´64 $V WKH VFRXWV WRRN RII WR WKH VRXWK WR HVWDEOLVK REVHUYDWLRQ SRVWV EHWZHHQ (9( DQG *,1*(5&URPELHRUGHUHGKLVWURRSVQRZFRQVLVWLQJRIRQO\PHQIURPWKHVW3ODWRRQ WRPRYHRIIWRWKHHDVWXSWKHGUDZWR(9(:LWKLQDVKRUWWLPHWKH%3ZDVHVWDEOLVKHG /RRNLQJWRZDUGWKHVRXWKZHVW&URPELHFRXOGVHHULJKWGRZQLQWRWKHYLOODJHRI0DU]DN-XVW DV:LHUFLQVNLDQG&RUNUDQKDGQRWHG&URPELHLPPHGLDWHO\UHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKHYLOODJHZDV HPSW\HVSHFLDOO\RIZRPHQDQGFKLOGUHQ³7KH\¶GSUREDEO\EHHQJRQHIRUDZHHN

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 12 of 316

Operation ANACONDA Rakkasan Brief Figure 23. The al-Qaeda compound near HLZ 1. UHFDOOHG³,QLWLDOO\ZKHQ,ODQGHGWKHUHZDVQRFRQWDFW(YHU\ERG\UXVKHGRIIWKHKHOLFRSWHUDQG NLQGRIZDLWHGXQWLOWKH&KLQRRNVÀHZRII7KHQ,ZRXOGVD\ZLWKLQDPLQXWHZHKHDUGVPDOO DUPV¿UH´687KLVWLPHE\FRQWUDVWWKH¿UHZDVQRWGLUHFWHGDWWKHWURRSVDWKLV/=%DOWD]DU VRRQUHFHLYHGDFDOOIURPKLVVW3ODWRRQDW+/=VD\LQJWKH\ZHUHDOUHDG\LQFRQWDFW69 2QFHRQWKHJURXQG3UH\VOHUH\HGDZDOOHGFRPSRXQGMXVWQRUWKHDVWRIWKH+/=WKDWKDG FDXJKWKLVDWWHQWLRQGXULQJWKHSODQQLQJIRUWKHRSHUDWLRQ7KHFRPSRXQGZDVVLWXDWHGDWWKH VRXWKHDVWHUQIRRWRIDODUJHHDVWZHVWULGJHWKDWFXWWKH6KDKL.RZWLQWZR7KHEXLOGLQJKDG VWUXFNKLPDVDOLNHO\HQHP\VWURQJSRLQWDQGKHRULJLQDOO\GLGQRWZDQWWRXVHWKDW/=+LV DQ[LHW\ZDVFDOPHGVRPHZKDWE\UHSRUWVIURPUHFRQQDLVVDQFHWHDPVEHIRUHWKHRSHUDWLRQWKDW VXJJHVWHGWKHFRPSRXQGZDVXQRFFXSLHGVRKHGHFLGHGWRJRDKHDGZLWK+/=IRUWKHDLU DVVDXOW3UH\VOHUQRZZDWFKHGDVDVTXDGIURPWKHG3ODWRRQERXQGHGDFURVVDGU\FUHHNEHG EHWZHHQWKH+/=DQGWKHFRPSRXQGDQGHQWHUHGWKHVWUXFWXUHWRVHDUFKLW70 $WDERXWWKDWWLPHWKHUHPDLQLQJWURRSVVWLOOGHSOR\HGRQ+/=EHJDQWRUHFHLYH¿UHIURP WKUHHHQHP\¿JKWHUVKLJKRQWKHULGJHEHKLQGWKHFRPSRXQG,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHVPDOODUPV¿UH DQ53*URXQGVDLOHGRYHU3UH\VOHU¶VKHDGDQGODQGHGLQWKHSHULPHWHU3UH\VOHUWROG%DOWD]DU ³:HKDYHWRPRYH:HDUHWRRH[SRVHGKHUH´716RRQSDUWRIWKHG3ODWRRQZDVOD\LQJGRZQ VXSSUHVVLYH¿UHZKLOHWKHUHPDLQLQJWURRSVERXQGHGLQWRWKHFRPSRXQG7KH\ZHUHWKHQIRO ORZHGE\WKHUHVWRIG3ODWRRQ)RUWXQDWHO\3UH\VOHUZDVDEOHWREULQJ$SDFKHKHOLFRSWHUVWR KLVORFDWLRQDQGWKRVHDLUFUDIWTXLFNO\NLOOHGWKHWKUHHHQHP\¿JKWHUVRQWKHULGJH72 ,QVLGHWKHFRPSRXQG3UH\VOHUGLVFRYHUHGWZRWKLQJV)LUVWWKHFRPSRXQGKDGLQGHHGEHHQ RFFXSLHGSUREDEO\E\WKHWKUHHPHQNLOOHGE\WKH$SDFKHVLIQRWRWKHUVDVZHOO%DOWD]DU¶V PHQIRXQGWZRPRUWDUWXEHVDFDFKHRI53*URXQGVDQ$PHULFDQQLJKWYLVLRQGHYLFHDIHZ KDQGKHOG UDGLRV DQG D JUHDW GHDO RI IRUHLJQ FXUUHQF\7KHUH ZHUH DOVR VL[ EHGV LQGLFDWLQJ

146 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 13 of 316

Chapter 6

WKDW SHUKDSV PRUH WKDQ WKH WKUHHGHDGPHQKDGEHHQOLYLQJ WKHUH $SSDUHQWO\ WKH HQHP\ KDGGHSDUWHGLQDUXVKEHFDXVH WKH\KDGOHIWWKHLUVKRHVDQGD SRW RI KRW WHD EUHZLQJ RQ WKH ¿UH 7KH VHFRQG WKLQJ WKDW 3UH\VOHU UHDOL]HG ZDV WKDW WKH FRPSRXQG ZDV QRW UHDOO\ D WHQDEOHSRVLWLRQ7KHKLJKULGJH WRWKHQRUWKORRNHGULJKWGRZQ LQWRLW1RWVXUSULVLQJO\HQHP\ ¿JKWHUV RQ WKH ULGJH EHJDQ SODFLQJ HIIHFWLYH VPDOO DUPV ¿UHLQWRWKHFRPSRXQG¶VRSHQ FRXUW\DUG DW DERXW WKDW WLPH

Rakkasan Brief 7R FRXQWHU WKH ¿UH 3UH\VOHU¶V Figure 24. AH-64 Apache conducting close air support on D-day. IRUZDUGREVHUYHUDWWHPSWHGWR FRQWDFWWKH,1¶VPP PRUWDUVTXDGLQWKHVRXWKWRSXWLQGLUHFW¿UHRQWKHHQHP\RQWKHULGJHEXWGLVFRYHUHGWKDWWKH FUHZZDVEXVLO\HQJDJHGLQVXSSRUWLQJLWVRZQEDWWDOLRQ7KH,1ZRXOGQRWVHHDQ\¿UH VXSSRUWIURPRQ0DUFK74 0HDQZKLOH%DOWD]DUKDGGHFLGHGQRWWRPRYHKLV&3LQWRWKHFRPSRXQG+HRSWHGLQVWHDG WRVHWXSRQWKHRXWVLGHXQGHUWKHFRYHURIWKHHDVWHUQZDOO7KHUHKHQRWLFHGWKDWWKHFRPSRXQG ZDVQRZUHFHLYLQJ¿UHIURPWKHYLFLQLW\RIZKHUH%3&,1'

147 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 14 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

PL Georgia

HLZ 15 BP AMY

PL Washington

HLZ C BP 3 BETTY

AQ Com pound

BP OBJ Remington HLZ CINDY 1

HLZ C 2 2 PL Carlahan`

BP HLZ DIANE 3 C HLZ 1 4 PL PR

BP EVE PL Ruby PL Florida (O/O RFL)`

Rak TAC Ridge BP GINGER BP HEATHER BP D

0 1 2 3 Kilometers NGA Figure 25. Operation ANACONDA, TF 2-187, 2 March 2002.

Rak TAC Ridge $WDERXWWKHVDPHWLPH.UDIW¶VVW3ODWRRQZDVFRQGXFWLQJLWVVKRRWLQJJDOOHU\¿UH¿JKWDW %3+($7+(5WKH6ROGLHUVRQ5DN7$&5LGJHQRWLFHGWKUHHPHQWRWKHQRUWKPRYLQJVRXWK RQDSDUDOOHOULGJHWRZDUGWKHLUSRVLWLRQ7KHPHQFRXOGYHU\ZHOOKDYHEHHQSDUWRIWKHJURXS WKDWKDGEHHQWU\LQJWRVOLSE\WKHVW3ODWRRQDW%3+($7+(57KHWURRSVRQ5DN7$&5LGJH 148 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 15 of 316

Chapter 6

ZHUHQRWVXUHLIWKHVHPHQZHUHHQHP\FRPEDWDQWVEHFDXVHWKH\ZHUHVWLOOWRRGLVWDQWWREH UHFRJQL]HG2QHRIWKHPHQDSSHDUHGWREHFDUU\LQJVRPHWKLQJODUJHVOXQJRYHUKLVVKRXOGHU E\DGDQJOLQJVWUDS$V:LHUFLQVNLDQG&RUNUDQZHUHGLVFXVVLQJZKHWKHUWKH\VKRXOGHQJDJH WKHVHVWUDQJHUVVHYHUDO$SDFKHVÀHZXSWKHYDOOH\RQDJXQUXQWRVXSSRUWWKHHPEDWWOHG ,1GRZQQHDU*,1*(5:LHUFLQVNLDQG&RUNUDQZDWFKHGDVWKHXQLGHQWL¿HGPHQWXUQHGDQG RSHQHG¿UHRQWKHFKRSSHUV7KDWGHFLGHGWKHLVVXH78 7KRXJK:LHUFLQVNLZDVFRPPLWWHG WRHQJDJLQJWKHFRQ¿UPHGHQHP\¿JKW HUVKHVWLOOKDGWRGHFLGHKRZKHZDV JRLQJWRGRLW7KHWKUHHHQHP\¿JKWHUV KDGVXGGHQO\LQFUHDVHGWRQLQHDOPRVW HTXDOLQQXPEHUWRWKHLURZQJURXSRQ WKH ULGJH 7KH Rakkasan FRPPDQGHU GHFLGHGWRGLUHFWDQDLUVWULNHDWWKHPEXW WKH-'$0KLWWRRORZRQWKHULGJHWRNLOO DQ\RIWKHP7KHQH[WDWWHPSWLQYROYHG DQ $SDFKH WKDW ÀHZ GLUHFWO\ RYHU WKH 7$& SRVLWLRQ ZHVW WR HDVW GLSSHG LWV QRVHMXVWEH\RQGWKHFUHVWDQGODXQFKHG VHYHUDO URFNHWV ZKLOH KRYHULQJ RQO\

IHHWRYHU:LHUFLQVNLDQGKLVVPDOOHOH Rakkasan Brief PHQW7KHURFNHWVDOVRIDLOHGWRNLOODQ\ Figure 26. Members of TF Rakkasan TAC on Rak RIWKH¿JKWHUV7KHHQHP\VTXDGVLPSO\ TAC Ridge. WRRN FRYHU DQG SURFHHGHG WRZDUG WKH 7$&¶VSRVLWLRQDJDLQRQFHWKH$SDFKHGHSDUWHG79 $SSDUHQWO\WKHHQHP\¿JKWHUVZHUHVWLOOREOLYLRXVWKDWWKHUHZHUH$PHULFDQ6ROGLHUVRQ WRSRIWKHULGJH/HIWZLWKQRFKRLFHWKHPHQRIWKH7$&FKRVHWRDPEXVKWKHHQHP\¿JKWHUV DV WKH\ FDPH FORVHU7KH 62) WHDP ORFDWHG ZLWK:LHUFLQVNL LQLWLDWHG WKH DFWLRQ ZLWK WKHLU QRLVHVXSSUHVVHG0DVVDXOWULÀHV$IWHUNLOOLQJRQHRIWKH¿JKWHUVZKHQWKHDPEXVKEHJDQ &RUNUDQDQGRWKHUVVSHQWWKHQH[WVHYHUDOKRXUVSLFNLQJRIIWKHUHPDLQGHULQDVRUWRIFDWDQG PRXVHJDPH(YHQWXDOO\DOOQLQH7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVZHUHNLOOHGZLWKQRORVVHVWRWKH7)Rakkasan 7$& 80 %\WKLVWLPHLWZDVODWHPRUQLQJDQGWKHSODQIRUWKH7$&WRUHPDLQRQWKHJURXQGIRURQO\ PLQXWHVKDGORQJEHHQIRUJRWWHQ7KHSODQKDGFKDQJHGQRWVRPXFKEHFDXVHRIWKHHQHP\ DFWLYLWLHVRQ5DN7$&5LGJHEXWEHFDXVHWKHEDWWOHQHDUWKH%RZOKDGWXUQHGYHU\XJO\ The Battle at the Bowl 1RWORQJDIWHU.UDIWKDGREVHUYHGKLVVW3ODWRRQHQJDJLQJWKH7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVPP PRUWDUURXQGVEHJDQIDOOLQJRQ%3+($7+(57KHVWUDQJHDVSHFWDERXWWKHPRUWDU¿UHZDV WKDWWKHURXQGVZHUHFRPLQJIURPWXEHVORFDWHGRQWKHVORSHVRI7DNXU*KDUDVZHOODVWKH PRXQWDLQMXVWWRLWVVRXWK6LQFHWKHPRUWDUVLQWKHHDVWZHUHVXSSRUWLQJWKHHQHP\¿JKWHUVWR WKHZHVW.UDIWVXVSHFWHGWKDWWKHWZRHOHPHQWVSRVVHVVHGFRPPXQLFDWLRQVFDSDELOLWLHVDQG ZHUHFRRUGLQDWLQJWKHLUHIIRUWV:LWKLQDERXWRUPLQXWHVVHYHUDOYROOH\VKDGIDOOHQSUH FLVHO\RQWKHVW3ODWRRQ¶VSRVLWLRQDQGKDGZRXQGHGDWOHDVW6ROGLHUVLQFOXGLQJWKHSODWRRQ OHDGHUDQGSODWRRQVHUJHDQW81 149 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 16 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

(DUOLHU/D&DPHUDKDGDVNHG.UDIWLIKHKDGWKRXJKWDERXWHVWDEOLVKLQJDFRPSDQ\VWURQJ SRLQWEHWZHHQWKHWZR%3V,QKLVSODQQLQJWKH&&RPSDQ\FRPPDQGHUKDGFRQVLGHUHGWKLV EXWKHZDQWHGKLVSODWRRQOHDGHUVWRKDYHWKHFKDQFHWRRSHUDWHLQDPRUHGHFHQWUDOL]HGPDQ QHU$WDQ\UDWHDIWHUWKHUDSLGVXFFHVVLRQRIFDVXDOWLHVLQWKHVW3ODWRRQ.UDIWFKDQJHGKLV

Rak TAC Ridge

BP HLZ GINGER 13A BP HEATHER

The “BOWL”

HLZ 13

Enemy mortar Enemy movement Enemy escape route

0 500 1000

Meters NGA Figure 27. Operation ANACONDA, 1-87 in the Bowl, 2 March 2002.

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 17 of 316

Chapter 6

PLQGDQGRUGHUHGPRVWRIKLVG3ODWRRQWRPRYHXSIURP+/=DQGFRQVROLGDWHZLWKKLP DWWKH%RZO2QHVTXDGZRXOGVWD\QHDU+/=ZLWKWKHPRUWDUVWRPDLQWDLQLQGLUHFW¿UHRQ WKHHQHP\WRWKHHDVW:KHQWKHG3ODWRRQDUULYHG.UDIWVHQWWKHPWR%3+($7+(5WRKHOS VW3ODWRRQPRYHLWVFDVXDOWLHVDQGWKHUHVWRIWKHSODWRRQLQWRWKH%RZO%\DERXWWKH FRQVROLGDWLRQZDVFRPSOHWH82 )RUWKHQH[WKRXU&&RPSDQ\KXQNHUHGGRZQLQLWVSRVLWLRQDQGWUDGHG¿UHZLWKWKHHQHP\ ZKLOH/D&DPHUDDQGWKH(7$&VDWWHPSWHGWRDFTXLUHDQGFRRUGLQDWH&$6VRUWLHVWRKLWWKH HQHP\SRVLWLRQV$WDERXWWKHWURRSVLQWKH%RZOVWDUWHGUHFHLYLQJKHDY\PDFKLQHJXQDQG VPDOODUPV¿UHIURPWKHQRUWK7KHFRPSDQ\ZDVWKHQ¿JKWLQJLQWKUHHGLUHFWLRQV$FFRUGLQJ WR.UDIW³:HZHUH¿JKWLQJRIILQP\EHVWHVWLPDWHWR>HQHP\¿JKWHUV@LQWKHZHVW WRLQWKHHDVWDQGWRWRRXUQRUWK´,WVRRQEHFDPHDSSDUHQWWKDWWKHWURRSVLQWKH QRUWKZKLFKZHUHZHDULQJEODFNDO4DHGDEDWWOHGUHVVZHUHDWWHPSWLQJWRPDQHXYHUDJDLQVW WKH$PHULFDQLQIDQWU\PHQLQWKH%RZO³7KH\ZHUHSRSSLQJLQDQGRXWRIWKH>UDYLQHV@DQG KHDGLQJWRZDUGRXUSRVLWLRQ´.UDIWUHFDOOHG84 $WDERXWDIWHUDQXPEHURIWKHHQHP\¿JKWHUVIURPWKLVQHZWKUHDWZHUHNLOOHGWKH ¿UVW&RDOLWLRQ¿[HGZLQJDLUFUDIWVKRZHGXSRQVWDWLRQ7KHDLUFUDIWV¶¿UVWWDUJHWZDVWKHDO 4DHGDHOHPHQWLQWKHQRUWKZKLFKWKH\TXLFNO\GHVWUR\HG7HFKQLFDO6HUJHDQW0F&DEHWKH EDWWDOLRQ(7$&KDGPHDQZKLOHEHHQWU\LQJWRFRRUGLQDWHIRU&$6WRVWULNHWKHSRVLWLRQVRQ 7DNXU*KDU+HZDV¿QDOO\DEOHWRUDLVHWKHDLUFUDIWWKDWZHQWE\WKHFDOOVLJQ³%ODGH´D% ERPEHUZKRVHSLORWLQIRUPHG0F&DEHWKDWKHKDGRQERDUG0DUNSRXQGERPEV 0F&DEHZDVDEOHWRSODQIRUDVWULNHWKDWZRXOGEULQJWKHERPEHURQDURXWHVRXWKWRQRUWKDQG OD\WKHERPEVLQDSDWKSDUDOOHOWR&&RPSDQ\¶VSRVLWLRQDQGDERXWPHWHUVWRLWVHDVW7KH VHUJHDQWHVWLPDWHGWKDWWKHHQHP\SRVLWLRQVZHUHRQO\DERXWPHWHUVDZD\EXWKHZDVOHHU\ RIEULQJLQJVXFKDGHYDVWDWLQJORDGLQWKDWFORVHWRIULHQGO\WURRSV+HHVWLPDWHGWKDWZLWKWKH PHWHUVWDQGRIIGLVWDQFHWKHHQHP\ZRXOGVWLOOEHZLWKLQWKHPHWHUEODVWUDGLXVRIWKH SRXQGERPEV 2QHPLQXWHEHIRUHWKH%VWULNH0F&DEH\HOOHGRYHUWR/D&DPHUDDQG.UDIWWKDWWKH SODQHZRXOGVRRQEHGURSSLQJLWVERPEVDQGWKHWURRSVQHHGHGWRVWD\GRZQ³6RHYHU\ERG\ EDVLFDOO\GUHZGRZQRIIWKHULGJHDOLWWOHELW´0F&DEHUHFDOOHG³7KH\VWRSSHGGRLQJWKHLU VXSSUHVVLYH¿UHVDQGEDVLFDOO\HYHU\ERG\JRWRQWKHLUEHOOLHVKDQGVRYHUWKHLUKHDGVJHWWLQJ UHDG\IRUWKHDLUVWULNH$WWKHPRPHQWWKDWLWFDPHLQLWZDVORXGDQGIXULRXV´868QIRUWXQDWHO\ WKHVWULNHIDLOHGWRGRPXFKGDPDJHDOWKRXJKDV0F&DEHUHPHPEHUHG³LWGH¿QLWHO\ERRVWHG WKHPRUDOH+DYLQJD%GURS0DUN¶VWKDWFORVHWRµIULHQGOLHV¶\HVWKDW¶VDKHOORID ERRVWHU´87 7KHUHDOKHURHVWRWKHWURRSVRI&&RPSDQ\WKDWGD\KRZHYHUZHUHWKH$SDFKHSLORWV RIWKHG%DWWDOLRQVW$YLDWLRQ5HJLPHQWQLFNQDPHGWKH³.LOOHU6SDGHV´7KLVXQLWKDG WUDLQHGWRRSHUDWHE\WDNLQJXSKLGHSRVLWLRQVEHKLQGKLOOVDQGRWKHUWHUUDLQIHDWXUHVSRSXSWR ¿UHDWWKHHQHP\DQGWKHQUHWXUQWRWKHVDIHW\RIWKHPDVNLQJIHDWXUH7KLVWDFWLFPLQLPL]HG H[SRVXUHWRHQHP\¿UH%HFDXVHRIWKHWHUUDLQDQGWKHZD\WKHHQHP\DQGIULHQGO\WURRSVZHUH SRVLWLRQHGWKH$SDFKHVFRXOGQRWRSHUDWHLQWKDWPDQQHUDWWKHVRXWKHQGRIWKH6KDKL.RZW ,QVWHDGWKH\ZHUHIRUFHGWRPDNHPRYLQJJXQUXQVDORQJDFDQ\RQOLNHURXWH¿ULQJLQWRWKH VLGHRIWKHPRXQWDLQDVWKH\ZHQW,IWKH\FKRVHWRXVHWKHLUURFNHWVWKH\ZRXOGKDYHWRVWRS KRYHUDQGWDNHDLPWRKDYHDQ\KRSHRIKLWWLQJWKHHQHP\7KHSLORWVNQHZWKHVHPHWKRGV ZRXOGH[SRVHWKH$SDFKHVWRFORVHUDQJHGLUHFW¿UHEXWWKH\JDPHO\DFFHSWHGWKHULVN

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 18 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

7KH$SDFKHVPDGHWKHLUUXQVIURPWKHVRXWKRI&&RPSDQ\DQGÀHZQRUWKWKURXJKWKH%3 +($7+(5GUDZ$VWKH\ÀHZWKURXJKWKH\ZHUHPHWE\DKDLORI¿UHIURPWKHHQHP\WURRSV FRQFHQWUDWHGWKHUH0F&DEHVWDWHG³,GRUHFDOOVHHLQJ>LQFK@URFNHWVFRPLQJRIIRIWKH .LOOHU6SDGHV7KH\VKRWWKHLUPPDWWKHP$JDLQWKH\ZRXOG¿UHWKHLUZHDSRQV\V WHPVFRQWLQXHÀ\LQJDQGWKH\UHFHLYHGKHDY\JURXQG¿UHIURPWKHJX\V,EHOLHYHWKH\PDGH SUREDEO\IRXUDWWDFNVDWEHVW´88$WWKHHQGRIWKRVHUXQVWKDWPRUQLQJ¿YHRIWKHVL[$SDFKHV DYDLODEOHKDGWRUHWXUQWR%DJUDP7KH\KDGEHFRPHWRRGDPDJHGWRFRQWLQXHÀ\LQJFRPEDW PLVVLRQVLQWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\ 7KHPPPRUWDUFUHZQHDUWKH%RZOKDGDOVREHHQEXV\WU\LQJWRFRQWULEXWHWRWKH RYHUDOOHIIRUW6WLOOSRVLWLRQHGDERXWPHWHUVVRXWKRIWKH%RZOLWZDVFRQGXFWLQJFRXQWHU¿UH PLVVLRQVDJDLQVWWKHHQHP\PRUWDUVRQWKHKLJKJURXQGWRWKHHDVW0F&DEHKDSSHQHGWREH ORRNLQJDWWKHPPPRUWDUSRVLWLRQZKHQDQHQHP\PRUWDUURXQGVWUXFNULJKWLQWKHPLGGOH RI LW EXW PLUDFXORXVO\ QRQH RI WKH PHQ ZHUH LQMXUHG 0F&DEH ODWHU UHPDUNHG ³+RZ WKH\ VXUYLYHGWKDWLWVWLOOMXVWERJJOHVPH´897KHPRUWDUFUHZPHQGXVWHGWKHPVHOYHVRIIDQGUDSLGO\ PRYHGWRDVHFRQGSRVLWLRQWREHJLQ¿ULQJDJDLQ7KHQWKHFUHZZDVVRRQVWUXFNE\DVHFRQG HQHP\PRUWDUURXQG7KLVWLPHWKH\VXIIHUHGVHYHUDOFDVXDOWLHVDQGWKHPPPRUWDUZDV NQRFNHGRXWRIDFWLRQ90 /D&DPHUDGHFLGHGLWZDVWLPHWRFRQVROLGDWHHYHU\ERG\DWKLVORFDWLRQ:KLOH&&RPSDQ\ SURYLGHGKHDY\VXSSUHVVLYH¿UHWKHPRUWDUFUHZDQGWKHVTXDGIURPG3ODWRRQGUDJJHGWKH ZRXQGHGPHQWRWKHZHVWDQGWKHQQRUWKEHKLQGDVPDOOULGJHWRVWD\RXWRIWKHRSHQNLOO]RQH WKDWOD\EHWZHHQ&&RPSDQ\DQGWKHVHFRQGPRUWDUSRVLWLRQ(YHQWXDOO\DOOWKHWURRSVZHUH DVVHPEOHGLQWKH%RZO91 :KLOHWKH%RZOSURYLGHGDOHYHORIVDIHW\IURPWKHHQHP\¶VVPDOODUPV¿UHLWZDVDJRRG WDUJHWIRUWKHHQHP\PRUWDUV:LWKWKH$PHULFDQWURRSVFRQFHQWUDWHGLQDUHODWLYHO\VPDOODUHD LWZDVHDVLHUWRGURSPRUWDUURXQGVLQWRWKHGHSUHVVLRQDQGH[SHFWWRFDXVHFDVXDOWLHV,QGHHG LWZDVWKHPPPRUWDUVPDQQHGE\ZHOOWUDLQHG7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGDFUHZVWKDWXOWLPDWHO\ SURGXFHGWKHJUHDWHVWQXPEHURIFDVXDOWLHVLQ&&RPSDQ\+DOOUHFDOOHGWKDWWKHHQHP\WURRSV ³ZHUHQ¶WYHU\JRRGVKRWVZLWKWKHLUZHDSRQVEXWWKHLUPRUWDU¿UHZDVDFFXUDWHLQWKDWWKH\ DGMXVWHG¿UH7KHVHJX\VWRRNDZKLOHWRDGMXVWWKHURXQGVEXWRQFHWKH\GLGDGMXVWWKH URXQGVWKH\VHUYHGDSXUSRVHWKH\H[HFXWHG´92 7KHHQHP\QRWRQO\NQHZKRZWR¿UHWKHLU ZHDSRQVWKH\XQGHUVWRRGSUXGHQWWDFWLFVDVZHOO7KH\ZRXOG¿UHWKHLUPRUWDUVDVORQJDVWKH\ ZHUHFRQ¿GHQWWKDWQR&RDOLWLRQDLUFUDIWZHUHLQWKHDUHD2QFHDSODQHRUKHOLFRSWHUZDVVSRW WHGWKHPRUWDUFUHZZRXOGPRYHLQWRDFDYHRUDKLGHSRVLWLRQXQWLOWKHDLUFUDIWGHSDUWHG7KHQ WKHFUHZZRXOGUHVXPH¿ULQJ $OWKRXJKWKHPPPRUWDUVZHUHWKHPRVWOHWKDOHQHP\ZHDSRQWKDWGD\VPDOODUPV¿UH UHPDLQHGDSUREOHP7KH&&RPSDQ\6ROGLHUVKDGWRPDLQWDLQSRVLWLRQVRQWKHOLSRIWKH%RZO WRSURYLGHUHWXUQ¿UHRQWKHHQHP\7KHSUREOHPZDVWKDWLID6ROGLHUOD\RQWKHHDVWVLGHRI WKH%RZOWKHHQHP\LQWKHZHVWKDGDVKRWDWKLVEDFN&RQYHUVHO\WKRVHRQWKHZHVWVLGHZHUH EHLQJVKRWDWE\WKHHQHP\XSRQWKHKLJKJURXQGWRWKHHDVW2IFRXUVHWKH6ROGLHUVGRZQLQ WKH%RZOZHUHWKHPRVWOLNHO\WREHKLWE\PRUWDUIUDJPHQWV$V0DMRU+DOOUHPHPEHUHGLW ³1&2VKDGZRUNHGKDUGWRFRQYLQFHWKH6ROGLHUVWKDWWKH\FRXOGJHWXSWKHUH>RQWKHOLS@DQG VWLOOEHVDIHZKLFKZDVTXLWHDFKDOOHQJHEXWWKH\GLGLW7KH6ROGLHUVSHUIRUPHG²WKH\ZHUH WUXHZDUULRUVJHWWLQJXSRQWKRVHULGJHOLQHVZKHQWKH\PRUWDUHG\RX\RX¶GZDQWWRJHWXS

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 19 of 316

Chapter 6

WKHUH>RQWKHOLS@DQG>ZKHQ@WKH\¶GVQLSH\RX\RX¶GZDQWWRJREDFN,W>ZDV@NLQGRID&DWFK VLWXDWLRQ´94 %HIRUHQRRQDQPPPRUWDUURXQGODQGHGLQWKH%RZODERXWIHHWIURPWKHEDWWDOLRQ 7$&7KDWRQHVKHOOZRXQGHG+DOOWKHEDWWDOLRQFRPPDQGVHUJHDQWPDMRUWKH¿UHVXSSRUW RI¿FHUWKHRSHUDWLRQV1&2DQGRQHRIWKH572V7KRXJK/D&DPHUDZDVZLWKWKHJURXSRI PHQDWWKH7$&KHVXIIHUHGQRZRXQGV%\QRRQWKHQXPEHURIZRXQGHGPHQLQWKH%RZOKDG UHDFKHGWKHYDVWPDMRULW\KDGEHHQKXUWE\PRUWDUURXQGV 7KHEDWWDOLRQVXUJHRQDQGKLVPHGLFVSHUIRUPHGKHURLFDOO\WKDWGD\$VWKHFDVXDOWLHVSLOHG XS /D&DPHUD IDFHG WKH GHFLVLRQ RI ZKHWKHU WR EULQJ LQ PHGLFDO HYDFXDWLRQ 0('(9$& FKRSSHUVLQEURDGGD\OLJKWDQGULVNJHWWLQJWKHPVKRWGRZQRUZDLWXQWLOGDUNZKHQWKHDO 4DHGDDQG7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVZHUHH[SHFWHGWREUHDNRIIWKHHQJDJHPHQW7KHVXUJHRQZKRKDG EHHQZRXQGHGWROG/D&DPHUDWKDWKHDQGKLVPHGLFVFRXOGVWDELOL]HHYHQWKHPRVWVHULRXVO\ ZRXQGHGDWWKDWSRLQWDQGNHHSWKHPDOLYHXQWLOGDUN/D&DPHUDFDOOHG:LHUFLQVNLDQGWROGKLP WKDWKLVZRXQGHGPHQFRXOGZDLWXQWLOQLJKWIDOOWREHHYDFXDWHG96 $VWKHZRXQGHGLQFUHDVHGWKHIRUFHLQWKH%RZOIDFHGDQRWKHUHPHUJLQJSUREOHPDVKRUW DJHRIDPPXQLWLRQ:KHQ&&RPSDQ\EHJDQWRUHFHLYH¿UHRQWKH/=VPDQ\RIWKHWURRSV KDGGXPSHGWKHLUUXFNVDFNVWRUHWXUQ¿UHDQGPDQHXYHURQWKHHQHP\LIQHFHVVDU\$VWKHHOH PHQWVPRYHGRIIWRWKHLUSODQQHGORFDWLRQVDQGODWHUDVWKHFRPSDQ\FRQVROLGDWHGLQWKH%RZO PDQ\6ROGLHUVKDGOHIWWKHLUUXFNVZKHUHWKH\KDGGXPSHGWKHP8QIRUWXQDWHO\PXFKRIWKH VSDUHDPPXQLWLRQIURPWKHLUEDVLFORDGZDVVWLOOLQWKHSDFNV7KLVZDVSDUWLFXODUO\WUXHRIWKH DPPXQLWLRQIRUWKH0PDFKLQHJXQV7RFRPSHQVDWHIRUWKHDPPXQLWLRQVKRUWDJH.UDIW RUGHUHGWKHWURRSVWRGLUHFW¿UHDWWDUJHWVWKH\FRXOGFOHDUO\LGHQWLI\DQGQRWXVHVXSSUHVVLYH ¿UH WHFKQLTXHV ZKLFK H[SHQGHG D JUHDW GHDO PRUH DPPXQLWLRQ$GGLWLRQDOO\WKH FRPSDQ\ FRPPDQGHUVHQW6ROGLHUVWRUHWULHYHVRPHRIWKHUXFNVDFNVWKDWZHUHDFFHVVLEOHZKLFKIXUWKHU HDVHGWKHDPPXQLWLRQVKRUWDJH97 7KHEDWWOHFRQWLQXHGWKURXJKRXWWKHGD\:LWKRQHRXWRIHYHU\IRXUPHQVWUDQGHGQHDU *,1*(5QRZZRXQGHG&RORQHO:LHUFLQVNLVWLOOXSRQ5DN7$&5LGJHEHJDQWRUHHYDOXDWH WKHRULJLQDOSODQ7KHUHZHUHQRFLYLOLDQVWRZRUU\DERXWDQGWKHHQHP\ZDVDJJUHVVLYHO\¿JKW LQJQRWDWWHPSWLQJWRÀHH$GGLWLRQDOO\/D&DPHUDDQGWKHHOHPHQWVRI,1LQWKH%RZO ZHUHDWDGLVWLQFWGLVDGYDQWDJH)DFHGZLWKDODUJHUHQHP\IRUFHWKDWKHOGWKHKLJKJURXQG DURXQGKLP/D&DPHUDFRXOGQRWHIIHFWLYHO\VHL]HWKHLQLWLDWLYHHYHQKDGKLVIRUFHEHHQHQWLUHO\ KHDOWK\+HDQGKLVFRPPDQGZHUHSLQQHGGRZQ /DWHUWKDWDIWHUQRRQ:LHUFLQVNLGHFLGHGRQDQHZSODQ+HFRQWDFWHG3UH\VOHUDQGWROGKLP WKDWWKH,1ZDVQRZWKHPDLQHIIRUW:LHUFLQVNLDOVRGLUHFWHG3UH\VOHUWRPRYH,1 7$&DQG&&RPSDQ\SODWRRQVWRWKHEDVHRIWKHYDOOH\ EHORZWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH%3V DQGJHW LQWRSLFNXS]RQH 3= SRVWXUH7KH7)RakkasanFRPPDQGHUZDQWHGWRFRQVROLGDWHWKHXQLWVDW DQRWKHU+/=DQGKDYHLWVZHHSWKURXJKWKHYDOOH\LQOLHXRI=LD¶V$IJKDQXQLWV +RZHYHUDIWHUKHSDVVHGRQWKHSODQWR%DOWD]DUDQGDV3UH\VOHU¶V7$&EHJDQPRYHPHQW WRWKH3=:LHUFLQVNLUHFRQVLGHUHGDJDLQ98:LHUFLQVNLQRZGHFLGHGWRH[WUDFWWKHHOHPHQWV RI/D&DPHUD¶V,1RXWRIWKHVRXWKDQGUHWXUQLWWR%DJUDPZKHUHWKHZRXQGHGFRXOGEH WUHDWHGDQGWRVHQG&URPELH¶V$&RPSDQ\,1QRUWKWROLQNXSZLWK3UH\VOHU¶VEDWWDOLRQ 3UH\VOHUZRXOGSXOO&URPELH¶VFRPSDQ\DQGDOOWKHSODWRRQVRIKLV&&RPSDQ\XSWRWKHYLFLQ LW\RI+/=WRVHFXUHWKDWORFDWLRQWREULQJLQIUHVKWURRSV ZKLFKZRXOGLQFOXGH3UH\VOHU¶V

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 20 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

RZQ$&RPSDQ\ 99,QDQ\HYHQWWKHSODQZRXOGKDYHWRZDLWXQWLOGDUNZKHQ86IRUFHV¶ ¿JKWLQJFDSDELOLWLHVZHUHRYHUZKHOPLQJDQGWKHHQHP\FRXOGEHVXSSUHVVHGWRWKHSRLQWZKHUH KHOLFRSWHUVFRXOGODQGQHDU/D&DPHUD¶VSRVLWLRQ 7KHVXQVHWDURXQGWKDWHYHQLQJDQGVRRQDIWHUDQ$&JXQVKLSDUULYHGRQVWD WLRQRYHUWKH%RZO:LWKVXSHUEQLJKWFDSDEOHRSWLFVDQGDQLPSUHVVLYHDUUD\RIPLQLJXQVDQG PPDQGPPFDQQRQWKH6SHFWUHJXQVKLSZDVVRRQGHWHFWLQJDQGKLWWLQJWKHHQHP\ ZLWKDFFXUDWHDQGFRQFHQWUDWHG¿UH.UDIWODWHUGHVFULEHGWKH6SHFWUHVXSSRUWDV³DZHVRPH´100 :LWKLQDQKRXUHQHP\¿UHKDGGLPLQLVKHGWRWKHSRLQWWKDW/D&DPHUDIHOWLWZDVVDIHWREULQJ LQWZR%ODFNKDZN0('(9$&FKRSSHUVWRJHWKLVPRVWFULWLFDOO\ZRXQGHG6ROGLHUVRXW1017KH KHOLFRSWHUVODQGHGMXVWWRWKHZHVWRIWKH%RZO$V6ROGLHUVVWUXJJOHGWRJHWWKHZRXQGHGPHQ ORDGHGWKH/=EHJDQWRWDNH¿UHRQFHDJDLQ,PPHGLDWHO\WKHWURRSVRQWKHSHULPHWHUUHWXUQHG ¿UHWRVXSSUHVVWKHHQHP\7KRXJKWKHWZR%ODFNKDZNVKDGWRUHPDLQLQWKLVYXOQHUDEOHORFD WLRQDVWKHZRXQGHGZHUHORDGHGWKH\HYHQWXDOO\GHSDUWHGVDIHO\IRU%DJUDPZLWKWKH¿UVW 6ROGLHUVZRXQGHGLQDFWLRQ :,$ 102 :LHUFLQVNLFRQWDFWHG/D&DPHUDWRGLVFXVVKLVVLWXDWLRQDQGUHOD\WKHQHZSODQ/D&DPHUD WROGWKH7)RakkasanFRPPDQGHUWKDWKHZDQWHGWREULQJLQ&&RPSDQ\¶VUHVHUYHWKHG 3ODWRRQWKDWQLJKW7KXVUHLQIRUFHG/D&DPHUDEHOLHYHGKHFRXOGKROGWKH%RZO:LHUFLQVNL RYHUUXOHGKLVEDWWDOLRQFRPPDQGHUDQGWROGKLPWKDWWKH,1ZDVJRLQJWREHSXOOHGRXWDQG VHQWWR%DJUDPWRUH¿WIRUIXWXUHRSHUDWLRQV 0HDQZKLOHWKH$&KDGGHSDUWHGWRUHIXHOEXWRQFHLWZDVEDFNRQVWDWLRQ/D&DPHUD ZDVJLYHQDQKRXUIRUKLVPHQWRORFDWHWKHLUUXFNVDFNVDQGDQ\RWKHUSUHYLRXVO\GLVFDUGHG HTXLSPHQWZKLOHXQGHUWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKH6SHFWUH¶VJXQV104$WDERXWPLGQLJKWDGGLWLRQDO KHOLFRSWHUVODQGHGQHDUWKH%RZODQGWKH,1GHSDUWHGIRU%DJUDP'XULQJKRXUVRI DOPRVWFRQWLQXRXVFRPEDWWKHEDWWDOLRQVXVWDLQHGFDVXDOWLHVEXWPLUDFXORXVO\QRQHEHFDPH IDWDOLWLHV7KH7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGD¿JKWHUVWKDWRSSRVHGWKHPZHUHQRWVROXFN\ Reinforcing the Operation: The Valley on Day 2 'XULQJWKHQLJKW:LHUFLQVNLGHFLGHGWREULQJLQKLVUHVHUYHEDWWDOLRQWKH,1%XW EHIRUHKHKDGDFKDQFHWRGLUHFWWKLVSKDVHRIWKHRSHUDWLRQWKHRakkasanFRPPDQGHUGHFLGHG WRSXOOKLVRZQFRPPDQGSRVWRXWRIWKHYDOOH\$WDERXWRQ0DUFKDLUFUDIWODQGHGQHDU 5DN7$&5LGJHH[WUDFWHG:LHUFLQVNLDQGKLVVPDOOHOHPHQWDQGWKHQKHDGHGIRU%DJUDP106 2QFHEDFNDW%DJUDP/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO&RUNUDQUHFHLYHGKLVQHZPLVVLRQ²ODQGKLV ,1DW+/=DWWKHQRUWKHUQHQGRIWKHYDOOH\QHDU%3$0-@WKDWFDQ VHHXSWKHYDOOH\6RLI\RXZLOOWUXVWPHRQPRYLQJXSWKHYDOOH\ZLWKP\JX\VDQGSXWWLQJ \RXUVQLSHUVXSZKHUHWKH\FDQORRNGRZQ\RXFDQPDNHDSUHWW\TXLFNPRYHRIWKLVWRJHWXS WKHUH´107:LWKWKHDVVXUDQFHVRIWKH62)RI¿FHUWKDWZRXOGKDYHSOHQW\RIHDUO\ZDUQLQJ RIDQ\HQHP\PRYHPHQWLQRUQHDUWKHGUDZ&RUNUDQDJUHHGWRWKHSODQ1087KH,1ZDV WRODQGDW+/=DWQRRQRQ0DUFK Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 21 of 316

Chapter 6

%\DERXWRQ0DUFKWKHHQHP\¿UHDW+/=KDGGLHGGRZQHQRXJKWREULQJLQWKH QH[WFRQWLQJHQWRIIUHVKWURRSV3UH\VOHU¶VRZQ$&RPSDQ\G%DWWDOLRQWK,QIDQWU\ $ ,1 FRPPDQGHGE\&DSWDLQ.HYLQ%XWOHUDORQJZLWK%DOWD]DU¶VPPPRUWDUSODWRRQ 2Q$,1¶VDUULYDODWDSSUR[LPDWHO\%XWOHUHVWDEOLVKHGWKHLQLWLDO+/=SHULPHWHU GHIHQVH 0HDQZKLOH&URPELHZLWK &RPSDQ\$ ,1 DQG WKH ,16FRXW3ODWRRQKDGEHHQ RUGHUHGWRPRYHQRUWKWROLQN XSZLWK%DOWD]DU¶VG3ODWRRQ DW%3',$1()URPWKHUHWKH WZR XQLWV ZRXOG PRYH WR %3 &,1'

Rakkasan Brief WKHUXJJHGWHUUDLQEHWZHHQ%3V Figure 28. Troops of 1-187 Infantry in AMY draw. (9(DQG',$1($IWHUZDON LQJDOOQLJKW&RPSDQ\$ ,1KDGPRYHGRQO\PHWHUV$VGDZQDSSURDFKHGRQ0DUFKWKHJURXQGEHJDQWROHYHO RXWDQGWKHPRYHPHQWVSHGXS109 /LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO3UH\VOHUKDGH[SHFWHGWRUHFHLYHDFDOOZHOOEHIRUHGDZQUHSRUWLQJWKDW &URPELHKDGOLQNHGXSZLWKWKHG3ODWRRQDW',$1(7KHOLQNXSGLGQRWRFFXUKRZHYHUXQWLO ZHOODIWHU¿UVWOLJKW3UH\VOHUZDVFRQFHUQHGWKDWKLVSODWRRQVPLJKWJHWHQJDJHGSLHFHPHDO GXULQJWKHGD\OLJKWVRKHRUGHUHGWKHPDOOWRVWDUWPRYLQJWR+/=IRUFRQVROLGDWLRQ7KH EDWWDOLRQFRPPDQGHUDUULYHGDWWKH/=ZLWK%DOWD]DUDQGWKHG3ODWRRQEHIRUHQRRQDQGVHWXS DSHULPHWHU0HDQZKLOH&URPELHZLWKWKHG3ODWRRQDWWDFKHGUDQLQWRHQHP\UHVLVWDQFHQHDU WKHVDPHFRPSRXQGWKDWKDGKHOGXS3UH\VOHUWKHGD\EHIRUH$IWHUDVLJQL¿FDQW¿UH¿JKWEXWVXV WDLQLQJQRFDVXDOWLHV&URPELH¶VPHQGXPSHGWKHLUUXFNVDFNVDQGFRQWLQXHGWRPDUFKQRUWK110 $V&URPELH¶VIRUFHPRYHGDQRWKHUSDUWRI&RUNUDQ¶V,1ZDVORDGLQJLQWRFKRSSHUV DW%DJUDP)RUWKLVPLVVLRQ&RUNUDQKDGRQO\KLVRZQ&&RPSDQ\FRPPDQGHGE\&DSWDLQ 3DWULFN$VSODQGWKHG3ODWRRQRI'&RPSDQ\WKHEDWWDOLRQ6FRXW3ODWRRQDQGDVQLSHUWHDP IURPD&DQDGLDQ$UP\XQLW+LV$&RPSDQ\DQGWKHUHVWRIKLV'&RPSDQ\KDGUHPDLQHGDW 6KDKED]$LU¿HOGDW-DFREDEDGDQGKLV%&RPSDQ\DQGPRUWDUVZHUHKHOGLQUHVHUYH7RSUR YLGH&RUNUDQDGGLWLRQDOFRPEDWSRZHU:LHUFLQVNLDWWDFKHG%&RPSDQ\VW%DWWDOLRQWK ,QIDQWU\ %,1 FRPPDQGHGE\&DSWDLQ&KULVWRSKHU&RUQHOOWRWKH,1ZKLFKWKHQ PDGH&RUNUDQ¶VFRPPDQGD7)7KH7)WRRNRIIIRU+/=DWQRRQ111 $W+/=3UH\VOHUDQG%DOWD]DUEHJDQWRUHFHLYHPRUWDU¿UHIURPDORQHPPPRU WDUORFDWHGRQWKH:KDOH7KHHQHP\PRUWDUFUHZZDVFUDIW\DQGZHOOWUDLQHG7KHYHU\¿UVW

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 22 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

URXQGODQGHGRQO\PHWHUVIURP3UH\VOHU¶V&36HYHUDO&$6VRUWLHVDWWHPSWHGWRWDNHRXWWKH SRVLWLRQEXWLWZDVQRHDV\WDUJHW³WKH PRUWDUFUHZ@ZHQWWRJURXQG6RWKHDLUFUDIWDIWHULWFKHFNHGLQDQGJRWLWVFRRUGLQDWHVZRXOG FRQGXFWLWVDWWDFNDQGWKHQPLQXWHVDIWHULWÀHZDZD\WKHPRUWDUJXQQHUZRXOGFRPHEDFN XSDQGGURSDFRXSOHRIURXQGVMXVWWROHWXVNQRZKHZDVVWLOOWKHUH´112 'XULQJWKHÀLJKWWR+/= &RUNUDQFRXOGKHDUIURP WKH UDGLR FKDWWHU WKDW WKHUH ZDV HQHP\ ¿UH RQ WKH /= 7KHDLUPLVVLRQFRPPDQGHU ZDVLQVWUXFWHGWRWDNHWKHDLU FUDIWRQDORQJRUELWDURXQG WKH$2WRVHHLIWKH¿UHZRXOG GLH GRZQ DQG WKXV DOORZ WKHDLUFUDIWWRODQG%XWWKH ¿UH GLG QRW VODFNHQ DQG WKH FKRSSHUV ZHUH UXQQLQJ ORZ RQ IXHO &RUNUDQ UHFDOOHG ³:H ZHUH JRLQJ WR JR RXW DQGODQGDWRQHRIWKHUHIXHO

VLWHV7KHUHZDVDUHIXHOVLWH Rakkasan Brief WKH\KDGQHDU.KRVWEXWWKH\ Figure 29. Airstrikes hitting enemy troops in GINGER pass HQGHGXSZDYLQJXVRIIDQG VD\LQJµ5HWXUQWREDVH¶VR,ZDVOLNHµ*RWLW1RELJGHDO:HZLOOUHWU\DJDLQ¶´,QDQ\ HYHQWWKHDLUFUDIWFDUU\LQJ&RUQHOO¶V%&RPSDQ\,1GLGQRWJHWWKHDERUWPHVVDJHDQG SURFHHGHGLQWR+/=ZKLOHWKHUHVWRI7)ÀHZEDFNWR%DJUDP)RUWXQDWHO\QHLWKHUWKH FKRSSHUVQRU%&RPSDQ\VXIIHUHGDQ\ORVVHVRUGDPDJHRQWKHKRW/=114 7KHUHVWRI&RUNUDQ¶V7),1¿QDOO\DUULYHGDWWKH/=DWDERXWRQ0DUFK2QFH RQWKHJURXQGDQGDIWHUDELWRIIUXVWUDWLRQZLWKWHUUDLQRULHQWDWLRQGXHWRWKHORFDWLRQZKHUHWKH FKRSSHUVODQGHG&RUNUDQVRRQEHJDQPRYHPHQWWRZDUGWKH$0UHIXHOLQJ@SUREHVRZHNQHZWKH\ZHUHQ¶WRXUVDQGWKH\ZHUH 62)KHOLFRSWHUV%XWWKH\ÀHZRYHURXUSRVLWLRQKHDGHGXSWRZDUG>7DNXU

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 23 of 316

Chapter 6

*KDU@DQGODQGHGXSWKHUH7KHQWKHQH[WWKLQJZHNQHZWKLVKHOLFRSWHUÀHZ RYHUXVDJDLQIURPWKHVRXWKWRWKHQRUWKDQGODQGHGDERXWPHWHUVIURP RXUSRVLWLRQ7KDWZDVZKHQZHJRWZRUGRIZKDWKDGKDSSHQHGWKDWWKH\KDG VRPHFDVXDOWLHVXSWKHUH 7KHUHZDVWURXEOHRQWKHWRSRIWKHODUJHVWPRXQWDLQLQWKH6KDKL.RZW Disaster on Takur Ghar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¶VH[LWIURPWKHKHOLFRSWHU7KHGHOD\ZDVMXVWORQJHQRXJKIRUDFRQFHDOHGDO4DHGD ¿JKWHUWRODXQFKDQ53*DWWKH&KLQRRN7KHUHVXOWLQJH[SORVLRQNQRFNHGRXWWKHDLUFUDIW¶V HOHFWULFDOSRZHUDQGK\GUDXOLFVUHQGHULQJWKHPPPLQLJXQVDQGWKHSLORW¶VPXOWLIXQF WLRQDOGLVSOD\VUDGLRVDQGRWKHUÀLJKWFRQWUROHTXLSPHQWXVHOHVV116 7KH&KLQRRN¶VUHDUUDPSKDGEHHQLQWKHGRZQSRVLWLRQWRDOORZWKHH[LWRIWKH6($/ WHDPEXWZLWKWKHK\GUDXOLFVOHDNLQJDOORYHUWKHÀRRULWZDVQRZLPSRVVLEOHWRJHWLWEDFN XS$VWKHSLORWDWWHPSWHGWRWDNHRIIDQGJHWWKHFKRSSHURXWRIGDQJHURQHRIWKH6($/V 3HWW\2I¿FHU)LUVW&ODVV1HLO5REHUWVVOLSSHGRQWKHRLO\ÀRRUDQGIHOO5REHUWVVOLSSHGIDU WKHUWRZDUGWKHUDPSDVWKHFKRSSHUQRVHGXSLQWKHDLUZKLOHOLIWLQJRII5D]RU¶VUHDU0 JXQQHUDWWHPSWHGWRNHHS5REHUWVIURPVOLGLQJRXWEXWLQVWHDGERWKVOLSSHGRIIWKHUDPSDQG RXWRIWKH&KLQRRN)RUWXQDWHO\IRUKLPWKHJXQQHUZDVWHWKHUHGWRWKHLQVLGHRIWKHFKRSSHU EXW5REHUWVIHOOWRWKHJURXQGIHHWEHORZ117:LWKWKHLQWHUFRPV\VWHPGRZQWKHSLORWZDV REOLYLRXVWRWKHIDFWWKDW5REHUWVKDGIDOOHQRXWDQGFRQWLQXHGÀ\LQJQRUWKWU\LQJWRDVVHVV WKHVHULRXVQHVVRIWKHGDPDJH6RRQQRWL¿HGWKDWD6($/ZDVVWLOODWWKH/=DQGWKDWDPDQ ZDVGDQJOLQJRXWWKHEDFNRIKLVDLUFUDIWWKHSLORWGHFLGHGWRJREDFNIRUWKH6($/DVVRRQ DVWKHJXQQHUZDVEDFNLQVLGH+RZHYHUMXVWDVWKHUDPSJXQQHUZDVUHFRYHUHGWKH&KLQRRN EHJDQWRVKXGGHUDQGWKHSLORWNQHZKHKDGWR¿QGDVDIHSODFHWRODQGRUKHZRXOGFUDVKLQWR WKHPRXQWDLQVEHORZ118:KHQWKHSLORWVDIHO\SXWWKH&KLQRRNGRZQKHZDVRQO\PHWHUV IURP3UH\VOHU¶V7$&119 5D]RUXQDEOHWRFRQWDFW5D]RUE\UDGLRFDOOHGWKH$&WKHQRQVWDWLRQLQWKHYDO OH\7KH6SHFWUHSLORWWROG5D]RU¶VSLORWWKDW5D]RUKDGEHHQIRUFHGGRZQDQGSURYLGHG WKHFRRUGLQDWHVWRZKHUHWKH&KLQRRNWKHQVDW$UPHGZLWK5D]RU¶VORFDWLRQ5D]RUÀHZ EDFNLQWRWKHYDOOH\UHVFXHGWKHFUHZDQGWKHUHPDLQLQJPHPEHUVRIWKH6($/WHDPDQGÀHZ WKHPWR*DUGH]120 %DFNDW%DJUDPWKH45)IURP$&RPSDQ\VW%DWWDOLRQWK5DQJHU5HJLPHQW $ ZDVQRWL¿HGRIWKHVLWXDWLRQ$WDERXWWKH45)FRPPDQGHU&DSWDLQ1DWKDQ6HOIEHJDQ Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 24 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

WRSODQWKHUHVFXHPLVVLRQ$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKH0DNRWHDPOHDGHUDQGWKHSLORWRI5D]RU PDGHDTXLFNDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHVLWXDWLRQDQGGHFLGHGWKDWWKH&KLQRRNFUHZZRXOGUHLQVHUWWKH 6($/WHDPRQ7DNXU*KDUWRWU\DQGUHVFXH5REHUWV$WDERXWWKH&KLQRRNOHIW*DUGH] HQURXWHIRUWKHPRXQWDLQDQGMXVWEHIRUH0DNRZDVVXFFHVVIXOO\LQVHUWHGDWWKHVDPH /=ZKHUH5REHUWVKDGIDOOHQ121 ,PPHGLDWHO\RQLQVHUWLRQ0DNRFDPHXQGHUHQHP\¿UH,QWKH¿JKW7HFKQLFDO6HUJHDQW -RKQ&KDSPDQWKHWHDP¶V$LU)RUFHFRPEDWFRQWUROOHUZDVPRUWDOO\ZRXQGHG7KHWHDPEURNH FRQWDFW DQG VOLGLQJ LQ WKH VQRZ PRYHG DERXW PHWHUV GRZQ WKH VRXWK VORSH WR VDIHW\ 'XULQJWKHGHVFHQWWZRRIWKH6($/VZHUHKLWE\HQHP\¿UH122:LWKRQHPDQGHDGDQGWZR ZRXQGHG0DNR¶VPLVVLRQKDGUDSLGO\FKDQJHGIURPUHVFXHWRVXUYLYDO $WDERXWWKHWLPHWKDW0DNRZDVLQVHUWHGRQWKHPRXQWDLQ&DSWDLQ6HOIZKRZDVQRW DZDUHWKDWWKH6($/VKDGEHHQUHLQVHUWHGRQWRSRI7DNXU*KDUOHGKLVPDQ5DQJHU45) RQWRWZR&KLQRRNV²5D]RUDQG5D]RU²DW%DJUDP$FFRPSDQLHGE\DQ(7$&DQGD WKUHHPDQ$LU)RUFH&RPEDW6HDUFKDQG5HVFXH &6$5 WHDPWKH\EHJDQÀ\LQJWRZDUGWKH 6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\%\WKHWLPHWKHVHDLUFUDIWDUULYHGQHDU7DNXU*KDUWKHVXQZDVXSDQG WKHPLVVLRQSLORWÀ\LQJ5D]RUEHFDPHFRQFHUQHGWKDWWKHWZRFKRSSHUVZRXOGEHODQGLQJ LQGD\OLJKWDQGRQDYHU\VPDOO/=7KHSLORWZDVDOVRFRQFHUQHGWKDWLIWKHDLUFUDIWZHUHWR UHFHLYH¿UHRQODQGLQJDVKDGWZRRWKHUVDOUHDG\WKHWZR&KLQRRNVPLJKWFROOLGHLQWKHLUKXUU\ WRJHWDZD\+HGHFLGHGWRVHQG5D]RUWR*DUGH]DQGEULQJLWVORDGRI5DQJHUVLQODWHU5D]RU ZDVJRLQJLQDORQH $OLWWOHDIWHUDV5D]RUDSSURDFKHGWKH/=LWWRRUHFHLYHGKHDY\DQGDFFXUDWH¿UH 6WUXFNE\EXOOHWVDQGDQ53*URXQGWKHELJ&KLQRRNPDGHDKDUGODQGLQJRQ7DNXU*KDUEXW QRWEHIRUHWKHFRSLORWZDVVWUXFNLQWKHOHJZLWKDEXOOHW%RWKGRRUJXQQHUVZHUHDOVRKLWGXULQJ WKHDSSURDFKDQG6HUJHDQW3KLO6YLWDNWKHULJKWGRRUJXQQHUGLHGDVDUHVXOW124 8QDEOHWRWDNHRIIWKH&KLQRRNEHFDPHDQHDV\WDUJHWDVEXOOHWVULSSHGWKURXJKWKHDLUFUDIW DQGWKHPHQLQVLGH$V6HOIDQGWKH5DQJHUVDWWHPSWHGWRH[LWWKHDLUFUDIWWKH\UDQLQWRDZLWK HULQJEODVWRIVPDOODUPV¿UH,QUDSLGVXFFHVVLRQWKUHHPRUHPHQZHUHNLOOHGRUZRXQGHG7KH HQHP\ZDVDOODURXQGWKHFKRSSHUDQG¿ULQJLQWRLWIURPPXOWLSOHGLUHFWLRQV'HVSHUDWHO\WKH 5DQJHUVDWWHPSWHGWRVHWXSDGHIHQVLYHSRVLWLRQDWWKHEDFNRIWKHGRZQHGFKRSSHUDQGUHWXUQ ¿UH*UDGXDOO\WKH\ZHUHDEOHWRVXSSUHVVWKHLUDGYHUVDULHVHQRXJKWRDOORZWKH(7$&WRVWDUW FRRUGLQDWLQJ&$6VWULNHVDJDLQVWWKHHQHP\SRVLWLRQV $URXQGPLQXWHVDIWHU5D]RUKDGODQGHGWKH(7$&VXFFHHGHGLQEULQJLQJWZR )DLUFUDIWRQVWDWLRQ$IWHUVHYHUDOGU\UXQVWKHWZR¿JKWHUVPDGHVHYHUDOVWUD¿QJUXQV ¿ULQJWKHLUPPFDQQRQVLQWRWKHHQHP\SRVLWLRQVRQWKHPRXQWDLQWRS7KRXJKWKHVWUD¿QJ UXQVGLGQRWKDYHDQLPPHGLDWHHIIHFWRQWKHHQHP\WKHSUHVHQFHRIWKH86$LU)RUFHFHUWDLQO\ KHLJKWHQHGWKHPRUDOHRIWKHVWUDQGHG45)126 %DFNDW*DUGH]5D]RUFDUU\LQJWKHRWKHU5DQJHUVIURPWKH45)WRRNRIIIRUWKH PRXQWDLQDWDERXWWKHWLPHWKH)VDUULYHG(QURXWH0DNRFRQWDFWHG5D]RUDQGWROG KLPWKDWWKH/=ZDVKRWDQGWKDWWKH)VZHUHDERXWWRPDNHWKHLUVWUD¿QJUXQV7KH6($/ WHDPOHDGHUDOVRLQIRUPHG5D]RUWKDWKLVWHDPZDVQRWRQWRSRIWKHPRXQWDLQEXWGRZQ VORSHRQWKHVRXWKVLGH$IWHUWKH)VGHSDUWHGWKHFKRSSHUSLORWODQGHGKLVORDGRI5DQJHUV RQO\PHWHUVIURPWKH6($/WHDPDWDURXQG2QFHRQWKHJURXQG6WDII6HUJHDQW$ULQ .&DQRQWKHOHDGHUIRUWKHVHFRQG45)HOHPHQWFRQWDFWHG6HOIDQGLQIRUPHGKLPZKHUH

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 25 of 316

Chapter 6

WKHRWKHUKDOIRIWKH45)ODQGHG$TXLFNORRNDWWKHPDSWROGWKHPWKDW&DQRQ¶VWHDPZRXOG KDYHDIRRWFOLPEDWDOWLWXGHVRIRYHUIHHWWRUHDFKWKHVWUDQGHGKDOIRIWKH45) 1HYHUWKHOHVV6HOIRUGHUHGWKHVHUJHDQWWRPRYHRXW²WKHIRUFHRQWRSZDVLQGLUHQHHGRI KHOS127 $V&DQRQDQGKLVVHFWLRQVWUXJJOHGLWVZD\XS7DNXU*KDU6HOIDQGKLVJURXSFRQWLQXHGWR UHFHLYH¿UH7KHHQHP\KDGQRZEHJXQXVLQJPPPRUWDUVDQGZDVDWWHPSWLQJWREUDFNHWWKH GRZQHG0+ZKHUHWKH&6$5WHDPZDVWUHDWLQJWKHZRXQGHG$VWKHURXQGVFDPHFORVHUWR WKHDLUFUDIW6HOIDQGRQHRIWKH&KLQRRNSLORWVGHFLGHGWKHZRXQGHGQHHGHGWREHPRYHGWRD VDIHUORFDWLRQ7KH\FKRVHDGHSUHVVLRQDERXWPHWHUVIURPWKHFKRSSHU128 2QFHWKHLQMXUHGZHUHPRYHGWRWKHQHZSRVLWLRQ6HOIUHDOL]HGWKDWLIKLVIRUFHZDVWREH H[WUDFWHGKHQHHGHGWRWDNHRXWDNH\HQHP\SRVLWLRQRQWKHYHU\WRSRIWKHPRXQWDLQRQO\ DERXWPHWHUVDZD\2WKHUZLVHQRIULHQGO\KHOLFRSWHUVZRXOGEHDEOHWRVDIHO\ODQG6HOI DQG ¿YH RWKHU PHQ EHJDQ WR DVVDXOW WKH HQHP\ VWURQJSRLQW EXW ZHUH TXLFNO\ GULYHQ EDFN 7KH HQHP\ WURRSV ZHUH HQWUHQFKHG LQ D ZHOOIRUWL¿HG EXQNHU &$6 VHHPHG WR EH WKH RQO\ VROXWLRQ129 6HOI¶V(7$&ZHQWWRZRUNJHWWLQJWZR)VOLQHGXSIRUDVWULNHRQWKHEXQNHU$IWHURQH RIWKH³9LSHUV´GURSSHGWZRSRXQGERPEVDQGIDLOHGWRNQRFNRXWWKHEXQNHUWKH(7$& DFTXLUHGWKHVHUYLFHVRID3UHGDWRUDUPHGZLWK+HOO¿UHPLVVLOHV7KH3UHGDWRUSLORWIDLOHGWRKLW WKHSRVLWLRQZLWKWKH¿UVW+HOO¿UHEXWWKHVHFRQGVXFFHVVIXOO\VWUXFNWKHEXQNHUDQGNLOOHGWKH HQHP\LQVLGH7KRXJKUHVLVWDQFHIURPWKHEXQNHUZDVHOLPLQDWHGHQHP\PRUWDU¿UHUHPDLQHG DSUREOHP+RZHYHUVKRUWO\DIWHUWKH3UHGDWRUGLGLWVZRUN6HOIQRWLFHGWKDWWKHPRUWDU¿UHKDG VKLIWHGGRZQKLOO+HNQHZQRZWKDW&DQRQDQGWKHUHVWRIWKH45)ZHUHJHWWLQJFORVHDQGE\ WKHWZRHOHPHQWVFRQGXFWHGDVXFFHVVIXOOLQNXS 7KHFRPELQHG45)FOHDUHGWKHWRSRIWKHPRXQWDLQDQGE\QRWL¿HG&-7)MountainDW %DJUDPWKDWWKH3=WKH\KDGVHOHFWHGZDVIUHHRIWKHHQHP\DQGDYDLODEOHIRUH[WUDFWLRQ7KDW PHVVDJHKDGKDUGO\EHHQVHQWZKHQWKHHQWLUH$PHULFDQIRUFHRQFHDJDLQFDPHXQGHU53*DQG PDFKLQHJXQ¿UH7KHHQHP\KDGUHWXUQHGLQIRUFH 7KLVGHYHORSPHQWIRUFHG&-7)MountainWRFDQFHOWKHPLVVLRQRIWKHPDQ45)WKDW KDGDVVHPEOHGDW%DJUDP,QVWHDGWKHH[WUDFWLRQWLPHZDVSXVKHGEDFNWRZKHQGDUNQHVV KLQGHUHGWKHHQHP\DQG$&6SHFWUHVXSSRUWZRXOGEHDYDLODEOH)RUWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKH GD\WKH5DQJHUVWUDGHGORQJUDQJH¿UHZLWKWKHHQHP\DQGZDWFKHGDVDSDUDGHRIDLUFUDIWIURP YDULRXVVHUYLFHVDQGQDWLRQVFDPHWRWKHLUDLG$OLWWOHDIWHUWZR0+VODQGHGDQG EHJDQH[WUDFWLQJWKHZRXQGHGDQGWKH$LU)RUFH&6$5WHDP2QFHRQWKHLUZD\WR*DUGH] WKRVH&KLQRRNVZHUHIROORZHGLQWRWKH3=E\WZRRWKHUDLUFUDIWWKDWSLFNHGXSWKHUHPDLQLQJ IRUFHDQGWKHERGLHVRIWKHPHQZKRKDGEHHQNLOOHGGXULQJWKHDFWLRQLQFOXGLQJ3HWW\2I¿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

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 26 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

6WLOOWKHEDWWOHZDVDWHVWLPRQ\WRWKHLQFUHDVLQJHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI$UP\±$LU)RUFHMRLQW RSHUDWLRQVDQGWKH¿JKWLQJWHQDFLW\RIWKH$PHULFDQ6ROGLHU&DSWDLQ6HOIDQGWKHUHVWRIWKH PHQRQWKHPRXQWDLQZRXOGKDYHEHHQKDUGSUHVVHGHYHQWRVXUYLYHWKHGD\ZLWKRXWWKHHIIRUWV RIWKH(7$&WKH&6$5SHUVRQQHODQGRIFRXUVHWKHSLORWVRYHUKHDGZKREURXJKWVRPXFKWR WKH¿JKW0RUHRYHUWKHEDWWOHGURYHKRPHWKHSRLQWWKDWWKH$PHULFDQ6ROGLHULVFRPPLWWHGWR QHYHUDEDQGRQLQJDIHOORZ6ROGLHURQWKHEDWWOH¿HOG,WZDVDWUDJHG\WKDWVL[PHQGLHGWU\LQJ WRUHVFXHRQH%XWLWLVVDIHWRVD\WKDWDVORQJDVWKH\WKRXJKW5REHUWVZDVDOLYHDQGNQHZKLV DSSUR[LPDWHORFDWLRQWKRVHPHQEHOLHYHGWKH\KDGDQLPSRUWDQWDQGKRQRUDEOHPLVVLRQ Clearing the Eastern Ridge 7KH¿JKWRQ7DNXU*KDUDOVRGURYHKRPHWKHSRLQWWKDWDO4DHGDDQG7DOLEDQIRUFHVLQWKH 6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\ZHUHQRWJRLQJWRÀHH,QVWHDGWKH\SODQQHGWR¿JKWWRWKHGHDWKDQGWDNHDV PDQ\$PHULFDQ6ROGLHUVZLWKWKHPDVSRVVLEOH7KHHQHP\¿JKWHUVZKRKDGUHLQIRUFHG7DNXU *KDUZDVRQO\RQHLQGLFDWRURIWKLVIDFW)XUWKHUFRQ¿UPDWLRQFDPHZKHQ&RDOLWLRQPLOLWDU\ LQWHOOLJHQFHSLFNHGXSDVLJQDOIURPDFRPPDQGHULQWKH,VODPLF0RYHPHQWRI8]EHNLVWDQ ,08 ORFDWHGVRPHZKHUHRXWVLGHWKHYDOOH\ZKRZDVXUJLQJVXERUGLQDWHVDQGORFDO$IJKDQV WRFRQGXFWMLKDGDQG¿JKWWKHLQ¿GHOVLQVLGHWKHYDOOH\7KHH[KRUWDWLRQVZHUHHIIHFWLYHDVVHY HUDOKXQGUHG¿JKWHUVDWWHPSWHGWRHQWHUWKHYDOOH\GXULQJWKHRSHUDWLRQ 7KHVHZHUHWKHHQHP\WURRSVWKDW&RUNUDQ¶VDQGODWHU/D&DPHUD¶V6ROGLHUVZHUHWR¿JKW RYHUWKHQH[WVHYHUDOGD\VEXWQRWLQ%3$0

160 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 27 of 316

Chapter 6

DFURVVWKHDUHDDVZHOO&RPSOLFDWLQJWKHSUREOHPZDVWKHVQRZWKDWVWLOOFRYHUHGWKHJURXQG LQSDWFKHV³:HKDGVRPHROG6RYLHWPDSVZLWKZKHUHZHWKRXJKWPLQHFRQFHQWUDWLRQVZHUH EXWVWXIIKDGVKLIWHGRYHUWKH\HDUVZLWKWKHLFHDQGVQRZDQGDOOWKDWNLQGRIVWXIIVRZHZHUH SUHWW\QHUYRXVDERXWWKDW´&RUNUDQUHFDOOHG %\WKHDIWHUQRRQRI0DUFK7),1KDGDUULYHGQHDU%3',$1($VSODQGGHSOR\HG& &RPSDQ\WRHVWDEOLVKWKDW%3ZKLOH&RUNUDQPRYHGKLV7$&DQGWKHSODWRRQRI'&RPSDQ\WRD

2-187

HLZ Enemy Cave 15 BP AMY

1-187

BP BETTY

AQ Compound

OBJ Remington BP CINDY

BP LZ DIANE 3

BP EVE

BP GINGER BP HEATHER

0 1 2 3 Kilometers NGA Figure 30. Operation ANACONDA, TF 1-187, 4–6 March 2002.

161 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 28 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

SRLQWDERXWPLGZD\EHWZHHQWKHWZROLQHFRPSDQLHVHVWDEOLVKLQJPXWXDOO\VXSSRUWLQJ%3V LQWHJUDWHGWRFRYHUWKHFHQWUDOSDUWRIWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\,QWKHLUQHZSRVLWLRQVWKHPHQRI 7),1KDGDFRPPDQGLQJYLHZRIWKHYDOOH\&RUNUDQUHFDOOHG :KDWZHKDGZDVDOPRVWDPSKLWKHDWHUOLNH:HKDGDFRPPDQGLQJYLHZRI 6KLU.KDQ.KH\ODOOWKHZD\DFURVVWR%DERO.KH\OEXWZHFRXOGQ¶WUHDOO\VHH LWZDVVRUWRIGRZQDQGEHORZRXUOLQHRIVLJKW LQWR0DU]DN%XWZHKDGD JUHDWYLHZRIWKHYDOOH\DQGZHGLGQ¶WKDYHWRJRGRZQWKHUHWRVWDQGRQLWWR VHHLW %\ WKH HYHQLQJ RI 0DUFK DOO %3V IURP$0< WR ',$1( KDG EHHQ UHHVWDEOLVKHG E\ WKHXQLWVRI7)RakkasanEXWWKHHQHP\¶VSULPDU\URXWHVHHPHGWREHWKHSDVVWKURXJKWKH PRXQWDLQVOHDGLQJVRXWKHDVWIURPZKHUH%3*,1*(5ZDVVXSSRVHGWRKDYHEHHQHVWDEOLVKHG *,1*(5KDGWREHFORVHGDQG&RORQHO:LHUFLQVNLVHOHFWHG/D&DPHUD¶V,1WRGRLW Insertion of TF Summit %DFN DW %DJUDP /D&DPHUD ZDV SUHSDULQJ WR WDNH KLV EDWWDOLRQ EDFN LQWR WKH YDOOH\ 6LQFHSDUWRI&URPELH¶V$&RPSDQ\ZDVVWLOOLQWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\/D&DPHUDJDYHWKDW FRPSDQ\¶VWZRUHPDLQLQJSODWRRQVZKLFKKDGVWD\HGDW%DJUDPRQ0DUFKWR&DSWDLQ.UDIW WRUHLQIRUFHKLVEDGO\GHSOHWHG&&RPSDQ\140:LHUFLQVNLIXUWKHUUHLQIRUFHG,1ZLWK& &RPSDQ\WK%DWWDOLRQVW,QIDQWU\ &,1 ²DXQLWWKDWEHORQJHGWRWKHWK0RXQWDLQ 'LYLVLRQDQGKDGMXVWDUULYHGIURP.XZDLW²DQG%&RPSDQ\,1ZKLFKZDVWKHEULJDGH UHVHUYH$GGLWLRQDOO\/D&DPHUDUHFHLYHG&RUNUDQ¶VPPPRUWDUSODWRRQ1RZZLWKWKUHH IXOOFRPSDQLHVDQGRWKHUDWWDFKPHQWV7),1ZDVUHDG\WRUHHQWHUWKH¿JKWWKLVWLPH QDPHGDIWHUWKHEDWWDOLRQ¶VKLVWRULFFDOOVLJQ²7)Summit $WDERXWRQWKHDIWHUQRRQRI0DUFK7)SummitZDVLQVHUWHGLQWR+/=MXVWWR WKHZHVWRI%3',$1(XQGHUWKHRYHUZDWFKLQJJXQVRI$VSODQG¶V&&RPSDQ\2QFHRQWKH JURXQG/D&DPHUDUHFHLYHGDPLVVLRQFKDQJHYLDUDGLR&-7)MountainZDQWHGKLPWRVHL]H WKHWRSRI7DNXU*KDU0RXQWDLQDQGFOHDULWRIWKHHQHP\3UH\VOHUEDFNQHDU+/=ZDV OLVWHQLQJWRWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQ+HUHFDOOHG 6RPHERG\WROG>/D&DPHUD@WKDWKHZDVJRLQJWRKDYHWRDWWDFNWKHKLOODQG PRYHDOOWKHZD\XSWRWKHWRSRI*,1*(5DQG,ZLOOQHYHUIRUJHWKLVUHVSRQVH ,WZDV³

162 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 29 of 316

Chapter 6

,1WRDQRYHUZDWFKSRVLWLRQWRWKHZHVW.UDIW¶V&&RPSDQ\,1ZDVVHQWWRDQRWKHU RYHUZDWFKSRVLWLRQRQKLJKJURXQGWRWKHQRUWKDQG&URPELH¶V$&RPSDQ\,1ZDVVHQW WRVHFXUHWKHKHOLFRSWHU144$IWHUGDUN&URPELHPRYHGKLVFRPSDQ\XQHYHQWIXOO\LQWRSRVLWLRQ .UDIWKRZHYHUUDQLQWRDWRPDQ7DOLEDQVTXDGWKDWRSHQHG¿UHZLWKVPDOODUPV)RUWKH PRYHPHQWWKRXJK.UDIWKDGUHFHLYHGWKHDVVLVWDQFHRIDQ$&WKDWPDGHVKRUWZRUNRI WKHHQHP\¿JKWHUV2QFH&&RPSDQ\,1ZDVLQSRVLWLRQ&URPELH¶V$&RPSDQ\PDGH WKHVHDUFKRIWKHWDUJHWDUHDEXWIRXQGQRKHOLFRSWHU7KHUHSRUWVRIWKHGRZQHGKHOLFRSWHUKDG EHHQLQDFFXUDWH 7KHIROORZLQJPRUQLQJGDZQHGFROGFULVSDQGFOHDU7)SummitZDVQRZVLWXDWHGRQ YDULRXVSLHFHVRIKLJKJURXQGVRXWKRI&RUNUDQ¶V7),1DQGRQWKHZHVWHUQVORSHVRI 7DNXU*KDU)URPWKHLUSRVLWLRQVWRWKHVRXWKHDVWRIWKHYLOODJHVWKHWURRSVRI7)SummitFRXOG FOHDUO\ORRNGRZQLQWRWKHWRZQVRI2EMHFWLYH5(0,1*721:KDWWKH\FRXOGVHHZHUHHQHP\ WURRSVKXUULHGO\ORDGLQJZKDWDSSHDUHGWREHFLYLOLDQVSRUWXWLOLW\YHKLFOHV 689V DVZHOODV RWKHUHQHP\DFWLYLW\LQDOOWKUHHYLOODJHV.UDIWZKRKDGEURXJKWKLVRZQPRUWDUVZLWKKLP WKLVWLPHRSHQHG¿UHRQWKHHQHP\YHKLFOHV/D&DPHUDKDGDOVREURXJKWDORQJWKHEDWWDOLRQ¶V PPPRUWDUVDQGWKHUHPDLQLQJPPPRUWDUVWKDWKDGQRWEHHQEURXJKWLQRQ0DUFK 6RRQDOO7)SummitPRUWDUVZHUHEXV\GURSSLQJURXQGVRQWKH7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGD¿JKWHUV .UDIWUHFDOOHGWKDWWKHPRUWDUV³ZHUHSUHWW\VXFFHVVIXOLQGHVWUR\LQJDORWRIHQHP\SHUVRQQHO LQWZRYLOODJHVWKDWGD\´146 %\0DUFK7)SummitKDGSXVKHGDOPRVWDOOWKHZD\WRWKHRULJLQDO%3*,1*(57KH HQHP\ZDVHIIHFWLYHO\FXWRIIIURPHVFDSHWRWKHHDVW6WLOOWKH7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGD¿JKWHUV GLGQRWVHHPWREHUXQQLQJ$V7)SummitKDGVHHQPDQ\ZHUHVWLOOFRQFHQWUDWHGLQWKHYLO ODJHVLQWKHYDOOH\,WZDVDSSDUHQWWKDWWKHUHZHUHQRFLYLOLDQVLQWKHYDOOH\DQGDVDUHVXOW &-7)MountainKDGGHFODUHG6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\DIUHH¿UH]RQH1XPHURXV&$6VRUWLHVVRRQ DUULYHGWRVRIWHQXSWKHDUHDIRUIROORZRQDVVDXOWVLQWRWKHYLOODJHV %\WKLVWLPH=LD/RGLQZDVUHDG\WRVHQGKLVWURRSVEDFNLQWRWKH¿JKW+LVFRQ¿GHQFHKDG EHHQUHQHZHGHVSHFLDOO\E\WKHQHZVWKDW-627)1KDGUHTXHVWHGWKHDVVLVWDQFHRI$IJKDQ PHFKDQL]HGIRUFHVWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQDMRLQWRSHUDWLRQZLWKKLVXQLWV7KHWZR$IJKDQFRPPDQGV ZHUHWRFRQGXFWDVLPXOWDQHRXVVZHHSRIWKH:KDOHDQGWKHYDOOH\YLOODJHV7KHSUHSDUDWRU\ ERPEDUGPHQWIRUWKLVQHZRSHUDWLRQEHJDQRQ0DUFK Operation GLOCK, 6–12 March 2001 )URPWR0DUFK&RDOLWLRQDLUFUDIWSRXQGHGWKH:KDOHDQGWKHYLOODJHV7KHYLROHQFH RIWKHDLUVWULNHVFDXVHGVHYHUDODO4DHGDWURRSVWRVXUUHQGHUVRPHZKLOHVWLOOFDUU\LQJWKHLU ZHDSRQV:KLOH WKH DLUVWULNHV WRRN SODFH2'$V DQG SUHSDUHG WKHLU 3DVKWXQ PLOLWLDPHQIRUWKHLUUROHLQZKDWEHFDPHNQRZQDV2SHUDWLRQ*/2&. 7KHSODQFDOOHGIRU=LD¶VPHQWRPRYHSDVWWKHZHVWHUQVLGHRIWKH:KDOHDQGDVVHPEOH DWDQDVVDXOWSRVLWLRQDWWKHVRXWKHQGRIWKHPRXQWDLQ$Q$IJKDQPHFKDQL]HGIRUFHZRXOG FRQFXUUHQWO\PRYHWRWKHQRUWKHUQHQWUDQFHWRWKHYDOOH\7KHVLJQDOWREHJLQWKHDWWDFNZDV WKHGURSSLQJRIDSRXQG%/8³'DLV\&XWWHU´ERPEE\WKH86$LU)RUFHRQWKHWRS RIWKH:KDOHDWWKHGD\RIWKHRSHUDWLRQ$WWKDWVLJQDOWKHWZRIRUFHVZRXOGFRQGXFWD FRQYHUJLQJDWWDFNWRZDUGWKHYLOODJHVZLWK&RDOLWLRQDLUFUDIWLQVXSSRUW147 7KH$IJKDQPHFKDQL]HGIRUFHFRQVLVWHGRIDERXWPHQ7WDQNV%03DUPRUHG SHUVRQQHO FDUULHUV DQG VHYHUDO WUXFNPRXQWHG URFNHW ODXQFKHUV 7KH XQLW ZDV FRPPDQGHG

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 30 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

E\ *HQHUDO *XO +DLGDU DQ HWKQLF7DMLNDQG ZDV FRPSRVHG SULPDULO\ RI7DMLNVWUDGLWLRQDO DGYHUVDULHV RI WKH 3DVKWXQ7KXV LW ZDV QR HDV\ WDVN WR JHW =LD DQG +DLGDU WR FROODERUDWH DQGSODQWKHPLVVLRQ7KH6)SHUVRQQHOLQYROYHGLQWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHWZR$IJKDQ PLOLWLD FRPPDQGV DFFRPSOLVKHG DQ H[WUDRUGLQDU\ IHDW LQ JHWWLQJ WKHVH WZR FRPPDQGHUV WR ZRUNWRJHWKHU148

OBJ Remington

0 1 2 3 Kilometers NGA Figure 31. Operation ANACONDA Glock, 11–12 March 2002.

164 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 31 of 316

Chapter 6

7KH7DMLNVDUULYHGRQ0DUFKDQGDIWHUGD\VRIQHJRWLDWLRQVDQGSODQQLQJPRYHGWR WKHLUDVVDXOWSRVLWLRQVRQWKHDIWHUQRRQRI0DUFK:KLOH=LD¶VIRUFHSRVLWLRQHGLQWKHVRXWK +DLGDU¶VWURRSVPRYHGGLUHFWO\WRWKHSODQQHGMXPSRIISRLQW+RZHYHULQVWHDGRIKROGLQJLQ SODFHDWWKHEDVHRIWKH:KDOHDVSODQQHGWKHGLVPRXQWHGHOHPHQWVEHJDQFOLPELQJWKHQRUWK HQGRIWKHPRXQWDLQHYHQDVWKH&RDOLWLRQDLUFUDIWZHUHGURSSLQJERPEVRQWKHVXPPLW2QFHRQ WRSWKH7DMLNVFRQVWUXFWHGDKXJHERQ¿UHGHVSLWHWKHH[LVWHQFHRIHQHP\WURRSVRQWKHPRXQWDLQ DQGWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUDWWUDFWLQJPRUWDU¿UH7KHSUHVHQFHRI+DLGDU¶VPHQRQWKHWRSRIWKH:KDOH WKXVIRUFHGWKHFDQFHOODWLRQRIWKH'DLV\&XWWHUPLVVLRQVHWIRUGDZQWKHQH[WGD\149 2QWKHPRUQLQJRI0DUFK+DLGDU¶VPHQRQWKH:KDOHEHJDQDVZHHSRIWKHVXPPLW EXW+DLGDUZDVQRZKHUHWREHVHHQ7KH2'$WHDPOHDGHUZRUNLQJZLWK+DLGDU¶VFRP PDQGVRRQGLVFRYHUHGWKDWWKH7DMLNFRPPDQGHUKDGRSWHGWRUHPDLQZLWKWKHPRXQWHGIRUFH DVLWGURYHWKURXJKWKHYDOOH\WRZDUGWKHYLOODJHVDQGOHIWOHDGHUVKLSRIWKHGLVPRXQWHGIRUFHWR KLVVHFRQGLQFRPPDQG$OPRVWDVVRRQDVWKHGLVPRXQWHGWURRSVVDZWKHWKUHHYLOODJHVLQWKH YDOOH\EHORZWKH6)DGYLVRUVIRXQGWKH\FRXOGQRWKROG+DLGDU¶VPHQWRWKHLUWDVN7KH7DMLNV WRRNRIIKHDGORQJGRZQWKHHDVWHUQVORSHRIWKH:KDOHKHDGHGIRUWKHYLOODJHVWRVHDUFKIRU ZKDWHYHUVSRLOVPLJKWEHDYDLODEOH7KH³DWWDFN´ZDVIDVWEHFRPLQJFKDRV $V+DLGDU¶VPRXQWHGIRUFHHQWHUHGWKHYDOOH\RQWKHQRUWKWKH\VRRQHQFRXQWHUHGZKDW WKH\EHOLHYHGWREHHQHP\IRUFHVWRWKHLUHDVWDORQJWKHKLJKJURXQG7KHWDQNVKDOWHGDQG RSHQHG¿UH7KH³HQHP\´WKH\ZHUHVKRRWLQJDWKRZHYHUZDV)UDQN%DOWD]DU¶V&&RPSDQ\ ,1DW%3%(77<$IWHUVFUDPEOLQJWRORFDWHD96UHÀHFWLYHSDQHOWKHRakkasans ZHUHDEOHWRVLJQDOWRWKH7DMLNWDQNHUVWKDWWKH\ZHUHIULHQGO\IRUFHVDQGWKH¿ULQJFHDVHG 0HDQZKLOH=LD¶VIRUFHDPRUHGLVFLSOLQHGJURXSVZHSWWKHLUHQGRIWKH:KDOHDQGHQWHUHG WKHYLOODJHVRI%DERO.KH\ODQG0DU]DN7KH3DVKWXQVFOHDUHGERWKDQGFRQWLQXHGQRUWKXQWLO WKH\PHW+DLGDU¶VWURRSVZKRKDGMXVWFOHDUHG²DQGORRWHG²6KLU.KDQ.KH\O7KHYDOOH\YLO ODJHVZHUHGHYRLGRIHQHP\E\WKDWDIWHUQRRQDQG2SHUDWLRQ*/2&.FRQFOXGHG :KLOH*/2&.ZDVLQSURJUHVVWKHXQLWVRI7)RakkasanKHOGLQSODFHDQGFRQGXFWHG ORFDOL]HGSDWUROV¿UHPLVVLRQVDQGHQJDJHGWDUJHWVRIRSSRUWXQLW\)HZGLUHFW¿UHHQJDJHPHQWV RFFXUUHGDIWHU0DUFKLQGLFDWLQJWKDWPDQ\RIWKHHQHP\KDGDOUHDG\EHHQNLOOHGRUZRXQGHG DQGVRPHQRGRXEWKDGGHFLGHGWRPDNHWKHLUHVFDSH%HJLQQLQJRQ0DUFK7)Rakkasan EHJDQH[¿OWUDWLQJLWVEDWWDOLRQVDQGVHQGLQJWKHPEDFNWR%DJUDP2Q0DUFKWKHUHVWRIWKH 7)ZDVVXFFHVVIXOO\H[WUDFWHG1HYHUWKHOHVV2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$ZDVQRW\HWFRPSOHWH TF Commando and Operation HARPOON %\0DUFKFRQWDFWZLWKWKHHQHP\KDGEHFRPHVSRUDGLFDQGDQ\GLUHFWFRQWDFWZDVHLWKHU DWORQJUDQJHRUZLWK&$60RVWHQHP\¿JKWHUVUHPDLQLQJLQWKHYDOOH\E\WKLVWLPHZHUHGHDG LQKLGLQJRUDWWHPSWLQJWRPDNHWKHLUZD\RXW0RVWRIWKHODWWHUZHUHSUREDEO\7DOLEDQWKRVH ZKRUHPDLQHGZHUHSUREDEO\DO4DHGD,IDQ\¿JKWHUVVWD\HGWKH\PRVWOLNHO\LQWHQGHGWR¿JKW WRWKHGHDWK%XWWKHWRWDOQXPEHURIWKHVHIRUFHVUHPDLQHGXQFOHDUWR&RDOLWLRQLQWHOOLJHQFH )RUPRVW&-7)MountainOHDGHUVWKHUHZDVDQDVVXPSWLRQWKDWDQHQHP\SUHVHQFHUHPDLQHG DQGWKDWWKH:KDOHZDVWKHPRVWOLNHO\ORFDWLRQRIWKDWWKUHDW7KHVZHHSRIWKDWIHDWXUHE\WKH 7DMLNPLOLWLDIRUFHGXULQJ2SHUDWLRQ*/2&.KDGEHHQLQVXI¿FLHQWDQG&-7)Mountain now KDGDGGLWLRQDOFRQYHQWLRQDOIRUFHVDYDLODEOHWRFRPSOHWHWKDWWDVN 7KHKHDGTXDUWHUVRIWKHWK0RXQWDLQ'LYLVLRQ¶VG%ULJDGHFRPPDQGHGE\&RORQHO.HYLQ :LONHUVRQKDGEHHQDW.DQGLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDOPRVWDVORQJDVWKHWK0RXQWDLQ'LYLVLRQ¶V

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 32 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

KHDGTXDUWHUV$UULYLQJRQ'HFHPEHUWKHG%ULJDGHKDGDOUHDG\SURYLGHGWKH&IRU VHYHUDOPLVVLRQVLQFOXGLQJRSHUDWLRQVLQYROYLQJWK0RXQWDLQXQLWVDW0D]DUH6KDULIDQG GHWDLQHHRSHUDWLRQVDW6KHEHUJKDQ3ULVRQ7KHG%ULJDGHGHVLJQDWHG7)CommandoZRXOG H[HFXWHRSHUDWLRQVIRUWKHVHFRQGKDOIRI2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$ )RUWKHYDULRXVPLVVLRQVIRUZKLFK7)CommandoZRXOGEHUHVSRQVLEOH0DMRU*HQHUDO +DJHQEHFNSURYLGHG:LONHUVRQZLWKVHYHUDOQRQGLYLVLRQDOXQLWVDQGRQHRUJDQLFEDWWDOLRQXQGHU LWVRSHUDWLRQDOFRQWURO2Q0DUFK+DJHQEHFNRUGHUHG33&/,WR%DJUDPIURP.DQGDKDU DQG SXW LW XQGHU7) Commando +H DOVR SURYLGHG:LONHUVRQ ZLWK +00 D 0DULQH KHOLFRSWHUEDWWDOLRQSRVVHVVLQJWKUHH&+³6HD6WDOOLRQ´KHDY\OLIWKHOLFRSWHUVVL[&+V DWWDFKHGIURPWKH$UP\¶VWK$YLDWLRQ5HJLPHQW DQG¿YH$+&REUDDWWDFNKHOLFRSWHUV RUJDQLFWR+00 7KH&-7)Mountain&*KDGDOVRRUGHUHG/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO6WHSKHQ7RZQVHQGFRP PDQGHURIWK%DWWDOLRQVW,QIDQWU\ ,1 WRGHSOR\KLVEDWWDOLRQKHDGTXDUWHUVIURP)RUW 'UXPWR%DJUDPWRDVVXPH&RIKLVWZRLQIDQWU\FRPSDQLHVWKDWZHUHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ7KH ,1QLFNQDPHGWKH³3RODU%HDUV´IRUWKHLUVHUYLFHLQ6LEHULDLQ:RUOG:DU,ZDVRQHRIWKH G%ULJDGH¶VWKUHHRUJDQLFEDWWDOLRQV7KHEDWWDOLRQ¶V&&RPSDQ\KDGDOUHDG\GHSOR\HGLQWR WKH$1$&21'$$2HDUOLHUZLWK/D&DPHUD¶V,17KHEDWWDOLRQ¶V$&RPSDQ\ZKLFKKDG DUULYHGDW%DJUDPDERXW0DUFKZRXOGEHDWWDFKHGWRWKH33&/,IRUWKH¿UVW7)Commando PLVVLRQ GXEEHG 2SHUDWLRQ +$532217RZQVHQG¶V7$&KRZHYHU ZRXOG QRW DUULYH LQ $IJKDQLVWDQLQWLPHWRWDNHSDUW 7KHPDLQHIIRUWRI2SHUDWLRQ+$53221ZRXOGEHWKH33&/,FRPPDQGHGE\/LHXWHQDQW &RORQHO 3DWULFN 6WRJUDQ 7KH ³3ULQFHVV 3DWV´ KDG DUULYHG DW .DQGDKDU RYHU VHYHUDO GD\V EHJLQQLQJ)HEUXDU\7KHUHWKHEDWWDOLRQZDVDWWDFKHGWR:LHUFLQVNL¶VG%ULJDGHDQG DVVLJQHGWRWKHDLU¿HOGVHFXULW\PLVVLRQ%HFDXVHWKHEDWWDOLRQDOVRKDGDQDWWDFKHG³&R\RWH´ OLJKWDUPRUHGYHKLFOH /$9 VTXDGURQ6WRJUDQKDGGLUHFWHGWKDWHOHPHQWWRFRQGXFWSUHVHQFH SDWUROVDQGLQWHUDFWZLWKWKHORFDO$IJKDQUHVLGHQWVDURXQGWKHDLU¿HOGSHULPHWHU7KH&R\RWH KDGDVXUYHLOODQFHV\VWHPWKDWDOORZHGLWVRSHUDWRUVWRVHHWRNLORPHWHUVLQWKHGHVHUWD FDSDELOLW\WKDWZDVODFNLQJZLWKWKH86EDWWDOLRQVFRQGXFWLQJDLU¿HOGVHFXULW\PLVVLRQV7KH /$9XQLWZRXOGSOD\QRUROHLQ$1$&21'$EXWZRXOGLQIROORZRQPLVVLRQVDORQJWKH 3DNLVWDQLERUGHU (DUO\RQ0DUFK:LHUFLQVNLFRQWDFWHG6WRJUDQDQGWROGKLPWKDWWKH33&/,ZRXOG VRRQEHFRQGXFWLQJDQDLUDVVDXOWPLVVLRQLQWRWKH1DND9DOOH\VRXWKHDVWRI7DNXU*KDUWR LQWHUFHSWDQGGHVWUR\HQHP\IRUFHVWKHUH5LJKWDIWHU6WRJUDQ¿QLVKHGKLVFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWK :LHUFLQVNLKHQRWL¿HGWKHVHQLRU&DQDGLDQRI¿FHULQWKHWKHDWHUDUHDUDGPLUDOZKRZRUNHG LQ WKH &(17&20 KHDGTXDUWHUV RI WKH LPSHQGLQJ PLVVLRQ7KH DGPLUDO WROG WKH 33&/, FRPPDQGHU ³1R \RXU REMHFWLYH LV DFWXDOO\ WKH :KDOH , MXVW FDPH RXW RI D PHHWLQJ ZLWK>&(17&20FRPPDQGHU@*HQHUDO)UDQNVDQG*HQHUDO)UDQNVVDLG\RXZHUHDWWDFNLQJ WKH:KDOHZKLFKLVVRUWRIWKHKDUGQXWRQWKHZHVWHUQÀDQN´&RQIXVHG6WRJUDQFDOOHG :LHUFLQVNLEDFNDQGLQIRUPHGKLPRIKLVFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWKWKHDGPLUDO7KH7)Rakkasan FRPPDQGHULQLWLDOO\DVVXUHG6WRJUDQWKDWWKH33&/,¶VWDUJHWZDVLQGHHGWKH1DND9DOOH\EXW DVKRUWWLPHODWHUFKDQJHGWKHVWRU\²³

166 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 33 of 316

Chapter 6

,1FRPPDQGHGE\&DSWDLQ-RKQ6WHYHQVZRXOGEHDWWDFKHGWRKLPIRUWKHRSHUDWLRQ7KLV FDXVHG6WRJUDQVRPHFRQFHUQDVKHKDGQRXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHFDSDELOLWLHVDQGUHDGLQHVVRI WKH$PHULFDQXQLWRULWVFRPPDQGHU1HYHUWKHOHVV6WRJUDQDQGKLVVWDIIZHQWWRZRUNSODQQLQJ WKHRSHUDWLRQ 7KH SODQ IRU +$53221 ZDV WR LQVHUW WKH EDWWDOLRQ DW DQ +/= DW WKH QRUWK HQG RI WKH:KDOH7KHFRPSDQ\IURP ,1 QRZ FRGH QDPHG ³6WULNH´ &RPSDQ\ WR GLIIHU HQWLDWH LW IURP WKH &DQDGLDQ¶V RZQ$&RPSDQ\ZRXOGVZHHS WKHVSLQHRIWKH:KDOH7KH 33&/,¶V &RPSDQ\ $ ZRXOG VZHHS WKH :KDOH¶V VORSLQJ HDVWHUQ IRRWKLOOV %HWZHHQ 6WULNH DQG $ &RPSDQLHV & &RPSDQ\ ZRXOG ¿OO WKH YRLG ZKLOH%&RPSDQ\IROORZHGLQ

Rakkasan Brief UHVHUYH,QIURQWRIWKHIRUPD Figure 32. Troops of 3d Battalion, PPCLI climb the Whale. WLRQ 6WRJUDQ SODQQHG WR VHQG KLV UHFRQQDLVVDQFH SODWRRQ WR GHWHFWWKHHQHP\DQGUHSRUWORFDWLRQV7KHEDWWDOLRQZRXOGVZHHSWKHPRXQWDLQPRYLQJIURP WKHQRUWKHDVWWRVRXWKZHVWXQWLOUHDFKLQJWKHVRXWKHUQHQWUDQFHWRWKHYDOOH\7KH:KDOH¶VZHVW HUQVORSHZDVH[WUHPHO\UXJJHGDQGVWHHSVRWKHSODQWRFOHDUWKDWDUHDZDVIRUWKHVFRXWVDQG 6WULNH&RPSDQ\WRVFDQWKDWVLGHWRGHWHFWDQ\HQHP\SUHVHQFHWKHUH $VWKHSODQQLQJGHYHORSHG6WRJUDQZDVQRWL¿HGWKDWIULHQGO\$IJKDQVZHUHRQWKH:KDOH DQGFRQGXFWLQJFOHDULQJRSHUDWLRQVVR+$53221ZDVSRVWSRQHG7KHVHRSHUDWLRQVZHUHWKH DERUWHGHIIRUWVRI*XO+DLGDURQ0DUFKGXULQJ2SHUDWLRQ*/2&.,WVRRQEHFDPHHYLGHQW WKDWWKH$IJKDQIRUFHVKDGQRWDGHTXDWHO\SHUIRUPHGWKHLUPLVVLRQDQGLWZDVVWLOOQHFHVVDU\WR FOHDUWKH:KDOHLQDPRUHFDUHIXOIDVKLRQ7KXV6WRJUDQZDVWROGWKDW+$53221ZDVEDFN RQ160'GD\ZDVVHWIRU0DUFK -XVWDIWHUGD\EUHDNRQWKHWKWKH¿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

167 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 34 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

$ERXWKDOIZD\WKURXJKWKH¿UVWGD\RIWKHDFWXDODGYDQFHWKH&2>6WRJUDQ@ VDLG³2ND\:HKDYHWREHVPDUWDERXWWKLV´DQGZKDWKHGLGZDVKHKDGWKH FRPSDQLHV HVVHQWLDOO\ HVWDEOLVK FRPSDQ\ SDWURO EDVHV GURS WKHLU UXFNVDFNV ZLWKDVHFXULW\IRUFHVRUWRIIDQRXWDQGVFRXUWKDWDUHDLI\RXNQRZZKDW, PHDQZLWKLQDERXWDQKRXURUKRXUZDONDQGWKHQJREDFNSLFNXSWKHLU

A/4-31 HLZ B/3PPCLI

C/3PPCLI

A/4-31 A/3PPCLI

0 500 1000 1500 2000 Meters NGA Figure 33. Operation ANACONDA, HARPOON, 13–17 March 2002.

168 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 35 of 316

Chapter 6

UXFNVDFNVPRYHHVWDEOLVKDQHZVRUWRI¿UPEDVHDQGWKHQIDQRXWDJDLQDQG FKHFNRXWDOOWKHUHHQWUDQFHSRLQWVLQFDYHVDQGGRWKHLUGHPROLWLRQVDQGVHQVL WLYHVLWHH[SORLWDWLRQVWXII162 $WQLJKWWKHFRPSDQLHVVHWXSSDWUROEDVHVDQGZDLWHGWRUHVXPHPRYHPHQWWKHIROORZLQJGD\ DW¿UVWOLJKW 'XULQJWKH¿UVWQLJKWVRQWRSRIWKH:KDOH6WRJUDQQRWLFHGWKDWWKHUHZHUHVKDUS¿UH ¿JKWVRIIWRWKHHDVWLQWKHYDOOH\6LQFHWKHUHDSSHDUHGWREHQRWKUHDWRQWKHKLJKJURXQGKH VXUPLVHGWKDWWKHVHHQHP\HOHPHQWVZHUHH[¿OWUDWLQJGRZQLQWRWKHYDOOH\DQGUXQQLQJLQWRWKH $IJKDQVDQGWKHLU6)DGYLVRUVZKRKDGEHHQGRZQWKHUHVLQFHWKH\KDGHQWHUHGWKHYLOODJHVD IHZGD\VEHIRUH³7KDWZDVYHU\IUXVWUDWLQJEHFDXVHZHFRXOGQRWPRYHIDVWHQRXJKWRDFWXDOO\ HQJDJH>WKHHQHP\@´6WRJUDQUHFDOOHG /DWHLQWKHGD\RQ0DUFKWKH&DQDGLDQVFRXWVUHSRUWHGDQHQHP\EXQNHURQWKHVSLQH FORVHWRZKDWZDVWKHWRSRJUDSKLFDOKLJKSRLQWRIWKH:KDOH7KH6WULNH&RPSDQ\FRPPDQGHU ZDVQRWL¿HGRIWKHORFDWLRQDQGJLYHQWKHWDVNWRWDNHRXWWKHSRVLWLRQ6WHYHQV¶PHQFRQGXFWHG WKHDWWDFNTXLFNO\DQGZLWKQRIULHQGO\FDVXDOWLHV%\GXVNWKH$PHULFDQFRPSDQ\KDGWDNHQ RXWWKHWKUHHGHIHQGHUVZLWK$7VDQGVHL]HGWKHSRVLWLRQ7KLVLQFLGHQWZDVWREHWKHRQO\ FRQWDFWWKDWWKH33&/,ZRXOGPDNHZLWKDOLYHHQHP\GXULQJWKHRSHUDWLRQ164 2YHUWKHQH[WGD\VWKHEDWWDOLRQGLVFRYHUHGPDQ\PRUHFDFKHVRIZHDSRQVDQGDPPXQL WLRQ7KH&DQDGLDQVUHWDLQHGDQ\WKLQJRILQWHOOLJHQFHYDOXHWKH\IRXQGZKLOHWKHLUHQJLQHHUV HI¿FLHQWO\ EOHZ WKH FDFKHV LQ SODFH 7KH EDWWDOLRQ UHDFKHG WKH VRXWK HQG RI WKH :KDOH RQ 0DUFKKDYLQJDOVRFOHDUHGSRUWLRQVRIWKHVWHHSZHVWHUQVORSHV7KHPLVVLRQFRPSOHWHWKH 33&/,ZDVRUGHUHGWRH[¿OWUDWHRYHUWKHQH[WGD\V$IWHUZKDWZDVWHUPHGD³SUHWW\WUHDFK HURXVGHVFHQW´GRZQWKHZHVWHUQVORSHWRJHWWRWKH3=WKHODVW&DQDGLDQVROGLHUZDVOLIWHGRXW RIWKH$2RQ0DUFK

Operation POLAR HARPOON 7KHRSHUDWLRQWKH33&/,ZDVRULJLQDOO\WDVNHGWRSHUIRUP²WKHVZHHSRI7DNXU*KDU DQGWKHYDOOH\WRLWVHDVW²ZDVVWLOODQHFHVVDU\PLVVLRQ6RZKLOHWKH&DQDGLDQVZHUHFOHDULQJ WKH:KDOHRIHQHP\WURRSVZHDSRQVDQGPXQLWLRQV7RZQVHQG¶VEDWWDOLRQ7$&ZDVHQURXWH WR%DJUDPWRDVVXPHFRQWURORILWVFRPSDQLHV&RPSDQ\&XQGHU&DSWDLQ*UHJRU\.R]HOND KDGUHWXUQHGWR%DJUDPZKHQ7)RakkasanZDVSXOOHGRXWRIWKHYDOOH\DQGKDGEHHQUHVWLQJ DQGUH¿WWLQJIRULWVQH[WPLVVLRQ6WHYHQV¶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¿QGXSWKHUHZDVSUHWW\GDUQVNHWFK\:H KDGGLVFRYHUHGWUHQFKHVZHKDGGLVFRYHUHGEXQNHUVZLWKRYHUKHDGFRYHUEXW

169 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 36 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

ZHGLGQ¶WUHDOO\KDYHDORWRINQRZOHGJHDERXWWKDWRWKHUWKDQZKDW,ZDVDEOH WR JDUQHU IURP D FRXSOH RI WKH 6SHFLDO 2SHUDWRUV ZKR KDG IRXJKW XS WKHUH EULHÀ\DQGKDGZLWKGUDZQRIIWKHULGJHOLQH167

C/4-31 HLZ HLZ A/4-31

Cave-Ammo Cache

Firefight with AQ cache guard

0 500 1000 1500 2000 Meters NGA Figure 34. Operation ANACONDA, POLAR HARPOON, 18–19 March 2002.

170 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 37 of 316

Chapter 6

1HYHUWKHOHVV DUPHG ZLWK ZKDW LQIRUPDWLRQ KH FRXOG JOHDQ 7RZQVHQG GHYHORSHG D WZR FRPSDQ\DLUDVVDXOWWKDWZDVGHVLJQHGWRVDWLVI\ERWKWDVNV²FOHDUWKHWRSRI7DNXU*KDUDQG FOHDUWKHYDOOH\WRWKHHDVW 7KHSODQIRU2SHUDWLRQ32/$5+$53221FDOOHGIRULQVHUWLQJ&&RPSDQ\,1RQWR DULGJHOLQHPHWHUVWRWKHQRUWKRIWKHSHDN7KDWFRPSDQ\ZRXOGFOLPEWRWKHWRSDQGERWK FOHDUWKHVXPPLWDQGSURYLGH$&RPSDQ\,1RYHUZDWFKLQJ¿UHVDVLWFOHDUHGWKHYDOOH\ EHORZ$&RPSDQ\ZRXOGEHLQVHUWHGLQWRDQ+/=RQWKHYDOOH\ÀRRUWRWKHQRUWKHDVWRI7DNXU *KDUDQGFOHDUWKHYDOOH\IURPQRUWKWRVRXWKWRDSRLQWZKHUHWKHYDOOH\PHWZLWKWKH*,1*(5 GUDZWKDWVNLUWHG7DNXU*KDURQWKHVRXWK7RZQVHQG¶V7$&DQGWKHEDWWDOLRQPRUWDUVZHUHWR LQVHUWZLWK&&RPSDQ\RQWKHVLGHRIWKHPRXQWDLQ168 7KHRSHUDWLRQEHJDQDWGDZQRQ0DUFKZLWKWKHEDWWDOLRQOLIWLQJRIIDW%DJUDP7KH ÀLJKWHQFRXQWHUHGQRSUREOHPVHQURXWHEXW7RZQVHQGVXGGHQO\EHFDPHFRQFHUQHGDVKLV &+SLORWWRXFKHGGRZQRQWKHULGJHOLQH+HUHPHPEHUHG :HODQGHGRQWRSRIWKHULGJHOLQHDQGDV,ORRNHGRXWWKHZLQGRZVDVP\ WURRSVZHUHGLVHPEDUNLQJ,WKRXJKW³:KHUHLQWKHKHFNKDVKHODQGHG",FDQ¶W WHOOWKDWZHKDYHODQGHG´:HOODV,FDPHRIIWKHUDPSP\VHOI,UHDOL]HGWKDW KHKDGQRWODQGHG7KHULGJHZDVVRQDUURZWKDWKLVUHDUWZRZKHHOVRQO\DQG KLVUDPSZHUHRQWKHPRXQWDLQ+LVUDPSZDVRQWKHULGJHOLQHDQGKLVIURQW WZRZKHHOVZHUHKRYHULQJRXWLQWKHDLUDQGKHZDVDWPD[SRZHU,QIDFWP\ 6ROGLHUVZHUHFOLQJLQJWRVPDOOVKUXEVDQGEXVKHVRQWKHULGJHWRNHHSIURP WXPEOLQJGRZQWKHULGJHDQGDPHGLFDODLGEDJDQGDQDVVDXOWSDFNGLGLQIDFW JRWXPEOLQJGRZQWKHULGJH169 7KH VHFRQG &KLQRRN IROORZHG WKH ¿UVW DQG XQORDGHG WKH UHVW RI WKH 7$& PRUWDUV DQG & &RPSDQ\,1WKHQÀHZQRUWKZDUGWRZDUG%DJUDP,WZDVTXLFNO\DSSDUHQWWRWKHEDWWDO LRQ¶VOHDGHUVWKDWWRFOLPEWKHUHPDLQLQJIHHWWRWKHWRSZDVJRLQJWREHGLI¿FXOWDWWKDW DOWLWXGH2SWLQJWROHDYHWKHPRUWDUVRQWKH+/=7RZQVHQGDQG.R]HONDOHGWKHLUWURRSVRQWKH VORZDUGXRXVDVFHQWXSWKHPRXQWDLQ170 0HDQZKLOHGRZQEHORZ6WHYHQV¶$&RPSDQ\ZDVLQVHUWHGLQWKHYDOOH\DQGEHJDQLWV VZHHSZLWKRXWWKHRYHUZDWFKHOHPHQW\HWLQSODFH7KHFRPSDQ\KDGOLWWOHGLI¿FXOW\¿QGLQJ DEDQGRQHGEXQNHUVDQGFDFKHV7KHWURRSVEXVLHGWKHPVHOYHVZLWKJDWKHULQJDQ\GRFXPHQWV RURWKHULWHPVRILQWHOOLJHQFHYDOXHWKHQZLUHGDQ\GLVFRYHUHGZHDSRQVDQGDPPXQLWLRQIRU GHVWUXFWLRQZLWKH[SORVLYHV$WRQHSRLQWWKH\ORFDWHGDKXJHDPPXQLWLRQEXQNHUDQGEOHZ LWLQSODFHRQO\WRUHDOL]HWKDWWKHFDYHLQZKLFKWKHDPPXQLWLRQZDVVWRUHGZDVWKHQEORZ LQJVKUDSQHODQGFKXQNVRIRWKHUGHEULVIURPZHVWWRHDVWDFURVVWKHFRPSDQ\¶VOLQHRIPDUFK 6WHYHQVZDVIRUFHGWRPRYHKLVWURRSVWRWKHIDUVLGHRIWKHYDOOH\DQGPDNHUXVKHVRYHUWKH ³NLOO]RQH´WRJHWWKHPVDIHO\DFURVV7KHDPPXQLWLRQLQWKDWEXQNHUFRQWLQXHGWRH[SORGHIRU DERXWKRXUV171 2QFHRQWRSRI7DNXU*KDU.R]HOND¶VWURRSVVSUHDGRXWDQGEHJDQWKHLUVHDUFK1RWNQRZ LQJZKDWWKH\ZRXOG¿QG7RZQVHQGZDVJODGWKDWKLVWURRSVGLGQRWKDYHWR¿JKWIRUWKHWRS ³,WZDVEDVLFDOO\DEDQGRQHG´KHUHFDOOHG³7KHUHZDVQRWKLQJXSWKHUHEXWGHDGDO4DHGD %XWZKHQZHJRWXSWKHUH,UHDOL]HGWKHUHZHUHWUHQFKHVSUHSDUHGGHIHQVLYHSRVLWLRQVKLG GHQEXQNHUVKLGGHQFRPPDQGDQGFRQWUROIDFLOLWLHVDQGVRPHFUHZVHUYHGZHDSRQVWKDWZHUH VWLOORSHUDWLRQDOXSWKHUH´172,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHHQHP\HTXLSPHQW&&RPSDQ\6ROGLHUVZHUH

171 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 38 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

DEOHWRUHFRYHUPXFKRIWKH86HTXLSPHQWWKDWKDGEHHQDEDQGRQHGLQWKHDWWHPSWVWRUHFRYHU 1HLO5REHUWV2QHRIWKHLWHPVZDVWKHKHOPHWRI6HUJHDQW%UDGOH\6&URVHRQHRIWKH45) 5DQJHUVZKRKDGEHHQNLOOHGLQWKH¿JKWLQJRQ0DUFK174 $VLWWXUQHGRXW&&RPSDQ\GLGQRW¿QGDOORIWKHGLVFDUGHG86HTXLSPHQW/DWHULQWKH GD\DV$&RPSDQ\DSSURDFKHGLWVOLPLWRIDGYDQFH6ROGLHUVVSLHGVHYHUDOEXQNHUV1RWVXUH LIWKHSRVLWLRQVZHUHRFFXSLHG6WHYHQVFDOOHGIRUPRUWDU¿UHDQGVHQWVRPHPHQWRHQJDJHWKH SRVLWLRQVZLWK$7V6RPHWURRSVHYHQJRWFORVHHQRXJKWROREDIHZKDQGJUHQDGHVLQWRRQH EXQNHU,WWXUQHGRXWWKDWQRQHRIWKHSRVLWLRQVZHUHPDQQHGEXWLWZDVQRWORQJEHIRUHWKH 6ROGLHUVGLGPDNHFRQWDFW$VRQHRI6WHYHQV¶SODWRRQVZDVFOHDULQJDVPDOOGUDZWKHSODWRRQ VHUJHDQWSRVWHGZLWKWKHVTXDGLQWKHRYHUZDWFKSRVLWLRQQRWLFHGDQHQHP\SRVLWLRQKLJKHU XSLQWKHGUDZ2QHVTXDGKDGDOUHDG\SDVVHGWKHVXVSHFWHGORFDWLRQDQGWKHQH[WDORQJZLWK WKHSODWRRQKHDGTXDUWHUVZDVDSSURDFKLQJLW7KHVHUJHDQWUDGLRHGWKHSODWRRQOHDGHUZKR WKHQOHGDVTXDGWRZDUGWKHVXVSHFWHGHQHP\6XGGHQO\DQDO4DHGD¿JKWHUDUPHGZLWKD86 PDGH06TXDG$XWRPDWLF:HDSRQ 6$: SRSSHGXSRXWRIDKROHDPHUH\DUGVDZD\ 7KH$PHULFDQWURRSV¿UHGDQGTXLFNO\NLOOHGKLP6HDUFKLQJWKHGUDZWKHSODWRRQQRWRQO\ UHFRYHUHGWKH6$:EXWRWKHU86HTXLSPHQWWKDWKDGEHHQGHSRVLWHGWKHUHIRUVDIHNHHSLQJ 7RZQVHQGIHOWWKDWWKHDFWLRQUHYHDOHGWKHHQHP\¶VLQWHQWLQWKHDIWHUPDWKRI$1$&21'$ DVVHUWLQJ³,WZDVP\DVVHVVPHQWWKDWDO4DHGDZKHQWKH\ZLWKGUHZIURPWKHEDWWOH¿HOGWKHUH WRKHDGWRZDUG3DNLVWDQOHIWWKLVJXDUGEHKLQGWRJXDUGWKHLUVWXIIEHFDXVHWKH\NQHZLIWKH\ ZHUHFDXJKWZLWKLWZKLOHWKH\ZHUHPRYLQJLWZRXOGORRNEDGIRUWKHP´ 7KDWDFWLRQHIIHFWLYHO\HQGHG32/$5+$53221DQGDVLWWXUQHGRXW$1$&21'$DV ZHOO7KHFRPSDQLHVUHPDLQHGLQSDWUROEDVHVWKDWQLJKWDQGWKHIROORZLQJPRUQLQJ,1 SUHSDUHGWREHDLUOLIWHGEDFNWR%DJUDP³,UHPHPEHUWKDWRQ0DUFKZKLFKZDVP\ ELUWKGD\,ZDVVLWWLQJRQWRSRI7DNXU*KDU0RXQWDLQ´7RZQVHQGUHFDOOHG³:HZHUHOLVWHQLQJ WRWKHUDGLRDQGLWFDPHDFURVVWKHVDWHOOLWHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV 6$7&20 UDGLRZKLFKZDVWKH RQO\ZD\ZHKDGWRWDONDOOWKHZD\EDFNWR%DJUDPWKDWWKHFRPPDQGHULQFKLHIWKHQ*HQHUDO 7RPP\)UDQNVWKH&(17&20&RPPDQGHUKDGFRPHWR%DJUDPDQGDQQRXQFHGWKDW 2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$ZDVRI¿FLDOO\RYHU´176/DWHUWKDWPRUQLQJWKHEDWWDOLRQ¶V6ROGLHUV PDGHWKHLUZD\WRWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH3=VDQGZHUHÀRZQEDFNWR%DJUDP $W%DJUDP7RZQVHQGDVVHPEOHGKLVWURRSVWRWDONWRWKHPDERXWZKDWWKH\KDGMXVWH[SH ULHQFHG:KDWKHKDGWRVD\ZDVDSSOLFDEOHWRDOORIWKH$PHULFDQ6ROGLHUVZKRKDGMXVWHQWHUHG FRPEDWIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHDQGNLOOHGRWKHUKXPDQEHLQJV+LVZRUGVWKDWGD\ZHUHSRLJQDQW )LUVWRIDOO,VXSSRUW\RXLQZKDW\RXGLG,I\RXIHHODV,GRGHDG $PHULFDQVRQ6HSWHPEHULVDOOWKHMXVWL¿FDWLRQ\RXQHHG1RZVRPHRI \RXPLJKWFRQVLGHU\RXUVHOYHVOXFN\WRKDYHWKHFKDQFHWRJHWRQHRIWKHP DQGWKDW¶VRND\,I\RXIHHOJRRGDERXWLWNHHSLWWR\RXUVHOI'RQ¶WPDNHRWKHU SHRSOHOLVWHQWRLW%XWPRVWRI\RXSUREDEO\VD\WR\RXUVHOYHV³,GLGQ¶WZDQW WRNLOODQ\ERG\,ZDVMXVWGRLQJP\MRE´7RWKRVHSHRSOH,ZDQWWRVD\GRQ¶W IHHOEDGDERXWZKDW\RXKDYHWRGR177 7RZQVHQGWKHQDGGHGDQRWHRIZDUQLQJ³'RQ¶WOHWWKLVFORXG\RXUYLVLRQ7KHUHPD\EHPRUH RILWWREHGRQHLQWKHGD\VDKHDG´178 $1$&21'$ZDVQRWDSHUIHFWPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQ7KHUHKDGEHHQVLJQL¿FDQWFKDOOHQJHVLQ HVWDEOLVKLQJDFOHDUSLFWXUHRIWKHHQHP\¶VORFDWLRQVVWUHQJWKDQGLQWHQW$GGLWLRQDOSUREOHPV

172 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 39 of 316

Chapter 6

ZLWK WKH WDLORULQJ RI IRUFHV DQG HTXLSPHQW &$6 LQGLUHFW ¿UH VXSSRUW DQG VXI¿FLHQW OLIW FDSDELOLWLHVDOVRDIIHFWHGFRPEDWRSHUDWLRQVLQWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\,QGHHGMXVWPRQWKVDIWHU WKHEDWWOH0DMRU*HQHUDO+DJHQEHFNRSHQO\DGGUHVVHGVRPHRIWKHSUREOHPVHQFRXQWHUHGE\ 86JURXQGIRUFHVLQWKHYDOOH\HVSHFLDOO\WKRVHWKDWSUHYHQWHGLQIDQWU\XQLWVIURPFRRUGLQDWLQJ TXLFNUHVSRQVHDWWDFNVZLWK&RDOLWLRQ¿[HGZLQJDLUFUDIW179$VQRWHGHDUOLHULQWKLVFKDSWHUQRW DOOJURXQGIRUFHVZKRQHHGHG&$6HVSHFLDOO\LQWKHLQLWLDOKRXUVRIWKHRSHUDWLRQUHFHLYHGLW LQDWLPHO\IDVKLRQRUDWDOO $WDQ\UDWHJLYHQWKHPDQ\VKRUWFRPLQJVDQGLVVXHVIDFLQJWKHVWDIIVDQGFRPPDQGHUVZKR SODQQHGDQGFRQGXFWHGWKHRSHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$PXVWEHFRQVLGHUHGDQRYHUDOOVXFFHVV )LUVWDQGIRUHPRVWWKHRSHUDWLRQVXSSRUWHG&(17&20¶VPLOLWDU\REMHFWLYHVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ &RDOLWLRQDFWLRQVLQWKHYDOOH\VXFFHVVIXOO\GHVWUR\HGDO4DHGDIRUFHVDQGWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V WUDLQLQJEDVHVERWKRIZKLFKZHUHREMHFWLYHVLQ)UDQNV¶RULJLQDOSODQIRU2()180$FFRUGLQJ WR&-7)Mountain’sHVWLPDWHVRYHUDO4DHGDDQG7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVZHUHNLOOHGGXULQJWKH RSHUDWLRQ&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVDOVRGHVWUR\HGRUFDSWXUHGPRUWDUVDUWLOOHU\SLHFHVDQG '6K.KHDY\PDFKLQHJXQV$GGLWLRQDOO\WKRVHIRUFHVFDSWXUHGDQGVHDUFKHGFRPSRXQGV RWKHUEXLOGLQJVDQGFOHDUHGFDYHFRPSOH[HV181$PHULFDQHVWLPDWHVRIWKHQXPEHURIHQHP\ NLOOHGDUHQRWXQLYHUVDOO\DFFHSWHGDQGVRPHDFFRXQWVVXJJHVWWKDWWKHQXPEHURIDO4DHGD DQG7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVNLOOHGLQWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\ZDVDVORZDV6WLOOWKLVVPDOOHUWRWDO ZRXOGLQGLFDWHDQDSSUR[LPDWHQXPEHURIZRXQGHGHQHP\¿JKWHUVJLYHQKLVWRULFDONLOOHG LQDFWLRQ .,$ :,$UDWHVIRUFRPEDWDFWLRQVVLPLODUWR$1$&21'$:KHQHYHQWKHVHORZHU HVWLPDWHVRIWKHHIIHFWVRQWKHHQHP\DUHFRQVLGHUHGDJDLQVWWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VFDVXDOW\FRXQWWKDW WRWDOHGOHVVWKDQNLOOHGDQGZRXQGHGWKHRSHUDWLRQVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGDVXFFHVV 3HUKDSVPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQWKHRSHUDWLRQ¶VFDVXDOW\FRXQWZDV$1$&21'$¶VTXDOLWD WLYHHIIHFWRQWKHHQHP\0DQ\RIWKHDO4DHGDPHPEHUVZKRZHUHNLOOHGZHUHWKHVHDVRQHG ¿JKWHUVZKRIRUPHGWKHEDFNERQHRIWKDWRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VWUDLQLQJEDVHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ,QVXP PDUL]LQJ WKH UHVXOW RI WKH RSHUDWLRQ *HQHUDO +DJHQEHFN WKH &-7) Mountain FRPPDQGHU GHVFULEHGWKHHQHP\¶VORVVHVLQWKHIROORZLQJWHUPV 7KH\ZHUHWKHKDUGFRUHFDGUHWKDWKDGEHHQGRLQJWKHWUDLQLQJIRUDQXP EHURI\HDUVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQRIWKHVHWHQVRIWKRXVDQGVRIWHUURULVWVWKDWZHUH WUDLQHGWKHUH,I\RXWKLQNRIWKHPLQWHUPVRIWKHFDSWDLQVDQGPDMRUVDQGGULOO VHUJHDQWVWKDWPLJKWUXQRXUVFKRROVDW)RUW%HQQLQJRU)RUW6LOOWKDWZDVZKR WKHVHFKDUDFWHUVZHUH7KH\ZHUHZDUYHWHUDQV182 8OWLPDWHO\+DJHQEHFNEHOLHYHGWKDWWKHRSHUDWLRQLQWKHYDOOH\ZRXOGKDYHDODVWLQJHIIHFWRQ DO4DHGD¶VFDSDELOLWLHVDVVHUWLQJ³ZHWRRNRXWVRPHWKLQJWKDWWKH\FRXOGQRWUHSODFHRYHU QLJKWWKHSHRSOHDQGWKHQDOVRWKLVORFDOLW\WKLVVDQFWXDU\ZKHUHWKH\FRXOGDFWXDOO\GRWKH WUDLQLQJ´

ÔÔÔ

$1$&21'$ZDVWKHODUJHVWDQGDUJXDEO\WKHPRVWVXFFHVVIXOFRPEDWRSHUDWLRQRIWKH &RDOLWLRQFDPSDLJQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ%\WKHHQGRI0DUFKWKHDELOLW\RIWKH7DOLEDQDQG LWDO4DHGDDOOLHVWRFRQGXFWVLJQL¿FDQWPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQKDGEHHQVKDWWHUHG :LWKLQ PRQWKV HYHU\ EDWWDOLRQ WKDW KDG SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ WKH EDWWOH KDG OHIW$IJKDQLVWDQ WR

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 40 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

UHWXUQWRWKHLUKRPHVWDWLRQVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGHOVHZKHUH7KHXQLWVDQGFRPPDQGHUV WKDWIROORZHGWKHPLQ$IJKDQLVWDQLQWHQGHGWREXLOGRQWKHVXFFHVVRI$1$&21'$+RZHYHU WKH\ZHUHOHVVIRFXVHGRQODUJHVFDOHFRPEDWRSHUDWLRQVWKDQRQPRYLQJWKHFDPSDLJQLQWRLWV ¿QDOSKDVHE\UHIRFXVLQJ&RDOLWLRQHIIRUWVRQKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFHDQGVWUHQJWKHQLQJWKH YLDELOLW\DQGFDSDFLW\RIWKHQHZ$IJKDQQDWLRQ&RDOLWLRQOHDGHUVKRSHGWKDWLIWKHVHHIIRUWV ZHUHVXFFHVVIXOWKH\ZRXOGQRWKDYHWRPRXQWDQRWKHU$1$&21'$LQWKHIXWXUH

174 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 41 of 316

Chapter 6

Notes

/LHXWHQDQW *HQHUDO )UDQNOLQ / +DJHQEHFN LQWHUYLHZ E\ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV 6WXG\ 7HDP&RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60DUFK/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO3DXO :LOOHLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK .6'HFHPEHU +DJHQEHFNLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK &RORQHO 0LFKDHO +DZU\ODN LQWHUYLHZ E\ WK 0LOLWDU\ +LVWRU\ 'HWDFKPHQW &DPS 'RKD .XZDLW0D\%ULJDGLHU*HQHUDO-RKQ0XOKROODQGLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\2SHUDWLRQV 6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW%UDJJ1&0D\ /HVWHU:*UDXHGThe Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan :DVKLQJWRQ'&1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV /HVWHU : *UDX DQG 0LFKDHO$ *UHVV HGV The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost /DZUHQFH.68QLYHUVLW\RI.DQVDV3UHVV ±*UDXThe Bear Went Over the Mountain *UDXThe Bear Went Over the Mountain± *UDXDQG*UHVVThe Soviet-Afghan War *UDXDQG*UHVV The Soviet-Afghan War 0DMRU0DUN*'DYLV, ³2SHUDWLRQ $1$&21'$&RPPDQGDQG&RQIXVLRQLQ-RLQW:DUIDUH´ 0DVWHUV7KHVLV6FKRRORI$GYDQFHG$LUDQG6SDFH6WXGLHV$LU8QLYHUVLW\0D[ZHOO$)%$/-XQH 'DYLV³2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$´ +DZU\ODNLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 0XOKROODQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\± &KDUOHV+%ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice: US Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan )RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.6&RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH3UHVV 0XOKROODQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 0XOKROODQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 0XOKROODQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 5LFKDUG:6WHZDUWThe United States Army in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001–March 2002&0+3XEOLFDWLRQ :DVKLQJWRQ'&&HQWHURI0LOLWDU\+LVWRU\ 'DYLV³2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$´± +DJHQEHFNLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK +DJHQEHFNLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK 'DYLV³2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$´ %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice 6WHZDUWOEF, October 2001–March 2002'DYLV³2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$´ G%ULJDGHVW$LUERUQH'LYLVLRQAfter Action Report%ULHIXQGDWHGVOLGHV± &RORQHO &KDUOHV$ 3UH\VOHU LQWHUYLHZ E\ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV 6WXG\7HDP &RPEDW 6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60D\0DMRU3HWHU'DZHLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60D\ /LHXWHQDQW &RORQHO 5HWLUHG 5RQDOG &RUNUDQ WHOHSKRQH LQWHUYLHZ E\ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60D\± 0DMRU1HOVRQ.UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW 6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60D\± %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of ChoicH %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice 'DYLV³2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$´

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 42 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

&-7)MountainOperation Anaconda, Combat Operations %ULHI)HEUXDU\VOLGH &-7)MountainOperation Anaconda, Combat Operations %ULHI)HEUXDU\VOLGH 6WHZDUWOEF, October 2001–March 2002±%ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of ChoicH &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\3UH\VOHUKDGRQO\WZRFRPSDQLHVZLWKZKLFKWRFRQGXFW KLVPLVVLRQ%&RPSDQ\,1ZDVVHQWWRVHFXUHDVDIHKRXVHLQ.KRVWDQG'&RPSDQ\UHPDLQHG DW.DQGDKDUWRSHUIRUPWKHDLU¿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³2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$´VHHFKDSWHUIRRWQRWH %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice± %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice$FFRUGLQJWR0DMRU0DUN'DYLVDFRPELQDWLRQRIODWH VRUWLHVE\WKH$LU)RUFHPHVVDJHVE\WKH62)UHFRQQDLVVDQFHWHDPWRVWRSWKHVWULNHVWKDWKLWQHDUWKHLU SRVLWLRQDQGDZHDSRQVPDOIXQFWLRQLQD%%ERPEHUZHUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHVPDOOHUQXPEHURI DLUVWULNHVWKDWPRUQLQJ6HH'DYLV³2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$´ %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice +DOOLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ $XVWLQ%D\³$)XOO5HSRUWRQ2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$²$PHULFD¶V)LUVW%DWWOHRIWKHVW &HQWXU\$&RPSOHWH$IWHU$FWLRQ,QWHUYLHZZLWK&2/:LHUFLQVNL´KWWSZZZVWUDWHJ\SDJHFRPRQB SRLQWDVS[ DFFHVVHG0D\ %D\³$)XOO5HSRUWRQ2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$´&RUNUDQHPDLOLQWHUYLHZ0D\ %D\³$)XOO5HSRUWRQ2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$´ &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\+DOOLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 7HFKQLFDO6HUJHDQW-RKQ0F&DEHLQWHUYLHZE\WK0LOLWDU\+LVWRU\'HWDFKPHQW%DJUDP $IJKDQLVWDQ0DUFK .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &URPELHLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK &URPELHLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK &URPELHLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK &URPELHLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK &URPELHLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK

176 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 43 of 316

Chapter 6

0DMRU )UDQNOLQ %DOWD]DU WHOHSKRQH LQWHUYLHZ E\ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV 6WXG\ 7HDP &RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60D\ %DOWD]DUWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\%DOWD]DULQWHUYLHZ0D\ 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\ %DOWD]DULQWHUYLHZ0D\ %DOWD]DULQWHUYLHZ0D\± 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\ %DOWD]DULQWHUYLHZ0D\ 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\ %DOWD]DULQWHUYLHZ0D\ &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\± &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 0F&DEHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 0F&DEHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 0F&DEHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 0F&DEHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 0F&DEHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 0F&DEHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ +DOOLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK +DOOLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK +DOOLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK +DOOLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK +DOOLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK.UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ +DOOLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK +DOOLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK.UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\ 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\+DOOLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 0DMRU 1HOVRQ .UDIW Lessons Learned from a Light Infantry Company during Operation ANACONDA%ULHIXQGDWHGVOLGH &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\± &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &URPELHLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\± &RUNUDQHPDLOLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\ &RUNUDQLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &RUNUDQLQWHUYLHZ0D\

177 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 44 of 316

Operation ANACONDA

3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\± %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice± %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\ %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice 'HSDUWPHQWRI'HIHQVH³([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\RIWKH%DWWOHRI7DNXU*KDU´0D\ %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice± %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice± %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice± %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice± +DJHQEHFNLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\+HDGTXDUWHUVVW%DWWDOLRQWK,QIDQWU\ 0HPRUDQGXP6XEMHFW7DVN)RUFH,1$IWHU$FWLRQ5HSRUW2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$0DUFK &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\± &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\&RUNUDQHPDLOLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 7),1$IWHU$FWLRQ5HSRUW &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &RUNUDQWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 3UH\VOHULQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\± .UDIWWHOHSKRQHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice± %ULVFRHHWDOWeapon of Choice %DOWD]DULQWHUYLHZ0D\± 0DMRU)UHG:RODQVNLLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW6WXGLHV ,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60D\ G %ULJDGH WK 0RXQWDLQ 'LYLVLRQ “Commandoes,” Afghanistan: December 2001–April 2002 After Action Review%ULH¿QJVOLGH &RORQHO6WHSKHQ-7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW 6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60D\ /LHXWHQDQW &RORQHO 3DWULFN 6WRJUDQ LQWHUYLHZ E\ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV 6WXG\ 7HDP &RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60D\± 6WRJUDQLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 6WRJUDQLQWHUYLHZ0D\±

178 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 45 of 316

Chapter 6

6WRJUDQLQWHUYLHZ0D\± 6WRJUDQLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 6WRJUDQLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 6WRJUDQLQWHUYLHZ0D\± 0DMRU0DUN&DPSEHOOLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW6WXGLHV ,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60D\± 6WRJUDQLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 'DZHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ &DPSEHOOLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\± 7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 'HQQLV6WHHOH³86$UP\/LQH%DWWDOLRQLQWKH:DURQ7HUURULVP7KH0RXQWDLQV´Army 0DJD]LQH -XQH KWWS¿QGDUWLFOHVFRPSDUWLFOHVPLBTDLVBDLBQ DFFHVVHG 0D\ 7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\± 7RZQVHQGLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 6WHHOH³7KH0RXQWDLQV´ 6WHHOH³7KH0RXQWDLQV´ 6HH5REHUW+0F(OUR\³,QWHUYLHZZLWK)UDQNOLQ/+DJHQEHFN²$IJKDQLVWDQ)LUH6XSSRUW IRU2SHUDWLRQ$QDFRQGD´Field Artillery6HSWHPEHU±2FWREHU *HQHUDO7RPP\)UDQNVAmerican Soldier 1HZ

179 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 46 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 47 of 316

Chapter 7 Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002 In March 2002 Afghanistan appeared to be a nation ready to rise from the ashes of Taliban rule. While Mullah Mohammad Omar and Osama bin Laden had escaped the grasp of Coalition forces and their Afghan allies, the Taliban’s armed forces—and their al-Qaeda confederates— had been captured or killed almost in entirety. The vestiges of these forces had scattered and sought refuge in remote corners of Afghanistan or across the border in Pakistan. With these military threats defeated, leaders in both the Coalition and Hamid Karzai’s interim government IDFHGWKHGLI¿FXOWWDVNRIWUDQVIRUPLQJPLOLWDU\YLFWRU\LQWRDQHQGXULQJSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLF settlement that would constitute success for the Afghan population and for the Coalition. On the Coalition side, this challenge entailed the creation of new plans to ensure post-Taliban Afghanistan continued to move toward stability. This chapter focuses on the 3 months that followed the conclusion of Operation ANACONDA during which CENTCOM and the Coalition made critical decisions about their future operations in a dramatically altered Afghanistan. Unquestionably, the most important decision came in the spring of 2002 when Coalition leaders reached the conclusion that the great majority of their forces would not be departing Afghanistan anytime soon. Despite the victory in the Shahi Kowt Valley, the new Afghan state was still in its infancy and required nurturing if it was to endure. With Coalition strategic success contingent on the survival of WKLVQDVFHQWVWDWHRI¿FLDOVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG(XURSHEHJDQSODQQLQJDQHZFDPSDLJQ that demanded security missions to prevent the military and political resurgence of the Taliban as well as reconstruction operations and programs to train Afghan security forces. With the decision to extend the Coalition presence in Afghanistan came a change in command structure and force levels. These transitions essentially ended the campaign that centered on Special 2SHUDWLRQV)RUFHV 62) ZKLFKKDGGH¿QHGWKH¿UVWPRQWKVRIRSHUDWLRQVDQGLQLWLDOO\PDGH 2SHUDWLRQ (1'85,1* )5(('20 2() DSSHDU DV D XQLTXH FRQÀLFW$IWHU VSULQJ conventional units would become the core of the Coalition’s presence, even as the nature of the FRQÀLFWLQ$IJKDQLVWDQUHWDLQHGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKDWPDQ\ZRXOGGHVFULEHDVXQFRQYHQWLRQDO Spring 2002: Optimism and Anxiety $1$&21'$KDGLQÀLFWHGDPDMRUGHIHDWRQ7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGD forces. Afterwards, many of the Taliban that had survived ANACONDA, Tora Bora, and other Coalition actions and remained loyal to Mullah Omar hid within the population. In April 2002 General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM commander, admitted that the Coalition was aware of the presence of Taliban remnants in Afghanistan, stating, “I will say right now we do not see [large groupings of enemy forces.] What we see are smaller groups, we see groups of enemy soldiers trying to blend in with communities if you will.”1 That summer, the new Afghan Interior Minister Ali -DODOLFRQ¿UPHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRIVHPLGRUPDQW7DOLEDQIRUFHVLQVLGH$IJKDQLVWDQ7RKHOSGLV- cern likely Taliban actions in the near future, Jalali recalled the words of a 17th-century Pashtun guerrilla leader: “When you encounter a stronger enemy force, avoid decisive engagement and swiftly withdraw only to hit back where the enemy is vulnerable. By this you gain sustainabil- LW\DQGWKHDELOLW\WR¿JKWDORQJZDURIDWWULWLRQ´2 Thus, anxiety concerning the security of the QHZ$IJKDQVWDWHSHUVLVWHGHYHQDIWHUWKHVLJQL¿FDQWYLFWRU\LQWKH6KDKL.RZW9DOOH\

181 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 48 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002

Still, both the Coalition and the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) intended to pursue the political road map established at the Bonn Conference in December 2001. The agreement VLJQHGDWWKHFRQIHUHQFHFRGL¿HGDEDVLFFRQVHQVXVVKDUHGDPRQJPHPEHUVRIWKH&RDOLWLRQ the United Nations (UN), the larger international community, and Afghan representatives about the political future of Afghanistan. The cornerstone of the Bonn Agreement was its call for an emergency loya jirga, or grand council, scheduled to convene no later than June 2002 and charged “to lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elections.”3 Those elections, according to the agreement, were to be held no more than 2 years after the emergency loya jirga. To help foster a stable environment in which this political process could work, the UN Security Council on 20 December SDVVHG5HVROXWLRQWKDWLQDGGLWLRQWRVDQFWLRQLQJWKH%RQQ$JUHHPHQWFDOOHGIRU creating a military security force to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”4 This new security element would stand separately from OEF and concentrate its efforts on securing the capital of the new Afghan Government. The new UN-sponsored security force became known as the International Security Assis- tance Force (ISAF). The United Kingdom (UK) assumed the lead for providing command and control (C2) for ISAF and appointed Major General John McColl to command the organization. By early 2002, 18 other nations had pledged military forces to this command, which began operations that winter. A detailed seven-page Military Technical Agreement completed on 4 January 2002 outlined the rules of engagement (ROE) and established a clear separation between ISAF and Coalition forces, stating, “‘Coalition Forces’ are those national military elements of the US-led international coalition prosecuting the ‘War on Terrorism’ within Afghanistan. The ISAF is not part of the ‘Coalition Forces.’”5 The Military Technical Agreement was essentially a bilat- eral contract between ISAF and the AIA. It formalized the partnership between a new sovereign Afghanistan and a military force sanctioned by the United Nations. During the weeks of Operation ANACONDA, concerns about Afghanistan’s future grew. ,QWKH¿UVWTXDUWHURI81RI¿FLDOVKDGSDLQWHGDFDXWLRXVO\RSWLPLVWLFSLFWXUHRISURV- pects for consolidating the new interim government. On 27 February, for example, Kieran Prendergast, the UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, reported to the Security Council that although security threats remained in Afghanistan, on balance the country’s political progress had exceeded expectations.7 Prendergast noted that by that date, ISAF strength levels were approaching their full complement of 4,500 soldiers, that the World Food Program had successfully delivered more than 325,000 metric tons of food, and that the return of UN DQGQRQJRYHUQPHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQV 1*2 WR$IJKDQLVWDQSURPLVHGDVLJQL¿FDQWLPSURYHPHQW in the conduct of humanitarian assistance missions. Despite the generally upbeat quality of February 2002 assessments, a report made by UN 6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO.R¿$QQDQFDVWUHFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQDPRUHSHVVLPLVWLFOLJKW$QQDQ recognized the instability in Afghanistan, stating, “Insecurity remains the prime cause of concern for Afghans across the country.”8 He then listed the continued presence of Taliban DQGDO4DHGDPLOLWDQWVDVRQHFDXVHRIWKHJHQHUDOVHQVHRILQVHFXULW\EXWDGGHGWKDWFRQÀLFWV between political and military groups vying for power and criminal organizations seeking to take advantage of the instability were contributors as well.9 This apparent change in tone by UN

182 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 49 of 316

Chapter 7

RI¿FLDOVZDVV\PSWRPDWLFRIDQHZUHDOLW\%\ODWH0DUFK2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$KDG forced international observers—both civilian and military—to adjust the lens through which they viewed conditions in Afghanistan. The loya jirga, set for June 2002, remained on schedule as the AIA’s top priority. To ensure this milestone was reached, the Coalition began increasing its forces while ISAF consolidated its presence in Kabul. On the day that ANACONDA ended, the United Kingdom announced it would commit a brigade-size infantry task force consisting of approximately 1,700 Royal Marines from the 45th Commando Regiment to augment US efforts in Afghanistan. Dubbed Task Force (TF) Jacana, the UK deployment would constitute the largest projection of British military force since the end of the Gulf War in 1991.10%ULWLVKRI¿FLDOVSXEOLFO\HPSKDVL]HGWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ their ISAF contingent, discharging international peacekeeping responsibilities in and around Kabul, and TF Jacana,VHQWVSHFL¿FDOO\WRHQJDJHWKHHQHP\$V6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHIRU'HIHQFH Geoffrey Hoon noted during his address to the House of Commons, “These troops are being GHSOR\HGWR$IJKDQLVWDQWRWDNHSDUWLQZDU¿JKWLQJRSHUDWLRQV:HZLOOEHDVNLQJWKHPWRULVN their lives. Their missions will be conducted in unforgiving and hostile terrain against a dangerous enemy. They may suffer casualties.”11 Next to the American troop commitment, the British contribution to OEF would be the largest of the 37-nation Coalition by the end of July 2002.12 It also signaled that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom—the senior partners in 2()²ZHUHWDNLQJWKHUHODWLYHSHDFHRIWKHODWHVSULQJDVDVLJQRIDSDFL¿HG$IJKDQLVWDQ As TF Jacana prepared for its OEF deployment, US leadership reassessed the American stance on reconstruction and nation building. In mid-April 2002, approximately 1 month after the end of ANACONDA, President George W. Bush, addressing an audience at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), praised the “good progress” visible in Afghanistan. He remarked, “It’s important for Americans to know this war will not be quick and this war will not be easy. . . . The battles in Afghanistan are not over.”13 The President vowed that OEF would not replicate earlier military episodes in Afghanistan’s troubled history. Typically, he said, these involved ³LQLWLDOVXFFHVVIROORZHGE\ORQJ\HDUVRIÀRXQGHULQJDQGXOWLPDWHIDLOXUH:H¶UHQRWJRLQJ to repeat that mistake.”14 In addition to announcing the intention of America and its Coalition allies to “stay until the mission is done,” President Bush empowered advocates of a greater American commitment to Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction. He invoked the memory of George C. Marshall, a 1901 graduate of VMI and Army Chief of Staff during World War II who was also the architect of the Marshall Plan, to stress the need for the United States and other donor countries “to help Afghanistan . . . develop an economy that can feed its people” without falling back into destructive practices like opium cultivation.15 In Afghanistan, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, the commander of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain, was attempting to gain a better understanding of the situation and make some rudimentary plans for action. Across Afghanistan, Coalition military leaders began reaching out to the population to build rapport with local leaders and gain information. In the weeks after Operation ANACONDA, Hagenbeck personally met with tribal elders and other leaders to “get a grasp of the culture and live with the Afghans day in and day out.” According to Hagenbeck, the process entailed a calculated personal risk that the Afghans “would cut your throat when you fell asleep at night; and we were not unaware of all that.”17 7KHLQIRUPDWLRQKHJDLQHGIURPORFDOYLOODJHUVDFFRUGLQJWR+DJHQEHFNFRQ¿UPHG³ZKDW we thought had happened . . . that al-Qaeda had taken a beating. I mean these local people were

183 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 50 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002 telling me that al-Qaeda had lived among them for 10 years [sic] now.”18 However, the vestiges of bin Laden’s group remained in the country and were highly visible to the population. Local OHDGHUVWROG+DJHQEHFNWKDWWKHQRQ$IJKDQVWKDWPDGHXSWKHDO4DHGDUDQNDQG¿OH³VWXFN out like a sore thumb.”19 The CJTF Mountain commander believed this made the remnants of WKHHQHP\³VHSDUDWHDQGGLVWLQFWDQG,WKLQNWKHUHZDVDQRSSRUWXQLW\DÀHHWLQJRSSRUWXQLW\ where we could have killed them all.”20 $QQLKLODWLQJWKHHQHP\WKRXJKPLJKWKDYHUHTXLUHGSXUVXLQJÀHHLQJDO4DHGDDQG7DOLEDQ elements across the border into Pakistan, a move that international law and the ROE would not allow. Hagenbeck later came to appreciate the reasons behind this proscription: We didn’t pull the trigger for political reasons, which I understand now. I was out of my mind at the time. In retrospect, again, [deciding against cross-border operations] was in many ways a smart thing to do. It potentially could have collapsed the [friendly] Musharraf government [in Pakistan] at a time when we didn’t need that.21 ,QGHHGWKHVSULQJRIZDVQRWDSURSLWLRXVWLPHWRSXWVLJQL¿FDQWSUHVVXUHRQWKH0XVKDUUDI government. By May 2002 India and Pakistan were on the brink of nuclear war over terrorist attacks in India that the Indian Government believed had been sponsored by the Pakistani Government. Some of Hagenbeck’s visits took him to the frontier area on the Pakistani border and he used meetings with local leaders to explain the rationale behind the Coalition presence. In these discussions, he emphasized “that we were [in Afghanistan] for blood retribution because of 9/11 and we were going after the guys who did it.”22 The message resonated fairly well with the Afghans. “Their response to-a-person,” said General Hagenbeck, “basically was, ‘Okay. You can do that. You can stay here. We will be neutral until you dishonor us, our families, or our tribes. Then we will be your enemy.’”23 The challenge for American commanders would be to take a broad approach to the new environment in Afghanistan that allowed them to pursue the enemy while retaining the support—or at least the neutrality—of the Afghan population. Hagenbeck and his staff began IUDPLQJ WKLV QHZ DSSURDFK ZKLFK UHSUHVHQWHG WKH ¿UVW attempt by a senior Coalition command to articulate the overall direction for the military campaign in Afghanistan since US Central Command (CENTCOM) published the original OEF campaign plan in November 2001. For the CJTF Mountain commander, future Coalition efforts had to revolve around full spectrum operations. Hagenbeck drew this term from US Army doctrine that described full spectrum operations as the simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations such as reconstruction projects. By conducting full spectrum operations, US Army units could tailor their approach to the varying conditions across a country in which one region might harbor an entrenched enemy force and a neighboring region might be peaceful and welcoming of Coalition reconstruction efforts. Hagenbeck recognized that CJTF Mountain’s planned approach would set conditions for the new headquarters that would be deploying to Afghanistan in mid-2002 to take over Coalition operations. Pressure on the Enemy: Security Operations in Mid-2002 In his April speech at VMI, President Bush described how Coalition combat units were FRQGXFWLQJ2SHUDWLRQ02817$,1/,21WRWDNHWKH¿JKWWRDGDQJHURXVHQHP\ZKRUHPDLQHG DFWLYHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ02817$,1/,21ZDVWKH¿UVWODUJHVFDOHVHFXULW\RSHUDWLRQPRXQWHG

184 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 51 of 316

Chapter 7 by CJTF Mountain in the immediate post-ANACONDA period. Hagenbeck and his staff had launched this offensive in an attempt to do two things. First, the operation would take advantage of that short window of opportunity in which, they believed, the Coalition could easily identify the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda and deal them a fatal blow. CJTF Mountain intelligence had located key areas in southeast Afghanistan in Paktia, Paktika, and Oruzgan provinces along the Pakistani border that had served and possibly were still providing VDQFWXDULHVWRHQHP\JURXSV3ODQQLQJIRU2SHUDWLRQ02817$,1/,21IRFXVHGVSHFL¿FDOO\ on what the CJTF MountainVWDIILGHQWL¿HGDVWKHGHFLVLYHSRLQWVIRURSHUDWLRQWKHWRZQVRI Gardez, Khost, and Orgun-e.24 By eliminating these forces, the operation would help achieve the second objective—a secure environment in which the June 2002 loya jirga could take place. Hagenbeck envisioned Operation MOUNTAIN LION as a 90-day campaign that saw a succession of week-long missions launched by battalion-size or smaller elements. These forces would move from Bagram and Kandahar on helicopters into the targeted areas where they would conduct full spectrum operations—intelligence, cordon and search, raids, and humanitarian assistance—focused on capturing or killing Taliban and al-Qaeda groups.257KH¿UVWRI these smaller operations began in early April when the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry (1-187 IN), an element of TF RakkasanÀHZIURP.DQGDKDUDQGODQGHGLQDQDUHDVRXWKZHVWRIWKHWRZQRI

The CH-47 Chinook: The Army’s Workhorse in Afghanistan

During the first 4 years of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the US Army relied heavily on helicopters to move forces and materiel around Afghanistan. These aircraft were particularly important in magnifying the effect of the relatively small number of Coalition forces that until 2004 spent most of their time on a small number of bases. Of all the aircraft employed by the US Army in OEF, it was the CH-47 Chinook that bore the brunt of the heaviest work. The Chinook had been designed in the 1950s as a heavy lift helicopter. Its tandem rotors gave the aircraft capabilities to lift and transport as well as fly at speeds of up to 170 knots and reach altitudes higher than smaller helicopters. The CH-47 saw service with US forces in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and other major and minor operations. The CH-47’s capabilities made it ideal for a variety of missions in OEF. Special Operations versions of the aircraft were heavily involved in the first 3 months of the campaign in Afghanistan. The Chinook’s ability to transport 35 to 55 Soldiers made it ideal for the air assault portion of Operation ANACONDA. Beginning in the middle of 2002, as the campaign slowly shifted focus from offensive to stability operations, the CH-47 arguably remained the most important piece of equipment in the Coalition’s arsenal. The aviation units that flew the Chinook continued to support air assault missions in security operations such as MOUNTAIN LION, which put pressure on enemy formations in the south and southeast areas of the country. But these Rakkasan Brief units also delivered food, water, ammunition, and Mountain-side PZ. Note the terrain and the fact that the other supplies needed to sustain the Coalition CH-47’s front wheels are in the air. combat power.

185 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 52 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002

Khost in Paktia province. The unit’s target was a large training and supply base near the village of Zhawar Kili. That location was only several miles from the Pakistani border and had served as a logistics base for anti-Soviet mujahideen in the 1980s. By late 2001 Coalition intelligence KDGFRQ¿UPHGWKDWDO4DHGDKDGUHFHQWO\XVHGWKHVSUDZOLQJFDYHDQGWXQQHOFRPSOH[DVERWK a headquarters and a training base. The mission of 1-187 IN, and a small Afghan security force that joined the American battalion, was to move into the area and carefully search the complex. $OWKRXJKWKH\GLGQRW¿QGDQ\HQHP\IRUFHVLQWKHVDQFWXDU\WKH6ROGLHUVRI,1PHWKRG- ically cleared the facility, gathered information from the site and from the local population, and delivered humanitarian aid to the village that had provided the Afghan unit. By 7 April 2002 the Rakkasan6ROGLHUVKDGFRPSOHWHGWKHPLVVLRQDQGÀRZQEDFNWR.DQGDKDU Hagenbeck then turned to British and Canadian forces to continue the momentum begun by 1-187 IN. TF JacanaODXQFKHG2SHUDWLRQ37$50,*$1RQ$SULODQGGLUHFWHGWKH British marines, with some American units in support, back to Paktia province for several days to sweep through the rough terrain in search of enemy forces that might have returned after ANACONDA. In May the British followed PTARMIGAN with Operation SNIPE, which sent UK troops into areas of southeastern Afghanistan that previously had not been visited by the Coalition. According to the British Ministry of Defence, the mission in SNIPE was to “clear and destroy any terrorist infrastructure located there, and render it safe for humanitarian assistance.”27 British forces did not encounter the enemy during Operation SNIPE, but did uncover DVLJQL¿FDQWFDYHQHWZRUNWKDWFRQWDLQHGKXJHDUPVFDFKHV7KHVXFFHVVIXOGHVWUXFWLRQRIWKH arms caches marked one of the largest controlled explosions detonated by UK Soldiers since the end of World War II. Once the British concluded SNIPE, Canadian forces became the main effort. The 3d Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Regiment (3-PPCLI), which had participated in Operation ANACONDA, mounted Operations HARPOON and TORII in May. Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Stogran, the 3-PPCLI commander, described Operation TORII as “essentially a sensitive site exploitation into Tora Bora,” and planned primarily on the basis of satellite intelligence.28 The Canadians swept through the area and, as in Paktia province, failed WR¿QGDQ\RUJDQL]HGUHPQDQWVRIWKHHQHP\,QVWHDG6WRJUDQUHFDOOHGWKDWWKH\XQFRYHUHG “quite an extensive bunker structure built along the ridgeline, and we found that there were about 20 [non-Afghan] foreigners who had been killed [during the December 2001 Tora Bora operation] who had been buried in quite a monument down in the village.”29 CJTF Mountain had given the Canadians a broad mandate to examine the Tora Bora area and show the resolve RIWKH&RDOLWLRQWRXVHPLOLWDU\IRUFHLIQHFHVVDU\0DMRU3HWHU'DZHWKHRSHUDWLRQVRI¿FHUIRU 3-PPCLI, described how the battalion commander interpreted that intent by moving the unit IURP.DQGDKDULQWRDIRUWL¿HGSRVLWLRQQHDU7RUD%RUDIURPZKLFKGLVPRXQWHGSDWUROVPRYHG into smaller villages.30 Dawe emphasized that during the patrols, the Canadians not only demonstrated the Coalition’s military strength but distributed food and other humanitarian assistance to win over the support of the population.31 ,QJHQHUDOE\WKHVSULQJRI&RDOLWLRQSODQQLQJDQG&KDGEHFRPHUHDVRQDEO\HI¿- cient processes. Unfortunately, one incident in April revealed what could happen when close coordination between Coalition partners did not occur. On 17 April 2002, 3-PPCLI was con- GXFWLQJDOLYH¿UHWUDLQLQJH[HUFLVHZKHQDQ$PHULFDQ)¿JKWHUERPEHUDSSDUHQWO\PLVWRRN WKH&DQDGLDQVDVHQHP\IRUFHVDQGDFFRUGLQJWRD86$UP\RI¿FHULQYROYHGLQWKHUHVXOWLQJ investigation, dropped a 500-pound bomb, killing four and seriously wounding eight PPCLI Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 53 of 316

Chapter 7 soldiers.32 The incident demonstrated the level of complexity and danger faced by units conducting routine operations in Afghanistan, even after most enemy forces had been eliminated. Not long after the end of Operation TORII, an Australian Special Forces (SF) team met ZLWKUHVLVWDQFHIURPVPDOO7DOLEDQJURXSVQHDUWKHWRZQRI.KRVW$KRXU¿UH¿JKWHQVXHG during which the Australians called in close air support (CAS) from US AC-130 and helicopter gunships. This unexpected engagement spawned Operation CONDOR, an action conducted primarily by British forces in late May. Four companies from TF Jacana moved by helicopter LQWRWKHUHJLRQDQGVZHSWWKURXJK¿QGLQJRQO\ZHDSRQVFDFKHVZKLFKWKH\GHVWUR\HG33 The enemy resistance outside of Khost worried Coalition and AIA leaders. With the loya MLUJDVHWIRUWKH¿UVWZHHNRI-XQH&-7)Mountain believed it had to prevent all Taliban and al-Qaeda attacks to ensure the political process moved forward. To do this, TF Jacana launched Operation BUZZARD in late May that targeted suspected enemy concentrations in Paktia province, especially the area between Khost and the Pakistani border. British leaders directed the Royal Marines to make close contact with the local populace during the operation.34 Major Richard King, a spokesman for TF Jacana, emphasized the shadowy nature of the enemy and the Marines’ need to draw information from the population. King contended that at the time 2SHUDWLRQ%8==$5'ZDVRQJRLQJ³WKHWHUURULVWRUJDQL]DWLRQVKDYHUHDOO\¿OWHUHGEDFNLQWR WKHSRSXODWLRQDQGDUHQRWHDVLO\LGHQWL¿DEOH6RDVZHGRLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGZHSDWUROWR bring the locals on [our] side, but also gain intelligence against the terrorist organizations.”35 To assist this effort, Brigadier General Roger Lane, TF Jacana commander, used a radio program to reassure the local people of Paktia province that the Coalition had no quarrel with Islam, and no long-term intention of maintaining a permanent presence in Afghanistan. During the 4 weeks of Operation BUZZARD, the Royal Marines had strong indications WKDWHQHP\¿JKWHUVZHUHLQWKHUHJLRQ1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHVHIRUFHVGLGQRWPRXQWDWWDFNVRQWKH task force. One Marine told a journalist, “[the enemy] are there, but they are not coming out WR¿JKW´37 On 20 June 2002, while Operation BUZZARD was still underway, Mr. Hoon, the British Secretary of State for Defence, told the Parliament that 45 Commando’s deployment would end when the operation concluded. “The phased drawdown of the force,” said Mr. Hoon, “will begin on 4 July and, subject as always to operational demands, should be complete by late next month.”38 The course charted by the Canadians in the late spring of 2002 paralleled that of TF Jacana. On 21 May, about 2 weeks after completing Operation TORII, Canada’s Minister of National Defence announced that the 3-PPCLI would soon redeploy to Canada.39 However, in late June, the Canadian soldiers launched Operation CHEROKEE SKY, a mission designed to build on the success of the completed loya jirga. The operation took the battalion northeast from their base at the Kandahar Airport into Zabol province to suppress suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in that region.40 The warning order issued to TF Rakkasan tasked 3-PPCLI to conduct operations to deny al-Qaeda and Taliban the use of key facilities to forestall enemy action against the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and its recently reconstituted Afghan National Army (ANA).41 During the weeklong operation, the soldiers of 3-PPCLI conducted sweeps through suspected enemy locations; recovered cached weapon systems; and distributed food, blankets, and school supplies.42 In the midst of Operation MOUNTAIN LION, the AIA convened the loya jirga. On 11 June 2002 approximately 2,000 Afghans, chosen from slates of provincial party candidates

187 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 54 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002

Task Force BowieʊAn Early Interagency Success

In the weeks after the 9/11 attacks, CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks directed Brigadier General Gary L. Harrell to create a joint interagency task force (JIATF) to support Coalition operations in Afghanistan. Harrell, a veteran of several elite Special Operations units, immediately began recruiting individuals from the FBI, NSA, and other agencies in the US Government to serve on the JIATF that eventually became known as Task Force Bowie. Joining these men was a Marine Reserve officer who in civilian life was a detective from the New York City Police department. This group of approximately 50 people organized in Florida and then deployed to Bagram Air Base in November 2001. Housed in a small building on the base, the task force began operations as an intelligence “fusion cell” in which information from a variety of sources including Army Special Forces ODAs could be collected and synthesized into a larger and more precise picture of the enemy. Task Force Bowie also tasked units and organizations with the collection of specific information, much of which concerned high-value targets in al- Qaeda and the Taliban. The JIATF operated at Bagram into the spring of 2002 and departed once CJTF-180 arrived in May. Brigadier General Harrell was proud of the task force’s accomplishments and expressed great faith in the interagency approach to solving difficult problems, especially those that involve collecting and understanding a difficult enemy in an unfamiliar setting. For that reason, Harrell viewed Task Force Bowie as an excellent model for future JIATFs. In fact, the task force was so successful that it continued to work in support of CENTCOM even after Harrell was transferred to a new position. In the summer and fall of 2002, the organization made important contributions to CENTCOM’s planning for operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. Major General Gary L. Harrell, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, 11 October 2007. Matthew Bogdanos, with William Patrick, Thieves of Baghdad (New York, NY: 2005).

RUDSSRLQWHGEDVHGRQPHPEHUVKLSLQVSHFL¿FUHOLJLRXVRUSROLWLFDORUJDQL]DWLRQVDUULYHGLQ Kabul and began deliberations about the future of Afghanistan. Although traditionally par- ticipants in loya jirgas were exclusively male, the Loya Jirga Commission, established by the %RQQ$JUHHPHQWWRRYHUVHHWKHPHHWLQJHQVXUHGWKDWZRPHQZHUHDPRQJWKHWKRX- sands that convened in Kabul. The delegates deliberated for several days before agreeing to the establishment of an ATA with Hamid Karzai as interim president. A week later, Karzai had completed forming his cabinet. While observers noted that the new government featured too many military leaders, especially those from the Northern Alliance, the loya jirga had served the purpose set at Bonn to put Afghanistan on the path toward a democratic future. The conclusion of Operation CHEROKEE SKY in early July 2002 signaled the end of Operation MOUNTAIN LION. On 13 July the Coalition claimed that the lengthy series of VPDOOHURSHUDWLRQVKDGDWWDLQHGLWVSULPDU\REMHFWLYHVRIHQJDJLQJLGHQWL¿HGHQHP\UHPQDQW forces and creating a secure environment in which the loya jirga could convene.43 For General +DJHQEHFN2SHUDWLRQ02817$,1/,21UHSUHVHQWHG³WKH¿UVWUHDOHIIRUWLI\RXZLOOWRJR out and show a presence across the country . . . to let people know that we could go anywhere in

188 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 55 of 316

Chapter 7 the country with the blink of an eye.”44 Certainly, the success of the loya jirga, the establishment of the ISAF, and CJTF Mountain’s ability to seize the military initiative suggested strongly that the Coalition’s vision for a new Afghanistan was becoming a reality. To reinforce the efforts PDGH LQ WKH ¿UVW PRQWKV RI DW WKH HQG RI 0D\ WKH 86 PLOLWDU\ PDGH D VLJQL¿FDQW change in its command structure. That change, the arrival of a new CJTF, would change the complexion of the campaign yet again. The Creation of Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180) When the 10th Mountain Division headquarters deployed to Afghanistan in late 2001, its role was to serve as the forward headquarters for Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), the headquarters belonging to CENTCOM that oversaw all Coalition ground force operations throughout the combatant command’s area of responsibility (AOR). The 10th Mountain Division’s headquarters, in turn, would command all land forces inside Afghanistan. Major General Hagenbeck, the 10th Mountain Division’s commanding general, recalled that the entire process of choosing his headquarters for CFLCC (Forward) had been improvised and thus provided little time for his staff to prepare. Worse was that in the fall of 2001, most of the division’s troop units and staff were preparing for deployment to the Balkans and other peacekeeping missions. As a result, Hagenbeck had fewer than 200 Soldiers serving on his staff when the order for deployment to the Karshi- Khanabad (K2) Air Base arrived, far less than the normal headquarters staff of a US Army division.45 When Hagenbeck’s headquarters became CJTF Mountain in early 2002, taking on the additional burdens of C2 for all US forces and for units belonging to Coalition partners, the challenge became even greater. Lieutenant General Paul T. Mikolashek, who commanded CFLCC after 9/11, expressed regret that a way had not been found “to get our headquarters LQ>HDUOLHU@UDWKHUWKDQ>KDYH@WKHWK0RXQWDLQ'LYLVLRQGRLW$OWKRXJKWKH\GLG¿QH´ Mikolashek felt that in retrospect it would have been better to have a more robust CFLCC headquarters element in the theater, especially for the immense logistical and transportation tasks entailed in operating in central Asia.47 2WKHU GLI¿FXOWLHV VXUURXQGLQJ WKH 2() FRPPDQG VWUXFWXUH HPHUJHG LQ HDUO\ ,Q February, as the situation in the Shahi Kowt Valley pushed CFLCC (Forward) to consider a large-scale operation, Hagenbeck briefed the CENTCOM commander on his tentative plan for ANACONDA and suggested that CFLCC (Forward) be designated a combined and joint headquarters to oversee the operation. General Franks agreed, but ordered Hagenbeck to avoid adopting the title of CJTF Afghanistan as the designation of this new command. As General Hagenbeck recalled the conversation, Franks believed the word “Afghanistan” suggested that the new CJTF would be responsible for Coalition strategy and political affairs inside Afghanistan. Instead, according to Hagenbeck, Franks wanted the new CJTF to be focused on “the tactical OHYHORIWKH¿JKWDQGWKHRSHUDWLRQDOOHYHO´48 The CENTCOM commander expressly directed that all matters related to strategy and politics be reserved for his own headquarters. Although Hagenbeck, his staff, and the subordinate commanders of CJTF Mountain com- plied fully with General Franks’ guidance, realities after ANACONDA engendered some doubts about the proper Coalition command structure in Afghanistan. By April 2002 the changing circumstances suggested that political and strategic imperatives were precisely those that needed the most attention. While no senior military leaders were suggesting that tactical-level

189 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 56 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002 operations had become irrelevant, many had come to believe that the campaign needed to move into the next phase, a transition that entailed civil-military operations (CMO) at many levels as well as careful political and diplomatic assistance to the new Afghan Government. The rapidly changing situation sparked animated discussion throughout the chain of command. The most important aspects of the discourse, Hagenbeck recalled, consisted essentially RIWZRSDUWV)UDQNV¿UVWHPSKDVL]HGWKDWWKH&RDOLWLRQ³QHHGHGVRPHERG\RQWKHJURXQGWKDW could handle the political aspects and it took somebody with more than a two-star rank . . . somebody who had at least the equivalent [three-star] rank of the component commanders who reported to General Franks.”49 The CENTCOM commander essentially wanted a senior general RI¿FHULQ$IJKDQLVWDQZKRVHWDOHQWVDOORZHGKLPWRIRFXVRQVWUDWHJLFDQGGLSORPDWLFPDWWHUV DORQJVLGH$IJKDQRI¿FLDOV&RDOLWLRQFRXQWHUSDUWVDQGGLSORPDWVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH JRYHUQPHQWV3UHVXPDEO\DQRI¿FHUZLWKWKHUDQNRIOLHXWHQDQWJHQHUDOHTXLYDOHQWRUKLJKHU would have greater experience with Coalition partners, the UN, other international organizations (IOs), and NGOs. The second important dimension of this discussion concerned the proper size RIWKHKHDGTXDUWHUV%HFDXVHLWZDVSRVVLEOHWRGRRQO\VRPXFKZLWKSHRSOH²WKHVL]HRI the 10th Mountain Division staff when it deployed to K2—General Hagenbeck assumed that a corps headquarters, commanded by a lieutenant general, would serve as a “much more robust headquarters to do things larger than tactical operations.”50 Long before Franks began discussing these matters with Hagenbeck, the CENTCOM commander had been laying the foundation for the creation of a more robust headquarters in Afghanistan. In fact, as early as February 2002 Franks asked the commander of the US Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General Dan K. McNeill, to travel to Afghanistan and meet with Hagenbeck, Ryan Crocker—the ambassador to the Karzai government and the future ambassador to Iraq, and other Coalition leaders to gain an understanding of the situation on the ground.51 McNeill recalled that on his arrival, Crocker and others asked when his corps headquarters was deploying to Afghanistan, a question that surprised him because no formal decision had been made by Franks or anyone else in the chain of command. However, when McNeill left Kabul, just as Operation ANACONDA began, he did so with the understanding that he would be returning soon. McNeill also traveled to Washington, DC, that spring to get guidance from Department RI'HIHQVH '2' RI¿FLDOVDQGVHQLRU$UP\OHDGHUV7KH;9,,,$LUERUQH&RUSVFRPPDQGHU recalled that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers emphasized the Coalition’s need to avoid looking and acting like an occupying army.52 According to McNeill, General John Keane, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, told him, “Don’t you do anything that looks like permanence. We are in and out of there in a hurry.”53 In this way, the military leadership in the Pentagon reinforced the importance of the force cap and the imperative of preventing the Coalition from becoming enmeshed in a long campaign. The problem that lay in front of McNeill was how to attain Coalition military objectives in Afghanistan with a limited force and a limited amount of time. 0F1HLOOUHFDOOHGWKDWZKLOHVHQLRUPLOLWDU\DQGFLYLOLDQRI¿FLDOVQHYHUJDYHKLPDFDUHIXOO\ crafted mission statement, it was clear they wanted the Coalition forces to do two things: continue operations to kill or capture the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces that might still reside in Afghanistan and supervise the creation of Afghan security forces.54 The second requirement was

190 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 57 of 316

Chapter 7 unexpected and had been developed in early 2002 as DOD and CENTCOM became involved LQ GLVFXVVLRQV ZLWK WKH .DU]DL JRYHUQPHQW DERXW WKH ¿HOGLQJ RI D QHZ$IJKDQ$UP\ WKDW would defend the country from al-Qaeda and Taliban once the Coalition departed.55 Ultimately, Rumsfeld approved a CENTCOM proposal to spend approximately $4 million to train and equip a new army. At the same time that Lieutenant General McNeill received this guidance, senior leaders in the Pentagon had been warning against Coalition forces becoming involved in “nation building,” a term that suggested reconstruction and governance projects that would prevent a quick exit from Afghanistan. Despite the concerns about “mission creep,” it was clear that with the adoption of the mission to train Afghan military forces, the Coalition’s role in the country was beginning to expand. Again, the conundrum facing McNeill, and the commanders who followed, would be how to attain their objectives while maintaining the relatively small Coalition presence in Afghanistan. 7KH'2'PDGHWKH¿QDOGHFLVLRQWRGHSOR\WKH;9,,,$LUERUQH&RUSVKHDGTXDUWHUVLQ mid-March 2002. However, for the corps headquarters to oversee the next step in the campaign, it would have to transform into a CJTF that could synchronize the operations of US Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force units and the actions of Coalition forces. During March and $SULOVWDIIRI¿FHUVLQWKHFRUSVKHDGTXDUWHUVFRQVLGHUHGWKHYDULRXVRSWLRQVIRUWUDQVLWLRQLQJWR a CJTF. Much of the discussion revolved around the proper sizing of the staff that would form the core of the CJTF headquarters.57 The starting point was the creation of a Joint Manning Document (JMD). Brigadier General Stanley McChrystal, the XVIII Airborne Corps Chief of Staff, recalled that the corps headquarters standing operating procedure (SOP) directed the staff to expand to approximately 800 people when it transitioned to a joint task force (JTF).58 The addition of representatives from the military forces of Coalition nations, required to transform the JTF into a CJTF, would add still more people to the staff. At this point in the planning process, geopolitical realities began to have a critical effect on the size of the CJTF headquarters. First, there was the Coalition’s force cap to ensure that its PLOLWDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQVFUHDWHGRQO\DOLJKWIRRWSULQWLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ1RVHQLRURI¿FLDOLQWKH86 *RYHUQPHQWDSSHDUVWRKDYHPDQGDWHGDVSHFL¿FIRUFHOHYHOWR&RDOLWLRQOHDGHUV+RZHYHULQ WKHODWHZLQWHUDQGVSULQJRISULPDU\VWDIIRI¿FHUVLQ;9,,,$LUERUQH&RUSVXQGHUVWRRG that the informal cap was 7,000 US servicemen and women.59 Colonel Richard D. MeGahan, ZKRVHUYHGDVWKH3HUVRQQHO2I¿FHU * IRUWKH;9,,,$LUERUQH&RUSVDQGWKHQKHOGWKHVDPH position when the corps’ staff deployed in 2002 as part of the new CJTF, asserted that this number drove his planning for OEF. MeGahan recalled that CENTCOM acted as if this was an RI¿FLDOFDS\HWKHQHYHUIRXQGDQ\H[SOLFLWJXLGDQFHIURPWKH3HQWDJRQRUDQ\RWKHUDXWKRULW\ concerning a nonnegotiable limit on US forces in Afghanistan. Formal or informal, this cap directly affected the capacity of the new CJTF. Brigadier *HQHUDO0F&KU\VWDOQRWHGFRQFHUQVDERXWWKHRYHUDOOVL]HRIWKHVWDIIKHDYLO\LQÀXHQFHGWKH shaping of the CJTF structure. He recalled, “As we started to build, we culled [the 800 number] EDFNGRZQVLJQL¿FDQWO\EXWWKHUHFDPHJUHDWSUHVVXUHZLWKLQVWUXFWLRQVWRFXOOWKDWGRZQHYHQ PRUH6RZHFXOOHGEDFNGRZQDVPXFKDVZHFRXOGHQGLQJXSZLWKWKHQXPEHURIRQ the Joint Manning Document.” Thus, the Corps headquarters faced its impending deployment staffed to a level that amounted to less than half the authorizations mandated by its SOP for transitioning to a CJTF.

191 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 58 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002

7KH PDQGDWHG OHYHO RI VWDII SHUVRQQHO DSSOLHG WR WKH &-7) KHDGTXDUWHUV EXW DV McChrystal noted, was not inclusive: “There were requirements for some communications, intelligence, and a few other support [personnel] that were absolutely required for the head- TXDUWHUVEXWQRWUHÀHFWHGRQWKH-0'DWUHPHQGRXVDPRXQWRIWLPHDQGHIIRUWZDVVSHQW on trying to get that down to size.” The fact that few if any people inside XVIII Airborne &RUSVKHDGTXDUWHUVSRVVHVVHGDQ\¿UVWKDQGNQRZOHGJHRI$IJKDQLVWDQGLGQRWPDNHPDWWHUV DQ\HDVLHU.H\OHDGHUVLQWKHKHDGTXDUWHUVZHUHWU\LQJWRLGHQWLI\PLQLPDODFFHSWDEOHVWDI¿QJ levels within the theater of operations while concurrently trying to conceptualize what that theater looked like. General McChrystal asserted that it was “not an easy task to cut [the staff size to] less than half when we haven’t been in theater yet; you don’t know what you need and what you don’t need. So, you are trying to extrapolate what you think the situation will be.” Another major concern shaping the structure of the new CJTF was the possibility that the XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate units would become involved in operations elsewhere in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Lieutenant General McNeill recalled that during the planning process, General Shinseki and General Keane directed him to leave half of his corps headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in case the Army had to use corps’ units like the 82d Airborne Division to react to terrorist strikes or mount other campaigns that loomed on the horizon.0F1HLOOEHOLHYHGWKDWERWKVHQLRURI¿FHUVDWWKDWWLPHVXVSHFWHGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV was moving closer to war in Iraq and wanted to retain the capabilities of the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters for that contingency. As deployment of the newly-christened CJTF-180 headquarters began in May 2002, &(17&20GHVFULEHGWKHQHZFRPPDQGDVFUHDWLQJ³DGGLWLRQDOIRFXVDQGHI¿FLHQF\WRWKH $IJKDQLVWDQPLVVLRQ´E\SURYLGLQJ³DVLQJOHVHQLRURI¿FHUZKRZLOOEHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKH majority of forces and activity” in the country.%\WKDWGDWHWKHVWDIIRIWKH&-7)KDG¿QDO- ized their equivalent of a campaign plan. CJTF-180’s plan and guidance from CENTCOM emphasized that Coalition forces were still in Phase III—Decisive Combat Operations—of the overall OEF plan initiated in October 2001 by General Franks. The CJTF-180 leadership recognized that fact in its mission statement that described the nature of the campaign as full spectrum operations that prioritized security operations focused on destroying remaining al- Qaeda and Taliban forces and other elements hostile to the ATA. However, the CJTF-180 SODQDOVRGLUHFWHGRSHUDWLRQVWKDW¿WPRUHFRPIRUWDEO\ZLWKLQ3KDVH,9RIWKHRULJLQDO2() plan, which aimed at supporting the new Afghan Government after the toppling of the Taliban. In McNeill’s campaign, Coalition forces would conduct operations in support of the Afghan Army, the Karzai government, and the Afghan population. 7RJLYHIXUWKHUJXLGDQFHWRLWVVXERUGLQDWHXQLWVWKH&-7)SODQXVHG¿YHOLQHVRIHIIRUW WRGH¿QHKRZ&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVZRXOGDFKLHYHLWVPLVVLRQ$OLQHRIHIIRUWOLNHDOLQHRIRSHUD- tion, is a doctrinal term used by campaign planners to describe a general category of opera- WLRQVWKDWFROOHFWLYHO\UHVXOWLQDVSHFL¿FREMHFWLYHDQGHQGVWDWH&-7)¶VOLQHVRIHIIRUW were tactical combat operations, establishment and training of the ANA, support to the ISAF, CMO, and information operations. The last line of effort, information operations, described the Coalition’s use of information to build support for the Coalition and the ATA while undermin- ing the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Ultimately, McNeill and his staff hoped that operations along WKHVHOLQHVRIHIIRUWZRXOGUHVXOWLQWKHDWWDLQPHQWRIDZHOOGH¿QHGHQGVWDWH²WKHHPHUJHQFH of an Afghanistan that was stable politically and militarily and would no longer serve as a

192 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 59 of 316

Chapter 7 potential haven for terrorist groups that had the ability to strike globally. The challenge once McNeill and his headquarters arrived in Afghanistan was to quickly gain an understanding of the terrain, the enemy, and the overall political situation so they could translate their campaign plan into actual operations. Civil-Military Operations: Fall 2001–Spring 2002 'XULQJWKH¿UVWPRQWKVRIWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VSUHVHQFHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ, combat missions— often referred to as offensive operations—had remained the focus of the overall effort. As CJTF-180 began arriving in Afghanistan in May 2002, the situation was changing and by PLGVXPPHU &02 KDG WDNHQ RQ DQ LQFUHDVLQJ VLJQL¿FDQFH 86 MRLQW PLOLWDU\ GRFWULQH LQ GH¿QHG &02 DV WKRVH DFWLYLWLHV ³WKDW HVWDEOLVK PDLQWDLQ LQÀXHQFH RU H[SORLW UHOD- tions between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives.” This EURDGGH¿QLWLRQDSSHDUHGWRDOORZ&RDOLWLRQFRPPDQGHUVDQRSHQDSSURDFKWR&02ZLWKRXW FRPPLWWLQJWKHLUOLPLWHGDVVHWVWRDWUXH³QDWLRQEXLOGLQJ´HIIRUWWKDW$PHULFDQVHQLRURI¿FLDOV wanted to avoid. To conduct CMO in previous campaigns and contingency operations, the US Army has relied on its engineer, medical, logistical, and civil affairs (CA) units. These units were the assets that are trained, equipped, and staffed to execute reconstruction, humanitarian and medical assistance, and governance operations. Not surprisingly, these types of units would become critical to the effort in Afghanistan. However, Coalition commanders sought a novel approach to controlling CMO by establishing a somewhat unusual command structure. This command, which served as the initial headquarters for US CMO in Afghanistan, was known as the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). CFLCC Commander Lieutenant General Mikolashek created the CJCMOTF in late 2001 around elements of the 377th Theater Support Command, the 122d Rear Operations Center (ROC), and the 352d CA Command. In October of that year, once CENTCOM realized that the campaign in Afghanistan would involve humanitarian assistance operations, Mikolashek had contacted Brigadier General David E. Kratzer, deputy commander of the 377th Theater Support Command. Kratzer recalled that Mikolashek informed him that he was to be brought back on Active Duty as commander of the CJCMOTF. His response was, “Great, what is that?” Mikolashek explained what the acronym represented and that the command was designed to be a joint-level headquarters. Although a logistician with no formal experience in CA, Kratzer felt that Mikolashek had provided him with the latitude and all the tools necessary for success. In fact, Kratzer thought that his lack of connections to the CA branch allowed him to approach WKHQHZFRPPDQGZLWKDIUHVKSHUVSHFWLYHDQGZDVXOWLPDWHO\DEHQH¿W70 0LNRODVKHN¶VSHUVRQDOVHOHFWLRQRI.UDW]HUWRFRPPDQG&-&027)UHÀHFWHGDVWURQJO\ KHOGYLHZZLWKLQ&(17&20WKDWWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VLPSRUWDQFHZDUUDQWHGDJHQHUDORI¿FHU as commander. CFLCC formed the core of the CJCMOTF from 50 Soldiers assigned to the 122d Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC), a Georgia Army National Guard unit that had already been activated, and by early November 2001 occupied trailers co-located with CFLCC headquarters in Atlanta. After a 4-day planning session, the command’s advance party that included Kratzer and his deputy departed for Afghanistan.

193 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 60 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002

CENTCOM and CFLCC planners had designed the CJCMOTF to operate with a staff of 50 based on assumptions of how CMO would be conducted in OEF. Simply put, Kratzer’s command would coordinate the key agents in the distribution process—the NGOs. A 2002 study conducted by the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) labeled this approach as “wholesale aid distribution” and described it more fully by emphasizing the military’s role as one player in a system that made use of civilian networks whenever possible and enabled those networks by providing key assistance, especially transportation assistance. In this method, military headquarters ceased coordination once security was established in the area and the civilian networks were fully capable of delivering aid across the country.71 :KLOHWKHUHZHUHEHQH¿WVWRWKLVDSSURDFKWKHUHZHUHVHULRXVTXHVWLRQVLQODWHDERXW its feasibility in war-torn Afghanistan. The key advantages were obvious: it required relatively few soldiers and equipment and thus would help prevent Coalition forces from becoming enmeshed too deeply in broad reconstruction efforts. Still, the deployment of the CJCMOTF worried senior Coalition leaders about the campaign veering off course. Kratzer recalled that LQ*HQHUDO)UDQNV³WROGPHGLUHFWO\ZLWKKLV¿QJHULQP\IDFHWKDW,ZRXOGQRWJHW involved in nation building.”72 The disappearance of NGOs during the Taliban era and the violence and instability that accompanied the arrival of Coalition forces in October 2001 suggested “wholesale aid distribution” was not viable in Afghanistan. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, however, some NGOs involved in aid distribution returned to the country and still more returned in early 2002 as ISAF and Coalition forces secured larger portions of the Afghan countryside. 7KHRSHUDWLRQVRIWKHWK&$%DWWDOLRQ %1 RIIHUDQH[FHOOHQWZLQGRZLQWRWKHZD\V WKDWHDUO\&RDOLWLRQ&02ZRUNHGDQGKRZLW¿WLQWRWKHEURDGHU³ZKROHVDOHDLG´DSSURDFK 6ROGLHUVIURPWKLVXQLWDUULYHGLQ$IJKDQLVWDQLQ2FWREHUDQGZHUHWKH¿UVWFLYLOPLOLWDU\ affairs specialists to reach the theater.737KHRULJLQDOPLVVLRQRIWKHWK&$%1ZDVWRVHUYH as a coordination agency for projects planned by NGOs and to ensure that humanitarian assistance operations were focused on secure regions of the country. In earlier deployments, such as the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, the Army had established similar agencies called Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) to coordinate aid efforts while gaining credibility with NGOs and UN agencies. These organizations, though, sometimes spurned contact with any entity related to military organizations because they regarded CMOCs and other agencies DVSDUWRIDODUJHUDWWHPSWWRXVHKXPDQLWDULDQDLGIRUVSHFL¿FQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV,QGHIHUHQFHWR 1*2DQG81VHQVLWLYLWLHVRYHUWKLVLVVXHLQODWHWKHWK&$%1FUHDWHGWKHH[SHGLHQWO\ named Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) that, like the CMOCs, were supposed to focus on coordination and assistance rather than making decisions about the nature of the aid and its recipients.74%\WKHIDOORIRIWKHVHSHUVRQWHDPVZRXOGEHHVWDEOLVKHGQHDU large cities like Kandahar and Herat as well as smaller towns like Khost. Because of the nature of the campaign in Afghanistan, the CHLCs could not always function simply as CMOCs. In some cases, rather than coordinating aid delivery, the CHLCs became agencies that directly provided assistance on the ground, especially in emergencies and in regions that were not secure. Major Luther Webster, who supervised CHLC operations in early 2002, explained that the CHLCs were sent to key areas where Coalition leaders believed CMO could make a difference in winning local support. They were combined with Army SF Operational Detachment–Alpha (ODA) teams and divided the mission into two parts. According

194 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 61 of 316

Chapter 7 to Webster, the CHLCs “would do the Civil Affairs part. The ODA would do the more combat- type operations. It was determined that it was a win/win situation for both. We’d be dealing with the local leaders, the local ministers, the local warlords, while they were focused more on combat operations.”75 For the Coalition command that in 2001 and 2002 was faced with a dearth of troops and other resources, the CHLCs provided a means of extending the reach of the military campaign into regions far from Kabul and Kandahar. That reach often took the shape of “quick impact projects” that the small cells could plan and deliver to alleviate the negative affects of combat operations on a local area, build credibility with local populations, and broaden support among those people for the new Afghan Government. The CHLC concept proved so successful that it inspired the creation of experimental Joint Regional Teams, which would later evolve into Provincial Reconstruction Teams that would be subsequently deployed throughout Afghanistan. The Coalition’s decision to provide direct delivery of humanitarian assistance and quick action projects also signaled a move away from the partnership with NGOs and IOs.

Civil-Military Operations: Obstacles and Achievements $VHDUO\DV1RYHPEHUWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIUHVRXUFHVEHFDPHDVLJQL¿FDQWREVWDFOHWR conducting CMO. Even before CJCMOTF deployed into theater, Brigadier General Kratzer KDGHVWDEOLVKHGFRQWDFWZLWKOHDGHUVLQWKHWK&$%1ZKRWROGKLPWKDWDGHTXDWHIXQGVKDG become a critical problem. Kratzer recalled, “I had talked to them before we deployed—said we are coming. What do you need? They said we need vehicles and we need money. If you’re not bringing cash, we’ll love to see you, but you’re not going to help us.”77 The CA BN was so short of funds that their quarters in Kabul was a house rented by the British Government’s Department for International Development (DFID), an agency much like the US Agency for International Development (USAID).78 For the new CJCMOTF commander, the next 4 months were dominated by efforts to obtain funds and other resources required for accomplishing his mission. When the CJCMOTF advance party arrived at Bagram Air Base on Christmas Eve 2001, they brought with them a suitcase containing a million dollars in US currency to rent houses, lease vehicles, and conduct other business. The CJCMOTF commander soon used the suitcase full of American currency to good effect by doing everything necessary to properly equip and house his headquarters and outlying civil-military nodes, including the CHLCs. This currency, nevertheless, could not be used to fund the many projects the CHLCs were in the midst of planning. The core of the funding challenge was more than just a matter of having enough dollars WR PHHW &-&027)¶V H[SHQVHV ,W ZDV PDLQO\ D TXHVWLRQ RI ÀH[LELOLW\ LQ XVLQJ HVWDEOLVKHG funds for projects in Afghanistan, and determining who could authorize these expenditures. The 2002 PKSOI study judged the funding process used in support of CMO in this early stage of OEF “restrictive and bureaucratic.”79 Because the necessity for the OEF deployment came DVDVXUSULVHDIWHUWKH&RDOLWLRQKDGQRW\HWFUHDWHGÀH[LEOHIXQGLQJSURFHGXUHV0RVWRI the money available to CJCMOTF fell under the category of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds. Theoretically, this money was a tool that could be used in support of quick impact humanitarian aid projects generated by CHLCs. Prior to Kratzer’s arrival in the theater of operations, approval authority for dispensing these funds remained at DOD level. “The approval process,” the PKSOI study asserted, “became bureaucratic, and the

195 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 62 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002

DYDLODELOLW\RIFRQWUDFWLQJRI¿FHUVDQGWUDQVSRUWDWLRQWRJHWFRQWUDFWLQJRI¿FHUVWRNH\DUHDV was a restraint.”80 The situation cried out for a decentralized approval authority that could GLVWULEXWH2+'$&$IXQGVWRFRYHUWKHTXLFNLPSDFWSURMHFWVLGHQWL¿HGE\WKH&+/&V Obtaining that authority was uppermost on Kratzer’s priority list. “So here I am,” he recalled, “with a million dollars to sustain myself and not a penny to do the mission . . . I was on the border of . . . being insubordinate and at one point sent a message saying either give me the money or send me home. . . .We raised a lot of interest.”81 Forcible arguments and appeals ZLWKFRPPDQGHUVDQG¿QDQFLDOPDQDJHUVWKURXJKRXWWKHFKDLQRIFRPPDQGHYHQWXDOO\ERUH fruit. Before his departure from Afghanistan in April 2002, Kratzer arranged for his command to have approval authority to sign off on CJCMOTF projects. In retrospect, he argued that this decentralization of authority for disbursing of funding was the linchpin in the success attained by the CHLCs and should become the standard practice for future US Army operations.82 %\0D\RQWKHHYHRIWKHDUULYDORI&-7)&-&027)KDGXVHGPLOOLRQ to support a diverse set of projects that included the refurbishment of roads, bridges, schools, and medical facilities.83 The early months of the campaign also focused on wells and irrigation, two types of projects that were critical in the dry climate of Afghanistan. One large-scale irrigation effort in this period that attempted to help the Afghans recover from decades of war and instability was the Herat Desilting project. Begun in March 2002, the project sought to dredge DQG¿[WKHPDMRULUULJDWLRQFDQDOVDURXQG+HUDWWKDWKDGIDOOHQLQWRGLVXVHEHFDXVHRIQHJOHFW during the Taliban period. Major Webster, who was involved in planning the project, described the effect of the problem on agricultural conditions in the area: “Over the Taliban years . . . they MXVW>VLOWHG@XSDQGWKHZDWHUZDVQ¶WÀRZLQJ)DUPVZHUHQ¶WEHLQJLUULJDWHG%DVLFDOO\QRWKLQJ was growing because you couldn’t get water to it.”84 Once the CJCMOTF obtained funding, the project took off, ultimately employing 40,000 people who, using mostly hand tools, constructed approximately 300 miles of trenches and canals to reclaim 400 hectares of arable land.85 In the spring of 2002, the CHLC’s successful practices began to generate friction between the CJCMOTF and nonmilitary humanitarian assistance providers. In part, these challenges surfaced because of rapid diplomatic progress made during the period in which Operation ANACONDA occurred. On 28 March 2002 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1401 that established a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The new mission was to create an administrative framework that would bring order to the humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. The UNAMA charter altered the improvised system that had been put in place after OEF began in October 2001. The Security Council resolution enjoined prospective donor agencies to provide humanitarian assistance directly wherever the need surfaced, but also encouraged them to work “through the Afghan Interim Administration and its successors” in providing recovery and reconstruction assistance. A study conducted by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) declared this proposed system of working through the AIA a “radical departure from standard international aid practice in complex emergencies” in its involvement of a particular regime, one whose sovereignty was, in some opinions, dependent on a foreign military force.87 Despite the concerns, UNAMA developed a regional model for coordinating foreign aid GHOLYHU\WKURXJKRXW$IJKDQLVWDQ7KH$,$IRULWVSDUWE\$SULOKDGGUDIWHGDFRGL¿HG “National Development Framework,” which held that Afghanistan’s “developmental agenda

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 63 of 316

Chapter 7 must be owned domestically, and the recipient country must be in the driver’s seat.”88 The AIA also established its own Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) whose charter was to work with UN agencies and NGOs to create programs that would address the new Afghan Government’s needs and would be directed toward shoring up that government as well as fostering Afghan civil society.89 Some in the aid community chafed at the new environment emerging that spring simply because the new organizations and guidelines seemed confusing and redundant.90 When AREU conducted its study in the April–May timeframe, several organizations existed side- by-side in the Afghan theater of operations, all perceiving aid coordination as fundamental to their respective charters. In addition to UNAMA and the AIA’s AACA, a British Civil Military Cooperation (CMIC) element was on the ground in Kabul supervising aid connected with the ISAF deployment. CJCMOTF’s arrival in theater, according to the AREU study, only “added to the crush of . . . nongovernment organizations (NGOs), donors, and private sector organizations.”91 Much of this seemed heavy-handed to a largely civilian aid community long accus- tomed to operating independently. Some aid providers focused on the CJCMOTF, viewing it as less humanitarian assistance WKDQ³DLGLQGXFHGSDFL¿FDWLRQ´7KHQRWLRQWKDWWKH&RDOLWLRQDQG,6$)KDGLQYDGHGKXPDQL- tarian space became commonplace in the NGO community. The spread of CHLCs’ across the Afghan countryside created the appearance, in some minds, of a competition in which poorly- resourced NGOs that lacked the security capacity to venture into unsecured remote areas were destined to lose. Once Brigadier General Kratzer’s efforts overcame the funding obstacles, the CHLCs arguably became the most effective purveyors of humanitarian assistance and quick impact aid projects in Afghanistan. The built-in force protection gained by co-locating CHLCs with SF operational detachments addressed personal safety issues in ways no NGOs could match. Some of the Soldiers serving on the CHLCs believed that the Afghans recognized the Coalition’s capacity to deliver humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. According to Major Webster, “The CHLCs were immediately respected; [they] immediately established rapport with the local leaders, and immediately saw projects getting done.”92 Webster attributed the &+/&VXFFHVVVSHFL¿FDOO\WRWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIIXQGVDQGWKHDELOLW\WRRSHUDWHLQWKHSURYLQFHV where the need was greatest but the security tenuous.93 The command structure that allowed for this deployment of the CHLCs hardly allayed NGO misgivings about CMO. As noted earlier in this chapter, previous US peacekeeping operations in places such as the Balkans had conditioned NGOs to expect access to CMOCs that included workspace, communications nodes, and a staff that could provide critical information. The CMOC served the purpose of coordinating NGO efforts and ensuring that security operations GLGQRWFRPHLQWRFRQÀLFWZLWKWKH1*2SURMHFWV&-&027)KDGIROORZHGSUHFHGHQWDQGFUH- ated two CMOCs in Afghanistan, CMOC North and CMOC South, but they had little control in coordinating the actions of the CHLCs other than to provide logistical support. The PKSOI study explained the situation, contending, “When civil affairs [cells] deployed to Afghanistan, this function [CMOC] lapsed. . . . CHLCs in their areas coordinated with the NGOs in support of their high-impact projects, but did not perform traditional CMOC functions” associated with previous peacekeeping campaigns.947KLVVWDWHRIDIIDLUVOHIWWKH1*2VGLVVDWLV¿HG )ULFWLRQEHWZHHQ&-&027)DQG1*2VUHDFKHGDSHDNGXULQJWKH¿UVWZHHNRI$SULO over a CJCMOTF policy that allowed CHLC Soldiers in remote areas to wear civilian clothes

197 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 64 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002 as a force protection measure. Lieutenant General Mikolashek, the CFLCC commander, had concurred with this decision and in Brigadier General Kratzer’s opinion, the policy had made a major impact, contending, “[It] absolutely contributed to our early success that we were allowed to operate in civilian clothes. It allowed our teams to live in communities, and come and go in a very quiet way, and not [to] either raise interest or to cause any kind of belliger- ence.”95 For the CJCMOTF commander, the policy was aimed equally at safeguarding his troops and creating rapport with local Afghans. 0DQ\DLGZRUNHUVYLHZHGWKHSROLF\GLIIHUHQWO\1*2RI¿FLDOVEHOLHYHGWKDWHQHP\IRUFHV who opposed the Coalition would discover that US Soldiers were dressing in civilian clothes and consider all aid workers, civilian and military, as targets.According to one report, NGO representatives sent a letter to US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice complaining that Soldiers conducting CMO were often wearing civilian clothes when they worked on their projects in the provinces.97 But Brigadier General Kratzer was not convinced that the NGO concerns had a great deal of merit. In his view, the allegations that CHLCs were attempting to mimic the appearance of NGOs was unfounded.98 Although the controversy garnered com- PDQGDWWHQWLRQDWWKHKLJKHVWOHYHOV&RDOLWLRQOHDGHUVGHIXVHGWKHFRQÀLFWWKURXJKFRPSUR- mise. In late April 2002 the Center for Defense Information reported that new American policy dictated that US troops providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan while wearing civilian clothes were to wear items of apparel that would differentiate them from civilian aid workers.99 Despite this agreement, friction between aid organizations and the Coalition persisted. Higher-level leaders in NGOs and UNAMA continued to distance themselves from OEF com- PDQGHUVZHOOLQWRWKHVSULQJRI7KHLQDELOLW\RI81$0$RI¿FLDOVWR¿QGWLPHWRPHHW personally with the CJCMOTF commander was perhaps the most apparent sign of this friction. The relationship changed when CJTF-180 arrived in May 2002. That month, Lieutenant General McNeill and Brigadier General Kratzer succeeded in gaining an audience with a senior 81$0$RI¿FLDO7KHPHHWLQJVLJQDOHGWKHZLOOLQJQHVVRI81RI¿FLDOVWREHJLQEXLOGLQJDPRUH constructive relationship and, for the remainder of 2002, the connections between UNAMA, the NGOs, and Coalition forces improved. A New Government and a New Army After arriving in Afghanistan in late 2001, Brigadier General Kratzer’s duties quickly expanded. Not only did he command the CJCMOTF, but by February 2002 also took the title RI&KLHIRIWKH2I¿FHRI0LOLWDU\&RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ 20&$ ,QHDUO\WKLVRI¿FH represented the main thrust of the Coalition’s effort to assist the new Karzai government. For .UDW]HUWKHGXDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVPHDQWWKDWKHZRXOGKDYHWRUHO\RQWKHWDOHQWVRIRWKHURI¿- cers to lead the daily operations of the OMC-A. Assisting him with these governance operations was Colonel Mike Weimer, who arrived at the American Embassy in Kabul in February 2002 to serve as Kratzer’s deputy in OMC-A.100 In the broadest sense, anything related to fostering the legitimacy and authority of the AIA or its successors was part of the Coalition’s governance effort. To the extent that CJCMOTF was a conduit for delivering humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people, for example, or facilitating the completion of short-term reconstruction projects, it became part of this effort by making the Karzai regime appear more effective to its constituents. However, OMC-A, as

198 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 65 of 316

Chapter 7 part of the American Ambassador’s country team, was the most active proponent of gover- QDQFHRSHUDWLRQVLQ7KHRI¿FH¶VJRDOZDVWRHVWDEOLVKZRUNLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKNH\ individuals within Afghanistan’s nascent Ministry of Defense to accomplish overall objectives established by the Bonn Agreement. Colonel Weimer stated that the mission of OMC-A “pre- GRPLQDWHO\LVWREHWKHPLOLWDU\OLDLVRQIRUWKH>$PHULFDQ@$PEDVVDGRUDQGWKDWOLDLVRQRI¿- cer goes over to the host country to liaise with, in this case, the Minister of Defense, General Delawar, and the Afghan National Army, or at least the beginnings of what I would call the Afghan Ministry of Defense.”101 All of this activity occurred within the greater context of the international effort to reestablish Afghanistan’s military, police, and judicial organizations. In early 2002 the United States joined Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom in an agreement on what was called Security Sector Reform (SSR). Germany took the lead in reform of Afghan police forces and created a comprehensive 5-year training program focused on tactics, criminal and narcotics LQYHVWLJDWLRQVWUDI¿FFRQWURODQG,VODPLFODZ102 The Germans designed their program to pro- GXFHFRPSHWHQWZHOOWUDLQHG$IJKDQSROLFHRI¿FHUV+RZHYHUWKH$IJKDQSROLFHVHFWRUGHV- perately needed immediate reforms and the German-led police academy could not produce results quickly enough nor could Germany commit the necessary funds required to accelerate the training program.1037KH86VXSSOHPHQWHGWKHSROLFHWUDLQLQJSURJUDPZLWKPLOOLRQWR SURGXFHDVXI¿FLHQWQXPEHURISDWUROPHQIRUWKH$IJKDQSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQVVFKHGXOHGIRU fall 2004.104 Italy, with assistance from the United Nations and the United States, undertook reforms RIWKHMXVWLFHV\VWHP$IWHUGHFDGHVRIFRQÀLFW$IJKDQLVWDQGLGQRWKDYHDWUDGLWLRQRIUXOH of law. Thus, Italy focused on rewriting the legal code and training judges and Ministry of -XVWLFHRI¿FHUVWRHQIRUFHWKHUXOHRIODZ7KH,WDOLDQVDOVRPDGHSODQVWRLPSURYHSULVRQDQG detention facilities.105 The United Kingdom focused on counternarcotics. In 2002 poppy production was under 1,300 metric tons but would soon increase.3RSS\SURGXFWLRQ¿QDQFHG insurgent groups and warlords and the heroin that resulted from poppies fed European markets. Therefore, the United Kingdom had a vested interest in tackling this problem. The UK strategy included law enforcement as well as helping foster alternative livelihoods for the agricultural sector.107 -DSDQOHGWKH'LVDUPDPHQW'HPRELOL]DWLRQDQG5HLQWHJUDWLRQ ''5 SURMHFWRI¿FLDOO\ called the Afghan New Beginnings Program. The DDR program intended to convince regional PLOLWLDVWRGLVEDQGDQGHLWKHUMRLQWKH$1$RU¿QGRWKHUMREV7KLVZDVDGLI¿FXOWSURJUDPWR implement for several reasons. First, to convince militia members to disarm and leave militias, they needed sustainable employment. Japan, with UN assistance, spent a considerable amount of time establishing training centers to teach job-related skills. To succeed, the Japanese DDR program in 2002 needed funding to staff these training centers and provide housing for the IRUPHUPLOLWLDPHQ'LI¿FXOWLHVLQDWWDLQLQJIXQGVIRUWKHVHFRPSRQHQWVRIWKHSURJUDPXQIRU- tunately delayed large-scale demobilizations of the country’s militias. The United States’ role in security sector reform was to rebuild the ANA into a professional ¿JKWLQJIRUFHOR\DOWRWKHGHPRFUDWLFDOO\HOHFWHGJRYHUQPHQWRI$IJKDQLVWDQ20&$ZDVWKH vanguard of the American effort to construct this new force. Under normal circumstances, the State Department would set the administrative wheels in motion to create an OMC. However, because General Franks anticipated the need for that kind of military element to support the

199 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 66 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002 embassy and to provide military-to-military contact with the AIA Ministry of Defense (MOD), CENTCOM placed the initiative on a fast track. The CENTCOM commander’s interest in the quick establishment of OMC-A is understand- able, given Franks’ concerns about the nature of the Coalition campaign. By quickly establishing indigenous security forces, CENTCOM could hand off responsibilities for security to the Afghans and withdraw much of the Coalition’s land forces. But in early 2002, Afghanistan’s SROLFHDQGDUP\ZHUHHVVHQWLDOO\QRQH[LVWHQW,Q0DUFK816HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO.R¿$QQDQ recognized this and stated that the entire Bonn Agreement agenda largely depended on the establishment of effective Afghan security forces. “Proper management of the security sector,” $QQDQDVVHUWHG³LVWKHQHFHVVDU\¿UVWVWHSWRZDUG>$IJKDQQDWLRQDO@UHFRQFLOLDWLRQDQGUHFRQ- VWUXFWLRQLQGHHGPDQDJLQJWKLVVHFWRUPD\EHFRQVLGHUHGWKH¿UVWUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURMHFW´108 For Annan, the path to creating a legitimate and representative government in Afghanistan that would be capable of creating a stable environment started with the creation of new security forces loyal to that government. 7KHREVWDFOHVRQWKLVSDWKZHUHVLJQL¿FDQW,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHUHPQDQWVRIWKH7DOLEDQ Afghanistan faced threats posed by warlords that in early 2002 controlled whole regions of the country. Ali A. Jalali, Karzai’s interior minister that year, regarded the growing problem with warlords as inseparable from the fundamental issue of Afghan sovereignty. The AIA’s leaders could ill afford to have the new Afghan political process come to resemble the historical pat- terns of the previous decades. Nevertheless, by the spring of 2002, the emerging military situation troubled the Interior Minister because it replicated conditions that resembled the warlord interregnum of the 1990s. As Jalali reviewed the Afghan military units that would come to H[LVWE\PLGKHIRXQGWKDWPXFKRIWKH$IJKDQVXQGHUDUPVRZHGDOOHJLDQFHWRVSHFL¿F leaders rather than to the new Karzai government.109 In the summer of 2002, for example, he described the Afghan Army as a mix of units that were loyal to a variety of regional leaders. Holding this structure loosely together was a patchwork of alliances that sought to achieve a balance of provincial military power inside Afghanistan. If the alliances broke down, the country might be pulled apart by civil war yet again. Building and Training an Afghan National Army (ANA) In February, shortly after their arrival in the theater of operations, a portion of the British- OHG,6$)XQGHU0DMRU*HQHUDO0F&ROOEHJDQWUDLQLQJWKH¿UVWEDWWDOLRQRIZKDWZDVFDOOHGDQ Afghan National Guard (1st BANG). The demographic makeup of this group, comprised of URXJKO\SURVSHFWLYHVROGLHUVSXUSRUWHGO\UHÀHFWHG$IJKDQLVWDQ¶VHWKQLFGLYHUVLW\110 As .R¿$QQDQGUDIWHGKLV0DUFKUHSRUWWRWKH81PHPEHUVRIWKHVW%$1*ZHUHVWLOODERXW 2 weeks away from their graduation. Even as these soldiers went through their training, a lively discourse erupted over the model best suited for use in building the new ANA. $UULYLQJDWDFRQVHQVXVRIZKDWWKH$IJKDQVFRXOGVXSSRUWSUHVHQWHGDGH¿QLWHFKDOOHQJHWR the Coalition. As the Secretary-General explained in his report, debate centered on “two papers produced respectively by the International Security Assistance Force, which proposed a force of about 50,000, and the [Afghan] Ministry of Defense, which suggested a force of 200,000.”111 /LWWOHGRXEWH[LVWHGDERXWWKHKLJKOHYHOVRIH[SHUWLVHLQWHFKQRORJ\ZDU¿JKWLQJGRFWULQHRU training among the British soldiers or their ability to train Afghans. However, at this delicate juncture, their colonial tradition, justly or unjustly, fueled Afghan national sensitivities. While

200 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 67 of 316

Chapter 7 acknowledging that 21st century mentalities differed markedly from those in play during the 19th century, the disparity between the Afghan and British plans for building an ANA potentially threatened the larger SSR effort. %RWK20&$DQGWKH%ULWLVKUHJDUGHGWKH¿JXUHDVIDUWRRKLJK$IJKDQRI¿FLDOV explained that a force of this size would be capable of controlling the country’s borders and preventing unwanted incursions from terrorists, warlords, or drug-runners sheltering in regions contiguous with Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier province. Some in the Coalition believed that WKH¿JXUHKDGPRUHWRGRZLWKDOLQJHULQJ6RYLHWPLOLWDU\LQÀXHQFHWKDQDQ\UHDOFDOFXODWLRQ of the country’s military needs. According to Colonel Jeffery Marshall, who soon assumed responsibility for training the ANA, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) was “structured initially like an old Soviet Ministry of Defense, very unwieldy and very bureaucratic and not functional.”112 It came as no surprise, then, that key players within the MOD, including Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Atiquallah Baryalai, believed that the AIA’s continued existence depended on the size and centralized control of its military establishment.113 1HJRWLDWLRQVRYHUWKHEHVWZD\WRVKDSHDQG¿HOGWKHQHZ$1$FRQWLQXHGWKURXJKWKH spring and summer. The unwieldy nature of the Afghan proposal was emphasized by an assessment team sent by CENTCOM in the spring to analyze the options. That team immediately recognized the Afghan MOD template as outmoded, unaffordable, and almost impossible to resource. Rather than taking an adversarial stance, however, the team members worked along- side OMC-A to arrive at a consensus amenable to the AIA. During the time of transition in mid- 2002, the most notable accomplishment of Brigadier General Kratzer, Colonel Weimer, and others who served and worked with OMC-A was the forward momentum of the ANA project they helped generate. Much of this progress was based on the relationship they built gradually with the Afghan people. Looking back on the experience, Kratzer asserted that “building the Afghan Army took a thousand cups of tea.”114 To observers, the most visible sign of progress would have been the growing energy devoted to training Afghan Army units. As noted earlier, British forces within ISAF had launched the program in February 2002. On 1 May 2002, OMC-A greatly reinforced this effort by com- mitting US Soldiers in Afghanistan to the training of Afghan recruits and the formation of ANA units. Colonel Weimer credited General Franks in pushing aside or ignoring a number of bureaucratic obstacles to ensure that American troops became involved in the training HIIRUWHDUO\5DWKHUWKDQVHFXULQJIXQGVDQGRWKHUUHVRXUFHV¿UVWDQGWKHQVORZO\HVWDEOLVKLQJ a training site and a program of instruction, Weimer remembered, “The process was abso- OXWHO\UHYHUVHG7KH>WUDLQHHV@DUULYHG¿UVWDQGWKH20&PLVVLRQLQWKDWUHJDUGZDVWRKHOS set the conditions and stage for [the training] mission to begin.”115 Even as they were still getting organized, Weimer’s OMC-A team negotiated with the Afghan MOD to identify a demo- graphically acceptable cross-section of recruits and obtain possession of the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), a compound that had lain dormant for 4 years after being closed by the Taliban. OMC-A immediately started spending $4 million to restore the infrastructure to acceptable levels for the training of soldiers and worked briskly to prepare to get ready to train WKH¿UVWWKUHH $1$ EDWWDOLRQVDQGWKH¿UVWWZRERUGHUJXDUGEDWWDOLRQV The key to the OMC-A plan at this stage was securing the US Army’s 1st Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group (SFG) as the unit responsible for training the ANA and border guard battalions. SF Soldiers were trained to conduct the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission,

201 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 68 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002 which included the training of indigenous security forces. The men of the 1st Battalion, 3d SFG were experienced trainers and had worked with soldiers from a variety of foreign armies. The SUHVVXUHVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQWKDWVSULQJKRZHYHUPDGHWKH$1$PLVVLRQGLI¿FXOW Coalition and Afghan leaders sought to have trained Afghan forces available around the middle of June, the date of the loya jirga. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin McDonnell, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 3d SFG, emphasized that the training schedule and graduation goals posed a VLJQL¿FDQWFKDOOHQJHWRKLV6ROGLHUV0F'RQQHOOWROGDMRXUQDOLVWWKDWKLVWUDLQLQJPLVVLRQZDV daunting, expressing a preference for having “six months to one year” to train each battalion rather than the 10-week training cycle timetable driven by national political imperatives.117 The training effort began haltingly. In April 2002 the British ISAF completed the training of 550 Afghan soldiers, but only 400 remained on duty as of the beginning of June. Attrition affected the American effort as well. When the SF battalion opened its course at KMTC, its OHDGHUVH[SHFWHGSURVSHFWLYHUHFUXLWVWRUHSRUWIRUGXW\2QO\DUULYHGRQVFKHGXOH /LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO0F'RQQHOOUHFRJQL]HGWKDWUHWDLQLQJWUDLQHGVROGLHUVZDVRIWHQGLI¿FXOWLQ a country like Afghanistan, which was still unstable and whose future was still uncertain. He suggested that the ANA training program in early summer 2002 was just beginning to show progress: “If you’ve got the three stages of crawl, walk, and run, right now we’re doing the crawl.”118 However rudimentary this beginning might have been, the Coalition had made yet another transition aimed at preparing the new Afghan state to stand on its own.

ÔÔÔ

This chapter has focused on the 3-month period in mid-2002 when the nature of OEF EHJDQWRFKDQJHLQDIXQGDPHQWDOPDQQHU9HU\IHZVHQLRUSROLWLFDORI¿FLDOVRUWKHLUPLOLWDU\ commanders had expected the campaign to transition in the ways that it changed in the spring and summer of 2002. The original campaign plan for OEF, for example, made no provision for Coalition forces participating in the construction of a new Afghan Army or in supervising irrigation projects in the western provinces of Afghanistan. Yet, in May 2002, just weeks after ANACONDA concluded, American SF Soldiers found themselves training Afghan soldiers DQG&$VSHFLDOLVWVKDGEHFRPHLQYROYHGLQDP\ULDGRISURMHFWVODUJHDQGVPDOOLQWKHIDUÀXQJ UHJLRQVRIWKHFRXQWU\$WWKHVDPHWLPH86$UP\RI¿FHUVZLWKPRUHVHQLRULW\KDGEHFRPH directly involved in assisting the Afghan Government design its new Army. ,QUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKLVWUDQVLWLRQSRLQWWKH&RDOLWLRQLWVHOIPDGHDVLJQL¿FDQWFKDQJHLQ command structure. Rather than move forward in an ad hoc arrangement in which a small vestigial division headquarters—CJTF Mountain—continued to serve as the senior headquarters of Coalition forces, the CENTCOM commander created a CJTF and deployed it to Afghanistan. CJTF-180, based on roughly half of the XVIII Airborne Corps’ headquarters staff, arrived in May 2002 and immediately began to assert control over tactical military operations while it augmented the Coalition’s capacity to deal with strategic and operational level issues, especially those that pertained to fostering the stability of the new Afghan Government. Both militarily and diplomatically then, the Coalition moved in mid-2002 from deposing a rogue, terror-sponsoring regime to underwriting the legitimacy of a new Afghanistan ushered in by the Bonn Agreement.

202 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 69 of 316

Chapter 7

This period of transition marked several critical successes, the most important of which was the conduct of the emergency loya jirga, which began on 11 June 2002. The jirga’s peaceful selection of an ATA served as the next sign of political progress along the path established by WKH%RQQ$JUHHPHQW

203 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 70 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002

Notes

³&LQ&&(17&20DQGWKH&KLHIRIWKH'HIHQFH6WDII3UHVV&RQIHUHQFH²$SULO Operation Veritas 8. 0LQLVWU\ RI 'HIHQFH $SULO KWWSZZZRSHUDWLRQVPRGXNYHULWDV SUHVVBEULHIBDSUKWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ 2. Quoted in Ali A. Jalali, “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army,” Parameters, Autumn 2002, 73. 3. United Nations, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re- Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions. http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan- agree.htm (accessed 19 January 2009). ³6HFXULW\&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQ RQWKH6LWXDWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´Security Council Resolutions-2001, 20 December 2001. http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm (accessed 2 May 2007). 5. “Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’),” 4 January 2002. ³1$72LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ)DFWVKHHW´1RUWK$WODQWLF7UHDW\2UJDQL]DWLRQ)HEUXDU\ KWWSZZZQDWRLQWLVVXHVDIJKDQLVWDQIDFWVKHHWKWP DFFHVVHG0D\ 7. United Nations Press Release, SC/7311, “Afghanistan Political Progress Faster than Expected; Security Threats Remain, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Tells Security Council.” http:// www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7311.doc.htm (accessed 4 December 2008). .R¿$QQDQ³7KH6LWXDWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQGLWV,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO3HDFHDQG Security,” Report of the Secretary-General, General Assembly Fifty-sixth session, United Nations, NY, 18 March 2002. 9. Annan, “Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications.” 10. Emily Clark and Mark Burgess, “Action Update (Complete Archive),” Center for Defense Information Terrorism Project, 8 October 2001–1 September 2002. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ actionupdate-archive-pr.cfm (accessed 28 February 2007), see entry under 18–24 March 2002. 11. “The Secretary of State for Defence’s Statement in the Commons—18 March 2002,” Operation Veritas, UK Ministry of Defense, Statement, 18 March 2002. http://www.operations.mod. uk/veritas/statements (accessed 30 May 2007). 12. Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Commander, US Central Command, 31 July 2002. 13. “President Outlines War Effort: Remarks by the President to the George C. Marshall ROTC $ZDUG6HPLQDURQ1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\´2I¿FHRIWKH3UHVV6HFUHWDU\7KH:KLWH+RXVH$SULO http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04 (accessed 3 July 2007). 14. “President Outlines War Effort.” 15. “President Outlines War Effort.” /LHXWHQDQW *HQHUDO )UDQNOLQ / +DJHQEHFN LQWHUYLHZ E\ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV 6WXG\ Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 March 2007, 13. 17. Hagenbeck, interview, 30 March 2007, 13. 18. Hagenbeck, interview, 30 March 2007, 13. 19. Hagenbeck, interview, 30 March 2007, 13. 20. Hagenbeck, interview, 30 March 2007, 13. 21. Hagenbeck, interview, 30 March 2007, 17. 22. Hagenbeck, interview, 30 March 2007, 13. 23. Hagenbeck, interview, 30 March 2007, 13. 24. CJTF Mountain, Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, Afghanistan and Operation ANACONDA Brief, undated, slide 42. 25. Afghanistan and Operation ANACONDA Brief, slide 41.

204 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 71 of 316

Chapter 7

³867URRSV)LQLVKµ2SHUDWLRQ0RXQWDLQ/LRQ¶´CNN.com./TRANSCRIPTS, 7 April 2002. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0204/07/sm.04.html (accessed 25 January 2009). 27. “Operation Snipe,” Operation Veritas, UK Ministry of Defence, 13 May 2002. http://www. RSHUDWLRQVPRGXNYHULWDVVQLSHKWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ 28. Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Stogran, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 May 2007. 29. Stogran, interview, 18 May 2007. 30. Major Peter Dawe, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies ,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.60D\ 'DZHLQWHUYLHZ0D\ 32. Major David Baker, interview by Center for Military History, Interview # 48 EF I 0008, 18 May .DQGDKDU$LU¿HOG$IJKDQLVWDQ 33. “Operation Condor,” Operation Veritas, UK Ministry of Defence, 22 May 2002. http://www. operations.mod.uk/veritas/condor.htm (accessed 4 December 2008); Linda Kozaryn, “British-led Coalition Battle al-Qaeda, Taliban Fighters,” American Forces Press Service News Articles, 17 May 2007. http:// www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id-44048 (accessed 4 December 2008); Clark and Burgess, “Action Update (Complete Archive),” see “Coalition Operations” under 13–19 May 2002. 34. “UK Marines in New Afghan Mission,” BBC News, 29 May 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ ZRUOGVRXWKBDVLDVWP DFFHVVHG$XJXVW 35. “UK Marines in New Afghan Mission”; “Marines Launch Operation Buzzard in Afghanistan,” ABC News Online0D\KWWSZZZDEFQHWDXQHZVQHZVLWHPV DFFHVVHG$XJXVW 2007). ³8.0DULQHVLQ1HZ$IJKDQ0LVVLRQ´ 37. “UK Marines in New Afghan Mission.” 38. Mr. Geoffrey Hoon, “Operations in Afghanistan,” House of Commons Hansard Debates, Part 5 -XQH KWWSZZZSXEOLFDWLRQVSDUOLDPHQWXNSDFPFPKDQVUGYR DFFHVVHG $XJXVW 39. “Operation Apollo,” Backgrounder: Land Force Western Area, n.d., Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces. www.army.forces.ca/lfwa (accessed 17 August 2007). 40. Major Mark Campbell, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 May 2007, 12. 41. “Task Force Rakkasan Warning Order #2,” 21 June 2002. 42. “Canadian Forces’ Contribution to the International Campaign Against Terrorism,” Canadian Forces Backgrounder, Canadian Department of National Defence, BG-02.001p, 7 January 2004. http:// www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id+490 (accessed 17 August 2007). 43. Major Robert Forte, Combined Task Force Mountain %ULH¿QJ Operation Mountain Lion $VVHVVPHQW%ULH¿QJ, 13 July 2002, slide 5. +DJHQEHFNLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK± 45. Hagenbeck, interview, 30 March 2007, 4. /LHXWHQDQW *HQHUDO 5HWLUHG 3DXO 7 0LNRODVKHN LQWHUYLHZ E\ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV 6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH$UOLQJWRQ9$'HFHPEHU 0LNRODVKHNLQWHUYLHZ'HFHPEHU +DJHQEHFNLQWHUYLHZ0DUFK 49. Hagenbeck, interview, 30 March 2007, 12. 50. Hagenbeck, interview, 30 March 2007, 12. 51. General Dan K. McNeill, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies ,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.6-XQH 0F1HLOOLQWHUYLHZ-XQH 0F1HLOOLQWHUYLHZ-XQH

205 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 72 of 316

Success Out of Victory: Changing Course in Mid-2002

0F1HLOOLQWHUYLHZ-XQH 55. Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2008), 150. %ULJDGLHU*HQHUDO6WDQOH\$0F&KU\VWDOLQWHUYLHZE\WK0LOLWDU\+LVWRU\'HWDFKPHQW %DJUDP$LU¿HOG$IJKDQLVWDQ-XO\ 57. McChrystal, interview, 7 July 2002, 3. 58. McChrystal, interview, 7 July 2002, 3. 59. Colonel Richard D. MeGahan, interview by 49th Military History Detachment, Bagram $LU¿HOG$IJKDQLVWDQ-XO\ 0H*DKDQLQWHUYLHZ-XO\ 0F&KU\VWDOLQWHUYLHZ-XO\ 0F&KU\VWDOLQWHUYLHZ-XO\ 0F&KU\VWDOLQWHUYLHZ-XO\± 0F1HLOOLQWHUYLHZ-XQH 3UHVV5HOHDVH&RPELQHG-RLQW7DVN)RUFH+HDGTXDUWHUV0DF'LOO$)%)/5HOHDVH1XPEHU 02-05-01, 14 May 2002. www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1 (accessed 28 February 2007). 0F1HLOOLQWHUYLHZ-XQH± -RLQW3XEOLFDWLRQDOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC, 2001), as quoted in William Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan (Carlisle, PA: US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 23 March 2004), v. 0DMRU*HQHUDO'DYLG(.UDW]HULQWHUYLHZE\WK0LOLWDU\+LVWRU\'HWDFKPHQW&DPS'RKD .XZDLW-XO\ .UDW]HULQWHUYLHZ-XO\ .UDW]HULQWHUYLHZ-XO\ 71. Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, 17–18. .UDW]HULQWHUYLHZ-XO\ 73. Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, 19. 74. Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, 19; Major Luther Webster, interview by US Army Center for Military History, Kabul, Afghanistan, 18 October 2002, 1. 75. Webster, interview, 18 October 2002, 1. &RDOLWLRQ-RLQW&LYLO0LOLWDU\2SHUDWLRQV7DVN)RUFHCoalition Joint Civil-Military Operations (CJCMOTF) Brief, January 2002, MacDill AFB, FL, as quoted in Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, 19. .UDW]HULQWHUYLHZ-XO\ .UDW]HULQWHUYLHZ-XO\ 79. Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, xvi. 80. Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, xvi. .UDW]HULQWHUYLHZ-XO\ .UDW]HULQWHUYLHZ-XO\ 83. Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, 21. 84. Webster, interview, 18 October 2002, 5. 85. Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, 21. 816HFXULW\&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQVW0HHWLQJ0DUFK5HSRUWRIWKH6HFUHWDU\ General, “The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security,” 18 March 2002. 87. Nicholas Stockton, Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, August 2002, 21. 88. “National Development Framework Draft for Consultation (without annexes),” Kabul, April 2002, attached as Appendix E to Stockton, Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 73 of 316

Chapter 7

89. UN General Assembly Security Council, “The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security,” 18 March 2002, 3. 90. Stockton, Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan 91. Stockton, Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan, 1. 92. Webster, interview, 18 October 2002, 1. 93. Webster, interview, 18 October 2002, 1. 94. Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, 22. .UDW]HULQWHUYLHZ-XO\ &ODUNDQG%XUJHVV³$FWLRQ8SGDWH &RPSOHWH$UFKLYH ´VHHHQWU\XQGHU±$SULO 97. Clark and Burgess, “Action Update (Complete Archive),” see entry under 15–21 April 2002. .UDW]HULQWHUYLHZ-XO\ 99. Clark and Burgess, “Action Update (Complete Archive),” see entry under 15–21 April 2002. 100. Colonel Mike Weimer, interview by 47th Military History Detachment, Camp Doha, Kuwait, 1 May 2002, 2. 101. Colonel (Retired) Michael Weimer, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, &RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH6DQ$QWRQLR7;6HSWHPEHU 102. Seth G. Jones et al., (VWDEOLVKLQJ/DZDQG2UGHU$IWHU&RQÀLFW (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 118. 103. Major General Craig Weston, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat 6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.6'HFHPEHU%ULJDGLHU*HQHUDO:LOOLDP*DUUHWWZULWWHQ interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 July 2007. 8QLWHG6WDWHV*RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWDELOLW\2I¿FH³$IJKDQLVWDQ6HFXULW\(IIRUWVWR(VWDEOLVK $UP\DQG3ROLFH+DYH0DGH3URJUHVVEXW)XWXUH3ODQV1HHGWREH%HWWHU'H¿QHG´*$2-XQH 2005, 9. 105. Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order, 118. 2I¿FHRI1DWLRQDO'UXJ&RQWURO3ROLF\³(VWLPDWHG3RSS\&XOWLYDWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´3UHVV Release, 28 November 2003. http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/NEWS/press03/112803.html (accessed 29 August 2007). 107. “Afghanistan Fact Sheet Jan 2003,” United Kingdom Department for International Development, 29 January 2003. http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/ GHHGDGFFEGFHDIF DFFHVVHG$XJXVW 108. Annan, “Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications,” 11. 109. Jalali, “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army,” 78–79. 110. “Secretary of State for Defence’s Statement in the Commons—18 March 2002.” 111. Annan, “Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications,” 10. 112. Brigadier General Jeffery Marshall, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Washington, DC, 31 May 2007, 5. 113. Marshall, interview, 31 May 2007, 5. .UDW]HULQWHUYLHZ-XO\ 115. Weimer, interview, 1 May 2002, 20. :HLPHULQWHUYLHZ0D\ 117. Anthony Davis, “Basic Training,” Time, 3 June 2002. http://www.time.com/time/printout/ KWPO DFFHVVHG-XO\ 118. Davis, “Basic Training.”

207 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 74 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 75 of 316

Chapter 8 CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003 In mid-July 2002 US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz visited Afghanistan to meet with Hamid Karzai and other Afghan political leaders to gain a sense of the conditions in the country. In Kabul, Wolfowitz spoke publicly about the changes in Afghanistan and emphasized that the United States did not plan to pull its troops out of the country until the institutions introduced in the previous 6 months had settled. In his comments, Wolfowitz emphasized that the US campaign would be a broad effort that included economic reconstruction and the training of Afghan security forces as well as security operations. He asserted that the United States was committed to “strengthening those national institutions that can move Afghanistan forward, enable Afghanistan to overcome the wounds of 20 years of civil war—and if I can put it also, from an American point of view—that would keep Afghanistan from going back to being a sanctuary for terrorism.”1 This statement essentially endorsed the tentative efforts the Coalition had begun earlier in 2002 to rebuild Afghanistan’s security forces and its physical and economic infrastructure. The initial Coalition reconstruction program was not the only topic of discussion at this event. Reporters asked Mr. Wolfowitz about the recent Coalition aerial assault that resulted in scores of casualties and over 20 fatalities. This attack had come in support of an operation launched by US Special Forces (SF) near the town of Tarin Kowt in Oruzgan province at the beginning of July.2:KLOHVHDUFKLQJIRUZHDSRQVFDFKHVDQG7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVLQWKHUHJLRQ6) XQLWVUHSRUWHGWKH\KDGFDOOHGLQFORVHDLUVXSSRUW &$6 ZKHQXQNQRZQHQHP\IRUFHV¿UHG on them. The Coalition bombers and AC-130 gunships had then attacked a number of sites near the location of the SF teams. Women and children were among the casualties, and Afghan authorities soon announced that the Coalition aircraft had actually targeted a wedding party ZKHUHWUDGLWLRQDO3DVKWXQFHOHEUDWRU\JXQ¿UHKDGEHHQPLVWDNHQIRUDQHQHP\WKUHDW:KLOHWKH facts continued to be disputed and Coalition authorities promised a full investigation, Afghans launched organized protests and President Karzai and his foreign minister publicly reproved Coalition forces for the mistake and cautioned them about future operations. The tragic inci- GHQWVHUYHGDVDUHPLQGHURIWKHGLI¿FXOWLHVIDFLQJWKH&RDOLWLRQLQFUHDWLQJDQDSSURDFKLQ Afghanistan that balanced rebuilding and humanitarian assistance programs with the judicious application of force. In June 2002 Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180), commanded by Lieutenant General Dan K. McNeill, became the headquarters responsible for the Coalition’s campaign in $IJKDQLVWDQ$VQRWHGLQWKHSUHYLRXVFKDSWHU&-7)DUULYHGDW%DJUDP$LU¿HOGZLWKDFDP- SDLJQSODQWKDWGH¿QHG&RDOLWLRQRSHUDWLRQVDVIXOOVSHFWUXPRSHUDWLRQVIRFXVHGRQFUHDWLQJD stable Afghanistan that would no longer serve as a haven for terrorist. In the plan, the Coalition FRPPDQGHUDQGVWDIIIXUWKHUGHVFULEHGWKHLULQWHQGHGRSHUDWLRQVE\GH¿QLQJIRXUOLQHVRIHIIRUW along which these operations would be directed: security, civil-military, information, and the training of Afghan security forces. For McNeill, the CJTF-180’s campaign began in the midst of Phase III, Decisive Combat Operations, of US Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) original plan for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). This meant that McNeill and his staff H[SHFWHGVHFXULW\RSHUDWLRQVWREHKLVKHDGTXDUWHUV¶IRFXVGXULQJWKH¿QDOPRQWKVRI

209 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 76 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003

As Afghanistan became more stable, the campaign would gradually transition to Phase IV, Humanitarian Assistance and Support to the New Afghan Government, in which CJTF-180’s effort would become more focused on reconstruction and training the Afghan security forces.3 In the process of launching and sustaining the Coalition campaign, CJTF-180 and its subordinate commands encountered unforeseen obstacles and opportunities. To conduct successful security operations, for example, CJTF-180 had to gather intelligence from Afghans and other individuals in detention about the location and status of the enemy. Coalition detainee and interrogation operations, however, suffered from both a lack of guidance and resources, weaknesses that, in the short-term, created problems for the overall intelligence collection effort DQGLQWKHORQJWHUPEUHGOHJDODQGSXEOLFUHODWLRQVGLI¿FXOWLHVIRUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGLWV allies in Afghanistan. In its approach to reconstruction and training the Afghan National Army (ANA), CJTF-180 was energetic in the creation of new organizations to make the transition to Phase IV smooth and effective. The introduction of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to improve Afghan infrastructure and the formation of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Phoenix to assist with the training of the ANA are the best examples of Coalition innovation during this period. The greatest overall challenge facing the Soldiers of CJTF-180 was KRZWRUHWDLQWKHPRPHQWXPJHQHUDWHGGXULQJWKH¿UVWPRQWKVRIDVWKHQDWXUHRIWKH campaign broadened but resources remained essentially the same. CJTF-180 Begins its Mission At the beginning of July 2002, Lieutenant General McNeill had been leading CJTF-180 for 1 month. The creation of CJTF-180 clearly signaled the Coalition’s sustained commitment to Afghanistan despite the Bush administration’s unease in becoming involved in nation building. 6WLOOFRQFHUQVOLQJHUHGDPRQJVHQLRU$PHULFDQFLYLOLDQDQGPLOLWDU\RI¿FLDOVDERXWDSSHDULQJ as an army of occupation. The central problem for CJTF-180 was how to create a stable security environment in Afghanistan without relying too heavily on Coalition military forces—a practice Coalition leaders believed might alienate the Afghan population. In the summer of 2002, security operations had primacy over other aspects of the Coalition FDPSDLJQ \HW 0F1HLOO SODQQHG WR WDNH D EURDG DSSURDFK +H ¿UVW VHSDUDWHG WKH WDFWLFDO level responsibilities for security operations from his own duties, giving the former to the commander of Combined Task Force (CTF) 82, which would arrive that summer to replace CTF Mountain (formerly CJTF Mountain). As the VHQLRU &RDOLWLRQ PLOLWDU\ RI¿- cial, McNeill assumed responsibility for what he called the “political-military piece.”4 No less crucial than the security operations, this aspect of the campaign required more dip- Personal collection of Professor Thomas H. Johnson Personal collection of Professor lomatic acumen than military Figure 35. Ismail Khan.

210 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 77 of 316

Chapter 8 skill. For McNeill, working the political-military component of the Coalition effort entailed building relationships with the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), helping President Karzai develop his government’s capacity, and assisting in negotiations with powerful regional leaders like Ismail Khan and Abdul Rashid Dostum concerning the integration of their militia forces into the new Afghan security structure. McNeill characterized the Coalition’s broad program in Afghanistan as full spectrum operations at all levels. To better synchronize a campaign of this nature, McNeill took control of all civil-military operations (CMO) by asserting command over the Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). CJTF-180 also gained operational control (OPCON) over Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), the SOF headquarters established earlier in 2002 when Joint Special Operations Task Force–North (JSOTF-N) and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–South (CJSOTF-S) had combined. Since the spring, the Soldiers of the CJSOTF had played a critical role in the training of the ANA and this effort continued after CJTF-180 arrived. But McNeill gave greater emphasis to the overall $1$SURJUDPE\WDNLQJIRUPDOFRQWURORIWKH2I¿FHRI0LOLWDU\&RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ (OMC-A) from the US Embassy. 2WKHUWUDQVLWLRQVSODFHG0F1HLOO¶VFRPPDQGLQÀX[%\-XO\WKHWDFWLFDOOHYHOXQLWVIURP the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division, including TF Rakkasan, had all departed Afghanistan; the CTF Mountain headquarters staff followed in early September. They were replaced by CTF 82, formed from the headquarters of the 82d Airborne Division and led by the division’s commander, Major General John R. Vines. CTF 82’s headquarters was at %DJUDP$LU¿HOGDQG9LQHVEDVHG7)Panther, his primary maneuver element, at the Kandahar $LU¿HOG7)Panther was under the command of Colonel James L. Huggins and featured two infantry battalions from the 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and one attached infantry battalion from the division’s 1st Brigade. Huggins also enjoyed support from artillery, aviation, military intelligence, and other enabling units. TF Panther deployed to Afghanistan in late June 2002 and would serve under CTF 82 until 5 December 2002.5 At that point TF Devil, a unit formed around the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division arrived to take the lead in tactical-level security operations. Fostering Security Once CTF 82 established its headquarters in Afghanistan, Major General Vines’ forces were CJTF-180’s primary means of engaging the Taliban and al-Qaeda. CTF 82 launched secu- ULW\RSHUDWLRQVLQLWLDOO\IURP&RDOLWLRQEDVHVDWWKH%DJUDP$LU¿HOG.DQGDKDUDQGHYHQWXDOO\ from a handful of smaller forward operating bases (FOBs), such as Salerno, Shkin, or Orgun-e in southeastern Afghanistan, in reaction to the enemy.6 None of the tactical-level units in CTF KDGUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUVSHFL¿FDUHDVRIRSHUDWLRQ $2V EXWIRFXVHGWKHLUUDLGVDQGFRUGRQ and search operations on enemy elements that attacked Coalition forces or otherwise made their presence known. Lieutenant General McNeill, the CJTF-180 commander, recognized the QDWXUHRIWKH¿JKWEXWGLGQRWEHOLHYHWKH&RDOLWLRQKDGWKHTXDOLW\RUTXDQWLW\RILQWHOOLJHQFH to launch preemptive pinpoint strikes against this elusive foe. Consequently, he directed Major General Vines to focus his security operations on locations where the enemy was suspected to be hiding. McNeill envisioned CTF 82’s tactical-level campaign as “a rolling series of operations going on all the time” that would generally prevent the Taliban and al-Qaeda from reforming into a serious threat.7

211 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 78 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003

CTF 82

TF Pegasus 82 3 82 TF Panther

1 505 3 505 1 504

FSB 82 1 319

Figure 36. CTF 82 task organization, fall 2002. For Vines and his command, this approach also meant that the Coalition’s conventional combat power, the equivalent of a large brigade of approximately 5,000 Soldiers, had much of the responsibility for conducting security operations across Afghanistan. This effort was aided by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which secured the capital of Kabul, and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), which focused part of its assets on the border region. Still, the reinforced US Army brigades that deployed to the country as part of CJTF-180 held the lion’s share of the security burden. The Coalition’s approach that mandated conventional forces return to their bases at Bagram, Kandahar, or the smaller )2%VRQFHVHFXULW\RSHUDWLRQVFRQFOXGHGKHLJKWHQHGWKHGLI¿FXOWQDWXUHRIWKLVWDVN:KLOH this imperative certainly met the original Coalition intent to avoid appearing as an occupying army in a land that punished outside invaders, it also meant that Coalition forces in 2002 did not intend to assert complete control over the Afghan countryside. Beginning in August 2002, CTF 82 began a series of operations aimed at locating and destroying the enemy that many believed was in hiding and waiting for the proper opportunity to disrupt the political and military progress made up to that date. To keep pressure on the suspected threat, TF Panther’s actions took American Soldiers back into areas where previous ¿JKWVKDGRFFXUUHGWR¿QGERWKLQVXUJHQWVDQGWKHLUZHDSRQV Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP On 19 August 2002 the Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (1-505 PIR) and the 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (3-505 PIR) boarded KHOLFRSWHUVDWWKH.DQGDKDUDQG%DJUDP$LU¿HOGVDQGÀHZVRXWKWRZDUG3DNWLDSURYLQFH7KHVH

212 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 79 of 316

Chapter 8 units formed the main maneuver force for TF Panther’s Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP, the largest security mission in Afghanistan since Operation ANACONDA in March. MOUNTAIN SWEEP represented a continuation of the type of missions launched by CJTF Mountain in the spring and early summer, but was far more focused than MOUNTAIN LION. By August CTF 82 and TF Panther had decided to target suspected Taliban forces southwest of the town of Gardez near the Shahi Kowt Valley. Coalition intelligence suggested that this area harbored a NH\7DOLEDQRI¿FLDODQGODUJHDUPVFDFKHV During the week that followed the initial insertion of the two battalions, the paratroopers FRQGXFWHGVHYHQFRUGRQDQGVHDUFKRSHUDWLRQVIRFXVHGRQVSHFL¿FYLOODJHVDQGFRPSRXQGV The 3-505 PIR landed in the Zormat district, an area southwest of Gardez that had towns and villages located in open farmland in the central area and in mountainous terrain on the southern and northern edges. Lieutenant Colonel Martin Schweitzer, the battalion commander, used his IRXUULÀHFRPSDQLHVDQGDVFRXWSODWRRQDVWKHPDLQHOHPHQWVLQWKHVHULHVRIFRUGRQDQGVHDUFK missions. In these operations, Schweitzer also made use of an attached composite multipurpose unit called Team CMO that included a civil affairs (CA) section, engineers, military interrogators, linguists, medics, and public affairs specialists to arrange for humanitarian assistance, plan reconstruction projects, and gather information.8 Also joining the paratroopers were two Special Forces Operational Detachments–Alpha (ODAs) that had been working in the province since the spring of 2002.9 The ODAs were accompanied by allied Afghan militia forces. Over the course of the 6-day operation, elements of 3-505 PIR moved from village to village across the district. In most cases, the paratroopers conducted air assaults, landing near their objectives and then quickly moving into position near the village. In one instance, however, Soldiers from the battalion conducted a 13-kilometer foot march to approach one site. The ODAs and Afghan militia played an important role in the cordon and search operations, according to Lieutenant Colonel Schweitzer.10 Once the Soldiers of the 3-505 PIR set the cordon in place around the village, the SF Soldiers and Afghans would gain entry using their language and knowledge of cultural norms. Schweitzer’s troops would then conduct a thorough search of the dwellings and other buildings. These techniques led to the capture and detention of three $IJKDQVVXVSHFWHGRIEHLQJLQYROYHGZLWKWKH7DOLEDQDQGWKHVHL]LQJRIDVLJQL¿FDQWDPRXQWRI weapons and ammunition. Unfortunately, because of gaps in the intelligence and the possibility that news of MOUNTAIN SWEEP had reached the population in the Zormat area before US 6ROGLHUVDUULYHGWKH3,5GLGQRW¿QGWKH7DOLEDQRI¿FLDOWKRXJKWWREHLQWKHGLVWULFW11 Colonel Huggins, the TF Panther commander, suspected that intelligence leaks had led to the loss of the element of surprise. On 25 August, the last day of MOUNTAIN SWEEP, Huggins stated, “I have no doubt that [the enemy] had advance warning that we were coming.”12 Despite the sense that the operation had been compromised, Huggins and CJTF-180 leaders believed that Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP had been a success. As in MOUNTAIN LION, the Coalition demonstrated its ability to move considerable combat force into distant regions of Afghanistan and conduct large-scale security operations where Taliban and al-Qaeda groups were operating. Still, within CJTF-180, the integration of SF and Afghan militia into conventional operations did raise questions about the Coalition’s overall approach in areas like Zormat. Colonel Huggins and Lieutenant Colonel Schweitzer believed strongly that the conventional forces had worked well with the ODAs and had conducted the cordon and search operations appropriately.13 Moreover, both leaders saw Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP as a

213 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 80 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003 good model for future security operations. In contrast, several members of the ODAs involved in the operation differed, suggesting that in a few of their searches of Afghan dwellings, the Soldiers of TF Panther used techniques that were more suited to conventional combat operations.147KH6)RI¿FHUVGLGEHOLHYHWKDW2'$VZLWKWKHLUGHSWKRIH[SHULHQFHLQWKHUHJLRQDQG close relationship with the Afghan militia forces, could serve as key enablers for conventional infantry forces like 3-505 PIR as they sought to operate effectively within the Afghan culture. Huggins noted that in the wake of MOUNTAIN SWEEP his command closely reviewed all techniques and procedures to ensure that they were following the best practices, especially those that guided close interactions with Afghans during cordon and search operations.15 TF Panther’s security missions continued into the fall of 2002. But in September, CTF PDGHDVLJQL¿FDQWFKDQJHLQKRZLWGHSOR\HGXQLWVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ,QVWHDGRIPDLQWDLQLQJ DOPRVW DOO RI LWV IRUFHV DW %DJUDP DQG .DQGDKDU$LU¿HOGV 0DMRU *HQHUDO9LQHV WKH FRP- mander of CTF 82, chose to build FOBs in a handful of locations closer to the southern and VRXWKHDVWHUQSURYLQFHVZKHUH7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGDJURXSVZHUH¿QGLQJUHIXJH&7)HVWDE- lished the largest base called FOB Salerno just north of the city of Khost. Other FOBs near the towns of Asadabad, Shkin and Orgun-e—all sites close to the Pakistani frontier—followed by the end of the year. Salerno quickly grew as the entire 3-505 PIR, part of an aviation battalion, an SF ODA, and other units moved into the base. Schweitzer recalled that by the end of 2002, Salerno had become still larger as a runway capable of accommodating C-130 transport aircraft became functional. From the base, the 3-505 PIR launched a number of security and stability operations into the surrounding provinces. The decision to create the FOBs did generate some DOD Photo by SPF Eric E. Hughes Figure 37. US Soldiers from CTF 82 during MOUNTAIN SWEEP.

214 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 81 of 316

Chapter 8

Afghanistan Kabul Mountain VARDAK SweepNANGARHAR August 2002 ORUZGAN Village Viper Search February GHAZNI October FOB 2003 2002 Salerno Champion Strike Resolute Valiant September Strike Strike 2002 April March ZABOL PAKTIKA 2003 2003 Kandahar z Pakistan Mongoose January 2003

KANDAHAR z HELMAND Quetta

Afghanistan

Iran Pakistan AFG-XX-782653 Figure 38. Major CJTF-180 security operations, August 2002–April 2003. risk by placing Western forces closer to the Afghan population who might view the move as an encroachment on their cultural and territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, in 2002 the bases enabled the Coalition to contest more effectively those regions of the country that the enemy had chosen as sanctuaries. In early October 2002, for example, the 3-505 PIR used FOB Salerno to launch Operation VILLAGE SEARCH.16 This operation focused on four villages near the Pakistani border sus- SHFWHGRIKDUERULQJERWK7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVDQGZHDSRQVFDFKHV%XWWRHQJDJHWKHYLOODJHVWKH paratroopers used techniques that were less aggressive than those used during MOUNTAIN SWEEP, indicating that they had paid attention to the comments made by the ODAs after that operation. During VILLAGE SEARCH, unit leaders explained their intentions to village

215 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 82 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003 elders, asked permission to search homes, and had female Soldiers search the women. In addition, while searches were in progress, CA teams politely inquired about medical conditions and the general needs of the villages to identify potential reconstruction projects.17 7KHVHDUFKHVGLGXQFRYHUVLJQL¿FDQWVWRFNSLOHVRIZHDSRQVDQGDPPXQLWLRQLQFOXGLQJRQH cache of 250 rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and thousands of rounds of heavy machinegun DPPXQLWLRQWKDWEHORQJHGWRD\RXQJ$IJKDQPDQZKRKDGÀHGWR3DNLVWDQ18 A second large cache was discovered in a village less than a mile from the Pakistan border. During this part of the operation, the Soldiers of 3-505 PIR became involved in a tense standoff with Pakistani militiamen who believed the American Soldiers had crossed into Pakistan.19 Lieutenant Colonel 6FKZHLW]HUWKHEDWWDOLRQFRPPDQGHUUHTXHVWHG&$6DQGSUHSDUHGKLVPRUWDUSODWRRQWR¿UH a warning shot before the Pakistanis disengaged.20 This incident illustrated the unique charac- teristics of the Coalition’s security operations in Afghanistan. For leaders like Schweitzer and his superiors in Kandahar and Bagram, the task was clear—prevent enemy forces from affecting the progress in Afghanistan by denying them sanctuaries in the southern and southeastern regions, most importantly Paktia and Paktika provinces. The presence of the Pakistani frontier, as well as uncooperative Pakistani security forces along it, made that relatively straightforward task almost impossible to achieve in any permanent sense. The Transition to TF Devil In 2002 Coalition planners chose to deploy tactical formations such as TF Panther in Afghanistan for 6 months. This practice followed the pattern set during previous deployments like the peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans in the 1990s. For this reason, on 10 January 2003

CTF 82

TF Pegasus 82 1 82 TF Devil

2 504 2 505 3 504

FSB 307 3 319

Figure 39. CTF 82 task organization, spring 2003.

216 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 83 of 316

Chapter 8

TF Panther turned over authority for tactical security operations to TF Devil, comprised primarily from the units of the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. The new brigade-size TF would serve in Afghanistan until the late spring of 2003 and, like TF Panther, located most RILWVIRUFHVDWWKH.DQGDKDU$LU¿HOGZKLOHGHSOR\LQJVPDOOHUHOHPHQWVDWWKH)2%VORFDWHGLQ provinces where Taliban and al-Qaeda were seeking refuge. From these bases, the Soldiers of TF Devil conducted security patrols around their facilities, dispatched CA and psychological operations teams into cities and towns, and reacted to the common incidents of enemy small DUPVDQGLQGLUHFW¿UH21 The TF punctuated these routine activities with a series of larger operations. In January the command launched Operation MONGOOSE to search for enemy groups and weapons caches in the Adi Ghar Mountains southeast of Kandahar.22 The mission, conducted by the 2d Battalion, 504th (2-504 PIR) came in reaction to contact between US aircraft and Taliban IRUFHV$IWHU&RDOLWLRQKHOLFRSWHUVWRRN¿UHLQWKHDUHD&$6FRQYHUJHGRQWKH$GL*KDUUHJLRQ Intelligence gathered near the attacks suggested there were hundreds of Taliban soldiers hiding throughout the cave complexes in the area. TF Devil units carefully searched through the region to identify and destroy the caves that had originally been constructed in the 1980s by the anti-Soviet mujahideen. Operation VIPER, the next major security operation mounted by TF Devil, began on 19 February 2003 with the 2-504 PIR conducting air assaults into the Baghran Valley in Helmand province, a Taliban stronghold. The mission during VIPER was to use cordon and search operations to clear villages in the valley of unauthorized weapons and hostile forces.23 The series of search operations took the Soldiers of the 2-504 PIR across the Baghran Valley DQGWKH\XOWLPDWHO\GHWDLQHGHLJKW$IJKDQVVXVSHFWHGRIDI¿OLDWLRQZLWKWKH7DOLEDQ24 Captain Andrew Zieseniss, one of the battalion’s company commanders, emphasized the deliberate and painstaking character of the Coalition’s mission in early 2003. Zieseniss asserted, “It’s not a ZDUZKHUHZH¶UH¿JKWLQJDFRQYHQWLRQDODUP\OLNHWorld War II. There are bad guys in civilian clothes. It’s old-fashioned detective work, digging through hay stacks, literally.”25 Less than a month after Operation VIPER, TF Devil mounted a two-battalion air assault that inserted the 2-504 PIR, the 3-504 PIR, and Romanian and Afghan Army units into eastern Kandahar province. In this operation, called VALIANT STRIKE, company-size elements landed near targeted villages and towns and moved into positions to begin cordon and search actions. The dismounted movement through the mountainous terrain was grueling but often resulted in the discovery of small arms, crew-served weapons, land mines, mortar rounds, and rockets. These captures were not always easy. The village compounds were often labyrinthine, and enemy insurgents and their sympathizers had in some cases concealed weapons and equipment in haystacks, wells, and even under piles of manure. The American paratroopers also detained a number of Afghans who they suspected were involved in anti-Coalition activity.26 VIPER and VALIANT STRIKE demonstrate how TF Devil sought to keep the enemy off guard by hitting targets with large forces in two provinces in relatively quick succession—an innovation that appeared to pay dividends. The operations also demonstrate the continuing evolution of the US Army’s tactical procedures in OEF. Accounts of the techniques used during these actions reveal that the Soldiers of TF Devil were cautious in their operations, attempting to avoid unnecessary alienation of the Afghan population. Most critical was the paratroopers’ use of negotiation rather than force in conducting these search operations. Rather than breach

217 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 84 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003 compound or house walls and enter villages aggressively, unit leaders often partnered with CA specialists and linguists to engage village and town elders.27 The American commanders requested Afghan assistance in identifying and inventorying weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment and explained to the Afghan leaders how they would proceed with searching including pledges to segregate village women and have them searched by female American Soldiers. Both of these large-scale operations were examples of the overall maturation of tactical operations during OEF. UNIFIED VENTURE, DELIBERATE STRIKE, and other missions later in the spring of 2003 would take the TF Devil paratroopers back into the unstable provinces along the Pakistani frontier and would build on the experiences of previous security operations. Although these actions enjoyed success, the Coalition had made only limited gains in understanding the organization and the intent of the enemy its Soldiers faced in places like Kandahar and Helmand provinces. The struggle to develop a clear picture of a shadowy adver- VDU\OHGWROHVVWKDQGHFLVLYHRSHUDWLRQVGXULQJ&-7)¶V¿UVW\HDURIRSHUDWLRQV Understanding the Elusive Enemy: Coalition Intelligence and Detainee Operations in 2002 and 2003 When US forces arrived in Afghanistan in October 2001, they brought with them an intelligence system that was a relic of the Cold War. During the decades that followed World War II, the Army collected information about its enemies and potential adversaries primarily using signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT). These two forms of intelligence relied on the American advantage in technology to listen to enemy communications and monitor enemy locations and facilities with spy aircraft and satellites. The other important form of gathering information, human intelligence (HUMINT), had become more prominent during the Vietnam War when the interrogation of prisoners and other detainees offered precise intelligence about a shadowy insurgent enemy who often eluded detection by SIGINT and IMINT systems. But by the time the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the Army was devoting relatively few resources to the gathering of intelligence through interrogations and other forms of HUMINT collection. Nevertheless, HUMINT proved to be very important to the peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations that the Army mounted in the Balkans and elsewhere in the 1990s. Still, only 30 percent of the assets in the US Army’s intelligence force in 2001 were HUMINT units. The military’s general lack of attention to developing the capacity to collect and analyze HUMINT meant that US forces in Afghanistan initially struggled to use this intelligence discipline to understand the Taliban and al-Qaeda enemy. Most important was the lack of preparation among US intelligence organizations for large-scale interrogation operations and the detainee operations with which interrogations are often intertwined. The US Army in the 1990s had conducted regular training for these operations that simulated complex interrogations within enemy prisoner of war (EPW) facilities. These exercises were based on Army doctrine that gave responsibility for interrogation operations to the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps. Those MI units that specialized in HUMINT normally contained teams of trained interrogators, many of whom spoke and conducted interrogations in foreign languages. In almost all cases, formal interrogations occur in or near detention facilities where prisoners of war or other detainees are held. However, according to the doctrine at the time, US Army interrogators did not run detention centers. They worked within or next to facilities that were staffed and commanded

218 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 85 of 316

Chapter 8 by Military Police (MP) units. MP Soldiers served as the “prison guards” who oversee the housing, feeding, medical support, and other aspects of a detainee’s care. When a detainee was interrogated, the MPs were responsible for escorting the detainee to the interrogation site where the MI interrogators took control. Once the interrogation ended, the MPs returned the detainee to his or her cell. This was the doctrinal foundation that the US military used for detainee and interrogation operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan through 2004. ,QWKH¿UVWZHHNVRI2()&RDOLWLRQ62)DQGWKHLU$IJKDQDOOLHVKDGEHHQUHVSRQVLEOHIRU the relatively small number of detentions and interrogations that took place after the surrender of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. That all changed when Taliban forces in the city of Mazar-e Sharif capitulated and became the prisoners of General Dostum’s Northern Alliance troops. $V FKDSWHU GRFXPHQWHG WKRXVDQGV RI WKHVH SULVRQHUV ZHUH FRQ¿QHG DW WKH DQFLHQW 4DODL -DQJL3ULVRQLQODWH1RYHPEHU:KHQ&RDOLWLRQRI¿FHUVDUULYHGWRLQWHUURJDWHVXVSHFWHG al-Qaeda detainees, the prisoners began to riot, killing one American and eventually taking over the fortress. After several days of sustained Coalition bombing, the prison was once again under the control of the Northern Alliance. Inside, Dostum’s troops found less than 100 detainees still alive. These men were immediately transferred to a prison in the city of Sheberghan. At the same WLPH&RDOLWLRQDQGIULHQGO\$IJKDQIRUFHVZHUHFDSWXULQJRWKHU7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGD¿JKWHUV near Kabul and Kandahar. By early December 2001, there were over 4,000 detainees in custody and the task of holding and interrogating this growing number of detainees was simply too large for the Coalition intelligence assets in Afghanistan.28 CENTCOM reacted in December by directing TF 202 and elements of the 10th Mountain 'LYLVLRQWRPRYHWR.DQGDKDU$LU¿HOGIURPWKHLUORFDWLRQDW.DUVKL.KDQDEDG . 7) formed from elements of the 202d MI Battalion (BN) augmented by Reserve and National Guard Soldiers, specialized in HUMINT operations. By late December the TF headquarters KDGEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGDW.DQGDKDUDQGLWV6ROGLHUVKDGEHJXQGHWDLQHHRSHUDWLRQVDWWKHDLU¿HOG The TF 202 commander had also formed mobile interrogation teams (MITs) and sent them to 6KHEHUJKDQ3ULVRQWRWKH%DJUDP$LU¿HOGQHDU.DEXODQGWRRWKHUORFDWLRQVZKHUHWKHQXPEHU of detainees was growing. The team located at Bagram quickly became part of TF Bowie (see chapter 7), a joint interagency group that combined intelligence specialists from the Coalition SOF community with other agencies within the US Government. The TF 202 team at Bagram assisted TF BowieZLWKWKHLQWHUURJDWLRQRIKLJKOHYHO7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGDRI¿FLDOVGHWDLQHG by Coalition SOF. By the end of December, TF 202’s Soldiers were not only involved in interrogations but also conducting counterintelligence operations and translating the thousands of Taliban and al-Qaeda documents found during searches of enemy facilities. Most of the TF’s resources were devoted to running the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) DW.DQGDKDU$LU¿HOG:KHQWKH0,6ROGLHUVDUULYHGLQ.DQGDKDUWKH\KDGZRUNHGZLWK86 0DULQHVIURP&7)ZKRKDGGHSOR\HGWRWKHDLU¿HOGLQODWH1RYHPEHUWREXLOGDGHWHQ- tion camp and an adjacent interrogations facility. The Marines served as the guards and were responsible for the care of the detainees. The involvement of the MI Soldiers with the detainees was limited to interrogations. When TF Rakkasan, the 3d Brigade of the US Army’s 101st Airborne Division, arrived in Kandahar in early 2002, its attached MP Company took over responsibility for the detention site. For the next 6 months, the interrogators in the JIF and the MITs conducted hundreds of interrogations with detainees of various nationalities and loyalties. A small number of these

219 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 86 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003 interrogations uncovered links between detainees and al-Qaeda. In those cases where the detainee appeared to be a member of the terrorist group or to hold a large amount of intelligence about al-Qaeda, TF 202 transferred the individual to the new detention site at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). In the early months of their operations, the MI Soldiers at the JIF had to deal with the DXVWHUHOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQVRIWKHXQGHYHORSHG.DQGDKDU$LU¿HOGDQGDGHWDLQHHSRSXODWLRQWKDW was growing in complexity. Perhaps the most pressing problem was the lack of linguist support. The detainees in the facility spoke a large variety of languages including Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Arabic, and Russian. By contrast, the US Army had very few speakers of Pashto, Dari, and Urdu, and TF 202 waited for 45 days while the Department of Defense (DOD) hired and deployed contract linguists who could work as translators. In the meantime, the TF leadership WULHGWR¿QGORFDO$IJKDQVZKRFRXOGZRUNDVOLQJXLVWVDWWKH-,) (TXDOO\GLI¿FXOWZDVWKHVFRSHRIWKHPLVVLRQLQWKH-,),QWKHIDOORI&RDOLWLRQ OHDGHUVZHUHIRFXVHGRQ¿QGLQJWKHDO4DHGDOHDGHUVDQGGLVUXSWLQJDWWDFNVWKDWPDQ\LQWKH West suspected were planned for the months following 9/11. These objectives led CENTCOM to issue a broad directive to TF 202 to hold for interrogation all those detainees who were interviewed and found to be members of al-Qaeda, Taliban leaders, non-Afghan members of the Taliban, and anyone else the interrogator believed “may pose a threat to US interests, held intelligence value, or may be of interest for US prosecution.”29 According to Major David &DUVWHQVZKRVHUYHGDVWKHRSHUDWLRQVRI¿FHUIRU7)LQ.DQGDKDUWKHVHFDWHJRULHVZHUH far too vague and expansive. Carstens asserted that the CENTCOM guidance led to the detention of many individuals who after thorough interrogation proved to offer no information of value about al-Qaeda or the Taliban. Faced with problems of a ballooning detainee population, WKHOHDGHUVRI7)RQWKHLURZQLQLWLDWLYH¿QHWXQHGWKHVFUHHQLQJFULWHULDEDVHGRQH[SHUL- ence and began aggressively looking for procedural ways to release the detainees they believed should no longer be held by the Coalition.30 When CJTF-180 became the Coalition’s senior military headquarters in May 2002, the 519th MI BN, an element that was organic to the XVIII Airborne Corps, deployed to Afghanistan to take control of HUMINT operations. Although most of TF 202 returned to the United States, the unit did leave one reinforced company in Afghanistan to assist the 519th. By that date, the Coalition had established its primary detention facility and JIF at Bagram $LU¿HOGDOWKRXJK .DQGDKDUDQGRWKHUVLWHVUHPDLQHGDFWLYHDV WHPSRUDU\GHWDLQHHKROGLQJ activities. Under CJTF-180, HUMINT operations were essentially planned and commanded from Bagram where the TF had created an intelligence fusion cell within its CJ2 staff section. Using larger counterintelligence and interrogation teams, the HUMINT effort became more HI¿FLHQWGXULQJDQGHDUO\31

The Evolution of Interrogation Policy and Incidents of Abuse in OEF, 2002–2003 Issues concerning interrogation and detention policies and practices affected the overall development of HUMINT procedures. Because most of the HUMINT collected in Afghanistan FDPHIURPPHPEHUVRIWKH7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGDGHWDLQHGRQRUQHDUWKHEDWWOH¿HOGWKHLVVXH of detainee legal status and treatment became an important aspect of Coalition operations. $FFRUGLQJWRWKHRI¿FLDOUHYLHZRIWKH'2'¶VGHWDLQHHRSHUDWLRQVFRQGXFWHGE\9LFH$GPLUDO A.T. Church in 2005, a document known as The Church Report, DOD’s understanding of

220 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 87 of 316

Chapter 8 the legal status of those individuals detained in Afghanistan changed several times between 2001 and 2005. In October 2001, when US forces entered Afghanistan, this issue had yet to be resolved. Several months later in January 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed in a memorandum that al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees were not to be afforded the legal VWDWXVRI(3:VWKDWXQGHUWKH*HQHYD3URWRFROVZRXOGKDYHJLYHQWKHVHGHWDLQHHVVSHFL¿F protections. However, that memorandum also asserted that, despite this conclusion, US forces were to treat all detainees “humanely and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”32 This legal stance and requirement for humane treatment was further reinforced in President George W. Bush’s memorandum of 7 February 2002 sent to the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of State.337KHVHUXOLQJVLQÀXHQFHG how Soldiers involved in detainee and interrogation operations in Afghanistan perceived detainees because it established that the individuals they were holding and questioning were not EPWs to whom all the protections of the Geneva Conventions were legally extended at all times. Detainees in Coalition hands in Afghanistan were referred to as persons under control (PUCs) instead of EPWs or detainees. /LNHZLVHLQWHUURJDWLRQSROLFLHVGHYHORSHGVORZO\DQGKDOWLQJO\LQWKH¿UVW\HDURI2() When TF 202 Soldiers arrived in late 2001, they received no special guidance on which techniques or “approaches” were allowed for use in inducing a detainee to speak openly during an interrogation. Between October 2001 and January 2003, interrogators relied on the approaches allowed in US Army Field Manual (FM) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, published in 1992. That manual allowed Army interrogators to use 14 techniques or “approaches” designed to break down the resistance of prisoners of war or detainees to questioning. This set of approaches included direct questioning, elevation or de-escalation of a detainee’s fear (fear up/down), and provision of incentives. None of the techniques allowed for the use of physical contact; deprivation of sleep; or withholding of food, water, or shelter. In the early months of TF 202’s operations, American interrogators found that most of the GHWDLQHHVZKRDUULYHGDWWKH-,)ZHUHWHUUL¿HGE\WKHLUGHWHQWLRQDQGDSSUHKHQVLYHDERXWWKHLU future. Few of them attempted to mislead or challenge the MI Soldiers during interrogations. The willingness of the detainees to talk diminished over time and forced the Soldiers to consider which approaches were authorized to degrade the detainees’ resistance to questioning. According to The Church Report, at some point in late 2002 interrogators in the 519th MI BN began going beyond the approaches explicitly described in FM 34-52. They introduced both stress positions and sleep adjustment as techniques designed to wear down the resistance of some detainees.34 The former technique entailed directing the detainee to hold a strenuous SK\VLFDOSRVLWLRQVXFKDVNQHHOLQJRQDKDUGFHPHQWÀRRU6OHHSDGMXVWPHQWLQYROYHGFKDQJ- ing the detainee’s sleep pattern, but was not exactly the same as sleep deprivation. The Church Report documented that these techniques were introduced in Afghanistan because they had been initiated in the detention facility at GTMO earlier in 2002 and “migrated” from that facil- LW\WR%DJUDP$LU¿HOG ,QHDUO\&-7)EHJDQDQDWWHPSWWRJLYHPRUHGH¿QLWLRQWRWKLVUDWKHUORRVHO\ GH¿QHGLQWHUURJDWLRQSROLF\7KHGHDWKVRIWZRGHWDLQHHVDWWKH%DJUDPGHWHQWLRQIDFLOLW\LQ December 2002 spurred this process. Lieutenant General McNeill, commander of CJTF-180, initiated a formal investigation of the incidents and investigators found that the deaths involved

221 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 88 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003

Medical Assistance to the Afghans

Medical assistance to indigenous populations has been a part of US military campaigns throughout the 20th century. By 2002 these programs, often known as Medical Civic Action Programs or MEDCAPs, had become an integral element in OEF. Certainly, bringing medical aid to impoverished Afghan communities was part of the overall efforts mounted by the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). But other US units provided MEDCAP support as well. This type of humanitarian assistance was especially critical in 2002 and 2003 as the new Afghan Government was just beginning to exert its authority and did not yet have the ability to establish even rudimentary healthcare in the provinces. In all 2002 the 339th Combat Support Hospital (CSH), a Reserve unit from the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, area, supported a number of MEDCAPs. In September its doctors and medical specialists traveled to a village north of Kabul and treated 800 Afghans, half of whom were children. They followed this operation up by teaming with the 82d Forward Support Battalion to hold a clinic in a town near the city of Kandahar where they examined and treated approximately 1,400 Afghans. Lieutenant Colonel James Post, the commander of the 339th (CSH), noted that many of the patients the American doctors saw were suffering from malnutrition and conditions caused by a lack of clean water for drinking and bathing. Not surprisingly, the American doctors dispensed a large amount of deworming medicine to treat perhaps the most common ailment caused by the lack of safe water. In 2002 and after, the CHLCs and PRTs focused a great deal of effort on drilling water wells in many communities to provide sources of potable water. And the US-led Coalition would continue to send MEDCAPs into the Afghan countryside to improve the health of the population and demonstrate the Coalition’s commitment to fostering progress in Afghanistan. Matthew Acosta, “KAF MEDCAP Treats Against Worms,” Freedom Watch, 13 November 2002. Jim Garamone, “US Medics Treat Afflicted Afghans,” DefenseLink, 23 September 2002. detainees who had been handcuffed to overhead objects to keep them awake. According to the investigation, MP and MI Soldiers also beat and kicked these two detainees. In both cases, investigators found that blunt force trauma to the legs was the cause of death.35 None of the actions WKDWOHGWRWKHDEXVHDQGGHDWKVRIWKHGHWDLQHHVZHUHRI¿FLDOO\VDQFWLRQHGE\VHQLRUOHDGHUVLQ Afghanistan.36 Nor were they found to be among the sanctioned approaches in FM 34-52 or in any policy in effect at GTMO. These deaths were the tragic result of abusive and undisciplined Soldiers who chose to treat the individuals under their control inhumanely. On 21 January 2003 the Director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon requested information from CJTF-180 about interrogation techniques in use in Afghanistan.37 Lieutenant General McNeill responded by asking his Staff Judge Advocate to write a memorandum describing the approaches used at the time and 3 days later CJTF-180 sent a list of the techniques to DOD, noting that FM 34-52 was the only reference in use although interrogators also relied on experience gained in the previous year of OEF.38 CJTF-180’s memorandum recommended that the enclosed list of techniques be approved. The Church Report documented that in the absence of any response from DOD, CJTF-180 assumed that the recommended techniques were approved

222 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 89 of 316

Chapter 8 for use in Afghanistan. In early 2003 McNeill prohibited several techniques that were believed to have contributed to the deaths at Bagram in December 2002.39 However, the large majority of approaches in use in late 2002 remained in effect for another 2 years. CJTF-180 and the Reconstruction Effort While CJTF-180 endeavored to collect intelligence that would enable the effort to create greater security, McNeill also sought to use the CJCMOTF to foster greater stability in Afghanistan. For its part, the CJCMOTF struggled to meet its objectives under the new CJTF-180 headquarters. As the command’s Soldiers performed their assessments, met with local leaders, and measured the pulse of the local populations, CJCMOTF leaders wrestled with how best to execute their mission. While the structure of the task force remained the same, its leadership changed twice in the 6 months after CJTF-180 arrived in Afghanistan. In the summer and fall of 2002, reconstruction efforts continued to gain momentum. The CJCMOTF completed an increasing number of projects and shepherded previously nominated projects through the laborious approval and funding process. The command continued to empha- size the digging of wells and school construction and refurbishment, but also began sponsoring periodic medical clinics known as Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPs). Reconstruction efforts were intended to gain support from the Afghans for the better way of life offered to them by the Karzai government and to demonstrate the Coalition resolve to help them. At a minimum, &RDOLWLRQRI¿FLDOVEHOLHYHGWKDWUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURMHFWVFRXOGVZD\DYLOODJHU¶VUHVLGXDOVXSSRUW away from the Taliban or al-Qaeda members still operating inside Afghanistan. 7KH&-&027)FDPSDLJQLQWKHODWWHUKDOIRIEHQH¿WHGIURPWKHDUULYDORIWKHWK CA BN, which replaced the Soldiers of the 96th CA BN. The 489th, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Roland de Marcellus, used its 117 Soldiers to man the existing Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) located in Herat, Kandahar, Bamian, Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, and Kabul.40 From these relatively stable and secure cities, the CHLC members traveled into the provinces to perform assessments, nominate projects, and meet with local leaders to measure the pulse of the populations. Sometime between June and August 2002, CJTF-180’s Lieutenant General McNeill directed Lieutenant Colonel de Marcellus to establish three additional CHLCs in areas that were less permissive but of critical importance because of cultural and historic ties to the Taliban. Shortly thereafter, CA Soldiers established additional CHLCs near Khost, at FOB Salerno, and near Gardez and Jalalabad.41 The Afghan governors of these areas had personally requested that CHLCs be established in their provinces.42 They knew that the CHLCs in other provinces had brought jobs and opportunities for the local Afghan people. +RZHYHUVLJQL¿FDQWWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQHIIRUWKDGEHHQXSWRWKLVSRLQWLWEHFDPHFOHDUWR the Coalition’s leadership that more needed to be done and faster. Nevertheless, obstacles in funding projects remained as did friction between the CJCMOTF and civilian aid agencies. 5HFRQVWUXFWLRQRSHUDWLRQVEHJDQZLWKDSURMHFWQRPLQDWLRQIURPD6ROGLHULQWKH¿HOG²XVXDOO\ a CA Soldier supporting a particular unit. This nomination was a formal assessment of a particular need. The information required included a description of the project, the planned review SURFHVVRUPDQDJHPHQWRIWKHFRQWUDFWHGSURMHFWZKRWKHSURMHFWZRXOGEHQH¿WDQGKRZWKH SURMHFWZRXOGEHQH¿WWKHORFDOSRSXODWLRQDULVNDVVHVVPHQWZLWKPLWLJDWLQJIDFWRUVWKDWFRXOG

223 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 90 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003

Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan

China Turkmenistan Tajikistan Det HQs UZ Konduz z z CHLC CHLC Mazar-e Sharif Det HQs & CHLC CHLC CHLC Bamian z z z z CHLC Herat HQ CJCMOTF Kabul Jalalabad 489th HQs & CHLC Kabul z CHLC Gardez Baghranz CHLC CHLC

Iran Kandahar z CHLC Afghanistan

Pakistan

India

Arabian Sea

Oman AFG-XX-782653 Figure 40. Disposition of CJCMOTF and CHLCs, 2002. anticipate any negative outcomes, an itemized list of funding needs, and a priority value based on the national needs.43 The CJCMOTF staff set the priorities without regular consultation with the CHLC that had nominated the project.44 The next step would require approval from CJTF-180 and CENTCOM. Certain projects could be authorized at each level—dependent on the estimated cost for completing the project. Still, there was a hesitancy to nominate any projects that would cost $300,000 or more due to the assumption within the CJCMOTF that such projects would not be approved.457KH2I¿FH of the Secretary of Defense would have to personally review and approve anything at this level.46 Beginning in October 2002, this policy began to change. According to Colonel George Maughan, projects were “capped at $300,000,” but the CJCMOTF could get an exception on a case-by-case basis.47

224 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 91 of 316

Chapter 8

Although digging a well for a village should have been less expensive than building a school, costs were not set and would change based on the complexity of the project. Unfortunately, the gruelingly slow process of justifying the project need, gaining approval, and receiving funds was not conducive to many projects that were easy to identify. Projects added to the CJCMOTF list often encountered a 3 or 4 month lag time before funding arrived.48 The only funding process organic to the CJCMOTF and its supporting CHLCs was through the Department of State (DOS) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) used primarily to fund DOD humanitarian assistance activities.49 According to the RAND National Defense Research Institute, OHDACA was a very effective tool for the CJCMOTF in providing direct and active assistance even if these activities developed slowly.50 The CJCMOTF had other concerns as well. Increasingly, the TF leaders had become frus- trated with the refusal by various international organizations (IOs) and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) to coordinate or to overtly support the military’s efforts to conduct reconstruction and humanitarian aid operations. Although these organizations ran internal coordination meetings, they tended to avoid inviting Soldiers. Nor did their representatives attend CJCMOTF coordination meetings. Instead, CHLC personnel took to meeting independently with IOs and NGOs. A related source of frustration originated in the CJCMOTF command’s perception of competition between the military and civilian aid efforts, based at least in part on misunder- standing of what the CJCMOTF was intended to do. Captain Benjamin Houston, a member of the Kandahar CHLC in 2002, recognized that the CJCMOTF became closely wedded to the idea of using OHDACA funds rather than serving as a coordination agency that would enable the entire reconstruction and humanitarian assistance effort. Houston recalled, “CJCMOTF got immediately blinded [by] OHDACA, OHDACA, OHDACA . . . they forgot they were actually a Civil Affairs Task Force.”51 Houston believed that CJCMOTF’s ability to direct projects led to the environment of mistrust, “The problem with that was that it created a competition to where instead of working with NGOs, we were competing with NGOs.”52 Some of the commanders and senior staff within the CJCMOTF fostered this sense of competition in which the military authority aggressively protected its projects from NGO inter- ference.53 For some within the TF, transitioning projects to IOs and NGOs was viewed as a failure—not as an achievement—partly because success in the military reconstruction effort ZDVGH¿QHGE\WKHQXPEHURI2+'$&$SURMHFWVDQGWKHDPRXQWRIPRQH\VSHQW7KLVSLWWLQJ of the military against the civilian sector was not conducive to gaining IO or NGO participation DQGZRXOGRQO\EHUHYHUVHGDIWHUVLJQL¿FDQWHIIRUWLQODWH54 On 28 August 2002 Colonel Maughan of the 360th CA Brigade took the reins of the CJCMOTF. By mid-November the command included approximately 300 CA Soldiers who made up the CHLCs and worked in direct support of CTF 82.550DXJKDQLGHQWL¿HGKLVXQLW¶V mission as twofold as CJTF-180 moved closer to a full transition to Phase IV of its campaign plan. First, the direct support (DS) and general support (GS) companies within the CJCMOTF would provide the personnel to man the CHLCs. They would coordinate with the provincial government leaders to determine where they preferred reconstruction take place and in what manner. Second, the CJCMOTF staff received the nomination and prioritized the funding for reconstruction. Maughan also created and implemented a national government-level ministerial team originally envisioned in late 2001 but not established. The original plan called for 40 personnel, but was reduced to only 15 CA Soldiers who worked within key areas of Karzai’s early

225 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 92 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003 government, such as Minister of Finance and Minister of Education.56 At the same time, the CJCMOTF began referring to the CHLCs as Civil Affairs Team–Alpha (CAT-As), which was a doctrinal term that describes a CA element that offers general support to local populations. The CHLC concept had emerged as an ad hoc idea in October–December 2001.57 Now, almost D\HDUKDGSDVVHGDQGWKH&-&027)ZDVXQGHUWKHFRPPDQGRIH[SHULHQFHG&$RI¿FHUV The Evolution of Joint Regional Teams/Provincial Reconstruction Teams In the spring of 2002, before CJTF-180 had arrived, leaders in the CJCMOTF had begun thinking about ways in which the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan could be rationalized and improved. Their thoughts turned to a new type of organization that might be able to link key personnel from the DOD, DOS, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), or other stakeholders that could review a project nomination together and thereby rapidly reduce the nomination-to-implementation cycle.58 Some used the term “joint regional teams” (JRTs) to describe the notional organization. As the summer of 2002 progressed, this idea gained strength, leading some CA specialists to envision the JRT concept as a “super CMOC on steroids.”59 The idea was introduced to Hamid Karzai but, according to Interior Minister Ali Jalali, Karzai preferred the term “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” because the president did not like the connotation of the term “regional.” For Karzai, that term suggested that the teams would work for regional leaders and he did not want to empower the men who had been warlords in the past and sought to retain their military strength and independence from the control of the Kabul-based government.60 After a short period of negotiation, the JRTs became known as Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Lieutenant Colonel Michael Stout, an experienced &$RI¿FHUWRRNWKHEDVLFFRQFHSWDQGEUHDWKHGOLIHLQWRLW In September 2002 Stout had arrived from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to do a study about the effectiveness of the CJCMOTF as it approached its 1-year anniversary. Stout had helped write the doctrine for the command and briefed the director of the CJTF-180 staff, Brigadier General Benjamin Mixon, about the purpose and intent of the study he was hoping to GR'XULQJWKHFRXUVHRIKLVEULH¿QJKHGLVFXVVHGWKHODFNRIDQDXWKRUL]HG3ROLWLFDO±0LOLWDU\ (POL-MIL) Plan for Afghanistan, a concept that would guide the Coalition in their strategic engagement with the new government of Afghanistan. Coincidentally, Stout had an unsigned draft of this plan with him and it would soon become the authorizing document for the PRTs. The POL-MIL Plan had been created earlier in 2002 by the US DOS Director for the Political- Military Bureau for Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping (PM-CPP) under the manage- PHQWRI0U'HQQLV6NRF]6WRXWH[SODLQHGWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKH32/0,/3ODQDVIROORZV ³7KH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV$JHQF\ IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'HYHORSPHQW 86$,' ZDV LGHQWL¿HG LQ WKDW POL-MIL Plan to be the lead Federal agency, most importantly, and, number two, they would have all the funding to be able to do the development, reconstruction, and that kind of (CMO) in Afghanistan.”61 At a 19 September 2001 conference, Dennis Skocz had contrasted conventional military planning with the political component in POL-MIL planning. He explained that military planning occurred at operational level with heavy emphasis on logistics and command and control, while POL-MIL planning directed a coordinated multiagency effort at strategic level where decisions are negotiated with a host nation government.62 The commissioning and eventual creation of a POL-MIL Plan may not have been well communicated to DOD. In December 2001 Ambassador James F. Dobbins, who was serving as 226 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 93 of 316

Chapter 8 the US Representative to the Afghan Opposition in 2001, directed Skocz’s department to produce this document—similar to what he had commissioned them to do for him when he served in Kosovo.63 Skocz’s staff was relatively small for such a critical task. They were comprised of RQHWKLUG)RUHLJQ6HUYLFH2I¿FHUV )62V RQHWKLUGPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHODQGRQHWKLUGFLYLO- ians with occasional interns augmenting their meager team of 12.64 The avalanche of required tasks associated with collaborating with the United Nations (UN), multiple agencies, and inter- QDWLRQDOFRXQWULHVUHVXOWHGLQD¿QDOSURGXFWWKDWZDVFUHDWHGWKURXJKUHYLVHGLWHUDWLRQV65 The drafts were then sent to the various stakeholders who would submit a response. Skocz’s team was able to produce this POL-MIL Plan in a mere 6 weeks and sent it to Ambassador Dobbins prior to his departure for Afghanistan.66 The State Department plan featured a Kabul-centered approach that emphasized political and economic long-term viability for Afghanistan following the collapse of the Taliban.67 POL-MIL Plans are central to campaigns like OEF that require not just joint and Coalition operations but an interagency effort from the governments involved. These plans clearly iden- WLI\QDWLRQDOOHYHOVWUDWHJLHVDQGVKRXOGGH¿QHWKHHQGVWDWHRUJRDORIWKHFRQÀLFWZLWKDGH- quate detail. A well-constructed plan clearly assigns elements of national power—military, HFRQRPLFGLSORPDWLF²WRVSHFL¿FREMHFWLYHVDQGVKRXOGVHUYHDVWKHFRUQHUVWRQHRIWKHFRP- batant command’s or joint task force’s campaign plan. Most importantly, in the long term, it is the key transition document for strategic, operational, and tactical operations. Simply put, the POL-MIL Plan is a roadmap for assisting countries like Afghanistan to achieve political and social stability.68 Lieutenant Colonel Stout’s knowledge of the POL-MIL Plan and his experience turned his temporary duty in Afghanistan into a much larger mission. Lieutenant General McNeill DQGKLVVWDIILGHQWL¿HG6WRXWDVWKHH[SHUWWKH\QHHGHGWRHVWDEOLVKWKH357VZKLOHSURYLGLQJD logical transition strategy that would take the burden of the reconstruction from DOD to DOS. 6WRXW¶VLQLWLDOWDVNZDVWRHVWDEOLVKWKH¿UVWIRXU357VZLWKWKH¿UVWWKUHHDVSLORWVLQWKHWRZQV RI*DUGH]%DPLDQDQG.RQGX]$FFRUGLQJWR6WRXWWKHSLORW357VZHUHLQWHQGHG³WRÀHVK RXWWKHFRQFHSWIRUWKH&-7)&RPPDQGHUDQG¿JXUHRXWZKDWLWVKRXOGORRNOLNHZHKDGD USAID representative that was going to be embedded with the PRT, we had a Department of State representative that was going to be on the ground assigned to the team, and then, most importantly, there was a representative from President Karzai’s government.”69 Thus, the PRT concept was the linchpin in that transition because the new organization would team up the military reconstruction agencies with DOS, USAID, and Afghan Government representatives.70 This inclusion of transition partners was essentially unprecedented and allowed McNeill and other Coalition military leaders a means of envisioning a path toward the end of foreign military presence in Afghanistan. 7KH¿UVWWKUHHSLORW357VZHUHHVWDEOLVKHGLQHDUO\DQGKDGWKH86DVWKHOHDGFRXQWU\ 3UHVLGHQW.DU]DLUHTXHVWHGWKH¿UVWWHDPEHHVWDEOLVKHGLQDQXQVWDEOHDUHDWRKHOSH[WHQGWKH reach of his government, and he chose Gardez where the inaugural PRT opened in January 2003. The Bamian PRT, located in that north-central city, opened on 2 March 2003. Finally, the .RQGX]357EHJDQRSHUDWLRQVRQ$SULO2Q-XO\WKH¿UVWQRQ86VSRQVRUHG PRT located in the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif opened with the United Kingdom (UK) serving as the lead country. The 360th CA Brigade would provide the expertise and manning but could not provide security forces or logistical support for the PRTs because there were no additional resources available in the CENTCOM area. Lieutenant Colonel Carl E. Fischer, 227 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 94 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003 who served as a planner in CJTF-180 in late 2002 and 2003, was involved in establishing the structure and manning for the initial PRTs. Fischer recalled that in late 2002 when CJTF-180 requested 500 to 600 additional combat arms Soldiers to serve on the security elements for WKH357VWKRVHUHTXHVWVFDPHEDFNXQ¿OOHGE\WKH$UP\71 He contended that the demand for FRPEDWDUPVXQLWV²VSHFL¿FDOO\86$UP\LQIDQWU\EDWWDOLRQV²WRVXSSRUW2SHUDWLRQ,5$4, FREEDOM (OIF) meant that no forces were available to help secure the PRTs. Consequently, CTF 82 had to provide combat forces as well as logistical, communications, and aviation support for the new teams to ensure they were defended, supplied, and mobile. The PRT concept was an important step forward in the Coalition campaign in the view of senior military commanders. Despite the fact that the logistical, transportation, and security needs of the PRTs took resources away from CTF 82 and that command’s security operations, Major General Vines, CTF 82 commander, recognized the utility of the teams. Vines stated that his command “paid the biggest part of the bill in terms of numbers though because of the security and some of the support, and it certainly was painful to support.”72 But Vines concluded that WKH357VPDGHDSRVLWLYHRYHUDOOFRQWULEXWLRQWR&-7)¶VFDPSDLJQHYHQLQWKH¿UVWPRQWKV of their operations. In addition to representatives from the CJCMOTF, each of these PRTs were to include at least one representative from USAID, DOS, and, if possible, the US Department of Agriculture. A representative from the Afghan Ministry of the Interior also served on the team to help mediate and guide interactions with the local population. This pairing of DOD and DOS enti- ties was revolutionary, but also become a recruitment challenge considering that civilians in agencies such as the DOS could not be easily deployed into combat zones in countries like Afghanistan. 7KHHVWDEOLVKPHQWDQGPDQQLQJRIWKH¿UVW357DW*DUGH]VHUYHVDVDJRRGH[DPSOHRI how the overall concept developed in late 2002 and early 2003. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen C. Walker, the commander of the 450th CA BN (Airborne), was heavily involved in the establish- PHQWRIWKH¿UVWWHDPDQGUHFDOOHGWKDWLQODWH'HFHPEHUKLVXQLWVHQWWKH¿UVW6ROGLHUV to the new mud-walled PRT compound near Gardez.73 The nonmilitary members of the team at that point included six representatives from international organizations, but with the exception of the representative from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), these civilians would travel 3 hours back to Kabul each night because of the constant rocket attacks on the compound in early 2003. The security situation gradually improved as CJTF-180 assigned more resources to the team. By April 2003 the PRT consisted of a US SF ODA that brought with it medical, engineering, and other specialized skills; an infantry platoon from CTF 82; and 12 CA Soldiers.74 Additionally, the PRT gained six members from the IOs who remained in Gardez throughout their tour. Still, conducting CMO in the insecure region around Gardez was a challenge and forced the PRT to travel in large groups, thus diminishing the number of projects it could begin and monitor at any given time. At sites like Bamian, where the threat was less, the CA Soldiers were more mobile and the PRT needed a smaller security force. Despite the IOs that joined the Gardez team, all involved in the Afghan reconstruction effort did not readily accept the PRT concept. IOs, NGOs, and even some representatives of the 86'26KDGVHULRXVREMHFWLRQVWRWKHVWUXFWXUHDQGLQWHQWRIWKHWHDPV7KH¿QDOUHFRPPHQGD- tions, in a January 2003 brief by Barbara Stapleton of the British Agencies Afghanistan Group,

228 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 95 of 316

Chapter 8 captured the general stance of many aid workers toward the PRTs. Stapleton contended that among the civilian aid agencies there was a preference for extending the presence of the ISAF beyond Kabul. However, this consensus held that the PRTs were not the best method because of the likelihood that Coalition military forces would be involved in projects that were beyond their level of collaborative experience.75 Deborah Alexander, USAID Field Program Manager for Afghanistan in 2002, also voiced concerns about the PRTs: I like the regional team concept . . . I think the work they’ve done has been WHUUL¿F,¶PKDSS\WKDWWKH&LYLO$IIDLUVWHDPVDUHH[SDQGHGEXW,¶PQRWKDSS\ that there is an expansion of other military forces. I’m real concerned about KRZWKLVLVJRLQJWREHSHUFHLYHGEHFDXVH,WKLQNLI,KDYHP\¿QJHURQWKH pulse, I think it’s going to be seen as an occupation, that these military regional teams are going to be seen as taking over their country.76 These assessments represent a perspective that CJCMOTF and CJTF-180 leadership worked to counter through better communication, interaction, and coordination. Selling the PRT concept would take time. As the PRT concept evolved, the CJCMOTF continued to fund and enable a variety of reconstruction projects. As of 1 January 2003, CJCMOTF had received 492 project nomina- tions and had approved 305 OHDACA-funded projects valued at $14,020,986. CJTF-180 at that time was in the process of transferring 26 approved projects with an estimated value of $1.722 million to NGOs or other agencies for execution.77 By early 2003 the types of projects assumed by Coalition forces and the civilian aid community spanned a wide spectrum, ranging from MEDCAP projects such as a clinic in Kandahar that treated 1,400 civilians to the large- scale renovation of the Avecina Pharmaceutical Plant, which not only made medicine available but also laid the groundwork for employment of hundreds of Afghans.78 CJTF-180 was still in Phase III of its campaign, but the further growth of the overall reconstruction effort, especially the introduction of the PRTs, suggested that the Coalition leadership believed OEF was moving closer to a fuller transition to the next phase. Building a Better Afghan Army One of the objectives of the CJCMOTF and the PRTs was to enhance the legitimacy and capacity of the new ATA. Given the lingering security threats from the Taliban and al-Qaeda as well as the continued presence of regional leaders who had retained their own military forces after the fall of the Taliban regime, the creation of a new ANA was not just about the legitimacy of the ATA but concerned its very survival. To tackle the daunting task of establishing a new army, essentially from the ground up, CJTF-180 took charge of the OMC-A, revised the blueprints and roadmap for the ANA’s development, and attempted to further the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program to defuse the serious threats posed by the many militias that still existed outside the control of the ATA. Perhaps the most immediate problem facing OMC-A in the summer of 2002 was the continuing debate about the overall size and structure of the ANA. As explained in the previous FKDSWHU$IJKDQPLOLWDU\RI¿FLDOVKDGIDYRUHGDYHU\ODUJHIRUFHWKDWUHVHPEOHG6RYLHWPRGHOV from previous decades. The Coalition had argued for a smaller, more streamlined military establishment. When CJTF-180 arrived in late May 2002, the Afghans had essentially con- ceded but no real blueprint existed for the future ANA. US Army Colonel Jeffery Marshall,

229 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 96 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003 who initially worked for CJTF-180 and then became a member of OMC-A, succinctly summa- rized the predicament facing the team in late summer 2002: “We inherited a high level design with no implementing details and no real underlying details of how to do that.”79 He became the head of a team that included Soldiers from Canada, Romania, United Kingdom, and France, that was charged with creating a new ANA design. It would become the long-range planning GRFXPHQWWKDWZRXOGJXLGHWKHLQLWLDO¿HOGLQJRIWKH$1$ 7KDW SODQ DQG WKH PRGL¿FDWLRQV WKDW UHVXOWHG IURP LW ZDV EDVHG RQ EXLOGLQJ DQ DUP\ of about 70,000 soldiers. In December 2002 Hamid Karzai endorsed that number in a presidential decree, which established the basic framework for the ANA. Most of those soldiers would serve in light infantry divisions although OMC-A planned for the eventual creation of mechanized forces and combat service units. The Coalition also intended to form the ANA in three phases, each of which would take approximately 2 years.80 In Phase I, which would be FRPSOHWHGE\-XQHWKUHHPLOHVWRQHVZRXOGEHUHDFKHGWKH¿UVWEDWWDOLRQVRIWKH$1$ would be formed into what OMC-A called the Central Corps that would be based in Kabul; the Ministry of Defense would be established; and Afghanistan would have a functioning Border Command that safeguarded its frontiers. The mission of the Central Corps was to serve as a counterbalance to regional leaders and conduct security operations independent of Coalition forces.81 Phase II, which would end in June 2006, would see the completion of the construction of the Central Corps so that it could secure the capital and the early steps in creating a small air IRUFH7KH¿QDOSKDVHZDVLQWHQGHGWRHQGLQ-XQHZLWKWKHFRPSOHWLRQRIDIXOO\IXQFWLRQ- ing Ministry of Defense and some regionally-based corps. Between 2002 and 2004, OMC-A planned to train and equip 24 army battalions. OMC-A’s plans met Afghan realities and by late summer 2002 some of the inertia in the ANA effort began to erode the optimism initially held by many in both the Coalition and the ATA. On 29 August 2002, for example, Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani stated that the lack of the presence of the central government’s military force made the population uneasy. *KDQLDVVHUWHG³:HDUHLQGDQJHURIORVLQJWKHFRQ¿GHQFHRIWKH$IJKDQSHRSOH+LVWRULFDOO\ this means that they take security into their own hands, and the country [descends into anarchy] and the leaders are hanged. I do not know how far along we are in this cycle, but I will be honest that I am not getting a full night’s sleep lately.”82 The Finance Minister and others were essen- WLDOO\UHDFWLQJWRWKHVORZJURZWKRIWKH$IJKDQ$UP\¶VXQLWV7KH¿UVWEDWWDOLRQRIWKH$1$ (1st BANA) graduated with 308 new soldiers on 23 July 2002. The second ANA Battalion followed on 14 August 2002 with 300 additional soldiers from the Kabul Military Academy. +RZHYHUSUREOHPVLQKRXVLQJDQGVSHFLDOL]HGWUDLQLQJOHGWRGLI¿FXOWLHVLQPDNLQJWKRVH¿UVW units capable of mounting operations. Worse was the attrition inside these initial units. The original OMC-A plan was to train 602 Soldiers per battalion.83 But desertions quickly made that goal unattainable. Eventually, the ATA and the Coalition agreed to combine the Afghan National Guard forces, trained separately by UK units, with the 1st BANA in an effort to miti- gate the attrition rates. 0HDQZKLOHWKHIXQGLQJIRUVDODULHVRIWKHQHZVROGLHUVDQGRI¿FHUVZDVVWLOO¿QGLQJLWV way through the US Government’s bureaucracy. To keep the ANA project moving forward, the )UHQFK*RYHUQPHQWDJUHHGWRSURYLGHWKH¿UVWWZREDWWDOLRQV¶SD\7RVRPHGHJUHHWKLVSXWWKH program on a better foundation and sent a signal to potential recruits. On 3 October 2002 the 3d BANA graduated with 358 soldiers after experiencing a loss of 8 men during its training,

230 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 97 of 316

Chapter 8 an attrition rate of only 2 percent. While the 1st and 2d BANAs had received no advanced training after their initial basic course and were not yet conducting operations, the Coalition made great efforts to give the 3d BANA specialized classes that would prepare them for combat DQGRWKHURSHUDWLRQVDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOH,QGHHGWKHG%$1$ZRXOGEHWKH¿UVWUHFRJQL]HG operational unit of the ANA when it began conducting security operations in Paktika province on 4 February 2003.84 %XLOGLQJWKH¿UVWWKUHHEDWWDOLRQVRIWKH$1$ZDVIUXVWUDWLQJEHFDXVHWKHUHFUXLWLQJEDVH for the ANA was primarily the hundreds of thousands of militia members in Afghanistan. Inducting these men—many of whom were former mujahideen or Taliban supporters—into a new army did not automatically make them loyal to the central government. Indeed, these individuals had formerly sworn allegiance to an individual commander or warlord, not a distant political leader who they had never seen in person. Still there were ways of improving the process of transforming these men into reliable supporters of the new government. According to Dr. Eshan Entezar, an Afghan Specialist who worked for the US Army at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, these recruits had to be carefully transitioned into the new military institution to HURGHOR\DOWLHVWRZDUORUGVDQGRWKHUPLOLWDQWJURXSVWKDWPLJKWSUHYHQWWKHÀRXULVKLQJRIWKH ANA. Entezar contended, “Just giving [the recruit] showers and good food and good salary does not make him loyal. . . . It’s important how they’re treated, the rules and regulations. No favoritism, all of those things.”85 Even then, the ANA would have to overcome many cultural obstacles that militated against building a truly national army. The “Valley Forge of the Afghan National Army”: Growth of OMC-A and the Creation of CJTF Phoenix In October 2002 US Army Major General Karl Eikenberry became the chief of OMC-A. By that point planning and designing the ANA was well underway. As noted earlier, three light infantry battalions had already been trained and two more—the 4th and 5th BANAs—had begun the training process.86 Moreover, OMC-A was planning to initiate the training for seven more BANAs between late October 2002 and June 2003.87 One of these units would be a light LQIDQWU\ EDWWDOLRQ OLNH WKH ¿UVW ¿YH %$1$V EXW WKH RWKHU VL[ ZRXOG LQFOXGH D TXLFN UHDF- tion battalion, two mechanized battalions, and combat service support units. The scope of the OMC-A project was growing bigger and broader. As Eikenberry began to comprehend the scale of the task facing OMC-A, he realized that his organization did not have what was required to create the ANA. Eikenberry described what he found after he deployed to Kabul: “When I arrived in early October 2002, my own headquarters on the ground as a two-star general consisted of about 15 people working out of a FRXSOHRIRI¿FHVLQWKH86(PEDVV\DVDQDGMXQFWWRWKDWWKHUHZDVDVPDOOSODQQLQJVWDIIDQG then the actual training mission was being conducted by a Special Forces battalion that was on the ground.”88 He concluded, “The mandate [to build the ANA] was clear and it was a central task, but it is also fair to say that up until that time there had been few resources committed.”89 This point was driven home in December 2002 when Eikenberry visited the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) on the eastern side of the city and found the conditions deplorable for both the new Afghan soldiers and their American advisors. He recalled that the food and the sanitary conditions were terrible and there was no heat inside the barracks. Eikenberry remembered thinking, “This is the Valley Forge of the Afghan National Army.”90

231 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 98 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003

This reaction came with the realization that creating a new military institution that could protect the nation of Afghanistan from foreign and internal threats was going to be a long and arduous process. Indeed, Eikenberry recalled being struck by the immensity of the task given to the Soldiers of OMC-A and their Afghan partners. He stated, “It was just an extraordinary set of challenges. I have been in the service for 33 plus years and I have never seen a set of infrastructure challenges, leadership challenges, and organizational challenges as we were facing in Afghanistan in October 2002.”91 Success for OMC-A would require more than just the training and equipping of light infantry battalions. Instead, Eikenberry and his command ZHUHUHDOO\LQWKHEXVLQHVVRIFRQVWUXFWLQJDQHQWLUHPLOLWDU\HGL¿FHWRLQFOXGHWKH0LQLVWU\RI Defense, a General Staff, and all the other institutions and facilities that fall under that type of structure. Consequently, Eikenberry and his staff restated the OMC-A mission by articulating the IRXUSULPDU\JRDOVWKH\KRSHGWRDFKLHYH7KH¿UVWZDVWR³'HVLJQFRRUGLQDWHDQGRYHUVHHWKH organizing, training and equipping of the Afghan National Army.” Second, the OMC-A needed to “Assist the ANA in developing the military institutions, organizations, regulations, doctrine and systems needed to support a professional military force.” Further, the OMC-A would “Assist in the reform of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff so they can provide effective management and operational oversight of the Afghan Armed Forces.” Finally, the OMC-A would “Assist the transitional government, a Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and ANA that was representative of the nation, not dominated by any one ethnic group.92 To accomplish all of these tasks, Eikenberry realized that he needed a much more robust KHDGTXDUWHUVVWDIIDQGDVNHG/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO0F1HLOOWRWUDQVIHUVRPHRI¿FHUVIURP&-7) 180 and request more personnel support from CENTCOM to build the headquarters’ capability.93 Within several months, the OMC-A headquarters team grew to 50 staff members.94 Nevertheless, the larger staff did not meet all the challenges facing OMC-A. As the project became far broader than just training small tactical units, the Coalition’s reliance on US SF and other allied units as trainers was no longer feasible.95 (LNHQEHUU\DQG20&$¿UVWWXUQHGWR&RDOLWLRQDOOLHVIRUDVVLVWDQFHZLWKWUDLQLQJLQWKHIDOO RI+HDVNHGIRUWKH%ULWLVKWRFRQGXFWWKHWUDLQLQJIRUQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRI¿FHUV 1&2V and they began building a program for that purpose. The French Army likewise began conduct- LQJWKHRI¿FHUWUDLQLQJIRUWKH$1$6PDOOFRQWLQJHQWVIURPWKH5RPDQLDQ%XOJDULDQDQG Mongolian Armies assisted by forming mobile training teams (MTTs) that provided instruction on how to operate and maintain Soviet-designed weapons and equipment.96 Far more important was OMC-A’s decision in the spring of 2003 to create a new TF that would serve as the central core of trainers for the ANA. That organization took the name CJTF Phoenix to signify the rebirth of Afghanistan’s professional army. For the new CJTF, Eikenberry turned to the US Army’s conventional forces, and Forces Command (FORSCOM) assigned an augmented US Army infantry brigade, the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, to provide a headquarters and training teams. The 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division began moving to Afghanistan in May 2003 and started training the ANA that summer. However, it did not deploy with all of its units. One of its battalions, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment (2-22 IN) was assigned to TF Warrior, which would serve under CJTF-180 beginning in mid-2003. A second unit, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment (2-14 IN) deployed in support of OIF that spring. CJTF Phoenix then began with

232 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 99 of 316

Chapter 8 an augmented brigade headquarters, one infantry battalion, and the brigade’s forward support battalion—a force of approximately 1,000 Soldiers. OMC-A further revised the approach the Coalition would take in training the ANA by directing CJTF Phoenix to organize it Soldiers into MTTs and embedded training teams (ETTs). The general concept dictated that the MTTs conduct initial training for all ANA soldiers at KMTC. Specialized training for non-infantry units would occur thereafter. Then the MTTs would leave and the ETT, consisting of 10 to 15 Soldiers who would live with the ANA battalions and men- tor them during actual operations, would arrive and take responsibility for the next phase of the ANA unit’s development. This program, which will be described in more detail in the next two chapters, was a critical innovation in the Coalition’s effort to build the ANA.

ÔÔÔ

During the year that followed the establishment of a large combined and joint headquarters in Afghanistan in June 2002, the nature and scope of the Coalition’s campaign in the country essentially changed. Although Lieutenant General McNeill’s CJTF-180 created a broad campaign plan that attempted to use security operations to help rid Afghanistan of Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other threats, the Coalition’s objectives and targeted end state demanded non- combat oriented operations as well. Thus, the CJTF-180 commander directed his efforts toward reconstruction operations and building the new Afghan Army, both of which supported the larger objective of legitimizing the central Afghan Government and enabling its reach into the provinces. These changes took the campaign in directions not imagined by General Tommy Franks in 2001 or the SOF commanders who led the initial phases of OEF that overthrew the Taliban and destroyed the al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan. Yet those new directions by 2002 had become critical to achieving US interests in the country and the region. The problems created by this shift were evident in the year that immediately followed the establishment of CJTF-180. US conventional forces mounted a rolling series of security operations that temporarily sup- pressed the enemy, but had effects that were less than permanent. US Army intelligence units that sought to understand the irregular enemy forces operating within these areas also struggled to devise ways of gaining a coherent picture of the Coalition’s adversaries. The leaders and Soldiers of the CJCMOTF struggled to create a means of pushing the right type of aid to the provinces and in doing so created the PRT, an innovation that would have a lasting impact on &02 LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ DQG HOVHZKHUH )LQDOO\ &RDOLWLRQ OHDGHUV IDFHG WKH GLI¿FXOW SUREOHPV inherent in creating a modern professional army in a developing country that had been dis- rupted for decades by insurgency and civil war. The challenges for the Coalition would only become greater in late 2003 as the disorganized Taliban forces began regrouping and focused organized attacks that promised to undo much of what US Soldiers and their partners had accomplished during the previous 18 months.

233 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 100 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003

Notes

³'HSXW\6HFUHWDU\:ROIRZLW]3UHVV%ULH¿QJZLWK$IJKDQ)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU´US Department of Defense News Transcript, 15 July 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=3601 (accessed 26 January 2009). 2. Linda D. Kozaryn, “New Weapons Cache Found: Oruzgan Deaths Investigated,” Defend America, 8 July 2002. http://www.defendamerica.mil/archive/2002-07/20020708.html (accessed 5 February 2009). 3. 10th Mountain Division, 10th Mountain Afghanistan and Opn Anaconda Brief, undated, slide 33. 4. General Dan K. McNeill, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 June 2008, 10. 5. “TF 3-505th PIR Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) After Action Review,” 5 December 2002. 6. Major General Benjamin Mixon, interview by Center for Military History, 22 October 2002. 7. McNeill, interview, 16 June 2008, 10. 8. TF 3-505th PIR, AAR Comments for OPERATION MOUNTAIN SWEEP, 26 August 2002, 1. 9. Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP AAR from ODAs 986 and 314, 25 August 2002, 1. 10. Lieutenant Colonel Martin Schweitzer, paraphrased in Major Scott A. Jackson, Tactical Integration of Special Operations and Conventional Forces Command and Control Functions, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003, 34. 11. “TF Panther, 3d Brigade, Battle Captain After Action Review,” 27 August 2002. 12. “Largest Afghan Campaign since Anaconda Ends,” CNN, 25 August 2002. http://archives.cnn. com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/08/25/afghan.operation/index.html (accessed 10 February 2009). 13. Schweitzer, paraphrased in Jackson, Tactical Integration of Special Operations, 34; Colin Soloway, “I Yelled at Them to Stop,” Newsweek, 7 October 2002. http://www.newsweek.com/id/65868/ page/1 (accessed 10 February 2009), 2–3. 14. Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP AAR from ODAs 986 and 314, 25 August 2002, 1. 15. Soloway, “I Yelled at Them to Stop,” 2–3. 16. David Zucchino, “The Changing Face of Battle,” 14 October 2002. http://www.dailytimes.com. pk/default.asp?page=story_14-10-2002_pg7_11 (accessed 16 August 2007). 17. Zucchino, “The Changing Face of Battle.” 18. Zucchino, “The Changing Face of Battle.” 19. Zucchino, “The Changing Face of Battle.” 20. Zucchino, “The Changing Face of Battle.” 21. See TF Devil, 6LJQL¿FDQW$FWLRQV'DLO\6WDII-RXUQDO, March 2003. 22. “TF Devil Operation Mongoose After Action Review,” 18 March 2003, 16. 23. Desert Devil Dispatch, TF Devil Newsletter I, Issue 7, 28 February 2003, 3. 24. “America and the War on Terror,” Soldier Magazine 58, Number 9, September 2003, 27. 25. Desert Devil Dispatch, TF Devil Newsletter I, Issue 7, 28 February 2003, 3. 26. “Operation Valiant Strike,” Army, 1 May 2003, 1. 27. “Operation Valiant Strike,” 1. 28. Lieutenant Colonel David Carstens, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 April 2008, 6. 29. Carstens, interview, 9 April 2008, 19. 30. Carstens, interview, 9 April 2008, 41. 31. Major Ron Stallings and Sergeant First Class Michael Foley, “CI and HUMINT Operations in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, October– December 2003, 44–45. 234 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 101 of 316

Chapter 8

32. Vice Admiral A.T. Church III, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques (The Church Report), 7 March 2005, 186–187. 33. Church, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations, 187. 34. Church, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations, 196, 201. 35. Church, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations, 235. 36. Church, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations, 232–233. 37. Church, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations, 196. 7KHOLVWRIWHFKQLTXHVUHPDLQVFODVVL¿HGDQGLVUHGDFWHGLQWKHSXEOLFO\UHOHDVHGYHUVLRQRIThe Church Report. See Church, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations, 197–198. 39. Church, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations, 196. 40. Lieutenant Colonel Roland de Marcellus, Commander, 489th CA Battalion, interview by Center for Military History, 9 October 2002. 41. de Marcellus, interview, 9 October 2002. 42. de Marcellus, interview, 9 October 2002. 43. Karen Gadbois, Improving the Financial Resourcing Process for Civil/Military Operations, Strategy Research Project, 19 March 2004, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College. http://www. VWUDWHJLFVWXGLHVLQVWLWXWHDUP\PLONVLO¿OHVGRF DFFHVVHG$XJXVW 44. Captain Benjamin Houston, 401st CA Battalion, interview by Center for Military History, 28 October 2002. 45. Olga Oliker et al., $LG'XULQJ&RQÀLFW,QWHUDFWLRQ%HWZHHQ0LOLWDU\DQG&LYLOLDQ$VVLVWDQFH Providers in Afghanistan, September 2001–June 2002 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004). http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG212.pdf (accessed 22 August 2007). 46. Oliker et al., $LG'XULQJ&RQÀLFW. 47. de Marcellus, interview, 9 October 2002. 48. Houston, interview, 28 October 2002. 7RPH + :DOWHUV -U ³7KH 2I¿FH RI +XPDQLWDULDQ $VVLVWDQFH DQG 'HPLQLQJ 6XSSRUWLQJ Humanitarian Needs Around the Globe—Brief Article,” DISAM Journal:LQWHUKWWS¿QGDUWLFOHV com/p/articles/mi_m0IAJ/is_2_23/ai_71837319 (accessed 22 August 2007). 50. Oliker et al., $LG'XULQJ&RQÀLFW. 51. Houston, interview, 28 October 2002. 52. Houston, interview, 28 October 2002. 53. Houston, interview, 28 October 2002. 54. Houston, interview, 28 October 2002. 55. Colonel George P. Maughan, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 August 2007. 56. Maughan, interview, 24 August 2007. 57. Major Mike DeJarnette, 96th CA Battalion Liaison to Islamabad, Pakistan, interview by Center for Military History, 5 November 2002. 58. Major General David E. Kratzer, telephone interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 July 2007. 59. Colonel Michael Stout, 352d CA Command, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Meade, Maryland, 22 May 2007. 60. Ali Jalali, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 June 2007, 7–8. 61. Stout, interview, 22 May 2007. 62. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Proceedings of the Conference, The U.S. Role in the World: Enhancing the Capacity to Respond to Complex Contingency Operations, Washington, DC, 19 September 2001, 13–14. 63. Mr. Dennis Skocz, notes from telephone interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 September 2007, 1. 235 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 102 of 316

CJTF-180 Takes the Lead: Maintaining Momentum, July 2002 to July 2003

64. Skocz, notes from telephone interview, 17 September 2007, 2. 65. Skocz, notes from telephone interview, 17 September 2007, 2. 66. Skocz, notes from telephone interview, 17 September 2007, 2. 67. Skocz, notes from telephone interview, 17 September 2007, 1. 68. Colonel Michael Stout, Afghanistan: Effects Based Operations as a “Roadmap to Transition,” 86$UP\:DU&ROOHJH%ULH¿QJ 69. Stout, interview, 22 May 2007. 70. Stout, interview, 22 May 2007. 71. Lieutenant Colonel Carl E. Fischer, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 January 2007, 4. 72. Major General John R. Vines, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 June 2007, 6. 73. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen C. Walker, interview by 326th Military History Detachment, 18 April 2003, 4. 74. Walker, interview, 18 April 2003, 4–5. 75. Barbara J. Stapleton, $%ULWLVK$JHQFLHV$IJKDQLVWDQ*URXS%ULH¿QJ3DSHURQWKH'HYHORSPHQW of Joint Regional Teams in Afghanistan, January 2003. http://www.baag.org.uk/downloads/reports/ barbara_JRT_report.pdf (accessed 22 July 2007). 76. Deborah Alexander, USAID Field Program Manager for Afghanistan, interview by Center for Military History, 15 November 2002. 77. CJTF-180, Memorandum for the Commander (ATTN: CJCMOTF LNO to CJTF180), OHDACA Status Report as of 1 January 2003, 5 January 2003. 78. Matt Mientka, US Medics Reach Out In Afghanistan, December 2002. http://www.usmedicine. com/article.cfm?articleID=550&issueID=45 (accessed 23 August 2007). 79. Brigadier General Jeffery Marshall, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Washington DC, 24 May 2007. 80. OMC-A, CSA Brief, Afghan National Army, 28 November 2002, slide 3. 81. OMC-A, CSA Brief, Afghan National Army, 28 November 2002, slide 3. 82. Major Christopher M. Chambers, Deputy Director, OEMA (ANA Reconstruction Team, CJTF- 180), Recruiting for the Afghan National Army Brief, 3 October 2002. 83. Staff Sergeant Tyler Ekwell, 401 CA BN, CHLC 11, interview by Center for Military History, 28 October 2002. 84. “America and the War on Terror,” Soldier, 25. 85. Dr. Ehsan Entezar, interview by Center for Military History, 18 October 2002. 86. Colonel Timothy Reese, Successful Fielding of the Afghan National Army, Central Corps Brief, 3 April 2003, slide 6. 87. OMC-A, Building the Afghan National Army Brief, January 2003, slide 54. 88. Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 November 2006, 3. 89. Eikenberry, interview, 27 November 2006, 3. 90. Eikenberry, interview, 27 November 2006, 10. 91. Eikenberry, interview, 27 November 2006, 10. 92. Colonel Timothy Reese, 2I¿FHRI0LOLWDU\&RRSHUDWLRQ²$IJKDQLVWDQ&RPPDQG,QIRUPDWLRQ Brief, slide 7. 93. Eikenberry, interview, 27 November 2006, 8. 94. Colonel Timothy Reese, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 June 2007. 95. Reese, interview, 26 June 2007. 96. Eikenberry, interview, 27 November 2006, 5–6.

236 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 103 of 316

Chapter 9 The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004 In the summer of 2003, the Coalition began making a series of critical changes in the way it approached the campaign in Afghanistan. Over the previous 12 months, Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180), the senior Coalition military headquarters, had viewed its campaign as still focused on decisive combat operations (Phase III) aimed at destroying Taliban and al- Qaeda remnants. But Lieutenant General Dan K. McNeill, the commander of CJTF-180, had envisioned that campaign gradually transitioning to the next phase—humanitarian assistance and support to the new Afghan Government—by the middle of that summer. By May 2003, that transition had occurred. The major expansion of the Afghan Army training program in 2002 and the introduction of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in early 2003 were signs of this gradual transition. On 1 May 2003 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reinforced this idea by traveling to Kabul and declaring that security levels in Afghanistan were such that a more formal transition to the next phase of the campaign could occur: “We have concluded we’re at a point where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities. The bulk of this country today is permissive, it’s secure.”1 This widely-held belief about the nature of the campaign had a number of critical and immediate affects on the shape of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Just weeks after Rumsfeld’s statement, McNeill and the bulk of his staff from the US Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps that had formed the core of CJTF-180 departed Afghanistan. The Coalition passed command of the combined task force and its 11,000 members to Major General John R. Vines who had recently commanded Combined Task Force (CTF) 82. The Soldiers of CTF 82, most of whom had come from the US Army 82d Airborne Division, had begun redeploying to the United States in April. Beginning in May 2003, the US Army’s 10th Mountain Division headquarters and other combat and support elements of the division arrived to replace the departing forces, but this transition would take most of the summer. The 10th 0RXQWDLQKHDGTXDUWHUVWKHQEHFDPHWKHVWDIIIRU&-7)XQGHU0DMRU*HQHUDO9LQHVVLJQL¿- cantly reducing the size and capacity of the senior military command in Afghanistan. +RZHYHU E\ WKH IDOO RI &RDOLWLRQ RI¿FLDOV KDG GHFLGHG WKDW WKH FDPSDLJQ LQ Afghanistan required a headquarters that could focus primarily on operations at the theater strategic level where political affairs were integrated with military matters. Additionally, the campaign had become a more complex effort that involved a combined joint task force that included a number of nations as well as various agencies of the US Government. As a combined joint task force based on a division headquarters, CJTF-180 did not have the proper manning or expertise to direct the campaign at this level. Moreover, CJTF-180 was not well suited to direct theater-strategic affairs while also overseeing the military campaign at the tactical and operational levels. For these reasons, in the fall of 2003 the Coalition created a new senior military headquarters called Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC-A). US Army Lieutenant General 'DYLG : %DUQR EHFDPH WKH ¿UVW FRPPDQGHU RI &)&$ %DUQR QRW RQO\ EHJDQ GLUHFWLQJ political-military affairs for the Coalition but also formally shifted the Coalition approach in Afghanistan to counterinsurgency (COIN). This type of effort would require close coordination between military and political agencies as well as between the Coalition and the Afghan Government. 237 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 104 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

This chapter covers these dramatic shifts in command structure and campaign direction WKURXJKWKHVSULQJRIE\¿UVWH[DPLQLQJWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI&-7)¶VHYROXWLRQLQWKH spring of 2003. Then the discussion will focus on the insurgent enemy that began to coalesce in early 2003 and how it evolved over the next 18 months. Finally, the chapter will look at the HVWDEOLVKPHQWRI&)&$LQWKHIDOORIDQGWKH&2,1FDPSDLJQLWODXQFKHGZKLFKVLJQL¿- cantly changed the way Coalition combat forces were deployed and operated in Afghanistan. CFC-A’s COIN campaign also featured a continuing emphasis on reconstruction, the training of Afghan security forces, the engagement of regional leaders and their militias, and the fostering of a close partnership between CFC-A, Coalition political leaders, and the Afghan *RYHUQPHQW0DNLQJWKLVVKLIWLQDSSURDFKPRUHGLI¿FXOWZHUHWKHODUJHUWUDQVLWLRQVVFKHGXOHG for 2003. In August 2003 a NATO command was set to take leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partly in preparation for Afghanistan’s constitutional loya jirga that was supposed to meet in December 2003 to approve a new constitution for the country. Ushering Afghanistan peacefully through these key transitions was a paramount goal for the Coalition. Restructuring CJTF-180 On 27 May 2003 Lieutenant General McNeill turned over command of CJTF-180 to Major General Vines. Because McNeill left with much of his headquarters staff, the CJTF-180 that Vines directed would look quite different. In fact, after the change of command, Vines found himself in charge of a much smaller headquarters than the one McNeill had led, which numbered close to 400. As noted earlier, the core of the new CJTF-180 staff came from the 10th Mountain Division headquarters. Vines recalled that he and other senior leaders had decided to ³ÀDWWHQRXW´WKHFRPPDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQVLQ2()E\LQWHJUDWLQJWKHRSHUDWLRQDOOHYHOUHVSRQ- sibilities, normally handled by corps-level headquarters, into a tactical-level division headquarters.2 The 10th Mountain Division staff received some augmentation to its staff as well as training from the US Joint Forces Command before it deployed in 2003 to operate in this way.3 There were a number of reasons behind the decision to make this change. Vines suggested that by placing operational-level and tactical-level responsibilities in one headquarters, the QHZ&-7)DYRLGHGUHGXQGDQFLHVDQGWKXVRSHUDWHGZLWKJUHDWHUHI¿FLHQF\6RPHVHQLRU RI¿FHUVLQFOXGLQJ9LQHVKDYHDOVRQRWHGWKDWDVWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVPRYHGWRZDUGZDUZLWK Iraq in early 2003, US Central Command (CENTCOM) became very careful about the number of troops and other resources it directed toward Afghanistan. Vines noted that in late 2002 and early 2003 CENTCOM was “under enormous pressure not to over commit resources to Afghanistan to make sure everything possible was available for Iraq.”4 :KLOH9LQHVGLGQRWVWDWHWKDWWKLVZDVWKHVSHFL¿FUDWLRQDOHEHKLQGWKHGRZQVL]LQJRI CJTF-180, Lieutenant General Barno, who would take command in OEF later in 2003, offered a more direct assessment. Barno suggested that the decision to staff the CJTF with the 10th Mountain Division headquarters originated in the desire to conserve manpower and other resources for the campaign in Iraq.5 Certainly by late 2003, it had become clear to a number RIRI¿FHUVRQ%DUQR¶VVWDIIWKDW2SHUDWLRQ,5$4,)5(('20 2,) KDGEHFRPHWKHPDLQ effort in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).6 Thus, the campaign in Afghanistan had, in their minds, clearly evolved into an economy of force campaign in the larger war. The doctrinal term “economy of force” denotes a military action conducted apart from and in support of the main effort. In this sense, OEF certainly remained critical to the larger global effort, but had become

238 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 105 of 316

Chapter 9 less important than the campaign in Iraq, which began in March 2003. After 2005, several KLJKOHYHO86PLOLWDU\RI¿FLDOVFOHDUO\LGHQWL¿HG2()DVDQHFRQRP\RIIRUFHFDPSDLJQ,Q December 2007, for example, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated publicly that the effort in Afghanistan was “by design and necessity, an economy of force operation. There is no getting around that. Our main focus, militarily, in the region and in the ZRUOGULJKWQRZLVULJKWO\DQG¿UPO\LQ,UDT´7 In practical terms, however, the designation of OEF as something other than the main effort had emerged as early as 2003 and it meant that after OIF began, the campaign in Iraq would receive the bulk of the resources available leaving those in Afghanistan to make do with what remained. Regardless of the motives behind the decision to alter CJTF-180, the senior Coalition military headquarters in Afghanistan was now based on a division staff. This change had an affect on the capacity of both commander and staff. After he became the new CJTF commander, Vines admitted that he could no longer focus on the tactical aspects of the campaign. Instead, Vines found that he had to take on the higher-level duties previously handled by McNeill such as directing the Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) training program under CJTF Phoenix. The new CJTF-180 commander also began working closely with Zalmay Khalilzad, the American Special Envoy to $IJKDQLVWDQDQGPHHWLQJZLWK$IJKDQSROLWLFDORI¿FLDOVVXFKDV+DPLG.DU]DLZLWKZKRPKH talked on a regular basis.8 By mid-summer, Major General Lloyd Austin, the new commander of the 10th Mountain Division, joined CJTF-180 as the Deputy Commanding General for Operations and paid close attention to tactical-level operations as Vines became increasingly enmeshed in his operational-level duties. However, as the staff of the XVIII Airborne Corps GHSDUWHG$IJKDQLVWDQWKH&-7)KHDGTXDUWHUVORVWDVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHURIVHQLRURI¿FHUV who could not be replaced by the incoming headquarters of the 10th Mountain Division. The new CJTF-180 did not alter the direction in which the campaign had begun moving under Lieutenant General McNeill. Vines pursued the reconstruction program by overseeing the CJCMOTF and an increasing number of PRTs while also monitoring CJTF Phoenix’s efforts. To continue putting pressure on the enemy forces located primarily in the southern and southeastern provinces, CJTF-180 employed TF Warrior, a brigade-size combat organization built around the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. Like McNeill, Vines maintained tactical control (TACON) of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), which generally had three battalions in the theater involved in a mix of security and foreign internal defense (FID) operations. The Evolving Enemy and the Coalition Counterinsurgency Response Despite Secretary Rumsfeld’s belief that the campaign in Afghanistan had entered a new phase of stability, Coalition forces still faced a lethal enemy threat in 2003. The reality was that the enemy had not been completely vanquished in early 2002, but had focused on regrouping in the year following Operation ANACONDA. While these groups reconstituted, Coalition VROGLHUVLQWKHODWWHUKDOIRIDQG¿UVWPRQWKVRIKDGEHFRPHWKHWDUJHWVRIVSRUDGLF 7DOLEDQGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFW¿UHZLWKWKHIRUZDUGRSHUDWLQJEDVHV )2%V LQWKHVRXWKHUQDQG southeastern provinces perhaps the most common targets of enemy mortar crews and rocket teams. As spring 2003 became summer and then fall, enemy attacks increased in frequency and violence and began to focus on Afghan civilians, Afghan security forces, and representatives of

239 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 106 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004 international organizations (IOs) and nongovernment organizations (NGOs).9 On 7 June 2003, for example, a suicide bomber in a taxicab collided with an ISAF bus killing 4 German personnel and 1 Afghan bystander, and injuring 29 others. This attack on ISAF workers was the most deadly assault on civilians to date. Two months later, on 17 August, an estimated 400 Taliban FURVVHGWKH3DNLVWDQLERUGHUDQGDWWDFNHGSROLFHVWDWLRQVNLOOLQJ$IJKDQSROLFHRI¿FHUV DQGVLJQDOLQJDVWUDWHJLFVKLIWWRWDUJHWLQJ$IJKDQRI¿FLDOVDVZHOODV&RDOLWLRQPHPEHUV2Q 1 September Taliban forces followed the attack on the police station by assaulting Afghan secu- ULW\RI¿FHUVZKRZHUHJXDUGLQJDUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURMHFWDORQJWKH.DEXO±.DQGDKDUURDG10 All told, in 2003, 12 NGO staff members died in attacks and the number would double in 2004.11 2WKHU&RDOLWLRQRI¿FLDOVDQGDJHQFLHVGRFXPHQWHGWKLVXSWLFNLQYLROHQFH6FKRODUVDWWKH RAND Corporation traced a seasonal increase from 10 attacks of all kinds in Afghanistan in WKH¿UVWTXDUWHURIWRLQWKHIRXUWKTXDUWHURIDQGWKHQULVLQJIXUWKHUWRQHDUO\ attacks by the fourth quarter of 2003.12 On the ground in Afghanistan, the staff of the CJSOTF-A tracked an increase in monthly insurgent incidents through 2003 and into 2004.13 Captain Tim :ROIHDQRI¿FHULQWKHG6SHFLDO)RUFHV*URXS 6)* RSHUDWLQJLQ.DQGDKDUQRWHGLQ “The Taliban are targeting UN workers, NGOs, and friendly Afghans to show that nothing has changed to better their lives.”14 August 2003 proved to be one of the most deadly months since OEF began with more than 220 Afghan soldiers and civilians killed by Taliban forces.15 Despite Coalition efforts, the enemy had found ways to regroup and retaliate. Combat operations in 2001 and early 2002 had devastated organized resistance from the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The leaders of CJTF-180 had followed that success by launching security operations LQDQGWKH¿UVWKDOIRIWKDWDWWDFNHGLGHQWL¿HGHQHP\FRQFHQWUDWLRQV6WLOOSRFNHWVRI enemy forces found safe havens in the mountains of Afghanistan along the border of Pakistan and inside Pakistan itself.16 Ahmed Rashid, a specialist on the Taliban and its relations with Pakistan, has asserted that in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan—especially in and around the city of Quetta—the Taliban leadership found refuge and began to reorganize, plan future RSHUDWLRQVDQGUHFUXLWQHZPHPEHUVWR¿OOWKHLUGHSOHWHGUDQNV17 A number of agencies and organizations fostered these activities. The Jamiat Ulema-e Islam (JUI) party, which had won enough votes in Pakistan’s 2002 legislative elections to give WKHPFRQWURORIWKHSURYLQFLDOJRYHUQPHQWLQ%DOXFKLVWDQKDGDQDWXUDODI¿QLW\IRUWKH7DOLEDQ JUI was a political organization that espoused a traditional form of Islam and ran a network of conservative madrassas or religious schools in the region. The party had been involved in the initial formation of the Taliban in the 1990s and once again offered support. Other agencies, possibly those connected to the Pakistani Government, also lent assistance to Taliban resistance forces by helping them procure arms, equipment, and vehicles.18 By August 2003 Taliban groups had become so powerful in Pakistan that they controlled a large suburb of Quetta.19 Ahmed Rashid has further stated that at times Pakistani military forces provided direct assistance, including medical care for those wounded in operations to the north, to Taliban crossing into Afghanistan.20 2IFRXUVHQRWDOO7DOLEDQVROGLHUVKDGWRLQ¿OWUDWHLQWR$IJKDQLVWDQIURP3DNLVWDQPDQ\ had simply remained in the country after the fall of the Taliban government in late 2001. By the middle of 2003, these forces had begun reorganizing and were targeting Western interests. Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, created a council of 10 prominent Taliban leaders and 4 com- mittees focused on military, political, cultural, and economic affairs.21 According to Rashid,

240 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 107 of 316

Chapter 9

ZLWKLQ$IJKDQLVWDQWKLVOHDGHUVKLSERG\GLUHFWHG7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVWRIRUPLQWRVPDOOPLOLWLD groups of 25 to 100 members. Khalid Pushtun, a spokesperson for the Afghan Government in Kandahar, stated in the fall of 2003: “The Taliban were always in Afghanistan. . . . They were MXVWZDLWLQJIRUVRPHNLQGRIJUHHQOLJKWWRVWDUW¿JKWLQJWKH$PHULFDQDQG$IJKDQDXWKRUL- ties.”22 Certain factors in 2003 may have contributed to this perceived green light, such as US attention being diverted to the invasion of Iraq, which had created concern around the country about the resiliency of US interest in Afghanistan. Ali Jalali, who served as Afghanistan’s Interior Minister beginning in January 2003, believed “the intervention of Iraq shifted attention from Afghanistan at a time [when] everything was favorable to rebuild that country,” and that the US-led Coalition missed “golden opportunities” to capitalize on the hope and goodwill of the Afghan people after ousting the Taliban.23 Another factor at play in the Taliban’s regrouping was the Bush administration’s continued and very public backing of Pakistan’s President, Pervez Musharraf. Despite the growing power of the Taliban forces inside Pakistan, which was evident to many observers, the administration asserted its belief in the partnership with Pakistan. In June 2003, during a visit to Camp David, President George W. Bush described the common threat of global terror on the United States and Pakistan and lauded President Pervez Musharraf’s commitment to reform: “Pakistan’s support was essential in our campaign against the Taliban. . . . Today, both our countries are working with the Afghan Government to build a stable, democratic Afghanistan with secure border regions that are free from terror and free from extremism.”24 Earlier in the year, Afghan President Hamid Karzai had communicated a different message, clearly identifying the Taliban threat that found sanctuary in Pakistan. His efforts were dismissed and, at home, his credibility faltered. Nevertheless, the United States appeared unwilling to threaten the general cooperation of the Pakistani Government by directly confronting them about the growth of Taliban power on Pakistani soil. This diplomatic decision left Coalition forces in Afghanistan to face the growing threat. By directly targeting Afghan security forces, Afghan civilians, and unarmed aid workers, Taliban forces were highlighting the weakness of the transitional government and thus showing its lack of legitimacy. At times, Taliban leaders emphasized this political objective. In mid-2003, for example, a Taliban mullah asserted, “We have the American forces and the puppet regime of Karzai on the run. They will collapse soon.”25 These political aspirations led many in the Coalition to classify the reemerging enemy an insurgency. -RLQWPLOLWDU\GRFWULQHLQGH¿QHGDQLQVXUJHQF\DV³an organized movement aimed DWWKHRYHUWKURZRIDFRQVWLWXWHGJRYHUQPHQWWKURXJKXVHRIVXEYHUVLRQDQGDUPHGFRQÀLFW´26 7KLVGH¿QLWLRQVWUHVVHVWKHRYHUWSROLWLFDOREMHFWLYHVWKDWVHSDUDWHLQVXUJHQWPRYHPHQWVIURP terrorist groups who tend to focus on the use of violence for coercion and destruction rather than the introduction of new political orders. In contrast, insurgent groups tend to be “overtly” politically focused.27 Terrorism and insurgency expert Bard O’Neill emphasized the political QDWXUHRIDQLQVXUJHQF\ZKHQKHGH¿QHGLW³DVDVWUXJJOHEHWZHHQDQRQUXOLQJJURXSDQGWKH ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”28 Given the enemy goal to RYHUWKURZWKH$IJKDQ7UDQVLWLRQDO$XWKRULW\ $7$ WKHUHVXUIDFLQJ7DOLEDQ¿WWKHGH¿QLWLRQRI an insurgent force, albeit one that used terrorist attacks.

241 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 108 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

Another feature that differentiated terrorist groups from insurgencies was their respective organizational structures. Generally, terrorist groups have been loosely structured with autonomous factions and cells serving as the chief organizing units. In contrast, insurgent organizations tended to be more overt in their posture and were structured in a more hierarchi- cal fashion, often resembling military organizations.29 While the cellular structure of al-Qaeda indicates a terrorist group, its overt posture and the considerable “scope and scale” of its operations in Afghanistan indicated an insurgency.30 In describing the classical insurgent movement characteristic of the Communist revolutions of the 20th century, Chinese leader Mao Zedong described an organization that was centrally controlled and focused on central political objectives. Mao’s paradigm, however, was not universal. By the late 20th century, decentralized insurgencies characterized by regional and ethnic ties also came to exist in many countries and appeared to be emerging in Afghanistan in the early 21st century.31 The realization among Coalition leaders that the Afghan enemy was strengthening and sought to topple the ATA heav- LO\LQÀXHQFHGWKHQHZKHDGTXDUWHUVWKDWWRRNFRPPDQGLQWKHIDOORI

A New Command and a New Approach In October 2003 Lieutenant General Barno began forming the staff of CFC-A, the new theater strategic headquarters for OEF. This small staff—beginning essentially as a “pocket” staff EXLOWDURXQGDFRUHRIVL[RI¿FHUV²IDFHGDPDMRU challenge. Before taking command, General John Abizaid, the commanding general of CENTCOM, told Barno that he was to establish a new headquarters that would focus on political-military affairs and to build necessary relationships with Karzai’s government, the US–Afghanistan Embassy, and the ISAF.32 These had become tasks critical to the RYHUDOOHIIRUW\HWDIWHUWKH;9,,,$LUERUQH&RUSV returned to the United States in May 2003, CJTF- 180’s staff had arguably become too small to ade- quately handle affairs at the high operational and theater strategic level. The CENTCOM commander believed that a headquarters dedicated to working US Army Photo at these levels would give the Afghan Government Figure 41. Lieutenant General David Barno. the attention and support it required. %HFDXVHWKHLPSRUWDQW&RDOLWLRQDQG$IJKDQSROLWLFDO¿JXUHVZHUHDOOORFDWHGLQ.DEXO while most of the military operations were located in Bagram, there was a physical and psychological separation between military and diplomatic efforts. Barno sought to correct the separa- WLRQE\HVWDEOLVKLQJWKHQHZKHDGTXDUWHUVIRU&)&$LQ.DEXODQGORFDWLQJKLVRI¿FHMXVWWZR doors down from Zalmay Khalilzad, the newly appointed ambassador to Afghanistan.33 The relocation of the new headquarters from Bagram to Kabul was a strategic decision that paid VLJQL¿FDQWGLYLGHQGV/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO7XFNHU%0DQVDJHUWKH&)&$SROLWLFDOPLOLWDU\ chief in 2003, contended that this single decision had a major impact:

242 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 109 of 316

Chapter 9

7KHEHQH¿WRISK\VLFDOFROORFDWLRQRIVHQLRUPLOLWDU\DQGGLSORPDWLFOHDGHUV DQG WKHLU VWDIIV FDQQRW EH RYHUHPSKDVL]HG QHDUO\ DOO RWKHU OHVVRQV OHDUQHG ZHUHLQÀXHQFHGE\SK\VLFDOSUR[LPLW\DQGLWVEHQH¿FLDOHIIHFWRQSHUVRQDO interaction and coordination. Being in the same place allowed more agility and speed in dealing with rapidly developing crises.34 Mansager added that in his estimation, Barno’s move to Kabul signaled to the Afghans, Coalition allies, and international observers that the United States “was entering a phase of Enduring Freedom focused on reconstruction and stability.”35 Perhaps most importantly, relocating with the Embassy demonstrated Barno’s emphasis on the nonmilitary instruments of the campaign. In fact, the CFC-A commander felt so VWURQJO\DERXWWKHUROHWREHSOD\HGE\WKH(PEDVV\WKDWKHORDQHG¿YHRI¿FHUVIURPKLVVPDOO headquarters to the Embassy to augment Khalilzad’s equally undersized staff.36 This group of RI¿FHUVEHFDPHWKH(PEDVV\,QWHUDJHQF\3ODQQLQJ*URXSZKLFKVHUYHGDVWKHPDMRUOLDLVRQ between the new Coalition military headquarters and the American political representatives in the Embassy.37 Through close cooperation with the US Embassy, Barno was attempting to harmonize military action and political plans, thus creating unity of effort, a doctrinal term that describes the synchronization of the key instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—within a larger campaign. The interagency planning group, led by Barno and Khalilzad, matured into an integrated team that endured for several years and coordinated the civilian and military effort in Afghanistan. Barno began meeting daily with the US Ambassador and key Embassy staff, a practice that led to streamlined staff work and decisionmaking. By 2005, this close relationship led to the creation of an integrated Country Team that was successful in building close relationships with UN representative Jean Arnault, ISAF commanders General Jean Louis Py and Lieutenant General Richard Hillier, and Canadian Ambassador Christopher Alexander. Ultimately, the interagency coordination led to a political-military campaign plan—replete with lines of operation (called lines of effort)—that had taken into account the interests and opinions of Coalition partners. That success allowed the Coalition to SUHVHQWDXQL¿HGHIIRUWDQGFROOHFWLYHIURQWWRWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWDQGWKHEURDGHULQWHUQD- tional community. While Barno sought to use his small staff to forge relationships and establish a coordi- QDWHGFDPSDLJQWKHRYHUDOOGHDUWKRIPDQSRZHULQWKHKHDGTXDUWHUVPDGHWKLVWDVNGLI¿FXOW,Q CENTCOM’s original plan, the CFC-A headquarters was to be a small “pocket” staff of roughly DGR]HQRI¿FHUVWKDWZRXOGEHDEOHWRUHO\RQORZHUOHYHO&RDOLWLRQVWDIIVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQLIQHF- essary.38 But once Barno began analyzing the mission of CFC-A, he realized that CENTCOM’s LGHDRI D SRFNHWVWDII ZDV VHULRXVO\ ÀDZHG7KH ¿QDO -RLQW 0DQQLQJ 'RFXPHQW -0' IRU &)&$FDOOHGIRUDSSUR[LPDWHO\RI¿FHUVDQGUHOLHGKHDYLO\RQFRQWULEXWLRQVE\&RDOLWLRQ nations. Despite its new design, the CFC-A staff grew slowly. By mid-2005, Barno had gradually built a staff of roughly 270 personnel, giving CFC-A a more robust capacity over time even if the headquarters was not quite as large as its commander desired. Barno found that the Coalition nations as well as the American military services were KDUGSUHVVHGWRSURYLGHRI¿FHUVWR¿OOKLVVWDII39 There were multiple reasons why this was the case. But a predominant cause was that in the summer of 2003, as the structure and mission

243 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 110 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004 of CFC-A was under development, the US Department of Defense (DOD) was in the midst of establishing CJTF-7, the new senior Coalition military headquarters in Iraq. Thus, Barno found his new command competing for resources. Coalition partners were also slow in contributing RI¿FHUVWRWKHVWDIIRIWKHQHZKHDGTXDUWHUV7KH&)&$FRPPDQGHUFRQWLQXHGWRVHDUFKIRU ways to augment their staff structure for the next 18 months. Barno contended that it was only through “an immense amount of time, energy, and effort” that the CFC-A staff approach 400 RI¿FHUVPDQ\RIZKRPFDPHIURPWKH86PLOLWDU\¶VLQGLYLGXDOUHDG\UHVHUYH ,55 40 While CFC-A attempted to improve its staff structure, Lieutenant General Barno and his command forged ahead with their mission. General Abizaid, CENTCOM commander, had told Barno that his job was “big POL and little MIL,” meaning that CFC-A was to focus on political matters at the theater strategic level, especially those aspects of the campaign closely tied to the Afghan Government and other regional powers such as Pakistan. Despite this guidance, the mission, in Barno’s estimate, quickly became “big POL and big MIL” as he became intimately involved in both political matters and military operations.41 By being at this level and having the ability to look broadly at the emerging threat, the capabilities of the Coalition, and the needs of the young Afghan state, Barno tried to integrate both political and military aspects of the campaign into a new approach. Within weeks after arriving in Kabul, Barno and his staff began to assess the threats to the Coalition project in Afghanistan. They took into account the broad range of problems facing the new Afghan Government and the nuances that distinguished those groups that opposed both the Coalition and the ATA. CFC-A concluded from the analysis that there were really WKUHHFRQÀLFWVRFFXUULQJVLPXOWDQHRXVO\in Afghanistan.427KH¿UVWFRQÀLFWSLWWHGWKH&RDOLWLRQ and Afghan Government forces against al-Qaeda and closely related terrorist organizations composed primarily of non-Afghans that espoused a radical version of Islam and operated in WKHVRXWKHUQDQGVRXWKHDVWHUQSURYLQFHVDORQJWKH$IJKDQ±3DNLVWDQERUGHU7KHVHFRQGFRQÀLFW featured the insurgent networks of the Taliban and the Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) faction. The native Afghans involved with the Taliban movement were driven by their Pashtun identity as much as they were by the militant form of Islam that formed the ideology of the Taliban. The pockets of remaining Taliban tended to be near Kandahar in the south and the adjoining provinces of Zabol, Oruzgan, and Ghazni, and along the mountainous Pakistani frontier where they had training bases and other facilities. In the northeastern provinces of Nuristan, Konar, Laghman, and Nangarhar, the former mujahideen and militia leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his insurgent group, HIG, mounted operations against Coalition forces and Afghan security units. Although the HIG, Taliban, and al-Qaeda organizations were distinctive, there were indications by the fall of 2003 that leaders of all three were increasingly interested in collaboration. )LQDOO\WKHWKLUGFRQÀLFWZDVWKHVWUXJJOHWRSUHYHQWUHPDLQLQJ³FHQWULIXJDO´IRUFHVIURP disrupting a peaceful transition to democracy led by the ATA. The CFC-A staff viewed this threat as primarily composed of regional leaders who maintained militias. Despite the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program launched by the UN as part of the Bonn DJUHHPHQWVDQGFRQGXFWHGZLWKVLJQL¿FDQWVXFFHVVE\-DSDQHVHIRUFHVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQWKHVH PHQKDGKHOGRQWRPLOLWDU\IRUFHVWKDWJUDQWHGWKHPJUHDWDXWKRULW\LQVSHFL¿FSDUWVRIWKH country.43 Former mujahideen and Northern Alliance leaders like Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammed had formally given their support to the ATA, but in the fall of 2003 they and their forces had become embroiled in a violent feud that threatened to start a new civil

244 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 111 of 316

Chapter 9 war. Other organizations such as poppy producers and criminal groups also undermined the authority of the Afghan Government either directly or indirectly. Taking this analysis into account and considering the slow but steady rise in violence, the &)&$VWDIIEHJDQWRIRUPXODWHDQDSSURDFKWKDWZRXOGDGGUHVVDOORIWKHVHFRQÀLFWV2QHRI WKH¿UVWVWHSVLQWKHIRUPXODWLRQRIWKDWSODQZDVWRLGHQWLI\WKHFHQWHURIJUDYLW\ &2* IRUWKH campaign. Barno recalled that he viewed CJTF-180’s campaign between the summer of 2002 and the fall of 2003 as “a very limited effort focused on the enemy.”44 His assessment was that during this period, the campaign had actually “morphed into an effort that needed to focus on the population if it was going to be sustainable over time.”45 That meant that the primary thrust of the CFC-A’s approach had to be more focused on the rebuilding of the physical and social infrastructure of Afghanistan. Ultimately, the command would view their effort as a classic COIN campaign that focused 80 percent of its resources on civil affairs and political initiatives and the remaining 20 percent on military actions. For these reasons, Barno turned away from classifying the Taliban and other enemy forces as the COG, and instead looked to the people of the country: :HVSHFL¿FDOO\LGHQWL¿HGWKHSRSXODWLRQRI$IJKDQLVWDQDVWKHFHQWHURIJUDY- ity of our effort, and so anything we did that jeopardized the population’s support for that effort, population’s support for their government or for the degree of hope which they all had for their future, that put the entire mission in Afghanistan at risk.46 In other words, the CFC-A commander believed that the Coalition would achieve success in the campaign not by focusing on destroying the enemy but by strengthening the people’s support for the Afghan Government and the Coalition’s plans for Afghanistan. Success with this type of approach implied that the population would reject the Taliban, al-Qaeda, HIG, and other disruptive forces. Instead of actively aiding these groups or even remaining neutral, the population would assist the efforts of the Coalition and Afghan security forces to eliminate the threats they posed. For Barno, success in this approach was contingent on the ability of the population to tolerate Coalition operations. Much of this attitude was based on Barno’s belief that Coalition security operations before mid-2003 had focused too heavily on destroying the enemy and less on winning and retaining the support of the population. Barno asserted, “In our emerging strategy, I viewed the tolerance of the Afghan people for this new international military effort as DµEDJRIFDSLWDO¶RQHWKDWZDV¿QLWHDQGKDGWREHVSHQWVORZO\DQGIUXJDOO\´47 That realization led him to conclude that Coalition operations had to help preserve capital rather than expend it. )URP WKLV HDUO\ DVVHVVPHQW WKH &)&$ EXLOW D &2,1 FDPSDLJQ VWUDWHJ\ EDVHG RQ ¿YH LQWHUDJHQF\³RSHUDWLRQDO´FRQFHSWVWKDW%DUQRFDOOHGSLOODUV7KH¿UVWSLOODUZDVFDOOHGDefeat Terrorism and Deny Sanctuary and categorized operations and actions that placed continual pressure on the enemy. While Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams would continue their search for al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, other Coalition forces would conduct full spectrum operations, which Barno described as a mix of combat operations aimed at insurgents, negotiations among rival groups, and reconstruction missions. The second pillar was called Enable Afghan Security Structure and referred to the growing efforts to rebuild the ANA and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) as well as the Afghan National Police and the Ministry of Interior.

245 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 112 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

Center of Gravity The Afghan People Unity of Purpose: Interagency and International

Defeat Enable Enable Terrorism Sustain Recon- Engage Afghan and Area struction Regional Security Deny Ownership and States Structure Sanctuary Good Governance

Information Operations

Figure 42. Pillars of CFC-A campaign.

CFC-A would rely heavily on Afghan security forces to win the support of the population and extend the legitimacy of the ATA. With the third pillar, Sustain Area Ownership, the CFC-A instituted a dramatic change in the way US military units operated within the country. Prior to fall 2003, the small number of Coalition maneuver forces operated primarily out of Bagram, Kandahar, or the small number of FOBs from which they would launch operations that often took them deep into the Afghan countryside. Once on the ground, they attacked the small number of Taliban and al-Qaeda units WKDWZHUHÀXVKHGLQWRWKHRSHQRUFKRVHWRVWDQGDQG¿JKW%XWEHFDXVHRIWKHOLPLWHGQXPEHU of maneuver units and the brevity of the security operations, the Coalition could neither gain a detailed understanding of conditions in that region nor create a durable security environment. Enemy groups either reemerged or moved back into these areas once Coalition forces returned WR WKHLU EDVHV7R FRUUHFW WKLV GH¿FLHQF\ WKH WKLUG SLOODU PDQGDWHG WKH FUHDWLRQ RI DUHDV RI operation (AOs) for TF Warrior, the reinforced brigade that served as CJTF-180’s maneuver force. CFC-A would assign brigades that arrived later in 2004 similar AOs. Through ownership of AOs, Soldiers could familiarize themselves with the local population and key leaders. The move into unit areas was also intended to send a message to the Afghan population that the Coalition was committed to making their lives better. Barno hoped that building better relations with Afghan communities would allow his Soldiers to collect better information. In turn, better intelligence would lead to more focused combat operations and more timely reconstruction projects. Pillar three dovetailed with the fourth pillar called Enable Reconstruction and Good Governance.$WWKHFRUHRIWKLVSLOODUZDVWKH357FRQFHSWWKDWKDGEHHQGHVLJQHGDQG¿HOGHG to facilitate and coordinate the Coalition’s efforts to rebuild Afghan infrastructure and government institutions. Governance projects would focus on democratic elections and development

246 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 113 of 316

Chapter 9 of the ATA, both of which would also undermine the strength of regional leaders and poppy JURZHUV)LQDOO\WKH¿IWKSLOODUEngage Regional States, required CFC-A to continue diplo- macy with bordering nations such as Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.* 7REUHDWKHOLIHLQWRWKLVDSSURDFK%DUQRGHOHJDWHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUVSHFL¿FSLOODUVWR his subordinate commands. CJTF-180 would bear the burden for the security operations and UHFRQVWUXFWLRQHIIRUWVWKDWVXSSRUWHGSLOODUVDQG7KH2I¿FHRI0LOLWDU\&RRSHUDWLRQ± Afghanistan (OMC-A) would focus on pillar 2. Finally, Barno, working closely with his staff DQG86(PEDVV\RI¿FLDOVSXUVXHGWKHLQLWLDWLYHVDWWKHFHQWHURISLOODU48 Given the nature of OEF as an economy of force campaign, the CFC-A commander understood that his resources were limited. The number of troops available to Barno in late 2003, for example, was approximately 14,000. Once these forces took ownership of their AOs, they would be spread very thin across the southern and southeastern provinces where the enemy had a strong grip. In some AOs, battalions composed of 800 Soldiers took responsibility for entire provinces that were the size of small New England states. This stark reality meant that Barno could not expect the tactical-level forces available in OEF in late 2003 to secure the population in any complete sense. The small number of Coalition units in Afghanistan simply could not occupy and patrol every Afghan village and town in the contested provinces. Troop levels would grow during his tenure as commander of CFC-A, as Barno requested and in 2004 received an additional brigade of US Soldiers. More units arrived in 2004 and 2005 when CFC-A received reinforcements for major events, such as elections which called for increased security. But these units were relatively small in size and remained in Afghanistan for short periods of time. When asked to look back and assess troop levels during 2004 and 2005, Barno unequivocally asserted that given the limitations driven by operating in a theater that was an economy of force mission, “I was very comfortable with the troops I got. . . . I felt very comfortable having that many forces in country and being able to accomplish the mission in the environment we had there.”49 The underlying reason for this attitude about force levels was that Barno did not base his approach on the principal of using Coalition maneuver units to secure Afghan communities. +HVLPSO\GLGQRWKDYHHQRXJKWURRSVWRDFFRPSOLVKWKDWGLI¿FXOWWDVN,QVWHDG%DUQRUHVWHG his campaign on the idea that the maneuver units could develop an acute understanding of their areas and then conduct a mix of offensive, stability, and information operations that would clear the enemy out of the AO and win the support of the population for the Coalition and the ATA. In this effort, the maneuver unit would be assisted by an increasing roster of competent and dependable Afghan security forces as well as a growing number of PRTs. This multifaceted and synchronized approach would, in Barno’s thinking, ensure that the population remained on the side of the Coalition and the Afghan Government. That support would prevent the enemy from returning and regaining a foothold. Providing Security: Combat Operations The nucleus of the CJTF-180’s effort was TF Warrior, the largest component of which was the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. The augmented brigade’s 5,000 Soldiers were divided

*By early 2005, CFC-A expanded the number of lines of operation in its campaign plan to 12. These included counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, but also economic development, social development, and counternarcotics efforts.

247 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 114 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

KONDUZ

TAKHAR BADAKHSHAN BALKH 2 87

BAGHLAN

Bagram Afghanistan Asadabad Kabul VARDAK NANGARHAR 1 501

3 17 Gardez GHAZNI FOB Salerno Orgun-e 1 87 2 22 ZABO Shkin KANDAHAR Pakistan Kandahar

Afghanistan

Iran Pakistan AFG-XX-782553 Figure 43. TF Warrior disposition—2003. LQWRIRXUOLJKWLQIDQWU\EDWWDOLRQVRQH¿HOGDUWLOOHU\EDWWDOLRQDIRUZDUGVXSSRUWEDWWDOLRQD FDYDOU\WURRSDQGDODUJHQXPEHURILQWHOOLJHQFHVLJQDOHQJLQHHUDQGPLOLWDU\SROLFHHOH- ments. Eventually, once CFC-A established its “area ownership” initiative in late 2003, these units would begin taking control of their own AOs, primarily in the south and east of the country. Moreover, by the spring of 2004, CFC-A and CJTF-180 would create two regional headquarters in the south and east that provided greater command and control for TF Warrior’s tactical units. When the Soldiers of TF Warrior began arriving in the summer of 2003, however, that transition was in the future. Units like the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (1-87 IN) began deploying

248 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 115 of 316

Chapter 9 across Afghanistan according to the template established by CJTF-180 in 2002. The Soldiers of 1-87 IN conducted operations from FOBs at Orgun-e, Shkin, and several other locations along the Pakistani border. Further to the east, a troop from the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment operated out of the Gardez FOB. 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (2-22 IN) moved into Kandahar $LU¿HOGDQGSURYLGHGWKHTXLFNUHDFWLRQIRUFH 45) IRUVRXWKHUQ$IJKDQLVWDQG%DWWDOLRQ WK,QIDQWU\ ,1 VHFXUHG%DJUDP$LU¿HOGDVZHOODVDVPDOOEDVHQHDU$VDGDEDGDQG provided the QRF for northern Afghanistan. 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (1-501 PIR), a unit based in Alaska, joined the TF in fall 2003 and deployed to FOB Salerno near Khost. The batteries of the 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery (3-6 FA) were deployed at YDULRXV)2%VWRSURYLGHLQGLUHFW¿UHVXSSRUWWRWKHVHXQLWVDVWKH\FRQGXFWHGPLVVLRQVQHDU the bases. TF WarriorDOVRFRQWDLQHGDVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHURI&RDOLWLRQIRUFHV)RXUKXQGUHG6ROGLHUV IURP5RPDQLD¶VVW,QIDQWU\%DWWDOLRQ³%ODFN:ROYHV´ZHUHEDVHGDWWKH.DQGDKDU$LU¿HOG 7KH\SURYLGHGDLU¿HOGVHFXULW\DVZHOODVFRQYR\VHFXULW\IRUFLYLODIIDLUV &$ RSHUDWLRQV7KH 250 Soldiers of French Task Group Arès operated in the border region southeast of Kandahar ZLWKDSULPDU\PLVVLRQWRLQWHUGLFW7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGDLQ¿OWUDWRUV8VLQJDWHFKQLTXHFDOOHG “nomadisation,” Task Group Arès soldiers ran frequent and random reconnaissance patrols that yielded valuable intelligence concerning the terrain, population, and enemy locations. The new intelligence allowed the French to focus their cordon and search raids and humanitarian aid efforts. The Italian TF Nibbio II was based at FOB Salerno, north of Khost, until September 2003. This 800-soldier airborne battalion conducted patrols that led to the seizure of several weapons caches and facilitated relationships with local Afghans near Khost. The CJSOTF-A, under the operational control (OPCON) of CJTF-180, had approximately 4,000 special operators from the US Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coalition compo- nents from 7 countries. With a staff built around the headquarters of the US Army’s 3d SFG, the CJSOTF-A’s primary mission was to conduct unconventional warfare that included combat operations and humanitarian operations in support of its primary mission. Because of the nature RIWKHLUZRUNWKH&-627)$ZDVQRWJLYHQDVSHFL¿F$2EXWKDGRQHEDWWDOLRQRI86$UP\ Special Forces (SF) based out of Bagram that operated in the eastern part of Afghanistan and a second battalion in Kandahar that focused on the south.50 For many of the Soldiers in TF Warrior, this was the second deployment to Afghanistan. Some noticed huge changes when they arrived in 2003: bigger structures, larger forces, and a better-developed logistics system.51 The veterans in the TF also realized that the enemy had matured. Alpha Company Sergeant Christopher Below noted, “They’ve adapted to our body armor—they know where to shoot us. These guys may be the hard-core survivors. They seem more trained than the guys in [Operation] ANACONDA.”52 Despite some improvements, conditions at the FOBs, where CJTF-180 had concentrated PXFKRILWVFRPEDWSRZHUUHPDLQHGGLI¿FXOW&RQGLWLRQVZHUHDXVWHUH)RUH[DPSOH)2% 6KNLQORFDWHGMXVWNLORPHWHUVIURPWKH3DNLVWDQLERUGHUDORQJDNH\LQ¿OWUDWLRQURXWHFRQ- sisted of a small number of wood or mud buildings and guard towers inside mud walls that were about 15 feet high and surrounded by triple strand concertina wire.53 For this reason and because of their isolation, the Soldiers of 1-87 IN sometimes referred to the base as “The Alamo.”54 A landing strip and Afghan militia positions lay outside the wire. In the summer of 2003, the compound accommodated about 300 Soldiers from 1-87 IN and Coalition SOF.

249 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 116 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

Sustaining Full Spectrum Operations: The 10th Forward Support Battalion (FSB) in OEF

Supporting the thousands of Soldiers of CJTF-180 required extensive combat service support (CSS) operations. In 2003 the 10th Forward Support Battalion (FSB) of the l0th Mountain Division arrived in Afghanistan to support Task Force (TF) Warrior. Like the 30th FSB of the 82d Airborne Division that had provided CSS to Combined Task Force 82, the Soldiers of the 10th FSB found themselves supporting not just US Army units but Marine, Air Force, Special Operations, Coalition, and Afghan units as well. Operating primarily from Kandahar Airfield, approximately 450 members of the 10th FSB moved all types of supplies to the units of TF Warrior deployed to smaller bases in the provinces of eastern and southern Afghanistan. To do this, the battalion had been augmented with Soldiers from the US Army Reserve and Army National Guard that brought expertise in specific logistics skills such as fuel storage and handling. Although a large amount of supplies traveled by helicopter, the 10th FSB also contracted with Afghan “Jingle” trucks to transport a variety of items and reduce the burden on Coalition aircraft. The 10th FSB also provided much needed medical care through its medical company and attachments from the 44th Medical Brigade and the 911th Forward Surgical Team. From July 2003 to May 2004, the 10th FSB provided over 3,000 cases of MREs and over 100,000 gallons of potable water to customers each week. The unit also maintained close to a million gallons of fuel in support of both aircraft and wheeled vehicles. Despite the great demands placed on the 10th FSB by the Coalition’s conduct of a complex campaign in difficult conditions, the efforts of the CSS Soldiers ensured that the units of TF Warrior always had the supplies they needed. Lieutenant Colonel Rodney D. Edge, “10th Forward Support Battalion ‘On Steroids’ Supporting Full-Spectrum Combat Operations,” Quartermaster Professional Bulletin, Spring 2004.

The state of the latrines, showers, and dining facility were less than ideal—a problem that unit OHDGHUVIRXQGGLI¿FXOWWRVROYHZKHQ&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVZHUHVRZLGHO\GHSOR\HGDQGORJLVWLFDO support, stationed at the larger bases, were equally distant. 7KH SODFHPHQW RI )2% 6KNLQ DQG WKH RWKHU )2%V DORQJ RU QHDU WKH LQ¿OWUDWLRQ URXWHV from Pakistan made contact between Coalition units and enemy forces a regular, almost daily, RFFXUUHQFH0RVWDWWDFNVFDPHIURPURFNHWRUPRUWDU¿UHWKDWFDXVHGIHZFDVXDOWLHV8QLWV like 1-87 IN would conduct routine combat and stability operations normally within a radius of 15 or 20 kilometers of the FOB.55 The exceptions were the large-scale security operations, discussed later in this section, that focused tactical-level units on a particular region in search of the Taliban and al-Qaeda facilities and force concentrations. The routine operations within the sphere of the FOBs included mounted combat patrols, dismounted combat patrols, cordon and searches, and small security missions in support of PRT or other humanitarian activities. Mounted patrols, one of the most common operations launched from the FOBs, normally FRQVLVWHGRIDULÀHSODWRRQGLVWULEXWHGDFURVVIRXUKLJKPRELOLW\PXOWLSXUSRVHZKHHOHGYHKL- FOHV +00:9 HDFKRIZKLFKZDVHTXLSSHGZLWKDFUHZVHUYHGGLUHFW¿UHZHDSRQVXFKDV a .50-caliber M2 machinegun or an MK-19 40-mm grenade launcher. The platoon normally enjoyed attachments such as a 60-mm mortar section, a sniper team, medics, and a forward observer.56

250 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 117 of 316

Chapter 9

As noted earlier, combat operations and contact with the enemy were routine events, and a brief summary of these cases cannot do justice to their scope and complexity. However, several examples of small unit actions can serve to provide insights into the type of operations conducted at the tactical level. One of the most dramatic and deadly came on 29 September 2003. The 2d Platoon from A Company, 1-87 IN, operating out of FOB Shkin, was conduct- LQJDURXWLQHPRXQWHGSDWURORIWKHPDLQLQ¿OWUDWLRQURXWHWKURXJKWKH3DNLVWDQLIURQWLHUZKHQ HQHP\PRUWDU¿UHDQGURFNHWSURSHOOHGJUHQDGHV 53*V EHJDQLPSDFWLQJDURXQGWKHXQLW¶V +00:9V2QH6ROGLHUZDVLPPHGLDWHO\ZRXQGHGDQGWKHHQHP\¿UHFRQWLQXHGXQDEDWHG Captain Ryan L. Worthan, the company commander, then moved out of the FOB with another platoon and together moved toward the sites where they suspected the enemy mortars were ORFDWHG(OHPHQWVRI$&RPSDQ\TXLFNO\PRYHGRQWRRSHQJURXQGWKDWSURYLGHGDFOHDU¿HOG RI¿UHDQGDODUJHHQRXJKDUHDWRDFFRPPRGDWHDPHGLFDOHYDFXDWLRQ 0('(9$& KHOLFRSWHU ZKLFKZDVRQLWVZD\WRSLFNXSWKHZRXQGHG6ROGLHU7KHHQHP\¿UHLQWHQVL¿HGDQGDQRWKHU 6ROGLHUZDVKLWE\VQLSHU¿UH$VWKHKHOLFRSWHUÀDUHGWRODQGDQGSLFNXSWKHZRXQGHGGR]HQV RIHQHP\¿JKWHUVEHJDQ¿ULQJIURPSRVLWLRQVRQWKHULGJHOLQHVVXUURXQGLQJWKHVLWH0DMRU 3DXO:LOOHWKHH[HFXWLYHRI¿FHU ;2 RIWKH,1VWDWLRQHGDW)2%6KNLQGXULQJWKH¿JKW contended that Company A had moved into “a horseshoe-shaped engagement area” in which a GHWHUPLQHGDQGZHOODUPHGHQHP\IRUFHZDVGLUHFWLQJERWKGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFW¿UH57 7KHVWUHQJWKRIWKDW¿UHIRUFHGWKH0('(9$&KHOLFRSWHUWRSXOORXW$VLWGLGVRPHRIWKH Soldiers near the landing zone found a wire that they traced to an insurgent position prepared to detonate a mine near where the helicopter was going to land. Fortunately, they had killed the insurgent in the position earlier in the battle before he was able to detonate the device. While WKHFRPSDQ\FRQWLQXHGWRWDNH¿UHXQLWOHDGHUVRQWKHJURXQGDQGDWWKH)2%FRRUGLQDWHG for close air support (CAS) to suppress the enemy on the high ground. Soon, several Apache KHOLFRSWHUVDQGWZR$JURXQGVXSSRUWDLUFUDIWDUULYHGSODFHGOHWKDO¿UHRQWKHHQHP\¿JKW- HUVRQWKHULGJHOLQHVDQGEURXJKWWKH¿JKWWRDQHQG58 By that time, unfortunately, Private First Class Evan O’Neill, the Soldier who had been hit three times by a sniper, had died of his ZRXQGV/HDGHUVRI,1HVWLPDWHGWKDWDO4DHGDDQG7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVKDGEHHQNLOOHG EHIRUHWKH¿UH¿JKWZDVRYHU59 Cordon and search operations were also critical in TF Warrior’s effort to disrupt the enemy’s DWWDFNV6RPHVHDUFKHVIRFXVHGRQ¿QGLQJZHDSRQVFDFKHV)RUH[DPSOHLQODWH'HFHPEHU 2002 Soldiers from 2-87 IN conducted a 4-day operation along the main road from Kabul to Jalalabad, an area in which HIG insurgents were active and in which RPG attacks on Coalition supply vehicles had become common. The battalion’s four companies, which operated out of Bagram and other bases in eastern Afghanistan, split up to conduct low-intensity searches in several towns along the road suspected of harboring weapons and ammunition. Staff Sergeant Charles Haskins of 1st Platoon, C Company described the searches as “low-intensity” because Soldiers paid great attention to the rights of homeowners and refrained from “busting down doors.”60 This sensitivity paid off when Afghans in the town of Surobi pointed out two different sites of unexploded ordnance. By the end of the mission, the 2-87 IN Soldiers recovered over 50 RPGs, dozens of mortar rounds and grenades, and improvised explosive device (IED) materials.61 On 22 April 2004 another small unit action took place in Khost province near the Pakistani frontier. In this incident, Corporal Pat Tillman, a former member of the National Football /HDJXH¶V$UL]RQD&DUGLQDOVZDVNLOOHGZKHQ¿UHIURPKLVRZQXQLWPLVWDNHQO\WDUJHWHGKLV

251 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 118 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

¿UHWHDPZKLFKLQFOXGHGDQ$IJKDQPLOLWLDPDQ7LOOPDQDQGKLVEURWKHU.HYLQKDGMRLQHGWKH Army in 2002 in the wake of the attacks of 9/11. Both Tillman brothers were serving with the 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment when the incident occurred. Tillman’s unit—2d Platoon, A Company—had been conducting security operations with Afghan forces near the village of Manah north of Khost. Because the platoon had a disabled vehicle that needed to be evacuated for repair, the company commander directed the platoon leader to split his unit into two serials. Serial 1 began moving toward the main road to the city of Khost while Serial 2 escorted the broken vehicle along a different route. The platoon planned to reunite at the same location on the Khost Road. Tillman was in Serial 1. Along its route, the leader of Serial 2 determined that the path was too treacherous for the towed vehicle and switched routes, getting behind Serial 1. But the mountainous terrain pre- vented the two units from maintaining radio contact. The new route took both serials through a canyon. Tillman’s serial passed through unharmed. When Serial 2 passed through, however, LWFDPHXQGHU53*DWWDFN6HULDOVDZWKHWUDFHUDQGGHFLGHGWRSURYLGHFRYHULQJ¿UHIRU Serial 2 from high ground overlooking the exit from the canyon. To do this, the squad leader placed Tillman, another Ranger, and an Afghan militiaman on a ridge above the canyon exit. 7LOOPDQ¶VJURXSWKHQEHJDQ¿ULQJRQHQHP\SRVLWLRQVWKH\FRXOGVHHRQWKHRSSRVLWHZDOORI WKHFDQ\RQ$VWKH\¿UHG6HULDOFDPHRXWRIWKHFDQ\RQDQGLGHQWL¿HG7LOOPDQ¶VJURXSDVDQ enemy force. The presence of the Afghan militiaman and the lack of communications between the two serials contributed heavily to this mistake. Believing they had met a new threat, Serial 2 EHJDQGLUHFWLQJKHDY\PDFKLQHJXQ¿UHDWWKHVHFWLRQRQWKHULGJHPRUWDOO\ZRXQGLQJ7LOOPDQ and the Afghan. The tragedy of this event was compounded when the incident was erroneously reported as WKHUHVXOWRIHQHP\UDWKHUWKDQIULHQGO\¿UH62 Several investigations into the incident ensued, and in the summer of 2007, Mr. Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army, announced that he had issued a letter of censure to Retired Lieutenant General Phillip R. Kensinger Jr.63 As commander of the Army’s Special Operations Command (USASOC) in 2004, Kensinger had administra- WLYHDXWKRULW\RYHUWKHG5DQJHU%DWWDOLRQDQGZDVWKHVHQLRURI¿FHULQYROYHGGLUHFWO\LQWKH investigation process. Mr. Geren asserted that Kensinger had not overseen the investigations correctly and had not informed Corporal Tillman’s family in the immediate aftermath of the incident that the US Army was investigating the death as a possible fratricide. Seven other 6ROGLHUVUHFHLYHGOHVVHUIRUPVRISXQLVKPHQWIRUWKHLUUROHVLQWKHÀDZHGLQYHVWLJDWLRQSURFHVV Geren ultimately concluded the Army had “mishandled this matter from very early on” and apologized publicly to Tillman’s family.64 In several cases, spikes in enemy violence or indications of enemy concentrations led CJTF-180 and TF Warrior to execute larger operations that featured the insertion of battalion- size formations into regions outside the sphere of Coalition bases. In late August 2003, for example, Coalition and Afghan forces launched Operation MOUNTAIN VIPER in the mountains north of Deh Chopan in Zabol province, an area believed to harbor a large number of 7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUV&RDOLWLRQ62)DQG$IJKDQVHFXULW\IRUFHVLQLWLDWHGWKHRSHUDWLRQE\FRQGXFW- ing reconnaissance in the objective areas.65 Once intelligence indicated where Taliban forces were located, TF Warrior inserted 2-22 IN into the region. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Dichairo, the battalion commander, recalled that his Soldiers had only been in Afghanistan for several weeks before deploying into Zabol for MOUNTAIN VIPER.667KLVZRXOGEHWKH¿UVWFRPEDW many of his infantrymen had seen. 252 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 119 of 316

Chapter 9

'LFKDLUR¶VEDWWDOLRQVL]H7)FRQVLVWHGRIWKUHHULÀHFRPSDQLHVDQGDPL[RI&$SV\FKR- logical operations (PSYOPs), and linguist support teams. On 30 August 2003 this force air assaulted into the Deh Chopan area and began conducting dismounted marches toward a set of objectives where they suspected Taliban forces were located. The TF Warrior staff expected ,1ZRXOGPHHWHQHP\UHVLVWDQFHEXWWKH\DQWLFLSDWHGWKDWWKH7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVZRXOG dissipate into the mountains or villages after initial contact. Instead, Taliban forces decided WRVWDQGDQG¿JKW67 On the second day of operations, the battalion air assaulted into the area north of the target sites and came into contact with a small enemy element. Pushing deeper LQWRWKHDUHD7)FRQWLQXHGWKHRSHUDWLRQLQWRWKH¿UVWZHHNRI6HSWHPEHUDVJURXQGDQG air assaults targeted an enemy cave complex and a suspected Taliban headquarters.68 During MOUNTAIN VIPER, US Soldiers, Afghan security forces, and Coalition units killed between DQG7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUV69 Operation MOUNTAIN AVALANCHE in December, MOUNTAIN BLIZZARD in January 2004, and MOUNTAIN STORM in March 2004 also massed US, Coalition, and Afghan forces LQVSHFL¿FSURYLQFHVLQUHDFWLRQWR7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGDDFWLYLW\02817$,167250WKH last major operation conducted by TF Warrior before its return to the United States, and focused on setting the right security conditions for the presidential elections scheduled for late 2004. For the operation, CFC-A conducted simultaneous missions in all the southern and southeastern provinces, but concentrated on the border area of Pakistan in Oruzgan province.70 Coalition intelligence had determined that the Taliban had created an important line of communication (LOC) between the city of Kandahar and the border crossing points in Oruzgan province along which people, money, and weapons moved. CJTF-180 sought to disrupt the LOC by launching a series of cordon and searches and other operations along this line. Two thousand Marines from the newly arrived 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit participated as did forces from two $1$EDWWDOLRQV7KH,1FRPSOHWHG¿YHDLUDVVDXOWVDQGRYHUDGR]HQFRUGRQDQGVHDUFKHV around Kandahar City in their portion of MOUNTAIN STORM.71 During this operation and the others that preceded it, Coalition and Afghan forces succeeded in killing and capturing a UHODWLYHO\VPDOOQXPEHURI7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUVEXWVHL]HGDVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHURIZHDSRQVFDFKHV Nevertheless, these successes were only temporary tactical victories in the larger campaign against an entrenched insurgent enemy. In the midst of these large-scale security operations, the leaders of CFC-A and CJTF-180 were making a dramatic change in their approach to the campaign. Beginning in December and continuing through the early months of 2004, TF Warrior’s units began moving into and taking ownership of six new battalion-size AOs in the southern and southeastern provinces. The 2-22 IN, for example, took responsibility for an area that included Zabol province. In February 2004 they began that transition by establishing a new base near the town of Qalat, the capital of the province. That post, eventually called Firebase Lagman, began as nothing more than a mud hut surrounded by concertina wire. Likewise, 2-87 IN moved into Ghazni province by setting up a base outside the city of Ghazni. Other units assumed ownership of their areas by expanding their operations from bases that the Coalition had already established. The Soldiers of 1-501 PIR took control of their AO, called GERONIMO, from FOB Salerno near Khost. Following Lieutenant General Barno’s guidance, these tactical-level units began to interact with the Afghan population and to take responsibility for security and progress in that area. As noted earlier in this chapter, these battalions could not expect to secure their AOs in their entirety. AO GERONIMO, for example, was 10,000 square kilometers in area, roughly the size 253 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 120 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004 of the state of Vermont. But CFC-A did not expect 1-501 PIR to gain and maintain security across that AO. Instead, battalion commanders in TF Warrior began conducting full spectrum operations in conjunction with the PRTs and Afghan security forces to clear enemy elements from the area and then win the support of the population relying on reconstruction and other missions focused on creating stability and prosperity. That success would enlist the population in the larger effort to prevent the enemy from regaining strength in the AO. The transition to area ownership and COIN operations was not easy for US commanders. /LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO%DUQRUHFDOOHGWKDWKHDQGWKH$PHULFDQRI¿FHUVRQKLVVWDIIKDGQR&2,1 H[SHULHQFH 2QO\ D IHZ %ULWLVK RI¿FHUV RQ WKH &)&$ VWDII KDG HYHU WDNHQ SDUW LQ &2,1 operations.72 Moreover, very few Soldiers in TF Warrior had any familiarity with COIN theory and had not trained to conduct COIN operations before deploying to Afghanistan. Thus, the shift directed by CFC-A caught many units off guard and unprepared. Most units adapted using initiative and common sense. For example, in spring 2004 Lieutenant Colonel Michael Howard, the commander of 1-87 IN, decided to assist his key leaders in this transition by ordering books about COIN theory and campaigns through the Internet.73 After the books arrived, Howard GLUHFWHGKLVFRPSDQ\FRPPDQGHUV¿UVWVHUJHDQWVSODWRRQOHDGHUVDQGSODWRRQVHUJHDQWVWR read them and begin applying the lessons learned from those studies to their AOs. (VWDEOLVKLQJWKHXQLW¶VQHZSUHVHQFHLQDQ$2ZDVWKHGLI¿FXOW¿UVWVWHSLQWKHQHZ&2,1 campaign. Lieutenant Colonel Dichairo, the commander of 2-22 IN, recalled the progressive approach his battalion used in its initial operations in Zabol province. After moving into the Qalat Firebase, Dichairo’s troops collected intelligence and then launched security operations to clear areas where enemy forces were detected. Dichairo attempted to ensure these regions UHPDLQHGIUHHRI7DOLEDQE\HQOLVWLQJ$IJKDQSROLFHXQLWVWRFRQGXFWSDWUROVDQGWUDI¿FFRQWURO points with his Soldiers. %DUQRKDGFRQWHQGHGWKDWDFULWLFDOEHQH¿WWRHVWDEOLVKLQJ$2VZRXOGEHWKHLQFUHDVHLQ the quantity and quality of intelligence that US units would collect. Lieutenant Colonel David Paschal, commander of 2-87 IN, found that Barno’s assumption was essentially accurate. Once his units assumed command of their AO, Soldiers were able to capitalize on the relationships built with local Afghans. A better situational awareness led to an improved understanding of the insurgent organization in the area.74 But the information gathered in consultation meetings with local leaders also helped 2-87 IN plan and coordinate reconstruction projects to build the economic and political institutions that would sustain the population in the long run. Reconstruction Operations in the New Approach Throughout the course of 2003 and into 2004, reconstruction operations became increasingly important to the Coalition’s campaign in Afghanistan. For this reason, the Coalition had put great effort into improving the delivery of humanitarian assistance and infrastructure improvement projects. By 2002 CJTF-180 had introduced the PRT concept that located all the resources for planning and conducting reconstruction projects within one organization. When TF Warrior arrived in July 2003, the PRTs were still in their infancy and existed in just four locations: Gardez, Bamian, Konduz, and Mazar-e Sharif. Thus, even before the adoption of CFC-A’s new COIN approach, Coalition units operating out of their bases often took the initiative to improve conditions in the communities that they made contact. The emphasis on reconstruction only sharpened once Barno introduced the new approach, and the PRTs became the center of that effort. 254 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 121 of 316

Chapter 9

For the senior Coalition leadership, the PRTs became symbolic of the means they hoped to use to foster stability and generate prosperity in Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Barno contended that the teams did more than just dig wells or refurbish schools. In his words, they also— %URXJKWKRSHZLWKWKHPWKH\EURXJKWPRQH\ZLWKWKHPWKH\EURXJKWWKHÀDJ with them, and they brought recognition that this was not just the Americans. This was the [Afghan] government because there was always a Minister of Interior representative with the PRTs. . . . [T]hey were widely viewed as kind of outposts of hope in the future and optimism and a positive outlook for people who had not seen any sign of the government or the Coalition except for guys running around in HMMWVs with guns.75 Thus, in the thinking of the CFC-A commander, an increase in the number of PRTs helped sway the population to support the ATA and the Coalition. But the rapid increase of PRTs became necessary in 2003 also because increased insurgent violence against humanitarian organizations prompted many NGOs to pull out of Afghanistan. In May 2003 the UN sus- pended humanitarian demining activities in many areas after attacks against its workers. The organization then curtailed operations in several provinces in August 2003 after attacks on UN compounds. More violence against the UN, including the killing of a staffer for the High Commissioner for Refugees, plagued the reconstruction effort in fall 2003. The PRT concept promised to facilitate stability in insecure areas so that humanitarian and reconstruction work could continue. Beginning in late 2003, Barno strived to elevate the status of the PRTs from what appeared to be a secondary matter limited to CA Soldiers to a concept that was critical to the main effort. To accelerate the timeline for standing up PRTs, Barno transferred CA personnel from the CJCMOTF headquarters as well as Soldiers from CJTF-180 to the staffs of new PRTs across the country.76 By the summer of 2004, there were 12 PRTs operating throughout Afghanistan with a concentration in the southern regions. Nine US PRTs operated in Gardez, Jalalabad, Khost, Parwan, Herat, Qalat, Ghazni, Kandahar, and Asadabad. In addition, ISAF, which had come under NATO command in August 2003, coordinated three additional PRTs: Mazar-e Sharif, Bamian, and Konduz.77 The decision to place these PRTs under ISAF command was part of the extension of the ISAF mission from Kabul to other parts of Afghanistan. A typical US PRT contained a contingent of 60 to 80 Soldiers for force protection, a CA team, a US Army Corps of Engineers representative, a PSYOP element, and an SF Operational Detachment–Alpha (ODA). The PRT structure also had positions for representatives from other US agencies such as Department of State (DOS) and United States Agency for International 'HYHORSPHQW 86$,' EXWWKHVHZHUHQRWUHDGLO\¿OOHG78 By design, each PRT also had an Afghan Ministry of Interior representative who facilitated communications with the provincial governors and local community. A CA lieutenant colonel commanded each PRT and reported to the commander of the CJCMOTF. The force protection element of the PRT was not large enough to conduct combat opera- WLRQV,QVWHDGWKHIRUFHSURWHFWLRQXQLWVSURYLGHGJHQHUDOVHFXULW\DQGKDGRWKHUVSHFL¿FWDVNV including maintaining relationships with law enforcement and intelligence personnel and observing and assessing the capabilities of local military and police forces.79 CA Soldiers coordinated reconstruction projects with NGO and ATA representatives and recommended reconstruction projects for funding. They established a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

255 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 122 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

Morgha b

Konduz Mazar-e Sharif

Asadabad Parwan Kabul Herat Bamian Jalalabad

Gardez Ghazni Khost Britain Germany New Zealand Qalat

Kandahar

Afghanistan Pakistan AFG-XX-782653 Figure 44. PRT locations.

DQGKHOSHG$IJKDQRI¿FLDOVHVWDEOLVKUHJLRQDOFRRUGLQDWLRQRI¿FHV&$6ROGLHUVDOVRH[HFXWHG weekly assessments of IO and NGO activities, intraregional commerce, and Afghan acceptance of the rule of law and the Afghan central government.80 Army Corps of Engineers representa- WLYHVSURYLGHGVXEMHFWPDWWHUH[SHUWLVHSURMHFWLGHQWL¿FDWLRQDVVLVWDQFHTXDOLW\FRQWURODQG project inspections.81 7KH357VVHUYHGDVDZD\IRUWKH.DEXOFHQWHUHG$7$WRH[WHQGLWVLQÀXHQFHWRUHPRWH and rural areas. In this capacity, Soldiers working in the PRTs were diplomats. As the Foreign 6HUYLFH2I¿FHU )62 VWDWLRQHGDWWKH3DUZDQ357H[SODLQHGZKHQKHDGGUHVVHGKLVPLOLWDU\ FROOHDJXHV³(YHU\RQHRI\RXLVDGLSORPDW(YHU\RQHRI\RXLVZHDULQJWKDWÀDJRQ\RXU shoulder and is representing the United States of America and you need to conduct yourselves accordingly.”82 Included in this role was the necessity to extend the authority of the local gover- QRUV6ROGLHUVFRRUGLQDWHGZLWKWKHJRYHUQRUVDQGRWKHUORFDORI¿FLDOVWRSODQSURMHFWVDFFRUG- ing to local priorities. They also helped reinforce local security at a time when the Afghan police service was in its infancy.83 Although each PRT had the same mission to establish security, facilitate reconstruction, and promote the Afghan central government, CJTF-180 allowed individual teams to approach their mission in ways particularly suited to their unique environments throughout Afghanistan. The emphasis of the PRTs differed depending on the needs of the area. Some regions of Afghanistan required a greater emphasis on security while other areas required more reconstruction activities.

256 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 123 of 316

Chapter 9

Colonel Darrel Branhagen, the director of the Civil Military Coordination Center in Kabul in 2003, explained: “Each PRT is tailored to the area [in] which it is located. If it is a particularly hazardous area, we expect to have more force protection teams. If it is an area where we need more reconstruction, we will probably have more civilians to help in the reconstruction.”84 Branhagen added that this unique character affected the shape and size of the PRTs that “vary IURPDORZUDQJHRISHUKDSV¿IW\SHUVRQ357WHDPVWRDVPDQ\DVWZRKXQGUHGWRWKUHHKXQ- dred people as in Konduz.” But he reiterated, “The mission is the same and the same mission parameters exist for all.”85 Lieutenant Colonel John Lineweaver, the PRT commander in Herat in 2004, asserted that WKLVÀH[LELOLW\ZDV³WKHEHDXW\´RIWKH357FRQFHSW86/LQHZHDYHUXVHGWKLVÀH[LELOLW\WRGHVLJQ a PRT uniquely suited to his region. The Herat PRT was based in the city of Herat but had responsibility for reconstruction in four western provinces. This area was huge but relatively secure. Thus, Lineweaver chose to take the 50 artillery Soldiers that he had as his security force, divide them into three teams, and pair them up with his CA Soldiers. The PRT commander then divided his AO into three smaller regions, each of which was assigned to a team. This strategy allowed for continual operations as one team worked in its community, one team provided base VHFXULW\LQ+HUDWDQGRQHWHDPUH¿WWHGIRUIXWXUHRSHUDWLRQV(YHQWXDOO\/LQHZHDYHU¶VJRDO was to establish safe houses throughout the four provinces in their AO. Together with the PRT base, the safe houses would provide a “hub and spoke organization” with which to conduct patrols and keep track of the security situation in the surrounding areas.87 Lineweaver’s approach to reconstruction projects was representative of that taken by all of the PRTs. For his team in Herat, the point of the individual project was not just to build schools or repair roads. Instead, according to Lineweaver, the idea “was to develop the legitimacy of the local government and provide support for the central government and not make it look like the Americans were coming to save the day.”88 To do that, his three teams acted as facilitators ZKRWDONHGWRORFDO$IJKDQRI¿FLDOVDVVHVVHGWKHLUQHHGVDQGSODQQHGDQGIXQGHGWKHSURM- ect. Afghan communities would provide the labor. When the project, such as a new school, was complete, the PRT commander arranged for speakers from the provincial government and Ministry of Education to attend an opening ceremony. Lineweaver noted, “We tried to focus a ORWRQWKHORFDORI¿FLDOVEHFDXVHWKDWZDVWKHUHDOSXUSRVH´ 89 7KHÀH[LEOHDSSURDFKLQRUJDQL]LQJ357DFWLYLWLHVDOVRDSSOLHGWRWKH&RDOLWLRQSDUWQHUV who sponsored PRTs. The United Kingdom led the PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, New Zealand the PRT in Bamian, and Germany the Konduz PRT. Each of these countries took a slightly different approach to fostering progress and security in their areas. Germany’s PRT had close to 400 personnel but most of this contingent was composed of civilians. The vision that drove the British effort in Mazar-e Sharif separated humanitarian work from PRT operations, preferring to focus PRT forces on government institution building and the DDR process while referring most of the reconstruction effort to NGOs.90 This was possible because of the relative stability of Northern Afghanistan. But the British found that their emphasis on DDR could become a major security issue. In the fall of 2003, the militia forces of Generals Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammed began clashing over dominance in Northern Afghanistan. The British PRT then found itself focusing a great deal of energy and resources on brokering an agreement between Dostum and Atta Mohammad simply to reestablish stability. One of the objectives of the PRT concept was to better integrate civilian agencies such as the US DOS, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture into OEF. These agencies brought 257 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 124 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

H[SHUWLVHDQGH[SHULHQFHLQVSHFL¿F¿HOGVWKDWFRXOGQRWEHPDWFKHGE\WKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VPLOL- tary forces. Historically, USAID has been the principal US agency involved in overseas assistance, and in Afghanistan USAID again assumed a primary role. In 2003 USAID provided $508 million for humanitarian, quick impact, and long-term projects while the DOD and the DOS spent $254 million and $64 million, respectively.91 In September 2003 the United States attempted to reinforce the interagency effort in Afghanistan by introducing a new initiative called “Accelerating Success in Afghanistan.” Congress appropriated $1 billion for that program in November 2003, but delays postponed the receipt of these fund that in turn postponed many long-term programs.92

Reconstruction Team Afghan Gov’t Rep

UNAMA HQ Security Civil Section Section

Security CMOC/ Operations Sector IO/N GO Coordinator CIMIC Support Patrols Element CA TM DOS

Force Military Protection Observer Element USAID Security Linguists Observer CJCMOTF Brief, 2003 Figure 45. General structure for Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 2003.

Despite the emphasis on the interagency aspect of the PRT concept, most PRTs were not suf- ¿FLHQWO\PDQQHGZLWKJRYHUQPHQWFLYLOLDQV$Q$PHULFDQ357RISHRSOHW\SLFDOO\LQFOXGHG RQO\FLYLOLDQVZLWKWKHUHPDLQLQJSRVLWLRQVPDQQHGE\WKHPLOLWDU\$'26RI¿FLDOZKR served as Barno’s political advisor expressed the general’s disappointment at his inability to get US agencies to staff civilian positions. This frustration forced the CFC-A commander to turn WRWKH86$UP\5HVHUYHWRPDQWKH357V7KH'26RI¿FLDOGHVFULEHG%DUQRDVEHZLOGHUHG EHFDXVH³WKH'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWHGLGQ¶WKDYHRQHWZRWKUHH>IRUHLJQVHUYLFHRI¿FHUV@UHDG\ to roll to serve on each of these PRTs.”93 However, even Barno reluctantly admitted that the US military with its manpower and resources was the only entity capable of delivering results, stating, “It was clear with the capacity we had in the military, we actually had a chance of making that happen, whereas no one else had the remotest chance of getting close to that without the military playing an immense role.”94 Thus CFC-A adopted a “we own it all” philosophy rather than maintaining a narrow military mission.95 In areas where government civilians did serve on the PRTs, the military-civilian relationship was generally successful. Agencies such as USAID coordinated their reconstruction projects with the military projects to maximize their impact. For US units and PRT commanders,

258 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 125 of 316

Chapter 9 the primary reconstruction funding sources were the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the latter an initiative that began earlier in 2003 in Iraq that allowed tactical-level units to contract for small reconstruction projects such as the refurbishing of schools. PRT commanders learned how to make use of all of these funding sources, often combining CERP, USAID’s Quick-Impact Program (QIP), and the Economic Support Funds (ESF) to complete larger, phased programs. In Herat, for example, CERP funds and USAID funds were used sequen- tially to build a burn treatment hospital.96 In Gardez, the military paid a contractor to grade and compact a road and USAID provided the asphalting and paving.97 In Ghazni, USAID projects totaled $2,975,000 and included numerous road projects and building renovations.98 By the middle of 2003, the PRTs had launched 451 projects that required $20 million in funding from the DOD. These actions included road and bridge repair, rebuilding schools and hospitals, and providing educational and medical supplies to local facilities. Soldiers met with FRPPXQLW\RI¿FLDOVWRFRQVXOWRQWKHVHSURMHFWVDQGWRHQVXUHWKDWWKH\LPSOHPHQWHGSURMHFWV DSSURSULDWHO\3ODQVIRUZDWHUZHOOVIRUH[DPSOHKDGWREHFRQ¿UPHGWRPDNHFHUWDLQWKDW entire villages or towns had equal access to the water. Additionally, PRT staffs tended to view women as critical constituencies for their services, especially those that provided education and medical care. Facing some of the highest rates of illiteracy and the lowest standards of healthcare in the world, Afghan women were particularly grateful for the assistance they received from US military forces. The effective use of PRTs may be one reason for such favorable opinions of the United States and the Afghan Government in public polls in 2004.99 The overall Coalition reconstruction effort received a boost in fall 2003 when the US Government approved the Accelerated Success initiative that greatly expanded funding for Afghanistan. Beginning that fall, the fund that provided money for all manner of projects increased to $1.76 billion.100 But this initiative also marked a conscious shift from an emphasis on smaller QIPs to larger infrastructure improvements. The accelerated funding also targeted improvements in the Afghan security forces and the mounting of elections, several of which were approaching in 2004 and 2005. Large-scale infrastructure projects such as road networks in the cities of Kabul and Kandahar received the largest portion of this aid. But the US Government, through USAID and DOD, sent $91 million to fund PRT projects so that the Coalition could continue to make an impact across the provinces of Afghanistan.101 Reconstruction Activities in the AOs The PRTs were not the only Coalition organizations involved directly in the reconstruction pillar of the COIN campaign. The units of TF Warrior also played a role. Colonel William Garrett, the TF Warrior commander, believed that reconstruction was a key means of winning over local Afghan populations. He recalled thinking, “To win, we needed to separate the Taliban from the local population through hearts and minds, as well as combat operations. . . . Reconstruction could drive a wedge between the two groups by providing jobs and opportunities, while creating doubts that the Taliban offered a better life.”102 Previous Coalition maneuver units like TF Devil had reconstruction projects integrated into their operations. TF Warrior, however, had a new tool that made Garrett and his subordinate units more powerful agents of change in the Afghan countryside—the CERP. In November 2003 Congress expanded the program to Afghanistan and initially authorized $40 million in appropriations. CERP allowed both battalion commanders and PRT commanders to authorize small-scale projects up to $25,000

259 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 126 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004 for quick impact. These projects demonstrated the Coalition’s will to build a better future for Afghanistan, and built good will and trust between Coalition Soldiers and the population. Typical small-scale projects funded by CERP in Afghanistan included building wells, providing generators, and distributing school supplies. 0DQ\XQLWVRQWKHLU)2%VDQG¿UHEDVHVZHQWIXUWKHU%DWWDOLRQDQGFRPSDQ\FRPPDQG- ers allowed local Afghans to access their medical facilities. For example, the 10th Forward Support Battalion Medical Company, augmented by 44th Medical Brigade and the 911th )RUZDUG6XUJLFDO7HDPWUHDWHGRYHUSDWLHQWVLQWKHLU¿UVWPRQWKVDW.DQGDKDU/RFDO $IJKDQVÀRFNHGWRWKHLUJDWHVDQGRQFHLQVLGHWKHZDOOVQRSDWLHQWZDVWXUQHGDZD\$IWHU WKH7DOLEDQGHWRQDWHGVHYHUDO,('VLQDORFDOPDUNHWFKLOGUHQZLWKKRUUL¿FLQMXULHVDUULYHG at the hospital and received treatment.103 In the rural communities that surrounded the FOBs, veterinary care was also in high demand. The commander of 1-87 IN allowed local Afghans to bring their animals to the FOBs for treatment. The hired veterinarian distributed medicine to the animals and instructed their owners in proper care.104 Lieutenant Colonel Paschal, 2-87 IN commander, found that reconstruction projects often induced village leaders to help provide security. In 2003 one of his units was involved in drilling a well when an IED killed one of his Soldiers. Paschal stopped the project and told the village leadership, “You cannot secure your own area. You have affected me. Until you can secure your area, we are not going to have any other dealings.”105 Together, Paschal and the village leaders created a neighborhood watch program with each village elder responsible for security in an area. Paschal wrote a contract and translated the document into Pashto. Each elder stamped his thumbprint on the contract to seal the agreement. About 6 weeks later, villages alerted 2-87 IN to a roadside land mine. Paschal attributed this success to the local Afghan investment to the security process.106 Soldiers in 1-87 IN used CERP funds to launch a large agricultural project in Paktika province that they hoped would also foster security. Major Paul Wille, the battalion XO, knew that groves of fruit trees and a robust farming economy once prospered in the area, but years of war destroyed the infrastructure and the land. Wille wanted to regenerate the farming sector by helping the local Afghans plant crops other than poppies, the sale of which funded Taliban activities. Not knowing where to begin, he began to e-mail a number of agriculture profes- sors located in US universities in the western states who knew how to sustain crops in arid, mountainous regions. He also researched irrigation systems that conserved water. To help the local economy, Wille purchased equipment, seed, and fertilizer from local vendors whenever possible. With the help of local labor, the unit built greenhouses to allow the community to continue the growing season through the winter and dug drip irrigation systems. To ensure the locals knew how to sustain the agricultural sector for the future, 1-87 IN hired Pashto speakers to teach classes on vocational agriculture, worked with local tribal leaders to ensure equitable distribution of resources, and to promote the local government’s involvement in civic projects. ,QWKH¿UVWPRQWKVWKHSURJUDPGLVWULEXWHGPLOOLRQLQUHVRXUFHVWKURXJKRXW3DNWLND province.107 One of the goals of the reconstruction projects was to further the reach of the local and central governments. CJTF-180 was careful to credit Afghan leaders when projects were completed. Soldiers also conducted information operations to help teach locals about the new JRYHUQPHQW/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO%HQWOH\1HWWOHVWKH&-7)LQIRUPDWLRQRSHUDWLRQV¿HOG

260 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 127 of 316

Chapter 9 support team chief, found that many Afghans did not have a strong national identity or feel a connection to the national government.108 Most citizens had never seen President Karzai and were thrilled when Soldiers had pictures to share.109 Nettles helped CA teams distribute Afghan ÀDJVWREHGLVSOD\HGLQWKHQHZVFKRROVRUFOLQLFV CFC-A and CJTF-180 maintained that information operations was at the center of the strategy to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The enemy, however, had their own information operations campaigns intent on stimulating anti-Coalition sentiment. The Taliban broadcasted radio messages and blamed the Coalition for civilian deaths.1103URSDJDQGDHIIRUWVLQFOXGHGOHDÀHWV showing US Soldiers violating the dignity of Afghan citizens and warning citizens not to cooperate with US reconstruction efforts.111 Coalition information operations needed to overcome a widespread concern that the United States would abandon Afghanistan once combat ended. CFC-A maintained a six-person information operations team that coordinated the various Coalition information efforts. Lieutenant Colonel Nettles, an information operations specialist and a team leader in 2003, used a variety of methods for strategic communications. His team coordinated radio shows hosted by local commanders and established a program that handed out radios powered by an attached hand crank to Afghans. Nettles’ team also launched an initiative that built bulletin boards in villages that posted messages promoting the local and national governments.112 Nettles even convinced the commercial airline carrier, Ariana Afghan Airlines, to distribute to passengers a newspaper highlighting the economic and social accomplishments of the new Afghanistan.113 None of these measures, however, was as powerful as seeing the Afghan security forces, especially the soldiers of the ANA, working closely with Coalition troops. Enabling the ANA The CFC-A plan allotted an entire pillar to the enabling of the Afghan security forces. For Lieutenant General Barno, the reasoning behind this emphasis was sound. For most counter- insurgent forces throughout history, successful campaigns against insurgencies featured collaboration with host nation police, paramilitary, and military forces. Barno and the CFC-A staff knew this and also understood that the Coalition, relatively speaking, had very few forces inside Afghanistan. Thus, Coalition military units needed effective Afghan partners to be successful. Since 2002 the OMC-A had been working toward the establishment of the ANA and by mid-2003, was assisting the Afghan Government recruit, train, and equip a dozen battalions of light infantry. OMC-A reported that on 1 June 2003 it had trained over 7,000 Afghan soldiers of which approximately 4,000 were currently serving in units. Problems with pay, facilities, DQGRWKHULVVXHVNHSWDWWULWLRQUDWHVKLJKEXWSURJUHVVZDVVWHDG\DQG20&$RI¿FLDOVEHOLHYHG that the ANA Central Corps, based in Kabul, would be completed by mid-2004.114 In December 2003 US Air Force Major General Craig Weston changed command with US Army Major General Karl Eikenberry as head of the OMC-A.115 Under Eikenberry, the effort to train the soldiers of the ANA had transitioned from a US Army SF battalion to CJTF Phoenix, a unit that was focused solely on training and advising the ANA. US Army conventional forces formed the core of CJTF Phoenix, but individuals and units from other US services and the Coalition nations were also critical to the training and advising tasks. In the fall of 2003, the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, which had been serving as that core since mid-2003, was designated for deployment to Iraq as part of OIF. The Coalition then arranged for the 45th Infantry Brigade of the Oklahoma Army National Guard to provide the manning for CJTF

261 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 128 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

PhoenixEHJLQQLQJLQ1RYHPEHU7KLVPRYHPDUNHGWKH¿UVWPDMRUFRPPLWPHQWRID brigade-size Reserve Component force in OEF. Weston sought to continue the momentum built up by Eikenberry and hoped to solve some of the larger persistent issues, especially poor facilities and high attrition rates. Recruiting, Retention, and Diversity President Karzai’s decree establishing the ANA had stipulated that the new army be a force of 70,000 soldiers composed of volunteers who represented all of Afghanistan’s ethnic and social groups.116 To meet these requirements, the ANA required a robust recruiting effort. A joint Afghan/OMC-A program to establish National Army Volunteer Centers in all 34 provinces began in July 2003. The initiative started slowly as the two recruiters from OMC-A faced challenges in securing ground and helicopter transportation to distant areas. Likewise, once new recruits enlisted, they often faced days of traveling to reach the ANA training centers in Kabul. But by winter 2004, Afghanistan’s Recruiting Command was well established with 23 of the 34 centers open.117 5HFUXLWHUVHPSOR\HGUDGLRWHOHYLVLRQSRVWHUVELOOERDUGVDQGÀ\HUVWRHQFRXUDJH\RXQJ $IJKDQVWRHQOLVWXVLQJWKHUHFUXLWLQJPRWWR³2QH1DWLRQ2QH$UP\´²DVORJDQWKDWUHÀHFWHG the Coalition imperative of building a multiethnic national army. Many of the billboards featured that motto written under a picture of four Afghan Soldiers—a Pashtun, a Hazara, a Tajik, and an Uzbek. A large part of the recruiting effort was working with village leaders and elders who would nominate young men for the ANA.118 While most Afghan families were familiar with weapons, the majority of the recruits had no military experience. Colonel David )UDQFDYLOODZKRVHUYHGDV20&$¶V¿UVWFKLHIRIUHFUXLWLQJGHVFULEHGWKHUHFUXLWLQJGULYHLQ 2003 as “absolutely starting from scratch. [The recruits] had no military training. They may have known how to pull a trigger, but no military discipline, no marksmanship, and no tactics other than hunting.”119 Because the Afghan MOD lacked a history of personnel records or cen- sus data, it was virtually impossible for the Afghan Government to check the records of young recruits for health problems, crimes, associations with criminal or terrorist organizations, and other things that might exclude them from military service. Village leaders had to serve in this capacity and often took responsibility for the young men they nominated. However, as the ANA developed, the intelligence section began to approve the accession of young soldiers.120 7KH$IJKDQ02'VHOHFWHGRI¿FHUVEDVHGRQPHULWDQGHWKQLFUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ7KHPLQL- PDOUHTXLUHPHQWIRURI¿FHUVHOHFWLRQZDVWKHDELOLW\WRUHDGDQGZULWH:KHQRI¿FHUVGLGQRW meet requirements or on recommendations from Coalition trainers, the MOD would remove RUUHSODFHWKHVHRI¿FHUV7KH$7$UHFRJQL]LQJWKHOHJDF\RIPXMDKLGHHQOHDGHUVLQWKHZDU DJDLQVWWKH6RYLHWVPDGHHYHU\HIIRUWWRHQFRXUDJHTXDOL¿HGPXMDKLGHHQOHDGHUVWRMRLQWKH ANA.121 CJTF PhoenixDQGWKH$1$HPSKDVL]HGWKHPDQ\EHQH¿WVRIIHUHGWRUHFUXLWVE\VHUYLFH in the ANA, including housing, steady meals, healthcare, literacy classes, and skills training. 5HFUXLWHUVDGYHUWLVHGWKHVHEHQH¿WVWRSRWHQWLDOVROGLHUV7KHPRVWLPSRUWDQWUHZDUGRIPLOLWDU\ service was a steady income. Basic pay began at $50 a month, but quickly increased to $70 ZKHQ$IJKDQDQG&RDOLWLRQRI¿FLDOVUHDOL]HGWKDWWKHLQLWLDODPRXQWZDVQRWHQRXJKWRUHFUXLW and retain soldiers. Promotions added $15 a month, and soldiers earned an extra $1 a day ZKHQGHSOR\HG2I¿FHUVHDUQHGFRQVLGHUDEO\PRUH'HVSLWHDWWHPSWVWRHQVXUHWKDWSD\ZDV adequate and competitive in the labor market, enlisted pay often fell short, contributing to the

262 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 129 of 316

Chapter 9 larger problem of desertion. Mohammad Tahir, a platoon sergeant and sole income provider for a nine-member family explained to a journalist in December 2003: “If we can’t pay rent, ZHKDYHWR¿QGDQRWKHUMRE´122 Other employment was available in Afghanistan and created competition for the ANA. Day laborers working for American contractors made more money than Afghan soldiers’ earned.123 Interpreters for ISAF earned $400 to $450 per month while Afghans serving in local Afghan militia forces sponsored by Coalition SOF earned up to $200 per month.124 'HVHUWLRQVFRQWLQXHGWREHDVLJQL¿FDQWFKDOOHQJHDVVROGLHUVZHUHWHPSWHGWRXVHWKHLU newly gained marketable skills working for ISAF, IOs, or local militia forces.125 Afghanistan’s lack of a nationwide banking system also affected retention, because soldiers were forced to carry cash payments back to their families. After lengthy journeys of weeks or even months, PDQ\ RI WKHVH VROGLHUV UHWXUQHG WR WKH$1$ EXW XQLW VWUHQJWK DQG HI¿FLHQF\ VXIIHUHG126 In -DQXDU\WKH20&$UHSRUWHGWKDWWKHVWUHQJWKRIWKH¿UVWDQGVHFRQGEDWWDOLRQVZDV SHUFHQWDQGSHUFHQWUHVSHFWLYHO\7KHWKLUGIRXUWKDQG¿IWKEDWWDOLRQVZKLFKKDGMXVWFRP- pleted basic training, maintained strengths of 59 percent, 58 percent, and 67 percent, respectively. The sixth battalion, which was still in basic training, sustained 99 percent strength.127 Thus, battalions tended to lose soldiers through time, and maintaining their strength was a priority for recruiting and retention efforts. The average rate of attrition from December 2003 to July 2004 was 1.3 percent per month.128 President Karzai had directed that the ANA be ethnically balanced. Accordingly, both recruiters and trainers tried to ensure that the ANA represented all of Afghanistan’s ethnic and sectarian groups. This principle was so important that on occasions when efforts fell short of providing recruits that represented ethnic demographics, the OMC-A delayed the start of basic training.129 At each unit level—from squad to brigade—the ANA was ethnically integrated. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Gallant, commander of CJTF Phoenix’s 1st Brigade Training Team, recalled that the Pashtun, Uzbeks, and Tajiks each had command of one battalion in the brigade. Gallant emphasized that this step was a major achievement, stating, “These guys, who

MoD/ Afghanistan Ground Forces General Staff Ethnic Makeup Ethnic Makeup Ethnic Makeup

Pashtun 44% 44% 39%

Tajiki 25% 34% 35%

Hazara 10% 8% 12%

Uzbek 8% 4% 8%

Other 13% 8% 6% CFC-A Brief CFC-A

Figure 46. ANA Ethnic balance, May 2004.

263 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 130 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

10 years ago were sworn enemies, would sit in brigade commander’s calls together and they would work together like brothers. It was tremendous to see and it actually did work.”130 Despite these strides with ethnic diversity, women were not included in recruiting efforts because US DQG$IJKDQRI¿FLDOVDJUHHGWKDW¿JKWLQJKDGEHHQWUDGLWLRQDOO\YLHZHGLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDVDMRE for males. Basic Training $IWHUUHFUXLWPHQWWKH$IJKDQVROGLHUZHQWWKURXJKLQSURFHVVLQJZKHUHKLVSKRWRDQG¿Q- JHUSULQWVZHUHWDNHQDQGKHZDVLVVXHGDQLGHQWL¿FDWLRQFDUGDQGXQLIRUP7KHQWKHVROGLHU began basic training, which was overseen by CJTF Phoenix%DVLFWUDLQLQJRI¿FHUVFKRRODQG 1RQFRPPLVVLRQHG2I¿FHU 1&2 $FDGHP\ZHUHFRQGXFWHGDW&DPSPhoenix and the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) located just east of Kabul. On arrival, enlisted soldiers would EHJLQWUDLQLQJZLWK$IJKDQLQVWUXFWRUVDQG$PHULFDQPHQWRUVZKLOHWKHRI¿FHUVZRXOGHQWHU RI¿FHUWUDLQLQJVFKRROOHGE\WKH)UHQFK$UP\ Basic training consisted of weapons instruction, physical training, and small unit tactics. In building these skills, US trainers relied on basic US Army small unit tactical doctrine translated into Dari and given to the Afghan instructors. Brigadier General Joseph Prasek, the CJTF Phoenix commander in mid-2003, found teaching fundamentals was critical, and marksman- VKLSSK\VLFDO¿WQHVVDQG¿UHDQGPDQHXYHUZHUHWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWVNLOOVIRU$1$OLJKW infantry soldiers.131 Originally, two battalions began the 10-week basic training program simul- taneously, but when CFC-A directed CJTF Phoenix to train more units at a faster pace, basic training was shortened to 7 weeks and three battalions entered the KMTC at the same time.132 Soon after entering basic training, enlisted soldiers had the opportunity to volunteer for the British-led NCO school. This very competitive program had higher training standards for skills such as physical training and marksmanship. A soldier who successfully completed the program received a gold bar on his uniform and, depending on how well the soldier did in the NCO program, was then eligible for promotion. The NCO corps was a very new concept for most Afghans, because the Russian model with which they were familiar did not utilize NCOs. 6HQLRU$IJKDQRI¿FHUVZKRHPXODWHGWKH5XVVLDQRI¿FHUVWKH\KDGNQRZQWHQGHGWRPLFUR- manage their units and delegated mundane chores to the NCOs. Not surprisingly, they found it SDUWLFXODUO\GLI¿FXOWWRDFFRPPRGDWHWKH1&2FRUSV133 ,QWKHLQLWLDOWUDLQLQJMXQLRUVROGLHUV1&2VDQGRI¿FHUVSURJUHVVHGRQVHSDUDWHEXWSDUDO- lel tracks. Training was synchronized so that on graduation, soldiers of all ranks came together to form a battalion.134 The 500 to 700 soldiers of the new battalion received their unit name and ÀDJDQGWKHQPRYHGLQWREDUUDFNVDW'DUXODPDQ0LOLWDU\%DVHQHDU.DEXODQGRWKHUIDFLOLWLHV where they would continue their training. Mentoring the ANA: The Embedded Training Teams %DVLFWUDLQLQJZDVMXVWWKH¿UVWVWHSIRUWKH$IJKDQVROGLHU2QFHWKHVROGLHUMRLQHGKLVEDW- talion, he and his entire unit began training together under the tutelage of a Coalition embedded training team (ETT) from CJTF Phoenix. A fully staffed ETT at the battalion level consisted of 15 Soldiers led by a major. At the brigade level, ETTs numbered around 75 Soldiers. Embedded trainers developed training plans for their Afghan units, which included personal K\JLHQHSK\VLFDO¿WQHVVWDFWLFDOWUDLQLQJOLYH¿UHVDQGQLJKWRSHUDWLRQV%ULJDGLHU*HQHUDO

264 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 131 of 316

Chapter 9

Prasek’s training guidance stipulated that training should be “hands-on” with the primary focus on “shoot, move, and communicate.”135 In addition, Prasek directed the ETTs to conduct two 10-kilometer tactical foot marches per week, one monthly 20-kilometer foot march, squad and SODWRRQOLYH¿UHH[HUFLVHVDFRPSDQ\OHYHOGD\¿HOGWUDLQLQJH[HUFLVHDQGGDLO\SK\VLFDO ¿WQHVVHYHQWV136 In mid-2003, when the 45th Infantry Brigade from the Oklahoma Army National Guard received the mission to serve as the core of CJTF Phoenix, brigade leaders realized they had a major challenge in manning the ETTs. Brigadier General Thomas Mancino, who commanded the 45th Brigade and would in November 2003 become the commander of CJTF Phoenix, explained that the ETTs required Soldiers that were relatively high in rank.137 For example, the lowest ranking Soldier on a battalion ETT was a sergeant (E5). As a large infantry formation, WKHWK,QIDQWU\%ULJDGHGLGQRWKDYHHQRXJKVHQLRU1&2VDQGRI¿FHUVWR¿OOWKHVORWVRQWKH training teams. The US National Guard Bureau assisted the brigade by arranging for Soldiers from the Vermont Army National Guard and the South Carolina Army National Guard as well DVWKH860DULQH&RUSVWR¿OOWKH(77V This problem was exacerbated by the fact that CJTF Phoenix was also responsible for manning mobile training teams (MTTs), which augmented the ETTs by teaching specialty skills such as equipment repair, reconnaissance, heavy weapons, and even driver’s training.138 MTT courses were accelerated and designed to teach specialized skills in a very short amount of time. Both ETTs and MTTs would reinforce the basic skills developed in initial training, but for their battalions to sustain themselves independently, the ETTs had to shift the burden to Afghan commanders who gradually would assume responsibility to plan and supervise the training for their soldiers. ETTs mentored ANA commanders at the battalion, company, and platoon levels to teach commanders how to conduct effective meetings and how to plan training schedules.139 Captain Charles Di Leonardo served in 2003 as an embedded trainer for the Weapons Company of the ANA 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade. Di Leonardo quickly discovered that his most important task was to give the ANA company tools and processes that would make it more effective. After assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the company, Di Leonardo found that the leadership of the company had a great deal of military experience. Captain Sayeed Mohammad had served in the Soviet-trained Afghan Army of the 1980s, progressing to the rank of lieutenant colonel. His XO was also a veteran of the previous Afghan Army and his ¿UVWVHUJHDQWKDGIRXJKWDJDLQVWWKDWDUP\RQWKHVLGHRIWKHPXMDKLGHHQ:HDSRQV&RPSDQ\ and the 1st Battalion had been together for a year and had conducted security missions in the Khost and Gardez areas.140 When the company trained on the ranges, however, there was still DWHQGHQF\IRUWKHRI¿FHUVWRGRPLQDWHWKHH[HUFLVHVZKLOHUHOHJDWLQJ1&2VWRVHFRQGDU\ positions. After his initial assessment, Di Leonardo embarked on an aggressive training program to improve the company’s operations. Di Leonardo began his program with 2 weeks of classes IRU WKH FRPSDQ\¶V RI¿FHUV WR WHDFK RSHUDWLRQ RUGHUV SODQ UDQJHV DQG OLYH¿UH H[HUFLVHV Meanwhile, NCOs worked with the junior enlisted who trained separately under the watchful eyes of the corporals and sergeants. This training arrangement emphasized to the Afghans KRZWKHGLYLVLRQRIGXWLHVFRXOGJLYHPRUHWLPHIRUXQLWDGPLQLVWUDWLRQWRWKHRI¿FHUVZKLOH sharpening the leadership skills of the NCOs. Di Leonardo taught Sayeed Mohammad the US Army’s after-action review (AAR) process so that the company could learn from their

265 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 132 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004 successes and mistakes. Both Di Leonardo and Sayeed Mohammad noted improvements as the company completed successive drills. Captain Di Leonardo’s mission extended beyond the training ranges. In August 2003, Di Leonardo accompanied his counterpart on a deployment to the town of Qalat in Zabol province. In that town, the ETT coordinated a linkup with an American ODA and both the Afghans and WKH$PHULFDQVEHJDQFRRUGLQDWLQJZLWKORFDOJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVWRSODQDVHULHVRIRSHUDWLRQV against insurgents in the province. Over the course of several weeks, Di Leanardo’s ETT and WKH$IJKDQFRPSDQ\FRQGXFWHGVHFXULW\SDWUROVWUDI¿FFRQWUROSRLQWVDQGFRUGRQDQGVHDUFK operations.141 One of the Coalition’s objectives for this operation had been to increase the legitimacy of the ATA by demonstrating the competence of the ANA. Captain Di Leonardo believed WKDWWKHPLVVLRQVLQ=DEROGH¿QLWHO\KDGWKDWHIIHFW7KH$PHULFDQDGYLVRUZDVSDUWLFXODUO\ struck by the positive reaction Afghans in Pashtun-dominated Zabol had when they saw how well they were treated by the soldiers in Weapons Company that were of multiple ethnicities. Equipment and Facilities Building competent and professional tactical-level units was just one part of the task that faced CJTF Phoenix. As noted in the previous chapter, the Coalition had committed to building an entire support structure that would educate, train, supply, equip, and pay those forces. Due to the urgency of imparting basic soldier skills, however, Coalition leaders had postponed the formation and training of combat service support units. Without even a rudimentary logistics system in place up through 2003, the ANA became dependent on Coalition support, including the basic coordinating and contracting for food and maintenance services.142 In a 19 June 2003 memorandum, Brigadier General Prasek noted the problem: There is no reliable host-nation supply system in place for the ANA at any level . . . [battalions] themselves have no systemic mechanism for tracking requirements, resources, and unit hand receipts. Equipment accountability is nonexistent . . . the company and [battalion] logistics personnel have no system in place to request required equipment and supplies to support the units in garrison or on operational deployments.143 6WLOOE\PLGWKH¿UVWEDWWDOLRQVZHUHRSHUDWLRQDODQGQHZXQLWVZHUHJUDGXDWLQJIURPWKH KMTC at a steady pace. CJTF Phoenix could no longer ignore the need for a truly Afghan logistical infrastructure. Indeed, once Brigadier General Mancino took command of CJTF Phoenix in late 2003, he found that 80 percent of his time was focused on building the logistics system.144 Embedded trainers at battalion-level taught Afghan soldiers the proper way to request supplies, how to inventory their weapons and munitions, and how to track the supplies they had.145At the same time, ANA leaders worked with the Coalition to develop a quartermaster corps and logistical system complete with budgetary functions, acquisition systems, maintenance facilities, and distribution capability. Until the Afghan MOD could build that institu- tional capacity, the 210th Forward Support Battalion, 10th Mountain Division provided the acquisition and distribution of all incoming equipment and parts. Managing the high volume of supply and equipment donations was a particular challenge for the ANA. In one instance, two large Condor transport aircraft unexpectedly arrived with full cargo loads of ammunition for the ANA, which CJTF Phoenix members scrambled to unload.146 While the ANA and Coalition greatly appreciated all contributions, the variety of arms and

266 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 133 of 316

Chapter 9

HTXLSPHQWFUHDWHGGLI¿FXOWLHVIRUVWDQGDUGL]LQJWKH$1$¶VRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGHVWDEOLVKLQJLWV supply stores. The ANA’s uniforms were a collection of donations from various nations, and thus varied appearance somewhat diminished the professionalism of the army. One embedded trainer found that his battalion was operating with three different types of mortars—Chinese, Czechoslovakian, and Hungarian—each with its own parts and ammunition requirements.147 Countries that contributed weapons and equipment did not often send sustainment packages, VSDUHSDUWVRUWUDLQLQJDVVLVWDQFH7KHUHIRUHLWZDVGLI¿FXOWWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHGRQDWLRQVZRXOG be properly maintained and operated. Even US equipment, such as the over 500 2.5-ton trucks sent by CENTCOM, arrived without the proper supply of spare parts.148 Much of the existing Afghan weaponry was vintage Soviet equipment with which most Afghans were familiar because it was widely used by the former Afghan Army and Afghan militias. Several Coalition nations from Eastern Europe donated Soviet equipment from their arsenals.149 Romanian and Bulgarian trainers provided extra instructional assistance. Still, Afghan units experienced severe equipment shortages, despite all the donations. A January 2003 assessment found that the Afghan Army needed 44 tanks, 108 armored personnel carriers, 53.PDFKLQHJXQVRYHU$.ULÀHVDQGRYHUURXQGVRI53*DPPXQL- tion.150 The units also suffered from shortages in uniforms, boots, and communications gear.151 In 2003 and 2004 Afghan military facilities were also in a dismal state of affairs. Most egregious was that the KMTC lacked heat and sanitation. Almost all of Afghanistan’s existing facilities required major renovation and many more facilities needed to be constructed. Given the increasing scope and complexity of ANA infrastructure development, Major General Eikenberry requested that the Army Corps of Engineers deploy increasing numbers of personnel from its Transatlantic Program Center, which provides engineering support to deployed Soldiers in the Middle East, Africa, and Russia. Their mission was to design master plans for the KMTC, Pol-e-Charki, and Darulaman.152 In the OMC-A’s estimation, providing basic facil- LWLHVZLWKURR¿QJZDVWKHKLJKHVWSULRULW\7KH¿UVWEDUUDFNVEXLOWE\WKH&RDOLWLRQUHVHPEOHG World War II American Army basic training buildings and were simple one-story concrete EXLOGLQJVZLWKPHWDOURRIVDQGSDYHGÀRRUV(DFKEDWWDOLRQKDGDFOXVWHURIIDFLOLWLHVLQFOXGLQJ EDUUDFNVDKHDGTXDUWHUVEXLOGLQJDQRI¿FHIRUHDFKFRPSDQ\DZHDSRQVVWRUDJHDUHDDQGD mess hall. US engineers did not construct mosques, but assisted Afghan engineers in the MOD who designed mosques at the three bases.153 Engineers raced to keep up with the growing ANA and delivered new barracks and buildings as each new battalion graduated from basic training. Because Afghanistan lacked the ability to produce construction materials, all building supplies were imported. Steel, cement, HOHFWULFDOVXSSOLHVSOXPELQJDQG¿[WXUHVDOOFDPHIURP3DNLVWDQRUIURPRWKHURYHUVHDVORFD- tions through the port of Dubai. Contractors provided most of the construction effort employ- LQJ7XUNLVKDQG(J\SWLDQZRUNFUHZVDQGTXDOL¿HG$IJKDQVIRUVNLOOHGODERUDQGORFDOVIRU unskilled labor.154 Although Afghanistan did not share US building codes, engineers and contractors were very careful to ensure that construction met high environmental and safety standards, including those that made a building earthquake resistant. Most buildings relied on wood stove heat or local generators, which were expensive to maintain so engineers tried to design heating systems that were not dependent on outside resources. Building and maintaining adequate sewage systems was also a paramount concern.155

267 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 134 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

Measuring Progress By spring 2004 the OMC-A and CJTF PhoenixEHJDQWRVHHVLJQL¿FDQWPHDVXUDEOHVLJQVRI progress. May 2004 witnessed the grand opening of the 10th National Army Volunteer Center and the Recruiting Academy.156 On 17 June 2004 the 20th ANA Battalion graduated from basic training and joined the Central Corps, which was on that date fully formed. By mid-2004 the OMC-A had helped Afghanistan train and equip the 10,000 soldiers that manned the Central Corps.157 With this mission complete, the OMC-A began building the regional corps in Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Gardez, and Kandahar. Successful combat operations were another measure of progress. By early 2004 more $1$XQLWVZHUHEHJLQQLQJWRSDUWQHUZLWK&-7)XQLWVLQWKH¿HOG7ZR$1$EDWWDOLRQV for example, were part of Operation MOUNTAIN STORM in March 2004. Moreover, the ANA began securing events and initiatives that directly enhanced the legitimacy of the ATA. In December 2003, for example, several ANA battalions provided security for the constitutional loya jirga in Kabul.158 In March 2004, 1,500 ANA soldiers deployed to Herat to defuse tensions between regional leaders Ismail Khan and Abdul Zahir Navebzadeh. The two men had quar- reled over a military garrison and the disagreement culminated with the assassination of Khan’s son Mirwai Sadeq, the Minister of Civil Aviation and Tourism in President Karzai’s cabinet. Just 1 month later, the ATA sent ANA units to Faryab province in northern Afghanistan where 'RVWXP¶VIRUFHVZHUHHPEURLOHGLQD¿JKWZLWKXQLWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK*HQHUDO+DVKLP+DELEL the government-appointed commander in the region. The ANA battalions secured the main centers of the province and helped de-escalate the clash between a strong regional military leader and the central government.159 President Karzai’s employment of the ANA in these situ- ations demonstrated how far Afghan security forces had progressed since 2002. More importantly, these cases reveal the degree to which the central government was willing to use its military forces to keep Afghanistan on the path toward greater political stability. 7KLVVXFFHVVKRZHYHUOHGWRDJUHDWHUFKDOOHQJHIRU&)&$DQG20&$,QRI¿- cials in the US DOD began asking the Coalition command in Afghanistan to consider how it might accelerate the creation of Afghan security forces. By January 2004 the Bush administration had included this initiative in the aforementioned program known as “Accelerating Success in Afghanistan,” which would also include an infusion of $2.2 billion for the funding of all types of projects.160 In February 2004 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld explained during a visit to Kabul that a key factor driving the acceleration of Afghan forces was his desire to begin decreasing the number of US troops in Afghanistan as soon as possible.161 Thus, in 2004, OMC-A began making plans to increase the number of army battalions that would train simul- taneously at KMTC and the rapidity with which these units would become operational. Enabling Good Governance: The Constitutional Loya Jirga As part of his new approach, Lieutenant General Barno had emphasized the partnership between CFC-A and the ATA. This effort fell within the campaign pillar labeled Enable Reconstruction and Good Governance. For Barno, the establishment of the PRTs and the ANA were the most direct ways of lending legitimacy to President Karzai and the ATA. But he and his staff also worked closely on a daily basis with the American Embassy, President Karzai, and WKHVHQLRURI¿FLDOVLQWKH$7$/LNH/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO0F1HLOOWKH&)&$FRPPDQGHUDOVR spent a great deal of time dealing with regional leaders like Ismail Khan, Dostum, and others, WRGHIXVHWHQVLRQVDQGDUPHGFRQÀLFWV

268 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 135 of 316

Chapter 9

Critical to the overall effort of strengthening the ATA’s ability to govern was the political timetable established by the Bonn Agreement in 2002 that sought to move Afghanistan closer to democratic rule. In 2003 the most important political event was the constitutional loya jirga scheduled for December 2003. In preparation for the assembly, President Karzai created a Constitutional Commission, which created a draft document based on the 1964 Afghan Constitution. When the assembly met on 14 December 2003, it brought together delegates from the country’s diverse tribes and ethnicities, including 89 women, who gathered to approve a new constitution.162 7HQVLRQVÀDUHGRYHUWKHVWUHQJWKRIWKHSUHVLGHQF\LQWKHQHZV\VWHPWREHHVWDEOLVKHG E\ WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ %XW WKH GLVFRQQHFW ZDV XOWLPDWHO\UDWL¿HGE\ FRQVHQVXV UDWKHU WKDQ E\ individual ballot. The charter established a two-chamber parliament and an elected president with two vice presidents. The constitution also included provisions that recognized women as equal citizens, protected the rights of Uzbeks and Turkmen to use their native languages in their regions, and designated former King Zahir Shah as the ceremonial Father of the Nation.163 The new political process in Afghanistan had led to the peaceful creation of a new form of representative government. Neither regional leaders nor armed insurgents had been able to derail that forward momentum.

ÔÔÔ

The successful loya jirga was perhaps the most obvious sign of progress during the year that followed the XVIII Airborne Corps departure from Afghanistan. But the Coalition had also VLJQL¿FDQWO\DOWHUHGWKHZD\LWDSSURDFKHGWKHFDPSDLJQ7KLVSHULRGVDZQXPHURXVWUDQVLWLRQV in command: the arrival of 10th Mountain Division to take command of CJTF-180, the deployment of TF Warrior as the Coalition’s main tactical force, and, most importantly, the creation of a new strategic-level headquarters in Afghanistan that introduced a new approach. CFC-A’s counterinsurgency campaign focused on winning the support of the Afghan people to ensure that much of the progress made since 2001 was not undone by a growing enemy threat. There were other signs of progress in this period. OMC-A continued to build the ANA and by spring 2004 had trained approximately 10,000 Afghan soldiers. Moreover, all units that composed the Afghan Central Corps, including combat support and combat service support, had completed basic training and were preparing for their mission to secure the national elections set for later in 2004. At the same time, the acceleration of the training program and the overall expansion of the ANA building effort placed great stress on OMC-A, CJTF Phoenix, and the Afghan MOD. CFC-A and CJTF-180 also saw the number of PRTs increase to 12 teams, many of which were now located in regions most threatened by the insurgency. Despite these successes, Taliban and al-Qaeda forces continued to oppose the Coalition and the ATA as the spring of 2004 ended. As the summer began, the number of attacks continued to rise and as they did, CFC-A had to oversee another round of command transitions and troop deployments. CJTF-76, a task force composed primarily of units from the 25th Infantry Division, replaced CJTF-180 and the new Soldiers from the Indiana Army National Guard arrived to serve in CJTF Phoenix/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO%DUQRDQGKLVVWDIIIDFHGWKHVLJQL¿FDQW challenge of preserving the momentum they had created in their campaign to win the population’s support for the Coalition and the ATA and thereby prevent the insurgent enemy from gaining further ground. 269 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 136 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

Notes

1. “Secretary Rumsfeld Joint Media Availability with President Karzai,” Department of Defense News Transcript, 1 May 2003. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2562 (accessed 25 July 2007). 2. Lieutenant General (Retired) John R. Vines, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 June 2007, 19. 3. Vines, interview, 27 June 2007, 19. 4. Vines, interview, 27 June 2007, 19. 5. Lieutenant General (Retired) David W. Barno, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 January 2009, 2–3. 6. Colonel David W. Lamm, e-mail to Dr. Donald P. Wright, Combat Studies Institute, 28 Sep- tember 2009. Colonel Lamm served as the CFC-A Chief of Staff between 2003 and 2005. 7. Robert Burns, “Mullen: Afghanistan Isn’t Top Priority,” USA Today, 11 December 2007. http:// www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-12-11-3963072919 x.htm (accessed 6 November 2009). 8. Vines, interview, 27 June 2007, 19. 9. Seth G. Jones et al., (VWDEOLVKLQJ/DZDQG2UGHU$IWHU&RQÀLFW (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 91. -HDQ0DULH*XHKHQQR³%ULH¿QJVWRWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLORQWKH6LWXDWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´ Open Meeting of the Security Council Afghanistan, 17 June 2003. http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN- 'RFVBVFBEULH¿QJVMXQKWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ 5RU\0F&DUWK\³'LHDV7DOLEDQ$WWDFN Police Station,” The Guardian$XJXVW/L]6O\³7DOLEDQ6XVSHFWHGLQ$WWDFNVRQ$IJKDQV Guarding Highway Work,” Knight Ridder Tribune News Service, 1 September 2003, 1. http://www. libraryo.com/article.aspx?num=107133024 (accessed 24 September 2007). 11. “NGO Insecurity in Afghanistan,” $IJKDQLVWDQ1*26DIHW\2I¿FH $162 DQG&$5( May 2005. http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/20050505_ansocare.pdf (accessed 16 August 2007). 12. Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order, 90. 13. Colonel Walter M. Herd, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, Unconventional Warriors: Separate Insurgents from the Populace: Special Operations in Afghanistan from September 2003 to June 2004, June 2004, slide 11. 14. Captain Bradley J. Armstrong, USAF, “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency and Reconstruction in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003, 111. 15. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York, NY: Viking Press, 2008), 247. 16. Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Lester W. Grau, “Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis,” Military Review (July–August 2004): 42. 17. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 242. 18. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 221. 19. Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban Mounted Militia Prepares for Border Strike,” The Daily Tele- graph, 8 August 2003. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/10/08/wafg08. xml (accessed 26 July 2007). 20. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 223. 21. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 247. 22. Ilana Ozernoy, “The Return of the Taliban,” U.S. News & World Report (29 September 2003): 16. 23. Minister Ali Jalali, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Insti- tute, Washington, DC, 1 June 2007, 4.

270 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 137 of 316

Chapter 9

24. George W. Bush, “The President’s News Conference with President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan at Camp David, Maryland,” 24 June 2003. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. php?pid=63119 (accessed 3 February 2009). 25. Rashid, “Taliban Mounted Militia Prepares for Border Strike.” 26. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC, 2001), 265. 27. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris, USMC, “Al Qaeda as Insurgency,” Joint Force Quarterly (October 2005): 39–42. 28. Bard O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Inc., 1990), 13. 29. Morris, “Al Qaeda as Insurgency,” 39–42. 30. Morris, “Al Qaeda as Insurgency,” 39–42. 31. Captain Bakhtiyorjon U. Hammidov, Uzbekistan Armed Forces, “The Fall of the Taliban Regime and Its Recovery as an Insurgent Movement in Afghanistan,” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, 12. 32. Lieutenant General David W. Barno, interview by Center for Military History, 3 May 2006, 4. 33. Colonel Tucker B. Mansager, “Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan,” Joint Force Quarterly, First Quarter 2006, 82. 34. Mansager, “Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan,” 82. 35. Mansager, “Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan,” 82. 36. Afghanistan Experience Project Interview #5, interview by United States Institute for Peace, 13 April 2005. 37. Zalmay Khalilzad, “How to Nation-build: Ten Lessons from Afghanistan,” The National Interest (Summer 2005): 26. 38. Barno, interview, 29 January 2009, 4. 39. Barno, interview, 29 January 2009, 4. 40. Lieutenant General David W. Barno, interview by Center for Military History, 21 November 2006, 10. 41. Barno, interview, 21 November 2006, 4. 42. Barno, interview, 29 January 2009, 8. 43. Colonel David Lamm, USA, “Success in Afghanistan means Fighting Several Wars at Once,” Armed Forces Journal, November 2005. http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2005/11/1174189 (accessed 11 September 2007). 44. Barno, interview, 29 January 2009, 4. 45. Barno, interview, 29 January 2009, 4. 46. Lieutenant General David W. Barno, interview by Center for Military History, 14 March 2007, 51. 47. Lieutenant General David W. Barno, “Fighting ‘the Other War’: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005,” Military Review (September–October 2007): 35. 48. Barno, “Fighting ‘the Other War,’” 41. 49. Barno, interview, 3 May 2006, 34. 50. Colonel Walter Herd, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 June 2007, 2. 51. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Wille, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 December 2006, 8. 52. Ann Scott Tyson, “Going in Small in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 2004, 1. http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0114/p01s04-wosc.html (accessed 24 September 2007). 53. Wille, interview, 14 December 2006, 9–10.

271 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 138 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

:LOOH LQWHUYLHZ 'HFHPEHU ± &HQWHU IRU $UP\ /HVVRQV /HDUQHG &$// Operation Enduring Freedom Initial Impressions Report, December 2003, iii. 55. CALL, OEF Initial Impressions Report'HFHPEHU&RORQHO-RVHSK'LFKDLURLQWHUYLHZ by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 August 2007, 4. 56. CALL, OEF Initial Impressions Report, December 2003, 18. 57. Wille, interview, 14 December 2006, 11. 58. Association of Graduates USMA, Ninger Award, http://www.aogusma.org/aog/awards/ 1LQLQJHU*UD\B0DWWHUB$UWLFOHKWP DFFHVVHG 6HSWHPEHU :LOOH LQWHUYLHZ 'HFHPEHU 2006. 59. Tim McGirk, “Battle in the Evilist Place,” Time Online, 3 November 2003. http://www.time. com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1006032-1,00.html (accessed 5 June 2007). 60. Sergeant Greg Heath, 4th Public Affairs Detachment, “2-87 Catamounts Keep Rolling in Afghanistan,” Fort Drum Blizzard Online, 8 January 2004. http://www.drum.army.mil/sites/postnews/ blizzard/blizzard_archives/hnews.asp?id=1&issuedate=1-8-2004 (accessed 11 September 2007). 61. Heath, “2-87 Catamounts Keep Rolling in Afghanistan.” 62. Thomas Gimble, DOD Acting Inspector General, et al., “Special Defense Department %ULH¿QJ²,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO 7KRPDV *LPEOH 5HSRUWV RQ WKH 'HDWK RI &RUSRUDO 3DWULFN 7LOOPDQ LQ $IJKDQLVWDQIURPWKH3HQWDJRQ%ULH¿QJ5RRP$UOLQJWRQ9LUJLQLD´News Transcript, 26 March 2007. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3917 (accessed 11 September 2007). 63. Gerry J. Gilmore, “General Censured for Tillman Investigation Mistakes,” DefenseLink, 31 July 2007. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46888 (accessed 13 February 2009). 64. Gilmore, “General Censured for Tillman Investigation Mistakes.” 65. 130th Military History Detachment Command Report, Operation Enduring Freedom Rotation IV, July 2003–March 2004, no date/place given, 4. 66. Dichairo, interview, 27 August 2007, 9. 67. 130th Military History Detachment, Operation Enduring Freedom Rotation IV, 4. 68. Colonel Rod Davis, USA, Director, Public Affairs, Coalition JTF 180, “Division Soldiers Help Kill Enemy Fighters in Operation Mountain Viper.” http://www.drum.army.mil/sites/postnews/blizzard/ blizzard_archives/hnews.asp?id=1&issuedate=9-11-2003 (accessed 8 August 2007). 69. The estimates of enemy casualties varied. In its report on TF Warrior’s operations, the US Army 130th Military History Detachment suggested that enemy radio intercepts during MOUNTAIN VIPER estimated between 150 and 200 killed. See 130th Military History Detachment, Operation Enduring Freedom Rotation IV, 4. 70. Terry Boyd, “Troops in Afghanistan Preparing Spring Offensive in Pursuit of Insurgents,” Stars and Stripes European Edition, 10 March 2004. http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104& article=20924 (accessed 17 February 2009). 71. Dichairo, interview, 27 August 2007, 11. 72. Barno, interview, 3 May 2006, 8. 73. Barno, interview, 29 January 2009, 8. 74. Colonel David Paschal, interview by Operational Leadership Experience, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 July 2006, 4. 75. Barno, interview, 21 November 2006, 42. 76. Barno, interview, 3 May 2006, 24. 77. Sima Alinejad, “Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT),” UNHCR, 1 April 2004. http:// www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/emergency_assistance/refugee/unhcr_return_issues/issue_54.pdf (accessed 10 September 2007).

272 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 139 of 316

Chapter 9

78. Lieutenant Colonel Steven Ford, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat 6WXGLHV ,QVWLWXWH )RUW /HDYHQZRUWK .6 6HSWHPEHU $IJKDQLVWDQ ([SHULHQFH 3URMHFW Interview #3, interview by United States Institute for Peace, 19 October 2004, 9. /LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO6WHYHQ)RUG*KD]QL3579,3%ULH¿QJProvisional Reconstruction Team: Ghazni, Afghanistan,0D\VOLGHV±WK$LUERUQH&RUSV&-&027)%ULHI101 Brief as of 31 March 2003, slide 23. 80. 18th Airborne Corps, CJCMOTF Brief, slide 24. 81. Colonel Richard Conte, Working with the US Army Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan Brief, 27 July 2004, slide 17. 82. Afghanistan Experience Project Interview #2, interview by United States Institute for Peace, 10 December 2004, 7. 83. Afghanistan Experience Project Interview #5, interview, 13 April 2005, 8. 84. “Afghanistan: Interview with US-Led Coalition Civil Military Coordination Center,” 8 January 2004. http:www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=22699 (accessed 1 August 2007). 85. “Afghanistan: Interview with US-Led Coalition Civil Military Coordination Center.” 86. Lieutenant Colonel John Lineweaver, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 August 2007, 5. 87. Lineweaver, interview, 24 August 2007, 5. 88. Lineweaver, interview, 24 August 2007, 8. 89. Lineweaver, interview, 24 August 2007, 8. 90. “Afghanistan: Paper On UK PRT Experience,” Afghanistan Group, FCO, 20 January 2005. KWWSZZZIFRJRYXN)LOHVN¿OH8.SDSHURQLWV357H[SHULHQFHSGI DFFHVVHG $XJXVW 0LFKDHO - 0F1HUQH\ ³Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters (Winter 2005–06): 38–39. 86*RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWDELOLW\2I¿FH*$2Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deterio- rating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed, June 2004, 11. 92. GAO-04-403, 51. 93. Afghanistan Experience Project Interview #5, 13 April 2005, 19. 94. Barno, interview, 21 November 2006, 48. 95. Colonel David Lamm, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies ,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.66HSWHPEHU%DUQRLQWHUYLHZ1RYHPEHU &KULVWRSKHU*ULI¿Q“A Working Plan: Hope Isn’t the Only Strategy for Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Journal (April 2007). http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/04/2587549 (accessed 16 June 2007). 97. Afghanistan Experience Project Interview #3, 19 October 2004, 16. 98. Ford, Ghazni 357 9,3 %ULH¿QJ Provisional Reconstruction Team: Ghazni, Afghanistan, 22 May 2004, slide 9. 99. Cheryl Bernard et al., Women and Nation-Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 29. 86 *RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWDELOLW\ 2I¿FH *$2 Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of US Goals, July 2005, 13. 101. GAO-05-742, 14. 102. Brigadier General William Garrett, written interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 June 2007, 14. 103. Colonel Rodney Edge, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 June 2007, 13. 104. Wille, interview, 14 December 2006, 14.

273 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 140 of 316

The Shift to a New Approach: OEF May 2003 to April 2004

105. Paschal, interview, 18 July 2006, 6. 106. Paschal, interview, 18 July 2006, 6. 107. Garrett, interview, 5 June 2007, 15. 108. Lieutenant Colonel Bentley Nettles, interview by Operational Leadership Experience, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 September 2006. 109. Paschal, interview, 7 March 2007, 17. 110. Wille, interview, 14 December 2006, 12. 111. Ann Scott Tyson, “Uphill Pursuit for Afghan Warlord,” Christian Science Monitor, 22 December 2003. http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1222/p06s01-wosc.html (accessed 10 September 2007). 112. Paschal, interview, 18 July 2006, 18. 113. Nettles, interview, 20 September 2006, 6. 114. OMC-A, ANA Presentation to MG Ostenberg Brief, 27 August 2003, slide 48. 115. Major General Craig Weston, OMC-A Orientation, 26 June 2004, slide 5. 116. UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, “Decree of the President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan on the Afghan National Army,” 1 December 2002. http://www.unama-afg.org/ GRFVBQRQ81'RFVB,QWHUQDWLRQ&RQIHUHQFHV )RUXPV%RQQ7DONVGHFUHHRQDUP\SGI (accessed 18 August 2007). 117. Master Sergeant D. Keith Johnson, “Afghan National Army Volunteer Center Opens,” 22 Dec- ember 2004. http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/Dec2004/a122204dw1.html (accessed on 20 August 2007). 118. Colonel David Francavilla, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 April 2007, 4. 119. Francavilla, interview, 26 April 2007, 5. 120. Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 November 2006, 16. 121. UN, “Decree of the President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan.” 122. Ann Scott Tyson, “Desertions Deplete Afghan Army,” Christian Science Monitor Online, 17 December 2003. http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1217/p06s01-wosc.html (accessed 20 August 2007). 123. Colonel Richard Gallant, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 June 2007, 4. 124. Captain Michael Chagnon, Canadian Army, “Canadian Embedded Training Teams,” The Bulletin, December 2004, 12. http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ALLC/Downloads/bulletin/Vol_10/Bulletin_ 9RO1R(QJSGI DFFHVVHG $XJXVW %ULJDGLHU *HQHUDO -RVHSK 3UDVHN LQWHUYLHZ E\ Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 September 2007, 16. 125. Chagnon, “Canadian Embedded Training Teams,” 12. 126. Major General (Retired) Craig Weston, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 December 2006, 25. 127. Colonel Timothy Reese, Afghan National Army—Karzai, 6 January 2006, slide 55. 128. Major General Craig Weston, Creating the Afghan Defense Sector, July 2004, slide 25. 129. Eikenberry, interview, 27 November 2006, 5. 130. Gallant, interview, 29 June 2007, 8. 131. Prasek, interview, 7 September 2007, 11. 132. Prasek, interview, 7 September 2007, 8. 133. Chagnon, “Canadian Embedded Training Teams,” 7. 134. Colonel Mark Milley, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 June 2007, 10. 135. Brigadier General Joseph Prasek, “CJTF Phoenix Training Guidance 4th Quarter, FY 03 (Draft),” Memorandum for Record, 19 June 2003.

274 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 141 of 316

Chapter 9

136. Prasek, “CJTF Phoenix Training Guidance.” 137. Brigadier General Thomas Mancino, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 September 2007, 8. 138. Colonel Timothy Reese, Task Force Phoenix TRADOC Recon Overview Brief, 8 April 2003, slide 16. 139. Prasek, “CJTF Phoenix Training Guidance.” 140. Captain Charles Di Leonardo, USA, “Training the Afghan National Army,” Infantry (March/ April 2005): 31. 141. Di Leonardo, “Training the Afghan National Army,” 38. 142. Gallant, interview, 29 June 2007, 6. 143. Prasek, “CJTF Phoenix Training Guidance.” 144. Mancino, interview, 15 September 2007, 15. 145. Di Leonardo, “Training the Afghan National Army,” 31–39. 146. Prasek, interview, 7 September 2007, 18. 147. Di Leonardo, “Training the Afghan National Army,” 33. 148. Mancino, interview, 15 September 2007, 24. 86*RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWDELOLW\2I¿FH*$2Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Estab- OLVK$UP\DQG3ROLFH+DYH0DGH3URJUHVVEXW)XWXUH3ODQV1HHGWREH%HWWHU'H¿QHG, June 2005, 16. 150. Reese, Afghan National Army—Karzai, slide 56. 151. GAO-05-575, 16. 152. Amy Clement, “TAC Helps Army Rebuild Afghan Forces, January 2003. http://www.hq.usace. army.mil/cepa/pubs/jan03/story17.htm (accessed 11 August 2007). 153. Colonel Richard Conte, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 July 2007, 6. 154. Conte, interview, 6 July 2007, 6. 155. Conte, interview, 6 July 2007, 12. 156. “Afghanistan Update,” June 2004. http://www.defendamerica.mil/afghanistan/update/ jun2004/ au062104.html (accessed 12 September 2007). 157. US Department of State, “New Afghan Initiatives Promote Growth, Education, Democracy,” 15 June 2004. http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2004/Jun/16-365926.html (accessed 12 September 2007). 158. Prasek, interview, 7 September 2007, 6. 159. UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Chronology of Events in Afghanistan, April 2004ZZZXQKFURUJUHIZRUOGSG¿GFSGI DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ 160. GAO-04-403, 4. 161. Major General Craig Weston, .H\WR$1$$FFHOHUDWLRQ%ULH¿QJV memorandum, undated, 1. 162. Major Guy Turpin, “Preparing for the Constitutional Loya Jirga,” 17 November 2006. http:// www.nato.int/ISAF/Update/varia/getready.htm (accessed 11 September 2007). 163. Dr. Kenneth Katzman, “CRS Report for Congress,” CRS Web Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, 28 December 2004, 17.

275 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 142 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 143 of 316

Chapter 10 The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005 In the spring of 2004, the future of Afghanistan appeared less than secure. A sense of JXDUGHGRSWLPLVPGLGH[LVWUHÀHFWLQJWKHIDFWWKDW3UHVLGHQW+DPLG.DU]DLDQGWKH$IJKDQ Transitional Authority (ATA) had made political progress with the constitutional loya jirga and LQHVWDEOLVKLQJWKH&HQWUDO&RUSVRIWKH$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\ $1$ +RZHYHUWKHOLPLWHG DELOLW\RI&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVWRIXUWKHUWKHUHDFKRIWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW¶VDXWKRULW\WHPSHUHG these successes. This problem was especially acute in the south and east where the insurgency mounted by Taliban and al-Qaeda forces showed no sign of dissipating. Not only were insur- JHQWDWWDFNVFRQWLQXLQJWRLQFUHDVHWKHHQHP\DSSHDUHGEHWWHURUJDQL]HGEHWWHUIXQGHGDQG LQWHQWRQGLVUXSWLQJWKH$IJKDQSROLWLFDOSURFHVV0RUHRYHUHQHP\DWWDFNVEHFDPHPRUHWDFWL- FDOO\VRSKLVWLFDWHGLQYROYLQJLPSURYLVHGH[SORVLYHGHYLFHV ,('V VXLFLGHERPEHUVNLGQDS- pings, and targeted assaults on reconstruction projects. This chapter describes how Coalition forces responded to the problems and opportuni- WLHVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQLQWKHPRQWKVEHWZHHQWKHDUULYDORI&RPELQHG-RLQW7DVN)RUFH &-7) LQ$SULODQGWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\HOHFWLRQVLQ6HSWHPEHU,QWKLVSHULRGWKH &RDOLWLRQPLOLWDU\OHDGHUVKLSLQ$IJKDQLVWDQSODFHGWKHLUFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKHFRXQWHULQVXUJHQF\ &2,1 HIIRUWEHJXQE\&RPELQHG)RUFHV&RPPDQG±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¿UPHUIRXQGDWLRQDQGJHQHUDWHDKLJKHUOHYHORI security. 0XFKRIWKHEXUGHQIRUWKH&2,1FDPSDLJQIHOOWR&-7)WKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VQHZRSHUDWLRQDO DQGWDFWLFDOOHYHOPLOLWDU\KHDGTXDUWHUVWKDWUHSODFHG&-7)7KHKHDGTXDUWHUVRIWKH86 $UP\¶VWK,QIDQWU\'LYLVLRQ ,' VHUYHGDVWKHFRUHKHDGTXDUWHUVRI&-7)XQWLOWKHVSULQJ RI ZKHQ WKH 86$UP\ 6RXWKHUQ (XURSHDQ7DVN)RUFH 6(7$) ZRXOG DUULYH WR WDNH FRPPDQG,Q0D\&-7)¶VPDQHXYHUIRUFHVWRRNRYHUWKHDUHDVRIRSHUDWLRQV $2V HVWDEOLVKHGE\&-7)DQGEHJDQWRZRUNFORVHO\ZLWKWKHSRSXODWLRQVLQWKRVH$2V E\ mounting a mix of security and stability operations.*

—————————— *7KHVW%DWWDOLRQVW3DUDFKXWH,QIDQWU\5HJLPHQW 3,5 ZKLFKKDGMRLQHG7)Warrior in 1RYHPEHUUHPDLQHGLQLWV$2DVSDUWRI&-7)XQWLO$XJXVWZKHQLWUHWXUQHGWRLWVKRPH station in Alaska. 277 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 144 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

:KLOH WUDQVLWLRQV LQ FRPPDQG DUH XVXDOO\ GLVUXSWLYH WR RQJRLQJ PLOLWDU\ RSHUDWLRQV WKH WUDQVIHU RI DXWKRULW\ WR &-7) LQ VSULQJ SURYLGHG RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR LPSURYH WKH &RDOLWLRQ¶VÀHGJOLQJ&2,1FDPSDLJQ:KHQ&)&$LQWURGXFHGLWVQHZDSSURDFKLQIDOO LWV VXERUGLQDWH RSHUDWLRQDO DQG WDFWLFDOOHYHO FRPPDQGV²&-7) DQG 7DVN )RUFH 7) Warrior,UHVSHFWLYHO\²KDGQRWWUDLQHGRURWKHUZLVHSUHSDUHGIRU&2,1RSHUDWLRQV:KLOHWKH 6ROGLHUVLQWKHVHXQLWVKDGDGDSWHGLQWKHZDQLQJPRQWKVRIWKHLUGHSOR\PHQWVWKH\KDGRQO\ PRQWKVWRPRYHLQWRWKHLUQHZO\GHVLJQDWHG$2VDQGEHFRPHIDPLOLDUZLWKWKHORFDOSRSXODWLRQ before they departed Afghanistan. 7KH6ROGLHUVRI&-7)RQWKHRWKHUKDQGXQGHUVWRRGIURPWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHLUGHSOR\- ment that their mission was to conduct COIN operations to win the support of the Afghan people. 7KH\WUDLQHGIRUWKDWPLVVLRQDQGDIWHUDUULYLQJPRYHGGLUHFWO\LQWRWKHLU$2VSUHSDUHGWRZRUN FORVHO\ZLWKWKH$IJKDQFRPPXQLWLHV)XUWKHU&-7)KDGGHSOR\HGZLWKPRUHPDQHXYHU XQLWVWKDQ&-7)KDGFRPPDQGHGLQHDUO\DQGWKXVZDVDEOHWRFRPPLWPRUHPDQ- SRZHUWRLWV$2V%\WKHVXPPHURI%DUQRIXUWKHUUHLQIRUFHGWKH&-7)HIIRUWE\JLY- LQJUHJLRQDOFRPPDQGHUVDXWKRULW\RYHUWKH3URYLQFLDO5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ7HDPV 357V LQRUGHU WRPDNHWKHRYHUDOOUHFRQVWUXFWLRQHIIRUWPRUHUHVSRQVLYHWRORFDO$IJKDQQHHGV&-7)DOVR EHQH¿WHGIURPWKHXQFRQYHQWLRQDOZDUIDUH 8: FDPSDLJQODXQFKHGE\WKH&RPELQHG-RLQW 6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV7DVN)RUFH±$IJKDQLVWDQ &-627)$ LQVSULQJ7KDWHIIRUWLQZKLFK WKH&-7)FRPPDQGHUDQGVWDIIZHUHFORVHO\LQYROYHGIRFXVHGRQIRVWHULQJVHFXULW\IRUWKH SUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQVDQGRQLQWHUGLFWLQJHQHP\IRUFHVDQGPDWHULHOPRYLQJLQWR$IJKDQLVWDQ IURP3DNLVWDQ &)&$ FRPSOHPHQWHG &-7) ¶V DFWLRQV E\ IRVWHULQJ WKH GHYHO- RSPHQW RI WKH$IJKDQ *RYHUQPHQW %DUQR DQG KLV VWDII ZRUNHG FORVHO\ ZLWK WKH 86 (PEDVV\$IJKDQ RI¿- FLDOV LQ .DEXO DQG $IJKDQLVWDQ¶V powerful regional leaders to coordinate policies that would expand the control and legitimacy of the central JRYHUQPHQW 7KH 2I¿FH RI 0LOLWDU\ &RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ 20&$ DQG &-7) Phoenix assisted in this DOD Photo by CPL Jeremy Colvin DOD Photo by CPL effort through their programs to Figure 47. Major General Karl W. Eikenberry who would LQFUHDVH WKH VL]H DQG FDSDELOLWLHV RI take command of CFC-A in May 2005. WKH $1$ ,Q 0D\ /LHXWHQDQW *HQHUDO.DUO:(LNHQEHUU\IRUPHU FRPPDQGHURI20&$WRRNFRPPDQGRI&)&$IURP/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO%DUQR(LNHQEHUU\ SOHGJHG WR PDLQWDLQ WKH &2,1 DSSURDFK LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ DQG LQ -XO\ UHLQIRUFHG WKH &RDOLWLRQ¶VRYHUDOOUROHE\GLUHFWLQJ20&$WRDVVLVW*HUPDQIRUFHVLQWKH¿HOGLQJRI$IJKDQ 1DWLRQDO3ROLFH $13 IRUFHV7KLVH[SDQVLRQLQPLVVLRQOHG&)&$WRFKDQJHWKHQDPHRI 20&$WRWKH2I¿FHRI6HFXULW\&RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ 26&$ :KLOHWKLVEURDGHQLQJ RIGXWLHVUHTXLUHGPRUHUHVRXUFHVWKHQHZ&)&$FRPPDQGHUDQGVWDIIYLHZHG$IJKDQSROLFH forces as critical to the security of local communities across the country.

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 145 of 316

Chapter 10

The Coalition Posture in Spring 2004 ,Q0D\&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQQXPEHUHGDSSUR[LPDWHO\6ROGLHUV XQGHUWKHFRPPDQGRI&)&$2Q$SULOWKHKHDGTXDUWHUVRIWKH86$UP\WK,'DUULYHG LQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQGWRRNFRPPDQGRI&-7)IURPWKHWK0RXQWDLQ'LYLVLRQ/LHXWHQDQW *HQHUDO%DUQRWKHQGHFLGHGWRUHQDPHWKH&-7)EHFDXVHWKH³´GHVLJQDWLRQKDGWUDGLWLRQ- DOO\EHHQJLYHQWRMRLQWWDVNIRUFHV -7)V OHGE\WKH86$UP\;9,,,$LUERUQH&RUSV%DUQR FKRVH&-7)DVWKHQHZQDPHWRHYRNH$PHULFD¶VKLVWRU\DQGWKHGHPRFUDWLFVSLULWRI1 7KH&)&$FRPPDQGHUZDVKRSLQJWKDWWKLVQHZGHVLJQDWLRQZRXOGKLJKOLJKWWKHFKDQJHLQ FRPPDQGDWWKHRSHUDWLRQDOOHYHODWDWLPHZKHQ$IJKDQLVWDQDSSHDUHGWREHPRYLQJFORVHUWR democracy. 0DMRU*HQHUDO(ULF72OVRQWKHFRPPDQGLQJJHQHUDORIWKHWK,'EHFDPHWKHFRP- PDQGHU RI &-7) ,Q WKH VSULQJ RI QHDUO\ 86$UP\ 1DY\$LU )RUFH DQG 0DULQH&RUSVSHUVRQQHODVZHOODVIRUFHVIURP&RDOLWLRQQDWLRQVPDGHXSWKLVIRUFH,QWKH $2VRIWKHVRXWKHUQDQGVRXWKHDVWHUQSURYLQFHV2OVRQGHSOR\HGEDWWDOLRQVL]HXQLWVRI ZKLFKZHUH86$UP\OLJKWLQIDQWU\EDWWDOLRQV%\FRPSDULVRQLQHDUO\&-7)KDG URXJKO\KDOIWKDWQXPEHURIXQLWVLQWKH$2V$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHQXPEHURI866ROGLHUV in Afghanistan increased by one-third between the early winter and mid-summer of 2004 to 27KLVZDVWKHKLJKSRLQWLQWURRSVWUHQJWKLQ$IJKDQLVWDQVLQFHWKHEHJLQQLQJRI2()LQ 86$UP\OHYHOVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQZRXOGUHPDLQDWWKLVOHYHOZLWKPLQRUÀXFWXDWLRQVIRU WKHUHPDLQGHURIDQGWKURXJK

Figure 48. US Army troop levels in OEF, October 2001–September 2005.

279 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 146 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

Major General Olson RUJDQL]HG &-7) LQWR six principal task forces. &RPELQHG 7DVN )RUFH &7) Bronco, commanded by Colonel 5LFKDUG 3HGHUVHQ DQG EDVHG RQ WKH G %ULJDGH RI WKH WK ,' DVVXPHG responsibility for an AO that became known as 5HJLRQDO &RPPDQG± 6RXWK 5&6RXWK 6HH ¿JXUH 7KLVODUJHDUHD DOD Photo by SPC Jerry T. Combes T. DOD Photo by SPC Jerry LQFOXGHGWKHSURYLQFHVRI Figure 49. Major General Eric T. Olson, CJTF-76 Commander, .DQGDKDU /DVKNDU *DK talks with Afghan citizens during a patrol in the Cehar Cineh area of Zabol, Zaranj, and a part Afghanistan during Operation OUTLAW, 26 October 2004. RI2UX]JDQ&7)Bronco¶V IRUFHVLQFOXGHGIRXU86$UP\OLJKWLQIDQWU\EDWWDOLRQVRQH¿HOGDUWLOOHU\EDWWDOLRQWKH)UHQFK Task Group ArésDQGD5RPDQLDQLQIDQWU\UHJLPHQW7KHWK,'¶V'LYLVLRQ$UWLOOHU\UHRUJD- QL]HGDVDPDQHXYHUIRUFHFDOOHG&7)ThunderXQGHUWKHFRPPDQGRI&RORQHO*DU\+&KHHN 7KHQHZ&7)LQFOXGHGDQ$FWLYH'XW\LQIDQWU\EDWWDOLRQDQ$UP\1DWLRQDO*XDUG,QIDQWU\ %DWWDOLRQD860DULQHEDWWDOLRQDQG&RDOLWLRQDQG$IJKDQ$UP\XQLWV,Q-XO\&7) ThunderWRRNWKHUHLQVRI5HJLRQDO&RPPDQG±(DVW 5&(DVW PDGHXSRISURYLQFHVLQFOXG- LQJWKHUHVWLYHSURYLQFHVRI3DNWLND3DNWLD.KRVW*KD]QL1DQJDUKDUDQG/DJKPDQ,QDUHD 5&(DVWZDVURXJKO\WKHVL]HRIWKHVWDWHRI,RZD -7)WingsOHGE\&RORQHO%6KDQQRQ'DYLVSURYLGHGDYLDWLRQDVVHWVIRUDOO&RDOLWLRQ RSHUDWLRQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ$OORIWKH86DYLDWLRQDVVHWVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQH[FHSWWKRVHEHORQJLQJ WRWKH86$LU)RUFHZHUHFRQWUROOHGE\-7)WingsDQGLQFOXGHG86$UP\%ODFNKDZN&KLQRRN DQG$SDFKHKHOLFRSWHUVSOXV6XSHU6WDOOLRQVDQG&REUDVIURPWKH0DULQH&RUSV-7)Wings ZDVVWDIIHGE\PRUHWKDQSLORWVFUHZPHPEHUVDQGVXSSRUWSHUVRQQHODQGLQFOXGHG 6ROGLHUVIURPWKH$ODEDPD)ORULGD*HRUJLD+DZDLLDQG8WDK$UP\1DWLRQDO*XDUG7KH DYLDWLRQ-7)ZDVWKHEDFNERQHRIWKH&RDOLWLRQVXSSO\FKDLQDQGSURYLGHGDHURPHGLFDOHYDFX- DWLRQDQGDLUWUDI¿FFRQWUROVHUYLFHVWKURXJKRXWWKHWKHDWHU 7KH G 6TXDGURQ WK &DYDOU\ 5HJLPHQW &$9 DQG &RPSDQ\ % G$YLDWLRQ 5HJLPHQWPDGHXS&7)SaberDQGRSHUDWHGLQWKHYDVWSURYLQFHVRIZHVWHUQ$IJKDQLVWDQ ,Q 6HSWHPEHU &-7) GHVLJQDWHG WKLV DUHD DV 5HJLRQDO &RPPDQG±:HVW 5&:HVW DQGFUHDWHGDQHZRUJDQL]DWLRQFDOOHG&7)LonghornEDVHGRQ&$9&7)CoyoteRYHU- VDZHQJLQHHULQJRSHUDWLRQVIRU&-7)DQGZDVFRPPDQGHGE\&RORQHO1DQF\-:HWKHULOO 6RXWK'DNRWD$UP\1DWLRQDO*XDUG86$UP\5HVHUYHDQG$UP\1DWLRQDO*XDUGXQLWVIURP $ODEDPD,RZD/RXLVLDQD0LQQHVRWD1HZ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 147 of 316

Chapter 10

,'6XSSRUW&RPPDQGEHFDPHWKH-RLQW/RJLVWLFDO&RPPDQGDQGVHUYHGDOO&-7)VIURPLWV KHDGTXDUWHUVDW%DJUDP ,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHVL[SULPDU\7)VRUJDQL]HGXQGHU&-7)VHYHUDORWKHU86DQG&RDOLWLRQ XQLWVRSHUDWHGXQGHU2OVRQ¶VDXWKRULW\GXULQJWKHVSULQJRI)RUH[DPSOHWKHG0DULQH ([SHGLWLRQDU\8QLWORFDWHGDW%DJUDP$LU%DVHZDVGHVLJQDWHG&7)Stonewall and conducted LQGHSHQGHQWRSHUDWLRQVLQQRUWKHUQ2UX]JDQSURYLQFHLQ5&6RXWK$0LOLWDU\3ROLFH7) 7) Enforcer SURYLGHGJHQHUDOVXSSRUWVHUYLFHVWRWKHUHJLRQDOFRPPDQGVDQGRSHUDWHGGHWDLQHH KROGLQJIDFLOLWLHVDW%DJUDPDQG.DQGDKDU 7KH WK ,QIDQWU\ %ULJDGH RI WKH 2NODKRPD $UP\ 1DWLRQDO *XDUG DORQJ ZLWK $UP\ National Guard detachments from 20 additional states and contingents from 7 Coalition coun- WULHVFRQWLQXHGWKH&-7)Phoenix mission of training the ANA. In August, the 76th Infantry %ULJDGHIURPWKH,QGLDQD$UP\1DWLRQDO*XDUGZRXOGWDNHRYHUIURPWKH2NODKRPD*XDUG 7KH20&$EDVHGLQ.DEXOZDVWKHSDUHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQIRU&-7)Phoenix and planned for VL[$1$EDWWDOLRQVWREHWUDLQHGDQGUHDG\E\WKHVXPPHURIWRDVVLVWLQYRWHUUHJLVWUD- tion and presidential election security operations. Approximately 20,000 additional Afghans, JUDGXDWHVRI&RDOLWLRQUXQ5HJLRQDO/DZ(QIRUFHPHQW7UDLQLQJ&HQWHUVZHUHDOVRH[SHFWHGWR DVVLVWLQHOHFWLRQVHFXULW\DVPHPEHUVRIWKH$137KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\$VVLVWDQFH)RUFH ,6$) XQGHU1$72DXWKRULW\VLQFH$XJXVWSURYLGHGVHFXULW\IRUWKH.DEXODUHDDQG FRPPDQGHGWKH357LQ.RQGX]LQQRUWKHDVW$IJKDQLVWDQ 7KH 86 PLOLWDU\ ZDV QRW WKH RQO\ 86 *RYHUQPHQW LQVWLWXWLRQ DW work in Afghanistan. In the spring of =DOPD\.KDOLO]DGFRQWLQXHGDV WKH$PHULFDQ DPEDVVDGRU LQ .DEXO DQG DGGLWLRQDO UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV IURP WKH86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH '26 VHUYHG ZLWK YDULRXV 357V 2WKHU assistance came from the Afghan 5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ *URXS $5* DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQFUHDWHGLQE\WKH 86 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO WKDW featured professionals from the pri- YDWHVHFWRUDQGWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV Assistance Mission in Afghani-

VWDQ 81$0$ ZKLFK FRQWLQXHG DOS Photo UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ DFWLYLWLHV DQG SUR- Figure 50. Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to Afghanistan. YLGHGKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFHWRWKH Afghan people.7KHYLROHQWDWWDFNVDJDLQVW:HVWHUQIRUFHVDQGLQWHUHVWVFRQWLQXHGKRZHYHUDQG OHGWKHQRQJRYHUQPHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQ 1*2 Medecins Sans Frontieres 'RFWRUVZLWKRXW%RU- GHUV WROHDYH$IJKDQLVWDQDIWHU¿YHRILWVPHPEHUVZHUHNLOOHGLQ%DGJKLVSURYLQFH6 The Maturing Threat ,QWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIDQGWKURXJKWKHWKUHDWSRVHGE\WKHDO4DHGDRUJDQL]DWLRQ WKH7DOLEDQDQGWKH+L]EL,VODPL*XOEXGGLQ +,* DSSHDUHGWREHFRQVROLGDWLQJ,QWKHVHFRQG

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 148 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

KDOIRIDQGPXFKRIHQHP\IRUFHVODXQFKHGDSSUR[LPDWHO\DWWDFNVSHUPRQWK DJDLQVW&RDOLWLRQIRUFHV$IJKDQVHFXULW\IRUFHVDQGJRYHUQPHQWLQIUDVWUXFWXUH7'XULQJWKLV SHULRGWKH$IJKDQLQVXUJHQWVEHJDQUHO\LQJPRUHKHDYLO\RQ,('V(QHP\IRUFHVZHUHDOVR able and willing to mass combat power to attack the Coalition in a more direct manner. One RIWKHPRVWGUDPDWLFH[DPSOHVRIWKLVFDSDFLW\RFFXUUHGLQWKH¿UVWZHHNRI-XQHLQWKH 'HK&KRSDQGLVWULFWRI=DEROSURYLQFHZKHQ$IJKDQ$UP\XQLWV&RDOLWLRQ6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV )RUFHV 62) DQG860DULQHVIURP&7)Stonewall FRQGXFWHGVHYHUDOEDWWOHVDJDLQVWKXQGUHGV RIZHOORUJDQL]HG7DOLEDQ¿JKWHUV $&7)BroncoDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHHQHP\LQ0D\GHVFULEHGHQHP\DFWLYLWLHVDVEHLQJD ³/HYHO2QH,QVXUJHQF\´7KDWWHUPGHVFULEHGDQLQVXUJHQWIRUFHWKDWXVHGVPDOOVFDOHDVVDXOWV UDLGVDQGDPEXVKHVRQSUHGRPLQDQWO\VRIWWDUJHWVWRKDUDVVVHFXULW\IRUFHVZHDNHQWKHJRY- HUQPHQW¶VUHVROYHWR¿JKWDQGHURGHSRSXODUVXSSRUWIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQW9:KLOH7DOLEDQIRUFHV FHUWDLQO\PRXQWHGODUJHURSHUDWLRQVVXFKDVWKHDFWLRQVLQ'HK&KRSDQLQVXPPHUWKH\ JHQHUDOO\DYRLGHGEHFRPLQJHPEURLOHGLQSLWFKHGEDWWOHVZLWKWKH&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVWKDWXVXDOO\ KDGDQDGYDQWDJHLQ¿UHSRZHUDQGWHFKQRORJ\,QVWHDGWKHHQHP\UHOLHGSULPDULO\RQVPDOOHU HQJDJHPHQWVWRGHVWDELOL]HWKHVHFXULW\VLWXDWLRQDQGFUHDWHGRXEWVZLWKLQWKHSRSXODWLRQDERXW WKHFDSDFLW\DQGZLOORIWKH&RDOLWLRQDQG$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWIRUFHVWRFUHDWHODVWLQJLPSURYH- PHQWV)RUWKHDFFXPXODWHGHIIHFWVRIVPDOOHUDWWDFNVWREHGHFLVLYHKRZHYHUWKH7DOLEDQDQG other enemy forces needed time.106RPH&RDOLWLRQPLOLWDU\OHDGHUVEHOLHYHGWKDWWKH7DOLEDQ¶V ZLOOLQJQHVVWREHSDWLHQWZDVWKHLUJUHDWHVWVWUHQJWK&RORQHO:DOWHU+HUGWKHFRPPDQGHURI &-627)$LQDQGHPSKDVL]HGWKHDV\PPHWU\EHWZHHQWKHHQHP\LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ DQGWKH&RDOLWLRQTXRWLQJDQRIWKHDUGDSKRULVP³ WKH7DOLEDQ¶V VWUHQJWKZDVWKHLUDELOLW\WR HQGXUHDQG WKH&RDOLWLRQ¶V ZHDNQHVVZDVRXUZLOOLQJQHVVWRHQGXUH7KH$PHULFDQVKDYH DOOWKHZDWFKHV´+HUGVDLG³EXWWKH$IJKDQVKDYHDOOWKHWLPH´11 In other words, Coalition forces were on a schedule in Afghanistan while the enemy was not. 2IFRXUVHWKHVLWXDWLRQLQHDFKSURYLQFHZDVXQLTXH+,*IRUFHVRSHUDWHGSULPDULO\LQ the northeast and mounted small-scale attacks. In the south and southeast, Coalition analyses RIIHUHGDPRUHFRPSOH[SLFWXUH,QWKH0D\DVVHVVPHQWRIWKHHQHP\WKHVWDIIRI&7) BroncoGHVFULEHGDPL[RIIRUFHVDQGFDSDELOLWLHVLQWKHSURYLQFHVRI5&6RXWK$O4DHGD IRUFHVDSSHDUHGWREHORGJHGSULPDULO\LQ3DNWLDDQG3DNWLNDSURYLQFHVEXWWKH7DOLEDQZDV SUHVHQW DV ZHOO ,Q 3DNWLD SURYLQFH IRU H[DPSOH WKH &-7) DVVHVVPHQW GHVFULEHG VPDOO 7DOLEDQIRUFHV WKDW WHQGHG WR XVH RQO\ LQGLUHFW ¿UH DQG ,('V DJDLQVW &RDOLWLRQ DQG$IJKDQ forces.12%RWK3DNWLNDDQG=DEROSURYLQFHVRQWKHRWKHUKDQGZHUHWKHKHDGTXDUWHUVIRUNH\ 7DOLEDQFRPPDQGHUVDQGDO4DHGDOHDGHUVKLS3DNWLNDZDVWKH$2IRUD7DOLEDQFRPPDQGHU NQRZQWRWKH&RDOLWLRQDV³5RFNHW0DQ´ZKRKDGEHFRPHLQIDPRXVIRUKLVDWWDFNVDJDLQVW WKHIRUZDUGRSHUDWLQJEDVHV )2%V DW6KNLQDQG2UJXQHXVLQJPPURFNHWV7KH'HK &KRSDQDUHDLQ=DEROSURYLQFHKDGEHFRPHERWKDWUDLQLQJVLWHDQGDVWDJLQJDUHDIRU7DOLEDQ operations elsewhere. 0RVWGLVFRQFHUWLQJZDVWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ+HOPDQGDQG2UX]JDQSURYLQFHVDQGWKHVRXWK- HUQKDOIRI.DQGDKDUSURYLQFH7KHDVVHVVPHQWVWDWHGWKDWLQWKH7DOLEDQPRYHGIUHHO\ WKURXJKWKHHQWLUHUHJLRQXVLQJYHKLFOHVWRSRVLWLRQWURRSVDQGVXSSOLHV14 Coalition intelligence LQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH7DOLEDQKDGHVWDEOLVKHGFRPPDQGFHQWHUVQRUWKRI'HK5DZRGLQ2UX]JDQ DQGLQWKH%DJKUDQ9DOOH\LQ+HOPDQGSURYLQFH0XOODK2PDUDQGRWKHUVHQLRUHQHP\OHDGHUV ZHUHWKRXJKWWRXVHWKH%DJKUDQ9DOOH\WRPDNHSODQVDQGLVVXHRUGHUV(QHP\IRUFHVLQWKLV

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 149 of 316

Chapter 10

UHJLRQEHFDPHTXLWHDFWLYHLQWKHVXPPHUDFFRUGLQJWR&-7)UHSRUWVDQGQRUPDOO\PRYHG VRXWKLQWRIULHQGO\WHUULWRU\LQ3DNLVWDQIRUWKHZLQWHUPRQWKV CJTF-76 Adapts to COIN ,QWKHPRQWKVEHIRUHWKH\GHSOR\HGWR$IJKDQLVWDQWKH6ROGLHUVRI&-7)EHJDQWR WKLQNDERXWDQGWUDLQIRUWKH&2,1HIIRUWLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ7KLVUHTXLUHGDPHQWDOVKLIWLQWKH W\SHRIDSSURDFKWKHFRPPDQGDQGVWDIIRIWKH7)LQWHQGHGWRWDNH%ULJDGLHU*HQHUDO%HUQDUG 6&KDPSRX[WKHDVVLVWDQWGLYLVLRQFRPPDQGHURIWKH86$UP\WK,'DQGWKHGHSXW\FRP- PDQGLQJJHQHUDORI&-7)UHFDOOHGWKDWWKLVWUDQVLWLRQZDVQRWHDV\,QSUHSDULQJIRUGHSOR\- PHQWWKHVHQLRUVWDIIYLHZHGWKHPLVVLRQDVVHHNLQJEDWWOHZLWKLQVXUJHQWIRUFHV&KDPSRX[ VWDWHG³,WKLQNZHWKRXJKWZHZHUHJRLQJWRJRNLOOFDSWXUHDQGGHIHDWWKH7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGD DQG>*XOEXGGLQ@+LNPHW\DU´*UDGXDOO\WKHOHDGHUVKLSRI&-7)EHJDQWRVHHWKHLUUROH DVVHSDUDWLQJWKHLQVXUJHQWVIURPWKHSRSXODWLRQ&KDPSRX[JDYHJUHDWFUHGLWWR/LHXWHQDQW *HQHUDO%DUQRIRUDVVLVWLQJLQWKLVWUDQVLWLRQE\H[SODLQLQJKLVYLVLRQIRUWKHFDPSDLJQDQGWKH UROHRI&RDOLWLRQPDQHXYHUIRUFHVLQZLQQLQJRYHUWKHSRSXODWLRQDQGSUHSDULQJIRUWKHHOHF- tions of 2004.16 7KLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJÀRZHGGRZQZDUGWRWKH6ROGLHUVLQDQXPEHURIZD\V,Q0DUFK &RORQHO3HGHUVHQWKHFRPPDQGHURIG%ULJDGHWK,'LVVXHGJXLGDQFHLQWKHIRUPRID GLUHFWLYHHQWLWOHGHow to Think OEF7KHGRFXPHQWFRQWDLQHGNH\SRLQWVDERXWWKHVLWXDWLRQ LQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQGKRZG%ULJDGH¶V6ROGLHUVVKRXOGRSHUDWHRQFHWKH\ZHUHRQWKHJURXQG (DUO\LQKLVJXLGDQFH3HGHUVHQH[SODLQHGWKDWPLOLWDU\DFWLRQVGLGQRWKDYHSULPDF\HPSKDVL]- LQJLQVWHDGWKDW³2()LVDQHQYLURQPHQWFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\WKHSXUVXLWRIQDWLRQDO2EM>HFWLYHV@ LQDSROLWLFDOGLPHQVLRQ´17+HZHQWIXUWKHUE\DGGLQJWKDWHYHQPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVZHUHRIWHQ FKDUDFWHUL]HGE\³LQGLUHFWUDWKHUWKDQGLUHFWDSSOLFDWLRQRIIRUFHSRZHU´3HGHUVHQVWUHVVHG WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQDVVHUWLQJWKDW³WKHDWWLWXGHRIWKH$IJKDQSHRSOHLVWKH>FHQWHU RIJUDYLW\@IRU2()ZHPXVWVHHNQRWMXVWWRGHIHDWWKHHQHP\EXWWRGHIHDWWKHHQHP\¶VVWUDW- HJ\ZHPXVWVHHNQRWMXVWWRGHIHDWWKHLQVXUJHQWVEXWWRGHIHDWWKHLQVXUJHQF\´19 &RORQHO&KHHNWKHFRPPDQGHURI&7)Thunder WKDWKDGDXWKRULW\IRUWKHSURYLQFHV RI5&(DVWDSSURDFKHG&2,1LQDPDQQHUVLPLODUWR3HGHUVHQ&KHHNUHFRJQL]HGWKHQHHGWR DWWDFNWKRVHHQHP\JURXSVWKDWHVSRXVHGDUDGLFDOIRUPRI,VODPDQGUHTXLUHGYLROHQFHLQVXS- SRUWRIWKDWLGHRORJ\&KHHNGH¿QHGVXFFHVVDVFRQWLQJHQWRQKLVFRPPDQG¶VDELOLW\WRJDLQ WKHVXSSRUWRIORFDO$IJKDQVDVVHUWLQJ³7REHYLFWRULRXVZHPXVWZLQ>WKHSHRSOH¶V@WUXVWDQG FRQ¿GHQFH´20%\H[WHQVLRQ&KHHNVDZWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWDVWKHFHQWHURIJUDYLW\IRUWKH &RDOLWLRQ,IWKHDFWLRQVRIKLV7)XOWLPDWHO\GLGQRWIRVWHUWKDWJRYHUQPHQW¶VFDSDFLW\DQGLWV OHJLWLPDF\ZLWKLQWKHH\HVRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ&7)Thunder¶VFDPSDLJQFRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHG successful.21 $VWKHVHLGHDVWRRNURRWZLWKLQWKHXQLWVRI&-7)VHQLRUOHDGHUVJUDSSOHGZLWKWKH ODUJHUSUREOHPRI¿QGLQJWKHPHDQVRIDFKLHYLQJDEVWUDFWREMHFWLYHVVXFKDVZLQQLQJSRSXODU VXSSRUW2QHRIWKH¿UVWVWHSVLQWKLVSURFHVVZDVWRJDLQDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶V DWWLWXGHWRZDUGWKH&RDOLWLRQWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWDQGWKH7DOLEDQ:KHQ&7)Bronco con- GXFWHGDQDVVHVVPHQWLQWKHVSULQJRILWIRXQGWKDWOHYHOVRIVXSSRUWLQ5&6RXWKIRUWKH &RDOLWLRQDQG$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWYDULHGDFURVVWKHSURYLQFHV,Q.KRVW3DNWLDDQG3DNWLND WKHRXWORRNZDVSURPLVLQJ$FFRUGLQJWRWKHDVVHVVPHQWORFDO$IJKDQOHDGHUVKDGDIDYRUDEOH UHVSRQVHWRWKHSUHVHQFHRI&RDOLWLRQVROGLHUVDQGWKHVHQVHWKDWVHFXULW\ZDVLPSURYLQJ22

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 150 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005 Thunder Photo by SSG Bradley Rhen, PA NCOIC, CTF Photo by SSG Bradley Rhen, PA Figure 51. Colonel Gary H. Cheek, Commander of CTF Thunder, and Captain Tage Rainsford, Commander of C Company, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, listen to village elders on 20 December 2004 in Waza Khwa, Afghanistan.

6WLOO$IJKDQVLQWKHVHDUHDVZHUHDQ[LRXVDERXWWKHZLOOLQJQHVVRI&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVWRPDNHD ORQJWHUPFRPPLWPHQWWR$IJKDQLVWDQDWKHPHHPSKDVL]HGLQ7DOLEDQLQIRUPDWLRQRSHUDWLRQV 7KHVLWXDWLRQLQ=DERODQG+HOPDQGSURYLQFHVDQGWKHVRXWKHUQKDOIRI.DQGDKDUSURYLQFHZDV IDUPRUHWURXEOLQJ,Q=DERO&-7)UHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKH7DOLEDQSUHVHQFHSUHYHQWHGORFDO SRSXODWLRQV IURP ZRUNLQJ FORVHO\ ZLWK WKH &RDOLWLRQ DQG$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW7KH DVVHVV- PHQWFRQVLGHUHGWKHSRSXODFHRI+HOPDQGD³FORVHGVRFLHW\´FRQWUROOHGE\0XVOLPFOHULFVDQG VWURQJPHQLQYROYHGLQSRSS\FXOWLYDWLRQ This population cared little about Coalition projects RUWKHSODQVRIWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW )RU3HGHUVHQDQGKLVVXERUGLQDWHFRPPDQGHUVWKHSURSHUDSSURDFKDWWKHWDFWLFDOOHYHO was a combination of operations—tailored to conditions in each AO—that would concurrently ZHDNHQWKHLQÀXHQFHRIWKHHQHP\DQGZLQWKHVXSSRUWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ7KH&7)Bronco FRPPDQGHUDQGVWDIIXVHGWKLVFRQFHSWDVDEDVLVIRUWKHLURSHUDWLRQRUGHU 2325' FDOOHG Bronco Strike. 7KLVGRFXPHQWHVWDEOLVKHGWKHRYHUDOOPLVVLRQDQGSXUSRVHIRU&7)Bronco RSHUDWLRQVGXULQJWKHFRXUVHRIDQHQWLUH\HDUDQGHPSKDVL]HGWKDWWKHVDIHDQGVXFFHVVIXO FRQGXFWRIWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQVLQ2FWREHUZDVDNH\REMHFWLYH,QDVHQVHBronco StrikeHVWDEOLVKHGWKHSDUDPHWHUVRIDPRQWKFDPSDLJQPRUHWKDQDGLVFUHWHWDFWLFDOOHYHO RSHUDWLRQ)XUWKHUWKHRUGHUPDQGDWHGWKDWVXERUGLQDWHXQLWVFRQGXFWDPL[RIVHFXULW\FLYLO PLOLWDU\ DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ RSHUDWLRQV DLPHG DW DFKLHYLQJ VWDELOLW\ LQ 5&6RXWK7R JLYH KLV 6ROGLHUV D PRUH VSHFL¿F LGHD RI KRZ KH GH¿QHG VXFFHVV 3HGHUVHQ¶V HQG VWDWH LQ WKH RUGHU FRQVLVWHGRIIRXUNH\FRQGLWLRQV$IJKDQSRSXODWLRQJHQHUDOO\UHMHFWVWKHHQHP\SRSXODWLRQ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 151 of 316

Chapter 10

WUXVWVWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VDELOLW\DQGZLOOWRFUHDWHVWDELOLW\DQGVHFXULW\5&6RXWKSUHSDUHGIRU H[SDQVLRQRI&RDOLWLRQDQG$IJKDQVHFXULW\IRUFHRSHUDWLRQVDQGLQVXUJHQF\LQ5&6RXWK defeated.24 7REHJLQWKLVFRPSOH[PLVVLRQWKHXQLWVRI&7)Bronco EHJDQWDNLQJRYHU$2VIURP7) WarriorLQWKHODWHVSULQJRI)ROORZLQJWKHJXLGHOLQHVVHWE\/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO%DUQR WKHSUHVHQFHRI&RDOLWLRQXQLWVLQWKHSURYLQFHVZDVDNH\IDFWRULQWKH&2,1FDPSDLJQ)RU &-7)WKHEDVHVRFFXSLHGE\&7)BroncoDQG&7)Thunder in the spring and summer of ZHUHWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWVIRUDQHIIRUWWKDWZRXOGJUDGXDOO\GRPLQDWHHQWLUHSURYLQFHV %ULJDGLHU*HQHUDO&KDPSRX[WKHGHSXW\FRPPDQGLQJJHQHUDORI&-7)GHVFULEHGWKLVSUR- cess using the ink spot (or oil stain) metaphor often employed in COIN theory. Champoux H[SODLQHG³7KHLGHDLV\RXKDYHWKHVHLQNVSRWVOLO\SDGVWKDW\RX¶UHRSHUDWLQJIURPDQGWKDW WKH\H[SDQGDQGHYHQWXDOO\RYHUWLPHWKHVHLQNVSRWVZRXOGDOOFRQQHFW´ No one within the Coalition command hoped to create security for the entire Afghan population. Instead, Major *HQHUDO2OVRQWKH&-7)FRPPDQGLQJJHQHUDOGHVFULEHGKLVDSSURDFKDVHVWDEOLVKLQJWKH ULJKWFRQGLWLRQVZLWKUHFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGJRYHUQDQFHRSHUDWLRQVVRWKDWHQHP\IRUFHVZRXOG HLWKHUORVHWKHLUEDVHRIVXSSRUWZLWKLQWKHSRSXODWLRQRUOD\GRZQWKHLUDUPVWRWDNHDGYDQWDJH of the progress.26&RORQHO3HGHUVHQEHFDPHFRQYLQFHGWKDWWKHLQNVSRWFRQFHSWZDVWKHFRUUHFW FRQFHSWJLYHQWKHUHVRXUFHVDQGFDSDELOLWLHVKHKDG3HGHUVHQDVVHUWHG³,QKLQGVLJKWWKHLQN spot theory works for reconstruction where you plant permanent presence. If you want to sit KHUHLQWKHVHELJEDVHVDQGJRRXWDQGZKDFNEDGJX\VDQGFRPHEDFNWKHSHRSOHGRQ¶WWUXVW \RXLI\RXJRRXWDQGOLYHZLWKWKHPWKH\VWDUWWRWUXVW\RX´27 8QGHU WKH VXSHUYLVLRQ RI &-7) EDVHV VSUHDG DFURVV 5&(DVW DQG 5&6RXWK &7) ThunderZRXOGHVWDEOLVKLWVKHDGTXDUWHUVDW)2%6DOHUQRLQ5&(DVWDQGSXVKLWVIRUFHVRXW LQWRSUHYLRXVO\HVWDEOLVKHG)2%VDQGQHZHUEDVHV&7)Bronco GLGOLNHZLVH+HDGTXDUWHUHGDW .DQGDKDU$LU¿HOGWKH7)EHJDQLQVSULQJZLWKOHVVWKDQDGR]HQEDVHV7KHVW%DWWDOLRQ VW3DUDFKXWH,QIDQWU\5HJLPHQW 3,5 ZDVKHDGTXDUWHUHGDW)2%6DOHUQRWKHG %DWWDOLRQWK,QIDQWU\5HJLPHQW ,1 DW)2%6KNLQ/DWHULQWKHSURYLQFHVLQ ZKLFKWKHVHEDVHVZHUHORFDWHG.KRVWDQG3DNWLNDUHVSHFWLYHO\ZHUHWUDQVIHUUHGWR5&(DVW 7KH )UHQFK 7DVN *URXS Arés RSHUDWHG RXW RI WKH EDVH DW 6SLQ %ROGDN 7KH G %DWWDOLRQ WK )LHOG$UWLOOHU\ )$ PRXQWHG ERWK DUWLOOHU\ DQG VWDELOLW\ RSHUDWLRQV IURP .DQGDKDU $LU¿HOG(OHPHQWVRIWKHVHXQLWVZHUHDOVRORFDWHGDW)2%4DODWDQG)2%6SLQ%ROGDN The G%DWWDOLRQWK,QIDQWU\5HJLPHQW ,1 GHSOR\HG¿UVWWR)2%*KD]QLZKHUHLWRSHUDWHG XQGHUWKHFRPPDQGRIWKH86WK0DULQH5HJLPHQWXQWLOWKHVXPPHUZKHQLWPRYHGEDFNLQWR 5&6RXWKWRDEDVHDW7DULQ.RZWLQ2UX]JDQSURYLQFH%\VSULQJ&7)Bronco operated IURPDSSUR[LPDWHO\EDVHVLQFOXGLQJ357ORFDWLRQVDQGWKH.DQGDKDUKHDGTXDUWHUV29 )URPWKHVHEDVHVWKH6ROGLHUVRI&-7)FRQGXFWHGWKHDIRUHPHQWLRQHGFRPELQDWLRQRI security and stability operations. The security operations tended to be tied to the establishment RIQHZEDVHVRULQUHDFWLRQWRVSHFL¿FLQWHOOLJHQFHDERXW7DOLEDQIRUFHVRULQGLYLGXDOVWKDW SOD\HGDVLJQL¿FDQWUROHLQWKHLQVXUJHQF\/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO7HUU\/6HOOHUVFRPPDQGHU RI,1LQUHFDOOHGWKDWKHFRQGXFWHGRYHURSHUDWLRQVLQUHVWLYH2UX]JDQSURYLQFH focused on fostering greater security.0RVWRIWKHVHPLVVLRQVLQYROYHGFRPSDQ\VL]HHOHPHQWV WUDYHOLQJLQWRUHPRWHDUHDVRIWKHSURYLQFHE\KHOLFRSWHUDQGFRQGXFWLQJFRUGRQDQGVHDUFK RSHUDWLRQV&RQWDFWZLWKWKHHQHP\ZDVUHODWLYHO\UDUHDOWKRXJKWKH7DOLEDQGLGXVH,('V²WKH W\SHRIDPEXVKHVSHUIHFWHGE\WKHPXMDKLGHHQLQWKHV

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 152 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

7DFWLFDOOHYHOFRPPDQGHUVOLNH6HOOHUVKRZHYHUZHUHXQGHURUGHUVWRLQWHJUDWHVHFXULW\ operations into the larger effort. This was especially important in the summer and fall of 2004 ZKHQSUHSDUDWLRQVIRUWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQUHTXLUHGYRWHUUHJLVWUDWLRQDQGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW RISROOLQJSODFHV6HOOHUVUHFDOOHGWKDWKHODXQFKHG2SHUDWLRQ/$1'*5$%LQWKHVXPPHURI WRVHWXSDQHZEDVHFDOOHG)2%&REUDLQWKHQRUWKZHVWGLVWULFWRIWKHSURYLQFH That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¶V (PHUJHQF\5HVSRQVH3URJUDP &(53 7KHVHIXQGVDOORZHGIRUWKHGULOOLQJRIZDWHUZHOOV VLPSOHUHIXUELVKLQJRIVFKRROVDQGRWKHUPLQRULPSURYHPHQWVWRWKHSK\VLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUH The presidential elections of October 2004 played a critical role in shaping Coalition oper- DWLRQV 7KLVHOHFWLRQDQGWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\HOHFWLRQVRIZLOOEHWKHVXEMHFWRIDVHFWLRQ EHORZ ,QWKLVGLVFXVVLRQLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRHPSKDVL]HWKHUROHWKDWWDFWLFDOOHYHOXQLWVOLNH ,1SOD\HGLQSODQQLQJDQGFRQGXFWLQJHOHFWLRQV&RRUGLQDWLQJDQGVWDJLQJDQHOHFWLRQLQD ZHOOGHYHORSHGVWDEOHGHPRFUDF\LVGLI¿FXOWHQRXJK7RFRQGXFWDQHOHFWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQLQ ZDVIDUPRUHFRPSOH[DQGUHTXLUHGWKHUHVRXUFHVDQGFDSDELOLWLHVSURYLGHGE\&RDOLWLRQ military forces. In the registration campaign, commanders and staffs worked with the Afghan *RYHUQPHQWDQGWKH81WRJLYHWKHSRSXODWLRQDFKDQFHWRHQUROODVYRWHUV2QHOHFWLRQGD\ PDQ\XQLWVSURYLGHGTXLFNUHDFWLRQIRUFHV 45)V WRVHFXUHSROOVDQGHYHQWUDQVSRUWEDOORWV IURPUHJLRQDOVLWHVWRSURYLQFLDOFHQWHUV)RUH[DPSOH)$FRQGXFWHGDQLQFUHDVLQJQXPEHU RISDWUROVLQWKHFLW\RI.DQGDKDULQWKHZHHNVEHIRUHWKHHOHFWLRQDQGRQHOHFWLRQGD\PRYHG PRVWRILWV6ROGLHUVIURPWKH.DQGDKDU$LU¿HOGLQWRWKHFLW\WRSURYLGHVHFXULW\ $WWKHHQGRIWKHLUGHSOR\PHQWLQVSULQJWKHVHQLRUOHDGHUVLQ&-7)EHOLHYHGWKH\ KDGPDGHSURJUHVVWRZDUGFUHDWLQJDPRUHVWDEOHFRXQWU\ZLWKDJRYHUQPHQWWKDWKDGJUHDWHU legitimacy and reach. The successful presidential election had been one indicator of that suc- FHVV&7)BroncoKDGWUDFNHGRWKHUVLJQVRISURJUHVV:KHQWKH\DUULYHGWKH7)VWDIIDVVHVVHG WKHVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQWLQ5&6RXWKDQGIRXQGWKH\RQO\KDGLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKUHHRIWKH¿YH SURYLQFHVDQGLQWKRVHWKUHHUHJLRQV².DQGDKDU=DERODQGVRXWKHUQ2UX]JDQSURYLQFHV²WKH population feared the Coalition.7KH\NQHZDOPRVWQRWKLQJDERXWWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ+HOPDQG DQG1LPUX]SURYLQFHV2QH\HDUODWHU&7)Bronco reported making inroads in gaining the sup- SRUWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQLQPRVWRIWKHGLVWULFWVRI.DQGDKDU=DERODQG2UX]JDQSURYLQFHVDQGLQ DIHZGLVWULFWVRI+HOPDQGSURYLQFH7KLVZDVQRWYLFWRU\E\DQ\VWUHWFKRIWKHLPDJLQDWLRQ EXWWKH6ROGLHUVRI&7)BroncoZHUHFRQYLQFHGWKH\KDGPDGHVLJQL¿FDQWJDLQV The CJSOTF and Security Operations ,QLWV&2,1FDPSDLJQ&-7)KDGWKHVXSSRUWRIWKH&-627)$ZKRVHVSHFLDORSHUD- tions teams were trained for and experienced in COIN operations. In addition to the Operational

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 153 of 316

Chapter 10

'HWDFKPHQW±$OSKD 2'$ WHDPVSURYLGHGE\WKHG6)*LQHDUO\WKH&-627)$DOVR LQFOXGHGD861DYDO6SHFLDO:DUIDUH7DVN8QLW7DFWLFDO3V\FKRORJLFDO2SHUDWLRQV 36<23 7HDPVD&LYLO$IIDLUV &$ &RPSDQ\-RLQW7DFWLFDO$LU&RQWURO3DUWLHVDQG,UUHJXODU$IJKDQ 6HFXULW\ )RUFHV +HDGTXDUWHUHG DW %DJUDP$LU¿HOG &-627)$ RSHUDWHG RXW RI D VHULHV RI VPDOOEDVHVHYHQWXDOO\ORFDWLQJLWVIRUFHVLQUHPRWHEDVHFDPSVDQGERUGHUFKHFNSRLQWV LQ5&6RXWKDQG5&(DVW ,Q HDUO\ WKH &-627) OHDGHUVKLS EHJDQ SODQQLQJ DQ XQFRQYHQWLRQDO ZDUIDUH 8: FDPSDLJQIRFXVHGRQVHWWLQJFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQLQWKHIDOO,Q6SHFLDO)RUFHV 6) GRFWULQHWKHWHUP³XQFRQYHQWLRQDOZDUIDUH´GH¿QHGDW\SHRIDSSURDFKWKDWFORVHO\UHVHP- EOHG&2,17KHPDLQGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHWZRLVWKHHPSKDVLVLQ8:RQZRUNLQJZLWKDQG WKURXJKLQGLJHQRXVPLOLWDU\IRUFHV,QWKH8:FDPSDLJQLQ&-627)$ZRXOGDWWHPSW to partner with Afghan security forces, including the irregular militia found across the country. &-7) KDG RSHUDWLRQDO FRQWURO 23&21 RI WKH &-627) DQG LQ GLUHFWHG WKH &-627)FRPPDQGHU&RORQHO+HUGWRRSHUDWHDORQJWKH3DNLVWDQLIURQWLHUWKDWIRUPHGWKH VRXWKHUQERUGHURI5&6RXWKDQG5&(DVW,QWKHVSULQJ+HUGEHJDQVHWWLQJXSZKDWKHFDOOHG ³$ FDPSV´ DORQJ WKH IURQWLHU ,Q WKH /DZDUD GLVWULFW RI 3DNWLND SURYLQFH IRU H[DPSOH WKH 6)OHGFRQWLQJHQWHVWDEOLVKHGDFDPSWKDWLQFOXGHGD86$UP\&$WHDPDFRPSDQ\RIVROGLHUV IURPWKH$1$DQGFXVWRPVSROLFHRI¿FHUV7KHLUPLVVLRQZDVWRGHQ\WKHHQHP\WKHXVHRIDQ LQ¿OWUDWLRQFRUULGRUDQGGHPRQVWUDWHWKHDELOLW\RIWKH&RDOLWLRQDQGWKH$IJKDQVHFXULW\IRUFHV WRDVVHUWJRYHUQPHQWDOFRQWUROLQDSUHYLRXVO\ODZOHVVUHJLRQ/HVVWKDQKRXUVDIWHULWVHVWDE- OLVKPHQWDO4DHGD¿JKWHUVDWWDFNHGWKHFDPSDQGZHUHQRWRQO\VWRSSHGE\WKH86DQG$IJKDQ 6ROGLHUVEXWSXUVXHGLQWRWKHPRXQWDLQVE\WKH$1$XQLW In the 4 months that followed this DWWDFNWKH6ROGLHUVDWWKH$&DPSLQYHVWHGDSSUR[LPDWHO\LQWRWKHORFDODUHDLQWKH IRUPRIUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURMHFWVVXFKDVZDWHUZHOOVWKDWHPSOR\HGORFDOODERU&RORQHO+HUG UHFDOOHGWKDWWKHGLVSOD\RIDXWKRULW\E\WKH&RDOLWLRQDQG$1$DOVROHGWRDVXFFHVVIXOYRWHU UHJLVWUDWLRQGULYHLQWKHUHJLRQZLWKSHUFHQWRIWKHUHJLVWUDQWVEHLQJIHPDOH$IJKDQVDQ LPSUHVVLYH¿JXUHJLYHQWKHWUDGLWLRQDOYDOXHVRIWKHDUHDDQGWKHFRQWLQXHGSUHVHQFHRIERWK Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. $WWKHVDPHWLPHWKDWVRPHHOHPHQWVRIWKH&-627)ZHUHSURMHFWLQJPLOLWDU\DQGFLYLO SRZHUDORQJWKHERUGHURWKHUWHDPVZHUHDVVLVWLQJ&-7)VHWFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHHOHF- tion by launching a series of operations aimed at breaking up enemy concentrations in the LQWHULRURIWKHFRXQWU\2QHRIWKH¿UVWRIWKHVHPLVVLRQVWDUJHWHG7DOLEDQWUDQVLWFRUULGRUVLQWKH %DJKUDQ9DOOH\LQQRUWKHUQ+HOPDQGSURYLQFH,Q2SHUDWLRQ35,1&(66WZRSUHGDZQVLPXO- WDQHRXVVWULNHVUHVXOWHGLQWKHFDSWXUHRI$EGXO+D¿]0DJHHGDQG0RKDPPHG'DZRRGERWK senior enemy commanders. /DWHU LQ WKH VXPPHU WKH &-627) ODXQFKHG WZR RSHUDWLRQV WR EXLOG RQ WKH VXF- FHVV RI 35,1&(66 'XULQJ WKH ¿UVW ZHHN RI -XO\ WZR 2'$V FRQGXFWHG 2SHUDWLRQ ,1'(3(1'(1&(DIROORZRQVZHHSRIWKH%DJKUDQ9DOOH\$IWHU¿QGLQJWKDWWKH7DOLEDQ KDGUHWUHDWHGIURPWKHYDOOH\DORFDOYLOODJHUOHGWKHWHDPVWRDVXEVWDQWLDOZHDSRQVFDFKH WKDWLQFOXGHG7WDQNVPPKRZLW]HUV=68DQWLDLUFUDIWJXQVPPURFNHWVDQG tens of thousands of rounds of assorted ammunition.2SHUDWLRQ7,&21'(52*$ZKLFKIRO- ORZHGWDUJHWHGWKHIURQWLHUDUHDDQGWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQOLQHVWR.DEXODQG.DQGDKDUIURPWKH ERUGHU7KHRSHUDWLRQVWHPSRUDULO\FXWWKHHQHP\VXSSO\URXWHWKURXJKWKH.K\EHU3DVVZKLFK KHOSHGSUHYHQW7DOLEDQJURXSVIURPWUDQVLWLQJVRXWKHDVWHUQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQGVWULNLQJ.DEXORU

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 154 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

.DQGDKDU'XULQJWKHRSHUDWLRQD1DY\6($/WHDPNLOOHGSURPLQHQW7DOLEDQOHDGHU5R]L.KDQ DVKHDWWHPSWHGWRÀHHDFRUGRQHGYLOODJH ,Q HDUO\ 2FWREHU WKH &-627) ODXQFKHG 2SHUDWLRQ 75(1721 D VHULHV RI DJJUHVVLYH ORFDO RSHUDWLRQV WRSUHHPSWSUHHOHFWLRQDWWDFNV3DUWO\ in response to the success of these missions, a force of more than 200 7DOLEDQ DWWDFNHG DQ 6) EDVH FDPS DW 'HK 5DZRRG LQ 2UX]JDQ SURY- ince on the day before the election. 7KH6)WHDPVXFFHVVIXOO\IRXJKWRII the attackers and killed 70 Taliban.

All told, enemy attacks in the month Martin K. Newton DOD Photo by SGT prior to the election were minimal. Figure 52. General Bryan D. Brown (left), commander 86$UP\ *HQHUDO %U\DQ ' %URZQ of US Special Operations Command, receives a base &RPPDQGHU 86 6SHFLDO 2SHUDWLRQV GHIHQVHRSHUDWLRQVFHQWHUEULH¿QJRQ1RYHPEHU Command, asserted that in this pre- DW&DPS9DQFHRQ%DJUDP$LU¿HOG$IJKDQLVWDQIURP Captain Owen Ray of the 1st Special Forces Group HOHFWLRQ SHULRG ³6SHFLDO 2SHUDWLRQV (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington. )RUFHV KDG NLOOHG RU FDSWXUHG KXQ- GUHGVRIWHUURULVWVDQGLQVXUJHQWVXVLQJSUHFLVHO\WDUJHWHGRIIHQVLYHRSHUDWLRQV´40 ,Q'HFHPEHUWKHWK6)*WRRNFRPPDQGRI&-627)$DQGEHJDQSODFLQJPRUH HPSKDVLVRQVWUHQJWKHQLQJWKH&RDOLWLRQDQG$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW¶VSUHVHQFHLQWKHSURYLQFHV DORQJWKH3DNLVWDQLIURQWLHU:LWKRQHH\HRQWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\HOHFWLRQVVFKHGXOHGIRUWKHIDOO RIWKH&-627)VRXJKWWRGHFUHDVHIXUWKHUHQHP\LQ¿OWUDWLRQDFURVVWKHERUGHUZKLOH LQFUHDVLQJWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW¶VOHJLWLPDF\7KLVWDVNUHOLHGKHDYLO\RQWKHDYDLODELOLW\ RIWUDLQHG$IJKDQVHFXULW\IRUFHV,QWKHQXPEHURIWKHVHXQLWVZRUNLQJZLWK&RDOLWLRQ 62)UHPDLQHGORZEXWGLGKDYHVRPHVXFFHVVZLWKWKHIHZ$1$EDWWDOLRQVLWDGYLVHG41 In 2SHUDWLRQ1$0'21*IRUH[DPSOH62)DGYLVRUVDFFRPSDQLHGDQ$1$EDWWDOLRQLQWR DQHQHP\VDQFWXDU\LQ2UX]JDQSURYLQFHDQGVXFFHVVIXOO\FOHDUHGWKHGLVWULFWRIRUJDQL]HG enemy formations.427KDWRSHUDWLRQZDVWKHODUJHVW$1$OHGDFWLRQVLQFHWKH¿HOGLQJRIWKH $IJKDQIRUFHVLQ%HFDXVHRIWKHVXFFHVVZLWK1$0'21*DQGRWKHUDFWLRQV&-7) GLUHFWHGWKH&-627)$WRIRFXVLWVPLVVLRQRQDVVLVWLQJDQGDGYLVLQJ$IJKDQVHFXULW\IRUFHV in preparation for the elections.

The Continuing Militia Challenge ,QDQG&RDOLWLRQFRPPDQGHUVDWDOOOHYHOVFRQWLQXHGWRVWUXJJOHZLWKUHJLRQDO OHDGHUVDQGWKHLUDUPHGPLOLWLDV7KHLQGLYLGXDOOHDGHUVDQGWKHLUIRUFHVSRVHGDGLUHFWREVWDFOH WR WKH H[SDQVLRQ RI WKH$IJKDQ *RYHUQPHQW¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG LQ VRPH UHJLRQV VHUYHG DV SRWHQWLDODGYHUVDULHV7KH'LVDUPDPHQW'HPRELOL]DWLRQDQG5HLQWHJUDWLRQ ''5 SURJUDP XQGHUWKHDXVSLFHVRIWKH81FRQWLQXHGLQDQGDQGHQMR\HGYDU\LQJGHJUHHVRIVXF- FHVV7KH$IJKDQ0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQVH 02' UDQWKHSURJUDPDQGUHFHLYHGDVVLVWDQFHIURP WKH$IJKDQLVWDQ1HZ%HJLQQLQJV3URJUDP $1%3 WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV'HYHORSPHQW3URJUDP 81'3 DQGWKH81$0$-DSDQZDVWKHOHDGFRXQWU\LQ$IJKDQ''5PDWWHUV+RZHYHU

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 155 of 316

Chapter 10

SUREOHPVKDGDULVHQHDUO\RQUHJDUGLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQ02'RI¿FLDOVDQGUHJLRQDOOHDG- ers, many of whom stubbornly refused to cooperate because of the alien nature of the concept RIGLVDUPDPHQW$WORZHUOHYHOV&RDOLWLRQOHDGHUVOLNH&RORQHO3HGHUVHQFRPPDQGHURI&7) Bronco, found that his units were the only forces that had the will and the strength to put teeth LQWRWKH''5SURJUDP3HGHUVHQUHFDOOHGWKDWWKH\KDGVRPHVXFFHVVLQGHPRELOL]LQJDQGGLV- DUPLQJWKHPLOLWLDIRUFHVLQ5&6RXWK1HYHUWKHOHVVKHIRXQGWKHUHZDVOLWWOHFKDQFHRIUHLQWH- JUDWLQJPLOLWLDPHQLQWRVRFLHW\LQDYLDEOHZD\EHFDXVHRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUHPSOR\PHQWRXWVLGH the militias and the Taliban were few.44 $IHZZHHNVSULRUWRWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQ02'DQQRXQFHGDUHGHGLFDWHGHIIRUW WRJHWWKH''5SURJUDPEDFNRQWUDFN0HDVXULQJSURJUHVVZDVGHFLGHGO\GLI¿FXOW7REHJLQ ZLWKYDULRXVHVWLPDWHVRIWKHQXPEHURIHOLJLEOHPLOLWLDPHQGLIIHUHGE\DVPXFKDV troops.$GGLWLRQDOO\ORFDOPLOLWLDFRPPDQGHUVRIWHQLQÀDWHGWRWDOVLQDQHIIRUWWRVHL]HWKH SD\RI³SKDQWRP´PLOLWLDPHQ(YHQWXDOO\02'VHWWOHGRQDEDVHOLQH¿JXUHRIPLOLWLD members eligible for the program.46 $WWKHFRUHRIWKH''5SURJUDPZDVWKHLGHDRIUHLQWHJUDWLRQ)RUPHUPLOLWLDPHQDQG ORZHU OHYHO RI¿FHUV HDFK UHFHLYHG D IHZ KXQGUHG GROODUV DV D UHLQWHJUDWLRQ VWLSHQG ZKLOH VHQLRUFRPPDQGHUV²JHQHUDOVDQGVRPHFRORQHOV²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work, or teaching as a component of their packages, whereas illiterate soldiers were only RIIHUHGSD\PHQWLQNLQG JUDLQRUOLYHVWRFN 8QIRUWXQDWHO\PDQ\RIWKRVHZKRVXFFHVVIXOO\ FRPSOHWHGYRFDWLRQDOWUDLQLQJZHUHIRUFHGWRUHORFDWHWR¿QGDSSURSULDWHZRUN 7KH''5SURJUDPKDGDPHDVXUHGDPRXQWRIVXFFHVVLQDQG81¿JXUHVLQGL- FDWHGWKDWVOLJKWO\PRUHWKDQH[FRPEDWDQWVKDGEHHQGLVDUPHGDQGGHPRELOL]HGE\ WKHHQGRI)XUWKHUOLJKWPHGLXPZHDSRQVDQGKHDY\ZHDSRQVKDGEHHQ collected by that date.47(YHQVRWKHIDLOXUHVRIWKHSURJUDPUHYHDOHGWKHYHU\UHDOSHUVLVWHQW SROLWLFDOIUDFWXUHVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ,QDFRPPDQGHURIDPLOLWLDIRUFHEDVHGLQWKH3DQMVKLU region refused to participate in the disarmament process.:RUVHZDVWKHEDWWOHWKDWEURNH RXWLQWKHVXPPHURILQ+HUDWSURYLQFHEHWZHHQWKHPLOLWLDIRUFHVRI,VPDLO.KDQDQG $PDQXOODK .KDQ7KLV FULVLV IRUFHG 0DMRU *HQHUDO 2OVRQ WKH FRPPDQGHU RI &-7) WR LQWHUYHQHE\VHQGLQJ&7)Saber &$9 WZR6)2'$VDQGDQ$1$FRPSDQ\WRWKHDUHD49 7KLV&RDOLWLRQIRUFHTXHOOHGWKHEDWWOHEXW2OVRQKDGWRLQYROYH$PHULFDQ$PEDVVDGRU=DOPD\ .KDOLO]DGDQG+DPLG.DU]DLLQWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVEHIRUHWKHFRQÀLFWZDVGHIXVHG Expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) $NH\WRWKHRYHUDOO:HVWHUQHIIRUWLQ$IJKDQLVWDQZDVWKHVXFFHVVIXOH[SDQVLRQRI,6$)¶V UROHLQ:LWKIRUFHVVWUXQJRXWLQWKHVRXWKDQGWKHHDVW&)&$QHHGHGWKH,6$)WRVHFXUH .DEXODQGH[SDQGVHFXULW\DQGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRSHUDWLRQVWRWKHQRUWK%\PLG,6$)ZDV FRPPDQGHGE\/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO5LFN-+LOOLHUD&DQDGLDQ$UP\RI¿FHUZKRUHSRUWHGWR 1$72¶V$OOLHG-RLQW)RUFHV&RPPDQGLQ%UXQVVXP1HWKHUODQGV,6$)KDGDVVXPHGFRQWURO

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 156 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

RIWKH*HUPDQOHG.RQGX]357LQODWHDQG+LOOLHURYHUVDZLWVWDNHRYHURIWKH0D]DUH 6KDULI357IURP%ULWLVKIRUFHVLQ-XO\DQGWKH*HUPDQOHG357DW)H\]DEDELQ2FWREHU 'XULQJWKHVXPPHURI,6$)LQFUHDVHGWURRSVWUHQJWKIURPWRLQDQWLFLSDWLRQ RIWKHXSFRPLQJSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQDQGDWWKDWSRLQWFRQWUROOHGQLQHSURYLQFHV VTXDUH kilometers) in northern Afghanistan.)UHQFK/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO-HDQ/RXLV3\DVVXPHGFRP- PDQGLQ$XJXVWIROORZHGE\/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO(WKDP(UGDJLRIWKH7XUNLVK$UP\ZKR WRRNRYHULQ)HEUXDU\ ,Q,6$)H[SDQVLRQFRQWLQXHGDVWKHFRPPDQGWRRNRYHU357VDW+HUDWDQG)DUDK DORQJZLWKWKH+HUDW)RUZDUG6XSSRUW%DVH )6% 7KH)6%ZDVPDQDJHGE\FLYLOLDQDQG PLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHODQGLQFOXGHGD45)D6SDQLVKVXUJLFDOKRVSLWDODQGPHGLFDOHYDFXDWLRQ 0('(9$& XQLWV:LWKWKLVLQFUHDVHLQLWVPLVVLRQVFRSH,6$)FRQWUROOHGQLQH357VDQG KDGVHFXULW\UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUSHUFHQWRI$IJKDQLVWDQ¶VWHUULWRU\:KHQ,WDOLDQ/LHXWHQDQW *HQHUDO0DXUR'HO9HFFKLRDVVXPHGFRPPDQGLQ$XJXVW,6$)¶VWURRSVWUHQJWKGURSSHG WRVROGLHUVDOWKRXJKLWVUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQKDGQHYHUEHHQJUHDWHU ,6$)¶VH[SDQVLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQIDFHGFULWLFDOSUREOHPV/RZWURRSOHYHOVLQVXI¿FLHQW transportation, incompatible communication systems, and underfunding by participating coun- WULHVZHDNHQHGWKHRYHUDOOHIIRUW3UHVHQWLQJPRUHSUREOHPVIRUWDFWLFDORSHUDWLRQVZHUHWKH QXPEHURIFDYHDWVRUUHVWULFWLRQVWKDWJRYHUQPHQWVSODFHGRQKRZWURRSVFRXOGEHXVHG6RPH FDYHDWVFRQ¿QHGIRUFHVWRFHUWDLQJHRJUDSKLFDODUHDVDQGRWKHUVOLPLWHGWKHW\SHVRIPLVVLRQV in which their troops could participate.7KH*HUPDQ*RYHUQPHQWIRUH[DPSOHOLPLWHGLWV IRUFHVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQWRRSHUDWLQJLQWKHQRUWKHUQSURYLQFHVZKHUHWKHVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQW ZDVUHODWLYHO\EHQLJQ7KHVHOLPLWDWLRQVZRXOGKDYHVHULRXVHIIHFWVLQDQGDVWKH enemy threat worsened. Transition at the Tactical Level: SETAF Takes Charge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between combat and stability operations in predeployment training..DPL\DFDXWLRQHGKLV WURRSVWKDWWKH&-7)PLVVLRQZRXOGEHGLIIHUHQWIURPSUHYLRXVURWDWLRQVDQGWKDWWKH¿JKW IRU$IJKDQLVWDQZDVIDUIURPRYHU,QKLVLeader Preparation Monograph, .DPL\D described how the enemy forces in Afghanistan were mounting a classic insurgency intent on deposing 3UHVLGHQW.DU]DL¶VJRYHUQPHQW+HZHQWRQWRGHVFULEHWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIFRXQWHULQVXUJHQFLHV QRWLQJWKDWWKH\DUHSULPDULO\SROLWLFDOLQQDWXUHDQGWKDWSDWLHQFHSHUVHYHUDQFHLQLWLDWLYHDQG GLVFLSOLQHRQWKHSDUWRIDOO6(7$)IRUFHVZRXOGEHUHTXLUHGWRGHIHDWWKHLQVXUJHQF\.DPL\D IXUWKHUH[SODLQHG6(7$)¶VXQLTXHRSSRUWXQLW\WRSRVLWLYHO\LPSDFW$IJKDQLVWDQ¶VIXWXUHRQ DOOOHYHOVRIQDWLRQDOSRZHUGLSORPDWLFLQIRUPDWLRQDOPLOLWDU\DQGHFRQRPLF³:HPXVWEH DVWXWHWRUHFRJQL]HWKHVHRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGWUDQVIRUPWKHPWRRXUDGYDQWDJH´KHZURWHDGGLQJ ³:KHQRSSRUWXQLWLHVDUHVHL]HGWKH\PXOWLSO\:KHQWKH\DUHQRWWKH\GLH´

290 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 157 of 316

Chapter 10 DOD Photo by SPC Jerry T. Combes T. DOD Photo by SPC Jerry Figure 53. Major General Jason Kamiya (left), commander of CJTF-76, and Oruzgan province Governor Hajji Jan Mohammed discuss concerns and solutions to recent ÀRRGLQJWKDWRFFXUUHGLQWKHYLOODJHRI&HN]DL$IJKDQLVWDQ0DUFK

8OWLPDWHO\.DPL\DV\QWKHVL]HGKLV&2,1JXLGDQFHLQWRNH\SRLQWVZKLFKKHWLWOHGKLV :DU¿JKWLQJ)RFXVDQGSXEOLVKHGLQZDOOHWVL]HFDUGIRUPDWIRUGLVWULEXWLRQWRDOOPHPEHUVRI WKH&-7)7KHVHSRLQWVHPSKDVL]HGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI&02DQGWKHRYHUDOOJRDORIVXSSRUWLQJ WKHSROLWLFDOSURFHVVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQGWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHGHPRFUDWLFDOO\HOHFWHGJRYHUQ- PHQW7KHSRLQWVVWUHVVHGÀH[LELOLW\FUHDWLYLW\WKHQHHGWRFDUHIXOO\JDWKHULQWHOOLJHQFHDQGWR XQGHUVWDQGKRZORFDOSRSXODWLRQVSHUFHLYH866ROGLHUV $UPHGZLWKWKLVJXLGDQFH6(7$)¶VXQLWVÀRZHGLQWR$IJKDQLVWDQDQGPRYHGLQWRWKHLU $2V7KHG$LUERUQH%ULJDGHWKHPDLQHOHPHQWZLWKLQ6(7$)WRRNWKHGHVLJQDWLRQ&7) BayonetGHSOR\HGWR5&6RXWKDW.DQGDKDU$LU¿HOGDQGWKHQLQWRPRVWRIWKHEDVHVSUHYL- RXVO\HVWDEOLVKHGE\&7)Bronco86$UP\&RORQHO.HYLQ2ZHQVZKRFRPPDQGHGWKHG $LUERUQH%ULJDGHEHFDPHWKHFRPPDQGHURI5&6RXWK&7)Bayonet was comprised of 2d %DWWDOLRQG3DUDFKXWH,QIDQWU\5HJLPHQW 3,5 WK,QIDQWU\'HWDFKPHQW /RQJ 5DQJH6XUYHLOODQFH G6XSSRUW%DWWDOLRQ $LUERUQH HOHPHQWVRIG%DWWDOLRQWK)LHOG $UWLOOHU\5HJLPHQW )$ DORQJZLWKDGGLWLRQDO&RDOLWLRQHOHPHQWVIURP5RPDQLDDQG &DQDGD,QDOOQHDUO\PHQDQGZRPHQVHUYHGLQ&7)Bayonet. 7KHRWKHUPDLQPDQHXYHUIRUFHLQWKHQHZ&-7)ZDV&7)DevilDEULJDGHVL]HIRUFH EXLOWDURXQGWKHVW%ULJDGHRIWKH86$UP\G$LUERUQH'LYLVLRQ7KLVIRUFHFRQVLVWHGRI IRXU86$UP\OLJKWLQIDQWU\EDWWDOLRQVVW%DWWDOLRQWK$LUERUQH,QIDQWU\5HJLPHQW $,5 G %DWWDOLRQ WK 3DUDFKXWH ,QIDQWU\ 5HJLPHQW 3,5 VW %DWWDOLRQ WK 3DUDFKXWH,QIDQWU\5HJLPHQW 3,5 DQGG%DWWDOLRQVW,QIDQWU\5HJLPHQWIURPWKH 7H[DV$UP\1DWLRQDO*XDUG$VHULHVRI860DULQHEDWWDOLRQVDOVRURWDWHGWKURXJKWKHDUHD LQFOXGLQJG%DWWDOLRQG0DULQH5HJLPHQW)LHOGDUWLOOHU\DQGVXSSRUWXQLWVEURXJKWWKH7)

291 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 158 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

PDQSRZHUXSWR6ROGLHUV6DLORUV0DULQHVDQG$LUPHQ&RORQHO3DWULFN'RQDKXHWKH &7)DevilFRPPDQGHUWRRNRYHU5&(DVWZKLFKTXLFNO\EHFDPHWKHPDLQHIIRUWIRU&-7) because Coalition intelligence indicated enemy forces used the eastern and northeastern SURYLQFHV DGMDFHQW WR WKH 3DNLVWDQL ERUGHU DV VDQFWXDULHV 'RQDKXH EHFDPH HVSHFLDOO\ FRQFHUQHG DERXW WKH .RUHQJDO 5LYHU9DOOH\LQ .XQDU SURYLQFH WKDW VHUYHG DV D VWURQJKROG IRU:DKKDELVWUDGLFDOV60,Q-XO\DQ0+&KLQRRNZDVVKRWGRZQZKLOHVXSSRUWLQJ RSHUDWLRQVLQWKDWYDOOH\GHPRQVWUDWLQJWKHWHQDFLW\DQGFDSDFLW\RIHQHP\IRUFHVLQWKHDUHD $OO86FUHZPHPEHUVDQGSDVVHQJHUVRQERDUGZHUHNLOOHG :KLOHSUHSDULQJIRUWKHGHSOR\PHQW0DMRU*HQHUDO.DPL\DZDVDZDUHWKDWKLVXQLWVZRXOG QRWEHDEOHWRUHSODFHWKHXQLWVRIWKHWK,'RQDRQHIRURQHEDVLV7KXVKHKDGWRDFFHSW VRPHULVNE\XVLQJWKHWHDPVRIWKH&-627)WRFUHDWHD&RDOLWLRQSUHVHQFHLQVRPHDUHDV )RUH[DPSOHZLWKQRIRUFHVOHIWWRUHSODFHWKH,1LQ2UX]JDQSURYLQFH.DPL\DFKRVHWR VXSSRUWWKH357DW7DULQ.RZWZLWKDQ2'$%HFDXVH5&(DVWKDGEHFRPHWKHPDLQHIIRUW .DPL\DDFWXDOO\ORRNHGWRLQFUHDVHWKH&RDOLWLRQSUHVHQFHLQ1DQJDUKDUSURYLQFHDURXQGWKH FLW\RI-DODODEDG:KLOHWKHUHZDVDQ2'$WKHUH6(7$)VWDUWHGFRQVWUXFWLQJD)2%DQGE\ HDUO\WKHEDVHKDGJURZQWRLQFOXGHD357DQGDQDLUVWULSWKDWFRXOGDFFRPPRGDWH& transport aircraft. /LNH&7)BroncoDQG&7)ThunderEHIRUHWKHP'RQDKXHDQG2ZHQVSXUVXHGDFRPELQD- WLRQRIVHFXULW\JRYHUQDQFHLQIRUPDWLRQDQGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRSHUDWLRQVIURPWKHEDVHVHVWDE- OLVKHGLQEDWWDOLRQDQGFRPSDQ\$2V$VWKH357VLQFUHDVHGDQGFDPHPRUH¿UPO\XQGHUWKH authority of the regional commands, the effects of reconstruction became more pronounced. As LQWDFWLFDOOHYHOFRPPDQGHUVVXSSRUWHGWKHLURZQUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURMHFWVXVLQJ&(53 IXQGVDQGRWKHUPHDQV,Q5&(DVWWKH&7)Devil commander directed his battalion command- HUVWRFRRUGLQDWHFORVHO\ZLWKWKH357VWRFUHDWHDODUJHUHIIHFWHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHLPSURYHPHQW RIWKHURDGQHWZRUNDQGRWKHUKLJKO\YLVLEOHLQIUDVWUXFWXUH616HUYLQJDVDJXLGHSRVWIRUDOORI WKHVHDFWLRQVZDVWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\HOHFWLRQVVFKHGXOHGIRU6HSWHPEHU&-7)IRFXVHG RQVHWWLQJFRQGLWLRQVLQZKLFKWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWDQGWKH81FRXOGODXQFKWKHYRWHU UHJLVWUDWLRQSURFHVVDQGVHWXSSROOVWRPRYH$IJKDQLVWDQIXUWKHURQWKHSDWKWRZDUGVWDELOLW\ The Interagency Reconstruction Effort in 2004–2005 ,Q0DUFKWKH86'26LVVXHGDSURJUHVVUHSRUWRQWKH$IJKDQUHFRQVWUXFWLRQHIIRUW ZKLFKQRWHGWKDW86H[SHQGLWXUHVIRU$IJKDQUHFRQVWUXFWLRQEHWZHHQDQGWRWDOHG ELOOLRQZLWKDQDGGLWLRQDOELOOLRQVODWHGIRU¿VFDO\HDU )< 7KHSULPDU\REMHF- WLYHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ²WKHDYRLGDQFHRIDPDMRUKXPDQLWDULDQFULVLV²KDGEHHQDFKLHYHG7KH UHSRUWKLJKOLJKWHGPDMRULPSURYHPHQWVWRWKHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHUHRSHQLQJ.DEXO.DQGDKDUKLJK- ZD\DQG6DODQJ7XQQHOUHEXLOGLQJVFKRROVFOLQLFVDQGPLOHVRIVHFRQGDU\URDGV UHSDLULQJ VHYHUDO HOHFWULFDO SRZHU SODQWV WKH .DQGDKDU.DMDNL 'DP DQG WKH 3\DQM %ULGJH WR7DMLNLVWDQFRPSOHWLQJLUULJDWLRQSURMHFWVYDFFLQDWLQJPLOOLRQ$IJKDQFKLOGUHQ DJDLQVWPHDVOHVDQGSROLRDQGSURYLGLQJPLOOLRQVFKRROERRNV62 ,QFRQWUDVWWRWKH'26UHSRUWD86*RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWDELOLW\2I¿FH *$2 UHSRUW UHFRJQL]HG WKH HIIRUWV RI 8QLWHG 6WDWHV $JHQF\ IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'HYHORSPHQW 86$,' EXWFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVKDGVWLOOQHJOHFWHGWRPHHWLWVORQJWHUPUHFRQVWUXFWLRQ WDUJHWVRUSURMHFWREMHFWLYHVRYHUWKHFRXUVHRI2()6LQFHWKHUHSRUWFRQWHQGHGWKH 8QLWHG6WDWHVKDGSURYLGHGELOOLRQWRKHDGRIIWKHSURGXFWLRQRIRSLDWHVLQWKHUHJLRQ

292 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 159 of 316

Chapter 10

KRZHYHUE\WKHUHZDVOLWWOHSURJUHVVWRVKRZIRUWKDWPDMRUHIIRUW64 Along with this VWUDWHJ\WKH'26DQG86$,'SRUWLRQVRIWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQFDPSDLJQUHHPSKDVL]HGWKH VKLIWWRODUJHUVFDOHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHRULHQWHGSURMHFWVWRDVVLVW$IJKDQLVWDQ¶V ORFDOFRPPXQLWLHVDQGQDWLRQDOSURJUDPV7RIDFLOLWDWHWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSODQ86$,'QRZ DFFRXQWHG IRU WKH PDMRULW\ RI UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ H[SHQGLWXUHV ZKLOH WKH '26 FRQFHQWUDWHG RQ refugee assistance funding. '2'¶VUHFRQVWUXFWLRQIRFXVQHYHUWKHOHVVGLGQRWFKDQJHDQGFRQWLQXHGFRQWULEXWLQJWR WKHFDPSDLJQE\¿QDQFLQJVPDOOSURMHFWVXVLQJWKH2YHUVHDV+XPDQLWDULDQ'LVDVWHUDQG&LYLF $LG 2+'$&$ 3URJUDPDQGWKH&(53IXQGVZLWKWKH357V The main responsibilities of 2+'$&$ZHUHLPSURYLQJ'2'YLVLELOLW\EXLOGLQJVHFXULW\DQGJHQHUDWLQJ'2'JRRGZLOO &(53RQWKHRWKHUKDQGZDVPHDQWVROHO\IRUTXLFNUHVSRQVHSURMHFWVWKDWZRXOGKDYHDQ LPPHGLDWHLPSDFWRQORFDOSRSXODWLRQV8QOLNH86$,'SURMHFWVWKH'2'GLGQRWUHTXLUH357 FRPPDQGHUVWRFRQGXFWWHFKQLFDODVVHVVPHQWVDQGLQYROYH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVLQ WKHLUSODQVEHIRUHUHFHLYLQJ&(53IXQGLQJ'2'UHJXODWLRQVDOORZHGIXQGVWREHWXUQHGRYHU PRUHTXLFNO\ZKLFKUHVXOWHGLQZKDWDSSHDUHGWREHPRUHUDSLGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIVPDOOVFDOH projects.66 $QRWKHUNH\FRPSRQHQWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶EURDGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSODQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ ZDVWKH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVZKLFKDOVRKHOSHGWRPHHWWKHFRPPRQJRDODPRQJWKH DJHQFLHVVHFXULQJDQGVWDELOL]LQJWKHZDUWRUQUHJLRQ)URPWKH$IJKDQLVWDQ(QJLQHHU'LVWULFW $(' LQ .DEXO PRUH WKDQ &RUSV SHUVRQQHO PDQDJHG SURMHFWV IRU ,6$)WKH 26&$ &-7)DQG86$,'67%\WKH$('ZRUNIRUFHRIZRUNHUVZDVPDGHXSRI SULPDULO\$IJKDQV,Q)<86HQJLQHHUVDZDUGHGPLOOLRQLQFRQWUDFWVIRUZRUNLQ $IJKDQLVWDQDQGDVLJQL¿FDQWSRUWLRQRIWKHIXQGVZHUHDOORFDWHGWRFRPSDQLHVZKRWUDLQHGDQG employed local workers.$IJKDQSOXPEHUVHOHFWULFLDQVPDVRQVDQGFDUSHQWHUVVLJQL¿FDQWO\ contributed to a myriad of construction projects in progress—including buildings, bridges, runways, and public-works projects.69 &RORQHO-RKQ%2¶'RZGFRPPDQGHURI$('DQG'LUHFWRURIWKH(QJLQHHU'LYLVLRQIRU &)&$IURPWRGHVFULEHGWKHVWUDWHJ\KHVDZIRULQWHUDJHQF\FRRSHUDWLRQDQGKRZ progress could be made in Afghanistan: ,QWKLVHQYLURQPHQW\RXQHHGWKHVNLOOVHWVHDFKDJHQF\EULQJVWRWKHWDEOH :KHQ\RXFRPELQHWKHVRFLDOSURJUDPVWKDW86$,'FDQGR²LQVWLWXWLRQEXLOG- ing and capacity building—with the engineering and technical skills of the &RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVLW¶VDUHDOO\SRZHUIXOGHYHORSPHQWDOWRRODQGLWLVDSDU- ticularly useful tool for a country like Afghanistan that has seen a man-made disaster.70 %HFDXVHWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQUHTXLUHGDEURDGEDVHGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQUHVSRQVHWKH86 PLOLWDU\DQGWKHGHYHORSPHQWFRPPXQLW\FRQWLQXHGWRVWULYHIRUDEHWWHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRQH DQRWKHU¶VSURFHGXUHVDQGSROLFLHVWRFROODERUDWHZLWKFRPSDUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHVLQPLQG71 Expansion of the PRT Program 7R IXUWKHU HPSRZHU WKH 357V DQG WKH RYHUDOO PLOLWDU\ SRUWLRQ RI WKH UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ FDPSDLJQ 86$,' EHJDQ H[SDQGLQJ WKH VFRSH RI LWV UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ DVVLVWDQFH WR LQFOXGH programs for agriculture, education, health, road construction, and power generation. In

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 160 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

DOO 86$,' LGHQWL¿HG GLVWLQFW$IJKDQLVWDQ UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ SURJUDP FDWHJRULHV LQFOXGLQJ continued humanitarian needs such as food and assistance for internally displaced persons, IURPZKLFKVSHFL¿FSURMHFWVZRXOGEHLGHQWL¿HGDQGLPSOHPHQWHGE\357V72%HWZHHQPLG WKURXJKWKHIDOORIWKH357HIIRUWJUHZLQVL]HDQGZDVUH¿QHGLQFRQFHSW%\-XO\ 357VZHUHIXQFWLRQLQJLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ²FRQWUROOHGE\WKH1$72OHG,6$)DQG GLUHFWHGE\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KHPL[VKLIWHGE\LQ6HSWHPEHUWR1$72DQG8QLWHG 6WDWHV/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO-HQQLIHU&DUXVRZKRGHSOR\HGZLWKWKHWK,'LQ0DUFK DQGZDVLQLWLDOO\VWDWLRQHGDW&-7)KHDGTXDUWHUVLQ%DJUDPZLWQHVVHGWKLV357H[SDQVLRQ &DUXVRUHPHPEHUHGZRUNLQJZLWKWZR357VRQHLQ$VDGDEDGDQGDQRWKHULQ.DQGDKDUZKHQ VKH¿UVWDUULYHGLQWKHDWHU&DUXVRUHPHPEHUHG³$IWHUDZKLOHWKH\VWDUWHGSRSSLQJXSDOORYHU WKHSODFHDQGUHDOO\SRSXODWLQJWKHLGHDRI357VYHUVXVMXVWWKHPLOLWDU\XQLWRQWKHJURXQG GRLQJWKRVHVDPHIXQFWLRQV´74 'XULQJWKH±SHULRG357VDFURVV$IJKDQLVWDQVXSSRUWHGWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VODUJHU UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ REMHFWLYHV /LHXWHQDQW &RORQHO 6WHYHQ )RUG FRPPDQGHU RI WKH *KD]QL 357 IURP-DQXDU\WKURXJK2FWREHURYHUVDZKLVWHDP¶VH[SDQVLRQIURPD³357ZLWKMXVWGLUW DQGDQROGPDGUDVVDWREHLQJDZKROHIRUZDUGRSHUDWLQJEDVH )2% ZLWKDSSUR[LPDWHO\ EXLOGLQJV´:KLOH LQ WKHDWHU )RUG HQVXUHG KLV WHDP FRQGXFWHG &02 WKDW LPSURYHG VHFX- ULW\IDFLOLWDWHGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGVWUHQJWKHQHG³WKHUHDFKRIWKHFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWWRWKH

Regional Konduz Command North Mazar-e Sharif (established 2005)

Herat Kabul Regional Regional Command Khost Command East West (established September 2004) Kandahar

Regional Command Pakistan South AFG-XX-782653 Figure 54. Regional command structure as of September 2005. RC-South and RC-East established in May 2004.

294 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 161 of 316

Chapter 10

SURYLQFHV´767ZRRIWKHFULWLFDOZD\V)RUGDFFRPSOLVKHGWKLVPLVVLRQZDVWKURXJKDVVLVWLQJ 86$,'LQLWVPDQ\SURMHFWVVXFKDVEXLOGLQJWKH*KD]QL&LW\/LEUDU\DQGUHIXUELVKLQJWKH *KD]QL+RVSLWDO5RDG$VRI-XQH)RUG¶V357ZDVMXJJOLQJDKDOIPLOOLRQGROODUVZRUWK RISURMHFWVIRFXVHGRQVDQLWDWLRQFOHDQXSHGXFDWLRQDQGSXEOLFVDIHW\DQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´77 7KH357FRPPDQGHUZKRUHSODFHG)RUGGHVFULEHGKLVPLVVLRQDVWKDWRIZLQQLQJRYHU WKHSHRSOHRIWKHSURYLQFHDQGLVRODWLQJWKHPIURP7DOLEDQLQÀXHQFH+LVWHDPYLVLWHGHYHU\ GLVWULFW DQG PHW UHJXODUO\ ZLWK ORFDO FRXQFLO HOGHUV $IJKDQV OLQHG WKH VWUHHWV DQG ZDYHG HQWKXVLDVWLFDOO\ZKHQKLV357FRQYR\VFDPHWKURXJKWKHLUYLOODJHV³:HZHUHORRNLQJWRPDNH WKHLUOLYHVEHWWHU´KHH[SODLQHGEXWFDXWLRQHGDJDLQVWH[SHFWLQJWRRPXFKWRRTXLFNO\QRWLQJ ³ZHFDQ¶WPDNHLWKDSSHQRYHUQLJKW²WKLVLVDORQJWHUPLQYHVWPHQW´ 6ROGLHUVIURPWKHWK,'DOVRLQYROYHGWKHPVHOYHVLQWKHHYHU\GD\UHFRQVWUXFWLRQDFWLYL- WLHVRIHQJDJLQJZLWKWKHORFDOSRSXODWLRQ$V&-7)GHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVZHUHHVWDEOLVKHG WKH$IJKDQSHRSOHEHJDQWRVHHWKH357VPDNHDGLIIHUHQFH/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO&DUXVRHPSKD- VL]HGWKHFDSDFLW\RIWKH357VWRSURYLGHWKHOLYHVRI$IJKDQZRPHQE\³VKRZLQJXSGRLQJ EHQHYROHQW WKLQJV EXLOGLQJ VFKRROV´ ZLWK ZRPHQ¶V LQWHUHVWV VSHFL¿FDOO\ LQ PLQG79 Caruso understood that her presence in Afghanistan as a female leader could generate cultural obsta- FOHVHVSHFLDOO\DPRQJ$IJKDQPHQ'HVSLWHWKHVHLVVXHV&DUXVRSXUVXHGFRQQHFWLRQVZLWKWKH $IJKDQVZKLOHDWWKHVDPHWLPHPDLQWDLQLQJKHULGHQWLW\DVDQDXWKRULW\DQGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRI GHPRFUDWLFLGHDOV'XULQJWKHVHWULSVPDQ\$IJKDQZRPHQPHQWLRQHGWKHLULQWHUHVWLQEHWWHU VFKRROVDQGKHDOWKFDUHDVZHOODVWKHLUDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHLUQHZIUHHGRPWRYRWH6HUJHDQW )ORUD(VWUDGDUHFDOOHGHQMR\LQJWKHKXPDQLWDULDQPLVVLRQVVKHSDUWLFLSDWHGLQE\GHOLYHULQJ EODQNHWVDQGIRRGWRWKHSHRSOH$FFRUGLQJWR(VWUDGD³:KHQHYHUZHZHQWRXWWKHUHDQGZH saw those kids smiling and people waiting for us to get there, that was when we felt like we ZHUHDFWXDOO\GRLQJVRPHWKLQJIRUWKHP´ 3HUKDSV WKH ELJJHVW FKDQJH WR WKH UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ FDPSDLJQ GXULQJ WKLV WLPH ZDV WKH VXERUGLQDWLRQ RI WKH 357V WR WKH FRPPDQGHUV RI WKH UHJLRQDO FRPPDQGV &DUXVR UHFDOOHG SDUWLFLSDWLQJLQDVWDIIPHHWLQJDW&-7)KHDGTXDUWHUVZKHQWKHUHJLRQDOFRPPDQGHUVEHJDQ WRUHDOL]HWKDWWKHLUIRUFHVQRZLQFOXGHGWKH357V&DUXVRQRWHGWKDWWKHLULPPHGLDWHUHDFWLRQ ZDVSRVLWLYHFKDUDFWHUL]LQJLWDV³>7KH357@LVDSDUWRIP\WHDP´ These leaders immediately VDZWKHZD\VLQZKLFKWKH357VFRXOGPDJQLI\WKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHLUPDQHXYHUIRUFHVDQGKHOS VSUHDG&RDOLWLRQDQG$IJKDQJRYHUQPHQWDODXWKRULW\DFURVVWKH$2V &RORQHO&KHHNFRPPDQGHURI&7)ThunderDQG5&(DVWLQKDGQLQH357VXQGHU KLVDXWKRULW\6L[RIWKHQLQH357VZHUHOHGE\86$UP\5HVHUYH&$RI¿FHUV7ZRRWKHUV ZHUHFRPPDQGHGE\D861DY\FRPPDQGHUDQGD860DULQH&RUSVOLHXWHQDQWFRORQHO7KH QLQWK357LQ%DPLDQSURYLQFHZDVVWDIIHGSULPDULO\E\1HZ=HDODQGHUVDORQJZLWK'26 DQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV'HSDUWPHQWRI$JULFXOWXUH 86'$ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV&KHHNHPSKDVL]HG DPXOWLGLPHQVLRQDODSSURDFKWR357PDQDJHPHQWDQGWKHVKDULQJRILQIRUPDWLRQDPRQJWKH YDULRXVWHDPV+LVPHVVDJHWRWKH$IJKDQSHRSOHZDVFOHDU³:H¶UHKHUHWRUHVWRUHRUGHUZH¶UH here to assist with the reconstruction of your country by building schools and establishing LQVWLWXWLRQV´&KHHNGHVFULEHGWKHHQHP\¶VPHVVDJHDVYLROHQWDQGGHVWUXFWLYHQRWLQJWKDW 7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGDIRUFHVLQWHQGHGWR³EXUQGRZQWKHVFKRROVDQGNLOOSHRSOH´,Q5&6RXWK &RORQHO3HGHUVHQKDGIRXU357VLQ.DQGDKDU4DODW/DVKNDU*DKDQG7DULQ.RZW&RORQHO 3KLO%RRNHUWZKRWRRNFRPPDQGRI&7)LonghornLQ6HSWHPEHUJDLQHGDXWKRULW\RYHU WKH357DOUHDG\LQ+HUDWDQGODWHUHVWDEOLVKHGDQHZ357LQ)DUDK

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 162 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

Task Force Victory: Supporting the PRTs

In spring 2004, the Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry deployed to Afghanistan to assist the Coalition’s reconstruction effort. The battalion, originally 750 strong, swelled to over 1,000 Soldiers as other units including detachments of engineers, medics, and civil affairs specialists joined its ranks. The task force mission was to provide security, communications, and logistical support to the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) across Afghanistan. This mission grew as the number of PRTs increased from 7 in spring 2004 to over a 12 by the time of the unit’s departure in June 2005. Most of the task force’s Soldiers were assigned to specific PRTs as security elements. They manned the towers and gates at the team compounds and provided convoy security when PRT members moved around the countryside. The task force also created “Log cells” that provided all classes of supply to the PRTs as well as maintenance and medical support and items to be distributed to the Afghan population in the provinces. Task force Soldiers also helped build the PRT compounds, relying on their civilian plumbing, carpentry, and electrician skills to make the sites functional. Lieutenant Colonel Scott Visser, the commander of Task Force Victory, stated, “My guidance to our Soldiers was that they were to do everything so that civil affairs could do their mission.” That mission often became dangerous. In September 2004, after Afghan president Hamid Karzai removed Ismail Khan as governor of Herat province, task force elements at the Herat PRT became heavily involved in protecting civilian aid workers after riots erupted. In November, a PRT convoy in Paktika province that was under escort by Soldiers from Task Force Victory was ambushed by insurgents. Several members of the security element were hit by enemy fire and one ultimately died from his wounds. But quick action by other task force Soldiers to pull the wounded away from the ambush site and call for a MEDEVAC aircraft and close air support saved lives. The PRT security elements also played a critical role in the 2004 presidential election by providing patrols around polling sites and escorts for ballot boxes. Lieutenant Colonel Visser commented that his guardsmen gained the confidence of both the civilians and the Active Duty Soldiers with whom they served in Afghanistan. Visser recalled one senior officer in the 25th Infantry Division telling him, “I’d take your Soldiers with me anytime, anywhere.” Task Force 168 Unit History, 2006. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Scott Visser, 2006.

Effectiveness of the PRT $IWHUFRPSOHWLQJKLVGHSOR\PHQWWR$IJKDQLVWDQLQ-XQH&RORQHO&KHHNFRPPDQGHU RI&7)Thunder DQG5&(DVWLQUHFRJQL]HGWKHNH\DVVHWVDQGFDSDELOLWLHVWKH357V RIIHUHGWKH&RDOLWLRQ&2,1FDPSDLJQ³7KH357LVDKXJHSOXV,WLVH[DFWO\ZKDWZHQHHGWR UHDOO\¿JKWWKHLQVXUJHQF\DWWKHSRSXODWLRQOHYHO²LW¶VDEULOOLDQWLGHDDQGRQHWKDWVKRXOGEH H[SDQGHG´+RZHYHUKHDOVRUHFRPPHQGHGDQXPEHURISRWHQWLDOLPSURYHPHQWVWRWKH357 SURJUDP)RUH[DPSOHKHEHOLHYHGWKDWPRUHDWWHQWLRQVKRXOGEHSDLGWRWKHFHQWHUVRILQWHOOHFWXDO DQG FXOWXUDO LQÀXHQFHV LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ VXFK DV UHOLJLRXV OHDGHUV WHDFKHUV EXVLQHVVPHQ women, and elders. Getting the Coalition message out to these types of leaders and, in turn, KDYLQJWKHPVKDUHLWZLWKWKHJHQHUDOSRSXODWLRQSURPLVHGWRHQKDQFHWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VVWDWXUH $GGLWLRQDOO\&KHHNREVHUYHGDQDEVHQFHRIFLYLOLDQH[SHUWVRQWKH357VDQGQRWHGWKDWHDFK

296 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 163 of 316

Chapter 10

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ronco’sORJLVWLFDOSODQ6HFRQGWKH357VZHUHFROORFDWHGZLWKPDQHXYHUXQLWV WKDWFRXOGSURYLGHGLUHFWVXSSRUWHVSHFLDOO\LQXQVWDEOHDUHDV$FFRUGLQJWR3HGHUVHQWKHVH WZRIDFWRUVZHUHFULWLFDOWRWKHVXFFHVVWKH357VHQMR\HG 'U.HQQHWK.DW]PDQDVSHFLDOLVWLQ0LGGOH(DVWHUQ$IIDLUVIRUWKH86&RQJUHVVDOVR JHQHUDOO\DJUHHGZLWKWKHRSWLPLVWLFDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHRYHUDOO357SHUIRUPDQFH+DYLQJYLVLWHG WKH86UXQ*DUGH]357GXULQJWKLVWLPHKHSUDLVHGWKHSURJUDP¶VÀH[LELOLW\DQGLQFUHDVLQJ HIIHFWLYHQHVV 357V LQ FRQWHVWHG DUHDV UHVROYHG GLVSXWHV EHWZHHQ ORFDO JRYHUQPHQWV DQG supported combat operations and intelligence gathering, while those in more secure regions RIWKHQRUWKDQGZHVWFRQFHQWUDWHGRQUHFRQVWUXFWLRQ%HFDXVHRIWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKH357V HOHFWULFDOVXEVWDWLRQVDQGQHZURDGVZHUHHYHQEXLOWLQVRPHUXUDOYLOODJHVLQPRUHXQVWDEOH regions of southern Afghanistan. $V&)&$EHJDQWUDQVIHUULQJUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKH357VWR,6$)LQDQG UHFRQVWUXFWLRQSULRULWLHVFKDQJHGWRUHÀHFWWKRVHRIWKHGRQRUQDWLRQ,QWXUQWKHUHRUJDQL]DWLRQ FUHDWHGDVHQVHRIRYHUDOOODFNRIGLUHFWLRQEHFDXVHFHQWUDOL]HGFRQWUROZDVQRZGLPLQLVKHG $OVRWKHFRQWLQXHGSUHVHQFHRI357VUHPDLQHGDFRQWHQWLRXVLVVXHIRUPDQ\1*2VDQGRWKHUV LQWKHFLYLOLDQKXPDQLWDULDQUHOLHIFRPPXQLW\7KHVHJURXSVIHOWWKDWDI¿OLDWLRQZLWK357V ZRXOGEULQJDERXWHQHP\UHWDOLDWLRQWKDWWKHOLQHEHWZHHQPLOLWDU\DQGFLYLOLDQRSHUDWLRQV was obscured, and that their appearance of impartiality would be lost.)RUH[DPSOHDoctors without BordersSXOOHGLWVWHDPVIURP$IJKDQLVWDQDIWHU¿YHYROXQWHHUVZHUHNLOOHGE\HQHP\ JURXSVRQ-XQHLQ%DGJKLVSURYLQFH90&LYLOLDQZRUNHUVFRQWHQGHGWKH\QHHGHGPRUH ³KXPDQLWDULDQ VSDFH´ WR SHUIRUP WKHLU PLVVLRQ917KHVH QRWLRQV DSSHDUHG WR KDYH DW OHDVW VRPHPHULWDVDWWDFNVRQDLGZRUNHUVLQFUHDVHGGXULQJWKH\HDU\HWWKHIRUPHU357PLOLWDU\ FRPPDQGHULQ*KD]QLSURYLGHGDGLIIHULQJRSLQLRQRQWKHKXPDQLWDULDQVSDFHLVVXHQRWLQJ ³7KHIDFWWKDW\RXZHDUDFDPRXÀDJHXQLIRUPDQG\RX¶YHJRWDQ0DQG\RX¶UHEXLOGLQJ VFKRROVDQGJLYLQJVFKRROVXSSOLHVWRNLGVWKDWERWKHUV>1*2UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV@7KH\GRQ¶W OLNH WR VHH WKDW´92 ,Q FRQWUDVW WR ZKDW ZDV VDLG E\ 1*2 UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV 357 OHDGHUVKLS SHUFHLYHGDLGZRUNHUVDVIHHOLQJ³WKUHDWHQHG´E\XQLIRUPHGRI¿FHUVDOVRDVVLVWLQJWKH$IJKDQ people. 7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV,QVWLWXWHIRU3HDFH 86,3 FRPSLOHGLQVLJKWVDQGH[SHULHQFHVIURPPRUH WKDQLQWHUYLHZVFRQGXFWHGZLWK86DQGIRUHLJQRI¿FLDOVPLOLWDU\RI¿FHUVDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RI1*2VWKDWZRUNHGGLUHFWO\ZLWK357VLQ$IJKDQLVWDQLQDQG'U5REHUW3HULWR ZKROHGWKH86,3SURMHFWSLQSRLQWHGUHFXUULQJSUREOHPVWKDWSUHYHQWHGWKH357VIURPEHLQJ PRUH VXFFHVVIXO$PRQJ WKH SUREOHPV KH LGHQWL¿HG ZDV ¿UVW WKH UHOLDQFH RQ LPSURYLVDWLRQ which originated in the lack of interagency agreement regarding roles, missions, and concept of RSHUDWLRQVDQGVHFRQGWKHQHHGIRUWKHQRQPLOLWDU\DJHQFLHVRIWKH86*RYHUQPHQWWREHFRPH

297 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 164 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

PRUHVHULRXVDERXWVWDI¿QJWKH357VZLWKTXDOL¿HGSHRSOH$IWHU\HDUVLQH[LVWHQFHWKH357V VWLOOQHHGHGWREHLPSURYHG7KHFRQFHSWKRZHYHUZDVRULJLQDODQGUHYROXWLRQDU\DQGGHVSLWHD P\ULDGRIREVWDFOHVWKHWHDPVKDGPDGHVLJQL¿FDQWFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKH$IJKDQLVWDQFDPSDLJQ Enabling the Afghan National Army and Police In 2004 the OMC-A continued to exert its control of the programs fostering the ANA. The OMC-A mission remained essentially the same in 2004 as it had been earlier: reconstruct the $IJKDQVHFXULW\DQGGHIHQVHVHFWRUVDQGWUDLQWKH$1$8QLWHG6WDWHV$LU)RUFH 86$) 0DMRU *HQHUDO&UDLJ3:HVWRQWKHFKLHIRI20&$VWDWHG³)RURXUPLVVLRQZHUHDOO\WRRNWKH 3KDVH,92325'WRKHDUWDQGVDLGWKDWRXUPLVVLRQZDVWRFUHDWHWKHHQWLUH$IJKDQGHIHQVH VHFWRUIURPWKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQVHWRWKHVXVWDLQLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVOLNHWKHORJLVWLFVFRPPDQG DQGDUHFUXLWLQJFRPPDQGDQGDWUDLQLQJFHQWHUDOOWKHZD\GRZQWRWUDLQLQJFRPEDWWURRSV´94 7KURXJKRXW KLV WHQXUH :HVWRQ GHVFULEHG KLV SODQ DV ZRUNLQJ ZLWK WKH $IJKDQ SHRSOH WR ³VXVWDLQDQGHVWDEOLVK´GHIHQVHSROLFLHVWKDWZRXOGODVWXQGHU$IJKDQOHDGHUVKLSORQJDIWHUWKH VXSSRUWRIWKH86$UP\ZDVDYDLODEOH8QGHU:HVWRQ¶VOHDGHUVKLS20&$IXQFWLRQHGLQSDUW DVDQDFTXLVLWLRQSURJUDPZKLOHDOVRSURYLGLQJRYHUVLJKWRI&-7)PhoenixWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ primarily responsible for training and mentoring the ANA. 'XULQJWKHVXPPHURIWKHWK,QIDQWU\%ULJDGH,QGLDQD$UP\1DWLRQDO*XDUG FRPPDQGHG E\ %ULJDGLHU *HQHUDO 5LFKDUG 0RRUKHDG UHOLHYHG WKH WK ,QIDQWU\ %ULJDGH 2NODKRPD$UP\1DWLRQDO*XDUGDVWKHFRUHRI&-7)Phoenix$VVLVWLQJWKH6ROGLHUV DOD Photo by SGT Dennis Schultz DOD Photo by SGT

Figure 55. The Tropic Lightning Division’s Major General Eric Olson, commanding general of CJTF-76, poses with soldiers of the ANA’s Thunder Corps at the activation ceremony for the Gardez regional command, 22 September.

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 165 of 316

Chapter 10

IURPWKHWK%ULJDGHZHUHDSSUR[LPDWHO\DGGLWLRQDO$UP\*XDUGVPHQIURPRWKHU VWDWHVDORQJZLWKGHWDFKPHQWVRI860DULQHVDQG86$)RI¿FHUVDQGDLUPHQ)UDQFH*HUPDQ\ 5RPDQLD&DQDGD1HZ=HDODQGWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPDQG0RQJROLDDOVRSURYLGHGPLOLWDU\ WUDLQHUVIRU&-7)Phoenix.%\6HSWHPEHUWKHH[SDQGHG&-7)Phoenix had successfully WUDLQHGQHDUO\$1$VROGLHUVDQGWKH$IJKDQ02'KDGDFWLYDWHGUHJLRQDOFRPPDQGV LQ.DQGDKDU WK$1$&RUSV DQG*DUGH] G ,QDGGLWLRQWRPDLQWDLQLQJ$1$&HQWUDO &RUSV VW$1$&RUSV KHDGTXDUWHUVLQ.DEXOE\\HDUHQGWKH$IJKDQ02'DFWLYDWHGWZR PRUHUHJLRQDOFRPPDQGVDW0D]DUH6KDULI WK DQG+HUDW WK 96 20&$ DQG WKH 02' planned for each ANA corps WR KDYH WKUHH EULJDGHV HDFK consisting of three light infantry battalions, one combat sup- SRUW &6 EDWWDOLRQ DQG RQH FRPEDWVHUYLFHVXSSRUW &66 EDWWDOLRQ 7KLUG %ULJDGH VW &RUSV LQ .DEXO HYHQ- WXDOO\EHFDPHWKH$1$45) and, as such, had one commando battalion, one mecha- QL]HG LQIDQWU\ EDWWDOLRQ DQG

RQHDUPRUEDWWDOLRQ%\ DOD Photo all of the ANA recruits that Figure 56. Brigadier General Richard Moorhead (left), PDQQHG WKHVH XQLWV UHFHLYHG commanding general of CJTF Phoenix, and ANA Brigadier 7 weeks of basic training at General Ibrahim Ahmad Zai, the Recruiting Command Chief of WKH .DEXO 0LOLWDU\ 7UDLQLQJ Staff, are greeted by local residents of Khost on arrival at the NAVC. &HQWHU .07& DIWHU ZKLFK DIHZZHUHFKRVHQWRDWWHQGWKH%ULWLVKUXQQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRI¿FHU 1&2 VFKRROZKLOH WKRVHUHPDLQLQJZHQWRQWRFRPSOHWHDGGLWLRQDOZHHNVRIDGYDQFHGLQGLYLGXDOWUDLQLQJ $,7 $OVRE\WKLVGDWH$IJKDQLQVWUXFWRUVWDXJKWQHDUO\DOOFODVVHVDWWKHVHEDVLFOHYHOV$IWHUEDVLF DQGDGYDQFHGWUDLQLQJUHFUXLWVZHUHVZRUQLQDV$1$VROGLHUVDQGMRLQHG1&2VDQG$1$ RI¿FHUVIRUPRUHZHHNVRIVPDOOXQLW¿HOGH[HUFLVHVFRQGXFWHGE\WKH&DQDGLDQPLOLWDU\ GHWDFKPHQWWRIDFLOLWDWHFRKHVLRQDQGHVSULW1HZO\WUDLQHGVROGLHUVHDUQHGWKHHTXLYDOHQWRI DPRQWKZKLOH1&2VUHFHLYHGDPRQWKO\VDODU\RI97 As 2004 progressed, the capacities of the ANA increased. ANA units conducted operations ZLWK &RDOLWLRQ XQLWV LQ 5&6RXWK 5&(DVW DQG ZLWK WKH &-627) 3UHVLGHQW .DU]DL DOVR GLVSDWFKHG DQ$1$ EDWWDOLRQ WR +HUDW LQ WKH VXPPHU RI WR TXHOO WKH FRQÀLFW EHWZHHQ ,VPDLO.KDQDQG$PDQXOODK.KDQ7KHVXFFHVVRIWKH+HUDWRSHUDWLRQOHGRQH$IJKDQRI¿FHU WRDVVHUW³7KH$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\LVWKHVSLQHRIWKLVFRXQWU\DQGRIRXUSUHVLGHQW²WKH FHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWFDQGHIHQGLWVHOIQRZ´996WLOOFRQFHUQVUHJDUGLQJWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKH $1$SHUVLVWHG³$IHZPRQWKVRIWUDLQLQJDUHQRWJRLQJWRPDNHDQLOOLWHUDWH\RXQJ$IJKDQER\ DVROGLHU,WWDNHVWLPHWREXLOGDQDUP\´QRWHG$KPDG)DKLP1RRULDZHDSRQVLQVWUXFWRUDWWKH .07&³7KH86PLOLWDU\LVWKHEDFNERQHRIWKH$1$²ZLWKRXWWKHPWKH$1$FRXOGQRWVWDQG DORQH´100'HVSLWHDGYDQFHV&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVVWLOOIDFHGDGLI¿FXOWPLVVLRQLQWUDLQLQJWKH$1$

299 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 166 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

6HYHUDORIWKHSUREOHPVWKDWKDGKLQGHUHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH$1$LQDQGHDUO\ SHUVLVWHG/RZSD\FDXVHGDWWULWLRQUDWHVWRFOLPEDQGUHFUXLWPHQWEHFDPHPRUHGLI¿- FXOW7KHLQDELOLW\WRFUHDWHDIRUPDOEDQNLQJV\VWHPFUHDWHGDPRQWKO\DEVHQWZLWKRXWOHDYH $:2/ FULVLVEHFDXVHPDQ\$1$VROGLHUVZHUHIRUFHGWRKDQGFDUU\PRQH\KRPHWRWKHLU IDPLOLHV6ROGLHUVDOVRGLVDSSHDUHGGXULQJWKHPRQWKRI5DPDGDQDQGWKHFHOHEUDWRU\ZHHN WKDWIROORZHG$GGLWLRQDOO\WKHJHQHUDOKDUGVKLSVRIZLQWHUDQGWKHOXFUDWLYHSRSS\JURZLQJ VHDVRQFDXVHGVHDVRQORQJGHVHUWLRQV0RUHRYHUWKH7DOLEDQLVVXHGDGLUHFWLYHGHFODULQJ$1$ VROGLHUVDVLQ¿GHOVIRUWKHLUDVVRFLDWLRQZLWK&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVFUHDWLQJDFHUWDLQOHYHORIDPELY- DOHQFHLQWKHUDQNV%XGJHWDU\FRQVWUDLQWVGHOD\HGWKHSURSHUDUPLQJRI$1$VROGLHUVOHDYLQJ PDQ\ZLWKWKHIHHOLQJWKDWHQHP\IRUFHVRIWHQRXWJXQQHGWKHP,QPLGDYHUDJHEDWWDOLRQ PDQQLQJOHYHOVZKLFKZHUHEDVHGRQWKHQXPEHURIVROGLHUVDFWXDOO\DYDLODEOHIRUGXW\KRY- HUHGDURXQGSHUFHQWIRUPDQ\XQLWV101 Although remaining optimistic about the steady progress being made, leaders at OMC-A DQGLQ&-7)PhoenixXQGHUVWRRGE\WKDWGHYHORSLQJDIXOO\IXQFWLRQLQJ$IJKDQ¿JKW- LQJIRUFHZRXOGUHTXLUHFRQVLGHUDEOHWLPH,QWKHVXPPHURIWKDW\HDUZKHQWKHG6HSDUDWH ,QIDQWU\ %ULJDGH )ORULGD $UP\ 1DWLRQDO *XDUG FRPPDQGHG E\ %ULJDGLHU *HQHUDO -RKQ 3HUU\PDQ DUULYHG LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ WR DVVXPH WKH &-7) Phoenix mission, the Coalition had WUDLQHGDQGHTXLSSHGPRUHWKDQ$1$VROGLHUVVLQFHDQGPRUHZHUHFXU- rently in training.102 Yet, much still needed to be done if the ANA expected to hit its mark of 70,000 soldiers in the near future. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan $VLPSRUWDQWDVWKHRYHUDOOPDQSRZHUZDVWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDQHI¿FLHQWSURIHVVLRQDO FRUSVIRUWKH$1$,QWKHIDOORI&RORQHO*HRUJH)RUV\WKH9LFH'HDQIRU(GXFDWLRQDW WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV0LOLWDU\$FDGHP\ 860$ EHJDQGHYHORSLQJDFRQFHSWSODQIRUDQHZPLOL- WDU\DFDGHP\LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ$VFKLHIRIWKHQHZO\HVWDEOLVKHG0LOLWDU\$FDGHP\6WXG\7HDP 0$67 )RUV\WKH DORQJ ZLWK$UP\ /LHXWHQDQW &RORQHO &DVH\ 1HII DQG7XUNLVK 'HIHQVH $WWDFKH&RORQHO6HQHU7HNEDVSUHSDUHGDFRPSUHKHQVLYHSODQIRUZKDWZDVWREHFDOOHGWKH National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA). The operational premise for the academy GUHZRQH[DPSOHVIURPVHYHUDOFRXQWULHVZLWKRXWGXSOLFDWLQJDQ\RQHLQSDUWLFXODU0$67 WKHQIRFXVHGRQWKHH[SOLFLWQHHGVRI$IJKDQLVWDQLQGHYHORSLQJWKHIROORZLQJFRUHFRQFHSWV D\HDUXQLYHUVLW\OHYHOHGXFDWLRQIRUDOO$IJKDQRI¿FHUVWUDLQLQJFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHRYHUDOO $1$YLVLRQEDVHGRQ:HVWHUQVWDQGDUGVEXWVXVWDLQDEOHE\WKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWDQGLQKDU- PRQ\ZLWK$IJKDQFXOWXUHHPSKDVLVRQOHDGHUVKLSVNLOOVDQGWKHUROHRIPLOLWDU\RI¿FHUVLQDQ ,VODPLFGHPRFUDF\WKHYDOXHRIOR\DOW\WRRQH¶VFRXQWU\DQGWKHQRWLRQRIDFDUHHUGHGLFDWHGWR QDWLRQDOVHUYLFH The academy that resulted featured a 4-year curriculum that would produce SURIHVVLRQDORI¿FHUVSHU\HDUZKRZHUHFRPSHWHQWDQGOR\DOWRWKHGHPRFUDWLFDOO\HOHFWHG JRYHUQPHQWRI$IJKDQLVWDQ104 /LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO%DUQRDSSURYHGWKHFRQFHSWSODQLQ1RYHPEHU,QWKHFRQFOX- VLRQ)RUV\WKHUHFRPPHQGHGLQLWLDWLQJZRUNRQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQSODQDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOH WRHQVXUHWKHDFDGHP\¶VRSHQLQJE\)HEUXDU\+HIXUWKHUXUJHGWKHVXSHULQWHQGHQWDW :HVW3RLQWWRFRQWLQXHVHQGLQJPLOLWDU\DFDGHP\IDFXOW\WR$IJKDQLVWDQDWUHJXODULQWHUYDOVWR IDFLOLWDWHSURJUHVVDQGFRQWLQXLW\,QHDUO\/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO'RQQD%UD]LODQG0DMRU :LOOLDP&DUXVRERWKIURPWKH%HKDYLRUDO6FLHQFHDQG/HDGHUVKLS'HSDUWPHQWDQG&RORQHO %DUU\6KRRS'LUHFWRURIWKH860$(OHFWULFDO(QJLQHHULQJ3URJUDPGHSOR\HGWR$IJKDQLVWDQ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 167 of 316

Chapter 10

WR RYHUVHH WKH SURMHFW²³WR SXW PHDW RQ WKH ERQHV´ DV )RUV\WKHGHVFULEHG LW 86$UP\ 5HVHUYH&RORQHO-DPHV:LOKLWHDFROOHJHHGXFDWLRQSURIHVVRUWKHQDUULYHGLQ-XQHWR ¿QDOL]HZRUNRQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQSODQWKDWDGGUHVVHGDQXPEHURIIDFHWVLQFOXGLQJIDFXOW\ VWDIIDQGFDGHWVHOHFWLRQIDFLOLWLHVVXSSOLHVDQGHTXLSPHQW 7KH 02' FKRVH WKH IRUPHU VLWH RI WKH $IJKDQ $LU &RUSV 7UDLQLQJ &HQWHU DW .DEXO ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$LUSRUWDVWKHDFDGHP\¶VKRPH3ODQVIRUWKHIXWXUHLQFOXGHGDQHZIDFLOLW\ZHVW RI.DEXOLQ4DUJKDKWKDWFRXOGKRXVHFDGHWVERWKPHQDQGZRPHQ106%\'HFHPEHU FDGHWDSSOLFDQWVKDGFRPSOHWHGWKH10$$HQWUDQFHH[DP6XEVHTXHQWO\ZHUH RIIHUHGDGPLVVLRQWRWKHFODVVWKDWEHJDQVWXGLHVLQ10$$¶V¿UVWRI¿FLDOFODVV107 In -DQXDU\/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO5D\1HOVRQDVVXPHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRU&DGHW%DVLF7UDLQLQJ &%7 DQG&-7)Phoenix assigned six of its members to assist Nelson with the task of training WKH$IJKDQWUDLQHUV%\WKHHQGRI-DQXDU\$1$1&2VDQG$IJKDQRI¿FHUVFRPSOHWHG WKHFUDVKFRXUVHLQ86$UP\EDVLFWUDLQLQJ2I¿FLDO10$$&%7EHJDQRQ)HEUXDU\DQG ended with a formal graduation ceremony on 17 March at which each cadet swore his oath of DOOHJLDQFHWRWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW:LWKWKLVHYHQWWKHQHZ$IJKDQ$UP\EHJDQIRUPLQJ LWVSURIHVVLRQDORI¿FHUFRUSV The Afghan National Police Mission $WWKH*HQHYD&RQIHUHQFHRQ$IJKDQLVWDQ¶VIXWXUH*HUPDQ\KDGDFFHSWHGUHVSRQ- VLELOLW\IRUWKHVHFRQGSLOODURIVHFXULW\VHFWRUUHIRUPVUHRUJDQL]LQJDQGUHEXLOGLQJWKH$13 %HWZHHQDQGVHYHUDOVHFWLRQVRIWKH86(PEDVV\VWDIILQ.DEXODQGWKH'26¶V %XUHDXIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO1DUFRWLFVDQG/DZ(QIRUFHPHQW$IIDLUV ,1/ DOVRSURYLGHGH[WHQ- VLYHVXSSRUWWRWKH$13UHIRUPHIIRUW*HUPDQ\IRFXVHGSULPDULO\RQUHIXUELVKLQJWKH1DWLRQDO 3ROLFH$FDGHP\LQ.DEXODQGRQUHHVWDEOLVKLQJWKH\HDUSURIHVVLRQDOFRPPLVVLRQHGSROLFH RI¿FHUWUDLQLQJSURJUDP,1/FRQFHQWUDWHGRQWUDLQLQJQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGSROLFHRI¿FHUVDQG SDWUROPHQZRPHQDWVHYHUDOIDFLOLWLHVWKURXJKRXW$IJKDQLVWDQDQGDWWKH.DEXO&HQWUDO7UDLQLQJ &HQWHU8QGHUDQ,1/FRQWUDFW'\Q&RUS,QWHUQDWLRQDOEXLOWHTXLSSHGDQGVWDIIHGWKHYDULRXV $13WUDLQLQJFHQWHUVDQGDOVRSURYLGHGHPEHGGHGDGYLVRUVWRWKH$IJKDQ0LQLVWU\RI,QWHULRU 02, (YHQWXDOO\02,HVWDEOLVKHG¿YH$135HJLRQDO&RPPDQG&HQWHUVDW.DEXO*DUGH] +HUDW.DQGDKDUDQG0D]DUH6KDULI%\WKH$IJKDQSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQLQ2FWREHU QHDUO\$13KDGFRPSOHWHGWUDLQLQJDQGZHUHRSHUDWLRQDO7KURXJKWKH8QLWHG 6WDWHVKDGLQYHVWHGPRUHWKDQPLOOLRQLQUHIRUPLQJWKH$13109 ,QOLJKWRI20&$¶VVXFFHVVLQWUDLQLQJWKH$1$&)&$UHTXHVWHGWKDW20&$GHYHORS DFRPSUHKHQVLYHSODQIRUFRQGXFWLQJFRPSDUDEOH$13WUDLQLQJ$OWKRXJK*HUPDQIRUFHVKDG GHYHORSHGDQGZHUHQRZUXQQLQJWKH$13$FDGHP\WKH\ZHUHVHULRXVO\OLPLWHGE\LQDGHTXDWH IXQGLQJDQGDVKRUWDJHRISHUVRQQHO7KHUHIRUH0DMRU*HQHUDO:HVWRQDQGPHPEHUVRIKLV 20&$VWDIISUHSDUHGDGHWDLOHGSODQIRUUHVWUXFWXULQJWKH$13WUDLQLQJSURJUDP7KHQZLWK DVHULHVRIEULH¿QJVLQODWHDQGHDUO\:HVWRQJDLQHGWKHQHFHVVDU\DSSURYDOVIURP /LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO%DUQRDW&)&$DQGIURP86&HQWUDO&RPPDQG &(17&20 WREHFRPH VXEVWDQWLDOO\PRUHLQYROYHG110%\WKLVWLPHQHDUO\$13RI¿FHUVDQGSDWUROPHQZRPHQ had been trained and were on duty throughout the country.111 *HQHUDO:HVWRQ¶VSODQUHFRPPHQGHGWKDW*HUPDQ\UHWDLQLWVUROHDVOHDGQDWLRQLQUHIRUPLQJ WKH$IJKDQ SROLFH VHFWRU DQG WKDW WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV 20&$ DVVXPH D VWURQJ VXSSRUWLYH UROH7KHIXOO\LQWHJUDWHGSODQZDVEDVHGRQ:HVWHUQSROLFHSROLFLHVV\VWHPVDQGSURFHVVHV DQG HPSKDVL]HG TXDOLW\ RYHU TXDQWLW\ ORFDO UHFUXLWLQJ DQG DGHTXDWH SD\ WR DWWUDFW OLWHUDWH Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 168 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

RI¿FHUV:HVWRQIXUWKHUSURSRVHGDFRPSOHWHRYHUKDXORIWKHHQWLUHSROLFHVHFWRULQFOXGLQJ FHUWDLQDVSHFWVRIWKH$IJKDQ02,,VVXHVRIUHVWUXFWXULQJUHKLULQJUHWUDLQLQJUHHTXLSSLQJ DQGUHLQIRUFLQJZLWKPHQWRUVZHUHDOOFULWLFDODVSHFWVDGGUHVVHGE\*HQHUDO:HVWRQDVZDV H[SDQGLQJWKH$13WUDLQLQJSURJUDPIURPWRZHHNV,PSOHPHQWLQJWKHSODQZRXOGUHTXLUH QHDUO\PLOOLRQLQLQFUHPHQWDOIXQGLQJDQGPRUHWKDQDGGLWLRQDO&RDOLWLRQSHUVRQQHO112 ,Q )HEUXDU\ $LU )RUFH 0DMRU *HQHUDO-RKQ7%UHQQDQVXFFHHGHG*HQHUDO :HVWRQ DV &KLHI 20&$ $V %UHQQDQ¶V RI¿FH RI¿FLDOO\ DVVXPHG UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH $13 UHIRUP PLVVLRQ LQ -XO\ LW ZDV UHGHVLJQDWHG DV WKH 26&$ ,Q the name would change once again to the &RPELQHG 6HFXULW\ 7UDQVLWLRQ &RPPDQG± $IJKDQLVWDQ &67&$ DQG ZRXOG FRP- PDQG&-7)Phoenix and the newly-formed &-7) Police. 'XULQJ 0DMRU *HQHUDO %UHQQDQ¶V ¿UVW PRQWKV LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ he was consumed with the process of tak- LQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU$13 WUDLQLQJ VHFXU- ing the necessary congressional funding, DQGFRQYLQFLQJWKH*HUPDQVWRDFFHSWWKH WDNHRYHU114 In a short week in the middle RI-XQH%UHQQDQEULHIHG&RDOLWLRQ1$72 81DQG$IJKDQOHDGHUVKLSFXOPLQDWLQJLQ

DOD Photo DPHHWLQJZLWK3UHVLGHQW.DU]DL In all of Figure 57. Major General John T. Brennan. KLVSUHVHQWDWLRQV%UHQQDQHPSKDVL]HGWKH need for political support from the interna- WLRQDOFRPPXQLW\IRUWKH$13SURJUDPWR EHVXFFHVVIXO+HUHPLQGHGKLVDXGLHQFHVWKDWODZDQGRUGHUZDVFUXFLDOWRHVWDEOLVKLQJVWDELO- LW\DQGFUHDWLQJHFRQRPLFJURZWKIRUWKHFLWL]HQVRI$IJKDQLVWDQ116 $W WKH 26&$ UHRUJDQL]DWLRQ FHUHPRQ\ LQ .DEXO RQ -XO\ 0DMRU *HQHUDO %UHQQDQ¶V &KLHIRI6WDII%ULWLVK$UP\&RORQHO0DUNYDQGHU/DQGHGHVFULEHGKRZLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUP H[SHULHQFHJDLQHGLQUHEXLOGLQJWKH$1$ZRXOGLQÀXHQFHUHVWUXFWXULQJRIWKH$13/LNHZLVH 0DXUHHQ4XLQQ86&KDUJHG¶$IIDLUVDFNQRZOHGJHGWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRI26&$¶VKHLJKWHQHG UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVQRWLQJWKDW³WKLVFRPPDQGLVFUXFLDOWRWKHIXWXUHVXFFHVVRI$IJKDQLVWDQRXU DELOLW\WRIXUWKHUGHYHORSWKH$1$DQGWRWUDLQDQHIIHFWLYHSROLFHIRUFHZLOOKDYHDGLUHFWLPSDFW RQ GHPRFUDF\ DQG UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´117 26&$ KHDGTXDUWHUV DGGHG QHDUO\ QHZSRVLWLRQV¿OOHGPRVWO\E\86$UP\5HVHUYHRI¿FHUVDVLWDVVXPHGWKH$13WUDLQLQJUROH ³:HUHVWUXFWXUHGVRPHRIWKH>EDWWDOLRQV@WRLPSURYHWKHTXDOLW\RIWUDLQLQJWKHVHIRONVZHUH JHWWLQJ´%UHQQDQH[SODLQHG³:HFKDQJHGRXUIRFXVZLWKWKH$1$IURPTXDQWLW\WRTXDOLW\´ State Building and Democracy in Afghanistan: The October 2004 Election In political terms, the Afghans had made remarkable progress since the Taliban defeat in 7KH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWZDVXSDQGUXQQLQJLQ.DEXOXQGHUDQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQDQGZDV

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 169 of 316

Chapter 10 in mid-2004 planning for upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. The elections KDGEHHQVWLSXODWHGE\WKHFRQVWLWXWLRQWKDWKDGEHHQDSSURYHGE\WKHOR\DMLUJDLQHDUO\ 7KHFRQVWLWXWLRQFDOOHGIRUDSUHVLGHQWLDOIRUPRIJRYHUQPHQWZLWKHOHFWLRQVIRUWKHRI¿FHRI SUHVLGHQWWREHKHOGLQ-XQH7KDWJRYHUQPHQWZRXOGDOVRIHDWXUHDELFDPHUDOOHJLVODWXUH consisting of a lower house, Wolesi Jirga, to be chosen by direct elections, and an upper house, Meshrano JirgaVHOHFWHGE\WKHSUHVLGHQWDQGSURYLVLRQDOGLVWULFWFRXQFLOV7KHSDUOLDPHQWDU\ HOHFWLRQVZRXOGIROORZWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQVE\DERXWPRQWKV6HFXULW\FRQFHUQVDQG GHOD\HGYRWHUUHJLVWUDWLRQKRZHYHUFDXVHG+DPLG.DU]DLWRSRVWSRQHWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQ XQWLO6HSWHPEHU$IHZZHHNVODWHUWKH-RLQW(OHFWRUDO0DQDJHPHQW%RG\ -(0% D FRPELQHG$IJKDQDQG81RUJDQL]DWLRQUHVSRQVLEOHIRUHQVXULQJWUDQVSDUHQWDQGFUHGLEOHHOHF- WLRQVGHVLJQDWHG2FWREHUWKHRI¿FLDOHOHFWLRQGDWH119 A new election law issued in May 2004 FHUWL¿HGRQHPDQRQHYRWHIRUHYHU\$IJKDQPDQDQGZRPDQ\HDUVRUROGHUDQGVSHFL¿HG that a simple majority would determine the presidential winner. (DUO\SURMHFWLRQVLQGLFDWHGWKDWPLOOLRQ$IJKDQFLWL]HQVZRXOGEHHOLJLEOHWRYRWH %HFDXVHQRYRWHUUHJLVWU\DQGQRFHQVXVGDWDH[LVWHGLQ$IJKDQLVWDQUHJLVWUDWLRQHVWLPDWHVZHUH GLI¿FXOWDWEHVW,QSDUWLFXODUUHJLVWHULQJ$IJKDQZRPHQSRVHGXQLTXHSUREOHPVLQWKHWUDGL- tional male-oriented culture. As a result, separate teams of men and women were established WRUHJLVWHUPDOHDQGIHPDOHYRWHUV,VVXLQJYRWHUUHJLVWUDWLRQFDUGVZLWKSKRWRLGHQWL¿FDWLRQWR IXOO\YHLOHGZRPHQZDVRQHGLI¿FXOW\HQFRXQWHUHGQHYHUWKHOHVVWKH-(0%GHFLGHGWRGRVR in the interest of expediency.120 In addition to registration concerns, female candidates were DWVHULRXVULVN'HVSLWHVLJQL¿FDQWLPSURYHPHQWVLQWKHOLYHVRI$IJKDQZRPHQVLQFH ZRPHQLQWHUHVWHGLQUXQQLQJIRURI¿FHGLGVRLQDQDWPRVSKHUHRIIHDU2QHIHPDOHFDQGLGDWH IRUWKHSDUOLDPHQWIURP.DQGDKDUSURYLQFHVDLG³6HFXULW\LVGLIIHUHQWIRUPHQDQGZRPHQ 0HQFDQGLGDWHVKDYHSXWWKHLUSLFWXUHVHYHU\ZKHUHLQWKHED]DDU:RPHQFDQGLGDWHVFDQ¶WGR WKDWEHFDXVHWKH\DUHDIUDLG6RPHERG\PLJKWFRPHGXULQJWKHQLJKWDQGNLOOWKHP$Q\WKLQJ FDQ KDSSHQ´121 5HVWULFWLYH VRFLHWDO QRUPV WKUHDWV IURP ORFDO ZDUORUGV DQG WKH LQFUHDVLQJ DFWLYLW\RIWKH7DOLEDQGHWHUUHGERWKZRPHQFDQGLGDWHVDQGYRWHUVIURPSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQWKH election.1226WLOOE\6HSWHPEHUPLOOLRQSRWHQWLDOYRWHUVKDGUHJLVWHUHG Allegations DURVHTXHVWLRQLQJWKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHUHJLVWUDWLRQSURFHVVEHFDXVHPDQ\YRWHUVDSSHDUHGWRKDYH registered more than once.1241HYHUWKHOHVVRQHOHFWLRQGD\PRUHWKDQPLOOLRQ$IJKDQVIURP DOOSURYLQFHVYRWHGDWSROOLQJVWDWLRQVORFDWHGLQSROOLQJFHQWHUVHDFKRIZKLFK KDGVHSDUDWHIDFLOLWLHVIRUPHQDQGZRPHQ$IJKDQUHIXJHHVZHUHDOVRDEOHWRFDVWWKHLUYRWHVDW SROOLQJVWDWLRQVHVWDEOLVKHGLQ,UDQDQG3DNLVWDQ8QIRUWXQDWHO\ZLWKRQO\HOHFWLRQ RI¿FLDOVDYDLODEOHIRUPRQLWRULQJPRVWSROOLQJDUHDVODFNHGRYHUVLJKW6XFKDVPDOOQXPEHU RIREVHUYHUVYLRODWHG(XURSHDQ8QLRQHOHFWLRQVWDQGDUGVWKXVUHTXLULQJREVHUYHUWHDPVWREH UHQDPHG³GHPRFUDF\VXSSRUWWHDPV´DWWKHODVWPLQXWH126 ,Q-XO\WKH-(0%KDGDQQRXQFHGWKH$IJKDQSUHVLGHQWLDOWLFNHW²DOLVWRIRI¿FLDO FDQGLGDWHVZKRKDGUHJLVWHUHGWRUXQLQWKHXSFRPLQJSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQ7KHDSSURYHG FDQGLGDWHVLQFOXGHGLQGHSHQGHQWVDQGZLWKYDULRXVSDUW\DI¿OLDWLRQV3UHVLGHQW.DU]DLDQ HWKQLF3DVKWXQUDQDVDQLQGHSHQGHQWDVGLGKLVIRUPHU0LQLVWHURI3ODQQLQJ+D]DUDOHDGHU 0RKDPPDG0RKDTHT)RUPHU8]EHN1RUWKHUQ$OOLDQFH*HQHUDO$EGXO5DVKLG'RVWXPDOVR UHJLVWHUHGDVDQLQGHSHQGHQWDORQJZLWK0DVRRGD-DODODSK\VLFLDQDQGWKHRQO\IHPDOHFDQGL- GDWHLQWKHUDFH)LQDOO\.DU]DL¶VSUHYLRXV0LQLVWHURI(GXFDWLRQ0RKDPPDG

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 170 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

6HFXULW\FRQFHUQVSULRUWRWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQSHUVLVWHGGXULQJWKHVXPPHURI &RQWLQXHG HQHP\ WKUHDWV WR GLVUXSW RU SUHYHQW WKH HOHFWLRQ ZRUULHG OHDGHUV RI WKH$IJKDQ *RYHUQPHQW,6$)DQG&RDOLWLRQIRUFHV%\$XJXVWHOHFWLRQUHJLVWUDWLRQVWDIIPHPEHUV KDGEHHQNLOOHGDQGPRUHZRXQGHG6L[,('VZHUHIRXQGQHDUYRWHUUHJLVWUDWLRQORFDWLRQV RU -(0% RI¿FLDOV¶KRPHV DQG IRXU GLUHFW DWWDFNV RQ SHUVRQQHO RU VLWHV KDG RFFXUUHG127 In PLG6HSWHPEHUXQNQRZQIRUFHVODXQFKHGDQXQVXFFHVVIXOURFNHWDWWDFNRQ$IJKDQ3UHVLGHQW .DU]DL¶VKHOLFRSWHUQHDU*DUGH]ZHHNVODWHUYLFHSUHVLGHQWLDOFDQGLGDWH=LD0DVVRXGZDVWKH YLFWLPRIDQDVVDVVLQDWLRQDWWHPSWLQ%DGDNKVKDQSURYLQFH(YHQWKRXJKHQHP\DWWDFNVZHUH XSVOLJKWO\&-7)FRPPDQGHU0DMRU*HQHUDO2OVRQRSWLPLVWLFDOO\SRLQWHGRXWDWWKHWLPH WKDW³WKHERWWRPOLQHLVZH¶UHJHWWLQJGRQHWKHEXVLQHVVZHQHHGWRJHWGRQH´ $IJKDQDXWKRULWLHVSULPDULO\WKH02,DVVXPHGRYHUDOOUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUGHYHORSLQJDQG LPSOHPHQWLQJHOHFWLRQVHFXULW\SURFHGXUHV$FRQFHQWULFFLUFOHDSSURDFKFDOOHGIRUWKH$13 HVWLPDWHGDWVWURQJWRVHFXUHWKHSROOLQJFHQWHUVDQGLPPHGLDWHVXUURXQGLQJV3ROLFH FRPPDQGHUV ZHUH DXWKRUL]HG WR GHSXWL]H ORFDO FLWL]HQV DV QHFHVVDU\ WR VHUYH DV WHPSRUDU\ SROLFHRI¿FHUV6ROGLHUVIURPWKH$1$IRUPHGWKHVHFRQGULQJDQGSURYLGHGPRUHZLGHVSUHDG SROOLQJFHQWHUVHFXULW\PDQQHGFKHFNSRLQWVFRQGXFWHGSDWUROVDQGVHUYHGDVEDFNXSVXSSRUW IRUWKH$13$OOH[LVWLQJ$1$EDWWDOLRQV²DSSUR[LPDWHO\VROGLHUVDQGRI¿FHUV²ZHUH FRPPLWWHGWRWKHHOHFWLRQVHFXULW\PLVVLRQ,6$)DQG&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHRXWHU ULQJIXQFWLRQHGDVD45)FRXOGRQO\EHFDOOHGRQLQFDVHVRIHPHUJHQF\DQGZRXOGEHORFDWHG RXW RI VLJKW RI SROOLQJ IDFLOLWLHV *OREDO SRVLWLRQLQJ V\VWHP *36 FRRUGLQDWHV ZHUH HVWDE- OLVKHGLQDGYDQFHIRUHDFKSROOLQJFHQWHUIDFLOLWDWLQJDUDSLG&RDOLWLRQUHVSRQVHLIUHTXLUHG129 6XERUGLQDWHSODQVRXWOLQHGDGGLWLRQDOVHFXULW\PHDVXUHVLQYROYLQJURDGVXVHGWRWUDQVSRUWEDO- ORWVURDGVWRSROOLQJSODFHV-(0%UHJLRQDORI¿FHVDQGEDOORWFROOHFWLRQWUDQVIHUDQGFRXQW- ing locations. 'HVSLWHRQJRLQJLQWLPLGDWLRQDOOHJDWLRQVRIIUDXGDQGDSHUFHLYHGXQIDLUDGYDQWDJHKHOG E\3UHVLGHQW.DU]DLWKH2FWREHUHOHFWLRQWXUQHGRXWWREHQHDUO\IUHHRIYLROHQFH6HFXULW\ RSHUDWLRQVZHUHGHHPHGDPDMRUVXFFHVVEHFDXVHRIWKHFORVHFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKH-(0% $3$$1$,6$)DQG&RDOLWLRQIRUFHV02,RI¿FLDOVFLWHGH[WHQVLYHSUHHOHFWLRQWUDLQLQJ LQWHUGLFWLRQRISODQQHGHQHP\DWWDFNVE\&RDOLWLRQDQG$1$IRUFHVKLJKO\HIIHFWLYHRIIHQVLYH RSHUDWLRQVFDUULHGRXWDORQJWKH$IJKDQLVWDQ3DNLVWDQERUGHUDQGHOHFWLRQGD\&RDOLWLRQDLU SDWUROVDVEHLQJLQVWUXPHQWDOLQFUHDWLQJDUHDVRQDEO\VDIHHQYLURQPHQWIRUWKH$IJKDQSHRSOH 0RUHWKDQPLOOLRQ$IJKDQVYRWHGSHUFHQWRIZKRPZHUHZRPHQ7KHRYHUDOOWXUQRXW rate of 70 percent was much higher than anticipated. &RQWURYHUVLHV ZHUH PLQLPDO JLYHQ WKH FRQGLWLRQV$W D IHZ YRWLQJ ORFDWLRQV KRZHYHU WKH LQGHOLEOH LQN XVHG WR PDUN YRWHUV¶ WKXPEVFRXOGDSSDUHQWO\EHZDVKHGRII6XEVHTXHQWDFFXVDWLRQVRIPXOWLSOHYRWLQJSURPSWHG VHYHUDOSUHVLGHQWLDOFDQGLGDWHVWRWKUHDWHQDER\FRWW,QOLJKWRIWKHH[FHSWLRQDOO\KLJKYRWHU WXUQRXWDQGWKHRYHUZKHOPLQJHQWKXVLDVPRIWKH$IJKDQSHRSOHER\FRWWSURFHHGLQJVQHYHU PDWHULDOL]HG³7KLVLVRQHRIWKHKDSSLHVWGD\VRIP\OLIH´DQHOGHUO\ZRPDQVDLG³,GRQ¶W HYHQFDUHZKRZLQV,MXVWZDQWSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\DQGWROLYHORQJHQRXJKWRFRPHDQGYRWH DJDLQ´ 5HJDUGLQJ WKH HOHFWLRQ /LHXWHQDQW &RORQHO &DUXVR 'HSXW\ &RPPDQGHU RI &7) LonghornLQ+HUDWHPSKDVL]HGWKHPRQXPHQWDOQDWXUHRIWKHHYHQWDVVHUWLQJ³-XVWWKHZKROH LGHDRIJHWWLQJDQHOHFWLRQWRKDSSHQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQHYHQLIWKHUHZHUHDELOOLRQWKLQJVWKDW ZHUHQ¶WSHUIHFWDERXWLWZDVFRRODQG\RXFRXOGUHDOO\VHHWKDWWKHORFDO$IJKDQVZHUHSURXG² HVSHFLDOO\WKHZRPHQ´2YHUDOOSHUFHQWRI$IJKDQFLWL]HQVFRQVLGHUHGWKHHOHFWLRQWR KDYHEHHQIUHHDQGIDLUDVGHWHUPLQHGE\DSRVWHOHFWLRQQDWLRQZLGHVXUYH\RIYRWHUV Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 171 of 316

Chapter 10

Transporting the completed ballots from the polling centers to the counting centers was a ODERULRXVWDVN6HYHQFRXQWLQJFHQWHUVKDGEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGLQ.DEXO0D]DUH6KDULI+HUDW .RQGX] -DODODEDG *DUGH] DQG %DPLDQ %DOORWV IURP SROOLQJ FHQWHUV LQ 3DNLVWDQ DQG ,UDQ ZHUHEURXJKWWRWKH.DEXOFRXQWLQJFHQWHU9HKLFOHVRIDOOVKDSHVDQGGHVFULSWLRQVSOXVKRUVHV GRQNH\VDQG$IJKDQVRQIRRWSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKHSURFHVV2I¿FLDOFRXQWLQJGLGQRWEHJLQXQWLO 2FWREHUZKHQQDWLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHPEHUVRIWKH-(0%VWDIIFRPSOHWHGWKHSURFHVV 9DULRXVDJHQWVDQGREVHUYHUVZHUHSUHVHQWGXULQJDOOVWDJHVRIWKHFRXQWLQJSURFHVVWRHQVXUH WUDQVSDUHQF\5HVXOWVIURPHDFKFRXQWLQJFHQWHUZHUHWKHQUHSRUWHGWRWKHQDWLRQDOWDOO\URRP LQ.DEXO 2Q1RYHPEHU-(0%DQQRXQFHGWKHRI¿FLDOFHUWL¿HGUHVXOWVRI$IJKDQLVWDQ¶V¿UVWGHPR- FUDWLFSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQ$VDQWLFLSDWHG.DU]DLZRQZLWKDPDMRULW\RIPLOOLRQYRWHV SHUFHQW WKXVSUHFOXGLQJDUXQRIIHOHFWLRQ

President Karzai’s New Cabinet 2Q 'HFHPEHU .DU]DL DQQRXQFHG KLV QHZ FDELQHW ZKLFK ZRXOG HYHQWXDOO\ EH DSSURYHGE\WKH1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\7KHPHPEHUFDELQHWLQFOXGHGQXPHURXV$IJKDQLQWHO- OHFWXDOVDQGRQO\RQHUHJLRQDOOHDGHU²0LQLVWHURI(QHUJ\,VPDLO.KDQ)RUPHU'HSXW\'HIHQVH 0LQLVWHU$EGXO5DKLP:DUGDNUHSODFHG)DKLP.KDQDV'HIHQVH0LQLVWHU$OL$KPDG-DODOL UHWDLQHGKLVSRVWDV,QWHULRU0LQLVWHUDQG.DU]DL¶VSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQRSSRQHQW0DVRRGD -DODOUHFHLYHGDVSHFLDODSSRLQWPHQWDV0LQLVWHURI:RPHQ¶V$IIDLUV140(LJKW7DMLNVDQGVHY- HUDO+D]DUDVDQG8]EHNVZHUHDSSRLQWHGWRPLQLVWHULDOVHDWV3UHVLGHQW.DU]DL¶VUXQQLQJPDWHV $KPDG=LD0DVVRXGDQG0RKDPDG.DULP.KDOLOLEHFDPH¿UVWDQGVHFRQGYLFHSUHVLGHQWV %\ WKH VSULQJ RI WKH DQQRXQFHPHQW RI D 86±$IJKDQ DJUHHPHQW UHFRJQL]HG $IJKDQLVWDQ¶VSROLWLFDOSURJUHVVWRZDUGIXOOVRYHUHLJQW\7KHQHZSDUWQHUVKLSHPSKDVL]HGD UHQHZHGGHGLFDWLRQWRWKHUXOHRIODZSURWHFWLRQRIKXPDQULJKWVVXSSRUWIRUGHPRFUDWLFJRY- HUQDQFHGHIHDWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOWHUURULVPDQGHQVXULQJ$IJKDQLVWDQ¶VVHFXULW\VRYHUHLJQW\ LQGHSHQGHQFHDQGWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\³:HDUHFRQ¿GHQWWKDWWKH86±$IJKDQVWUDWHJLFSDUWQHU- VKLSZLOOSOD\DFHQWUDOUROHLQKHOSLQJ$IJKDQLVWDQDFKLHYHWKHVHJRDOV´GHFODUHG3UHVLGHQW *HRUJH:%XVKDQG$IJKDQ3UHVLGHQW.DU]DLDVWKH\MRLQWO\DQQRXQFHGWKHQHZSDUWQHUVKLS141 ,QDQHIIRUWWRVSUHDGGHPRFUDF\WRWKHSURYLQFLDODQGGLVWULFWOHYHOVWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW LQLWLDWHGD1DWLRQDO6ROLGDULW\3URJUDPWKDWHQFRXUDJHGUXUDOJRYHUQLQJFRXQFLOVWREHWWHUPDQDJH ORFDOUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURMHFWV1HDUO\SHUFHQWRIWKHJRYHUQLQJFRXQFLOPHPEHUVZHUHZRPHQ 7RIXUWKHUDVVLVWWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWWKH86'26HVWDEOLVKHGDQ$IJKDQ5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ *URXSDWWKH(PEDVV\LQ.DEXODQGDQ2I¿FHRI$IJKDQLVWDQ$IIDLUVLQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&$V DQDGGLWLRQDOPHDVXUHRIVXSSRUWIRUWKH$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW6HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVH'RQDOG

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 172 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

5XPVIHOGYLVLWHGHYHU\PRQWKV6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH&RQGROHH]]D5LFHPHWZLWK.DU]DLWZLFHLQ DQG)LUVW/DG\/DXUD%XVKWUDYHOHGWR$IJKDQLVWDQLQ0DUFK142 Afghanistan Parliamentary and Provincial Council Elections 2005 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ DQG SURYLQFLDO HOHFWLRQV LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ UHSUHVHQWHG WKH ODVW PLOHVWRQH LQ LPSOHPHQWLQJ WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV RI WKH %RQQ $JUHHPHQW 7KH $IJKDQLVWDQ &RQVWLWXWLRQDQGWKH$IJKDQ(OHFWRUDO/DZKDGGHVFULEHGWKHIRUPWKDWWKHOHJLVODWXUHDQG ORFDOJRYHUQPHQWZRXOGWDNH$1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\ZLWKD/RZHU+RXVHZLWKVHDWVDQGDQ 8SSHU+RXVHZLWKVHDWVZRXOGVHUYHDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO$WORZHUOHYHOVSURYLQFLDOFRXQ- cils, district councils, and municipal councils and mayors would ensure that the country was JRYHUQHGLQDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHIDVKLRQ,Q$IJKDQLVWDQ¶VQHZ1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\/RZHU+RXVH UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVZRXOGEHHOHFWHGGLUHFWO\E\WKHSHRSOHDQGHDFKSURYLQFH¶VVKDUHRIVHDWVZDV proportional to its population.†:RPHQZHUHJXDUDQWHHGVHDWV,QWKH8SSHU+RXVHPHP- EHUVZRXOGEHHLWKHUVHOHFWHGE\3URYLQFLDO&RXQFLOV PHPEHUV DQG'LVWULFW&RXQFLOV PHPEHUV RUDSSRLQWHGE\WKHSUHVLGHQW PHPEHUV $WD0DUFKPHHWLQJLQ.DEXO866HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH5LFHDQG$IJKDQ3UHVLGHQW.DU]DL GHFLGHGWRSRVWSRQHWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\DQGSURYLQFLDOFRXQFLOHOHFWLRQVIURP$SULOXQWLO 6HSWHPEHUDQGWRSXWRIIGLVWULFWFRXQFLOHOHFWLRQVXQWLO5HFRJQL]LQJWKDWWKLVHOHFWLRQ SODQZRXOGOHDYHDVHDWVKRUWIDOOLQWKH8SSHU+RXVH$IJKDQRI¿FLDOVDGRSWHGDWHPSRUDU\ PHDVXUHWKDWUHGXFHG3UHVLGHQW.DU]DL¶VDSSRLQWPHQWVIURPWRWKHUHE\UHWDLQLQJWKHWR UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQVHOHFWHGDQGDSSRLQWHGPHPEHUV6HFUHWDU\5LFHDQG3UHVLGHQW.DU]DL LQGLFDWHGWKDWWKHUHDVRQVIRUSRVWSRQLQJWKHHOHFWLRQVLQYROYHGWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIGHWHULRUDWLQJ VHFXULW\LQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQGFRPSOLFDWHGHOHFWLRQORJLVWLFDOLVVXHV)RUH[DPSOHVHSDUDWH EDOORWVZRXOGEHUHTXLUHGRQHIRUHDFKSURYLQFH+XQGUHGVRIFDQGLGDWHVZHUHOLVWHGRQHDFK ballot, and all the ballots—many of which had not yet been completely designed—needed to be printed and distributed to the 6,000 polling stations.144 More time would be needed to design, print, and distribute all the ballots. 7RWDNHWKHLQLWLDWLYHDJDLQVWHQHP\IRUFHVDQGSUHHPSWDQ\RIIHQVLYHVDLPHGDWGLVUXSWLQJ WKHHOHFWLRQV&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVH[SDQGHGRIIHQVLYHRSHUDWLRQVRYHUWKHVXPPHU7REROVWHU&)& $¶VFRPEDWSRZHUEHIRUHWKHHOHFWLRQV&(17&20GHSOR\HGWKHVW%DWWDOLRQWK$LUERUQH ,QIDQWU\ 5HJLPHQW $,5 WR $IJKDQLVWDQ GXULQJ WKH VXPPHU RI $V HOHFWLRQV DSSURDFKHGWKHQHZ&)&$FRPPDQGHU/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO(LNHQEHUU\VWUHVVHGWKHQHHGWR ³NHHSRQWDNLQJWKH¿JKWWRWKHHQHP\,WLVDEDWWOHRIZLOOVRXWWKHUH²ZHDUHXSDJDLQVW DGHWHUPLQHGHQHP\´ Indeed, the Taliban planned an information campaign and attacks to GHWHUWKHHOHFWLRQV0RIWL/DWLIROODK+DNLPLD7DOLEDQVSRNHVPDQLVVXHGDQWLSDUOLDPHQWDU\ HOHFWLRQSURSDJDQGDLQWKHVXPPHURIFDOOLQJWKHHOHFWLRQVGHFHSWLYHIUDXGXOHQWDQG LOOHJDODQGWKUHDWHQLQJWRDWWDFNHOHFWRUDORI¿FHVVWDIIDQGOHJLVODWLYHFDQGLGDWHV146 Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar threatened to disrupt the Afghan parliamentary elections at DQ\FRVWGHVFULELQJWKHPDVPHUHO\D³WROOWROHJLWLPL]HWKH86RFFXSDWLRQRI$IJKDQLVWDQ´147 (QHP\IRUFHVGLGVWHSXSDWWDFNVLQ%\6HSWHPEHUPRUHWKDQ$IJKDQVDQG $PHULFDQVHUYLFHPHQDQGZRPHQKDGEHHQNLOOHGVLQFHWKH\HDUEHJDQ Most notable was

†.DEXO SURYLQFH ZLWK LWV ODUJH SRSXODWLRQ KDV VHDWV 7KH VPDOOHU SURYLQFH RI 3DQMVKLU IRU example, has two seats.

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 173 of 316

Chapter 10

WKHGRZQLQJRIWKH0+&KLQRRNKHOLFRSWHULQ.XQDUSURYLQFHPHQWLRQHGHDUOLHULQWKLV chapter.149,QVRXWKHUQ.DEXOSURYLQFH7DOLEDQLQVXUJHQWVWKUHZKDQGJUHQDGHVLQWRDSROLFH YHKLFOHNLOOLQJ¿YHRI¿FHUVDQGWKHSROLFHFKLHIRI0XVHKL'LVWULFW6HYHQSDUOLDPHQWDU\FDQ- GLGDWHVDQGIRXUHOHFWLRQRI¿FLDOVZHUHDOVRNLOOHGDQGRI¿FLDOUHSRUWVVXUIDFHGRINLGQDSSLQJV beheadings, and suicide bombing attacks.,Q$XJXVWSROLFHRI¿FHUZDVNLOOHGDQGZHUH ZRXQGHGE\DUHPRWHFRQWUROERPELQ.DQGDKDUZKHUHDGLVWULFWMXGJHKDGEHHQIDWDOO\VKRW a month earlier. Although these attacks and others were serious, they were sporadic and did OLWWOHWRLQWHUIHUHZLWKYRWHUUHJLVWUDWLRQFDQGLGDWHUHJLVWUDWLRQRUFDPSDLJQLQJ (OHFWLRQGD\VHFXULW\PHDVXUHVZHUHVLPLODUWRWKRVHIROORZHGIRUWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQ D\HDUHDUOLHU$13RI¿FHUVDQGSDWUROPHQZHUHRQGXW\LQVLGHHDFKSROOLQJVWDWLRQZKLOH$1$ DQG DGGLWLRQDO$13 IRUFHV HQFLUFOHG WKH RXWVLGH &RDOLWLRQ DQG ,6$) WURRSV ZRXOG UHPDLQ QHDUE\ EXW RXW RI VLJKW WR VHUYH DV EDFNXS &-7)¶V ZHHNO\ LQWHOOLJHQFH PHHWLQJV ZLWK ERWK81$0$DQGWKH-(0%SURYHGLQYDOXDEOHLQGHYHORSLQJDFRPPRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKHWKUHDWHQYLURQPHQWDQGLQWKHVXEVHTXHQWSUHSDUDWLRQRIDQDSSURSULDWHHOHFWLRQVHFXULW\ plan.6FDWWHUHGEXWPLQLPDOYLROHQFHGLGRFFXURQ6HSWHPEHU²SROOLQJVWDWLRQV ZHUHDWWDFNHGDQGURFNHWVKLWD81FRPSRXQGWKH,6$)KHDGTXDUWHUVLQ.DEXODQGWKHDLUSRUW DW-DODODEDG+RZHYHULWZDVKDUGO\WKHFDWDFO\VPSURPLVHGE\WKH7DOLEDQ7KHPRVWVHULRXV LQFLGHQWLQYROYHGDQ,('DWWDFNWKDWNLOOHGD)UHQFKRI¿FHUQHDUWKH6SLQ%ROGDNERUGHUFURVV- LQJLQ.DQGDKDUSURYLQFH,QDOOWKHUHZHUHGHDWKVDWWULEXWHGWRHQHP\DWWDFNVGXULQJWKH elections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¶V6LQJOH1RQ7UDQVIHUDEOH9RWH 6179 policy. ,Q-XO\GXULQJDWHOHYLVHGORWWHU\KHOGDWWKH.DEXO,QWHUFRQWLQHQWDO+RWHO$IJKDQFKLOGUHQ KDG KDQGSLFNHG SLHFHV RI SDSHU ZLWK WKH QDPHV RI DOO SDUOLDPHQWDU\ DQG SURYLQFLDO FRXQFLOFDQGLGDWHV RIZKRPRYHUZHUHZRPHQ IURPFDUGERDUGER[HVWRGHWHUPLQHWKH RUGHULQZKLFKWKHQDPHVZRXOGEHOLVWHGRQWKHEDOORW7KLVVHOHFWLRQSURFHVVFRXOGKDYHEHHQ DFFRPSOLVKHGPRUHTXLFNO\XVLQJFRPSXWHUVKRZHYHU3HWHU(UEHQKHDGRIWKH81±$IJKDQ HOHFWLRQVHFUHWDULDWWKRXJKWWUDQVSDUHQF\ZDVLPSRUWDQW³:HZDQWHGWRGHPRQVWUDWHZKDWLW PHDQVWRKDYHIUHHDQGRSHQHOHFWLRQV´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sented genuine progress for a newly democratic nation.3UHVLGHQW%XVK&)&$&RPPDQGHU

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 174 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO(LNHQEHUU\DQG&-7)&RPPDQGLQJ*HQHUDO0DMRU*HQHUDO.DPL\D DOOSOHGJHGFRQWLQXHG86VXSSRUWIRU$IJKDQLVWDQDQGFRQJUDWXODWHG3UHVLGHQW.DU]DLDQGWKH $IJKDQSHRSOHIRUWKHLUVLJQL¿FDQWDFKLHYHPHQWDQGIRUVXUPRXQWLQJWKHPDQ\REVWDFOHVWKDW had stood in their way.7KH-(0%ZRXOGJRRQWRFHUWLI\WKH¿QDOSDUOLDPHQWDU\UHVXOWVRQ 1RYHPEHUDQGWKH1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\ZRXOGHYHQWXDOO\EHVHDWHGRQ'HFHPEHU $IJKDQVZRXOGQRZZDLWSDWLHQWO\WRVHHKRZWKHLUQHZSDUOLDPHQWZRXOGJRYHUQ

ÔÔÔ

)URPPLGWRWKHHOHFWLRQRI6HSWHPEHU$IJKDQLVWDQQRWRQO\WRRNFULWLFDOVWHSV WRZDUGIRUPLQJDWUXO\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHJRYHUQPHQWEXWDOVRFRQVROLGDWHGPLOLWDU\SRZHUZLWKLQ WKHKDQGVRIWKDWJRYHUQPHQW%\WKHIDOORIPRUHWKDQ$1$WURRSVKDGEHHQ WUDLQHGHTXLSSHGDQGUHDGLHGWR¿JKW$OVRE\WKDWGDWHWKH&RDOLWLRQDQGWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO community had poured billions of dollars into Afghanistan in the form of reconstruction aid DQGXVHGWKH357VLQRSHUDWLRQWRKHOSWKH$IJKDQVHI¿FLHQWO\HPSOR\WKRVHIXQGV7KHVH PLOHVWRQHVOHGPDQ\&RDOLWLRQOHDGHUVWRH[SUHVVRSWLPLVPDERXW$IJKDQLVWDQ¶VIXWXUH 'HVSLWHWKHJHQHUDOO\SRVLWLYHRXWORRNWKHUHZDVDQ[LHW\DERXWWKHVHFXULW\VLWXDWLRQLQ WKHFRXQWU\&OHDUO\7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGDIRUFHVZHUHEHWWHURUJDQL]HGWKDQWKH\ZHUHLQ DQGZHUHODXQFKLQJDWWDFNVWKDWKDGJUHDWHUOHWKDOLW\7KH&RDOLWLRQDQG,6$)KDGUHVSRQGHG partly by increasing the number of their troops inside Afghanistan and employing those forces in a COIN campaign designed to gain and retain the support of the population as the means of GHQ\LQJWKHLQVXUJHQWIRUFHVVXSSRUW:K\WKHQZDVWKHLQVXUJHQF\HQGXULQJ":KDWSDUWRIWKH &RDOLWLRQPLOLWDU\DSSURDFKQHHGHGWREHUHWRROHG" 7KHVHTXHVWLRQVUHPDLQHGXQDQVZHUHGDVWKHHQGRIDSSURDFKHG7KH&RDOLWLRQDQG WKH86$UP\KDGEHHQRSHUDWLQJLQ$IJKDQLVWDQIRUH[DFWO\\HDUVDQGKDGDFFRPSOLVKHG a great deal. Most importantly, it had freed the Afghan people from the grips of a tyrannical UHJLPHWKDWKDUERUHGDQGHQDEOHGDGHDGO\LQWHUQDWLRQDOWHUURULVWJURXS7KHVHZHUHYLFWRULHV WKDW$PHULFDQ6ROGLHUVPDGHSRVVLEOHDQGRIZKLFKWKH\FRXOGEHSURXG+RZHYHULWZDVFOHDU that the struggle to secure a stable and prosperous future for Afghanistan was not yet won.

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 175 of 316

Chapter 10

Notes

/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO'DYLG:%DUQRLQWHUYLHZE\&HQWHUIRU0LOLWDU\+LVWRU\1RYHPEHU ± 'HSDUWPHQWRIWKH$UP\*US Army Troop Levels in OEF Spreadsheet &RORQHO 5LFKDUG 3HGHUVHQ ³%521&2 *XLGDQFH +RZ WR7KLQN DERXW 2()´ 0DUFK 2004, 6. 86'HSDUWPHQWRI'HIHQVH³,QWR$IJKDQLVWDQ5RRWLQJ2XW7HUURULVWV´DefenseLink, ± KWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOKRPHIHDWXUHVGKWPO DFFHVVHG 0D\ WK ,QIDQWU\ 'LYLVLRQ $VVRFLDWLRQ ³*OREDO :DU RQ 7HUURULVP´ ± KWWSZZZWKLGDFRPGLYLVLRQKWPO (accessed 16 May 2007). 3HGHUVHQ³%521&2*XLGDQFH´± 'U 5REHUW 3HULWR LQWHUYLHZ E\ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV 6WXG\ 7HDP &RPEDW 6WXGLHV ,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.6-XQH± 0DMRU *HQHUDO 0LFKDHO )O\QQ State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions and Objectives %ULH¿QJ'HFHPEHUVOLGH $KPHG5DVKLGDescent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia 1HZ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 176 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

&7)Bronco, OEF V Historical Command Brief$SULOVOLGH &7)Bronco, OEF V Historical Command Brief$SULOVOLGH +HUGLQWHUYLHZ-XQH± +HUGLQWHUYLHZ-XQH $GULDQ 7 %RJDUW ,,, One Valley at a Time +XUOEXUW )LHOG )/ -RLQW 6SHFLDO 2SHUDWLRQV 8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV ± %RJDUWOne Valley at a Time, 61. %RJDUWOne Valley at a Time, 66. 86 &RQJUHVV 6HQDWH 6HQDWH$UPHG 6HUYLFHV &RPPLWWHH 6tatement of General Bryan D. Brown, US Army, WK&RQJVW6HVV$SULO 866SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQG+LVWRU\2I¿FHUnited States Special Operations Command HISTORY, 1987–2007, 20th Anniversary Edition 0DF'LOO$LU)RUFH%DVH)/8662&20 42. USSOCOM History, 110. USSOCOM History, 110. 3HGHUVHQLQWHUYLHZ1RYHPEHU $QWRQLR *LXVWR]]L Working Paper No. 33: Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State- Building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan&ULVLV6WDWHV3URJUDPPH'HYHORSPHQW5HVHDUFK&HQWUH /RQGRQ '(67,1 KWWSZZZFULVLVVWDWHVFRPGRZQORDGZS:3SGI DFFHVVHG-XO\ ³$IJKDQLVWDQ´ 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 'LVDUPDPHQW 'HPRELOL]DWLRQ DQG 5HLQWHJUDWLRQ 5HVRXUFH &HQWUHKWWSZZZXQGGURUJFRXQWU\SURJUDPPHVSKS"F DFFHVVHG0D\ ³$IJKDQLVWDQ´ 81 ''5 5HVRXUFH &HQWHU ,5,1 +XPDQLWDULDQ 1HZV DQG $QDO\VLV ³$IJKDQLVWDQ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 177 of 316

Chapter 10

&RORQHO.HYLQ2ZHQV³1HZV%ULH¿QJZLWK&RORQHO.HYLQ2ZHQV´ 6HSWHPEHU 2I¿FH RI WKH $VVLVWDQW 6HFUHWDU\ RI 'HIHQVH IRU 3XEOLF $IIDLUV ± KWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLO WUDQVFULSWVWUDQVFULSWDVS["WUDQVFULSWLG DFFHVVHG0D\ .DPL\DLQWHUYLHZ6HSWHPEHU &RORQHO 3 3DWULFN'RQDKXH³&RPEDWLQJD0RGHUQ,QVXUJHQF\&RPELQHG7DVN)RUFH'HYLO LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´Military Review 0DUFK±$SULO 'RQDKXH³&RPEDWLQJD0RGHUQ,QVXUJHQF\´ 86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH³)DFW6KHHW3URJUHVVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ¶V5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ´0DUFK ±KWWSZZZVWDWHJRYUSDSUVSVKWP DFFHVVHG-XQH 86 *RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWDELOLW\ 2I¿FH *$2 Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of US Goals-XO\±ZZZJDRJRYQHZLWHPVGSGI DFFHVVHG0D\ 86 *RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWDELOLW\ 2I¿FH *$263 Securing, Stabilizing, and Recon- structing Afghanistan0D\ZZZJDRJRYQHZLWHPVGVSSGI DFFHVVHG-XO\ *$2± *$2± (ULF$XEUH\$IJKDQLVWDQ(QJLQHHU'LVWULFW³7KH&RUSV1HHGV

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 178 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

&DUXVRLQWHUYLHZ-XO\± &KHHNLQWHUYLHZ$XJXVW 3HGHUVHQLQWHUYLHZ1RYHPEHU± 'U.HQQHWK.DW]PDQLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW6WXGLHV ,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.6-XQH 3HULWRUS Experience with PRTs in Afghanistan6SHFLDO5HSRUW 06) 3UHVV 5HOHDVH ³06) 3XOOV 2XW RI $IJKDQLVWDQ´ -XO\ ± KWWSZZZ PVIRUJPVILQWHUQDWLRQDOLQYRNHFIP"FRPSRQHQW SUHVVUHOHDVH REMHFWLG '))'' $'(%($(' PHWKRG IXOOBKWPO DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU 0LFKDHO']LHG]LFDQG&RORQHO0LFKDHO6HLGO6SHFLDO5HSRUW³8QLWHG6WDWHV,QVWLWXWHRI 3HDFH6SHFLDO5HSRUW3URYLQFLDO5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ7HDPV´6HSWHPEHU $QRQ\PRXV86PLOLWDU\357FRPPDQGHULQWHUYLHZ6HSWHPEHU 3HULWRUS Experience with PRTs in Afghanistan6SHFLDO5HSRUW± 0DMRU*HQHUDO 5HWLUHG &UDLJ3:HVWRQLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\7HDP &RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.6-XO\ ³*,V WR +HOS 7UDLQ $IJKDQ 1DWLRQDO $UP\´ -XO\ ± KWWSZZZPLOLWDU\FRP 1HZV&RQWHQW)/BWUDLQBKWPO DFFHVVHG-XQH 0LWFK3HUU\PDQ³/HWWHUIURP $IJKDQLVWDQ´XQGDWHG±KWWSZZZKDOOODNHODQGFRPWURRSVOHWWHUKWP DFFHVVHG$XJXVW +DOLPD.D]HP³1HZ$IJKDQ$UP\$VVHUWV,WVHOI´Christian Science Monitor, $XJXVW ³$IJKDQ 1DWLRQDO $UP\ $FWLYDWHV 6HFRQG 5HJLRQDO &RPPDQG´ American Forces Press Service 6HSWHPEHU ± KWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOQHZVQHZVDUWLFOHDVS["LG DFFHVVHG$XJXVW 5RQ6\QRYLW]³$IJKDQLVWDQ1HZ1DWLRQDO$UP\%DVHV3ODQQHGLQ)RXU 3URYLQFHV´0DUFK±KWWSZZZUIHUORUJIHDWXUHVDUWLFOH$)'(%' '&))&($(KWPO DFFHVVHG-XQH 6DPXHO&KDQ³6HQWLQHOVRI$IJKDQ'HPRFUDF\7KH$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\´65DMDUDWQDP 6FKRRORI,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WXGLHV-XQHXQSXEOLVKHGSDSHU± G6TXDGURQWK&DYDOU\G%&7WK,QIDQWU\'LYLVLRQ /LJKW ZDVDOVRVHQWDWWKLVWLPHWR +HUDW&DUXVRLQWHUYLHZ-XO\ .D]HP³1HZ$IJKDQ$UP\$VVHUWV,WVHOI´ .D]HP³1HZ$IJKDQ$UP\$VVHUWV,WVHOI´ 6DPXHO&KDQ³6HQWLQHOVRI$IJKDQ'HPRFUDF\´$U\Q%DNHU³&DQWKH$IJKDQV'HIHQG 7KHPVHOYHV"´Time in Partnership with CNN, -DQXDU\±KWWSZZZWLPHFRPWLPHZRUOG DUWLFOHKWPO DFFHVVHG-XQH )UHGHULFN5LFH³$IJKDQLVWDQ8QLW7DNHVRQ1HZ0LVVLRQDQG1DPH´American Forces Press Service -XO\ ± KWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOQHZVQHZVDUWLFOHDVS["LG DFFHVVHG 0D\ &RPELQHG 6HFXULW\7UDQVLWLRQ &RPPDQG±$IJKDQLVWDQ )DFW 6KHHW $SULO KWWSRQHWHDPFHQWFRPPLOIDFWBVKHHWV&67&$)DFWVKHHW$SULOSGI DFFHVVHG-XQH &RORQHO*HRUJH%)RUV\WKH³)LQDO5HSRUWRIWKH0LOLWDU\$FDGHP\6WXG\7HDP´RI¿FLDO FRUUHVSRQGHQFHWR20&$1RYHPEHU± &RORQHO *HRUJH % )RUV\WKH ³1DWLRQDO 0LOLWDU\$FDGHP\ RI$IJKDQLVWDQ &RQFHSW 3ODQ´ XQSXEOLVKHG1RYHPEHU %ULJDGLHU*HQHUDO 5HWLUHG *HRUJH%)RUV\WKHLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\ 7HDP&RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.6$SULO 1RWH)RUV\WKHZDVSUR- moted to brigadier general in 2004.) &67&$,QIR3DSHU³1DWLRQDO0LOLWDU\$FDGHP\RI$IJKDQLVWDQ´$SULO 5LFN3HDWDQG)UHGHULFN5LFH³$IJKDQ0LOLWDU\$FDGHP\2SHQV*DWHVWR)XWXUH/HDGHUV´ 6SHFLDO WR American Forces Press Service 0DUFK ± KWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOQHZV QHZVDUWLFOHDVS["LG DFFHVVHG$SULO

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 179 of 316

Chapter 10

5D\1HOVRQ³7KH1DWLRQDO0LOLWDU\$FDGHP\RI$IJKDQLVWDQ$)LUVW+DQG$FFRXQW´First Call, 0DUFK ± KWWSZZZZHVWSRLQWRUJXVHUVXVPD)LUVWB&DOOB$UWLFOH article.doc (accessed 12 April 2007). 86 *RYHUQPHQW $FFRXQWDELOLW\ 2I¿FH *$2 ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 6HFXULW\ (IIRUWV WR (VWDEOLVK$UP\DQG3ROLFH+DYH0DGH3URJUHVVEXW)XWXUH3ODQV1HHGWR%H%HWWHU'H¿QHG´-XQH ±86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWHDQG86'HSDUWPHQWRI'HIHQVH³,QWHUDJHQF\$VVHVVPHQWRI$IJKDQLVWDQ 3ROLFH 7UDLQLQJ DQG 5HDGLQHVV´ '26 5HSRUW 1R ,63,42 '2' 5HSRUW 1R ,( 1RYHPEHU± 0DMRU *HQHUDO &UDLJ 3 :HVWRQ ³.H\ WR $IJKDQ 1DWLRQDO 3ROLFH 0LVVLRQ $VVXPSWLRQ´ unpublished, undated notes. *$2 0DMRU *HQHUDO &UDLJ 3 :HVWRQ DQG WKH 20&$ 6WDII OMC-A’s Estimate, COAs, and Recommendation for Police Sector Reform: Brief to LTG Barno as of 3 January 2005, unpublished, VOLGHV± 5LFH³$IJKDQLVWDQ8QLW7DNHVRQ1HZ0LVVLRQDQG1DPH´± 0DMRU*HQHUDO-RKQ%UHQQDQLQWHUYLHZE\&RQWHPSRUDU\2SHUDWLRQV6WXG\7HDP&RPEDW 6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.66HSWHPEHU 0DMRU*HQHUDO-RKQ%UHQQDQ³3URSRVHG%ULH¿QJ)ORZIRU$133ODQ´XQSXEOLVKHGXQGDWHG 0DMRU*HQHUDO-RKQ%UHQQDQAfghan National Police Program %ULHIXQSXEOLVKHGXQGDWHG VOLGHV± 5LFH³$IJKDQLVWDQ8QLW7DNHVRQ1HZ0LVVLRQDQG1DPH´± %UHQQDQLQWHUYLHZ6HSWHPEHU /DUU\3*RRGVRQ³$IJKDQLVWDQLQ(OHFWRUDO3URJUHVVDQGDQ2SLXP%RRP´Caliber Asian Survey -DQXDU\)HEUXDU\ 86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH³)DFW6KHHW$IJKDQLVWDQ(OHFWLRQV:RPHQ¶V3DUWLFLSDWLRQ´ ±KWWSZZZVWDWHJRYJZLUOVKWP DFFHVVHG0D\ +XPDQ 5LJKWV :DWFK ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 3URWHFW :RPHQ &DQGLGDWHV´ $XJXVW KWWS ZZZKUZRUJHQQHZVDIJKDQLVWDQSURWHFWZRPHQFDQGLGDWHV DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ +XPDQ5LJKWV:DWFK³$IJKDQLVWDQ3URWHFW:RPHQ&DQGLGDWHV´ 7LP0F*LUN³,QVLGH.DU]DL¶V&DPSDLJQ´Time (11 October 2004): 44. ³6SHFLDO5HSRUW9RWLQJLQ:DUORUG&RXQWU\±$IJKDQLVWDQ´The Economist (9 October 2004): ± -RLQW (OHFWRUDO 0DQDJHPHQW %RG\ ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 3UHVLGHQWLDO (OHFWLRQ 5HVXOWV 2Q 9RWLQJ´ KWWSZZZHOHFWLRQVDIJKDQLVWDQRUJDI(OHFWLRQ5HVXOWV:HEVLWHHQJOLVKHQJOLVKKWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ *RRGVRQ³$IJKDQLVWDQLQ(OHFWRUDO3URJUHVVDQGDQ2SLXP%RRP´ ³6SHFLDO5HSRUW9RWLQJLQ:DUORUG&RXQWU\±$IJKDQLVWDQ´± $QGUHZ 5H\QROGV DQG $QGUHZ :LOGHU ³)UHH )DLU RU )ODZHG &KDOOHQJHV IRU /HJLWLPDWH (OHFWLRQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´$IJKDQLVWDQ5HVHDUFKDQG(YDOXDWLRQ8QLW $5(8 ±KWWSZZZDUHX RUJDI"RSWLRQ FRPBGRFPDQ ,WHPLG WDVN GRFBGRZQORDG JLG DFFHVVHG0D\ (ULF6FKPLWWDQG'DYLG5RKGH³7DOLEDQ)LJKWHUV,QFUHDVH$WWDFNVZLWK7URXEOLQJ7ROO$PRQJ *,¶VDQG$IJKDQV´New York Times, 1 August 2004, 1.11. 6HUJHDQW 'RXJODV 'H0DLR LQWHUYLHZ E\ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV 6WXG\ 7HDP &RPEDW 6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.6)HEUXDU\ -RLQW (OHFWRUDO 0DQDJHPHQW %RG\ ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 3UHVLGHQWLDO (OHFWLRQ 5HVXOWV 2Q 6HFXULW\´ KWWSZZZHOHFWLRQVDIJKDQLVWDQRUJDI(OHFWLRQ5HVXOWV:HEVLWHHQJOLVKHQJOLVK KWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ -DZDG 6KDULI]DGD ³(OHFWLRQ 6HFXULW\ D 6XFFHVV´ Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 2FWREHU$551RKWWSZZZLZSUQHW"S DUU V I R DSFBVWDWH KHQLDUU (accessed 21 May 2007).

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 180 of 316

The Path toward Stability: May 2004 to September 2005

-RLQW(OHFWRUDO0DQDJHPHQW%RG\³$IJKDQLVWDQ3UHVLGHQWLDO(OHFWLRQ5HVXOWV7XUQRXW E\ 3URYLQFH´ KWWSZZZHOHFWLRQVDIJKDQLVWDQRUJDI(OHFWLRQ5HVXOWV:HEVLWHHQJOLVK HQJOLVKKWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ +D¿]XOODK*DUGHVK³(OHFWLRQV&ORVH1RWZLWKD%DQJ%XWD:KLPSHUÍnstitute for War & Peace Reporting, 2FWREHU$551RKWWSZZZLZSUQHW"S DUU V I R DSFB VWDWH KHQLDUU DFFHVVHG0D\ 86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH³5RDGWR'HPRFUDF\$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV´ SRVWHG1RYHPEHU KWWSXVLQIRVWDWHJRYSURGXFWVSXEVDIJHOHFWDIJKDQLVWDQKWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ &DUXVRLQWHUYLHZ-XO\ 86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH³7KH)LUVW'HPRFUDWLF(OHFWLRQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ$5HSRUWE\WKH %LSDUWLVDQ2EVHUYHU7HDP´2FWREHU±KWWSISFVWDWHJRYISFKWP DFFHVVHG0D\ 2007). -RLQW (OHFWRUDO 0DQDJHPHQW %RG\ ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 3UHVLGHQWLDO (OHFWLRQ 5HVXOWV 2Q &RXQWLQJ´ KWWSZZZHOHFWLRQVDIJKDQLVWDQRUJDI(OHFWLRQ5HVXOWV:HEVLWHHQJOLVKHQJOLVK KWP DFFHVVHG-XQH -RLQW(OHFWRUDO0DQDJHPHQW%RG\³$IJKDQLVWDQ3UHVLGHQWLDO(OHFWLRQ5HVXOWV'HFLVLRQ RIWKH-RLQW(OHFWRUDO0DQDJHPHQW%RG\²&HUWL¿FDWLRQRI5HVXOWV´KWWSZZZHOHFWLRQVDIJKDQLVWDQ RUJDI(OHFWLRQ5HVXOWV:HEVLWHHQJOLVKHQJOLVKKWP DFFHVVHG-XQH /LVD6WHLQ³7KH:HHNÚS News and World Report'HFHPEHUKWWSZZZXVQHZV FRPXVQHZVQHZVDUWLFOHVZHHNOHGHKWP DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ *RRGVRQ³$IJKDQLVWDQLQ(OHFWRUDO3URJUHVVDQGDQ2SLXP%RRP´ ³-RLQW 'HFODUDWLRQ RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV±$IJKDQLVWDQ 6WUDWHJLF 3DUWQHUVKLS´ KWWSZZZ ZKLWHKRXVHJRYQHZVUHOHDVHVKWPO DFFHVVHG-XQH 'U .HQQHWK .DW]PDQ ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 3RVW:DU *RYHUQDQFH 6HFXULW\ DQG 86 3ROLF\´ &RQJUHVVLRQDO5HVHDUFK6HUYLFH5HSRUW5/-DQXDU\±ZZZIDVRUJVJSFUVURZ 5/SGI DFFHVVHG-XQH $QGUHZ5H\QROGV/XF\-RQHVDQG$QGUHZ:LOGHU³$*XLGHWR3DUOLDPHQWDU\(OHFWLRQVLQ $IJKDQLVWDQ´$IJKDQ5HVHDUFKDQG(YDOXDWLRQ8QLW$XJXVW±KWWSXQSODQXQRUJLQWUDGRF JURXSVSXEOLFGRFXPHQWV$3&,7<813/$1SGI DFFHVVHG-XQH 'HFODQ:DOVK³$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV3XW%DFNWRWKH$XWXPQ5LFH5HQHZV86&RPPLWPHQW DV%RPE'HDWKV0DU+HU9LVLW´The Guardian, 0DUFK1&$L]HQPDQ³/RQJ'HOD\HG $IJKDQ9RWH,V6HWIRU6HSWHPEHU2QH+RXVHRI3DUOLDPHQW:LOO5HPDLQ,QFRPSOHWH´Washington Post, 0DUFK$ 7KRP6KDQNHU³&RDOLWLRQ6WHSV8S5DLGVDV$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV$SSURDFKŃew York Times, $XJXVW$ ³7DOLEDQ 'HQRXQFH$IJKDQ (OHFWLRQV9RZWR 5HVLVW )XWXUH 3DUOLDPHQW´ BBC Monitoring 1HZV¿OH, 6HSWHPEHU³7DOLEDQ3OHGJHWR'LVUXSW$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV5XOHRXW3ROOLQJ'D\ $WWDFNV´BBC Monitoring South Asia, $XJXVW ³1$72WR%RRVW7URRSVWR$KHDGRI$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV´Xinhua News Agency–CEIS, -XO\ ³/HDGHUV3XWWLQJ6WHHOLQWR.DU]DL$IJKDQLVWDQ¶V3DUOLDPHQWDU\(OHFWLRQV´The Economist, 6HSWHPEHU -RKQ+HQGUHQ³/XFN\6KRW%URXJKW'RZQ+HOLFRSWHULQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´Houston Chronicle, -XO\ .LP%DUNHU³7DUJHWHG$WWDFNV,QWHQGHGWR'LVUXSW$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV´Knight Ridder Tribune News Service6HSWHPEHU-RQDWKDQ/DQGD\³$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQ3URPSWV)LJKWLQJ´Knight Ridder Newspapers, $XJXVW$

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 181 of 316

Chapter 10

&DUORWWD *DOO ³)DWDO %RPELQJ 0DUV 6WDUW RI $IJKDQ (OHFWLRQ &DPSDLJQ´ International Herald Tribune$XJXVW³$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQ:RUNHUV$EGXFWHG-XGJH6KRW´Washington Post-XO\$ %DUNHU³7DUJHWHG$WWDFNV,QWHQGHGWR'LVUXSW$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV´ .DPL\DLQWHUYLHZ6HSWHPEHU± ³$VLD'HPRFUDF\6RUWRI$IJKDQLVWDQ¶V(OHFWLRQV´The Economist, 6HSWHPEHU ³$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV%HJLQ$PLGVW7DOLEDQ$WWDFNV´Hindustan Times6HSWHPEHU (VWKHU3DQ³$IJKDQ3DUOLDPHQWDU\(OHFWLRQV´&RXQFLORQ)RUHLJQ5HODWLRQV%DFNJURXQGHU 6HSWHPEHU ± KWWSZZZFIURUJSXEOLFDWLRQDIJKDQBSDUOLDPHQWDU\BHOHFWLRQVKWPO (accessed 21 May 2007). 5H\QROGV-RQHVDQG:LOGHU³$*XLGHWR3DUOLDPHQWDU\(OHFWLRQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´ ³$VLD*HWWLQJWKH9RWH2XW$IJKDQLVWDQ´The Economist, -XO\ ³$IJKDQLVWDQ9RWHV´Washington Post, 6HSWHPEHU$$L]HQPDQ³/RQJ'HOD\HG $IJKDQ9RWH,V6HWIRU6HSW´$ ³3UHVLGHQW &RQJUDWXODWHV $IJKDQ 3HRSOH DQG *RYHUQPHQW RQ 6XFFHVVIXO 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ (OHFWLRQV´7KH:KLWH+RXVH2I¿FHRIWKH3UHVV6HFUHWDU\6HSWHPEHU

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 182 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 183 of 316

Chapter 11 Implications $OOZDUVDUHLPSURYLVDWLRQV*LYHQWKHLQÀXHQFHRQPLOLWDU\HQJDJHPHQWVRIDP\ULDGRI IDFWRUV²VRPHRIZKLFKDUHZLWKLQKXPDQFRQWURODQGPDQ\WKDWDUHQRW²KRZFRXOGZDUIDUH EHFKDUDFWHUL]HGRWKHUZLVH"7KHWKFHQWXU\*HUPDQPLOLWDU\WKHRULVW&DUOYRQ&ODXVHZLW] DFNQRZOHGJHGWKLVIDFWFDSWXULQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHLPSURYLVDWLRQDOQDWXUHRIZDULQWKH ZRUGfriction, DWHUPWKDWGHVFULEHVWKHXQSUHGLFWDEOHIDFWRUVLQZDUWKDWDOWHUFRQGLWLRQVSODQV DQGREMHFWLYHV&ODXVHZLW]HPSKDVL]HGWKHXQLTXHDQGXQSUHGLFWDEOHFKDUDFWHURIPLOLWDU\FDP SDLJQVE\FRQWHQGLQJ³(DFKLVDQXQFKDUWHGVHDIXOORIUHHIV´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¶VGRPHVWLF HQHPLHV ZDV D UHVRXQGLQJ VXFFHVV LQ DFKLHYLQJ WKH LQLWLDO REMHFWLYHV RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV :LWKLQWKHPRQWKSHULRGWKDWEHJDQLQ2FWREHUWKH86OHG&RDOLWLRQDQGLWV1RUWKHUQ $OOLDQFH DOOLHV RYHUWKUHZ WKH7DOLEDQ UHJLPH SXVKHG PRVW RI DO4DHGD¶V RSHUDWLYHV RXW RI $IJKDQLVWDQDQGLQVWDOOHGDQHZ$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW7KLVVXFFHVVIXOFRRUGLQDWLRQRIDLUSRZHU DQG6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV)RUFHV 62) LQVXSSRUWRIDSUR[\IRUFH²HVVHQWLDOO\DQXQSUHFHGHQWHG FRPELQDWLRQ²OHGWR3UHVLGHQW*HRUJH:%XVK¶VFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRI2()DVD³GLIIHUHQWNLQG RIZDU´7KLVVWDWHPHQWVLPXOWDQHRXVO\VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH$IJKDQLVWDQFDPSDLJQZRXOGIHDWXUH QHZWHFKQLTXHVDQGDYRLGWKHGHSOR\PHQWRIODUJHQXPEHUVRI86IRUFHVDQGPDWHULHOQRUPDOO\ XVHGWRJDLQFRQWURORIDQHQWLUHFRXQWU\ 7KH\HDU&RDOLWLRQHIIRUWWKDWIROORZHGWKHYLFWRU\RYHUWKH7DOLEDQZDVDOVRKHDYLO\ LPSURYLVHGEXWLWHQMR\HGOHVVVXFFHVVLQDFKLHYLQJWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VXOWLPDWHREMHFWLYH²WKH FUHDWLRQRIDVWDEOH$IJKDQLVWDQWKDWQRORQJHUVHUYHGDVDKDYHQIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOWHUURULVW JURXSVVXFKDVDO4DHGD7REHVXUHDV2()PDWXUHGWKH86$UP\DQGLWVMRLQWLQWHUDJHQF\ DQG &RDOLWLRQ SDUWQHUV EHFDPH IDU PRUH DGHSW DW ZRUNLQJ ZLWKLQ WKH$IJKDQ HQYLURQPHQW 6LJQL¿FDQWLQQRYDWLRQVVXFKDVWKHFUHDWLRQRIWKH3URYLQFLDO5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ7HDPV 357V GHPRQVWUDWHGÀH[LELOLW\LQWKRXJKWDQGDFWLRQ&KDQJHVLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWKHRYHUDOOHIIRUW PRVWLPSRUWDQWO\/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO'DYLG:%DUQR¶VLQWURGXFWLRQRIDIRUPDOFRXQWHULQVXU JHQF\ &2,1 FDPSDLJQLQGLVSOD\HGDYHU\UHDOFRPPLWPHQWWRPDNLQJFULWLFDOFRU UHFWLRQV$VSDUOLDPHQWDU\HOHFWLRQVZHUHKHOGLQ6HSWHPEHUKRZHYHU$IJKDQLVWDQZDV H[SHULHQFLQJLWVKLJKHVWUDWHRIYLROHQFHVLQFHWKHIDOORIWKH7DOLEDQVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKHFRXQ WU\ZDVQRWPRYLQJLQH[RUDEO\WRZDUGVWDELOLW\0RUHRYHUWKDW\HDUVDZWKHKLJKHVW86FDVXDO WLHVVLQFHWKHEHJLQQLQJRI2()

*&DUO YRQ &ODXVHZLW] On War HGV 3HWHU 3DUHW DQG 0LFKDHO +RZDUG 3ULQFHWRQ 1- 3ULQFHWRQ 8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV 317 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 184 of 316

Implications

7RXQGHUVWDQGZK\WKH&RDOLWLRQFDPSDLJQGLGQRWIRVWHUDPRUHVWDEOHHQYLURQPHQWDIWHU RQHPXVWORRNEH\RQGWKHfrictionWKDWDV&ODXVHZLW]QRWHGLVXQLYHUVDOWRWKHSUDFWLFHRI ZDUIDUH7KLVFKDSWHUKLJKOLJKWVWKHNH\GHFLVLRQVDQGSURFHVVHVWKDWVKDSHG2()IURP2FWREHU WR6HSWHPEHUWRSUHVHQWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVWKDWWKHFDPSDLJQGXULQJWKLVSHULRGRIIHUV WKH86$UP\WRGD\ Envisioning the Campaign: “Nation Building” and Planning for OEF 7KHGHSDUWXUHSRLQWIRUWKLVGLVFXVVLRQPXVWEHWKHLQLWLDOYLVLRQIRU2()DQGKRZNH\ VHQLRUPLOLWDU\DQGSROLWLFDORI¿FLDOVVDZWKHFDPSDLJQGHYHORSLQJRYHUWLPH:LWKWKHHPSKD VLVRQSURMHFWLQJDYLDEOHPLOLWDU\IRUFHLQWR$IJKDQLVWDQLQDPDWWHURIZHHNVWKH&(17&20 FRPPDQGHU*HQHUDO7RPP\)UDQNVDQGKLVVWDIITXLFNO\IDFLOLWDWHGWKHPDUULDJHRI&RDOLWLRQ IRUFHVZLWK1RUWKHUQ$OOLDQFHPLOLWLD)UDQNVKDGIHZRSWLRQV7KH$IJKDQWKHDWHURIZDUZDV UHPRWHO\ORFDWHGLQFHQWUDO$VLDDJUHDWGLVWDQFHIURPWKHVHDDQGLQDUHJLRQWKDWZDVXQZLOO LQJWRVXSSRUWDODUJH86SUHVHQFH 7KHWUDGLWLRQDO$PHULFDQDSSURDFKWKDWIHDWXUHGWKHQDWLRQ¶VDELOLW\WRSURMHFWODUJHDPRXQWV RIFRPEDWIRUFHVDQGPDWHULHOWRFUXVKDQHQHP\ZDVHVVHQWLDOO\QXOOL¿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¶VFRQYHQWLRQDOPDQHXYHUXQLWVEXWUDWKHU UHOLHGRQWZRXQL¿HGFRPPDQGV &(17&20DQG6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQG>62&20@ 7KHVSHHGZLWKZKLFKWKHVHWHDPVZHUHDEOHWRGHSRVHWKH7DOLEDQDQGFKDVHDO4DHGDWHUURULVW JURXSVLQWRWKHLUPRXQWDLQUHGRXEWVVXUSULVHGREVHUYHUVDQGSDUWLFLSDQWVDOLNHDQGUHYHDOHGWKH VHYHUHZHDNQHVVLQWKH7DOLEDQ¶VKROGRYHU$IJKDQLVWDQ 7KHIDOORIWKH7DOLEDQUHJLPHLQ'HFHPEHUQHYHUWKHOHVVGLGQRWPDUNWKHHQGRIWKH &RDOLWLRQFDPSDLJQ:KHQLWFDPHWLPHWRWXUQWKLVYLFWRU\LQWRDODVWLQJVXFFHVVWKDWZRXOG DFKLHYHWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VVWUDWHJLFJRDOVSODQQHUVDW&(17&2062&20DQGWKH86'2' EHFDPHOHVVFHUWDLQRIWKHSURSHUFRXUVH7KHVLQJOHJUHDWHVWREVWDFOHWRFRQFHSWXDOL]LQJ2()LQ DKROLVWLFVHQVHZDVWKHDPELYDOHQFHDPRQJVHQLRU$PHULFDQSROLWLFDORI¿FLDOVDERXWZKDWZDV RIWHQGHURJDWRULO\UHIHUUHGWRDV³QDWLRQEXLOGLQJ´WKHODUJHVFDOHWLPHFRQVXPLQJUHFRQVWUXF WLRQDQGJRYHUQDQFHEXLOGLQJHIIRUWVVXFKDVWKRVHWKDWKDGFKDUDFWHUL]HG$PHULFDQLQYROYH PHQWLQ%RVQLDDQG.RVRYR:KHQWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQWRRNSRZHULQ6HFUHWDU\RI 'HIHQVH'RQDOG5XPVIHOGDQGRWKHURI¿FLDOVWKRXJKWPLVVLRQVOLNHWKRVHLQWKH%DONDQVZHUH HVVHQWLDOO\TXDJPLUHVLQZKLFKWKHFRPEDWSRZHURIWKH86PLOLWDU\KDGEHFRPHWUDSSHG7KH ODFNRIFOHDUREMHFWLYHVDQGYDJXHWLPHWDEOHVPDGHQDWLRQEXLOGLQJHIIRUWVDQDWKHPDWRSURSR QHQWVRIDIRUHLJQSROLF\WKDWZRXOGUHO\RQDPLOLWDU\LQVWUXPHQWWKDWZDVKLJKO\UHVSRQVLYH 7KH5XPVIHOG'2'LQVWHDGSXVKHGKDUGWRWUDQVIRUPWKHPLOLWDU\LQWRDVPDOOHUPRUHDJLOH IRUFHWKDWZRXOGUHDFWTXLFNO\WRFRQWLQJHQFLHVDQGDYRLGQDWLRQEXLOGLQJ 7KDW DWWLWXGH VXUYLYHG WKH DWWDFNV RI HVVHQWLDOO\ LQWDFW :KHQ SODQQLQJ IRU 2() EHJDQDWWKH&(17&20OHYHO)UDQNVDQGKLVVWDIIGLGIROORZMRLQWGRFWULQHDQGFUHDWHGD FDPSDLJQIRU$IJKDQLVWDQWKDWFRQVLVWHGRIIRXUSKDVHVWHUPLQDWLQJZLWK3KDVH,97UDQVLWLRQ

318 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 185 of 316

Chapter 11

7KDW¿QDOSKDVHDFFRUGLQJWRGRFWULQHLQFOXGHGHFRQRPLFUHFRQVWUXFWLRQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW RIODZDQGRUGHUDQGDFWLRQVWDNHQWRDGGUHVVDQ\OLQJHULQJKXPDQLWDULDQFRQFHUQV3KDVH,9 QRUPDOO\WHUPLQDWHGRQFH86IRUFHVWXUQHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRURSHUDWLRQVRYHUWRDPXOWLQDWLRQDO SHDFHNHHSLQJIRUFHRUWRDQHZGRPHVWLFJRYHUQPHQW,QLWV2()SODQWKH&(17&20VWDII WLWOHGWKLVSKDVH³(VWDEOLVK&DSDELOLW\RI&RDOLWLRQ3DUWQHUVWR3UHYHQWWKH5H(PHUJHQFHRI 7HUURULVPDQG3URYLGH6XSSRUWIRU+XPDQLWDULDQ$VVLVWDQFH(IIRUWV´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oDGHFRQ VWUXFWHGE\WKH7DOLEDQ$IJKDQLVWDQUHPDLQHGDIDLOHGVWDWH7ZRGHFDGHVRIZDUKDGOHIWWKH FRXQWU\ZLWKDVKDWWHUHGVRFLHW\DQGDQHFRQRP\WKDWZDVVPDOOHUWKDQWKDWRI$OEDQLD:KHQ &RDOLWLRQIRUFHVDUULYHGLQ2FWREHU$IJKDQLVWDQZDVVWLOOLQWKHPLGVWRIFLYLOZDUZLWK WKH1RUWKHUQ$OOLDQFHFRQWUROOLQJVLJQL¿FDQWSRUWLRQVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VQRUWKHDVW7RDFHUWDLQ GHJUHH&(17&20SODQQHUVEHFDPHDZDUHRIWKHFRQGLWLRQVLQVLGH$IJKDQLVWDQDQGWKDWFRJ QL]DQFHOHGWRWKHLQFOXVLRQRIKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFHRSHUDWLRQVLQWKHHDUO\SKDVHVRIWKH FDPSDLJQ

†6HHFKDSWHURIWKLVVWXG\IRUGHWDLOV

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 186 of 316

Implications

6HQLRU &RDOLWLRQ PLOLWDU\ RI¿FHUV LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ OLNH .UDW]HUDQG 0F1HLOO WKHQ IDFHG DFRQXQGUXP*LYHQWKHFRQGLWLRQVRI$IJKDQLVWDQLQDFKLHYLQJWKHRYHUDOO&RDOLWLRQ REMHFWLYHPHDQWWKHODXQFKLQJRIPDMRUVWDWHEXLOGLQJLQLWLDWLYHVVXFKDVWKHFUHDWLRQRIDQ DUP\DQGWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHSK\VLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUH2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW RIWKRVHSURJUDPVUDQFRQWUDU\WRJHQHUDOJXLGDQFHIURPVHQLRUPLOLWDU\RI¿FLDOV1RWVXUSULV LQJO\0F1HLOODQGKLVKHDGTXDUWHUVDUULYHGLQ$IJKDQLVWDQZLWKRQO\DEDVLFFRQFHSWIRUSURJ UHVVDQGYHU\OLPLWHGUHVRXUFHVWRIRFXVRQWKHVHPLVVLRQV7REHVXUHWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV 81 DQGWKH&RDOLWLRQSDUWQHUVKDGWDNHQWKHOHDGWRFUHDWHDSROLWLFDOURDGPDSIRUDQHZ$IJKDQ VWDWH7KH%RQQ$JUHHPHQWLQHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWURDGPDS7KH&RDOLWLRQ¶VIRUPDWLRQRI WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\$VVLVWDQFH)RUFH ,6$) DOVRSURYLGHGDVVXUDQFHWKDWWKH86ZRXOG QRWEHDORQHLQIRVWHULQJVHFXULW\LQVLGH$IJKDQLVWDQ+RZHYHUWKH%RQQ$JUHHPHQWDQGWKH ,6$)ZHUHMXVWWKH¿UVWVWHSVLQWKHPXFKODUJHUSURMHFWWRFUHDWHDVWDEOHVWDWHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ ,WZRXOGWDNHDQRWKHUPRQWKVIRUWKH&RDOLWLRQWRJUDGXDOO\DVVHVVWKHFRQGLWLRQVLQVLGHWKH FRXQWU\DQGFRQVWUXFWWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQVQHHGHGWREHJLQWKHSURFHVVRIVWDELOL]LQJWKHFRXQWU\ 'XULQJWKDWSHULRGPRVWRI$IJKDQLVWDQUHPDLQHGXQWRXFKHGE\&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVDQGWKHÀHGJ OLQJ$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGDIRUFHVDOWKRXJKSUHVVXUHGLQVRPHUHJLRQVE\ UDSLG&RDOLWLRQVWULNHVZHUHIUHHWRUHFRQVWLWXWHDQGFRQGXFWRSHUDWLRQV 7KH ZHDNQHVVHV LQ WKH 86 SODQQLQJ HIIRUW IRU 2() DQG 2SHUDWLRQ ,5$4, )5(('20 2,) KDYHDOUHDG\KHOSHGFKDQJH86MRLQWGRFWULQH7KHQHZYHUVLRQRI-RLQW3XEOLFDWLRQ -3 Joint Operation PlanningSXEOLVKHGLQHPSKDVL]HGWKHQHHGIRUSODQQHUVWRHQVXUH WKDWFRQFHSWVRIFDPSDLJQVDUHFRPSOHWHDQGSODFHHTXDOHPSKDVLVRQERWKWKHGHFLVLYHRIIHQ VLYHRSHUDWLRQVWKDWOHDGWRPLOLWDU\YLFWRU\DQGWKHP\ULDGVWDELOLW\RSHUDWLRQVWKDWWUDQVIRUP WKDWYLFWRU\LQWRVWUDWHJLFVXFFHVV-3UHLQIRUFHGWKDWSRLQWE\LQWURGXFLQJDQHZSKDVLQJ WHPSODWHIRUFDPSDLJQVFRQVLVWLQJRIVL[SKDVHVLQFOXGLQJDWUDQVLWLRQSKDVH 3KDVH,9 LQ ZKLFKVWDELOLW\RSHUDWLRQVEHFDPHWKHIRFXVRI86IRUFHVDQGD¿QDOSKDVHFDOOHG³(QDEOH&LYLO $XWKRULW\´ZKLFKSUHVFULEHGDFWLRQVWDNHQWRVWUHQJWKHQDQHZO\HVWDEOLVKHGJRYHUQPHQW7KLV QHZGRFWULQHVKRXOGKHOSPLOLWDU\OHDGHUVSODQIRUHQWLUHFDPSDLJQVDQGKHOSVHQLRUFRPPDQG HUVXQGHUVWDQGWKHSHULOVRIIRFXVLQJWRRKHDYLO\RQGHFLVLYHFRPEDWRSHUDWLRQV7KHQHZMRLQW FDPSDLJQIUDPHZRUNLVQRWDSDQDFHD1HZWKHRULHVRQWKHXVHRIPLOLWDU\SRZHUDQGJXLGDQFH IURPSROLWLFDORI¿FLDOVZLOODOZD\VH[HUWDQLQÀXHQFHRQRSHUDWLRQV,WLVKRSHGWKDWWKHQHZ SODQQLQJGRFWULQHFRPELQHGZLWKWKHH[SHULHQFHRI2()DQG2,)ZLOOLQGXFHIXWXUHSODQQHUV WRFRQFHLYHFDPSDLJQVLQWKHLUHQWLUHW\ The Evolution of Command Structures %HFDXVH RI WKH GLI¿FXOWLHV ZLWK HQYLVLRQLQJ WKH FDPSDLJQ 86 RI¿FLDOV DQG SODQQHUV H[SHULHQFHGFKDOOHQJHVZLWKVKDSLQJFRPPDQGVWUXFWXUHVIRU2())URP2FWREHUWKURXJK &RDOLWLRQIRUFHVVDZDYDULHW\RIKHDGTXDUWHUVHVWDEOLVKHGDOWHUHGDQGGLVHVWDEOLVKHG $W WKH EHJLQQLQJ RI WKH FDPSDLJQ WKH DG KRF DUUDQJHPHQW RI WK 0RXQWDLQ 'LYLVLRQ¶V KHDGTXDUWHUV VHUYLQJ DV ERWK &RPELQHG )RUFHV /DQG &RPSRQHQW &RPPDQG &)/&& )RUZDUG DQGWKHQ&-7)MountainVRRQJDYHZD\WRDQHZ&-7)EDVHGRQWKHKHDGTXDUWHUV RIWKH86$UP\¶V;9,,,$LUERUQH&RUSV&-7)¶VVWUXFWXUHDOORZHGWKHVHQLRUFRPPDQGHU /LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO0F1HLOOWRIRFXVRQWKHDWHUVWUDWHJLFDQGRSHUDWLRQDOOHYHOFRQFHUQVWKDW LQFOXGHGUHODWLRQVZLWK$IJKDQPLOLWDU\DQGSROLWLFDORI¿FLDOV0F1HLOOSODFHGWKHEXUGHQIRU WDFWLFDOOHYHORSHUDWLRQVRQ&RPELQHG7DVN)RUFH &7) ZKLFKKDGEHHQFRQVWUXFWHGIURP WKH86$UP\¶VG$LUERUQH'LYLVLRQKHDGTXDUWHUVDQGZDVFRPPDQGHGE\0DMRU*HQHUDO

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 187 of 316

Chapter 11

-RKQ9LQHV%XWHYHQWKLVFRPPDQGVWUXFWXUHKDGEHHQZHDNHQHGE\WKHLQVLVWHQFHWKDWKDOIRI WKH;9,,,$LUERUQH&RUSVKHDGTXDUWHUVVWDIIUHPDLQLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWRNHHSIRUFHOHYHOV LQ$IJKDQLVWDQORZDQGWRSUHSDUHIRURWKHUFRQWLQJHQFLHVVSHFL¿FDOO\WKHFDPSDLJQLQ,UDT 7KXV&-7)GHSOR\HGZLWKDOHVVWKDQUREXVWDELOLW\WRFRPPDQGDQGFRQWUROMXVWDVWKH FDPSDLJQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQZDVEHFRPLQJPRUHFRPSOH[)XUWKHUWKHGHFLVLRQWROLPLWWKHVL]H RIWKH&-7)VWDIIUHÀHFWHGWKHLQLWLDOGHIDFWRFODVVL¿FDWLRQRI$IJKDQLVWDQDVDQHFRQRP\RI IRUFHWKHDWHU $V2()SURJUHVVHGWKHFDPSDLJQ¶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±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¿FXOWWRXQGHUVWDQG 7KHHYROXWLRQRIFRPPDQGVWUXFWXUHVLQ2()EHWZHHQDQGZDVDUHVXOWRIERWK VKRUWFRPLQJV LQ IXOO\ HQYLVLRQLQJ WKH VFRSH RI DQG UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU WKH FDPSDLJQ DQG WKH OLPLWDWLRQVRIUHVRXUFHVDYDLODEOHWRWKH$IJKDQWKHDWHURIRSHUDWLRQV7KLVXQFHUWDLQVXFFHV VLRQRIFRPPDQGVVWURQJO\VXJJHVWVWKDWLQWKHIXWXUHSODQQHUVPXVWFDUHIXOO\WKLQNWKURXJK WKH VL]H DQG FDSDFLW\ RI WKH KHDGTXDUWHUV UHTXLUHG WR VXFFHVVIXOO\ HQG WKH FDPSDLJQ ,Q DQ HFRQRP\RIIRUFHWKHDWHUDUJXDEO\WKHSODQQLQJIRUFRPPDQGVWUXFWXUHLVERWKPRUHGLI¿FXOW DQGPRUHFULWLFDO)XUWKHULQWKHLUSODQQLQJGRFXPHQWVSODQQHUVVKRXOGFOHDUO\LGHQWLI\WKH VSHFL¿FKHDGTXDUWHUVGHVLJQDWHGIRUFRPPDQG(TXDOO\LPSRUWDQWLVWKHSDUDPRXQWREMHFWLYH RIFUHDWLQJDQGUHWDLQLQJXQLW\RIHIIRUW,QERWK2()DQG2,)XQLW\RIHIIRUWJUHDWO\LPSURYHG ZKHQWKH&RDOLWLRQIRUPHGFRPPDQGVDWWKHWKHDWHUVWUDWHJLFOHYHO7KHVHGHFLVLRQVDOORZHG VHQLRUFRPPDQGHUVWRIRFXVRQSROLWLFDODIIDLUVWKDWZHUHRIWHQIDUPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQPLOLWDU\ operations.

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 188 of 316

Implications

Troop Levels and Troop Dispositions 'HEDWHVDERXWWKH86WURRSFRPPLWPHQWWR$IJKDQLVWDQJUHZLQYROXPHDQGLPSRUWDQFH DIWHU ZKHQ OHYHOV RI YLROHQFH LQ WKH FRXQWU\ EHJDQ WR ULVH SUHFLSLWRXVO\$Q\ VHULRXV GLVFXVVLRQDERXWFXUUHQWDQGIXWXUHWURRSGHSOR\PHQWVVKRXOGFRQVLGHUWKHWKUHHNH\IDFWRUV VKDSLQJWURRSOHYHOVLQWKH¿UVW\HDUVRI2())LUVWZDVWKHSUHYDLOLQJDWWLWXGHDERXWQDWLRQ EXLOGLQJDQGWKHUHODWHGDVVXPSWLRQWKDW86IRUFHVZRXOGEHLQWKHFRXQWU\IRUDOLPLWHGWLPH 'RYHWDLOLQJZLWKWKDWLQFRPSOHWHYLVLRQRIWKHFDPSDLJQZDVWKHVHFRQGIDFWRUWKHEHOLHILQWKH ¿UVWPRQWKVRIWKHFDPSDLJQWKDWDODUJH³IRRWSULQW´RI:HVWHUQIRUFHVLQVLGH$IJKDQLVWDQ ZRXOG DOLHQDWH WKH SRSXODWLRQ DQG OHDG WR GLVDIIHFWLRQ DQG YLROHQFH )LQDOO\ WKH VWDWXV RI $IJKDQLVWDQDVDQHFRQRP\RIIRUFHWKHDWHUSODFHGUHDOOLPLWDWLRQVRQWURRSOHYHOVHYHQDV 2()PDWXUHGDIWHUDQGVHQLRUFRPPDQGHUVEHFDPHOHVVFRQFHUQHGDERXWH[SDQGLQJWKH &RDOLWLRQPLOLWDU\SUHVHQFHDFURVV$IJKDQLVWDQ $PRQJVHQLRU86SROLWLFDODQGPLOLWDU\RI¿FLDOVWKHLQLWLDOHPSKDVLVRQPDLQWDLQLQJD VPDOOIRRWSULQWFDPHIURPDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH6RYLHWH[SHULHQFHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQWKDWZDV DWEHVWLQFRPSOHWH7KLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKDWGHFDGHORQJFRQÀLFWH[SODLQHGWKH6RYLHWIDLOXUH DVVWHPPLQJIURPWKHGHSOR\PHQWRIODUJHPHFKDQL]HGIRUPDWLRQVWKDWDSSHDUHGDQGDFWHGDV DQDUP\RIRFFXSDWLRQ7KHSUHVHQFHRIWKLVODUJHDOLHQIRUFHVRWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVXJJHVWHG EUHGWKHLQVXUJHQF\WKDWXOWLPDWHO\IRUFHGWKH6RYLHWVWROHDYHLQGLVJUDFHDGHFDGHDIWHUWKH\ DUULYHG 2IWHQRYHUORRNHGLQWKLVYHUVLRQRIWKH6RYLHW$IJKDQ:DUZDVWKHZD\VLQZKLFKWKH6RYLHW PLOLWDU\XVHGLWVSRZHULQ$IJKDQLVWDQ(DUO\LQWKHFRQÀLFWIRUH[DPSOHWKH6RYLHW$LU)RUFH GLUHFWO\DWWDFNHGFLYLOLDQSRSXODWLRQVWRGHQ\LQVXUJHQWVVDIHKDYHQV/DUJHVFDOHFDVXDOWLHVDQG UHIXJHHSRSXODWLRQVUHVXOWHGJHQHUDWLQJDKLJKOHYHORIVXSSRUWIRUWKHPXMDKLGHHQ0RUHRYHU ZKHQWKH6RYLHW8QLRQVHQWLWVPLOLWDU\IRUFHVDFURVVWKH$IJKDQERUGHULQWRVXSSRUWWKH $IJKDQ&RPPXQLVWJRYHUQPHQW$IJKDQLVWDQZDVDOUHDG\LQWKHPLGVWRIDFLYLOZDU7KXV PXFKRIWKHUHVLVWDQFHWKH6RYLHWVHQFRXQWHUHGZDVQRWJHQHUDWHGE\WKHVL]HRIWKHLUIRRWSULQW EXWE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKH\KDGLQWHUYHQHGLQVXSSRUWRIRQHVLGHLQWKHSUHH[LVWLQJFRQÀLFW )RU PDQ\ VHQLRUOHYHO SROLF\PDNHUV DQG PLOLWDU\ FRPPDQGHUV PDLQWDLQLQJ D VPDOO IRRWSULQWDSSHDUHGWREHWKHEHVWZD\RIDYRLGLQJIDLOXUHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ7KLVSROLF\OHGWR &(17&20¶VFORVHPDQDJHPHQWRIWURRSOHYHOVLQDQG,Q0D\IRUFHOHYHO OLPLWDWLRQVFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHGHFLVLRQWRGHSOR\RQO\KDOIRIWKH;9,,,$LUERUQH&RUSVVWDIILQ WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI&-7))XUWKHUWURRSOLPLWVVHYHUHO\UHVWULFWHGWKHDPRXQWRIFRPEDW SRZHUDYDLODEOHWRVHQLRU&RDOLWLRQFRPPDQGHUVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ([FOXGLQJ,6$)ZKLFKZDV OLPLWHGWR.DEXODQGLWVLPPHGLDWHHQYLURQVEHWZHHQODWHDQGWKHEHJLQQLQJRI WKHUHZDVDQDYHUDJHRIVL[PDQHXYHUEDWWDOLRQV²PRVWO\OLJKWLQIDQWU\²DYDLODEOHWRFRQGXFW RSHUDWLRQV7KHVHEDWWDOLRQVGLGHQMR\WKHVXSSRUWRIDYLDWLRQXQLWVWKDWSURYLGHGERWKPRELOLW\ DQGFORVHDLUVXSSRUW6WLOOWKHVHVL[XQLWVZLWKDSSUR[LPDWHO\6ROGLHUVHDFKSURYLGHGWKH HQWLUH&RDOLWLRQSUHVHQFHLQDFRXQWU\WKHVL]HRI7H[DV %HWZHHQ DQG WKH HQG RI WKH &RDOLWLRQ¶V FRPEDW SRZHU DQG RYHUDOO WURRS VWUHQJWK LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ JUHZ VWHDGLO\ LI QRW GUDPDWLFDOO\ 5RPDQLDQ DQG )UHQFK XQLWV UHLQIRUFHG&-7)DQG&-7)DVGLG860DULQH&RUSVIRUFHVWKDWGHSOR\HGIRUUHODWLYHO\ VKRUWSHULRGV$GGLWLRQDO86DQG&RDOLWLRQSDUWQHUVVWDIIHG&-7)Phoenix,WDNLQJWKHEXUGHQ RIWUDLQLQJWKH$1$RIIRIWKH&RPELQHG-RLQW6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV7DVN)RUFH±$IJKDQLVWDQ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 189 of 316

Chapter 11

&-627)$ )XUWKHUDV2()SURJUHVVHG86$UP\PDQSRZHUGRXEOHGIURPLQIDOO WRLQIDOO ,Q WKH ¿UVW PRQWKV RI WKH FDPSDLJQ WKH VPDOO IRUFH IRRWSULQW GLG QRW FRQVWUDLQ WKH &RDOLWLRQ*LYHQWKHLQWHQWWRPDLQWDLQDORZSUR¿OHPRVWRIWKHLQIDQWU\EDWWDOLRQVUHPDLQHG RQWKHODUJHEDVHVDW%DJUDPDQG.DQGDKDU$LU¿HOGV&-7)VRXJKWWRXVHLWVFRPEDWIRUFHV RQO\LQWKRVHLQVWDQFHVZKHUH&RDOLWLRQLQWHOOLJHQFHLQGLFDWHGVLJQL¿FDQWHQHP\DFWLYLW\SUL PDULO\LQWKHSURYLQFHVDORQJWKH3DNLVWDQLIURQWLHU,QWKHVHULHVRIUDSLGVHFXULW\RSHUDWLRQV WKDWEHFDPHHPEOHPDWLFRI&-7)¶VDSSURDFKLQDQGHOHPHQWVRIWKHVHEDW WDOLRQVDLUDVVDXOWHGLQWRUHJLRQVZKHUH7DOLEDQRUDO4DHGDIRUPDWLRQVZHUHVXVSHFWHGWREH RSHUDWLQJ$IWHUDZHHNRIVXFFHVVLYHRSHUDWLRQVZKLFKLQFOXGHGUDLGVFRUGRQDQGVHDUFKHV DQGKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFHPLVVLRQVWKHVHXQLWVZRXOGUHWXUQWRWKHLUEDVHVORFDWHGKXQGUHGV RIPLOHVDZD\2QO\LQIDOOGLG&-7)EHJLQWRH[WHQGLWVSUHVHQFHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQE\ HVWDEOLVKLQJDKDQGIXORIVPDOOEDVHVLQWKHSURYLQFHVRIWKHVRXWKDQGVRXWKHDVW7KLVJHQHUDO GLVSRVLWLRQRIIRUFHVPDGHWKH&RDOLWLRQKHDYLO\GHSHQGHQWRQDYLDWLRQVXSSRUWZKLFKUHTXLUHG DJUHDWGHDORIORJLVWLFDOPDQDJHPHQW,WDOVRPHDQWWKDWLQDQGIHZ$IJKDQVRXW VLGHRI.DEXO.DQGDKDUDQGDVPDOOQXPEHURIRWKHUFLWLHVHYHUVDZ&RDOLWLRQVROGLHUVRU GLUHFWO\IHOWWKHLUSUHVHQFH(YHQLQDOPRVW\HDUVDIWHU2()EHJDQWKHUHZHUHDUHDVRI $IJKDQLVWDQDERXWZKLFKWKH&RDOLWLRQNQHZDOPRVWQRWKLQJ 2QFH/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO%DUQRLQWURGXFHGWKHIRUPDO&2,1FDPSDLJQLQODWHWKH VPDOOIRRWSULQWEHFDPHIDUPRUHSUREOHPDWLF%DUQR¶VQHZHIIRUWKLQJHGRQ&RDOLWLRQIRUFHV WDNLQJRZQHUVKLSRIVSHFL¿FDUHDVRIRSHUDWLRQ $2V DQGFRQGXFWLQJDPL[RIUHFRQVWUXF WLRQVHFXULW\DQGLQIRUPDWLRQRSHUDWLRQVWRZLQWKHVXSSRUWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ%DUQRDVVHUWHG WKDWE\WDNLQJWKLVSRSXODWLRQFHQWULFDSSURDFKWR&2,1KHFRXOGPDJQLI\WKHSUHVHQFHRI WKH&RDOLWLRQ7KLVZDVDUHDVRQDEOHUHVSRQVHJLYHQWKDW2()ZDVDQHFRQRP\RIIRUFHWKH DWHU6LPSO\SXWIURPRQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZDVGLUHFWLQJWKHOLRQ¶VVKDUHRILWVPLOLWDU\ PDQSRZHUWRLWVPDLQHIIRUWWKHFDPSDLJQLQ,UDT,QIDFWIURPWKHIDOORIWKURXJK 86WURRSOHYHOVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQUHPDLQHGRQO\WRSHUFHQWRIWKHWURRSOHYHOVLQ,UDT7KH &)&$FRPPDQGHUUHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKHUHZHUHVHYHUHFRQVWUDLQWVRQXQLWVDYDLODEOHIRUGHSOR\ PHQWWR$IJKDQLVWDQDQGXVHGZKDWUHVRXUFHVDQGXQLWVKHKDGWRPRXQWKLV&2,1HIIRUW 6WLOODV%DUQRDGPLWWHGPDQ\EDWWDOLRQFRPPDQGHUV³RZQHG´$2VWKDWZHUHWKHVL]HRI VPDOO$PHULFDQVWDWHV+RZZHOOFRXOGWKHVHUHODWLYHO\VPDOOXQLWVDFKLHYHWKHGHVLUHGHIIHFWV DFURVVVXFKODUJHWHUULWRULHV",WLVWUXHWKDWLQDQGWKHUHZDVDQLQFUHDVHGQXPEHU RIEDWWDOLRQVRSHUDWLQJLQ$2VLQWKHVRXWKDQGVRXWKHDVWEXW&RDOLWLRQIRUFHVUHPDLQHGWKLQO\ VSUHDGDFURVV$IJKDQLVWDQ7KDWPHDQWWKDWPXFKRIWKHFRXQWU\UHPDLQHGYXOQHUDEOHWRHQHP\ IRUFHVLQFUHDVLQJO\ZLOOLQJWRUHDVVHUWWKHLUSRZHU 7KHSUREOHPVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHFRPPLWPHQWRIIRUFHVWRFDPSDLJQVDUHFRPSOH[6HQLRU SROLWLFDODQGPLOLWDU\RI¿FLDOVKDYHWRPDNHGLI¿FXOWGHFLVLRQVDERXWZKHUHWRIRFXVPDQSRZHU DQGRWKHUDVVHWVZKHQRQJRLQJFDPSDLJQVPDNHVLPXOWDQHRXVGHPDQGVIRUUHVRXUFHV7KH\ PXVWDOVRFRQVLGHUIDFWRUVRXWVLGHWKHPLOLWDU\UHDOPVXFKDVGRPHVWLFVXSSRUWIRUFDPSDLJQV WKDWPLJKWLQYROYHSODFLQJODUJHQXPEHUVRIWURRSVLQKDUP¶VZD\0LOLWDU\SODQQHUVLQWKH IXWXUHZLOOKDYHWRFRQVLGHUWKHQXPEHURIWURRSVUHTXLUHGIRUQDWLRQEXLOGLQJLQJHQHUDODQG &2,1VSHFL¿FDOO\7KHVHW\SHVRIFDPSDLJQVDUHWURRSDQGWLPHLQWHQVLYH)LHOG0DQXDO )0 CounterinsurgencySXEOLVKHGLQE\WKH86$UP\DQG860DULQH&RUSVHVWDEOLVKHG

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 190 of 316

Implications

QHZ&2,1GRFWULQHIRUWKH86PLOLWDU\DQGXQGHUOLQHVWKHSURWUDFWHGQDWXUHRIWKHVHFDPSDLJQV DQGWKHSUREOHPVWKDWWKLVFDQFUHDWHIRUWKHFRXQWHULQVXUJHQWIRUFH0RUHRYHUWKHPDQXDO HPSKDVL]HVWKHSDUDPRXQWLPSRUWDQFHRIVHFXULQJWKHSRSXODWLRQIURPWKHLQVXUJHQWVDQGWKDW WKHFRXQWHULQVXUJHQWIRUFHVKRXOGKDYHWRVROGLHUVSROLFHDQGRWKHUVHFXULW\SHUVRQQHO SHULQKDELWDQWVWRSURYLGHWKDWVHFXULW\7KDWJXLGDQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH&RDOLWLRQDQGWKH $IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGKDYHKDGDIRUFHOHYHORIDSSUR[LPDWHO\%HWZHHQ DQGWKHQXPEHURIWURRSVQHYHUDSSURDFKHGWKDWJRDO Full Spectrum Operations and Counterinsurgency :KHQWKH¿UVW86$UP\XQLWVDUULYHGLQ$IJKDQLVWDQLQ2FWREHUIHZLIDQ\KDG WUDLQHGRURWKHUZLVHSUHSDUHGIRUZKDWWKH$UP\FDOOHGIXOOVSHFWUXPRSHUDWLRQV$OWKRXJK )0Operations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ountain’sDQG&7)¶VLQFOXVLRQRIFLYLODIIDLUV &$ WHDPVRQWKHLUVHFXULW\RSHUD WLRQVWKDWWRRNLQIDQWU\EDWWDOLRQVLQWRWKHIDUÀXQJGLVWULFWVRI$IJKDQLVWDQ$V2()PDWXUHG DQGWKH357VZHUHHVWDEOLVKHGWRIRFXVRQUHFRQVWUXFWLRQPDQHXYHUHOHPHQWVFRQWLQXHGWR FRQGXFW D PL[ RI RIIHQVLYH PLVVLRQV DQG FLYLOPLOLWDU\ RSHUDWLRQV XVLQJ WKH &RPPDQGHU¶V (PHUJHQF\5HVSRQVH3URJUDP &(53 $VWDFWLFDOOHYHOFRPPDQGHUVEHFDPHPRUHFRPIRUW DEOHZLWKWKHFRQFHSWWKH\EHFDPHIDUPRUHDGHSWDWSUHSDULQJWKHLURZQRUJDQLFIRUFHVWRGR WKHVHP\ULDGRSHUDWLRQVFRQFXUUHQWO\7KHSURJUHVVWKH$UP\KDVPDGHLQERWK2()DQG2,) WRZDUGFUHDWLQJDIRUFHWKDWLVWUXO\FDSDEOHRIIXOOVSHFWUXPRSHUDWLRQVVKRXOGEHUHLQIRUFHGLQ WKH$UP\¶VWUDLQLQJEDVHLWVFRPEDWWUDLQLQJFHQWHUVDQGLWVHGXFDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQV &ORVHO\UHODWHGWRWKHWUDQVLWLRQWRIXOOVSHFWUXPRSHUDWLRQVZDVWKHVLPLODUO\GLI¿FXOWDGRS WLRQRI&2,1DVWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VIRUPDODSSURDFKLQ%\GLUHFWLQJWKDW86$UP\XQLWV ODXQFKD&2,1FDPSDLJQ/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO%DUQRZDVVDGGOLQJ6ROGLHUVZLWKDQLPSRV LQJWDVN7KH$UP\¶V&2,1GRFWULQHKDGODQJXLVKHGRYHUWKHSUHYLRXVWZRGHFDGHV:LWKWKH H[FHSWLRQRIWKH$UP\¶V6SHFLDO)RUFHV 6) QRXQLWVKDGWUDLQHGWRFRQGXFW&2,1:KLOH FRPPDQGHUVLQODWHDQGPDGHWKHWUDQVLWLRQWR&2,1ZLWKHQWKXVLDVPDQGÀ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

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 191 of 316

Chapter 11

WR PDUJLQDOL]DWLRQ E\ WKRVH PRUH IRFXVHG RQ DQG FRPIRUWDEOH ZLWK FRQYHQWLRQDO FRPEDW RSHUDWLRQV6ROGLHUVZKRZHUHJLYHQWKHGLI¿FXOWUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIFRQGXFWLQJ&2,1HDUO\LQWKH 2()DQG2,)FDPSDLJQVVKRXOGQRWDOORZWKH$UP\DVDQLQVWLWXWLRQWRRYHUORRNWKLVGRFWULQH LQWKHFRPLQJGHFDGHV2IFULWLFDOLPSRUWDQFHIRUFRQVLGHUDWLRQLQIXWXUH&2,1FDPSDLJQV LVWKHOLQJHULQJLVVXHRIWURRSOHYHOV+RZZLOOFRPPDQGHUVLQWKRVHFRQÀLFWVDUPHGWKRXJK WKH\PLJKWEHZLWKWKRXJKWIXOGRFWULQHDQGDWUDLQHGIRUFHGHDOZLWKDQLQVXUJHQWHQHP\LI WKHLU IRUFH LV WRR VPDOO WR FRQGXFW DOO WKH QHFHVVDU\ RSHUDWLRQV LQFOXGLQJ WKH VHFXULQJ RI D ODUJHSRSXODWLRQ"7KLVLVDFULWLFDOTXHVWLRQIRUSROLF\PDNHUVDQGSODQQHUV²ERWKFLYLOLDQDQG PLOLWDU\²WRJUDSSOHZLWKLQDQREMHFWLYHDQGVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGPDQQHU

Intelligence and Detainee Operations $FFXUDWHDQGWLPHO\LQWHOOLJHQFHZDVFULWLFDOWRVXFFHVVIXO&2,1RSHUDWLRQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ +RZHYHU86$UP\XQLWVWKDWIRXQGWKHPVHOYHVFRQGXFWLQJIXOOVSHFWUXPDQG&2,1RSHUDWLRQV LQIDFHGDPDMRUREVWDFOHLQXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHLUHQHP\7KHLQWHOOLJHQFHV\VWHPWKDWKDG HQDEOHG86$UP\RSHUDWLRQVVLQFHEHJDQORVLQJUHOHYDQFHDVVRRQDVWKHSODQHVVWUXFN WKHWRZHUVLQ1HZ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 192 of 316

Implications

The Interagency Effort 2QHLPSRUWDQWEULJKWVSRWLQ2()ZDVWKHVLJQL¿FDQWDPRXQWRILQWHUDJHQF\FRRUGLQDWLRQ DQGFRRSHUDWLRQWKDWKDGDQXOWLPDWHO\VDOXWDU\HIIHFWRQWKHFDPSDLJQ%HJLQQLQJZLWKWKH UHPDUNDEOHVXFFHVVHVRIWKH62)WHDPVLQWKHUHZDVDVWHDG\JURZWKRIRSHUDWLRQVWKDW LQYROYHGPRUHWKDQDIHZDJHQFLHVDQGUHVXOWHGLQLPSURYHPHQWVLQLQWHOOLJHQFHJDWKHULQJ SODQQLQJDWWKHWKHDWHUVWUDWHJLFOHYHODQGRWKHUDUHDV0RVWUHYROXWLRQDU\ZHUHWKHVWHSVWDNHQ WRLPSURYHWKHGHOLYHU\RIKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFHDQGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQVXSSRUWWRWKH$IJKDQ SRSXODWLRQ7KH&RDOLWLRQ¶VFUHDWLRQRIDVHSDUDWHFRPPDQGFDOOHGWKH&-&027)DQGWKHQ LWVIRUPDWLRQRIWKH357VLQODWHEHVWUHSUHVHQWHGWKHQHZZD\VRIWKLQNLQJDERXWFRRU GLQDWLQJGLI¿FXOWWDVNVWKDWZHUHVSUHDGDFURVVDYDULHW\RIXQLWVDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQV7KH357V HVSHFLDOO\ZHUHWKHUHVXOWRIIUXVWUDWLRQVHQFRXQWHUHGHDUOLHULQ2()LQWKHFRRUGLQDWLRQRIWKH PDQ\VWDNHKROGHUVDQGUHVRXUFHSURYLGHUVLQYROYHGLQWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURJUDP7KHREVWD FOHVLQYROYHGLQWU\LQJWREULQJ&RDOLWLRQFLYLOPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVWRJHWKHUZLWKWKRVHRIRWKHU &RDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQWDODJHQFLHVQRQJRYHUQPHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]D WLRQVZHUHVLJQL¿FDQW1HYHUWKHOHVVE\WKHHQGRI357VKDGLQWHJUDWHGWKHVHGLVSDUDWH FRPSRQHQWVWRJHWKHUWRPDNHWKHQDWLRQEXLOGLQJSURMHFWLQ$IJKDQLVWDQPRUHIHDVLEOH0RYLQJ WKH357VXQGHUWKHDXWKRULW\RIWKHUHJLRQDOFRPPDQGHUVLQZDV\HWDQRWKHUVWHSWKDW PRUH¿UPO\LQWHJUDWHGWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQHIIRUWLQWRWKHODUJHUFDPSDLJQ6WLOOWKH&RDOLWLRQ H[SHULHQFHGGLI¿FXOWLHVLQVWDI¿QJ357VZLWKHQRXJKPHPEHUVIURPWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH '26 8QLWHG6WDWHV$JHQF\IRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO'HYHORSPHQW 86$,' DQGRWKHUQRQPLOLWDU\ DJHQFLHV7KXVWKLVFRQFHSWPXVWEHGHYHORSHGIXUWKHUDQGJLYHQSHUPDQHQFHLQGRFWULQHDQG SUDFWLFHDWWKHFRPEDWDQWFRPPDQGOHYHO'2'DQGRWKHUDJHQFLHVRIWKH86*RYHUQPHQW Training Indigenous Forces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²WKH2I¿FHRI0LOLWDU\&RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ 20&$ ²ZDV ³FDOYHG´IURPWKH&-&027)DQGKDGWRUHO\SULPDULO\RQ&RDOLWLRQ6)WRFRQGXFWWKHWUDLQLQJ RIWKDWQHZIRUFH$VSURJUHVVHG&RDOLWLRQFRPPDQGHUVEHJDQWRUHDOL]HWKDWWKH20&$ KDG WR EHFRPH LQYROYHG QRW RQO\ LQ WUDLQLQJ$1$ EDWWDOLRQV EXW LQ FRQVWUXFWLQJ DQ HQWLUH PLOLWDU\HGL¿FHIURPWKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQVH 02' GRZQWRWKHEDVHVLQZKLFKWKH$IJKDQ VROGLHUVZRXOGOLYHDQGWUDLQ7KHVWDIIDQGUHVRXUFHVJUHZDFFRUGLQJO\0RVWLPSRUWDQWO\LQ WKH&RDOLWLRQHVWDEOLVKHG&-7)PhoenixWRWUDLQDQGDGYLVHWKHQHZ$1$XQLWV7KHVH LPSURYHPHQWVDOORZHGWKH$1$WRFRPSOHWHLWVHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH&HQWUDO&RUSVLQ%\ WKDWGDWHWKH&RDOLWLRQKDGDOVREHJXQWUDLQLQJWKH$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO3ROLFH $13 7KHVXEVWDQWLDOSURJUDPVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQG,UDTWRWUDLQEXLOGDQGDGYLVHLQGLJHQRXV DUPLHVDUHQRWXQSUHFHGHQWHG$EULHIVXUYH\RIWKH86$UP\¶VFDPSDLJQVLQWKHWKFHQWXU\

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 193 of 316

Chapter 11

ZLOO UHYHDO WKDW WKHVH W\SHV RI SURJUDPV ZHUH FRPPRQ ,Q WKH 3KLOLSSLQHV 6RXWK .RUHD 9LHWQDP(O6DOYDGRUDQGRWKHUFRXQWULHV$PHULFD6ROGLHUVVHUYHGDVWUDLQHUVDQGDGYLVRUVWR IRUHLJQIRUFHV'HVSLWHWKHSULPDU\UROHRIFRQYHQWLRQDOXQLWVDQGRI¿FHUVLQWKHVHSURJUDPVLQ WKHDIWHUPDWKRI9LHWQDPIHZXQLWVRXWVLGHRI$UP\6)SUHSDUHGIRUWKLVW\SHRIPLVVLRQ6) EDWWDOLRQVDQGWHDPVFHUWDLQO\SOD\HGDNH\UROHLQHVWDEOLVKLQJQHZQDWLRQDOIRUFHVLQERWK,UDT DQG$IJKDQLVWDQ(YHQVRWKHVHXQLWVDUHIHZLQQXPEHUDQGDUHQHLWKHUWUDLQHGQRUUHVRXUFHG WREXLOGWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHORJLVWLFDODQGWUDLQLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWPRGHUQDUPLHVUHTXLUH 7KH86$UP\¶VKLVWRU\LQWKH*:27VXJJHVWVWKDW6ROGLHUVZLOOEHFRPHLQYROYHGLQWKH WUDLQLQJRILQGLJHQRXVIRUFHVLQIXWXUHFDPSDLJQV3ODQQHUVDWWKH'2'DQGFRPEDWDQWFRPPDQG OHYHOVZLOOQHHGWRLGHQWLI\WKHKHDGTXDUWHUVDQGRWKHUUHVRXUFHVQHFHVVDU\WRLQLWLDWHWKHVH HIIRUWVDVVPRRWKO\DVSRVVLEOH&RPPDQGHUVDWWKHWDFWLFDOOHYHOZLOODOVRQHHGWRFRQVLGHUKRZ WKLVPLVVLRQ¿WVLQWRWKHLUWUDLQLQJIRUIXOOVSHFWUXPRSHUDWLRQV$WWKHYHU\OHDVW6ROGLHUVDW WKLVOHYHOVKRXOGH[SHFWWRZRUNFORVHO\ZLWKDQGSHUKDSVDGYLVHLQGLJHQRXVPLOLWDU\DQGSROLFH XQLWV3ROLF\PDNHUVDWWKH'2'OHYHOVKRXOGDOVRJLYHVHULRXVWKRXJKWWRIRUPLQJFRPPDQGV DQGXQLWVIRFXVHGRQWKLVPLVVLRQSHUKDSVWUDQVIRUPLQJIRUPDWLRQVLQWKH86$UP\5HVHUYHRU 1DWLRQDO*XDUGLQWRIRUHLJQDUP\DVVLVWDQFHXQLWV

The Integration of SOF and Conventional Forces 62)SOD\HGDODUJHUUROHLQ2()WKDQLQDOORWKHUUHFHQW86FDPSDLJQV1RWRQO\ZHUHWKH 2SHUDWLRQDO'HWDFKPHQW±$OSKD 2'$ WHDPVLQVWUXPHQWDOLQWKHLQLWLDOPLOLWDU\YLFWRU\RYHU WKH7DOLEDQEXWWKHPLVVLRQVSXUVXHGE\WKH&-627)$DIWHU'HFHPEHUZHUHPXOWLIDFHWHG DQGFULWLFDOWRWKHRYHUDOO&RDOLWLRQHIIRUW$PHULFDQDQG&RDOLWLRQ62)FRQGXFWHGUDLGVRQ 7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGDWDUJHWVZRUNHGZLWK$IJKDQPLOLWLDIRUFHVDORQJWKH3DNLVWDQLERUGHU WRLQWHUGLFWHQHP\WURRSVDQGPDWHULHODQGVHUYHGDVWUDLQHUVDQGDGYLVRUVIRUWKH$1$$W WLPHVWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶VVHQLRUFRPPDQGVDSSHDUWRKDYHJLYHQWKH&-627)WRRPDQ\WDVNV WKXVGLOXWLQJWKHVWUHQJWKVEURXJKWWRWKHEDWWOH¿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¶V DELOLW\WRIRVWHUUHODWLRQVKLSVDQGEXLOGOHJLWLPDF\IRUWKHQHZ$IJKDQ*RYHUQPHQW *LYHQWKHVXFFHVVRI62)LQ2()WKH$UP\VKRXOGEHUHDG\WRSODFHWKHVHIRUFHVWRJHWKHU ZLWKFRQYHQWLRQDOIRUFHVRQPRVWLIQRWDOOEDWWOH¿HOGVRIWKHIXWXUH7RDFKLHYHWKHEHQH¿WVVHHQ LQ$IJKDQLVWDQKRZHYHUWKH$UP\ZLOOQHHGWRSUHSDUHDQGWUDLQIRUWKLVW\SHRIRSHUDWLRQDO LQWHJUDWLRQ &HUWDLQO\ 62) ZLOO FRQWLQXH WR KRQH WKHLU DELOLW\ WR ZRUN ZLWK DLU SRZHU DQG LQGLJHQRXV IRUFHV$FFRUGLQJO\ WKH 86$UP\¶V FRPEDW WUDLQLQJ FHQWHUV %DWWOH &RPPDQG

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 194 of 316

Implications

7UDLQLQJ3URJUDP %&73 DQG2I¿FHUDQG1RQFRPPLVVLRQHG2I¿FHU(GXFDWLRQ6\VWHPVPXVW DOVRUHLQIRUFHWKHVWHSVWDNHQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQWRHQKDQFHWKHRSHUDWLRQDOLQWHJUDWLRQEHWZHHQ 62)DQGFRQYHQWLRQDOIRUFHV Operating in Foreign Cultures 7KHFDPSDLJQVRIWKH*:27KDYHGHSOR\HG$PHULFDQ6ROGLHUVWRFRXQWULHVZKHUHWKH FXOWXUHVDUHTXLWHGLIIHUHQWIURP$PHULFDQOLIH0RXQWLQJEDVLFPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVLQWKHVH GLVWDQWODQGVKDVEHHQGLI¿FXOWDQGVXFFHVVKDVRIWHQKLQJHGRQWKHDELOLW\WRQDYLJDWHFRPSH WHQWO\ZLWKLQWKHVHVWUDQJHFXOWXUHV7KLVWDVNQRWRQO\UHTXLUHVOLQJXLVWLFVNLOOVEXWDOVRDIDLUO\ VRSKLVWLFDWHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIUHOLJLRXVSROLWLFDODQGVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVWKDWGLIIHUIURPWKRVH IDPLOLDUWRPRVW6ROGLHUV0RUHRYHURI¿FHUVDQGQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRI¿FHUVKDYHRIWHQKDGWR ZDGHLQWRWKHVHFXOWXUHVDQGHPSOR\ORFDO$IJKDQRU,UDTLQRUPVWREHVXFFHVVIXO ,QWKH¿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¶VIXWXUHFDPSDLJQV86 6ROGLHUVZLOODOPRVWLQHYLWDEO\LQWHUDFWZLWKIRUHLJQFXOWXUHV,IWKHVHFDPSDLJQVDUHIRFXVHGRQ QDWLRQEXLOGLQJFXOWXUDODZDUHQHVVZLOOEHFRPHQRWMXVWDQHFHVVLW\EXWSHUKDSVDFULWLFDOVNLOO OLNHPDUNVPDQVKLSRUODQGQDYLJDWLRQ7KH$UP\¶VWUDLQLQJFRXUVHVDQGVFKRROVPXVWLPSUHVV WKLVSRLQWRQ6ROGLHUVDWDOOOHYHOVE\PDNLQJFXOWXUDOFODVVHVDQGHYHQODQJXDJHLQVWUXFWLRQ PDQGDWRU\7KHFRPEDWWUDLQLQJFHQWHUVVKRXOGVXVWDLQWKHWUDLQLQJVFHQDULRVWKDWSODFH6ROGLHUV RIDOOUDQNVLQVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHWKH\PXVWDFWDQGUHDFWZLWKDWOHDVWVRPHVHQVLWLYLW\WRORFDO QRUPV&RPPDQGHUVPXVWIROORZWKURXJKZLWKWKLVDVSHFWRIGHSOR\PHQWWUDLQLQJE\SUHSDULQJ WKHLU6ROGLHUVWRQDYLJDWHWKURXJKDQGHYHQWKULYHLQFXOWXUHVWKDWDUHDZRUOGDSDUWIURPWKH 8QLWHG6WDWHV

ÔÔÔ

7KH&RDOLWLRQHIIRUWLQ$IJKDQLVWDQEHWZHHQDQGZDVDQH[WUDRUGLQDU\DQGFRP SOH[FDPSDLJQRQHWKDWZDVUHSOHWHZLWKWKHXVHRIKLJKWHFKQRORJ\ZHDSRQU\VXFKDVWKH -RLQW'LUHFW$WWDFN0XQLWLRQ -'$0 DQGVPDOO62)WHDPVPRYLQJDURXQGWKHEDWWOH¿HOG ZLWKWKHLUWULEDODOOLHVRQKRUVHEDFN,QWKLVVHQVHWKLVVWXG\RI2()VKRXOGUHPLQGWKHUHDGHU WKDWPDQ\DVSHFWVRIZDUIDUH²HVSHFLDOO\WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIVPDOOZHOOWUDLQHGDQGDGDSWLYH WHDPV²UHPDLQFRQVWDQWUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHWRROVWKDWWKH\HPSOR\7KLVLVQRWWRXQGHUHVWLPDWH WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHWHFKQRORJ\EURXJKWWREHDURQWKH$IJKDQEDWWOH¿HOG$IWHUDOOWKHVPDOO WHDPVDW7RUD%RUDLQZHUHHTXLSSHGZLWKYHU\VRSKLVWLFDWHGGHYLFHVWKDWKHOSHGGLUHFW WKHDLUDWWDFNDQGWKXVJUHDWO\PDJQL¿HGWKHSRZHURI&RDOLWLRQDLUIRUFHV+RZHYHUHYHQWKH KLJKSUHFLVLRQERPELQJRIWKHDO4DHGDUHGRXEWGLGQRWFRQFOXGHZLWKWKHNLOOLQJRUFDSWXUH

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 195 of 316

Chapter 11

RI2VDPDELQ/DGHQ,QWKHVDPHZD\QRQHRIWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶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³DGLIIHUHQWNLQGRIZDU´XQOLNHDQ\RIWKHZHOONQRZQFRQÀLFWVUHFHQWO\ IRXJKWE\WKH86$UP\

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 196 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 197 of 316

Appendix A US Army Units in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM–Afghanistan Order of Battle: October 2001–September 2005 The following depicts the US Army units that participated in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) between 19 October 2001 and September 2005. This 4-year period included multiple rotations of forces, not all of the same length. Accordingly, this order of battle generally follows a chronological course to document the evolving Coalition command structure and the US Army units that served under those headquarters. The units listed below were often not operating with their full complement of Soldiers or subordinate commands. This order of battle attempts to capture the major operational- and tactical-level headquarters in OEF in this period as well as larger tactical-level formations. As such, this document does not capture smaller US Army elements like the security forces and civil-military operations staff on the Provincial Reconstructions Teams. US Central Command Joint Psychological Operations Task Force HQ/4th Psychological Operations Group 8th Psychological Operations Battalion Joint Special Operations Task Force–North (October 2001–March 2002) HQ/5th Special Forces Group (October 2001–May 2002) 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group 2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group 3d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group 19th Special Forces Group 2d Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) (Forward) HQ/10th Mountain Division Task Force Rakkasan HQ/3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (January 2002–July 2002) 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation B/1st Battalion, 159th Aviation 3d Battalion, 101st Aviation 626th Support Battalion Task Force Commando HQ/2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (November 2001–July 2002) 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry B/7th Battalion, 101st Aviation

331 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 198 of 316

Order of Battle: October 2001–September 2005

B/1st Battalion, 159th Aviation 7-101st Aviation HQ/507th Corps Support Group HQ/561st Corps Support Group 530th Corps Support Battalion 202d Military Intelligence Battalion 92d Engineer Battalion A/112th Signal Battalion 96th Civil Affairs Battalion Joint Special Operations Task Force–South (November 2001–March 2002) HQ/3d Special Forces Group HQ/3d Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group C/112th Signal Battalion 3d Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) 96th Civil Affairs Battalion 489th Civil Affairs Battalion (2002–June 2003) 403d Civil Affairs Battalion (June 2003–May 2004) 407th Civil Affairs Battalion (August 2003–May 2004)

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (March 2002–present) 3d US Army Special Forces Group 7th US Army Special Forces Group 19th US Army Special Forces Group 20th US Army Special Forces Group 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment 75th Ranger Regiment 2I¿FHRI0LOLWDU\&RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ 6HSWHPEHU±-XO\ $IWHU-XO\ 2I¿FHRI6HFXULW\&RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ 1st Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group (May 2002–June 2003) Task Force Phoenix (June 2003–September 2005) HQ/2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (August 2003–November 2003) 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry (August 2003–November 2003) 210th Forward Support Battalion (August 2003–March 2004) HQ/45th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (November 2003–August 2004) 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry (November 2003–August 2004) 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry (November 2003–August 2004) 1st Battalion, 279th Infantry (November 2003–August 2004) 1st Battalion, 160th Field Artillery (November 2003–August 2004) 700th Support Battalion (November 2003–August 2004) HQ/76th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (August 2004–August 2005) 1st Battalion, 151st Infantry (August 2004–August 2005) 113th Support Battalion (August 2004–August 2005)

332 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 199 of 316

Appendix A

Combined Joint Task Force-180 (June 2002–April 2004) HQ/XVIII Airborne Corps (June 2002–May 2003) HQ/10th Mountain Division (May 2003–April 2004) Combined Task Force 82 (August 2002–May 2003) HQ, 82d Airborne Division Task Force Panther (August 2002–January 2003) HQ/3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry 1-319th Field Artillery C/3d Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery C/307th Engineer Battalion C/769th Engineer Battalion 313th Military Intelligence Battalion A/9th Psychological Operations Battalion 3/82d Military Police Company 118th Military Police Company C/450th Civil Affairs Battalion C/82d Signal Battalion 82d Forward Support Battalion Task Force Devil (December 2002–May 2003) HQ/1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division 2d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery 307th Forward Support Battalion 307th Engineer Battalion 50th Signal Battalion 126th Finance Battalion Task Force Pegasus (September 2002–May 2003) HQ/Aviation Brigade, 82d Airborne Division Task Force Corsair HQ, 2-82d Aviation Brigade B/7-101st Aviation B/1-58 Aviation C/3-229th Aviation I/4-159th Aviation D/3-229th Aviation Task Force Angel HQ/3-229th Aviation (December 2002–May 2003) A/2-82d Aviation

333 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 200 of 316

Order of Battle: October 2001–September 2005

A/3-229th Aviation (December 2002–May 2003) B/3-229th Aviation (December 2002–May 2003) C/159th Aviation (December 2002–May 2003) 63d Ordnance Battalion (EOD) Task Force Warrior (August 2003–May 2004) HQ/1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (August 2003–May 2004) 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (August 2003–May 2004) 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry (August 2003–May 2004) 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (August 2003–May 2004) 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry (October 2003–April 2004) 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (August 2003–April 2004) 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery (August 2003–April 2004) 10th Forward Support Battalion (August 2003–April 2004) C/159th Aviation (August 2003–April 2004) 3d Battalion, 229th Aviation (August 2003–April 2004) A/41st Engineer Battalion (August 2003–April 2004) A/3d Battalion, 62d Air Defense Artillery (August 2003–May 2004) 519th Military Intelligence Battalion Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (October 2003–September 2005) Combined/Joint Task Force-76 (April 2004–April 2005) HQ, 25th Infantry Division (Light) (February 2004–April 2005) HQ, Southern European Task Force (April 2005–March 2006) Combined Task Force Bronco (February 2004–April 2005) HQ, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light) (February 2004–April 2005) 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry (February 2004–April 2005) 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry (February 2004–April 2005) 3d Battalion, 7th Field Artillery (February 2004–April 2005) 325th Forward Support Battalion (February 2004–April 2005) Combined Task Force Thunder (February 2004–April 2005) Division Artillery, 25th Infantry Division (February 2004–April 2005) 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry (February 2004–April 2005) 3d Battalion, 116th Infantry (July 2004–August 2005) 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry (September 2004–October 2004) Combined Task Force Saber 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Task Force Victory 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry Combined Task Force Coyote 65th Engineer Battalion (February 2004–April 2005) 367th Engineer Battalion (May 2004–June 2005) 528th Engineer Battalion (March 2004–March 2005)

334 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 201 of 316

Appendix A

Joint Task Force Wings (May 2004–April 2005) HHC/Aviation Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (February 2004–April 2005) 2d Battalion, 25th Aviation (February 2004–April 2005) 1st Battalion, 111th Aviation (February 2004–April 2005) 1st Battalion, 211th Aviation (February 2004–April 2005) 68th Aviation Company (February 2004–April 2005) HHC/Division Support Command (February 2004–April 2005) 725th Support Battalion (February 2004–April 2005) 556th Personnel Services Battalion (February 2004–April 2005) 125th Military Intelligence Battalion (February 2004–April 2005) 125th Signal Battalion (February 2004–April 2005) Combined Task Force Bayonet (April 2005–March 2006) HQ, 173d Airborne Brigade (April 2005–March 2006) 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry (April 2005–March 2006) 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery (April 2005–March 2006) 74th Infantry Detachment (Long Range Surveillance) 173d Support Battalion (April 2005–March 2006) Combined Task Force Devil (April 2005–March 2006) HQ, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry 2d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry

335 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 202 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 203 of 316

Appendix B Chronology Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Major Events, September 2001 to September 2005 2001 11 September 2001 Nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists hijack four passenger airliners and crash them into targets in New York City, Washington, DC, and rural western Pennsylvania. Two of the planes hit the Twin Towers in New York City; another hit the Pentagon in Washington, DC; and the last one crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, apparently when passengers attempted to regain control of the aircraft. The death toll for all four planes was over 3,000. 12 September 2001 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld requests options for military strikes against the planners of the 9/11 attacks. 5 October 2001 United States (US) receives permission from the Uzbekistan *RYHUQPHQWWRÀ\SODQHVDQGEDVHWURRSVDW.DUVKL.KDQDEDG . 7HOHYLVLRQ FUHZV KDG VSRWWHG 86 WUDQVSRUW SODQHV DW .KDQDEDGSULRUWRWKLVGDWH 7 October 2001 Forces from the 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DQG 8QLWHG .LQJGRP ERPE 7DOLEDQSRVLWLRQVIRU¿UVWWLPH 12 October 2001 United States and Uzbekistan Governments sign agreement allowing US forces to use Uzbek soil as a staging area for operations in Afghanistan. 19 October 2001 Insertion of Operational Detachments–Alpha (ODAs) 555 and 595. 19–20 October (night) 2001 Four MC-130 planes drop 199 Rangers of the 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Objective RHINO. 24 October 2001 Insertion of ODA 585. 31 October 2001 Insertion of ODA 553. 2 November 2001 2'$ODQGVQHDU%DPLDQWRVXSSRUW*HQHUDO.DULP.KDOLOL (Hazara General). 4 November 2001 Insertion of ODA 534. 8 November 2001 Insertion of ODAs 586 and 594. 10 November 2001 Mazar-e Sharif falls to General Dostum’s militia and US Special Operations Forces (SOF). 13 November 2001 7DOLEDQDEDQGRQV.DEXO

337 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 204 of 316

Chronology

14 November 2001 Special Forces (SF) ODA 574 inserted and links up with Hamid .DU]DL 17 November 2001 SF ODA 574 directs United States Air Force (USAF) bombing RID7DOLEDQFRQYR\RIWURRSVQHDU7DULQ.RZW²WUXFNV destroyed. 18 November 2001 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) inserts SF ODA 583 to link up with Gul Agha Sherzai. 25 November 2001 Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division, is directed to deploy his division headquarters staff to Uzbekistan to establish the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)–Forward headquarters. 26 November 2001 .RQGX] IDOOV WR *HQHUDOV 'RVWXP DQG 'DRXG .KDQ DQG 86 SOF. 23 November 2001 Battle of Tahk-te-pol between ODA 583, forces of Gul Agha Sherzai, and the Taliban. 24 November 2001 The town of Tahk-te-pol falls to ODA 583 and the forces under Gul Sherzai. 25 November 2001 Taliban prisoners in the 18th century fortress of Qala-i-Jangi revolt. 1 December 2001 7KHUHYROWLQVLGH4DODL-DQJLSULVRQLV¿QDOO\FUXVKHG 3 December 2001 6KHU]DL¶VPDQIRUFHSUREHVGHIHQVHVRI.DQGDKDU$LUSRUW south of the city, and is thrown back and bailed out by US air power. Elements of ODA 583, Sherzai’s men, and US air power thwart a Taliban attack on Sherzai’s southern outpost near Thak-te-pol. Fighting starts at Tora Bora between Eastern Alliance and al- Qaeda forces. 4 December 2001 .DU]DL¶VVROGLHUVDQG2'$WXUQEDFNDQRWKHU7DOLEDQDWWDFN PLOHVQRUWKRI.DQGDKDU 2'$MRLQVWKH¿JKWLQJDW7RUD%RUD 5 December 2001 $SRXQG-RLQW'LUHFW$WWDFN0XQLWLRQ -'$0 ERPELV mistakenly dropped on ODA 574 killing three and wounding QLQHRIWKHWHDPPHPEHUV,WDOVRNLOOHG3DVKWXQVROGLHUV DQGLQMXUHG+DPLG.DU]DL In Bonn, Germany, an agreement establishing the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) is approved. 7 December 2001 0XOODK2PDUDEDQGRQV.DQGDKDU Sherzai reoccupies the Governor’s Palace, and ODA 583 enters shortly thereafter.

338 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 205 of 316

Appendix B

12 December 2001 7DOLEDQ DQG DO4DHGD UHDU JXDUG ¿JKWV WR JLYH UHPDLQGHU RI their force time to escape into the mountains and complexes within Tora Bora. 86$UP\WK0RXQWDLQ'LYLVLRQ+4DUULYHVDW.WRVHUYHDV CFLCC (Forward). 14 December 2001 860DULQHVDW&DPS5KLQRUHORFDWHWR.DQGDKDU$LUSRUW 2VDPDELQ/DGHQLGHQWL¿HGWDONLQJRQUDGLRDW7RUD%RUD 17 December 2001 Last elements of al-Qaeda in Tora Bora are overrun. Bin Laden is not among those captured or killed. 20 December 2001 UN adopts Resolution 1386 authorizing an International Security Force to be used in Afghanistan. 2'$MRLQV2'$LQVHDUFKLQJWKHFDYHVRI7RUD%RUD 28 December 2001 First Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners arrive at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO).

2002 2 January 2002 86%DQG%ERPEHUV)¿JKWHUVDQG$&JXQVKLSV VWULNHDVXVSHFWHGDO4DHGDUHJURXSLQJSRLQWWKH=DZDU.LOL FRPSRXQGVRXWKZHVWRI.KRVW 24 January 2002 US forces use an AC-130 gunship strike to destroy a “very large cache” of arms and ammunition in a raid on two Taliban FRPSRXQGV DW +D]DU 4DGDP QRUWK RI .DQGDKDU 7KH UDLG QHWWHG7DOLEDQGHWDLQHHV/DWHUUHSRUWVVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH JXQVKLSVPD\KDYHNLOOHGVRPH.DU]DLDOOLHV 4 February 2002 A strike by a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle reportedly NLOOHG VHYHUDO DO4DHGD OHDGHUV DW D VLWH QHDU =DZDU .LOL Afghanistan. 15 February 2002 Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain forms around CFLCC–Forward headquarters to plan and command Operation ANACONDA. CJTF MountainPRYHVWR%DJUDP$LU¿HOG 2 March 2002 Operation ANACONDA begins. 4 March 2002 $FWLRQ RQ7DNXU *KDU²QLQH 86 PLOLWDU\ SHUVRQQHO NLOOHG LQ operation. 19 March 2002 Operation ANACONDA ends. 25 March 2002 Secretary of Defense announces plans for US and Coalition forces to help create and train the Afghan National Army (ANA). 15 April 2002 Operation MOUNTAIN LION begins.

339 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 206 of 316

Chronology

17 April 2002 $Q$PHULFDQ)¿JKWHUMHWGURSVDERPERQ&DQDGLDQIRUFHV conducting training. Four Canadian soldiers are killed and eight wounded as a result of the accident. 6 May 2002 Operation SNIPE, a part of MOUNTAIN LION, begins. 14 May 2002 7KH$1$¶V¿UVWVROGLHUVEHJLQWUDLQLQJ 8662)NLOO¿YHVXVSHFWHG7DOLEDQDQGDO4DHGD¿JKWHUVDQG FDSWXUHRWKHUVGXULQJDUDLGRQDFRPSRXQGPLOHVQRUWK RI.DQGDKDU 17 May 2002 British forces launch Operation CONDOR to support an Australian Special Air Service patrol engaged in combat with al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the mountains of southeastern Afghanistan. 31 May 2002 American and allied Afghan military forces conducting a raid PLVWDNHQO\¿UHRQRWKHUIULHQGO\$IJKDQWURRSV 31 May 2002 &-7)FRPPDQGHGE\/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO'DQ.0F1HLOO assumes control of Coalition operations in Afghanistan. 11 June 2002 The emergency loya jirga (grand council) convenes and ulti- PDWHO\ VHOHFWV +DPLG .DU]DL DV LQWHULP SUHVLGHQW ZLWK SHUFHQWRIWKHYRWHV.DU]DLKDGEHHQFKDLUPDQRIWKH$,$ 1 July 2002 &RDOLWLRQIRUFHVPLVWDNHQO\¿UHRQDZHGGLQJSDUW\LQ2UX]JDQ SURYLQFH DIWHU SLORWV DOOHJHGO\ PLVWRRN FHOHEUDWRU\ ¿UH IRU KRVWLOH¿UH 20 July 2002 TF Panther takes over from TF Rakkasan. 23 July 2002 7KH ¿UVW EDWWDOLRQ RI WKH $1$ JUDGXDWHV IURP WKH $IJKDQ Military Academy. 24 July 2002 Afghanistan–American Reconstruction Summit. 19 August 2002 Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP begins in southeastern Afghanistan. 5 September 2002 $IJKDQ3UHVLGHQW+DPLG.DU]DLVXUYLYHVDQDSSDUHQWDVVDVVLQD- WLRQDWWHPSWLQWKHFLW\RI.DQGDKDU 29 September 2002 Operation ALAMO SWEEP begins. 14 October 2002 0DMRU *HQHUDO.DUO:(LNHQEHUU\ DUULYHV WR EH WKH20&$ commander.

2003 10 January 2003 TF Panther transfers authority to TF Devil, manned by the 1st %ULJDGH&RPEDW7HDPG$LUERUQH'LYLVLRQ

340 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 207 of 316

Appendix B

27 January 2003 Operation MONGOOSE begins near Spin Boldak with troops RI WKH G $LUERUQH 'LYLVLRQ DQG $IJKDQ PLOLWLD DJDLQVW $IJKDQ¿JKWHUVOR\DOWR*XOEXGGLQ+HNPDW\DULQWKHFDYHV of the Adi Ghar Mountains. 19 February 2003 Operation VIPER begins. 19 March 2003 Coalition forces in Afghanistan launch Operation VALIANT 675,.(DWYLOODJHVDQGFDYHFRPSOH[HVHDVWRI.DQGDKDULQ the Sami Ghar Mountains. May 2003 TF Warrior, manned with forces from the 10th Mountain Division, replaces TF Devil. 27 May 2003 Lieutenant General McNeill transfers command of CJTF-180 to Major General John R. Vines. 4 June 2003 CJTF Phoenix, under Brigadier General Joseph Prasek and ele- PHQWVRIG%ULJDGHWK0RXQWDLQ'LYLVLRQLVDFWLYDWHG 7 June 2003 6XLFLGH FDU ERPELQJ LQ .DEXO LQMXUHV PRUH WKDQ *HUPDQ peacekeepers and kills 4 German soldiers, part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) conducting security and peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. 11 August 2003 NATO assumes strategic command, control, and coordination of the ISAF in Afghanistan. The force had been under the leadership of Germany and the Netherlands. August 2003 Operation MOUNTAIN VIPER launched. October 2003 Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC-A) is established under Lieutenant General David W. Barno. November 2003 Operation MOUNTAIN RESOLVE begins. 45th Separate Infantry Brigade from Oklahoma Army National Guard takes command of CJTF Phoenix. 14 December 2003 Constitutional loya jirga begins.

2004 5 January 2004 Delegates to Afghanistan’s loya jirga agree on a new constitution. 13 March 2004 Operation MOUNTAIN STORM begins. 15 April 2004 CJTF-76, commanded by Major General Eric T. Olson, replaces CJTF-180.

341 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 208 of 316

Chronology

22 April 2004 )ULHQGO\¿UHGXULQJD¿UH¿JKWLQVRXWKHDVWHUQ$IJKDQLVWDQNLOOV 6SHFLDOLVW3DW7LOOPDQGHSOR\HGZLWKWKHWK5DQJHU Regiment from Fort Benning, Georgia. 28 July 2004 Improvised explosive device (IED) goes off inside a mosque in Ghazni province killing two UN employees registering voters. August 2004 76th Infantry Brigade from Indiana Army National Guard takes command of CJTF Phoenix. 3 October 2004 Coalition forces capture 16 enemy insurgents during a day-long battle near the city of Spin Boldak. 9 October 2004 Afghan presidential elections held. 3 November 2004 (OHFWLRQ RI¿FLDOV DQQRXQFH WKDW +DPLG .DU]DL HOHFWHG president.

2005 February 2005 0DMRU *HQHUDO -DVRQ . .DPL\D commanding general of Southern European Task Force (SETAF), takes command of CJTF-76. 3 February 2005 National Military Academy of Afghanistan opens doors. 3 March 2005 3UHVLGHQW +DPLG .DU]DL DSSRLQWV WKH FRXQWU\¶V ¿UVW ZRPDQ governor. 17 March 2005 $ERPELQJLQ.DQGDKDUNLOOVDQGLQMXUHVXSWRSHRSOH 18 March 2005 86 KHOLFRSWHU FUHZV UHVFXH PRUH WKDQ YLOODJHUV DIWHU ÀRRGLQJIURPGD\VRILQWHQVHUDLQVWUDQGVWKHPDORQJWKH Helmand River near Deh Rawod in Oruzgan province. 6 April 2005 CH-47 Chinook helicopter crashes killing 19 Americans. 3 May 2005 /LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO.DUO:(LNHQEHUU\DVVXPHVFRPPDQGRI CFC-A from Lieutenant General Barno. 28 June 2005 While on a rescue mission to recover SOF personnel, Chinook helicopter downed by insurgents, killing 16 American troops. 12 July 2005 7KH 2I¿FH RI 0LOLWDU\ &RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ 20&$ FKDQJHV LWV QDPH WR WKH 2I¿FH RI 6HFXULW\ &RRSHUDWLRQ± $IJKDQLVWDQ 26&$ DQGRI¿FLDOO\DVVXPHVUHVSRQVLELOLW\ for the US role in reforming the Afghan National Police (ANP) force. 19 September 2005 Afghans vote in elections for parliament.

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 209 of 316

Glossary

1st BANG 1st Battalion, Afghan National Guard AA antiaircraft AACA Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority AAR after-action review ACM Anti-Coalition Militia AED Afghanistan Engineer District AFB Air Force Base AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command AIA Afghan Interim Authority AIT advanced individual training AMF Afghan Militia Forces ANA Afghan National Army ANBP Afghanistan New Beginnings Program ANP Afghan National Police AO area of operation AOR area of responsibility APOD aerial port of debarkation AQ al-Qaeda AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit ARG Afghan Reconstruction Group ARSOF Army Special Operations Forces ASOC Air Support Operations Center ASOS Air Support Operations Squadron ATA Afghan Transitional Authority AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System AWOL absent without leave BCTP Battle Command Training Program BN battalion BP blocking position BPT be prepared to C2 command and control CA civil affairs CAC Combined Arms Center CALCM Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile CAOC Combined Air Operations Center CAOCL Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning CAS close air support CAT Crisis Action Team CAT-A Civil Affairs Team–Alpha CAV cavalry CBT Cadet Basic Training CENTCOM US Central Command CENTRASBAT Central Asian Battalion CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program CFACC Combined Forces Air Component Commander CFC-A Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan CFLCC Combined Forces Land Component Command

343 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 210 of 316

Glossary

CG commanding general CHLC Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CJ2 Intelligence Section at Combined Joint Staff CJCMOTF Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force CJSOTF-A Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan CJSOTF-S Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–South CJTF combined joint task force CMIC Civil-Military Cooperation CMO civil-military operations CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center COG center of gravity COIN counterinsurgency CONUS continental United States COST Contemporary Operations Study Team CP command post CS combat support CSAR Combat Search and Rescue CSI Combat Studies Institute CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies CSS combat service support CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan CTC Counterterrorism Center CTF Combined Task Force DART (Canadian) Disaster Assistance Response Team DC District of Columbia DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DEFCON Defense Condition DFID (United Kingdom) Department for International Development DOD Department of Defense DOS Department of State DRA Democratic Republic of Afghanistan DS direct support EA Eastern Alliance EOD explosive ordnance disposal EPW enemy prisoner of war ESF Economic Support Fund ETAC enlisted terminal attack controller ETT embedded training team EU European Union )$ ¿HOGDUWLOOHU\ FARP forward arming and refueling point FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FID foreign internal defense )0 ¿HOGPDQXDOIUHTXHQF\PRGXODWLRQ FOB forward operating base FORSCOM Forces Command FSB forward support base

344 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 211 of 316

Glossary

)62 )RUHLJQ6HUYLFH2I¿FHU fwd forward )< ¿VFDO\HDU G2 Intelligence Section at Corps and Division Staff G3 Operations Section at Corps and Division Staff *$2 *RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWDELOLW\2I¿FH GDI ground-directed interdiction GPS Global Positioning System GS general support GTMO Guantanamo Bay, Cuba GWOT Global War on Terrorism HAST Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team HDR humanitarian daily rations HHC headquarters and headquarters company HIG Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin HLZ helicopter landing zone HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle HQ headquarters HSC headquarters and service company HUMINT human intelligence HVT high-value target ID Infantry Division IED improvised explosive device IMINT imagery intelligence IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IN Infantry INL International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs IO international organization IRR individual ready reserve ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISI Inter Services Intelligence ISIM Institute for the Study of Islam ISOFAC isolation facilities ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ITGA Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan JAG Judge Advocate General JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition JEMB Joint Electoral Management Body JFACC Joint Forces Air Component Command JFSOCC Joint Force Special Operations Component Command JIF Joint Interrogation Facility JMD Joint Manning Document JP joint publication JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force JRT joint regional team JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force JSOTF-N Joint Special Operations Task Force–North

345 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 212 of 316

Glossary

JTF joint task force JUI Jamiat Ulema-e Islam K2 Karshi-Khanabad (air base) KGB (Russian abbreviation of Committee for State Security) KHAD (Afghan security force similar to the Soviet KGB) KIA killed in action KMTC Kabul Military Training Center LAV light armored vehicle LOC line(s) of communications LOO line of operation LTF Logistics Task Force LZ landing zone MAST Military Academy Study Team MEDCAP Medical Civic Action Program MEDEVAC medical evacuation MI Military Intelligence MIT mobile interrogation team mm millimeter MMC Materiel Management Center MOD Ministry of Defense MOI Ministry of Interior MP Military Police MRE meal, ready to eat MSDF Maritime Self-Defense Force MT Mountain MTT mobile training team NA Northern Alliance NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NAVC National Army Volunteer Center 1&2 QRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRI¿FHU NGO nongovernment organization NLF National Liberation Front NMAA National Military Academy of Afghanistan NORAD North American Air Defense Command NTC National Training Center NVG night vision goggles obj objective ODA Operational Detachment–Alpha ODC Operational Detachment–Charlie OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 2(0$ 2I¿FHRI(FRQRPLFDQG0DQSRZHU$QDO\VLV OGA other governmental agency OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 20&$ 2I¿FHRI0LOLWDU\&RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ ONE Operation NOBLE EAGLE 23 REVHUYDWLRQSRLQWRSHUDWLRQ OPCON operational control OPORD operation order

346 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 213 of 316

Glossary

26&$ 2I¿FHRI6HFXULW\&RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ 286' 3 2I¿FHRIWKH8QGHU6HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVHIRU3ROLF\ PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan PIR Parachute Infantry Regiment PKSOI US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute PL phase line PM-CPP Political–Military Bureau for Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping POG Psychological Operations Group POL-MIL Political–Military PPCLI Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team PSAB Prince Sultan Air Base PSYOP psychological operations PUC persons under control PZ pickup zone QIP Quick-Impact Program QRF quick reaction force RAOC Rear Area Operations Center RC-East Regional Command–East RC-South Regional Command–South RC-West Regional Command–West ROC Rear Operations Center ROE rules of engagement RPG rocket-propelled grenade RTO radio-telephone operator SAR search and rescue SAS Special Air Service SATCOM satellite communications SAW Squad Automatic Weapon SEAL Sea, Air, Land SETAF Southern European Task Force SF Special Forces SFG Special Forces Group SIGINT signals intelligence SNTV Single Non-Transferable Vote SO Special Operations SOAR Special Operations Aviation Regiment SOCCE Special Operations Command and Control Element SOCCENT Special Operations Command Central SOCOM Special Operations Command SOF Special Operations Forces SOFLAM Special Operations Forces Laser Acquisition Markers SOP standing operating procedure SOSB Special Operations Support Battalion SOSCOM Special Operations Support Command SR Special Reconnaissance SSD Strategic Studies Detachment SSE sensitive site exploitation SSR Security Sector Reform

347 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 214 of 316

Glossary

STANAVFORMED Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean SUV sport utility vehicle TAC tactical command post TACON tactical control TACP Tactical Air Control Party TALC Theater Airlift Control Element TF task force THREATCON Threat Condition TLAM Tomahawk land attack missile TOC tactical operations center TOE table of organization and equipment TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command TRANSCOM US Transportation Command TSC Theater Support Command TSgt technical sergeant UAV unmanned aerial vehicle UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees US United States USAF United States Air Force USAID United States Agency for International Development USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command USDA United States Department of Agriculture USIP United States Institute for Peace USMA United States Military Academy USMC United States Marine Corps USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command UW unconventional warfare VMI Virginia Military Institute VTC video teleconference WIA wounded in action ;2 H[HFXWLYHRI¿FHU

348 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 215 of 316

Bibliography Interviews, Discussions, Notes, and e-mail Correspondence General John Abizaid General Bryan Brown General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Chief of Staff of the Afghanistan Army General Dan K. McNeill General Victor Eugene Renuart Lieutenant General David W. Barno Lieutenant General (Retired) Michael DeLong Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck Lieutenant General (Retired) Paul T. Mikolashek Major General John Brennan Major General (Retired) Dennis Jackson Major General Jason Kamiya Major General David E. Kratzer Major General Benjamin Mixon Major General (Retired) Eric Olson Major General (Retired) John R. Vines Major General (Retired) Craig Weston Brigadier General (Retired) George B. Forsythe Brigadier General William Garrett Brigadier General John Kern Brigadier General Thomas Mancino Brigadier General John Mulholland Brigadier General Jeffery Marshall Brigadier General Stanley A. McCrystal Brigadier General Joseph Prasek Colonel (Retired) Bruce Boevers Colonel Gary Cheek Colonel Richard Conte Colonel B. Shannon Davis Colonel Joseph Dichairo Colonel Edward Dorman III Colonel Kevin Doxey Colonel Rodney Edge Colonel David G. Fox Colonel (Retired) Michael Fitzgerald Colonel David Francavilla Colonel Richard Gallant Colonel Bruce Haselden Colonel Michael Hawrylak Colonel (Retired) Michael Hayes Colonel Walter Herd Colonel Terry Lambert Colonel David Lamm

349 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 216 of 316

Bibliography

Colonel Robert Landry Colonel Orlando Lopez Colonel (Promotable) Phillip McGhee Colonel George P. Maughan Colonel Mark Milley Colonel David Paschal Colonel Richard N. Pedersen Colonel Charles A. Preysler Colonel Timothy Reese Colonel Robert Sharp, British Army Colonel Thomas Snukis Colonel John Spiszer Colonel Michael Stout Colonel Michael Toner Colonel Stephen J. Townsend Colonel (Retired) James Treadwell Colonel (Retired) Mike Weimer Colonel Mark Wentlent Colonel Francis J. Wiercinski Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bolduc Lieutenant Colonel David Carstens Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer Caruso Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Ronald Corkran Lieutenant Colonel Roland de Marcellus Lieutenant Colonel Carl E. Fischer Lieutenant Colonel David Fitzgerald Lieutenant Colonel Steven Ford Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hilferty Lieutenant Colonel John Lineweaver Lieutenant Colonel David Miller Lieutenant Colonel Bentley Nettles Lieutenant Colonel Mary Ann O’Connor Lieutenant Colonel William Owen Lieutenant Colonel Tom Reilley Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Bruce Stanley Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Stogran Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Sullivan Lieutenant Colonel Stephen C. Walker Lieutenant Colonel Mike Warmack Lieutenant Colonel Paul Wille Major David Baker Major Franklin Baltazar Major William Bialozor Major Mark Campbell Major Roger Crombie Major Edward Croot Major Peter Dawe Major Mike DeJarnette

350 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 217 of 316

Bibliography

Major Michael L. Gibler Major James Hall Major Nelson Kraft Major Christine Locke Major Kevin Lovell Major Tim Miller Major Troy O’Donnell Major Luther Webster Major Fred Wolanski Captain Curtis Anderson Captain Charles Fowler Captain Benjamin Houston Captain Patrick O’Hara Captain Smith (First Name Withheld) Lieutenant Matt Stafford Command Sergeant Major Thomas Capel Master Sergeant Armand J. Bolduc Master Sergeant Michael Threatt Staff Sergeant Tyler Ekwell Technical Sergeant John McCabe Sergeant Douglas DeMaio Sergeant Flora Estrada Afghan Experience Project Interview, #2, 3, 5, 23, 29 Deborah Alexander, USAID Field Program Manager for Afghanistan Dr. David Champagne Dr. Ehsan Entezar Dr. Kenneth Katzman, CRS Dr. Robert Perito, USIP Minister Ali Jalali

US Military %ULH¿QJV 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. ³&RPPDQGRHV´$IJKDQLVWDQ'HFHPEHU±$SULO$IWHU $FWLRQ5HYLHZ%ULH¿QJ 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. $IWHU$FWLRQ5HSRUW, undated brief. 10th Mountain Division. WK0RXQWDLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQG2SQ$QDFRQGD%ULHI, undated, slide 33. 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). 2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP²9,%26$$5,date unknown, slide 16. 18th Airborne Corps CJCMOTF Brief. %ULHIDVRI0DUFK, slides 18, 23, 24. 130th Military History Detachment Command Report. 2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP5RWDWLRQ,9-XO\ ±0DUFK, date unknown. Beradini, Vince. 2I¿FH RI 0LOLWDU\ &RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ $1$ 'HYHORSPHQW %ULHI, Fall 2004, unpublished.

351 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 218 of 316

Bibliography

Bolduc, Donald (Lieutenant Colonel). 2SHUDWLRQVLQ6RXWKHUQ$IJKDQLVWDQ%ULH¿QJVOLGH Brennan, Major General John. $IJKDQ1DWLRQDO3ROLFH3URJUDP Brief unpublished, undated. C8 Resource Management. &RPPDQGHU¶V(PHUJHQF\5HVSRQVH3URJUDP &(53 Brief, slide 3. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 7KH$IJKDQLVWDQ±3DNLVWDQ:DU7KH5LVLQJ7KUHDW± %ULH¿QJ-DQXDU\ Chambers, Major Christopher M., Deputy Director, OEMA (ANA Reconstruction Team, CJTF-180). 5HFUXLWLQJIRUWKH$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\ Brief, 3 October 2002. &-7) ³2325' %URQFR 6WULNH 2() &RPEDW 2SHUDWLRQV G %ULJDGH WK ,QIDQWU\ Division.” 22 May 2004. CJTF 0RXQWDLQ. 2SHUDWLRQ$QDFRQGD&RPEDW2SHUDWLRQV%ULHI, 26 February 2002, slides 2 and 6. CJTF 0RXQWDLQ, Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division. $IJKDQLVWDQDQG2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$ Brief, undated, slide 19. Clinton, President William. Presidential Decision Directive 39, 21 June 1995. http://www.fas.org/irp/ RIIGRFVSGGKWP DFFHVVHG$SULO CTF %URQFR2()9+LVWRULFDO&RPPDQG%ULHI22 April 2005. Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. &RDOLWLRQ -RLQW &LYLO0LOLWDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV &-&027) Brief, January 2002. MacDill AFB, FL. CJTF–180 Afghanistan. WK0RXQWDLQ'LYLVLRQ¶V0RXQWDLQ6WRU\²2(),9Spring 2004. Conte, Colonel Richard. :RUNLQJZLWKWKH86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJLQHHUVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ%ULHI-XO\ VOLGH Franks, General Tommy. Presentation to the Army War College, April 2002, slide 9. )RUG/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO6WHYHQ*KD]QL3579,3%ULH¿QJ3URYLVLRQDO5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ7HDP*KD]QL $IJKDQLVWDQ 22 May 2004. Forte, Major Robert. Combined Task Force 0RXQWDLQ%ULH¿QJ2SHUDWLRQ0RXQWDLQ/LRQ$VVHVVPHQW %ULH¿QJ 13 July 2002, slides 1–5. Garrett, Brigadier General William Burke. WK0RXQWDLQ3RVWPRUWHP,QVLJKWVDQG,PSOLFDWLRQVIURP 2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP,9, date unknown, slides 5 and 12. +DJHQEHFN*HQHUDO)UDQNOLQ/WK0RXQWDLQ'LYLVLRQ /, %ULH¿QJWK0RXQWDLQ'LYLVLRQ$$5 $QDFRQGD±0DUFKVOLGH +HUG &RORQHO :DOWHU 0 &RPELQHG -RLQW 6SHFLDO 2SHUDWLRQV 7DVN )RUFH %ULH¿QJ 8QFRQYHQWLRQDO :DUULRUV 6HSDUDWH ,QVXUJHQWV IURP WKH 3RSXODFH 6SHFLDO 2SHUDWLRQV LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ IURP 6HSWHPEHUWR-XQH June 2004, slide 11. +ROOL¿HOG 0DMRU7LP 2I¿FH RI 0LOLWDU\ &RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ 20&$ %ULH¿QJ %XLOGLQJ WKH $IJKDQ$UP\6RPH.H\VWR&XOWXUDO8QGHUVWDQGLQJ no date/place given, 33 slides. ²²²2I¿FHRI0LOLWDU\&RRSHUDWLRQ±$IJKDQLVWDQ 20&$ %ULH¿QJ(WKQLF2YHUYLHZRI$IJKDQLVWDQ, no date/place given. ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULVLV *URXS 8SGDWH %ULH¿QJ $IJKDQLVWDQ *HWWLQJ 'LVDUPDPHQW %DFN RQ 7UDFN $VLD %ULH¿QJ 1R )HEUXDU\ ± KWWSZZZFULVLVJURXSRUJKRPHLQGH[ FIP" LG DFFHVVHG-XO\ Kraft, Major Nelson. /HVVRQV/HDUQHGIURPD/LJKW,QIDQWU\&RPSDQ\'XULQJ2SHUDWLRQ$QDFRQGD Brief, undated, slide 3. Mancino, Brigadier General Thomas. 7) 3KRHQL[ ,, %ULHI WK 8SGDWH WR &RPPDQG %ULH¿QJ, date unknown, slide 4. Marshall, Colonel Jeffery. OMC-A Brief. )RUFH'HYHORSPHQW&RQFHSW%ULHI, 15 October 2002, slide 8. McCullagh, 1st Lieutenant Kevin J. &RDOLWLRQ-RLQW7DVN)RUFH3KRHQL[ Brief, date unknown, slide 4. OMC-A. $1$3UHVHQWDWLRQWR0*2VWHQEHUJ%ULHI$XJXVWVOLGH OMC-A. %XLOGLQJWKH$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\Brief, January 2003, slide 54. OMC-A. CSA Brief, $IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\, 28 November 2002, slide 3.

352 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 219 of 316

Bibliography

Reese, Colonel Timothy. 2I¿FH RI 0LOLWDU\ &RRSHUDWLRQ²$IJKDQLVWDQ &RPPDQG ,QIRUPDWLRQ Brief, VOLGH ———. OMC-A Brief. $IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\².DU]DL, 6 January 2006, slides 55 and 56. ———. OMC-A Brief. 7DVN)RUFH3KRHQL[75$'2&5HFRQ2YHUYLHZ Brief, 8 April 2003. ———. 6XFFHVVIXO )LHOGLQJRIWKH$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\&HQWUDO&RUSV, 3 April 2003, slide 6. Shah Mahmood. 02'1DWLRQDO0LOLWDU\6WUDWHJ\, 21 October 2004. 6QXNLV&RORQHO7KRPDV$(,%ULH¿QJ$IJKDQLVWDQ0LOLWDU\8SGDWH, date unknown, slides 3 and 14. Stout, Colonel Michael. $IJKDQLVWDQ (IIHFWV %DVHG 2SHUDWLRQV DV D ³5RDGPDS WR 7UDQVLWLRQ´ US $UP\:DU&ROOHJH%ULH¿QJ 6XPQHUV QR ¿UVW QDPH JLYHQ WK 0RXQWDLQ 'LYLVLRQ /, %ULH¿QJ G %ULJDGH WK 0RXQWDLQ 'LYLVLRQ /, ³&RPPDQGRV´$IJKDQLVWDQ'HFHPEHU±$SULO, 25 July 2002. US Central Command. 2SHUDWLRQ(1'85,1*)5(('20+XPDQLWDULDQ$VVLVWDQFH +$ 6WUDWHJLF &RQFHSW%ULH¿QJ1RYHPEHU86&(17&200DF'LOO$)%)/ Weston, Major General Craig. OMC-A Brief. &UHDWLQJWKH$IJKDQ'HIHQVH6HFWRU, July 2004. ———. OMC-A Brief. *$1$3UHVHQWDWLRQ0DUFKVOLGH ———. OMC-A Brief. 20&$2ULHQWDWLRQ, 26 June 2004, slide 5. Weston, Major General Craig P., and the OMC-A Staff. 20&$¶V(VWLPDWH&2$VDQG5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ IRU3ROLFH6HFWRU5HIRUP%ULHIWR/7*%DUQRDVRI-DQXDU\, unpublished, slides 1–44.

'RFXPHQWV 1st Battalion, 505th PIR, $$50716:((3$XJXVW WK,QIDQWU\'LYLVLRQ$VVRFLDWLRQ³*OREDO:DURQ7HUURULVP´KWWSZZZWKLGDFRPGLYLVLRQKWPO DFFHVVHG0D\ ³UG $LUERUQH %ULJDGH +LVWRU\´ KWWSZZZDEQEGHVHWDIDUP\PLOKLVWRU\KWP DFFHVVHG $XJXVW $LU)RUFH6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQG³)DFW6KHHWV´KWWSZZZDIPLOIDFWVKHHWV DFFHVVHG)HE- UXDU\ $OOLHG -RLQW )RUFHV &RPPDQG +HDGTXDUWHUV 3,2 ³([SDQVLRQ RI 1$72 3UHVHQFH LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´ KWWSZZZQDWRLQWLVDIWRSLFVH[SDQVLRQLQGH[KWPO DFFHVVHG-XQH ²²²³,6$))DFW6KHHW´KWWSZZZQDWRLQWLVDIGRFXHSXESGILVDIBOHDÀHWSGI DFFHVVHG-XO\ ²²²³,6$)+ROGV&KDQJHRI&RPPDQG&HUHPRQ\LQ.DEXO´$XJXVW3UHVV5HOHDVH KWWSZZZQDWRLQWLVDIGRFXSUHVVUHOHDVH5HOHDVHB$XJBKWP DFFHVVHG -XO\ ²²²³,6$)7DNHV&RPPDQGRI:HVWHUQ357VLQ+HUDWDQG)DUDK´0D\3UHVV5HOHDVH KWWSZZZQDWRLQWLVDIGRFXSUHVVUHOHDVH5HOHDVHB0D\KWP DFFHVVHG -XO\ %UHQQDQ0DMRU*HQHUDO-RKQ³3URSRVHG%ULH¿QJ)ORZIRU$133ODQ´XQSXEOLVKHGXQGDWHG Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). G $LUERUQH 'LYLVLRQ ,QLWLDO ,PSUHVVLRQV 5HSRUW. Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 2003. ———. 2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP,QLWLDO,PSUHVVLRQV5HSRUW. Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 2003. CJTF-180. Memorandum for the Commander (ATTN: CJCMOTF LNO to CJTF180), OHDACA Status Report as of 1 January 2003, 5 January 2003. ³&RDOLWLRQ )RUFHV LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ´ KWWSZZZFIFDFHQWFRPPLO,QIRUPDWLRQ&RDOLWLRQIRUFHV LQ$IJKDQLVWDQKWP DFFHVVHG0D\

353 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 220 of 316

Bibliography

Cubbison, Douglas R., Command Historian, 10th Mountain Division. 6XPPDU\+LVWRU\RI2SHUDWLRQ (QGXULQJ)UHHGRP. 'DYLV &RORQHO 5RG 86$ 'LUHFWRU 3XEOLF$IIDLUV &-7) ³'LYLVLRQ 6ROGLHUV +HOS .LOO (QHP\ Fighters in Operation Mountain Viper.” http://www.drum.army.mil/sites/postnews/blizzard/ EOL]]DUGBDUFKLYHVKQHZVDVS"LG LVVXHGDWH DFFHVVHG$XJXVW Department of the Army G3. 86$UP\7URRS/HYHOVLQ2()6SUHDGVKHHW, 2008. 'R[H\/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO.HYLQ³&&&$3URJUHVV8SGDWH,QIRUPDWLRQ3DSHU´-XQH )RUV\WKH&RORQHO*HRUJH%³)LQDO5HSRUWRIWKH0LOLWDU\$FDGHP\6WXG\7HDP´XQSXEOLVKHGRI¿FLDO correspondence to OMC-A, 11 November 2003. ²²²³1DWLRQDO0LOLWDU\$FDGHP\RI$IJKDQLVWDQ&RQFHSW3ODQ´1RYHPEHUXQSXEOLVKHG +DQFRFN&RORQHO0DFNH\.0HPRUDQGXPIRU&RPPDQGHU&-7)%DJUDP$LU¿HOG$IJKDQLVWDQ Subject: CJCMOTF Lessons Learned, 3 May 03–19 Jan 04, 20 January 2004. +HDGTXDUWHUVVW%DWWDOLRQWK,QIDQWU\0HPRUDQGXP6XEMHFW7DVN)RUFH,1$IWHU$FWLRQ Report: Operation ANACONDA, 21 March 2001. +HDWK6HUJHDQW*UHJWK3XEOLF$IIDLUV'HWDFKPHQW³WK0RXQWDLQ'LYLVLRQ6KRZVLWV0HWWOHLQ Operation Mountain Resolve.” +HOP\/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO-DPHV86$'HIHQVH6XEFRPPLWWHH+HDULQJ6WDWHPHQW0D\ 2¶+DUD3DWULFN³2'$ 7H[DV +LVWRULFDO9LJQHWWHRI$IJKDQLVWDQ´XQSXEOLVKHGXQGDWHG 2SHUDWLRQ0RXQWDLQ6ZHHS$$5 from ODAs 986 and 314, 25 August 2002. 2OVRQ0DMRU*HQHUDO(ULF³&-7)&RPPDQGHU¶V*XLGDQFH´0D\ 3HGHUVHQ&RORQHO5LFKDUG³%521&2*XLGDQFH+RZWR7KLQNDERXW2()´0DUFK 3UDVHN %ULJDGLHU *HQHUDO -RVHSK ³&-7) 3KRHQL[ Training Guidance 4th Quarter, FY 03 (Draft).” Memorandum for Record, 19 June 2003. Press Release. Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters, MacDill AFB, FL. Release Number 02-05-01, 0D\ZZZFHQWFRPPLOVLWHVXVFHQWFRP DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ 6PLWK/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO+RSSHU&RPPDQGHU,QIDQWU\WK,QIDQWU\%ULJDGH³$IWHU$FWLRQ Review submitted to Brigadier General Thomas Mancino,” 28 September 2003. TF 'HYLO'HVHUW'HYLO'LVSDWFK-DQXDU\)HEUXDU\ ³7)'HYLO2SHUDWLRQ0RQJRRVH$IWHU$FWLRQ5HYLHZ´0DUFK TF 'HYLO 6LJQL¿FDQW$FWLRQV'DLO\6WDII-RXUQDO, March 2003. TF 3-505th PIR. $$5&RPPHQWVIRU2SHUDWLRQ02817$,16:((3 26 August 2002. ³7)WK3,52SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP 2() $IWHU$FWLRQ5HYLHZ´'HFHPEHU ³7)3DQWKHUG%ULJDGH%DWWOH&DSWDLQ$IWHU$FWLRQ5HYLHZ´$XJXVW ³7DVN)RUFH5DNNDVDQ Warning Order #2,” 21 June 2002. 86$UP\$FFHVVLRQV6XSSRUW%ULJDGH³&RORQHO:DOWHU0+HUG%LRJUDSK\´KWWSZZZXVDUHFDUP\ PLODVESDJHV&'5KWP DFFHVVHG-XQH 86$UP\ &RUSV RI (QJLQHHUV ³$IJKDQLVWDQ (QJLQHHU )DFW 6KHHW´ KWWSXVDFHDUP\PLO&(3$)DFW Sheets/Pages/AED.aspx (accessed 23 February 2009). US Army Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Web site. http://www.army.mil/operations/oef/images42. KWPO DFFHVVHG$XJXVW 86 &HQWUDO &RPPDQG ³$IJKDQLVWDQ ([FHUSWV IURP 6WDWHPHQW RI *HQHUDO -RKQ 3$EL]DLG 8QLWHG States Army Commander, United States Central Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 2006 Posture of the United States Central Command,” 14 March 2006. http:// ZZZFHQWFRPPLOVLWHVXVFHQWFRP0LVF$IJKDQLVWDQDVS[ DFFHVVHG$XJXVW US Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL). http://www.tecom. XVPFPLOFDRFO&DXFDVXVBDQGB&HQWUDOB$VLD&HQWUDOB$VLDB)RUPHUB6RY DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ 866SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQG+LVWRU\2I¿FH8QLWHG6WDWHV6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQG+,6725< ±WK$QQLYHUVDU\(GLWLRQ0DF'LOO$LU)RUFH%DVH)/8662&20

354 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 221 of 316

Bibliography

8QLWHG6WDWHV7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ&RPPDQG$QQXDO&RPPDQG5HSRUW. USTRANSCOM, 2001. :HVWRQ0DMRU*HQHUDO&UDLJ3³.H\WR$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO3ROLFH0LVVLRQ$VVXPSWLRQ´XQSXEOLVKHG undated notes. ———. .H\WR$1$$FFHOHUDWLRQ%ULH¿QJV memorandum, undated.

Joint Publications, Field Manuals, and Army Regulations Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, '2''LFWLRQDU\RI0LOLWDU\DQG$VVRFLDWHG7HUPV. Washington, DC, 2001. ———. JP 3-05, 'RFWULQHIRU6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV:DVKLQJWRQ'&$SULO ²²²-3-RLQW'RFWULQHIRU&LYLO0LOLWDU\2SHUDWLRQV. Washington, DC, 8 February 2001. ———. JP 5-0, 'RFWULQHIRU3ODQQLQJ-RLQW2SHUDWLRQV Washington, DC, 1995. ———. JP 30-8, ,QWHUDJHQF\&RRSHUDWLRQ'XULQJ-RLQW2SHUDWLRQV9ROXPH Washington, DC, 1996. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, 2SHUDWLRQV Washington, DC, 2001. ———. FM 3.05-201, 6SHFLDO)RUFHV8QFRQYHQWLRQDO:DUIDUH2SHUDWLRQV. Washington, DC, 2003. ———. FM 5-0, $UP\3ODQQLQJDQG2UGHUV3URGXFWLRQWashington, DC, 2005. ²²²)0/HJDO6XSSRUWWR2SHUDWLRQV. Washington, DC, 2000. ———. FM 41-10, &LYLO$IIDLUV2SHUDWLRQV. Washington, DC, 2000. ———. FM 90-8, &RXQWHUJXHUULOOD2SHUDWLRQVWashington, DC, 1986. ———. FM 100-20, 0LOLWDU\2SHUDWLRQVLQ/RZ,QWHQVLW\&RQÀLFWWashington, DC, 1990. ———. FM 100-25, 'RFWULQHIRU$UP\6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV)RUFHV Washington, DC, 1999. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Regulation (AR) 310-25, 'LFWLRQDU\RI 8QLWHG6WDWHV $UP\7HUPV Washington, DC, 1983.

Books, Articles, and Reports ³$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQ:RUNHUV$EGXFWHG-XGJH6KRW´:DVKLQJWRQ3RVW24 July 2005. 5HSRUW6WDII6WDWHPHQW³5HPDUNVE\WKH9LFH3UHVLGHQWWRWKH+HULWDJH)RXQGDWLRQ´2FWREHU 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/text/20031010-1.html (accessed $SULO ³ $QQXDO 'HIHQVH 5HSRUW´ KWWSZZZGRGJRYH[HFVHFDGUFKDSKWPO DFFHVVHG $SULO $EQH\ 6WHYH ³'/$$FWLYLWLHV LQ (XURSH LQ 6XSSRUW RI 2SHUDWLRQ (QGXULQJ )UHHGRP´ 'LPHQVLRQV (Winter 2003): 6–9. ³$&+8 *XQVKLS´ $LU )RUFH )DFW 6KHHW KWWSZZZDIPLOIDFWVKHHWVIDFWVKHHWDVS"IV,' DFFHVVHG$SULO $FNHUPDQ5REHUW.³,QIRZDUULRUV(QVXUH/RFDO&LWL]HQU\*HWVWKH0HVVDJH´6LJQDO0DJD]LQH (March 2002): 20–21. ³$GGUHVVE\3UHVLGHQW*HQHUDO3HUYH]0XVKDUUDIWRWKH3DNLVWDQL1DWLRQ´6HSWHPEHUKWWS ZZZXQLQWSDNLVWDQKWPO DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ ³$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV%HJLQ$PLGVW7DOLEDQ$WWDFNV´+LQGXVWDQ7LPHV18 September 2005. ³$IJKDQ 1DWLRQDO $UP\ $FWLYDWHV 6HFRQG 5HJLRQDO &RPPDQG´ $PHULFDQ )RUFHV 3UHVV 6HUYLFH 23 September 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25226 (accessed $XJXVW

355 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 222 of 316

Bibliography

$IJKDQLVWDQ(QJLQHHU'LVWULFW³&RORQHO2¶'RZG5HÀHFWVRQ$IJKDQ0LVVLRQ´-XO\KWWS www.aed.usace.army.mil/news/releases/exitinterview.html (accessed 23 February 2009). ³$IJKDQLVWDQ )DFW 6KHHW -DQ ´ 8QLWHG .LQJGRP 'HSDUWPHQW IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO Development, 29 January 2003. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/ GHHGDGFFEGFHDIF DFFHVVHG$XJXVW ³$IJKDQLVWDQ,QWHUYLHZZLWK86OHG&RDOLWLRQ&LYLO0LOLWDU\&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWHU´-DQXDU\ KWWSZZZLULQQHZVRUJUHSRUWDVS"5HSRUW,' DFFHVVHG$XJXVW ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 3DSHU 2Q 8. 357 ([SHULHQFH´ $IJKDQLVWDQ *URXS )&2 -DQXDU\ http:// ZZZIFRJRYXN)LOHVN¿OH8.SDSHURQLWV357H[SHULHQFHSGI DFFHVVHG $XJXVW ³$IJKDQLVWDQ´ 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 'LVDUPDPHQW 'HPRELOL]DWLRQ DQG 5HLQWHJUDWLRQ 5HVRXUFH &HQWUH KWWSZZZXQGGURUJFRXQWU\SURJUDPPHVSKS"F DFFHVVHG0D\ ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 8SGDWH´ -XQH KWWSZZZGHIHQGDPHULFDPLODIJKDQLVWDQXSGDWHMXQ DXKWPO DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU ³$IJKDQLVWDQ9RWHV´:DVKLQJWRQ3RVW16 September 2005. Ahari, M.E., and James Beal. 7KH1HZ*UHDW*DPHLQ0XVOLP&HQWUDO$VLD0F1DLU3DSHU1DWLRQDO Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001. $L]HQPDQ1&³/RQJ'HOD\HG$IJKDQ9RWH,V6HWIRU6HSW2QH+RXVHRI3DUOLDPHQW:LOO5HPDLQ Incomplete.” :DVKLQJWRQ3RVW21 March 2005. $OEULJKW6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH0DGHOHLQH.³6WDWHPHQWIRUWKH5HFRUGEHIRUHWKH6HQDWH&RPPLWWHHRQ Appropriations Hearing on Terrorism.” US Department of State, Washington, DC, 13 May KWWSZZZPLOQHWFRPVWDWHDOEULJKWKWP DFFHVVHG$SULO $OLQHMDG6LPD³3URYLVLRQDO5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ7HDPV 357 ´81+&5$SULOKWWSZZZDLPV RUJDIVHUYLFHVVHFWRUDOHPHUJHQF\BDVVLVWDQFHUHIXJHHXQKFUBUHWXUQBLVVXHVLVVXHBSGI DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU ³$O4DHGD¶V)DWZD´3%62QOLQH1HZV+RXU 23 February 1998. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/ LQWHUQDWLRQDOIDWZDBKWPO DFFHVVHG$SULO ³$PHULFDDQGWKH:DURQ7HUURU´6ROGLHU0DJD]LQH 58, No. 9, September 2003. $PLQ+XVVHLQ$EGXOZDKHHG³7KH2ULJLQVRIWKH6XQQL6KLD6SOLWLQ,VODP´,VODPIRU7RGD\ http:// ZZZLVODPIRUWRGD\FRPVKLDKWP DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ ³$QDO\VLV 0DVRRG¶V 5HJLRQDO $OOLHV´ %%& 1HZV 2QOLQH 11 September 2001. http://news.bbc.uk DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ Anderson, Benedict. ,PDJLQHG&RPPXQLWLHV5HÀHFWLRQVRQWKH2ULJLQDQG6SUHDGRI1DWLRQDOLVPRev. ed. New York, NY: Verso, 2006. $QGHUVRQ-RQ/HH³7KH6XUUHQGHU´1HZ

356 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 223 of 316

Bibliography

Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard, and Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO. ³3UHVV$YDLODELOLW\86 'HSXW\ 6HFUHWDU\ RI 6WDWH$UPLWDJH DQG 1$72 6HFUHWDU\ *HQHUDO Lord Robertson,” 20 September 2001. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010920a.htm (accessed 15 April 2009). $UPVWURQJ&DSWDLQ%UDGOH\-86$)³5HEXLOGLQJ$IJKDQLVWDQ&RXQWHULQVXUJHQF\DQG5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ in Operation Enduring Freedom.” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. Arnold, Anthony. $IJKDQLVWDQ7KH6RYLHW,QWHUYHQWLRQLQ3HUVSHFWLYH. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. ³$VLD'HPRFUDF\6RUWRI$IJKDQLVWDQ¶V(OHFWLRQV´7KH(FRQRPLVW(24 September 2005): 84. ³$VLD*HWWLQJWKH9RWH2XW$IJKDQLVWDQ´7KH(FRQRPLVW(2 July 2005): 60. ³$VLD2YHUYLHZ3DWWHUQVRI*OREDO7HUURULVP´2I¿FHRIWKH&RRUGLQDWRUIRU&RXQWHUWHUURULVP$SULO KWWSZZZVWDWHJRYVFWUOVFUWKWP DFFHVVHG$SULO ³$VVHPEO\ &RQFOXGHV 'HEDWH RQ 5HSRUW RI 6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO ZLWK 5HLWHUDWHG &DOOV IRU $FWLRQ WR Combat Terrorism.” Press Release/9918, Fifty-Sixth General Assembly, 11th Meeting (AM), 26 September 2001. $VVRFLDWHG3UHVV³$IJKDQ&KLHI7RXWV5HFRQFLOLDWLRQ3ODQ´.DQVDV&LW\7LPHV-XO\ ²²²³$IJKDQ/HDGHU7HOOVRI+HOSLQJ2VDPD*HW$ZD\´%HDXPRQW 7H[DV (QWHUSULVH 12 January Association of Graduates USMA, Nininger Award. http://www.aogusma.org/aog/awards/Nininger/ *UD\B0DWWHUB$UWLFOHKWP DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU $XEUH\ (ULF$IJKDQLVWDQ (QJLQHHU 'LVWULFW ³7KH &RUSV 1HHGV

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 224 of 316

Bibliography

%HGIRUG,DQ³1DWLRQDOLVPDQG%HORQJLQJLQ,QGLD3DNLVWDQDQG6RXWK&HQWUDO$VLD6RPH&RPSDUDWLYH Observations.” $XVWUDOLDQ-RXUQDORI$QWKURSRORJ\QR$XJXVWKWWS¿QGDUWLFOHV FRPSDUWLFOHVPLPLVBQBYDLBSULQW DFFHVVHG1RYHPEHU %HQ$U\HDK 'DYLG ³%ULWLVK 7URRSV )DFH WKH 5HDOLW\ WKDW LV $IJKDQLVWDQ´ $VLD 7LPHV 2QOLQH 1RYHPEHUKWWSZZZDWLPHVFRP DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ %HUNH5LFKDUG/DQG-DQHW(OGHU³1<7LPHV&%63ROO´1HZLibrary of Congress, 1998. %OXP %LOO WUDQV ³,QWHUYLHZ ZLWK 'U =ELJQLHZ %U]H]LQVNL 3DULV )UDQFH -DQXDU\ ± /H 1RXYHO 2EVHUYDWHXU´ KWWSZZZJOREDOUHVHDUFKFDDUWLFOHV%5=$KWPO DFFHVVHG )HEUXDU\ %OXP/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO+6WHYHQ86$³$9LVLRQIRUWKH1DWLRQDO*XDUG´-RLQW)RUFH4XDUWHUO\ 36, no. 24. Bocharov, Gennadi. %\O,YLGHO$IJDQLVWDQJR0RVFRZ3ROLWL]GDW Bogart, Adrian T. III. 2QH9DOOH\DWD7LPHHurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2006. %RJGDQRV0DWWKHZ)³-RLQW,QWHUDJHQF\&RRSHUDWLRQ7KH)LUVW6WHS´-RLQW)RUFHV4XDUWHUO\ 35 (April 2005): 10–18. %RQLQ-RKQ$DQG0DUN+*HUQHU³&RQWLQXRXV&RQFHQWULF3UHVVXUH´7KH/DQG:DUIDUH3DSHUV, September 2003. %RRW0D[³6SHFLDO)RUFHVDQG+RUVHV´$UPHG)RUFHV-RXUQDO(November 2006): 18–25. http://www. DUPHGIRUFHVMRXUQDOFRP DFFHVVHG$SULO Bowie, Christopher J., Robert P. Haffa Jr., and Robert E. Mullins. )XWXUH:DU:KDW7UHQGVLQ$PHULFD¶V 3RVW&ROG:DU0LOLWDU\&RQÀLFWV7HOO8V$ERXW(DUO\VW&HQWXU\:DUIDUH Arlington, VA: Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, 2003. %R\G7HUU\³7URRSVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ3UHSDULQJ6SULQJ2IIHQVLYHLQ3XUVXLWRI,QVXUJHQWV´6WDUVDQG 6WULSHV(XURSHDQ(GLWLRQ, Wednesday, 10 March 2004. http://stripes.com/article.asp?section= DUWLFOH DUFKLYH WUXH DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU Briscoe, Charles H., Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp. :HDSRQRI&KRLFH86 $UP\ 6SHFLDO 2SHUDWLRQV )RUFHV LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003. %XUHDXRI6RXWKDQG&HQWUDO$VLDQ$IIDLUV³$IJKDQLVWDQ´86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWHhttp://www.state. gov/p/sca/ci/af/ (accessed 19 December 2006). %XUJHVV0DUN³&',)DFW6KHHW,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\$VVLVWDQFH)RUFH 'HFHPEHU ´&HQWHU IRU'HIHQVH,QIRUPDWLRQ7HUURULVP3URMHFW'HFHPEHUKWWSZZZFGLRUJWHUURULVP LVDIBGHFSUFIP DFFHVVHG0D\

358 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 225 of 316

Bibliography

³%XVK&DOOVRQ86WR'HIHQG)UHHGRP$XWKRUL]HV*XDUGDQG5HVHUYH&DOOXSV´7$/21QR (22 September 2001): 4. %XVK*HRUJH:³$GGUHVVWRD-RLQW6HVVLRQRI&RQJUHVVDQGWKH$PHULFDQ3HRSOH´6HSWHPEHU http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed 19 September 2008). ²²² ³%ORFNLQJ 3URSHUW\ DQG 3URKLELWLQJ 7UDQVDFWLRQV ZLWK 3HUVRQV :KR &RPPLW 7KUHDWHQ WR Commit, or Support Terrorism.” Executive Order 13224, 23 September 2001. ²²²³3UHVLGHQWLDO$GGUHVVWRWKH1DWLRQ´2FWREHUKWWSZZZZKLWHKRXVHJRYQHZVUHOHDVHV KWPO DFFHVVHG-XO\ ²²²³5DGLR$GGUHVVRIWKH3UHVLGHQWWRWKH1DWLRQ´6HSWHPEHUKWWSZZZZKLWHKRXVH gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html (accessed 8 October 2008). ²²²³5DGLR$GGUHVVRIWKH3UHVLGHQWWRWKH1DWLRQ´2FWREHUKWWSZZZZKLWHKRXVHJRY news/releases/2001/10/20011006.html (accessed 14 March 2001). ²²²³6WDWHPHQWE\WKH3UHVLGHQWLQ+LV$GGUHVVWRWKH1DWLRQ´6HSWHPEHUKWWSZZZ whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html (accessed 15 September 2008). ²²²³7KH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\6WUDWHJ\RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVRI$PHULFD´6HSWHPEHU ²²²³The President’s News Conference with President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan at Camp David, Maryland,” 24 June 2003. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63119 (accessed 3 February 2009). %XWW -RKQ ³7KH7DOLEDQ 3KHQRPHQRQ´ ,Q $IJKDQLVWDQ 2d edition, edited by Edward Girardet and Jonathan Walter, co-editors Charles Norchi and Mirwais Masood. Geneva, Switzerland: Crosslines Publications, 2004. &DIIUH\ 0DWWKHZ ³$IJKDQLVWDQ &XUUHQW 2SHUDWLRQDO /HVVRQV IURP WKH 6RYLHW ([SHULHQFH´ $LU &RPPDQG DQG 6WDII &ROOHJH 4XLFN /RRN 05-01 (January 2005). http://research.airuniv.edu DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ &DOGZHOO-DFRE³2SHUDWLRQ'LDEOR5HDFK%DFN7DUJHWV0LOLWLD´'HIHQG$PHULFD²86'HSDUWPHQW RI'HIHQVH1HZVDERXWWKH:DURQ7HUURULVP28 June 2005. http://www.defendamerica.mil/ DUWLFOHVMXQHDDKWPO DFFHVVHG$XJXVW ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU%HKLQGWKH6FHQHVDW%RQQ&ROLQ3RZHOO866HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH´3%6 )5217/,1( http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/withus/cbonntheme. KWPO DFFHVVHG0DUFK ³&DPSDLJQ $JDLQVW 7HUURU %HKLQG WKH 6FHQHV DW %RQQ &RQGROHH]]D 5LFH 86 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ Adviser.” 3%6 )5217/,1( http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/ ZLWKXVFERQQWKHPHKWPO DFFHVVHG0DUFK ³&DPSDLJQ $JDLQVW 7HUURU %HKLQG WKH 6FHQHV DW %RQQ -DPHV 'REELQV 86 6SHFLDO (QYR\ WR Afghanistan.” 3%6 )5217/,1( http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/ ZLWKXVFERQQWKHPHKWPO DFFHVVHG0DUFK ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU,QWHUYLHZ&RORQHO-RKQ0XOKROODQG´3%6)5217/,1( (undated). http:// www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/mulholland.html (accessed $SULO ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU,QWHUYLHZ&RQGROHH]]D5LFH´3%6)5217/,1(, 12 July 2002. http://www. pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/rice.html (accessed 6 December 2006). ³&DPSDLJQ $JDLQVW 7HUURU ,QWHUYLHZ *HQHUDO 7RPP\ )UDQNV´ 3%6 )5217/,1(, 12 June 2002. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/franks.html (accessed 6 December 2006). ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU,QWHUYLHZ/W&RO'DYLG)R[´3%6)5217/,1( (undated). http://www. SEVRUJZJEKSDJHVIURQWOLQHVKRZVFDPSDLJQLQWHUYLHZVIR[KWPO DFFHVVHG$SULO

359 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 226 of 316

Bibliography

³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU,QWHUYLHZ3DXO:ROIRZLW]´3%6 )5217/,1((undated). http://www.pbs.org/ ZJEKSDJHVIURQWOLQHVKRZVFDPSDLJQLQWHUYLHZVZROIRZLW]KWPO DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU,QWHUYLHZ3UHVLGHQW+DPLG.DU]DL´3%6)5217/,1(0D\KWWS www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/karzai.html (accessed 29 March ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU,QWHUYLHZ86$UP\&DSWDLQ-DVRQ$PHULQH´3%6)5217/,1( 12 July 2002. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/amerine.html DFFHVVHG0DUFK ³&DPSDLJQ $JDLQVW 7HUURU ,QWHUYLHZ 86 $UP\ *HQHUDO 7RPP\ )UDQNV´ 3%6 )5217/,1(, 8 September 2002. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/ IUDQNVKWPO DFFHVVHG$XJXVW ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU,QWHUYLHZ866SHFLDO)RUFHV2'$)UDQN>1RODVWQDPHDYDLODEOH@ (SFC).” 3%6 )5217/,1( (undated). http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ FDPSDLJQLQWHUYLHZVKWPO DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU,QWHUYLHZ866SHFLDO)RUFHV2'$%LOO>1RODVWQDPHDYDLODEOH@ 66* ´ 3%6 )5217/,1( (undated). http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/ LQWHUYLHZVKWPO DFFHVVHG$SULO ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU,QWHUYLHZ866SHFLDO)RUFHV2'$-HII>1RODVWQDPHDYDLODEOH@ 66* ´ 3%6 )5217/,1( (undated). http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/ LQWHUYLHZVKWPO DFFHVVHG$SULO ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU,QWHUYLHZ866SHFLDO)RUFHV2'$6KDQH>1RODVWQDPHDYDLODEOH@ (MSG).” 3%6 )5217/,1( (undated). http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ FDPSDLJQLQWHUYLHZVKWPO DFFHVVHG$SULO ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU ,QWHUYLHZ 86 6SHFLDO )RUFHV 2'$ 0DUN >1R ODVW QDPH DYDLODEOH@ (CAPT).” 3%6 )5217/,1( 8 September 2002. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/campaign/interviews/595.html (accessed 4 December 2008). ³&DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW7HUURU7KH%DWWOHRI7DULQ.RZW&DSW-DVRQ$PHULQH866SHFLDO)RUFHV$7HDP Captain.” 3%6 )5217/,1( 12 July 2002. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ FDPSDLJQJURXQGWDULQNRZWKWPO DFFHVVHG0DUFK ³&DPSDLJQ $JDLQVW 7HUURU :RUNLQJ ZLWK WKH :DUORUGV 5HXHO *HUHFKW )RUPHU &,$ $JHQW´ 3%6 )5217/,1( 19 June 2002. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/ground/ ZDUORUGKWPO DFFHVVHG$SULO ³&DQDGLDQ )RUFHV¶ &RQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &DPSDLJQ$JDLQVW 7HUURULVP´ &DQDGLDQ )RUFHV %DFNJURXQGHU&DQDGLDQ'HSDUWPHQWRI1DWLRQDO'HIHQFH%*S-DQXDU\KWWS ZZZIRUFHVJFFDVLWH1HZVURRPYLHZBQHZVBHDVS"LG DFFHVVHG$XJXVW ³&(17&20 &RPPDQGHU )UDQNV 3UHVV &RQIHUHQFH LQ 8]EHNLVWDQ´ 6HSWHPEHU 7UDQVFULSW archived at the Department of State, Press Relations. &KDJQRQ &DSWDLQ 0LFKDHO &DQDGLDQ $UP\ ³&DQDGLDQ (PEHGGHG 7UDLQLQJ 7HDPV´ 7KH %XOOHWLQ 'HFHPEHUKWWSDUP\DSSGQGFD$//&'RZQORDGVEXOOHWLQ9ROB%XOOHWLQB9RO1R (QJSGI DFFHVVHG$XJXVW &KDQ6DPXHO³6HQWLQHOVRI$IJKDQ'HPRFUDF\7KH$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\´65DMDUDWQDP6FKRRORI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WXGLHV-XQH±8QSXEOLVKHGSDSHU Chayes, Sarah. 7KH 3XQLVKPHQW RI 9LUWXH ,QVLGH$IJKDQLVWDQ DIWHU WKH 7DOLEDQ New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2006. &KHHN &RORQHO *DU\ + ³6R

360 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 227 of 316

Bibliography

³&LQ&&(17&20DQGWKH&KLHIRIWKH'HIHQFH6WDII3UHVV&RQIHUHQFH²$SULO´2SHUDWLRQ 9HULWDV8.0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFH$SULOKWWSZZZRSHUDWLRQVPRGXNYHULWDVSUHVVB EULHIBDSUKWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ &ODUN(PLO\DQG0DUN%XUJHVV³$FWLRQ8SGDWH &RPSOHWH$UFKLYH ´&HQWHUIRU'HIHQVH,QIRUPDWLRQ 7HUURULVP 3URMHFW, 8 October 2001–1 September 2002. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ DFWLRQXSGDWHDUFKLYHSUFIP DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ &OHPHQW$P\³7$&+HOSV$UP\5HEXLOG$IJKDQ)RUFHV´-DQXDU\KWWSZZZKTXVDFHDUP\ PLOFHSDSXEVMDQVWRU\KWP DFFHVVHG$XJXVW &11&ROG:DU6HULHV³(SLVRGH*RRG*X\V%DG*X\V,QWHUYLHZZLWK'U=ELJQLHZ%U]H]LQVNL´ KWWSZZZJZXHGXaQVDUFKLYFROGZDULQWHUYLHZVHSLVRGHEU]H]LQVNLKWPO DFFHVVHG -DQXDU\ &113HUVSHFWLYH6HULHV³(SLVRGH5HG6SULQJ´KWWSZZZFQQFRP63(&,$/6FROGZDUHSLVRGHV 14/documents/doctrine (accessed 18 December 2006). ³&113UHVHQWV+RXVHRI:DU8SULVLQJDW0D]DUH6KDULI´$XJXVWKWWSZZZFQQFRP&11 Programs/presents/shows/house.of.war/interactive/interactive/house.of.swf (accessed 3 March ³&RDOLWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ:UDSV8S0RXQWDLQ%OL]]DUG´$PHULFDQ)RUFHV3UHVV6HUYLFH1HZV$UWLFOHV 0DUFK KWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOQHZVQHZVDUWLFOHDVS["LG DFFHVVHG -XO\ Coll, Steve. *KRVW:DUV7KH6HFUHW+LVWRU\RIWKH&,$$IJKDQLVWDQDQGELQ/DGHQIURPWKH6RYLHW ,QYDVLRQWR6HSWHPEHU New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2004. Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Fact Sheet, 12 April 2006. http://oneteam. FHQWFRPPLOIDFWBVKHHWV&67&$)DFWVKHHW$SULOSGI DFFHVVHG-XQH ³&RQVSLUDF\WR$WWDFN'HIHQVH8WLOLWLHVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´8QLWHG6WDWHV'LVWULFW&RXUW6RXWKHUQ District of New York, 6 November 1998. http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/11/indict1.pdf DFFHVVHG$SULO Cordesman, Anthony H. 7KH 2QJRLQJ /HVVRQV RI $IJKDQLVWDQ :DU¿JKWLQJ ,QWHOOLJHQFH )RUFH 7UDQVIRUPDWLRQDQG1DWLRQ%XLOGLQJWashington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004. Crane, Conrad. )LQDO5HSRUW7KH86$UP\¶V,QLWLDO,PSUHVVLRQVRI2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRPDQG 1REOH(DJOHCarlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2002. &UXPSWRQ+HQU\$³,QWHOOLJHQFHDQG:DU$IJKDQLVWDQ±´,Q7UDQVIRUPLQJ86,QWHOOLJHQFH HGLWHG E\ -HQQLIHU ( 6LPV DQG %XUWRQ *HUEHU ± :DVKLQJWRQ '& *HRUJHWRZQ University Press, 2005. &67&$,QIRUPDWLRQ3DSHU³1DWLRQDO0LOLWDU\$FDGHP\RI$IJKDQLVWDQ´$SULO Curtis, Glenn E., ed. .D]DNVWDQ.\UJ\]VWDQ7DMLNLVWDQ7XUNPHQLVWDQDQG8]EHNLVWDQ&RXQWU\6WXGLHV. :DVKLQJWRQ'&/LEUDU\RI&RQJUHVV)HGHUDO5HVHDUFK'LYLVLRQ 'DJJHU-DFRE³7KH0LQGRI%LQ/DGHQ,QWHUYLHZZLWK3URIHVVRU%UXFH/DZUHQFH´'XNH0DJD]LQH 91, Issue 6, November–December 2005. http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu/dukemag/ LVVXHVGHSTDKWPO DFFHVVHG0D\ ³'DLO\3UHVV%ULH¿QJE\WKH2I¿FHRIWKH6SRNHVPDQIRUWKH6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO´8QLWHG1DWLRQV3UHVV %ULH¿QJ 6HSWHPEHU KWWSZZZXQRUJ1HZVEULH¿QJVGRFVGEGRFKWP DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ 'DOH +HOOH ³1$72 LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ $ 7HVW &DVH IRU )XWXUH 0LVVLRQV´ 7KH +HULWDJH )RXQGDWLRQ %DFNJURXQGHU 1RYHPEHU KWWSZZZKHULWDJHRUJ5HVHDUFK(XURSHXSORDG EJBSGI DFFHVVHG0D\ 'DYLV $QWKRQ\ ³%DVLF 7UDLQLQJ´ Time, 3 June 2002. http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816, KWPO DFFHVVHG-XO\

361 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 228 of 316

Bibliography

'DYLV -DFTXHO\Q . ³5DGLFDO ,VODPLVW ,GHRORJLHV DQG WKH /RQJ :DU ,PSOLFDWLRQV IRU 86 6WUDWHJLF Planning and US Central Command Operations.” Washington, DC: Defense Threat Reduction $JHQF\,QVWLWXWHIRU)RUHLJQ3ROLF\$QDO\VLV,QF-DQXDU\ 'DYLV0DMRU0DUN*³2SHUDWLRQ$1$&21'$&RPPDQGDQG&RQIXVLRQLQ-RLQW:DUIDUH´0DVWHUV Thesis. Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, June 2004. ³'HEDWLQJ5HSRUWRIWKH6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDORQ:RUNRI2UJDQL]DWLRQ´3UHVV5HOHDVH)LIW\6L[WK General Assembly, Plenary, 8th Meeting (PM), 24 September 2001. 'HKJKDQSLVKHK%DEDN³7KH'HDWK&RQYR\RI$IJKDQLVWDQ´1HZVZHHN140, no. 9 (26 August 2002): 20. DeLong, Lieutenant General Michael, and Noah Lukeman. ,QVLGH&HQW&RP7KH8QYDUQLVKHG7UXWK DERXWWKH:DUVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQG,UDTWashington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2004. ³'HSDUWPHQW RI 'HIHQVH¶V 5ROH LQ &RPEDWLQJ 7HUURULVP DQG )RUFH 3URWHFWLRQ /HVVRQ %HIRUH WKH Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, House Committee of Armed Services,” 14 June 2001. KWWSFRPPGRFVKRXVHJRYFRPPLWWHHVVHFXULW\KDVKDVBIKWP DFFHVVHG 12 April 2001). ³'HSXW\ 6HFUHWDU\ :ROIRZLW] 3UHVV %ULH¿QJ ZLWK $IJKDQ )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU´ 86 'HSDUWPHQW RI 'HIHQVH 1HZV 7UDQVFULSW, 15 July 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=3601 (accessed 26 January 2009). ³'HWDLQHH+HOSHG%LQ/DGHQ)OHH'RFXPHQW6D\V´:DVKLQJWRQ3RVW 23 March 2005. ³',$*+LVWRU\DQG%DFNJURXQG´',$*KRPHSDJHKWWSZZZGLDJJRYDI DFFHVVHG-XQH 'L /HRQDUGR &DSWDLQ &KDUOHV 86$ ³7UDLQLQJ WKH$IJKDQ 1DWLRQDO$UP\´ ,QIDQWU\ (March/April 2005): 28–39. DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act.5HSRUWRIWKH'2'&RPPLVVLRQRQ%HLUXW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$LUSRUW7HUURULVW$FW2FWREHU>DND7KH/RQJ&RPPLVVLRQ@:DVKLQJWRQ DC: US Department of Defense, 20 December 1983. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/ XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/index.html (accessed 12 December 2006). 'RQDKXH &RORQHO 3 3DWULFN ³&RPEDWLQJ D 0RGHUQ ,QVXUJHQF\ &RPELQHG 7DVN )RUFH 'HYLO LQ Afghanistan.” 0LOLWDU\5HYLHZ(March–April 2008): 30. 'RZHOO:LOOLDP³%ORZLQJ+RWDQG&ROG

362 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 229 of 316

Bibliography

)DQQLQJ /LHXWHQDQW &RORQHO 3DXO 86$ ³5HVSRQGLQJ WR 7HUURU 7KH 1HZ

363 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 230 of 316

Bibliography

²²² ³86 %RPE :RXQGV *,¶V DV %DWWOH 5DJHV DW )RUW´ 1HZ

364 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 231 of 316

Bibliography

³*,V WR +HOS 7UDLQ $IJKDQ 1DWLRQDO $UP\´ -XO\ KWWSZZZPLOLWDU\FRP1HZV&RQWHQW )/BWUDLQBKWPO DFFHVVHG-XQH Giustozzi, Antonio. :RUNLQJ3DSHU1R5HVSHFWDEOH:DUORUGV"7KH3ROLWLFVRI6WDWH%XLOGLQJLQ 3RVW7DOHEDQ$IJKDQLVWDQ. Crisis States Programme Development Research Centre. London: '(67,1KWWSZZZFULVLVVWDWHVFRPGRZQORDGZS:3SGI DFFHVVHG-XO\ Gohari, M.J. 7KH7DOLEDQ$VFHQWWR3RZHU. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000. *RRGVRQ/DUU\3³$IJKDQLVWDQLQ(OHFWRUDO3URJUHVVDQGDQ2SLXP%RRP´&DOLEHU$VLDQ6XUYH\ (January/February 2005): 93. ———. $IJKDQLVWDQ¶V(QGOHVV:DU6WDWH)DLOXUH5HJLRQDO3ROLWLFVDQGWKH5LVHRIWKH7DOLEDQSeattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001. Grant, Rebecca. $Q$LU)RUFH$VVRFLDWLRQ6SHFLDO5HSRUW7KH$IJKDQ$LU:DU Arlington, VA: The Air Force Association, 2002. ²²²³7KH:DU1RERG\([SHFWHG´$LU)RUFH0DJD]LQH 85, no. 4, April 2002. http://www.afa.org/ PDJD]LQHDSULODLUZDUDVS DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ *UDX /HVWHU : ³7KH 7DNHGRZQ RI .DEXO$Q (IIHFWLYH &RXS GH 0DLQ´ ,Q %ORFN E\ %ORFN 7KH &KDOOHQJHVRI8UEDQ2SHUDWLRQV, edited by William G. Robertson and Lawrence A. Yates. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003. Grau, Lester W., ed. 7KH %HDU :HQW 2YHU WKH 0RXQWDLQ 6RYLHW &RPEDW 7DFWLFV LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996. Grau, Lester W., and Michael A. Gress, eds. 7KH6RYLHW$IJKDQ:DU+RZD6XSHUSRZHU)RXJKWDQG /RVW. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2002. *UDX /LHXWHQDQW &RORQHO 5HWLUHG /HVWHU : 86$ ³6RPHWKLQJ 2OG 6RPHWKLQJ 1HZ *XHUULOODV Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis.” 0LOLWDU\5HYLHZ (July–August 2004): 42–49. *UHVKDP-RKQ'³)RUFHV)LJKWLQJIRU(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP´8QLWHG6WDWHV1DYDO,QVWLWXWH3URFHHGLQJV QR 1RYHPEHU ± *ULI¿Q&KULVWRSKHU³A Working Plan: Hope Isn’t the Only Strategy for Afghanistan.” $UPHG)RUFHV -RXUQDO $SULO KWWSZZZDUPHGIRUFHVMRXUQDOFRP DFFHVVHG-XQH *XHKHQQR-HDQ0DULH³%ULH¿QJVWRWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLORQWKH6LWXDWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´2SHQ 0HHWLQJRIWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO$IJKDQLVWDQ-XQHKWWSZZZXQDPDDIJRUJGRFVB 81'RFVBVFBEULH¿QJVMXQKWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ Haass, Richard M. ,QWHUYHQWLRQ 7KH 8VH RI$PHULFDQ 0LOLWDU\ )RUFH LQ WKH 3RVW&ROG :DU:RUOG Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1984. +DPEOHW:LOOLDP3DQG-HUU\*.OLQH³,QWHUDJHQF\&RRSHUDWLRQ3''DQG&RPSOH[&RQWLQJHQF\ Operations.” -RLQW)RUFH4XDUWHUO\ 6SULQJ ± +DPPLGRY&DSWDLQ%DNKWL\RUMRQ88]EHNLVWDQ$UPHG)RUFHV³7KH)DOORIWKH7DOLEDQ5HJLPHDQG its Recovery as an Insurgent Movement in Afghanistan.” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004. +DVNHOO0DVWHU6HUJHDQW%RE86$³*XDUG5HVSRQGV´1DWLRQDO*XDUG%XUHDX14 September 2001. Haulman, Daniel L. ,QWHUWKHDWHU$LUOLIW&KDOOHQJHVRI2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRPMaxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Historical Research Agency, 2002. +HDWK6HUJHDQW*UHJWK3XEOLF$IIDLUV'HWDFKPHQW³&DWDPRXQWV.HHS5ROOLQJLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´ )RUW'UXP%OL]]DUG2QOLQH 8 January 2004. http://www.drum.army.mil/sites/postnews/blizzard/ EOL]]DUGBDUFKLYHVKQHZVDVS"LG LVVXHGDWH DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU +HQGUHQ-RKQ³/XFN\6KRW%URXJKW'RZQ+HOLFRSWHULQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´+RXVWRQ&KURQLFOH1 July 2005. Herd, Colonel Walter M., Colonel Patrick M. Higgins, Lieutenant Colonel Adrian T. Bogart III, 0DMRU0DUN$'DYH\DQG&DSWDLQ'DXGVKDK6$QGLVK³2QH9DOOH\DWD7LPH9LFWRU\LQ Afghanistan.” Unpublished monograph.

365 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 232 of 316

Bibliography

+LQHV-D\(³)URP'HVHUW2QHWR6RXWKHUQ:DWFK7KH(YROXWLRQRI86&HQWUDO&RPPDQG´-RLQW )RUFHV4XDUWHUO\ (Spring 2000): 42–48. +LUVK0LFKDHODQG-RKQ%DUU\³7KH+XQW+HDWV8S´1HZVZHHN(15 March 2004): 46–48. Hoffman, Bruce. ,QVLGH7HUURULVP New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998. ²²²³7HUURULVP7UHQGVDQG3URVSHFWV´,Q&RXQWHULQJWKH1HZ7HUURULVPedited by Ian O. Lesser, %UXFH+RIIPDQ-RKQ$UTXLOOD'DYLG5RQIHOGW0LFKHOH=DQLQLDQG%ULDQ0LFKDHO-HQNLQV Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999. +RO]ZRUWK 0DMRU &( 860& ³2SHUDWLRQ (DJOH &ODZ $ &DWDO\VW IRU &KDQJH LQ WKH $PHULFDQ 0LOLWDU\´&RPPDQGDQG6WDII&ROOHJH &6& KWWSZZZJOREDOVHFXULW\RUJPLOLWDU\ OLEUDU\UHSRUW+RO]ZRUWKKWP DFFHVVHG'HFHPEHU +RRQ0U*HRIIUH\³2SHUDWLRQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´+RXVHRI&RPPRQV+DQVDUG'HEDWHV3DUW, 20 June 2002. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020620 (accessed $XJXVW Hopkirk, Peter. 7KH*UHDW*DPH7KH6WUXJJOHIRU(PSLUHLQ&HQWUDO$VLD. New York, NY: Kodansha, 1992. House National Security Committee. 7KH.KREDU7RZHUV%RPELQJ,QFLGHQW6WDII5HSRUW, 14 August 1996. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/saudi.pdf (accessed 21 November 2006). +RZHOO/OHZHOO\Q'³7HUURULVP7KHVW&HQWXU\:DU´86$7RGD\March 2001. +XIIPDQ &DSWDLQ -DPHV : ,,, 86$ ³% )$ PP 0RUWDU %DWWHU\ LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ´ )LHOG $UWLOOHU\-RXUQDO (January–February 2005): 42–44. +XPDQ5LJKWV:DWFK³$IJKDQLVWDQ3URWHFW:RPHQ&DQGLGDWHV´$XJXVWKWWSZZZKUZRUJ en/news/2005/08/16/afghanistan-protect-women-candidates (accessed 23 February 2009). ³+XPDQLWDULDQ/HDGHUV$VN:KLWH+RXVHWR5HYLHZ3ROLF\$OORZLQJ$PHULFDQ6ROGLHUVWR&RQGXFW Humanitarian Relief Programs in Civilian Clothes.” Letter to National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice from InterAction, 2 April 2002. http://interaction.org/library/bushletter1. KWPO DFFHVVHG'HFHPEHU +XVVDLQ+DPLG³7KH%HDUDQGWKH(DJOH2SHUDWLRQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQE\7ZR6XSHUSRZHUV´KWWS ZZZGHIHQFHMRXUQDOFRPDSUEHDUHDJOHKWP DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ +XVVDLQ5LIDDW³3DNLVWDQ:DONVD7LJKWURSH´-DQH¶V'HIHQVH:HHNO\ (24 October 2001): 23. ,OOLQRLV,QVWLWXWHRI7HFKQRORJ\3DXO9*DOYLQ/LEUDU\³$IJKDQLVWDQ&RXQWU\6WXG\´ -DQXDU\ ±KWWSZZZJOLLWHGXJRYGRFVDIJKDQLVWDQ DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ ³,Q $IJKDQLVWDQ $ 3RSXODWLRQ LQ &ULVLV´ 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 3UHVV 5HOHDVH $)* 25* 24 September 2001. ³,QGLD3DNLVWDQ3XW7KHLU0LVVLOHVRQ$OHUW´3%62QOLQH1HZVKRXU8SGDWH, 26 December 2001. http:// ZZZSEVRUJQHZVKRXUXSGDWHVGHFHPEHULQGLDBSDNLVWDQBKWPO DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ ,QJOH6DXO³)LUVW6WULNH/DXQFKLQJRI7RPDKDZN0LVVLOHVIURP866-RKQ3DXO-RQHV$V3DUWRI:DU on Terrorism.” $OO+DQGV (December 2001). Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, Global History—January to June. http://www.ioss.gov/docs/jantojune. KWPO DFFHVVHG$SULO ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\$VVLVWDQFH)RUFH 2SHUDWLRQ)LQJDO ´8.0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFH-XQH KWWSZZZRSHUDWLRQVPRGXN¿QJDO DFFHVVHG'HFHPEHU ³,QWR$IJKDQLVWDQ5RRWLQJ2XW7HUURULVWV2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP0DUNV

366 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 233 of 316

Bibliography

,VODPLF5HSXEOLFRI$IJKDQLVWDQ³$%ULHI%LRJUDSK\RI3UHVLGHQW+DPLG.DU]DL´KWWSZZZSUHVLGHQW JRYDIHQJOLVKSUHVLGHQWBELRJUDSK\PVS[ DFFHVVHG0DUFK Jackson, Major Scott A. 7DFWLFDO,QWHJUDWLRQRI6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQVDQG&RQYHQWLRQDO)RUFHV&RPPDQG DQG&RQWURO)XQFWLRQV School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003. -DODOL$OL$³$IJKDQLVWDQLQ7KH6WUXJJOHWR:LQWKH3HDFH´$VLDQ6XUYH\ 43, no. 1. A Survey of Asia in 2002 (January–February 2003). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002. KWWSOLQNVMVWRURUJVLFL"VLFL )$&$$,76 7(&3%/ DFFHVVHG-XO\ ²²²³$IJKDQLVWDQ7KH$QDWRP\RIDQ2QJRLQJ&RQÀLFW´3DUDPHWHUV(Spring 2001): 92–93. ²²²³5HEXLOGLQJ$IJKDQLVWDQ¶V1DWLRQDO$UP\´3DUDPHWHUV (Autumn 2002). ²²²³7KH)XWXUHRI$IJKDQLVWDQ´3DUDPHWHUV(Spring 2006):4–19. Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau. 7KH2WKHU6LGHRIWKH0RXQWDLQ0XMDKLGHHQ7DFWLFVLQWKH 6RYLHW$IJKDQ:DU)RUW/HDYHQZRUWK.6)RUHLJQ0LOLWDU\6WXGLHV2I¿FH -DTXLVK'RXJODV:³8QLQKDELWHG$LU9HKLFOHVIRU3V\FKRORJLFDO2SHUDWLRQV²/HYHUDJLQJ7HFKQRORJ\ for PSYOPs Beyond 2010.” $LU 6SDFH3RZHU-RXUQDO²&KURQLFOHV2QOLQH (6 April 2004): 2. KWWSZZZDLUSRZHUPD[ZHOODIPLODLUFKURQLFOHV DFFHVVHG0DUFK -HQNLQV %ULDQ 0 ³'HIHQVH $JDLQVW 7HUURULVP´ 3ROLWLFDO 6FLHQFH 4XDUWHUO\ 101, no. 5 (1986): ± -RIIH /DZUHQFH ³$EGXO +DT 9HWHUDQ$IJKDQ /HDGHU 6HHNLQJ SRVW7DOLEDQ &RQVHQVXV 5XOH´ 7KH *XDUGLDQ, 29 October 2001. http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,,582692,00.html DFFHVVHG$SULO -RKQVRQ&KULVWLQH³$LGDQG5HFRYHU\´,Q$IJKDQLVWDQ2d edition, edited by Edward Girardet and Jonathan Walter, co-editors Charles Norchi and Mirwais Masood. Geneva, Switzerland: Crosslines Publications, 2004. -RKQVRQ0DVWHU6HUJHDQW'.HLWK86$³$IJKDQ1DWLRQDO$UP\9ROXQWHHU&HQWHU2SHQV´'HFHPEHU 2004. http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/Dec2004/a122204dw1.html (accessed 20 August -RKQVRQ7KRPDV+³,VPDLO.KDQ+HUDWDQG,UDQLDQ,QÀXHQFH´6WUDWHJLF,QVLJKWV, quoting the 1HZ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 234 of 316

Bibliography

before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services,” 24 March 2000. http://armed- VHUYLFHVVHQDWHJRYVWDWHPQWSESGI DFFHVVHG$SULO Jones, Seth G., Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley. (VWDEOLVKLQJ/DZDQG2UGHU $IWHU&RQÀLFW Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2005. .DKDQHU/DUU\³:HDSRQRI0DVV'HVWUXFWLRQ´:DVKLQJWRQ3RVW, 26 November 2006. Kalic, Sean. &RPEDWLQJD0RGHUQ+\GUD$O4DHGDDQGWKH*OREDO:DURQ7HUURULVP. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005. Kamiya, Major General Jason. /HDGHUVKLS3UHSDUDWLRQ0RQRJUDSK,QVXUJHQF\&RXQWHULQVXUJHQF\ +LVWRULFDO3HUVSHFWLYHVVincenza, Italy: USASETAF, 2004. Kaplan, Robert D. 6ROGLHUVRI*RG:LWKWKH0XMDKLGLQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ%RVWRQ0$+RXJKWRQ0LIÀLQ Company, 1990. ²²²³7KH&RPLQJ$QDUFK\´7KH$WODQWLF0RQWKO\ )HEUXDU\ ± .DW]PDQ'U.HQQHWK³$IJKDQLVWDQ3RVW:DU*RYHUQDQFH6HFXULW\DQG863ROLF\´&RQJUHVVLRQDO Research Service Report RL 30588, 11 January 2006. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf DFFHVVHG-XQH ²²²³&565HSRUWIRU&RQJUHVV´&56 :HE$IJKDQLVWDQ3RVW:DU*RYHUQDQFH6HFXULW\DQG86 3ROLF\, 28 December 2004. .D]HP+DOLPD³1HZ$IJKDQ$UP\$VVHUWV,WVHOI´&KULVWLDQ6FLHQFH0RQLWRU23 August 2004. .HQQHG\+DUROG³0RUH/LIH1HHGHG$YHUV867UDQVSRUWDWLRQ&KLHI´1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH0DJD]LQH, -XO\KWWSZZZQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHPDJD]LQHRUJLVVXHV-XO0RUHB/LIWKWP DFFHVVHG )HEUXDU\ .KDOLO]DG =DOPD\ ³+RZ WR 1DWLRQEXLOG 7HQ /HVVRQV IURP $IJKDQLVWDQ´ 7KH 1DWLRQDO ,QWHUHVW 6XPPHU ± .KDQ5DLV$KPDG³3DNLVWDQLQ:DLWLQJIRU&KDQJH´$VLDQ6XUYH\43, no. 2 Part II (February 1993). Khoshal Khan Khattak. 'DVWDUQDPD. $ &ODVVLF 7UHDWLVH RQ 1RUPV DQG 3UDFWLFH RI /HDGHUVKLS LQ 3DVKWR .DEXO .LSHU5LFKDUG/³2I9LWDO,PSRUWDQFH7KHWK36<23*URXS´6SHFLDO:DUIDUH (September 2002). ²²²³:H6XSSRUWWRWKH8WPRVW7KHWK6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV6XSSRUW%DWWDOLRQ´6SHFLDO:DUIDUH 15, no. 3 (September 2002): 13–15. .ODLGPDQ 'DQLHO DQG 0LFKDHO ,VLNRII ³:DONHU¶V %UXVK ZLWK ELQ /DGHQ´ 1HZVZHHN 139, no. 1 -DQXDU\ ± Knarr, William, and John Frost. 2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP%DWWOH5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2004. Koontz, Christopher N., ed. (QGXULQJ9RLFHV2UDO+LVWRULHVRIWKH86$UP\([SHULHQFHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ ±Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2008. .RVQLN&DSWDLQ0DUN(861DY\³7KH0LOLWDU\5HVSRQVHWR7HUURULVP´1DYDO:DU&ROOHJH5HYLHZ LIII, no. 2, Spring 2000. http://www.nwc.navy/PRESS/Review/2000/spring/art1-sp).htm (accessed 4 December 2006). .R]DU\Q/LQGD'³%ULWLVKOHG&RDOLWLRQ%DWWOH$O4DHGD7DOLEDQ)LJKWHUV´$PHULFDQ)RUFHV3UHVV 6HUYLFH 1HZV $UWLFOHV 0D\ KWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOQHZVQHZVDUWLFOHDVS["LG 44048 (accessed 4 December 2008). ²²²³)DPLOLHV)ULHQGV+RQRU'HVHUW6WRUP)DOOHQ´$UPHG)RUFHV3UHVV6HUYLFH)HEUXDU\ KWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOQHZV)HEQBKWPO DFFHVVHG $SULO ²²²³1HZ:HDSRQV&DFKH)RXQG2UX]JDQ'HDWKV,QYHVWLJDWHG´'HIHQG$PHULFD, 8 July 2002. KWWSZZZGHIHQGDPHULFDPLODUFKLYHKWPO DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ ²²²³3DNLVWDQ,QGLD&RQÀLFW&RQFHUQV860LOLWDU\´$PHULFDQ)RUFHV3UHVV6HUYLFH1HZV$UWLFOHV 28 May 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/news (accessed 8 December 2008).

368 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 235 of 316

Bibliography

²²² ³86 )RFXV 7XUQV WR $IJKDQLVWDQ¶V 5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ´ $PHULFDQ )RUFHV 3UHVV 6HUYLFH 16 January 2003. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29568 (accessed 16 July .UXODN *HQHUDO &KDUOHV & 860& ³7KH 6WUDWHJLF &RUSRUDO /HDGHUVKLS LQ WKH7KUHH %ORFN:DU´ 0DULQHV 0DJD]LQH -DQXDU\ KWWSZZZDXDIPLODXDZFDZFJDWHXVPFVWUDWHJLFB FRUSRUDOKWP DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU Lamb, Christopher J., and Paris Genalis. 5HYLHZRI3V\FKRORJLFDO2SHUDWLRQV/HVVRQV/HDUQHGIURP 5HFHQW2SHUDWLRQDO([SHULHQFH. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2005. /DPEHUW:LOOLDP&³86&HQWUDO$VLDQ6HFXULW\&RRSHUDWLRQ0LVXQGHUVWDQGLQJV0LVFRPPXQLFDWLRQV & Missed Opportunities.” In 6HFXULW\$VVLVWDQFH86DQG+LVWRULFDO3HUVSHFWLYHV3URFHHGLQJV IURPWKH&RPEDW6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH0LOLWDU\+LVWRU\6\PSRVLXPedited byKendall Gott and Michael Brooks, 123–159. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006. Lambeth, Benjamin S. $LU3RZHU$JDLQVW7HUURU$PHULFDQ¶V&RQGXFWRI2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2005. /DPP&RORQHO'DYLG86$³6XFFHVVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQPHDQV)LJKWLQJ6HYHUDO:DUVDW2QFH´$UPHG )RUFHV -RXUQDO 1RYHPEHU KWWSZZZDUPHGIRUFHVMRXUQDOFRP DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU /DQGD\-RQDWKDQ³$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQ3URPSWV)LJKWLQJ´.QLJKW5LGGHU1HZVSDSHUV21 August 2005. Lansford, Tom. $OOIRU2QH7HUURULVP1$72DQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002. ³/DUJHVW$IJKDQ&DPSDLJQVLQFH$QDFRQGD(QGV´&11, 25 August 2002. http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ WORLD/asiapcf/central/08/25/afghan.operation/index.html (accessed 10 February 2009). /DTXHXU:DOWHU³7HUURU¶V1HZ)DFH´+DUYDUG,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HYLHZ 20 (Fall 1998): 48–51. /DYURY6HUJH\9³%XLOGLQJD&ROOHFWLYH5HVSRQVHWR7HUURULVP´81&KURQLFOH June–August 2004. KWWSZZZXQRUJ3XEVFKURQLFOHLVVXHSDVS DFFHVVHG0D\ Lawrence, Bruce, ed. 0HVVDJHVWRWKH:RUOG7KH6WDWHPHQWVRI2VDPD%LQ/DGHQ New York, NY: Verso, 2005. ³/HDGHUV 3XWWLQJ 6WHHO LQWR .DU]DL $IJKDQLVWDQ¶V 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ (OHFWLRQV´ 7KH (FRQRPLVW 6HSWHPEHU ³/HJDO/HVVRQV/HDUQHGIURP$IJKDQLVWDQDQG,UDT9ROXPH,´&HQWHUIRU/DZDQG0LOLWDU\2SHUDWLRQV The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 1 August 2004. /HY\*DHD³2EMHFWLYHV5KLQRDQG*HFNR62)¶V2SHQLQJ6DOYRLQ2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP´7LS RIWKH6SHDU, November 2006. /LEUDU\RI&RQJUHVV&RXQWU\6WXGLHV³$IJKDQLVWDQ7KH3HVKDZDU$FFRUG$SULO´KWWSZZZ SKRWLXVFRPFRXQWULHVDIJKDQLVWDQJRYHUQPHQWDIJKDQLVWDQBJRYHUQPHQWBWKHBSHVKDZDUB DFFRUGaKWPO DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ ²²²³$IJKDQLVWDQ7KH6RYLHW'HFLVLRQWR:LWKGUDZ´KWWSOFZHEORFJRYFJLELQTXHU\U"IUG FVWG\#¿HOG '2&,'DI DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ Library of Congress—Federal Research Division. &RXQWU\3UR¿OH$IJKDQLVWDQ, May 2006. http://www. OFZHEORFJRY DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ ³/LRQ RI 3DQMVKLU $KPHG 6KDZ 0DVVRXG´ KWWSZZZPDVVRXGKHURFRP(QJOLVKELRJUDSK\KWPO DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ Mack, Raneta Lawson, and Michael J. Kelly. (TXDO-XVWLFHLQWKH%DODQFH$PHULFD¶V/HJDO5HVSRQVH WRWKH(PHUJLQJ7HUURULVW7KUHDWAnn Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004. http:// ZZZSUHVVXPLFKHGXSGIFKSGI DFFHVVHG'HFHPEHU 0DJQL 6HUJHDQW )UDQN 86$ ³9HUPRQW*XDUGVPHQ 7UDLQ 0HQWRU$IJKDQ 6ROGLHUV´$XJXVW KWWSGHIHQGDPHULFDJRYDUWLFOHVDXJDEKWPO DFFHVVHG$XJXVW Magnus, Ralph H., and Eden Naby. $IJKDQLVWDQ0XOODK0DU[DQG0XMDKLG. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.

369 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 236 of 316

Bibliography

³0DMRU $IJKDQ 2IIHQVLYH /DXQFKHG´ &11 2QOLQH 8 December 2003. http://www.cnn.com/2003/ :25/'DVLDSFIFHQWUDODIJKDQRIIHQVLYHLQGH[KWPO DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU 0DOLN1DGHHP³860LOLWDU\6HHNV'HHSHU5RRWVLQ3DNLVWDQ´$VLD7LPHV2QOLQH 30 January 2002. KWWSZZZDWLPHVFRPFDVLD'$$JKWPO DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ 0DQVDJHU &RORQHO 7XFNHU % 86$ ³,QWHUDJHQF\ /HVVRQV /HDUQHG LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ´ -RLQW )RUFH 4XDUWHUO\(First Quarter 2006): 80–84. 0DQZDULQJ0D[*³3HDFHDQG6WDELOLW\/HVVRQVIURP%RVQLD´3DUDPHWHUVWinter 1998. http://www. FDUOLVOHDUP\PLOXVDZF3DUDPHWHUVZLQWHUPDQZDULQKWP DFFHVVHG0D\ ³0DULQHV/DXQFK2SHUDWLRQ%X]]DUGLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´$%&1HZV2QOLQH, 30 May 2002. http://www.abc. QHWDXQHZVQHZVLWHPV DFFHVVHG$XJXVW 0DULRQ)RUUHVW/³%XLOGLQJ86$)µ([SHGLWLRQDU\%DVHV¶IRU2SHUDWLRQ(1'85,1*)5(('20² AFGHANISTAN, 2001–2002.” $LU 6SDFH 3RZHU -RXUQDO. http://www.airpower.maxwell. DIPLODLUFKURQLFOHVFFPDULRQKWPO DFFHVVHG-XO\ 0DUTXLV &KULVWRSKHU ³%HIRUH +H 'LHG &,$ 0DQ ,QWHUURJDWHG 86 &DSWLYH´ 1HZ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 237 of 316

Bibliography

0LOHV'RQQD³1$720DNHV.H\'HFLVLRQVRQ,UDT$IJKDQLVWDQ´$PHULFDQ)RUFHV3UHVV6HUYLFH, 28 -XQHKWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOQHZVQHZVDUWLFOHDVS["LG DFFHVVHG-XQH ³0LOLWDU\7HFKQLFDO$JUHHPHQW %HWZHHQ WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6HFXULW\$VVLVWDQFH )RUFH ,6$) DQG WKH ,QWHULP$GPLQLVWUDWLRQRI$IJKDQLVWDQ µ,QWHULP$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶ ´-DQXDU\ 0,377HUURULVP.QRZOHGJH%DVHKWWSZZZWNERUJ+RPHMVS DFFHVVHG$SULO 0LU]D 0DWHHQ ³7DPLQJ WKH µ:LOG :HVW¶ ,QWHJUDWLQJ WKH )HGHUDOO\ $GPLQLVWHUHG 7ULEDO $UHDV RI Pakistan.” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2005. ³0RELOL]DWLRQ5HIRUP$&RPSLODWLRQRI6LJQL¿FDQW,VVXHV/HVVRQV/HDUQHGDQG6WXGLHV'HYHORSHG Since September 11, 2001.”2I¿FHRIWKH6HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVH5HVHUYH)RUFHV3ROLF\%RDUG October 2003. 0RQDFR$QQDOLVD³%H\RQG.DEXO7HVWLQJ,6$)3RWHQWLDODQG/LPLWV´,6,6(XURSHQR October 2003. KWWSLVLVHXURSHRUJ%H\RQG.DEXO11YQ3') DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU Moore, Robin. 7KH+XQWIRU%LQ/DGHQ7DVN)RUFH'DJJHUNew York, NY: Random House, 2003. 0RUJDQ0DWWKHZ-³7KH2ULJLQVRI1HZ7HUURULVP´3DUDPHWHUV (Spring 2004): 29–43. 0RUJDQ 6KDQH 35REHUW + /HYLV DQG +DUU\ & *OHQQ ,,, ³% 3)$5 3ODWRRQ%DVHG )LUHV LQ Afghanistan.” )LHOG$UWLOOHU\ -RXUQDO (March–April 2005): 29–33. 0RUULV/LHXWHQDQW&RORQHO0LFKDHO)860&³$O4DHGDDV,QVXUJHQF\´-RLQW)RUFH4XDUWHUO\ (October KWWSZZZQGXHGXLQVV3UHVVMITBSDJHVLKWP DFFHVVHG'HFHPEHU 06) 3UHVV 5HOHDVH ³06) 3XOOV 2XW RI $IJKDQLVWDQ´ -XO\ KWWSZZZPVIRUJ PVILQWHUQDWLRQDOLQYRNHFIP"FRPSRQHQW SUHVVUHOHDVH REMHFWLG '))'' $'(%($(' PHWKRG IXOOBKWPO DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU 0XUUH\ 7KRPDV :-U ³.KREDU 7RZHUV¶$IWHUPDWK7KH 'HYHORSPHQW RI )RUFH 3URWHFWLRQ´ $LU 6SDFH3RZHU-RXUQDO 25 October 2000. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/ 0XUUH\KWPO DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ Musharraf, Pervez. ,QWKH/LQHRI)LUH New York, NY: Free Press, 2006. 0\OURLH/DXULH³7KH:RUOG7UDGH&HQWHU%RPE:KRLV5DP]L

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 238 of 316

Bibliography

³1*2 ,QVHFXULW\ LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´ $IJKDQLVWDQ 1*2 6DIHW\ 2I¿FH $162 DQG &$5( May 2005. KWWSZZZFDUHRUJQHZVURRPVSHFLDOUHSRUWVDIJKDQLVWDQBDQVRFDUHSGI DFFHVVHG $XJXVW 1LFKRO-LP³&HQWUDO$VLD¶V6HFXULW\,VVXHVDQG,PSOLFDWLRQIRU86,QWHUHVWV´&565HSRUWIRU&RQJUHVV 8SGDWHG)HEUXDU\ Nichols, Robert, ed. &RORQLDO 5HSRUWV RQ 3DNLVWDQ¶V )URQWLHU 7ULEDO $UHDV Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005. 1RRQDQ0LFKDHODQG0DUN/HZLV³&RQTXHULQJWKH(OHPHQWV7KRXJKWVRQ-RLQW)RUFH 5H 2UJDQL zation.” 3DUDPHWHUV(Autumn 2003): 38. Nyrop, Richard F., and Donald M. Seekins. $IJKDQLVWDQ$&RXQWU\6WXG\Washington, DC: American University, 1986. O’Balance, Edgar O. $IJKDQ:DUV%DWWOHVLQD+RVWLOH/DQGWRWKH3UHVHQW Revised Paperback Edition. London: Brassey’s, 2002. 2¶&RQQRU3KLOOLS³7ZR0HQ:KR)RXJKW7HUURU´6W/RXLV3RVW'LVSDWFK22 February 2004. 2I¿FHIRUWKH&RRUGLQDWRURI&RXQWHUWHUURULVP:HEVLWHKWWSZZZVWDWHJRYVFW DFFHVVHG$SULO 2I¿FHRI&RXQWHULQWHOOLJHQFH6S\DQG7HUURULVW%ULH¿QJ&HQWHU7HUURULVW$WWDFNVKWWSZZZKDQIRUG JRYRFLFLBWHUURULVWFIP"GRVVLHU DFFHVVHG$SULO 2I¿FHRIWKH$VVLVWDQW6HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVH 3XEOLF$IIDLUV ³2SHQLQJ6WDWHPHQWE\6HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVH William J. Perry before the House National Security Committee on the Downing Assessment Task Force.” Press Release No. 544-96, 19 September 1996. http://www.defenselink.mil/ releases/release.aspx?releaseid=1043 (DFFHVVHG$SULO 2I¿FHRI1DWLRQDO'UXJ&RQWURO3ROLF\³(VWLPDWHG3RSS\&XOWLYDWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´3UHVV5HOHDVH 28 November 2003. http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/NEWS/press03/112803.html DFFHVVHG$XJXVW Oliker, Olga, Richard Kauzlarich, James Dobbins, Kurt W. Basseuner, Donald L. Sampler, John G. McGinn, Michael J. Dziedzic, Adam Grissom, Bruce Pirnie, Nora Bensahel, and A. Istar Guven. $LG'XULQJ&RQÀLFW,QWHUDFWLRQ%HWZHHQ0LOLWDU\DQG&LYLOLDQ$VVLVWDQFH3URYLGHUVLQ $IJKDQLVWDQ 6HSWHPEHU±-XQH. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004. ³2QH+RXVHRI3DUOLDPHQW:LOO5HPDLQ,QFRPSOHWH´:DVKLQJWRQ3RVW21 March 2005. O’Neill, Bard. ,QVXUJHQF\ 7HUURULVP,QVLGH0RGHUQ5HYROXWLRQDU\:DUIDUH. Dulles: VA: Brassey’s Inc: 1990. ³2SHQLQJRIWKH)LIW\6L[WK6HVVLRQ*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\&RQGHPQV+HLQRXV$FWVRI7HUURULVP3HUSHWUDWHG in Host City and Washington.” Fifty-Sixth General Assembly Plenary, 1st Meeting, 12 October 2001. ³2SHQLQJ6WDWHPHQWRI$GPLUDO+DUROG:*HKPDQ-U861DY\&RPPDQGHULQ&KLHI8QLWHG6WDWHV Joint Forces Command, Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate,” 24 March 2000. http://armed- VHUYLFHVVHQDWHJRYVWDWHPQWKJSGI DFFHVVHG$SULO ³2SHUDWLRQ$SROOR´%DFNJURXQGHU/DQG)RUFH:HVWHUQ$UHD, n.d. Department of National Defence/ &DQDGLDQ)RUFHVZZZDUP\IRUFHVFDOIZD DFFHVVHG$XJXVW ³2SHUDWLRQ&RQGRU´2SHUDWLRQ9HULWDV. UK Ministry of Defence, 22 May 2002. http://www.operations. mod.uk/veritas/condor.htm (accessed 4 December 2008). ³2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP&RDOLWLRQ0LOLWDU\)DWDOLWLHVE\

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 239 of 316

Bibliography

³2SHUDWLRQ9DOLDQW6WULNH´$UP\, 1 May 2003. ³2VDPDELQ/DGHQ$&KURQRORJ\RI+LV3ROLWLFDO/LIH´3%6 )5217/,1( http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ SDJHVIURQWOLQHVKRZVELQODGHQHWFFURQKWPO DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ ³2VDPDELQ/DGHQLQWHUYLHZE\3HWHU$UQHWW´7UDQVFULSW&110DUFKKWWSZZZDQXVKDFRP osamaint.htm (accessed 21 November 2006). 2ZHQV&RORQHO.HYLQ³1HZV%ULH¿QJZLWK&RORQHO.HYLQ2ZHQV´2I¿FHRIWKH$VVLVWDQW6HFUHWDU\ of Defense for Public Affairs, 23 September 2005. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ WUDQVFULSWDVS["WUDQVFULSWLG DFFHVVHG0D\ 2]HUQR\ ,ODQD ³7KH 5HWXUQ RI WKH 7DOLEDQ´ 86 1HZV DQG :RUOG 5HSRUW (29 September 2003): ± 3DNLVWDQ 0LVVLRQ WR WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 1HZ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 240 of 316

Bibliography

³3UHVLGHQW 2UGHUV 5HDG\ 5HVHUYHV RI$UPHG )RUFHV WR$FWLYH 'XW\ ([HFXWLYH 2UGHU 2UGHULQJ WKH Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty and Delegating Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation,” 14 September 2001. http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-5.html (accessed 3 December 2008). ³3UHVLGHQW 2XWOLQHV:DU(IIRUW 5HPDUNV E\ WKH 3UHVLGHQW WR WKH *HRUJH & 0DUVKDOO 527&$ZDUG 6HPLQDURQ1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\´2I¿FHRIWKH3UHVV6HFUHWDU\7KH:KLWH+RXVH$SULO KWWSZZZZKLWHKRXVHJRYQHZVUHOHDVHV DFFHVVHG-XO\ ³3UHVLGHQW8UJHV5HDGLQHVVDQG3DWLHQFH5HPDUNVE\WKH3UHVLGHQW6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH&ROLQ3RZHOO and Attorney General John Ashcroft, Camp David, Thurmont, MD, 15 September 2001.” http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915-4.html (accessed 18 September 2008). ³3UHVV6WDWHPHQWE\6HFXULW\&RXQFLO3UHVLGHQWRQ7HUURULVW$WWDFNVLQ8QLWHG6WDWHV´3UHVV5HOHDVH 6&6HSWHPEHU 3ULFH -RKDQQ ³2SHUDWLRQ (QGXULQJ )UHHGRP &KDLQ RI &RPPDQG´ &HQWHU IRU 'HIHQVH ,QIRUPDWLRQ 7HUURULVP 3URMHFW. Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 26 June 2002. http:// www.cdi.org/terrorism/OEFcommand-pr.cfm (accessed 11 December 2008). 3URNKDQRY$ ³5XVVLDQ -RXUQDOLVW 6RUWV$PRQJ WKH 5XLQV RI 1LQH

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 241 of 316

Bibliography

5H\QROGV$QGUHZ/XF\-RQHVDQG$QGUHZ:LOGHU³$*XLGHWR3DUOLDPHQWDU\(OHFWLRQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´ Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, August 2005. http://unplan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/ SXEOLFGRFXPHQWV$3&,7<813/$1SGI DFFHVVHG-XQH 5KHP.DWKOHHQ7³2I¿FLDOV/DXG5HEXLOGLQJRI$IJKDQ*LUOV6FKRRO´$UPHG)RUFHV3UHVV6HUYLFH 2FWREHUKWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLO DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ 5KHP6HUJHDQW)LUVW&ODVV.DWKOHHQ7³%XVK6HQGLQJ5XPVIHOGWR0HHW/HDGHUVLQ,QGLD3DNLVWDQ´ $PHULFDQ)RUFHV3UHVV6HUYLFH1HZV$UWLFOHV, 30 May 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ newsarticle.aspx?id=43995 (accessed 11 December 2008). 5LFH)UHGHULFN³$IJKDQLVWDQ8QLW7DNHVRQ1HZ0LVVLRQDQG1DPH´$PHULFDQ)RUFHV3UHVV6HUYLFH 13 July 2005. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16650 (accessed 22 May 5LFKDUG$ODLQ³7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ$5LVLQJ)HDWXUHRQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WDJH´5HPDUNVE\WKH Minister of Defence of France, 12 Forum, %XQGHVZHKU *HVHOOVFKDIW:HOWDP6RQQWDJBerlin, 2FWREHU KWWSZZZGHIHQVHJRXYIUVLWHVGHIHQVHHQJOLVKBFRQWHQWVWKHBPLQLVWU\B RIBGHIHQFHDUFKLYHWKHBPLQLVWHUBRIBGHIHQFHBGLVFRXUVKWP DFFHVVHG 6 December 2006). 5LFNV 7KRPDV ( DQG $ODQ 6LSUHVV ³$WWDFNV 5HVWUDLQHG E\ 3ROLWLFDO *RDOV´ :DVKLQJWRQ 3RVW 23 October 2001. 5LVHQ-DPHVDQG'DYLG-RKQVWRQ³%XVK+DV:LGHQHG$XWKRULW\RI&,$WR.LOO7HUURULVWV´1HZ6RXUFH$OH[DQGHU/\DNKRYVN\ 7UDJHG\DQG9DORURI

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 242 of 316

Bibliography

$IJKDQ,VNRQ0RVFRZ$SSHQGL[7UDQVODWHGE\6YHWODQD6DYUDQVND\D@KWWSZZZ JZXHGXaQVDUFKLY16$(%%16$(%%VRYLHWKWPO DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ Scales, General Robert H., USA. &HUWDLQ9LFWRU\7KH86$UP\LQWKH*XOI:DU Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994. 6FDUERURXJK 5RZDQ ³86 6HDUFK IRU ELQ /DGHQ ,QWHQVL¿HV 8QLW WKDW 7UDFNHG 6DGGDP 0RYHV WR Afghanistan.” :DVKLQJWRQ7LPHV23 February 2004. 6FKPLWW(ULFDQG'DYLG5RKGH³7DOLEDQ)LJKWHUV,QFUHDVH$WWDFNVZLWK7URXEOLQJ7ROO$PRQJ*,¶V and Afghans.” 1HZ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 243 of 316

Bibliography

6LJQL¿FDQW7HUURULVW,QFLGHQWV±$%ULHI&KURQRORJ\ US Department of State. http://www. VWDWHJRYUSDKRSXEVIVKWP DFFHVVHG$SULO 6LSUHVV$ODQDQG9HUQRQ/RHE³868QFRXSOHV0LOLWDU\3ROLWLFDO(IIRUWV2I¿FLDOV'HFLGHWR6WHS8S Bombing Without a Postwar Government Arranged.” :DVKLQJWRQ3RVW1 November 2001. 6NLQQHU(OL]DEHWK³6WUDWHJLF,QVLJKW5XVVLDDQG(XUDVLD(QGXULQJ)UHHGRPIRU&HQWUDO$VLD"´&HQWHU IRU &RQWHPSRUDU\ &RQÀLFW 1DYDO 3RVWJUDGXDWH 6FKRRO 2 April 2002. http://www.ccc.nps. QDY\PLOVLDSUUXVVLDSGI DFFHVVHG0D\ 6ORDQ6WDQOH\5³7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKH8VHRI)RUFHLQWKH3RVW&ROG:DU:RUOG7RZDUG6HOI Deterrence?” &RQJUHVVLRQDO5HVHDUFK6HUYLFH5HSRUWIRU&RQJUHVV, 20 July 1994. 6ORVVHU 6SHFLDOLVW -RKQ ³G¶V µ:KLWH 'HYLOV¶ PDNH 9DOLDQW5HWXUQ´ 'HIHQG $PHULFD April 2003. http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/apr2003/a040103a.html (accessed 9 November 2008). 6O\/L]³7DOLEDQ6XVSHFWHGLQ$WWDFNVRQ$IJKDQV*XDUGLQJ+LJKZD\:RUN´.QLJKW5LGGHU7ULEXQH 1HZV 6HUYLFH 6HSWHPEHU KWWSZZZOLEUDU\RFRPDUWLFOHDVS["QXP DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU 6PLWK%ULJDGLHU*HQHUDO-DPHV³6SHFLDO%ULH¿QJRQ0LOOHQQLXP&KDOOHQJH´86'HSDUWPHQW RI'HIHQVH1HZV7UDQVFULSW, 22 May 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil (accessed 9 December 2008). Smith, Michael. 7KH.LOOHU(OLWH7KH,QVLGH6WRU\RI$PHULFD¶V0RVW6HFUHW6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQV7HDP New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2006. 6PXFNHU3KLOLS³+RZELQ/DGHQ*RW$ZD\$'D\E\'D\$FFRXQWRI+RZ2VDPDELQ/DGHQ(OXGHG the World’s Most Powerful Military Machine.” &KULVWLDQ 6FLHQFH 0RQLWRU 4 March 2002. KWWSZZZFVPRQLWRUFRPSVZRVFKWPO DFFHVVHG0D\ 6RORZD\&ROLQ³,

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 244 of 316

Bibliography

6WHLQ /LVD ³7KH:HHN´ 86 1HZV DQG :RUOG5HSRUW, 12 December 2004. http://www.usnews.com/ usnews/news/articles/041220/20week.lede.htm (accessed 18 February 2009). Stewart, Richard W. 7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV$UP\LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP2FWREHU ±0DUFK&0+3XEOLFDWLRQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&&HQWHURI0LOLWDU\+LVWRU\ 2006. Stockton, Nicholas. 6WUDWHJLF&RRUGLQDWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, August 2002. 6WRJUDQ &RORQHO 3DWULFN ³)OHGJOLQJ 6ZDQV 7DNH )OLJKW 7KH 7KLUG %DWWDOLRQ 3ULQFHVV 3DWULFLD¶V Canadian Light Infantry in Afghanistan.” &DQDGLDQ $UP\ -RXUQDO, Fall/Winter 2004/2005. KWWSVHDUFK"T FDFKH%D\5\H7&V-ZZZDUP\IRUFHVJFFDFDMGRFXPHQWV YROBLVVB DFFHVVHG$XJXVW 6\PRQ)LRQD³$IJKDQLVWDQ¶V1RUWKHUQ$OOLDQFH´%%&1HZV2QOLQH19 September 2001. http://news. EEFXN DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ 6\QRYLW]5RQ³$IJKDQLVWDQ1HZ1DWLRQDO$UP\%DVHV3ODQQHGLQ)RXU3URYLQFHV´0DUFK http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/3/360A06F8-2DE5-4B3D-8DCF-55F0CE3A648E. KWPO DFFHVVHG-XQH ³7DOLEDQ 'HQRXQFH$IJKDQ (OHFWLRQV9RZWR 5HVLVW )XWXUH 3DUOLDPHQW´ %%& 0RQLWRULQJ 1HZV¿OH 21 September 2005. ³7DOLEDQ3OHGJHWR'LVUXSW$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV5XOHRXW3ROOLQJ'D\$WWDFNV´%%&0RQLWRULQJ6RXWK $VLD21 August 2005. ³7DUJHW$PHULFD7HUURULVW$WWDFNVRQ$PHULFDQV±%RPELQJRI/D%HOOH'LVFRWHTXH´3%6 )5217/,1( http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html (accessed $SULO ³7DUJHW$PHULFD7HUURULVW$WWDFNVRQ$PHULFDQV±%RPELQJRI5RPH9LHQQD$LUSRUWV´ 3%6 )5217/,1(. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html (accessed $SULO ³7DUJHW$PHULFD7HUURULVW$WWDFNVRQ$PHULFDQV±+LMDFNLQJRI&UXLVH6KLS$FKLOOH/DXUR´ 3%6 )5217/,1(. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html DFFHVVHG$SULO ³7DUJHW$PHULFD7HUURULVW$WWDFNVRQ$PHULFDQV±7KUHDWVIURP/LE\D´3%6 )5217/,1(. KWWSZZZSEVRUJZJEKSDJHVIURQWOLQHVKRZVWDUJHWHWFFURQKWPO DFFHVVHG$SULO 7DU]L6KDK0³3ROLWLFVRIWKH$IJKDQ5HVLVWDQFH0RYHPHQW&OHDYDJHV'LVXQLW\DQG)UDJPHQWDWLRQ´ $VLDQ6XUYH\QR -XQH ± 7HKUDQLDQ0DMLG³&RPPXQLFDWLRQ*OREDO7HUURULVP6HDUFKLQJIRU$SSURSULDWH5HVSRQVHV´3DFL¿FD 5HYLHZQR )HEUXDU\ ± ³7HUURULVP´)%,3XEOLFDWLRQ86'HSDUWPHQWRI-XVWLFH ³7HUURULVPLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV&RXQWHUWHUURULVP7KUHDW$VVHVVPHQWDQG:DUQLQJ8QLW´1DWLRQDO Security Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1996. ³7HUURULVW1HWZRUN)DFW6KHHW´:KLWH+RXVH3UHVV5HOHDVH1RYHPEHUKWWSZZZZKLWHKRXVH JRYQHZVUHOHDVHVKWPO DFFHVVHG$SULO ³7H[WRI %XVK¶V$FW RI:DU6WDWHPHQW´%%& 1HZV 12 September 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ ZRUOGDPHULFDVVWP DFFHVVHG$SULO 7KH&RPPLVVLRQ5HSRUW)LQDO5HSRUWRIWKH1DWLRQDO&RPPLVVLRQRQ7HUURULVW$WWDFNV8SRQWKH 8QLWHG6WDWHV. Washington, DC, 2004. 7KH&RPPLVVLRQ5HSRUW New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004. ³7KH&DPSDLJQIRU0D]DUH6KDULI´&'RIUHHQDFWPHQWRI0D]DUHFDPSDLJQSUHSDUHGE\WKH,QVWLWXWH for Defense Analyses.

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 245 of 316

Bibliography

³7KH *XOI:DU 2UDO +LVWRU\ 5LFKDUG &KHQH\´ 3%6 )5217/,1(. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ IURQWOLQHJXOIRUDOFKHQH\KWPO DFFHVVHG$SULO ³7KH +HDUWEUHDN RI 0D]DUH 6KDULI´ &%& 1HZV 2QOLQH -DQXDU\ KWWSZZZFEFFDQHZV EDFNJURXQG$IJKDQLVWDQPD]DUHVKDULIKWPO DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ ³7KH/LEHUDWLRQRI0D]DUH6KDULIWK6)*URXS&RQGXFWV8:LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ´6SHFLDO:DUIDUH15, QR -XQH ± The North Atlantic Treaty, Article V, 4 April 1949. 7RGG 6DQGOHU ³&ROOHFWLYH $FWLRQ DQG 7UDQVQDWLRQDO 7HUURULVP´ :RUOG (FRQRP\ (June 2003): ± ³7UDQVFULSWRI8VDPD%LQ/DGHQ9LGHR7DSH´'HFHPEHUKWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOQHZV 'HFGXEOSGI DFFHVVHG0D\ ³7UDQVIRUPLQJ:KLOH0RELOL]LQJ3DUW,RID7ZR3DUW,QWHUYLHZZLWK/7*-DPHV5+HOPO\´$UP\ 5HVHUYH0DJD]LQH 49, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 8–11. 7XFNHU'DYLG³&RPEDWLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO7HUURULVP´,Q7KH7HUURULVP7KUHDWDQG86*RYHUQPHQW 5HVSRQVH2SHUDWLRQDODQG2UJDQL]DWLRQDO)DFWRUV edited by James M. Smith and William C. Thomas. US Air Force Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001. Turpin,*X\0DMRU.01%3,2³3UHSDULQJIRUWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO/R\D-LUJD´1RYHPEHU KWWSZZZQDWRLQW,6$)8SGDWHYDULDJHWUHDG\KWP DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU 7\OHU3DWULFN³86DQG%ULWDLQ6WULNH$IJKDQLVWDQ$LPLQJDW%DVHVDQG7HUURULVW&DPSV%XVK:DUQV µ7DOLEDQ:LOO3D\D3ULFH¶´1HZ

Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 246 of 316

Bibliography

UN Preamble. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945. 81 3UHVV 5HOHDVH 6& ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 3ROLWLFDO3URJUHVV )DVWHU WKDQ ([SHFWHG 6HFXULW\7KUHDWV Remain, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Tells Security Council.” http://www. XQRUJ1HZV3UHVVGRFVVFGRFKWP DFFHVVHG'HFHPEHU UN Resolution 1269, 19 October 1999. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/303/92/PDF/ 1SGI"2SHQ(OHPHQW DFFHVVHG$SULO UN Security Council Resolution 1401, 4501st Meeting, 28 March 2002, Report of the Secretary General. ³7KH 6LWXDWLRQ LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ DQG LWV ,PSOLFDWLRQV IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 3HDFH DQG 6HFXULW\´ 18 March 2002. 81³6HFXULW\&RXQFLO8QDQLPRXVO\$GRSWV:LGH5DQJLQJ$QWL7HUURULVP5HVROXWLRQ´3UHVV5HOHDVH 6&6HFXULW\&RXQFLOWK0HHWLQJ 1LJKW 6HSWHPEHU 81³6HQLRU,QWHU$JHQF\1HWZRUNRQ,QWHUQDO'LVSODFHPHQW0LVVLRQWR$IJKDQLVWDQ´)LQGLQJVDQG 5HFRPPHQGDWLRQVIURPWKH816SHFLDO&RRUGLQDWRURQ,QWHUQDO'LVSODFHPHQWIURP0LVVLRQ, 18–25 April 2001. 81³8QLWHG1DWLRQ¶V5ROH(VVHQWLDOLQµ0RUDO,PSHUDWLYH¶RI3UHYHQWLQJ&RQÀLFW*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\ Told, As Debate Continues on Secretary-General’s Report.” Press Release/9916, Fifty-sixth General Meeting, 9th Meeting (AM), 25 September 2001. 86$JHQF\IRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO'HYHORSPHQW³86$,')DFW6KHHWRQ+XPDQLWDULDQ$LGIRU$IJKDQLVWDQ´ $SULOKWWSJHQHYDXVPLVVLRQJRYSUHVV DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ 86 &RQJUHVV *ROGZDWHU1LFKROV $FW RI KWWSZZZDXDIPLODXDZFDZFJDWHFRQJUHVVWLWOHB KWP DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ US Congress. House. House Armed Services Committee. 6WDWHPHQWRI*HQHUDO7RPP\5)UDQNVWK &RQJ)HEUXDU\ ———. 6WDWHPHQW RI /LHXWHQDQW *HQHUDO .DUO : (LNHQEHUU\ 86 $UP\ 110th Cong., 1st Sess., )HEUXDU\ US Congress. Joint Resolution. $XWKRUL]DWLRQ IRU 8VH RI 0LOLWDU\ )RUFH WK &RQJ 6- 5HV &RQJUHVVLRQDO5HFRUG9RO 6HSWHPEHU KWWSZZZXVFRQVWLWXWLRQQHWQHZVDUFKB KWPO DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ US Congress. Senate. Senate Armed Services Committee. 3UHSDUHG 7HVWLPRQ\ RI 86 6HFUHWDU\ RI 'HIHQVH 'RQDOG + 5XPVIHOG EHIRUH WKH 6HQDWH $UPHG 6HUYLFHV &RPPLWWHH RQ 3URJUHVV LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ. As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Dirksen Senate 2I¿FH %XLOGLQJ:DVKLQJWRQ'& -XO\ KWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOVSHHFKHV VVHFGHIKWPO DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ ———. SWDWHPHQWRI*HQHUDO%U\DQ'%URZQ86$UP\109th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 April 2005. ———. 6WDWHPHQWRI*HQHUDO+HQU\+6KHOWRQ&KDLUPDQRIWKH-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDIIWK&RQJUHVV 3 May 2001. http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2001/010503shelton.pdf (accessed $SULO ———. 6WDWHPHQWRI*HQHUDO-RKQ3$EL]DLG86$UP\&(17&203RVWXUH6WDWHPHQW109th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 March 2005. ———. 6WDWHPHQWRI*HQHUDO-RKQ3$EL]DLG86$UP\&(17&203RVWXUH6WDWHPHQW109th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 March 2006. ———. 6WDWHPHQWRI*HQHUDO-RVHSK:5DOVWRQ9LFH&KDLUPDQRIWKH-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDII. 106th Congress, 9 March 1999. http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/1999/990309jr.pdf DFFHVVHG$SULO ———. 6WDWHPHQW RI *HQHUDO 7RPP\ 5 )UDQNV &RPPDQGHU LQ &KLHI RI 86 &HQWUDO &RPPDQG. Transcript, 22 March 2001. ———. 6WDWHPHQWRI*HQHUDO7RPP\5)UDQNV&RPPDQGHU86&HQWUDO&RPPDQG 31 July 2002.

380 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 247 of 316

Bibliography

US Congress. Senate. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Caucasus. 6WDWHPHQW RI (OL]DEHWK$ -RQHV$VVLVWDQW 6HFUHWDU\ IRU (XURSHDQ DQG (XUDVLDQ $IIDLUV. Washington, DC, 13 December 2001. 86'HSDUWPHQWRI'HIHQVH³$IJKDQ(QJLQHHU'LVWULFW&KLHI8SGDWHV3URMHFWV´$PHULFDQ)RUFHV3UHVV 6HUYLFH$SULOKWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOQHZVQHZVDUWLFOHDVS["LG DFFHVVHG 23 February 2009). ²²² ³'2' 1HZV %ULH¿QJ²*HQ 0\HUV´ 'HIHQVH/LQN 1HZV 7UDQVFULSW (20 October 2001). http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript/aspx?transcriptid=2145 (accessed 1 April ²²²³'2'1HZV%ULH¿QJ²6HFUHWDU\5XPVIHOGDQG*HQ0\HUV´'HIHQVH/LQN1HZV7UDQVFULSW 2FWREHUKWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLO DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ ²²²³'2'1HZV%ULH¿QJ²6HFUHWDU\5XPVIHOGDQG*HQ0\HUV´'HIHQVH/LQN1HZV7UDQVFULSW, 1RYHPEHUKWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLO DFFHVVHG0DUFK ²²²³([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\RIWKH%DWWOHRI7DNXU*KDU´0D\ ²²² ³,QWR$IJKDQLVWDQ 5RRWLQJ 2XW 7HUURULVWV´ 'HIHQVH/LQN. http://www.defenselink.mil/home/ IHDWXUHVGKWPO DFFHVVHG0D\ ²²²³5XPVIHOG9LVLWV7KDQNV867URRSVDW&DPS;5D\LQ&XED´'HIHQVH/LQN1HZV7UDQVFULSWV -DQXDU\ KWWSZZZGHIHQVHOLQNPLOQHZV-DQQBKWPO DFFHVVHG0DUFK 86'HSDUWPHQWRI-XVWLFH2,*6SHFLDO5HSRUW³7KH)%,/DERUDWRU\$Q,QYHVWLJDWLRQLQWR/DERUDWRU\ Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives-Related and Other Cases, Section D: The %XVK$VVDVVLQDWLRQ$WWHPSW´$SULOKWWSZZZXVGRMJRYRLJVSHFLDOD DFFHVVHG $SULO 86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH³)DFW6KHHW$IJKDQLVWDQ(OHFWLRQV:RPHQ¶V3DUWLFLSDWLRQ´KWWSZZZ VWDWHJRYJZLUOVKWP DFFHVVHG0D\ ²²²³)DFW6KHHW3URJUHVVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ¶V5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ´0DUFKKWWSZZZVWDWHJRY USDSUVSVKWP DFFHVVHG-XQH ²²² ³5RDG WR 'HPRFUDF\ $IJKDQ (OHFWLRQV´ SRVWHG 1RYHPEHU KWWSXVLQIRVWDWHJRY SURGXFWVSXEVDIJHOHFWDIJKDQLVWDQKWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ ²²²³5RDGWR'HPRFUDF\$IJKDQ(OHFWLRQV3UHVLGHQW.DU]DL¶V,QDXJXUDWLRQ´ SRVWHG'HFHPEHU KWWSXVLQIRVWDWHJRYSURGXFWVSXEVDIJHOHFWNDU]LKWP DFFHVVHG-XO\ ²²²³7KH)LUVW'HPRFUDWLF(OHFWLRQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ$5HSRUWE\WKH%LSDUWLVDQ2EVHUYHU7HDP´ 2FWREHUKWWSISFVWDWHJRYISFKWP DFFHVVHG0D\ ²²²³1HZ$IJKDQ,QLWLDWLYHV3URPRWH*URZWK(GXFDWLRQ'HPRFUDF\´-XQHKWWSXVLQIR VWDWHJRYVD$UFKLYH-XQKWPO DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU 86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWHDQG86'HSDUWPHQWRI'HIHQVH³,QWHUDJHQF\$VVHVVPHQWRI$IJKDQLVWDQ3ROLFH 7UDLQLQJ DQG 5HDGLQHVV´ '26 5HSRUW 1R ,63,42 '2' 5HSRUW 1R ,( 14 November 2006. 86 *RYHUQPHQW $FFRXQWDELOLW\ 2I¿FH *$2 $IJKDQLVWDQ 5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ 'HWHULRUDWLQJ 6HFXULW\ DQG /LPLWHG 5HVRXUFHV +DYH ,PSHGHG 3URJUHVV ,PSURYHPHQWV LQ 86 6WUDWHJ\ 1HHGHG June 2004. ²²²*$2$IJKDQLVWDQ6HFXULW\(IIRUWVWR(VWDEOLVK$UP\DQG3ROLFH+DYH0DGH3URJUHVV EXW)XWXUH3ODQV1HHGWR%H%HWWHU'H¿QHG June 2005. ²²²*$2$IJKDQLVWDQ5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ'HVSLWH6RPH3URJUHVV'HWHULRUDWLQJ6HFXULW\ DQG2WKHU2EVWDFOHV&RQWLQXHWR7KUHDWHQ$FKLHYHPHQWRI86*RDOV July 2005. www.gao. JRYQHZLWHPVGSGI DFFHVVHG0D\ ²²²*$2636HFXULQJ6WDELOL]LQJDQG5HFRQVWUXFWLQJ$IJKDQLVWDQ0D\ZZZJDR JRYQHZLWHPVGVSSGI DFFHVVHG-XO\

381 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 248 of 316

Bibliography

———. GAO Report, &RPEDWLQJ 7HUURULVP)HGHUDO$JHQFLHV¶(IIRUWVWR,PSOHPHQW1DWLRQDO3ROLF\ DQG6WUDWHJ\6HSWHPEHU ———. GAO Report, &RPEDWLQJ 7HUURULVP ,VVXHV WR EH 5HVROYHG WR ,PSURYH &RXQWHUWHUURULVP 2SHUDWLRQV 13 May 1999. 86 ,QVWLWXWH RI 3HDFH ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 3URVSHFWV IRU 3HDFH DQG 5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ´ KWWSZZZXVLSRUJ HYHQWVHVKWPO DFFHVVHG0DUFK ²²² ³$JUHHPHQW RQ 3URYLVLRQDO$UUDQJHPHQWV LQ$IJKDQLVWDQ 3HQGLQJ WKH 5H(VWDEOLVKPHQW RI 3HUPDQHQW *RYHUQPHQW ,QVWLWXWLRQV KWWSZZZXVLSRUJOLEUDU\SD$IJKDQLVWDQSDBDIJKDQB KWPO DFFHVVHG0DUFK ³86/DUJHVW6LQJOH'RQRURI$LGWR$IJKDQV´ US State Department Archives, 2 October 2000. http:// XVLQIRVWDWHJRYLV$UFKLYHB,QGH[86B/DUJHVWB6LQJOHB'RQRUBRIB$LGBWRB$IJKDQVKWPO DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ ³860LVVLOHV3RXQG7DUJHWVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ6XGDQ´&11FRP 21 August 1998. http://www.cnn.com/ 86XVVWULNHV DFFHVVHG$SULO ³861HWVµ$O4DHGD¶)LQDQFLHU´%%&1HZV2QOLQH, 12 September 2002. http://news/bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ VRXWKBDVLDVWP DFFHVVHG$XJXVW ³865HMHFWV7DOLEDQ2IIHUWR7U\%LQ/DGHQ´&11FRP2FWREHUKWWSDUFKLYHVFQQFRP XVUHWXVWDOLEDQ DFFHVVHG6HSWHPEHU 86 6SHFLDO 2SHUDWLRQV &RPPDQG 0LVVLRQ KWWSZZZVRFRPPLO'RFV&RPPDQGB0LVVLRQ SGI DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ ³86 7URRSV )LQLVK µ2SHUDWLRQ 0RXQWDLQ /LRQ¶´ &11FRP75$16&5,376 $SULO KWWS WUDQVFULSWVFQQFRP75$16&5,376"60KWPO DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ 9LJDU6DLG+DELEDQG*KXODP6D\HHG1DMDPL³0DVVRXGD-DODO3K\VLFLDQ7DONV8S+HU1HXWUDOLW\´ ,QVWLWXWHIRU:DU 3HDFH5HSRUWLQJ 2FWREHU $551RKWWSZZZLZSUQHW "S DUU V I R DSFBVWDWH KHQLDUUIDEIDGEDFIIEEH DFFHVVHG -XO\ von Clausewitz, Carl. 2Q:DU Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: 3ULQFHWRQ8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV :DOGPDQ$P\³0DVWHUVRI6XLFLGH%RPELQJ7DPLO*XHUULOODVRI6UL/DQND´1HZ

382 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 249 of 316

Bibliography

²²²³5HPDUNVE\WKH3UHVLGHQW8SRQ$UULYDODW%DUNVGDOH$LU)RUFH%DVH´6HSWHPEHU KWWSZZZZKLWHKRXVHJRY DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ :KLWWOH-HQQLIHUDQG6WHYH$OYDUH]³6SHFLDO)RUFHV2I¿FHU+RQRUHGIRU+HURLVPLQ0D]DUH6KDULI Prison Battle.” 'HIHQG $PHULFD 1HZV 14 November 2003. http://www.defendamerica.mil DFFHVVHG-DQXDU\ Wilber, Donald M. $IJKDQLVWDQ. New Haven: HRAF Press, 1962. Windows on Asia. *HRJUDSK\ RI $IJKDQLVWDQ. http://www.asia.msu.edu/centralasia/Afghanistan/ JHRJUDSK\KWPO DFFHVVHG)HEUXDU\ :LUVLQJ5REHUW³3UHFDULRXV3DUWQHUVKLS3DNLVWDQ¶V5HVSRQVHWR866HFXULW\3ROLFLHV´$VLD3DFL¿F &HQWHU IRU 6HFXULW\ 6WXGLHV 6SHFLDO $VVHVVPHQW (2003). http://www.apcss.org/Publications/ SAS/SASAPResponse030320/PrecariousPartnershipPakistansResponsetoUSSecurityPolicies. SGI DFFHVVHG0D\ Wishnick, Elizabeth. *URZLQJ 86 6HFXULW\ ,QWHUHVWV LQ &HQWUDO$VLD. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 3URFHHGLQJVRIWKH&RQIHUHQFH7KH865ROHLQWKH :RUOG(QKDQFLQJWKH&DSDFLW\WR5HVSRQGWR&RPSOH[&RQWLQJHQF\2SHUDWLRQV. Washington, DC, 19 September 2001. ³:RUGV$ORQH,QDGHTXDWHDV5HVSRQVHWR7HUURULVW$WWDFNV6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO7HOOV2SHQLQJRI)LIW\ 6L[WK*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\´3UHVV5HOHDVH6*60*$6HSWHPEHU ³:RUNLQJWR%ULQJ3HDFHDQG6WDELOLW\WR$IJKDQLVWDQ´1$72%ULH¿QJ$XJXVWKWWSZZZ QDWRLQWLVVXHVDIJKDQLVWDQEULH¿QJBDIJKDQLVWDQBSGI DFFHVVHG$XJXVW :RUOG %DQN ³$IJKDQLVWDQ 5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ 7UXVW )XQG´ -XO\ KWWSJRZRUOGEDQNRUJ *260'2 DFFHVVHG$XJXVW ³

383 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 250 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 251 of 316

Index 1 2 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, Afghan National Army, 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry (2-5 IN), 285–286, 292, 265 334 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (1-87 IN), 62, 67, 115, 2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, 108, 331 137, 139–140, 143, 145, 147, 149, 153– 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry (2-14 IN), 232 157, 160, 162–163, 166, 248–251, 254, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (2-22 IN), 232, 249, 260, 331, 334 252–254, 334 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry (2-27 IN), 284–285, Regiment (SOAR), 62–63, 67, 157, 334 331–332, 338 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, 334 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, 296, 334 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry (2-87 IN), 249, 251, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry (1-187 IN), 115, 136, 253–254, 260, 332, 334 140–141, 154–156, 161–163, 178, 185– 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry (2-187 IN), 136, 186, 331, 354 139–140, 145, 147, 153, 155–156, 160, 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Regiment (1-325 165, 176, 331 AIR), 291, 306, 334–335 2d Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment Regiment (SOAR) (2-160), 62, 67, 331 (1-501 PIR), 248–249, 253–254, 277, 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry (2-503 285, 334 PIR), 291, 335 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment 2d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry (2-504 (1-505 PIR), 212, 333–334, 353 PIR), 217, 291, 333, 335 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, 178, 232, (1-508 PIR), 291, 335 261, 331–332, 341, 351, 353 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, 239, 247, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 115 334 21st Theater Support Command (TSC), 85 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, 211, 217, 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 253, 281 290, 333, 335, 340 25-mm Gatling gun, 85 10th Forward Support Battalion (10th FSB), 250, 25th Infantry Division (25th ID), 269, 277, 279– 260, 334 280, 283, 292, 294–296, 309, 312, 334– 10th Mountain Division, 5, 62, 67, 83–84, 115, 335, 352–353 127, 132–133, 162, 165–166, 178–179, 200th Materiel Management Center, 85 189–190, 204, 211, 219, 232, 234, 237– 202d Military Intelligence Battalion, 219, 332 239, 247, 261, 266, 269, 279, 320–321, 331, 333, 338–339, 341, 351–354 3 16th Special Operations Wing, 62 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery (3-6 FA), 249, 101st Airborne Division, 115, 136, 175, 211, 219, 334 331, 351 3d Battalion, 7th Field Artillery (3-7 FA), 285– 112th Signal Battalion, 62, 332 286, 334 130th Military History Detachment, 69, 176, 272, 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, 95, 337 351 3d Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, 151, 331 151st Infantry Battalion (Romanian), 249, 332 3d Battalion, 141st Infantry, 291 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment 3d Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation (SOAR), 62–63, 157, 332, 338 Regiment (SOAR), 332 173d Airborne Brigade, 290–291, 335 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, 213–216, 193d Special Operations Wing, 65 234, 333, 354

385 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 252 of 316

Index

3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery (3-319 FA), 8 291, 333, 335 82d Airborne Division, 192, 211, 217, 237, 250, 3d Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light 290–291, 320, 328, 333, 335, 340–341, Infantry (3-PPCLI), 136–137, 166–167, 353 169, 186–187, 378 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 309, 312, 334, 9 352 9/11, 1–2, 29–30, 32–34, 36–37, 39, 41, 48–51, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, 333 57, 60, 62–63, 65, 68, 133, 184, 188–189, 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 136, 175, 195, 220, 252, 317–318, 325, 337, 373 219, 331, 351 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry (3-4 CAV), 280, 289, National Commission on Terrorist 312, 334 Attacks Upon the United States, 52, 54– 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 249, 334 55, 355, 376–378 352d Civil Affairs (CA) Command, 82, 193 911th Forward Surgical Team, 250, 260 360th Civil Affairs Brigade, 225, 227 9th Psychological Operations Battalion, 95, 333 377th Theater Support Command, 82, 193 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, 82–83, 194–195, 223, 235, 332 4 4th Psychological Operations Group (4th POG), A 65–66, 70, 331, 368 AC-130 gunship (Spectre), 64, 77, 84, 95–96, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry (4-31 IN), 162–163, 107, 141, 154, 156–157, 159, 163, 187, 166–167, 169, 171–172 209, 339, 355 44th Medical Brigade, 250, 260 AC-130U U-boat (Spooky), 84 45th Commando Regiment, 183 Adi Ghar, 217, 341 45th Infantry Brigade, 261, 265, 281, 298, 332, Ahmadzai, Dr. Najibullah. See Najibullah 341, 354 aerial port of debarkation (APOD), 59 450th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), 228, 333 Afghan 489th Civil Affairs Battalion, 223, 235, 332 Air Force, 16 civil war, 5, 17, 19, 26, 94, 113, 120, 200, 5 209, 233, 319, 322, 375 5th Special Forces Group, 62, 67, 75, 83–85, 108, constitution, 238, 268–269, 275, 277, 302– 132, 137, 331 303, 306, 341, 379 53d Separate Infantry Brigade, 300 culture, 2, 5–7, 9, 12, 18, 21–23, 42, 120, 58th Maintenance Company, 62 183, 214, 300, 303, 328, 362 507th Corps Support Command, 85, 332 monarchy, 9, 13–14 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 200, 221, national identity, 5, 8, 261 334 Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), 109, 182–183, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, 61– 187, 196–198, 200–201, 338, 340 62, 85, 91, 334, 368 Afghan National Army (ANA), 187, 199, 211, 530th Service and Supply Battalion, 62, 332 231, 236, 253, 261, 266–269, 274–275, 277–278, 281, 287–289, 299–300, 302, 312, 327, 352, 355, 360, 367, 379, 351– 7 353, 355 74th Infantry Detachment (Long-Range Surveil- origins, 3, 229–231, 236, 267, 277, 279, 299, lance), 291, 335 339–340, 352 75th Ranger Regiment, 95, 157, 252, 332, 337, training, 192, 200–202, 210–211, 232–233, 342 239, 262, 264–266, 269, 275, 281, 288, 76th Infantry Brigade, 281, 298–299, 332, 342, 298–299, 301–302, 308, 312, 321–322, 352 326–327, 339, 362, 365

386 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 253 of 316

Index

operations, 202, 231, 268, 287–289, 298– Armitage, Richard, 33, 53, 357 299, 304, 307, 312 Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), 48, ethnic composition, 201, 230, 262–263, 69–70, 85, 91, 122, 175, 355, 358, 269 375–376 recruiting, 199, 201, 230–231, 245, 262–263, Astaneh, 73 275, 299–300, 326, 352 Austin, Lloyd J. III, MG, 239, 321 Afghan National Police (ANP), 245, 278, 281, Australia, 32, 34–35, 187, 280, 358 301–302, 304, 307, 313, 326, 342, 352– Special Air Service (SAS), 35, 132, 137, 340 353, 355 Australian, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS), Afghan-Soviet War, 115, 120 34–35 Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), 187–188, 192, 203, 211, 229–230, 241–242, 244, 246–247, 255–256, 262, 266, 268–269, B 277 Babol Kheyl, 135, 162, 165 Afghanistan Engineer District (AED), 293, 311, Baghran Valley, 217, 282, 287 356–357 Bagram, 73, 96, 132, 137, 140–142, 152–159, AH-1 Cobra, 166 162, 165–166, 169, 171–172, 176, 185, Ahmad, Shamshad, 34 188, 212, 216, 219, 242, 246, 249, 251, Aimaqs, 12 281, 294, 325 Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Air Base, 83, 188, 195, 280–281 62, 77, 353 $LU¿HOG ± Air Mobility Command (AMC), 86 211–212, 214, 219–221, 223, 249, 287– Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), 87–88 288, 323, 339, 354 airborne warning and control system (AWACS), Balkh, 74–75, 77–78 32 Baltazar, Franklin, CPT, 139, 145–147, 153, 155, al-Qaeda, 1–3, 27–33, 38–51, 57, 63–64, 66, 68, 165, 177–178, 350 71–72, 75–77, 81–83, 85–86, 88, 91, Baluchistan, 14, 240 93–94, 96–98, 101, 106–108, 110–111, Bamian, 12, 73, 223, 227–228, 254–255, 257, 113–121, 127–129, 131–132, 134–136, 295, 305, 337 138, 145, 151–154, 157, 160, 163, 165, Barno, David W., LTG, 237–238, 242–247, 253– 171–173, 181–188, 190–192, 205, 211, 255, 258, 261, 268–273, 277–279, 283, 213–214, 217–221, 223, 229, 233, 237, 285, 300–301, 309, 311, 313, 317, 321, 240, 242, 244–246, 249–251, 253, 261, 323–324, 341–342, 349, 353, 357 269, 277, 281–283, 287, 295, 308, 317– Baumann, Dr. Robert, 15, 25–26, 357, 374 320, 323, 327–328, 337–340, 371 bin Laden, Osama, 3, 27–28, 30, 32, 39–40, Alexander the Great, 13, 75 47, 51–52, 66, 71, 91, 93, 113, 115, Ali, Hazrat, 115–116 117–120, 125, 135, 181, 184, 329, 339, Amerine, Jason, CPT, 99–104, 108–110, 123– 361–362, 368–369, 371, 373, 375–377, 124, 360 379, 382 $PLQ+D¿]XOODK Blair, Tony, British Prime Minister, 34, 41 Anglo-Afghan War(s), 14 Bolduc, Armand J., MSG, 71, 79–80, 90, 351 $QQDQ.R¿± Bolduc, Donald, MAJ, 97–98, 108, 110, 122–124, Arabian Sea, 46, 64, 85 350, 352 Arghastan Bonn Agreement, 182, 188, 199–200, 202–203, Bridge, 110–111 244, 269, 306, 320, 338 Wadi, 107 Bonn Conference, 99, 109, 182 Arghendab Bridge, 108, 110 Brazil, Donna, LTC, 300 Asadabad, 214, 248–249, 255, 294 Brennan, John T., MG (USAF), 302, 313, 349, Aspland, Patrick, CPT, 155, 160–162 352–353

387 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 254 of 316

Index

British, 9–10, 13–14, 16, 24, 34, 41, 43, 46, 84, Champoux, Bernard S., BG, 283, 285 116, 119, 183, 186–187, 195, 197, 200– Chapman, John, TSGT (USAF), 158 202, 205, 228, 232, 236, 254, 257, 264, Chechens, 71, 81, 83 290, 299, 302, 340, 350, 358, 362, 368, Chechnya, 37 377 Cheek, Gary H., COL, 280, 283–284, 295–297, Bush, George H.W., US President, 29 309, 311–312, 349, 360 Bush, George W., US President, 1–2, 27, 29–31, Cheney, Richard, US Vice President, 31, 305, 33–34, 37–39, 41, 44–46, 50–54, 57, 63, 379 69, 183–184, 221, 241, 271, 305, 307, Church Report, The, 220–222, 235, 360 317, 359, 364, 375, 378–381 civil affairs (CA), 47–48, 62, 82, 193, 195, 197, administration, 28–29, 34, 40, 42, 49, 62, 97, 213, 225–226, 229, 245, 249, 253, 255– 210, 241, 268, 318, 364 257, 261, 287, 296, 324, 332–333, 355 Butler, Kevin, CPT, 139, 155 civil-military operations (CMO), 82, 90, 190, 192–195, 197–198, 211, 213, 226, 228, C 286, 291, 294, 324, 326, 331, 355 Camp Doha, Kuwait, 127, 175, 206–207 Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), 82, Camp Rhino, 85, 339 194, 197, 226, 255 Camp X-Ray, 85, 91, 381 Clausewitz, Carl von, 42, 317–318, 382 Campbell, Mark, MAJ (CAN), 167, 179, 205, Clinton, William (Bill), US President, 29, 352 350 Cloak of the Prophet, 21 Caruso, Jennifer, LTC, 294–295, 304, 311–312, close air support (CAS), 78, 93, 116–120, 131, 314, 350 133, 145, 151, 156, 158–159, 163, 165, Caucasus, 25, 53, 354, 357, 374, 381 173, 187, 209, 216–217, 251, 296, 322 caves, 114, 118, 135, 160, 169, 217, 339, 341 Coalition, 3–5, 11–13, 27–28, 30–31, 35–36, Central Command (CENTCOM), 28, 37, 40–49, 39–41, 44–51, 59–61, 64–67, 72, 75–84, 51–52, 55, 60–61, 65, 67–69, 73, 83, 88, 93–98, 104, 109–111, 113–116, 86–88, 96–97, 115–116, 118–119, 131, 119–121, 127, 129, 131, 133–135, 137– 133–135, 166, 181, 188–189, 191–193, 138, 142, 151–152, 163, 165, 173–174, 200, 204, 206, 220, 224, 227, 232, 238, 181–195, 197–198, 200–203, 205–206, 267, 301, 306, 312, 317–319, 322, 331, 209–213, 215–223, 226–233, 237–247, 353–354, 357, 361–362, 366, 380 249–255, 257, 259–262, 264, 266–269, Commander, 28, 31, 37–38, 41, 43–46, 272–273, 277–292, 294–297, 300, 302, 48–49, 54, 59, 63, 65, 67, 75, 96, 166, 304, 307–308, 314, 317–324, 326–329, 172, 181, 188–190, 200, 202, 242, 244, 331, 340, 352–353, 356–357, 361, 363, 318, 360 368, 372, 376 Plan for OEF, 2, 27, 40–51, 57–58, 60–63, air forces, 45, 58, 60, 66–67, 71, 80, 82, 86, 73, 82, 86, 127, 173, 184, 192, 194, 201, 142, 328 204, 209, 220, 243, 317–319 forces, 12, 21, 28, 42, 44, 46–47, 49, 51, Preparations for OEF, 27–28, 41–42, 45, 49, 65–66, 72, 88, 93, 109, 116, 118–121, 51, 60–61, 65, 67, 82, 96, 105, 115, 194, 127–128, 131, 135, 138, 160, 173, 181– 219–220, 243 183, 185, 189–192, 194, 198, 200, 202, Central Asia, 3, 9, 13–14, 17, 25, 35, 37, 41, 47, 209–212, 219, 229, 230, 238–239, 241, 53–54, 58, 60, 71, 73, 86, 89, 189, 270, 244–247, 249–250, 252–254, 258, 260– 309, 318–319, 354, 356–358, 366, 369– 261, 263, 277, 279, 281–282, 283–286, 370, 372, 374–375, 377, 381, 383 288–289, 299–300, 304, 306, 318–320, Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT), 37 323, 326–328, 339–342 central Asian republics, 3 formation of, 1, 3, 28, 31, 40 Central Corps, Afghan National Army, 230, 236, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell (CHLC), 83, 261, 268–269, 277, 299, 326, 353 194–198, 222–226, 236

388 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 255 of 316

Index

Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Commando Solo, 65–66, 82 Force (CJCMOTF), 82, 193, 211, 225– Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 37 226, 228–229, 233, 236, 239, 255, 273, Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile 319, 326, 332, 351–354 (CALCM), 63 Combined Forces Land Component Command Cornell, Christopher, CPT, 155–156, 160 (CFLCC), 61, 82, 127, 132, 134, 136, Corkran, Ronald, LTC, 136, 140, 142–143, 145, 189, 193–194, 198, 320, 331, 338–339 149, 154–156, 160–163, 175–178, 350 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), 35, 38, 40, Crombie, Roger, CPT, 139–140, 143, 145, 153, 57–58, 60, 62, 67, 158–160 155, 160, 162–163, 176–177, 350 Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), 49, Czechoslovakia, 15, 267 63, 87 Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force– Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), 211, 239– D 240, 249, 270, 278, 282, 286–288, 322– Daoud, General, 75, 80–81, 90, 338 323, 327, 332 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 28, 374 Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force– Dari (Afghan Persian), 12, 65–66, 82, 220, 264 South (CJSOTF-S), 131–132, 137, 139, Darulaman, 264, 267 211 Darya-e Balkh, 74 Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), 4, 132–134, Darya Suf Valley, 73, 78 189, 191–192, 202, 227, 232, 237–239, Dasht-e Qaleh, 73 244, 279, 281, 291, 302, 320–321, 354 Davis, B. Shannon, COL, 280, 349 CJTF-180, 3–4, 188–189, 192–193, 196, Dawe, Peter, MAJ (CAN), 175, 179, 186, 205, 198, 202, 209–213, 218, 220–226, 228– 350 230, 232–233, 236–240, 242, 245–250, Deh Chopan, 252–253, 282 252–256, 260–261, 268–269, 277–279, Deh Rawod, 100, 282, 342 319–323, 340–341, 352, 354 Del Vecchio, Mauro, LTG (IT), 290 CJTF -76, 269, 277–295, 298, 304, 307–309, DeLong, Michael, LTG (USMC), 31, 41, 45, 52, 322, 341–342, 352, 354 54–55, 60, 69, 349, 362 CJTF Mountain, 132–133, 135–139, 141, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), 15, 159, 162–163, 165–166, 173, 176, 179, 94 183–187, 189, 202, 204, 210, 213, 320, Department of Defense (DOD), 4, 30, 37, 49, 324, 339, 352 54, 57, 61, 73, 89, 91, 97, 115, 122, CJTF Phoenix, 210, 231–233, 239, 261–266, 133, 178, 190–191, 195, 206, 220, 222, 268–269, 274–275, 278, 281, 298–302, 225–228, 234–235, 244, 258–259, 268, 322, 326, 332, 341–342, 352–354 270–272, 293, 309, 311, 313, 317–319, Combined Task Force (CTF), 237, 280 326–327, 355–356, 359–360, 362, 364, CTF 82, 210–214, 225, 228, 237, 250, 320, 366, 375–377, 381 324 Department of State (DOS), 35, 49, 54, 225–228, CTF Bayonet, 291, 335 255, 257–258, 275, 281, 292–293, 295, CTF Bronco, 280, 282–286, 289, 291–292, 301, 305, 311, 313–314, 326, 356, 358, 297, 309–310, 334, 352 360, 363, 373–374, 377, 381 CTF Coyote, 280, 334 detainee, 85, 115, 125, 137, 166, 210, 218–222, CTF Devil, 291–292, 311, 335, 362 235, 281, 325, 339–360, 362, 364 CTF Longhorn, 280, 295, 304 policies, evolution of, 221–222, 235, 325, CTF Mountain, 210–211 360 CTF Saber, 280, 289, 334 Dichairo, Joseph, LTC, 252–254, 272, 349 CTF Stonewall, 281–282 Di Leonardo, Charles, CPT, 265–266, 275, 362 CTF Thunder, 280, 283–285, 292, 295–296, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) 309, 334, 360 (Canadian), 35

389 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 256 of 316

Index

Dobbins, James F., Ambassador, 226–227, 359, Francavilla, David, COL, 262, 274, 349 372 Franks, Tommy, GEN (Ret.), 27–28, 37, 41–42, Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 18, 21, 44, 67, 73–79, 44–50, 53–55, 60, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 75– 81–85, 91, 211, 219, 244, 257, 268, 303, 76, 89, 96–97, 115–116, 122, 125, 141, 305, 337–338, 349 166, 172–173, 179, 181, 188–190, 192, Dupree, Louis, 9, 25, 362 194, 199–201, 204, 233, 318–319, 352, Durrani, 10, 12 359–360, 363, 380

E G EC-130 Commando Solo, 65 Gallant, Richard, LTC, 263, 274–275, 349 Eastern Alliance (EA), 115–119, 134, 338 Gardez, 127, 129–130, 132, 135, 138–139, 141– Ecevit, Bulent, 35 142, 157–159, 185, 213, 223, 227–228, economy of force, 4, 238–239, 247, 321–323 249, 254–255, 259, 265, 268, 297–299, Eikenberry, Karl W., LTG, 231–232, 236, 261– 301, 304–305 262, 267, 274, 278, 306, 308, 340, 342, Garrett, William, COL, 207, 259, 273–274, 349, 349, 363, 380 352 embedded training team (ETT), 233, 264–266, Geneva, 25, 70, 221, 301, 357, 359, 362, 364, 274, 360 367, 370, 374, 380, 383 enlisted terminal attack controller (ETAC), 103, Geren, Pete, Secretary of the Army, 252, 364 144–145, 151, 156, 158–160 Germany, 60, 64, 85–86, 109, 137, 199, 257, 299, Erdagi, Etham, LTG (TU), 290 301, 338, 341 Estrada, Flora, SGT, 295, 311, 351 Ghani, Ashraf, 230 Ghazni, 127, 244, 253, 255, 259, 273, 280, 285, F 294–295, 297, 311, 342, 352 Global Positioning System (GPS), 77, 86, 110, Farkhar, Afghanistan, 75, 81 304 Faryab province, 268 Global Power, 44 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 31, 188, Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 27, 29, 31, 34, 363, 378, 381 37–41, 50, 192, 238, 309, 325, 327–329, Findley, Mike, 86, 91–92, 363 353, 363, 368 Anglo-Afghan War Goldwater-Nichols Act, 380 First, 14 Goodson, Larry P., 9, 11–13, 25–26, 313–314, Second, 14 365 Third, 14 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 17 food drops, 31, 70, 86, 364 Grand Council. See loya jirga Ford, Steven, LTC, 273, 294–295, 311, 350, 352 Grau, Dr. Lester, 17, 25–26, 42, 175, 270, 365, Forsythe, George, COL, 300–301, 312, 349, 354 367 Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 48, 62, 65–66, 69, Great Britain, 13–14, 32, 34–35, 362 175, 192, 231, 321, 363 Great Game, 14, 25, 356, 366, 370 Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 61–62, 67, 75, 136 Great Saur Revolution, 15 Fort Irwin, California, 135 ground-directed interdiction, 86 forward arming and refueling point (FARP), 95– Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), 85, 115, 220– 96, 157 222, 339 forward operating base (FOB), 40, 63, 211–212, 214–215, 217, 223, 239, 246, 249–251, 260, 282, 285–286, 292, 294 H FOB Salerno, 211, 214–215, 223, 249, 253, Hagenbeck, Franklin L., MG, 127, 132–134, 285 136–138, 141, 166, 173, 175, 178–179, Fox, David, LTC, 99, 108, 110, 112–113, 124– 183–186, 188–190, 204–205, 338, 349, 125, 349, 359 352, 370 390 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 257 of 316

Index

Haidar, General Gul, 164–165, 167 interrogation operations, 210, 218–222, 235 Hajji Qadir, 115 Interrogation policy, evolution of, 220–221, Hajji Zahi, 115 325, 360 Hakimi, Mofti Latifollah, 306 Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan) (ISI), 16, Harriman, Stanley L., CW2, 141 95 Hazara(s), 9, 12–13, 20, 22–23, 73, 75, 262, 303, Iran, 5, 7, 12, 15–16, 20, 22, 24, 35, 50, 53, 303, 305, 337 305, 363, 367 Hazarajat, 12 Iraq, 1–2, 4–5, 41–42, 52, 69, 188, 190, 192, 219, Hazrat Ali, 115–116 228, 238–239, 241, 244, 259, 261, 310, Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 18–20, 244, 341 319, 321, 323–324, 326–329, 362, 369 Helmand province, 20, 217–218, 282, 284, 371 286–287 Islamabad, Pakistan, 82, 97–99, 235, 373 Herd, Walter M., COL, 270–271, 282, 287, 309– Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 38, 160 310, 349, 352, 354, 365 isolation facilities (ISOFAC), 75 Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), 244–245, 251, 281–282 Hilferty, Bryan, MAJ, 5, 25, 350 J Hindu Kush Mountains, 5–6, 12 Jacobabad, Pakistan, 40, 58, 105, 136, 155 Horn of Africa, 50, 324 Jalalabad, 113, 115–116, 223, 251, 255, 292, 297, Huggins, James L., COL, 211, 213–214 305, 307 human intelligence (HUMINT), 127, 218–220, Jalal, Masooda, 303, 305, 382 234, 325, 377 Jalali, Ali, 25, 89, 181, 200, 204, 207, 226, 235, Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST), 241, 270, 305, 351, 367 83 Jamiat-e Islami, 18 humanitarian daily rations (HDR), 46, 64, 66, 82, Jamiat Ulema-e Islam (JUI), 240 86 Japan, 35, 40, 63, 199, 288 humanitarian air drops, 64 jihad, 19, 21, 23, 72, 160, 373 Human Intelligence Collector Operations, Field Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 45, 49, 57, 63, 96, Manual (FM) 2-22.3, 325 190, 221, 355, 380 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), 44, 63, 78, I 109–110, 112, 142, 149, 328, 338 improvised explosive device (IED), 113, 251, Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), 303– 260, 277, 282, 285, 304, 307, 342 305, 307–308, 313–314, 367 Incirlik AB, Turkey, 86 Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC), Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), 307 63 India, 13–14, 36, 39–40, 94, 184, 358, 364, 366, Joint Forces Command, 86, 238, 289, 310, 353, 368, 375 372 Indian Ocean, 62–63, 86 Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF), 219–221 insurgency, 13, 48, 138, 233, 241–242, 269, 271, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force 277, 282–283, 285, 290, 296, 308–311, (JPOTF), 65–66, 331 322, 362, 368, 371–372 Joint Regional Team, 195, 226, 236, 377 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Joint Special Operations Task Force–North (ISR), 66, 169 (JSOTF-N), 67, 71, 75–76, 85–88, 96, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 104–105, 109, 116, 131–133, 136–138, 182–183, 189, 192, 194, 197, 200–202, 163, 211, 331 204, 212, 229, 238, 240, 242–243, 255, 263, 275, 281, 289–290, 293–294, 297, K 304, 307–308, 310, 320, 322, 326, 341, 353, 358, 366, 371, 373 K2. See Karshi-Khanabad

391 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 258 of 316

Index

Kabul, 3–5, 7, 12, 14, 18–23, 30, 39, 48, 64, 71–73, Khan, Amanullah, 14, 289, 299 76, 82–83, 88, 93, 96–97, 113, 119–120, Khan, Dost Muhammad, 14 129–130, 137, 182–183, 188, 190, 194– Khan, Genghis, 13 195, 197–198, 201, 206, 209, 212, 219, Khan, Habibullah, 14 222–223, 226–231, 237, 240, 242–244, Khan, Ismail, 18, 20, 72–73, 210–211, 268, 289, 247, 251, 255–257, 259, 261–262, 264, 296, 299, 305, 367 268, 277–278, 281, 287, 289, 292–294, Khan, Khair Mohammad, 94 299, 301–302, 305–307, 310, 319, 322– Khan, Mohammed Fahim, 44, 72, 76, 79, 96–97, 323, 337, 341, 353, 365, 368, 371 305 Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), Khost, 127, 129–130, 132, 138–139, 141, 156, 201–202, 231, 233, 264, 266–268, 299 176, 185–187, 194, 214, 223, 249, 251– Kabul River, 5 253, 255–256, 265, 280, 283, 285, 339 Kamiya, Jason K., MG, 290–292, 308, 310–311, Khyber Pass, 287 315, 342, 349, 368 Konduz, 7, 71, 73, 75–77, 79–82, 84, 90–91, 113, Kandahar, 3–5, 7, 11–12, 19–21, 24, 64, 93–98, 223, 227, 254–255, 257, 281, 290, 305, 100, 102–115, 120, 130–131, 136, 142, 338 166, 176, 185–187, 194–195, 205, 211– Korengal River Valley, 292 212, 214, 216–220, 222–223, 225, 229, Kozelka, Gregory, CPT, 169, 171 240–241, 244, 246, 248–250, 253, 255– Kraft, Nelson, CPT, 139–140, 144–145, 148–151, 256, 259–260, 268, 280–282, 284–288, 153–154, 162–163, 175–178, 351–352 291–292, 294–295, 299, 301, 303, 307, Kratzer, David E., BG, 193–198, 201, 206–207, 319, 323, 325, 338–342 235, 319–320, 349 Battle of, 14 Kunar, 292, 307 Karimov, Islam, 37–38 Kyrgyzstan, 35, 37–39, 361 Karshi-Khanabad, 38, 59, 71, 127, 189, 219, 337 Karzai, Abdul Ahad, 94 L Karzai, Hamid, 3, 12, 93–95, 98–101, 103–106, 108–110, 112–113, 120, 122–124, 127, LaCamera, Paul J., LTC, 137, 139–141, 143–144, 181, 188, 190–192, 198, 200, 209, 211, 150–154, 160, 162–163, 166 223, 225–227, 230, 239, 241–242, 261– Laghman, 244, 280 263, 268–270, 274–275, 277, 289–290, Lane, Roger, BG (UK), 187 296, 299, 302–306, 308, 313–314, 338– Lashkar Gah, 280, 295 340, 342, 353, 360, 367, 369–370, 376, OHDÀHW± 381 Lindh, John Walker, 84–85 arrival in Afghanistan, 98 line of operation (LOO), 42–43, 47, 192 actions around Tarin Kowt/Kandahar, 3, line of effort, 192 101–105, 108–112, 120 Lineweaver, John, LTC, 257, 273, 350 Kashmir, 36, 40 Logistics Task Force 530, 62, 69, 363 Katzman, Kenneth, 275, 297, 312, 314, 351, 368 loya jirga (grand council), 94, 182–183, 185, Kazakhstan, 35, 37–38 187–189, 202–203, 238, 268–269, 275, Keane, John M., GEN, 190, 192 277, 303, 340–341, 379 Kensinger, Philip R. Jr., LTG, 252 Lyakhovsky, Alexander, 43, 55, 375 Kenya, 41 Nairobi, 28, 374 M KHAD, Afghan security force, 17 MacDill AFB, FL, 49, 122, 206, 310, 352–354 Khalid Pushtun, 241 madrassas, 18–20, 72, 240 Khalili, Karim, 73, 305, 337 Manas Airport, Kyrgystan, 39 Khalilzad, Zalmay, 42, 239, 242–243, 271, 281, Mancino, Thomas, BG, 265–266, 275, 349, 352, 289, 321, 368 354

392 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 259 of 316

Index

Mansager, Tucker B., LTC, 242–243, 271, 370 mullah, 19–21, 71–72, 78, 94–96, 100, 104–105, Marine Expeditionary Unit, 253, 281 112–113, 120, 181, 240–241, 282, 306, Marye, James, LTC, 142 338, 369 Marzak, 135, 145, 162, 165 Musharraf, Pervez, 39–40, 54, 58, 97, 184, 241, Massoud, Ahmed Shah, 18, 20–21, 72, 81, 109, 271, 355, 359, 371 115, 369 Myers, Richard B., GEN (USAF), 49, 63, 89, 96, Materiel Management Center (MMC), 85 122, 190, 381 Maughan, George, COL, 224–225, 235, 350 Mazar-e Sharif, 7, 22, 38, 64, 71, 73, 75–79, 82– N 83, 86, 88–91, 113, 115, 166, 219, 223, Nairobi, Kenya 227, 254–255, 257, 268, 290, 299, 301, Embassy bombing, 28, 374 305, 337, 356, 361, 363, 373, 378–379, Najibullah, 17, 20–21, 23, 94 383 Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, 8, 113, 115, Mao Zedong, 242 244, 280, 292, 297 McCabe, John, TSGT (USAF), 144, 151–152, NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization 176–177, 351 nation building, 3–4, 8, 47, 91, 94, 98, 183, 191, McChrystal, Stanley A., BG, 191–192, 206 193–194, 210, 270, 273, 309, 318–319, McColl, John, MG (UK), 182, 200 322–323, 326, 328–329, 358, 361, 374 McDonnell, Kevin, LTC, 202 Navy, 34–35, 44, 46, 49, 62–64, 77, 87–88, 103, McNeill, Dan K., LTG, 97, 122, 190–193, 198, 132, 137, 157, 191, 249, 279, 288, 290, 205–206, 209–211, 221–223, 227, 232– 295, 368, 372, 377 234, 237–239, 268, 319–321, 340–341, Navebzadeh, Zahir Abdul, 268 349 Nelson, Ray, LTC, 301, 313, 371 MC-130 Combat Talon, 66, 78, 95–96, 337 Nettles, Bentley, LTC, 260–261, 274, 350 Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), 222– Nimruz, 286 223, 229 nongovernment organizations (NGO), 28, 46, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), 40, 112, 153– 50–51, 64, 83, 182, 190, 193–195, 197– 154, 251, 280, 290, 296 198, 225, 228–229, 240, 255–257, 270, Meshrano Jirga (upper house Afghan National 281, 297, 326, 372 Assembly), 303 non-Pashtuns, 18, 21–22 MH-47 Chinook, 62, 67, 73, 88, 157, 159, 292, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1, 307 32–35, 37, 52–53, 204, 238, 255, 281, Mikolashek, Paul T., LTG, 82, 91, 127, 132, 189, 289, 294, 302, 310, 314, 341, 353, 357, 193, 198, 205, 349 361, 369, 371, 375, 383 Milawa Valley, 114, 116, 119 Northern Alliance (NA), 21, 35, 63, 71–72, 75, 0.OHDÀHWERPEV 89, 93, 142, 188, 219, 244, 303, 317– mobile interrogation team (MIT), 219 319, 358, 378 Muhammad, Dost, 14 Northwest Frontier provinces (Pakistan), 14, 113, Mohammad, Sayeed, 265–266 129, 201 Mohaqqeq, General Mohammed, 78 Nuristan, 244 Mongolian Army, 232 Nutsch, Mark D., CPT, 76–77, 79 Mongols, 12, 232 Moron AB, Spain, 62, 86 O mujahideen, 13, 16–20, 22–23, 25, 36, 39, 72–73, 94–95, 98, 106, 114, 129–131, 186, 217, Objective 231, 244, 262, 265, 285, 322, 367 COBALT, 95 Mulholland, John F. Jr., COL, 67, 75, 86, 89, 91, GECKO, 95–96, 122, 369 104, 109, 111–112, 116, 123–124, 132, IRON, 95 134, 137, 141, 175, 349, 359 REMINGTON, 139, 163

393 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 260 of 316

Index

RHINO, 95–96, 337 POLAR HARPOON, 169, 171–172 TIN, 95 PRINCESS, 287 2I¿FH RI WKH 6HFUHWDU\ RI 'HIHQVH 26' PTARMIGAN, 186 371 SNIPE, 186, 205, 340, 364, 372 Olson, Eric T., MG, 279–281, 285, 289–290, 298, TICONDEROGA, 287 304, 341, 349, 354 TORII, 186–187 Operation TRENTON, 288 ANACONDA, 2–3, 70, 87, 127–129, 132– UNIFIED VENTURE, 218 134, 136–141, 162, 165–166, 172–179, VALIANT STRIKE, 217, 234, 341, 373 181–183, 185–186, 189–190, 196, 202, VILLAGE SEARCH, 215 204, 213, 234, 239, 249, 319, 327, 339, Operational Detachment–Alpha (ODA), 67, 71, 351–352, 354, 357, 362, 369–371 73, 75–76, 79, 83, 86–88, 93, 95–105, BRIGHT STAR, 60–61 107–108, 110–111, 116–118, 120, 131– BUZZARD, 187, 205, 370 132, 136–137, 141–142, 188, 194–195, CHEROKEE SKY, 187–188 213–215, 228, 255, 266, 287, 289, 292, DELIBERATE STRIKE, 218 327 DESERT SHIELD, 318 Operational Detachment A (Special Forces A DESERT STORM, 42, 58, 318, 368 Team) (ODA) EAGLE CLAW, 366 ODA 314, 234, 354 ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), 1–5, 11, ODA 372, 137, 141, 163 24, 27–28, 34, 45, 47–49, 52–53, 57–58, ODA 381, 137 60–61, 63, 65, 69, 71, 73, 78, 82, 84–85, ODA 392, 137 87–89, 91–92, 96, 122, 127, 173, 176, ODA 394, 137, 163, 165 175, 181–185, 189, 191–192, 194–196, ODA 395, 137 198, 202, 209, 217–223, 227, 229, ODA 534, 74–75, 77–78, 337 233–234, 237–240, 242–243, 247, 250, ODA 542, 137 257, 262, 270, 272, 279, 283, 290, 292, ODA 553, 73, 337 309–310, 317–329, 331, 337, 351–355, ODA 555, 73, 96, 122, 337, 360 357, 361, 363–366, 368–370, 372, 374, ODA 561, 118, 339 377–378, 382 ODA 563, 137 GLOCK, 163, 165, 167 ODA 571, 137 HARPOON, 165–167, 186 ODA 572, 116–119, 125, 338–339, 360 INDEPENDENCE, 287 ODA 574, 99–101, 103–105, 108–110, 120, IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), 1, 228, 232, 238– 137, 338 239, 261, 320–321, 324–326, 329 ODA 583, 105–107, 110, 111–112, 120, 338 INFINITE JUSTICE, 27 ODA 585, 71, 73, 79–80, 337 LANDGRAB, 286 ODA 586, 75, 80–82, 90, 337, 354 MAGISTRAL, 17, 130 ODA 594, 75, 132, 137, 141–142, 163, 337 MONGOOSE, 217, 234, 341, 354 ODA 595, 67, 73, 76–79, 84, 337, 360 MOUNTAIN AVALANCHE, 253 ODA 986, 234, 354 MOUNTAIN BLIZZARD, 253, 361 Operational Detachment Charlie (ODC), 74 MOUNTAIN LION, 184–185, 187–188, 205, ODC 53, 77 213, 339–340, 352, 382 opium, 6, 20, 183, 313–314, 365 MOUNTAIN STORM, 253, 268, 341, 370 Orgun-e, 139, 185, 211, 214, 248–249, 282 MOUNTAIN SWEEP, 212–215, 234, 340, Oruzgan province, 20, 100, 185, 209, 234, 244, 354 253, 280–282, 285–286, 288, 291–292, MOUNTAIN VIPER, 252–253, 272, 341, 354 340, 342, 368 NAM DONG, 288 O’Hara, Patrick, CPT, 81–82, 90, 351, 354 NOBLE EAGLE, 30, 57, 92, 361 O’Neill, Bard, 241, 271

394 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 261 of 316

Index

O’Neill, Evan, PFC, 251 pipeline, 16 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civil Aid Pol-e-Charki, 267 (OHDACA), 195–196, 225, 229, 236, political-military (POL-MIL), 47–48, 210–211, 259, 293 226–227, 242, 321 Owens, Kevin C., COL, 291–292, 311, 373 Powell, Colin, 31, 50, 52, 359, 374, 376 Prasek, Joseph, BG, 264–266, 274–275, 341, 349, 354 P precision-guided munition, 46–47, 63, 77, 86, 88, Pakistan, 3, 8, 10–13, 16–20, 22, 24, 28, 34, 36, 317 39–40, 51, 54, 58, 63, 71–72, 75, 79, Predator, 78, 87, 147, 159, 339 81–83, 94, 105, 107, 113, 115, 118–119, Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 121, 127–129, 135, 138–139, 172, 184, PDD 56, 365 201, 214, 216, 218, 235, 240–241, 244, Preysler, Charles A., LTC, 136, 139–140, 145– 247, 250–251, 253, 267, 270–271, 278, 147, 153–157, 160, 162, 175–178, 350 283, 287–288, 303, 305, 309, 323, 352, Prophet Mohammed, 21, 75 355, 358–359, 364, 366, 368, 370–376, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), 195, 210, 383 222, 226–229, 233, 237, 239, 246–247, Army, 39–40, 114, 240 250, 254–259, 268–269, 272–273, 278, border, 5, 19, 36, 39, 50, 58, 93, 98, 107, 281, 285–286, 290, 292–298, 308, 310– 113–114, 166, 181, 184–187, 215–216, 312, 317, 324, 326, 352–353, 356, 362, 240, 244, 247–249, 292, 294, 304, 327 366, 370, 373 Government, 16–17, 19, 34, 36, 39–40, 95, psychological operations (PSYOP), 48, 62, 97, 119, 184, 240–241 64–66, 70, 95, 217, 253, 255, 287, 331, Paktia province, 17, 113, 119, 121, 127, 129–131, 333, 363, 367–369 185–187, 212, 216, 280, 282–283 Psychological Operations Group (POG), 65–66, Paktika province, 185, 216, 231, 260, 280, 282– 331 283, 285, 287, 296–297 Putin, Vladimir, 37 Panjshir Valley, 12, 72–73, 75, 96, 289, 306, 369, Py, Jean-Louis, LTG (FR), 290 383 Parwan, 255–256 Q Paschal, David, LTC, 254, 260, 272, 274, 350 Pashto, 10, 65–66, 82, 220, 260, 368 4DGKD¿0XDPPDU Pashtun(s), 3, 9–13, 16, 18–19, 21–22, 24, 36, Qala-i Jangi, 83–85, 90–91, 137, 219, 338, 373, 39, 71–72, 88, 93–95, 97–101, 104–106, 376 108, 115, 137, 163–165, 181, 209, 244, Qalat, 253–255, 266, 285, 295 262–263, 266, 303, 338, 377 Quetta, Pakistan, 94, 240 Pashtunwali, 10–11 Quick Impact Program (QIP), 259 Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute quick reaction force (QRF), 67, 136–137, 140, (PKSOI), 90, 194–195, 197, 206, 363 157–159, 172, 249, 286, 290, 299, 304 Pedersen, Richard N., COL, 280, 283–285, 289, Quinn, Maureen, 302 295, 297, 309–310, 312, 350, 354 R People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 15, 23 Rabbani, Burnahuddin, 18–21, 23, 72 Perito, Robert, 297, 309, 311–312, 351, 373 Rak TAC Ridge, 148–149, 153–154 Perryman, John, BG, 300 Ramadan, 102, 117, 300 personnel carrier, 163, 267 Rangers, 48, 95–96, 158–159, 172, 337 persons under control (PUC), 221 Rashid, Ahmed, 13, 17–19, 21–22, 24–26, 54, 72, Peshawar, Pakistan, 11, 17–18, 369 89, 240, 270–271, 309, 374 Philippines, 324, 327 Rawalpindi, Treaty of, 14

395 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 262 of 316

Index

Reagan, Ronald, US President, 29, 374 Shoop, Barry, COL, 300 Red Cross, 28 signals intelligence (SIGINT), 127, 218, 325 redoubts, 318 Skocz, Dennis, 226–227, 235–236 refugees, 18, 34, 39, 82, 255, 275, 293, 303, 307, Soviet Union, 14–15, 17, 37, 322, 363 322, 370, 379 Southern European Task Force (SETAF), 277, Renuart, Victor E., LTG (USAF), 43–44, 48, 55, 290–292, 310, 334, 342, 376 349 Spain, 60, 62, 86 Rice, Condoleezza, National Security Advisor, Moron Air Base, 62, 86 37, 53–54, 198, 306, 314, 359, 366, 382 Special Air Service (SAS), 35, 84, 132, 137, 340 Ring Road, 6–7 Special Forces Group (SFG), 62, 67, 75, 83–85, Roberts, Neil C., PO1 (USN), 157–160, 172 108, 132, 137, 201–202, 240, 249, 280, Robertson, Lord, 32, 52–53, 357, 375 287–288, 331–332 5RFNH\HOHDÀHWERPE Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), Romania, 217, 230, 232, 249, 267, 280, 291, 299, 62–63, 67, 157, 331–332, 338 322 Special Operations Command and Control Royal Air Force, 34 Element (SOCCE), 97–98, 103, 108 Royal Marines, 183, 187 Special Operations Command Central Royal Navy, 34 (SOCCENT), 48, 61 Rumsfeld, Donald, Secretary of Defense, 27, 31, Special Operations Forces (SOF), 1, 27, 48, 58, 38, 41, 43–45, 49, 54, 57, 73, 89, 91, 69, 71, 77, 85, 93, 122, 131, 169, 175, 131, 190–191, 221, 237, 239, 268, 270, 181, 245, 249, 252, 263, 282, 288, 317, 306, 318, 337, 364, 375–376, 380–381 326–328, 337–338, 340, 342, 355, 358, Russia, 13–14, 25–26, 32, 35, 37–38, 42–43, 53, 363 55, 73, 130, 220, 264, 267, 357, 374– Special Operations Forces Laser Acquisition 375, 377 Marker (SOFLAM), 77 Special Operations Support Command S (SOSCOM), 85 Salang Tunnel, 292 Special Operations unit, 67 Saudi Arabia, 20, 63, 134, 318, 373 Spin Boldak, 107, 111, 285, 307, 341–342 Saur Revolution, 15 Spin Ghar, 113, 115–116, 118–119 Schweitzer, Martin, LTC, 213–214, 216, 234 Stogran, Patrick, LTC (CAN), 166–169, 178–179, September 11, 2001, 65, 361, 371 (See also 9/11) 186, 205, 350, 378 Shahbaz Air Base, 58, 105, 115, 136, 155 Sunni, 13, 22, 356 Shahi Kowt, 113, 119, 121, 127–130, 132, 135– 137, 139, 141–143, 146, 151–152, 157– T 158, 160, 162–163, 173, 181, 189, 213 Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), 49, 77, 108, Shanghai Five (China, Kazakistan, Kyrgystan, 110–111, 133 Russia, Tajikistan), 37 Tahk-te-pol, 107, 338 Shareef, Mohammed Zaman Ghun, 115, 118, 120 Tajik(s), 9, 12, 18–20, 22, 71–72, 75, 79, 93, 164– Shawali Kowt, 108 165, 262–263, 303, 305 Shelton, Henry H., GEN, 45, 380 Tajikistan, 5, 12, 35, 37–38, 73, 76, 247, 292, 361 6KHU]DL *XO $JKD DND 0RKDPPDG 6KD¿T Taliban, 2–4, 11–12, 19–23, 25–26, 28, 35–36, Sherzai), 93–95, 98, 105–108, 110–113, 39–43, 47–48, 50–52, 54, 61, 64–66, 120, 338 68, 70–71, 73, 75–91, 93–101, 103–115, Shia, 12–13, 20, 22, 356 117–118, 120, 122, 129, 131–132, 134, Shindand, 64 136, 181–182, 184–185, 187–188, 191– Shir Khan Kheyl, 130, 135, 138, 162, 165 192, 194, 196, 200–201, 205, 211, 214, Shkin, 211, 214, 248–251, 282, 285 217–221, 223, 227, 229, 231, 233, 237, Shomali Plains, 72, 96–97 239–241, 244–246, 249–254, 259–261,

396 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 263 of 316

Index

269–271, 277, 281–289, 295, 300, 302– terrorism, 1, 27–34, 37, 39–40, 46, 51–53, 55, 122, 303, 306–308, 313–315, 317–320, 323, 179, 182, 192, 204–206, 209, 241, 245, 327, 329, 337, 339, 355, 359–360, 363, 271, 305, 309, 319, 325, 353, 356–364, 367, 370, 373–374, 376–379, 382 366–369, 371–374, 377–380, 382 origins, 3, 17–18, 22, 25, 39, 365 Theater Support Command (TSC), 82, 85, 193 government, 1, 3, 5, 11–13, 17, 20–24, Third Army, 60 27–28, 30, 39–49, 64, 71, 75, 79, 93–94, Tillman, Patrick, CPL, 251–252, 272, 342, 364 100–101, 109, 120, 127, 181, 203, 240, Tora Bora, 3, 87, 93, 113–121, 127, 134, 181, 186, 365 328, 338–339, 379, 382 armed forces, 3, 18, 20, 35, 38, 40, 43–46, Townsend, Stephen, LTC, 166, 169, 171–172, 62–64, 71–72, 76–81, 83, 94–99, 101– 178–179, 350 103, 107–108, 110–112, 114, 118–119, Transitional Authority (Afghanistan), 187, 211, 121, 127–128, 131, 135, 149, 152–154, 241, 277 160, 162–163, 165, 173, 181, 190, 192, Treadwell, James, COL, 67, 70, 350 209, 213, 215, 217, 219, 237, 239–241, Treaty of Gandamak, 14 251–253, 269, 277, 282, 285, 287, 295, Treaty of Rawalpindi, 14 307–308, 313, 320, 323, 338–340, 368, tribes, 11, 13–14, 19, 22, 42–43, 72, 94, 103, 105, 376 115, 184, 269 non-Afghan, 22, 72 troop density ratio, 247 political rise, 2, 18–22 Turkmenistan, 5, 12, 19, 35, 37, 46, 361 Taloqan, 71, 76–77, 79, 81–82 Turkomen, 9, 12, 75 Tangi Gap, 78 Tanzania Dar es Salaam, 28, 374 U Tarin Kowt, 100–101, 103–105, 108, 113, 120, unconventional warfare (UW), 47–48, 75, 86, 209, 285, 292, 295, 338 88–89, 97, 105, 120, 131–132, 249, 278, Battle of, 105–106, 120, 360 287, 327, 355, 379 Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 37 United Front (UF) (NA-anti-Taliban), 72 task force (TF), 67, 95, 116, 135, 183, 187, 191, United Nations (UN), 1, 20–21, 23–24, 29, 32–34, 223, 227, 237, 269 50, 53, 55–56, 109, 127, 182, 190, 194, Task Force 11, 116–118 196–200, 204, 206–207, 227–228, 240, Task Force 58, 115 243–244, 255, 270, 274–275, 281, 286, Task Force 64, 132, 137, 141 288–289, 292, 302–303, 307, 310, 320, Task Force 202, 219–221 339, 342, 356, 361, 365–366, 369, 373– Task Force Anvil, 137, 139, 141 374, 377, 379–380 Task Force Devil, 211, 216–218, 234, 259, charter, 33, 53, 196–197, 269, 380 333, 340–341, 354, 362 Development Program, 288, 379 Task Force Hammer, 137, 139, 141–143 Security Council Resolution (SCR), 196, Task Force Jacana, 183, 186–187 204, 206, 376, 380 Task Force Nibbio II, 249 SCR 1368, 33 Task Force Panther, 211–214, 216–217, 234, SCR 1386, 182, 204, 339, 376 333, 340, 354 SCR 1373, 34 Task Force Rakkasan, 136–137, 139–143, SCR 1401, 196, 206, 380 149, 153–154, 160, 162, 165–166, 169, United Nations High Commission for Refugees 185–187, 205, 211, 219, 331, 340, 354 (UNHCR), 255, 272, 275, 356, 379 Task Force Warrior, 232, 239, 246–254, 259, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 78, 87, 147, 339 269, 272, 277–278, 285, 341 US Agency for International Development Task Group Arès, 249, 280, 285 (USAID), 70, 195, 226, 255, 257–259, Tenet, George, 91, 364 292–295, 326, 380

397 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 264 of 316

Index

US Air Force (USAF), 32, 41, 43–46, 49, 58, Wetherill, Nancy J., COL, 280 60–64, 66, 69–70, 77, 85–88, 91, 95–96, Whiteman AFB, 63–64 103, 133, 137, 139, 158–160, 163, 176, Wiercinski, Francis J., COL, 136, 139–141, 143, 191, 249–250, 261, 270, 279–280, 290, 145, 149, 153–156, 160, 162, 166, 176, 298–299, 302, 310, 338, 353–355, 357, 350, 357 364–365, 370, 379, 383 Wilkerson, Kevin, COL, 165–166, 169 US Air Force Special Operations Command Wille, Paul, MAJ, 127, 175, 251, 260, 271–274, (AFSOC), 62, 77, 353 350 US Air Mobility Command (AMC), 86 Wolesi Jirga (lower house Afghan National US Marine Corps (USMC), 79, 191, 265, 271, Assembly), 303 279–280, 290, 295, 322–323, 354, 366, Wolfe, Tim, CPT, 240 369, 371 Wolfowitz, Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense, US Navy (USN), 44, 46, 49, 62–64, 77, 87–88, 89, 209, 234, 360, 362 103, 132, 137, 157, 191, 249, 279, 288, Women(’s), 4, 11, 22–23, 26, 145, 188, 191, 209, 290, 295, 368, 372, 377 216, 218, 259, 264, 269, 273, 291, 295– US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), 296, 301, 303–307, 313, 328, 357–358, 47–48, 61, 69, 86, 95, 97, 122, 125, 288, 366, 381 310, 318, 353–354, 363, 382 rights, 21, 23 US Special Operations Command Central World Food Program (UN) (WFP), 182 (SOCCENT), 48, 61 Worthan, Ryan L., CPT, 251 US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), 60, 355 X USS Carl Vinson, 63, 377 XVIII Airborne Corps, 4, 97, 190–192, 202, 220, USS Cole, 28 237, 239, 242, 269, 279, 320–322, 333 USS Enterprise, 63 USS Kitty Hawk, 63 USS Peleliu, 85 Y USS Theodore Roosevelt, 63 Yemen Uzbek, 9, 12, 18, 22, 37, 59–62, 71, 73, 75, 81, Aden, 28 93, 262–263, 269, 303, 305, 337 Yokosuka, Japan, 63 Uzbekistan, 3, 5, 12, 19, 28, 35, 37–40, 46, 54, Yousef, Ramzi, 371 58–61, 75, 127, 160, 247, 271, 318, 337– 338, 345, 360–361, 365 Z V Zabol province, 20, 187, 244, 252–254, 266, 280, 282, 284, 286, 356 Van der Lande, Mark, COL (UK), 302 Zahi, Hajji, 115 Vines, John R., MG, 211–212, 214, 228, 236–239, Zahir, Shah, 269 270, 321, 341, 349 Zakim Khan, 137, 139 Viper laser target designator, 110, 159 Zaranj, 280 Zedong, Mao. See Mao Zedong W Zia Lodin, 137, 141–142, 163–164 Zinni, Anthony, 37 Wald, Charles F., LTG, 63 Washington Treaty, 52, 375 Webster, Luther, MAJ, 194–197, 206–207, 351 Weimer, Michael, COL, 198–199, 201, 207, 350 Weston, Craig P., MG (USAF), 207, 261–262, 274–275, 298, 301–302, 312–313, 349, 353, 355

398 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 265 of 316

About the Contributors Donald P. Wright is the chief of the Contemporary Operations Study Team at the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) and a lieutenant colonel in the US Army Reserve. He holds a Ph.D. in History from Tulane University and has served as an Army historian for 6 years. Wright was the co-author of On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign, The US Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003–January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 2008). He also authored several publications on the Russian Imperial Army including “That Vital Spark: Japanese Patriotism in Russian Military Perspective” in John Steinberg et al., The Russo- Japanese War in Global Perspective (Brill, 2005). James R. Bird, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, Retired, joined the Contemporary Operations Study Team in January 2006 and was a contributor to On Point II. Bird holds a M.A. in History and is a Ph.D. candidate in History at the University of Arkansas. Steven E. Clay, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, Retired, is the senior writer for the Contemporary Operations Study Team. Clay retired after 27 years of Active Duty service and holds a M.A. from Texas State University. He is the author or co-author of several publications, to include %ORRGDQG6DFUL¿FH7KH+LVWRU\RIWKHWK,QIDQWU\5HJLPHQWIURPWKH&LYLO:DUWR the Gulf War; Iroquois Warriors in Iraq; and Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, A Study in Operational-Level Command. Peter W. Connors was a charter member of the Contemporary Operations Study Team and contributed to On Point II. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics. Connors served as a US Marine Corps aviator in Vietnam and later served with and retired as a major from the Kansas Army National Guard. Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Farquhar is a historian at the Combat Studies Institute. He holds a M.A. in History from Kansas State University. Farquhar has served in a variety of command and staff positions, most recently in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 where he served as senior advisor to an Iraqi infantry brigade. Lynne Chandler Garcia has served on the Contemporary Operations Study Team since 2005 and was a contributor to On Point II. She holds a M.A. in Political Science from the University of Maryland and is a Ph.D. candidate in Government and Political Science at that university. Dennis Van Wey was a member of the Contemporary Operations Study Team from 2005 to 2007 and contributed to On Point II. 9DQ:H\LVD&LYLO$IIDLUVRI¿FHUZKRVHUYHGZLWKWKH 4th Infantry Division in Iraq in 2003 and 2004.

399 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 266 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 267 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 268 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 269 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 270 of 316 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 271 of 316

CIVILIAN PERFORMANCE RA. TING ~ot "'"of thlo to,,,.,•<>• AR 690-.COO, Ch•pl.. •OO; lh• ptop<>n•nl •t•,..y la OOSP!!R PART I· ADMIMISTRA11VE DATA 1. NAMl:(l..llA F1111l, JllJ AND 66N 2. NAME AND lOCATIONOF EMPLOYING OFFICf: SHAFFER, Anthony A. tSSN) USA Field Support Center 1--~-,...~~--~------~~~~~~---~--~~--1HQ, USAIHSCX>H, l\DCSOPS-HU/CX 3. 1>os1r10Nr1ru;ANONu1.1aeR.PAVPL~N.se111EsANO HOKINT v si·on GAADEl~EVEl 01 1 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5370 Intel Operations Specialist GS-0132-13

4. l'ERIOD COVERl:D ~. UN:>ER 6UPEllVISJON OF Ii, TYPE OF RATING 7. IF PROBATIONARY, INDICATE CU!'IRENT SUPERVISOR RECOMMENDED ACTION 0 AlolNUAL FROM: l Oct 92 OsPECIAL RETAIN D REMOVE FROMl'OSITI~ TO: 31 Jul 93 FROM: Feb 93 n PR08A TIONARY n (SF S2 OlVJCludJ PART II· PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

8. JOll ELELIE NT CE RATING JOB ELEMENT CE RATING a j .:- a h c

Provide Staff Guidance Yes Exceed Monitor Compliance with Directives/Regulations Yes Exceed Develop Plans, Policies and Procedures Yes Exceed Information Management and Security No Exceed 9. ELEMENTllA TINO EXPLANATION l. Provide Staff Cuidance. E~ceeded this element. Durinq this rating period Mr. Shaffer was a ~S-12, yet he performed duties normally expected of a more experienced GS-13. Mr. Shaffer served as the principAl staff officer responsible for oversight and staff manage~ent of all Arlny controlled HUMINT operatione. He performed all aseiqned actions in an exceptional manner. He was particularly adept at processing staff actions affecting operations· in an orderly, efficient and timely manner. He ia an outstanding writer and could always be counted on to prepare clear and concise staff ..... papers, often times on short notice. correspondence to respond to Command Group information needs was always well researched and to the point. On a daily basis, Mr. Shaffer dealt with varioue DOD and non-DOD a9encies to effect coordination, liaieon and qenerally exchange information in order for field collectors to operate at maximum efficiency. He ~as always fully prepared to brief the status of his actions on limited notice. Mr. Shaffer served as the principal ~rmy action officer on a highly sensitive interagency special access program. As such he was frequently required to brief the INSCOM command Group, DSCINT, DA, and DIA concerninq this project. His briefings were always clear, concise and well received. 2. Monitor Coll'\pliance With Directives/Regulations. Element vas exceeded. Mr. Shaffer was the Headquarters subject matter expert in the area of statutory and regulatory guidance concerning controlled HUMrNT operations. AG the KACOK staff of:icer responsible for the management and oversight of all Army controlled HUH.rNT operations, his in-depth knowledge of regulations and statutes has allowed him to ef!ectively serve both the organi%ations he supports as well as this headquarters.

3. Develop Plans, Policies and Procedures. ttr. Shaffer was intimately involved in a serieg of actions during this reporting period that concerned the development of plans, policies and procedures concerning Army controlled HUMINT operations. He was directly involved with INSCOM operational com111ands, D~ stat!, DIA and CIA 1n developing policies and procedures in such areas as counterdrug activities, joint and interagency initiatives, an intera9ency special access pro9ram and foreiqn materiel acquisition activities. He was always well prepared, and could be counted on, to detend lNSCOH positions in these various forums. He con~igtantly provided ingi9htful COll'llDents that at times definitely influenced the outcome of proposed action&. Exceeded this element.

4. Information Management and Seeurity. Exceeded performance standards. Kr. Shaffer

DA FORM 5390·R, May $6 R.l

e r PART II- PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (C""1inauJJ

~NT RA TING EXP'LANA TION (Coioli...... t) totally familiar with the office information management tools and capatiilities and .~ shares hie knowledge to the corporate benefit of the entire staff • He di.splayed an acute awareness of all security standards and procedures and demands that other employees uphold high security standards.

PART Ill· INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN HI.

PART IV· SEWIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE (SES/ ONLY

ti. RECO ~MEND A TION.S 12. RAT1N.Ci OFFICIAL APPROVAi.

P'ERFORlolANCE SALARY PERFORlolANCE RECOlolMENDING OFFICIAL RATING SALARY A WARD (BONUS) ADJUSTlolENT A WAl'IO (BONUS) " b c a b •.\•·'. YIOS NO YES NO SUPERVISOR REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Optmnlll) ES· % P'ERFORMANCE REVIEW SOARD Note: SES members may respond in writing to their initial ratings. They also uu.y request higher e11;ecutive level review either before ratings. are submitted to the Performance Review Board or after foal rating is as&igned, but not both. See AR 690-900, chapter 920. Subchapter 5,

PART V • COMMENTS

1~.

PART VI· SUMMARY RATING LEVa 14.

HIOHLY FULLY ~l/olllolA LL Y ACCEPT ABLE/ UN.ACCEP'TABLEI EXCEPTION.AL [!] D SUCCESSFUL D SUCCESSFUL D SATISFACTOR'I' D UNSATISFACTORY

PART VII· AUTHENTICATION 151. SUPERVISOR NAt.IE AND TITLE b. SIGNATURE~ c. DA7E BRIAN A. CORR, Chief, BUMI.NT Div C\, t::_ i 3 ('\ c. .... (!- C\.$ 151. REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Opz;o..ol) t

/ 17a. P'REI RE!'RESENTA TIVE NAME AND TITLE b. SIGN.a. TURE c. DATE f )/// 188. APPROVING/SES RA TING OFFICIAL NAME AND TITLE b.s1GN?~Y~ ~__./· c. DATE RICHARD J. JAMES, LTC, ADCSOPS-HU/CI ~I~ q--3 - L 191. EMPLOY!;E NAME ANTHONY A. SHAFFER ~(72---41 ~- ~ ~~'?~ Reverse of DA Form 5J98-R. May BIS Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 273 of 316 STAT£M£.\'T SC£ PRIVACY ACT "'O' V ... 01 fft1l tC)tm ... AA 623-tO!~ OP-ooal'l•ttt ON 01\ FOFt/ll 6?-~-1 ...,,..,,,.;v tt vs Au•n• ¥••tt•fY ...... ,.~",,.' t;•n1-

'4.AT f - AOMUtUtT1U~TlVE OAT.A t;, Q.c.":'E. OJ: AA1'¥K. • · LA.$T NAa-.1£ MAST N A.ME '1'100L.E 1N.IT•Ai,.. b . SSN c.. GA40E 'l. 8R 4 0£5lCJ>U.'1'£:) •. 1-ll<'01 ~.s~c:ooe ... Sl'!C I A~11f.S ~~~"I;; SHAFFER, Anthony A. ~( SSN) ·---, CPT 90 . MI 35F )1062 ; UPil~T. ORGAN•ZAtCON, ST&TtON ZIPC:OOE OA .&'0. MA.JOA C:Ot10.IANO J Ali.A$QH fOfl SV8Ml$SION •.COMO COO« HQ USAINSCOM, Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060 44 I RE'TAD .AS ; PERIOO C:(IVE111£0 ~.NO OF ., M t\..PO o. RA TEO 01'1-tC£A C0'Y tChtt"l on' •1110 tUU1 c:. . ~0fllWAA01NG AOOP.ES.$ "-'01("\"MS ~ROM T1"<111i\J co°" D 1, CJ VEN YO Of.FJC£A Yt•' ,\fo-.rl'I Y.e-t" ~fOl'lfl'I £>.. ""• 0 2. ~0A:WAA0£D TO OFFtCffC 91 03 11 91 09 27 07 MD02 ii E.XP"~ANATlOf'~ O~ NON"ATEO ll'tRtOOS I _.ART U - AUTHENTICATION tAott:'d otlicn t>t"•'""' Nn,.,.. l"Alt't t

GAAOE. 8"AMCt1 OAOA,.,,IZATtON OUTY ASStGNME.NT OAn

" N4Mt O~ SlNJQA AATf:st tt...#l, lvtt llll SSN 1 MA,STRAll.~'t:"T .(). .Michael A. J(SSN) · Ptm;;m~t_"bl ~~ G"AQE. •AAN(:H, OAGANtZA T•ON ourY A$$1(\.NMI: NT I/ 0 rm,. MI USAINC:::i'()M. Aro:'.OPS-ml-1I~"T 13 Ou- CJ I dSIGNA~A:~ OATl 1··OAT( fNT(R£0 ON If. AATEO o•~•cu• I~. $A WO •NIT1AUl >10. o• ~b ~_/~ 0.& J'OA~ 2 t M.P0 I N I Tl AL.$ r·lfrlli::L ;r/-,rp v ,,,,- -r ~c.- l l. l>ec ~I r P'IAT 111 - QUTY 0£$Cllll"TIOlll tlla1M ._ f'flUNC:l•At.. DUTY TSf'-1! Ml IM N' ~r::.FF nrf"i ...... r I•" ss11.. os ~c:;J;' ( "'''"to,..",. Uta. OA l=-O•u.. ,, ·t·, Serves as program manager of a controlled HUMINI' collection program for AIX:SOPS-HUMIN'I' Field Activities Division, conducts i nitial research, develops concepts, coordinates with national intelligence agencies, and implements project. As Far East Desk Officer, relates intelligence collection requirements and priorities to INSCOM's on-going operacions by providing substantive guidance to subordinate units. Plans HUMINT cperations to attain approved Army objectives and goa:s. Participates in the formulation of new procedural policies or plans thru t he application and articulation of expetience and knowledge. Processes staff actions affecting all Far: East operations. o:mcucts liaison with --"-~ -~ _ ...'"'-- TT Cl i _._,.,, 1 ;' ----~ ____ ....,; _ • ._ i --- ,,.i.,.. i..~••- ;-a..-.. , ,...,...... :-Vl\C!' --· . ·~ f'AlllT IV - PEAfORMANCl(EVAlU'ITIOlt - PROfES:SlONALIW ,,..,.. , - - -

LOW O!Glll!f. lfllr lt:r.... I '"'''Ott# '4 W"fiffti· '"llfW91,. ,,.,,. dll'6ff"'r uf ...,..,,..,.,,,.,., ...,,,_ Otll" /v4h.»Vf'l" •Oh'fPIW'11tl• 111

l. p--.. e&pocily lo acqwil'e IUIO-fl.'/Jl'DI) .in -111111d Wlb ., . •9: S..uMlr-imp...,..m•nl l 3. Malat&ln1 appropriate IH•ol or pb,..ical fiU.e• PASS 09/90 1 10. I• adapuble to 69/167 YES l •. ~ cmdar ud ,...,.~ io a."°"'6NW!t l 13. S..ppo.11 EOIE:liO 1 1. OHr and coneiloe in "'""" CO-fl>Calioll 1 14. 0-alld cancillt ill or1l contm111Ue.Uon 1 'O. foflOf'($$JOHA1,, eTttu:::I fCO#h.tlJll.t'IU 011t ... •l'!'C ..,,rl't' tM N"'• ..,/M'ft # ,..,.14-C'•f.afl'ft °'"'""'•"Ill'•• II'',..,,,,...,, ~'C"llllflf"'ft#I a.l Quick to grasp new ideas. I. OiOIC:ATION a.2 Exceptionally high degree of professional expertise in controlled HCJMINI' 2.. Rfif'QN$1.lf..ITY 3. LOYALTY subjects. 4. CUtiCIJllUN£ b.2 Aggressively seeks and accepts assignment of irx:::reased responsibilities. !S , Hrf.,.l:Qflll'ITY 4 . -JlAL COURAGE b.3 Clearly loyai to Army objectives. I. ~U•• Ft.IMflllC~ b.6 e. MO"'A~ !>T.-NO- Has the roral courage to express and defend his views. ""°'

DA 67-8 US ARNY OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 274 of 316

PCA10Q eov•flt.50 ai fl'<11 01na'>-r PART V- PERFORMANCE ANO •OTENTIAI. £VA~UATION tl!Glm • RATEO OF

... PfR•Ol•ll.. ANCf DURING THI$ AATIN(; P£•uoo. RliFER TO ""RT IU. 04 •o.... &?-I .AND l'ART Ill ••• Al'iD <. 04 -01"" t.7-1-•

Ci:] AL..,.AYS E>

( COMMl:NT ~ $PECtfSC A.$P£C'YS Of l"Ht: ,.EAPIOJl\MANC£. fl\EFER TO PAAT IH. OA. FOflliM ~.,_, ANO"A~'r ut •• b, At'•tl c.. OA FORM 67.....e.- t. DO'NOT vse FOft COMM!N'rS Ou POT~~Tu.. ._, Outstanding performance by an officer mature far beyond his years of experience. CPT Shaffer quickly grasped the complexities of a M.b.C'OM's staff HOMINT mission. He effectively assumed the full range of duties of a vacant active corrponent position during Desert Storm in support of INs:'OM's worldwide HUMih.T mission. He established for INSCOM a major controlled HUMINT collection program, which when fully inplerrented will provide expanded, permanent collection operations worldwide - truly a major undertaking. CPI' Shaffer conducted technical/operational reviews of Far East operational proposal for INS::OM CG approval, and coordinated same with DA, DIA and CIA. His performance greatly enhanced U.s. Army HUMINT collection operations in the Pacific, particularly in the counterdrug arena. CPT Shaffer played a pivotal role in formulating and successfully coordinating with DIA/CIA a time-constrained and corrplex HUM.INT operational proposal C'Oncerning a highly sensitive intelligence collection project. The gains germane to the project a~e expected to l::le extraordinary, never l::lefore achieved. Doring this tour of duty, he displayed the skills of a consummate staff Officer, eagerly accepting corrplex problems and resolving them through detailed research and analysis, thorough coe>rdination, and personal tenacity.

d. THI$ OFFIC:EA'S POlENllAL FOii PAOMOTJON TO TKf Nfkt HIGi OF D l>llOMOTE o'C1J COJl'rEMJooAA"IES COHTEMPOllA"lfS D

e. COMM~NT ON 'OT~N'TIAL Promote now. send to CAS3 at earliest opportunity after completion of advanced course. Assign to echelon above corps sensitive controlled HUMINT mangagement positions to utilize and hone his extraordinary talents. This officer is easily capable of performing the duties and responsibilities of a field grade officer.

PART VI• JNTEIWEPIATE RATEfl

•· COMMf;HT$

Pt.RT VU - SENIOR RATER

t.P'QTENTi4L £VALUATt0"4 1$t~ ,.14oJH~ -1. Alf. tJ.lJ·W31 ti COMMENT$ t>A $fl USE ONLY Truly outstanding officer whose remarkable job performance was x t HI a key factor in the sucx::ess that Army HIJMINT enjoyed in 1991. H CPT Shaffer is a rare talent whose unique background well ttlt suited him for the large challenges in the aftermath Of oesert ttttttttttltt Storm. He is a gitick learner, bright, eager to please and tlttttttttHIHUffltt"ttHtt destined for greater things. I would promote him now and tmttttttttmtttmtntttttt unconditionally accept hirn for future active duty tours. This ttttttttttm is the kind Of young officer we need to groom. He is t:he tttt future of the HUMINT business -- a big plus for the reservi2Jlt tt component. I LO

A COMPLETEOOA fOl'IM 61-~-· was llECe1veo ...... THIS flt£PORT ANDCONStOE~EO INMY £VAL.V4Tt01'1; ANO 11ev1ew rst\ YES n NO t~.o•JQin '"' I>

.. Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 275 of 316

SENIOR SYSTEM CIVILIAN EVALUATION REPORT For use of lhis fonn, aea AR 890-400: tho Pl"04IOMl'l'l agency is OOCSPER

PART I - ADMINISTRATM DATA L NAME (wt, first, Mldd/1 Initial} b. SSN j o. PosmoN TITLE. PAV PLAN, seA1es AND GRADE SHAFFER, Anthony A. I Chief. Controlled Operations Br.anch. GS-132-13 1(SSN) d. ORGANIZATION .r:. REA.SON FOR SUBMISSION • HQ, USAINSCOM, AOCSOPS-HU/CI I fX1 ANNUAL n SPECIAL n INTE"RN f. ?ERIOO COVERED fYYMMDDJ lg. RATEO MOS. h h. RA'reE COPV (Check one attd d1t11J FROM 930701 THRU 940630 12 GIVEN TO RATEE n FORWARDED TO RATEE PART I· AuneNTICATIOfC a. NA.ME OF AATI:R Ii.-.~ -- SIGNA'TURE~S' .\::: DATE' CORR, Brian A. - \ 1:-- Q. \l t,. ~'-} GRAOEIRANK, ORGANIZATION, OUTV ASSIGNMENT GS-14, ADCSOPS·HU/CI. Chief, Hl.i"MINT Division b. NAME OFIN'TERM!;DIATE RATER~ 1 1111- .Rnl:.MI SIONATVRE DATE

GRAOEIRANK. ORGANIZATION, DUTV ASSIGNMENT - c. NAME OF SENIOR RATER rt-i. Flltfllt. ~...... , Sl~AIU"' LP DATE GOEBEL.ER, Johll A. . ~/~LS~ A£pf \i. 0. \Jt:,.. C\ ~ GRADE/RANK. ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT COL, GS, ADCSOPS-HU/CI 0 - d. RATEE: I uncl~ my liQlnlWr• d- not constitur.e DATE aor..ment or diugr-.m with the ell'MletioM of tho ) Rater and Senior Retet, end meNly varffiN PM't I and Part rv data. ftg~~ \~ tl"~ Ci~ PART Ill • PERFORMANCE AWARD/Q'',. ... ~ INCRE'ASE • RECOMMe.IOATIONS b. ST. St. GM. GS. WS - PERFORMANCE A.WUDJQSI SES· AWARD, 80NUS/ PERFORMANCE AWARD RA.TING SALARY PERFORMANCE SALARY INCREASE AWARD • BONUS PERCENT OF SAi.ARY I AMOUNT (1J (21 ($) QSI IGS wilh su-..:•ful L•Wlll 1 A•tin(I OnlyJ RECOMMENDING OFFICIAi.$ YES NO YES NO TO (Gftldtt/St-J: RATH AWARD APPROVED 8Y INTERMEOIATE RA'reR PERFORMANCE REVIEW BOARD OATE (YYMMDDI J FUND crre SENIOR RATER es ~ PART fl/ • DUTY DSCRIPTION IR•tll'J DAILY DUTIES ANO SCOPE tr,...,._...,_, ,,._., -r. ~ _...... ,. Position Oaacription 041- :1141 is 4:orrect: ~YES LJNO Conduct day-to-day oversight, direction, planning and management of INSCOM1 s global controlled HUMINI' collection operations, and operational management as operations officer of joint Special Access Program (SAP), to include operational guidance on collection methodologies/techniques, operational support, a>mmunications support and production/analysis of information gained from the SAP. Provide staff supervision, lt".Chnical direction, advice, assistance and policy formulation of conttolled HUMINT, HUMINT support to special Mission Units and counterdrug (CD) operations. Coordinate controlled HUMlNT operations with DoD and non-DoD departmental and national intelligence and LFA activities. Assist in legal and regulatory oversight of all controlled operations in conjunction with INSCOM SIA and IO. Conduct review of all controlled HUMlNT proposals. Implement OPS ~olicy/Guidance.

PART V ·VALUES fR.atM' PERSONAL euwrr COMM04TS COftWftitnwnt o Loyalty and selfless service were exceptional. v Competence i Candor A 0 Spent many off-duty hours in furtherence of mission accomplishment. L Coureg• ARMY ETHIC • u 0 Enthusiasm for getting the job done was outstanding. 1.ova.ltv E Outy SelfleH Service s lntellritv .

t>A FORM 7222. MAY 93 Replaces OA form 5398, OEC 8&, which ill obsolate on 30 JUN 95 U!:N'PC Vl.00 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 276 of 316 P'ERIOD COVERED (YYMMOD1 RAi?:l!'S NAME 930701 - 940630 ISHAFFE.R, Anthony A. ~ SSNJ PART VI • PfRl'ORMANC! '!VALUATION IR111er/ a , PEllFOAMANCE DUIUNG THIS RATING F'l:RIOD Comparieo" of indi'tlidual obje11'1ivee a911ins1 •ooompli•lwnonta ol'ld OA-•14bliened porform11,.oe ot•nd•rd• resulted'" ti>• following object.i ...c ratings: Succos.s AU or IV'1 Excellence Over Excellence Needs lmpro~ment D Fails 1 or More Obj LQJ 50% Obj D 25·50% Obj Excellence D 1 or More ObJ D 1 ·24% Obi lncludei: &c.lllanc. in Oto MgtJL.dchp OR EEO/AA Obi for aunv/mar n Yei; n N.o b. &ULUT EXAMPLU o An outstanding staff officer who enthusi.as.tically accepted his share of work and more. o Staff actions were always timely and complete. o Outstanding performance as the key Anny repres.entatitive on a national level sensitive HUMINT operation.

o Outstanding job of facilitating HUMINT support to support contingency opemtions and deployed warfighters. o Very succ.e5sfutly and effectively briefed senior DoD and Army leadership on a sensitive project for which he was responsible. o Did an exceptional job in reviewing and coordinating numerous sensitive intelligence operational proposals.

o Successfully orchcstraled a series af actions within the intclligenc.e community which resulted in the increased effectiveness of Army HUMTh'T operations. o Performed a variety of actions associated with sensitive HUM1NT operations in an outstanding manner. o Could always be relied upon to perfonn critical staff functions during periods of crisis or mrbulence.

PART VII· INTEIMEDIATE RATER IOtlriona/J BUUET COMMENTS

PART VIII - Sl!NIOft RA"TER S.R • OY£RAU. b. BULL~ COMMENT$ fPwfa,,,,.,,crt/PottKJti9/ PERFORMANCE RATING PROFILE o One of the very best action officers on the HUMINT/CI staff. ~ o His enthusiasm for ooordinating and facilitating sensitive HUMINT : } SUCCESSFUL - operations was unparalleled. - .4 - FAIR - o Made significant contributions to the intelligence community. 5 UNSUCCESSFUL - A completed DA Form 7222·1 w11s received with o Very high potential individuaJ; recommend further assignment at DA or thls raporl and considered in my aveluetion and DIA staff. row~ES n NO fbD/tlin NO in Part VU! bl NEVERSE. DA FORM 7Z22, MAY 93 U$APPC V l.OC Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 277 of 316

SENIOR SYSTEM CIVILIAN EVALUATION REPORT For 11&e of lhis fonn, He AR 890-400; lM proponent agency is ODCSP£R

PART I· ADMINISTRATIVE DATA a. NAME (Le$t, Rnt, Wdd/11 Initial/ Ib. SSN Ic. POSl110N TITlf, PAY PLAN, SERIES AND GRADE SHAFFER, Anthony A. (SSN) Intel Operations Specialist, GS-0132-13 d. Ol'IGANIZATION HQ, INSCOM, ATTN: ADCSOPS-HUCI, e. llEASON FOR SUBMISSION FT. BELVOIR, VA 22060 I fXl ANNUAL n SPECIAL n INTERN f. PERIOD CO'-'EREO (YYMMDDI ,g. RATEO MOS.h h. RA TEE COPY fC>iet:k on• and daltlJ FROM 9407.01 THRU 950630 12 GIVEN 'TO RATEE n FORWARDED TO RATE1' PART II • AUTHENTICATION a. NA.ME OF RA~ (,__ "'- - .....,.,, DATE SIGNA.TURc:s? C\\: CORR, Brian A. - GRAOE~ANK. ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT GS-14, USAINSCOM. ADCSOPS-HUCI, CH, HUMINT DIVISION -b. NAME OF INTlRMEDIATE RATER fOtJriOMJJllM. Rrst. Mii SIGNATURE OA.lE

GRACE/RANK, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT /l /\ . c. NAME OF SENIOR RATER tu•. Fbr.. - wr;.n CATE sr;ff:RE/)J}. J WOOLFOI.X, DONAID D. .J .. o '(J.. oLJ GRADEIFIANK, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT I COL, OS, USAINSCOM, ADC30PS-HUCI '()_ I d. RA.Tef; I uooeruand my signature dotH not constitute agn1ement or disagreement with the avaluetions of the DATE Rater and Senio1 R111er, end merely veriries Part I and Part IV data. ;r~--· PART Ill· PERFORMANCE A'IYARD/QUAUTY S'TE> INOREASll! a RECOMM!NOATIO NS b. ST, SL, GM. GS, WS • l"ERFORt.llANCf AWARC>/QSI SES · AWARD, BONUS/ PERFORM4NCE AWARD RATING SALARY PERFORMANCE ISALARYINCREASE AWARD· BONUS PERCENT OF SALARY I AMOUNT ,, ) 12) {3} as I /GS with Suc-ful L•.,.J I R•ling Only/ RECOIVMENOING OFACIALS VES NO VES NO TO /Gr•dWSt..J: RATER AWARD APPROVED BY INTERWEOIATI RATIR PERFORMANCE REVIEW BOARD DATE fYYMMDDJ IFUND CITE SENIOR RATER es $ PART IV • OUTY DESCRIPTION !RatPrJ DAILY DUTIES AND SCOPE rro-••---: ,....,,-. ..w->t. looc!tiWa. --.1. Position Desoription j!l"I Ftnn i1~1 ii: correot l_JYES lJNo Conduct day-to-day oversight and management of INSCOM's global cnntrolled. HUMINT collection operations. Provide staff supervision, technical direction, advice, assistance and operations policy· formulation and implementation of ongoing controlled HUMIN1'. Coordinate controlled HUMINT operational activity with DoD and Non-DoD departmental and national Intelligence activities. Assist in legal and regulatory oversight of all controlled operations in conjunction with INSCOM SJA and IO. Conduct review of all controlled HUMINT proposals and di~minate policy guidance, concepts and obje.ctives for proposed controlled HUM.INT collection activities. Interface with consumers of controlled HUMINT collection to ensure effectiveness and responsiveness to collection requirements. Conduct/assist in selection of personnel and facili1ate their placement into special/critical mission assignments.

PART V ·VALUES {Rar.rJ

PERSONAL BULLET COMMENTS Commilrnont o Extremely competent in his field of expertise which makes him an invaluable v Ccmpetence asset. A C11ndor Co11t8J;>R l o Committed and focused on mission accomplishment. ARMY ETHIC u Loyelty E Ou tv 0 Worked many off-duty hours to get the job done. Solflen S oNioo s Integrity o Eager and enthusiastic at all times.

DA FORM 7222, MAY 93 Replaces DA Form 5398, DEC 86, whieh is obsolete on 30 JUN 95 USN'PC Vt.<)() Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 278 of 316

PERIOD COVfREO (YYMMOOJ RA TEE'S NAMf ISSN 940701 - 9S0630 ISHAFFER. Anthooy A. PART VJ - PERFORMANCE EVALUATION rRater/ a. PERFORMANCE DURING THIS RATING PERIOD ~omparison of.individual objectives against acco1T'4'lishments and DA·ssteblislted performance standards resulted in the following objectives rotin~s: IV"I Excellence Over E II Success All or N d I t ~ D xce enee D E>

Includes Excellence in Org Mgt/Ld~ OR l!!EO/AA Obi for sunv/mqr n Yes I I No b. BULLET P!XAMPl.ES o Continued excellent perforrnanc.e by a very cager and enthusiastic staff officer. o Outstanding performance, during half the rating period, while serving as the Army representative on a national level sensitive HU.MINT operation. o Briefed the leadership in INSCOM. DA, DIA, the Joint Staff and on the status of ongoing and future plans for this project. o Effectively executed a seamless transfer of this operation to the U.S. Army Foreign Intelligence Activity • as evidenced by the award of the U.S. Army Commander's Award for Civilian by Commander, USAFIA. o Reviewed, staffed and coordinated over 25 sensitive intelligence operations from INSCO:M Major Subordinate Commands involved in oontrolled HUMINr operations. o Worked weekends and evenings to ensure timely results to sensitive inquiries from INSCOM and DCSINT, DA staffs. o Performed a variety of staff actions associated with controlled HUMINT operations in an outstanding manner. o Staff actions were al.ways timely and complete.

PART VII - INTERMEDIATE RATER (OptiontlfJ BULLET COMMENTS

PART VIII - SENIOR RAT9'1 & OVERALL SR b. BULLET COMMENTS (Performance/PotentiaJJ PERFORMANCE RATING PROFILE - o Extremely aggressive, knowledgable staff officer. Understood the most ~ - minute details of his programs/projects. : } SUCCESSFUL - o Unlimited future potential with additonal maturity and experience in - - inter·agency/staff relationships. - 4 FAIR - -5 UNSUCCESSFUL o Should be selected for advanced management training to support future - team A completed DA Fonn 7222· 1 was t•ceived with responsibilities as either staff officer or operational leader. thic report and C(lllllidered in my evaluation and roviow: fS'Zl' YES n NO (Exclain NO in Parr VIII bl REVERSE. DA FORM 7222, MAY 93 VSN'l'C VI .00 Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 279 of 316

DEPARTMENT. OF ~fHE ARMY

ANTHONY A. SHAFFER

IS P.RESENTED THE COMMANDER'S AWARD .FOR C:IVILIAN SERVICE FOR DISTINGUISHING HIMSELF BY EXEMPL1JlY MERITORIOUS SERVICE AS PROJECT OFFICER FOR AN EX.ECUTIVE LEVEL SPEC I AL ACCESS PROGRAM AND AS CHIEF HUMINT OFFICER, USAINSCOM, FROM l DECEMBER 1994 ro 31 Dl~Cl'~MllER 1994. MR. SHAFFER'S COMPLETE DEDICATION AND BOUNDLESS EN ER CY, TECHNICAL EXPERTT SE, COMMON SENSE GUIDANCE AND COORDINATION SKILLS RESULTED JN /\ SEAMLESS TRANSFER TO USAF IA OF THE A FOREMENTlONED • GRAVELY CRT TI CAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTlON PROJECT. WITHOUT HIS MASTERFUL EFFORTS, CONTINUATlON OF THIS NATIONAL LEVEL PIWGRAH, IN ITS CURRENT HIGHLY EFFECTIVE CONFIGURATION, WOUT.D HAVE REEN IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY. MR. SHAFFER'S RESOURCEFULNESS, ENTHUSIASM Afm UNTIRlNG DEDICATION TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT HEFLECT AT CRF.DIT UPON HIM, HIS ORGANIZATION AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY. /f/ ~· ~,....

26 JANUARY 1995 / ;,(///_

Color.::-:1, MI Commanding / Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 280 of 316 / DIA PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

AUTHORITY: DIAM 22·56 PURPOSE: Etlablishes a Perform.an~ Appraisal Systern for employees In dealgnll«I pccltiont., ROUTINE. USES: Records 1"11 be pnx;essed and 11'18i1'1tained by theemplopee'c $.1pervl1110r and I.he eervicing pecconnal office of n.. ~ency.1nfo11netion will be 111ade-lleble to the appropriate review authotllies. Thi! SSlol will be u9Gd to acc:urately iderrtity the employee.

DISCLOSURES: Dledosure ottllis Information ia volun1ary. liowevN, failure IC) pro'tlde tha requested information m1y aCllo'Dniely afta~tyour performance appmiaal.

I. NAME Anthony A. Shaffer SSN .(SSN) FROM .LJuJ 96 TO 30 h10 97

TITLE Intelligence Officer (HLJMINT Ops) SERIESIGRAOE 013 2LGG-13 ORGANIZATION PHM-1 C

11.. JOB DE&CRIPTIOW:

Serves as the Functional Manager for HUMINT support to Information Operations/Information Wartare 110/IWJ • Prepares staff pack.ages, provides advice to senior managers. and conducts liaison with other offices within DIA and external to the Agency.

OIS'llloC SUCCESS NEEi!$ Ul

5. Professional conduct. IJJOOD Comment . . Personal and professional relationships with sup&visors and colleagues is excellent. Projects a positive image of DIA and DHS to external agencies.

6. Qrganlz:aliOn'l; Bfed!Veness (Maroalelry tor SupeMsol's) ------ 0000 Comment

SPECIAL EMPHASIS AREAS: SAT UNSAT

1. SEC~ITY AWARENESS ------~ 2. ETHICSJFRAUDJWASTE/ABUSE Comment

IV. OVERALL. PERFORMANCE RATING:

G2J DISTINGUISHED PERFORMANCE D SUCCESSFUL. PERFORMANCE 0 NEEDS IMPROVEMElll'T D UNSATISFACTORY

DIA Form. 124·B (9-94) Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 281 of 316

3UPERVISOR CERTIFICATION AND SIGNATURE:

,L) PERFORMANCE PlANIMID TERM COMPLETED 0 IDP COMPLETED 0 POSITION DESCRIPTION CURRENT OR UPDATE SUBMITTED

SIGNATURE: DATE:

V. EMPLOYEE COMMENTS:

SJGNA' :,~ DATE: (Signature certifies that performance appraisal has been accomplished and discussed with employee)

VI. REVIEWING OFFICIAL ACTION: 0 CONCUR D NONCONCUR (COMMENTS REQUIRED) COMMENTS:

SIGNATURE:

INSn:tUCTlONS:

\. Enter appl k:able data.

JL Job Description • Enter a bM el statemeot, one or two bullets, describing the job.

Ill. Performance Evaluation • List perlcrmance elements Imm the Performance Ptan. • Review special emphasis areas to note signlfican! achievements or deficiencies. • Comnu:mls are requirod on ar.y area rated other !hen Success! ul.

IV. O'Jlolrall Performance Rating • Check the raling whk:h in the rater's judgement best represents overall perform a nee and is supported by ratings ior i ridividua I elements in Sedan msubject to the follO\li"ing: Distinguished: No more !han one performance element rated Success! ul: remainder rated Distinguished and no special emphasis a re a rated below Successful. Sucoewul: No perlcrmanca element or special emphasis area rated below Successful. Needs Improvement: One or more performance elemenl.s or special emphasi;s areas rated Needs Improvement; none rated Urisatislactory. Unsatlafactory: On!I or mOl'I! performance eiemen Is or special amp hasis ar""'5 rated lJnsatislac!ory.

• If there is some doi.bt about lhe best overall rating or concurrence by the reviewing official. dioouss the proposed rating we revie""' r to gain consensus.

V. Supervisor Certification and Signature • Cheek the blocks eertilying that the IDP was completed and that the pos~ion description is curnmt or an updat<'l submitted. Update may be submit1ed with Ille appraise I. • Supervisor sign arid date. • Supervisor shaQ discuss lhe appraisal wUh the ~loyee

VI. Employee Comments • The employee may e<1ler comments and should be encouraged 1<> do so particularly if there is disagreement. a Employee sign and date. Signature certifies !hat p811ormanca appraisal has been acc01111Jlished and discussed with employee. • Supervisor shall lonw.rd tne appraisal lo the reYiewing official

VI I. Relliewing Oflioial Aetion • The reviewing official may nonconcu r and change the rating If oonsensus with !tie rater oould not be achieved. Commanta supporting the change mus1 be ante red. • Reviewer S9' and date. • Reviewer provide a feedback copy ID the employee and forward original appraisal th rough major organization administration officer lo Personnel. Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 282 of 316 POSITION DtsCMPTlON IP\llUC U.W 18 618)

2. f>A.V SCHEOV~E 3. OCCUf>ATIONAL SERIES 4. ORA.DE 5 S!CUl\ITY CLEARANCE 111gence Officer IHUM OPS: 10) GG 132 13 6

7. JTOAN 8. l'OSITION DESCRIPTION lolUM8ER $.CL.C

orAH/DHO~lNFO OPS) 64 6 RX-7291 10. GEOGAAl'HIC ANO l=UMCTIONAL AREA INFORMATION

GEOGRAPHIC AREA COVERED 8V THE POSITION f11 spplc11blt1J CODE:

PRIMARY FUNCTIONAL AREA COVERED BY THE POSITION C:OPE: Serves as a Regional Oesk Officer (ROO) for the Information Operations (101 Branch. Transnational Operations Element. Global Ope1ations Division, OHS. Provide$ oversight, and conducts direct support operations and activities relating to DIA's conduct of and support to Information Operations. Interfaces with DIA, OSD, CINC staffs, the Serviceg and other non·DoO agencies and intelligence production elements with respect to the DoO HUMINT collection and suppat effat. Mantains technical proficiency of tradecraft skills, and monitors technology trends to ensure OHS 10 support capabilities are abte to fulfill Cll'

SECONDARY FUNCTIONAL AREA COVEREil BY THE POSITION (1f apj)hcablel CODE: Prepare& staff paper.: on 10 HUMINT collection and support matte!$ for higher HQir. and external agencv authorities. Pretvides as&istant to OHS managment concerning all asoects of DoD Information Operations activities and OoD HUMINT collection regarding the enabling and use of technologies to fuHill 10 and 10 related taskings.

11. SPECIAL POSITION AlolO OUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS flJofygnlph, //Htgwlge pror11:it:ncy, proximnv to noiise ¥1<1 c'->icllls, fJ'eflUlltlt Cl' dtJng6rou6 travel, etc.I

MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS

Knowledge of OHS and OA field collection acti11itie. escecial!v those regarding the wenabling" or •emplacemenr of technical cacebilities. Background in, or knowledge of Information Operationa, especially Internet, Telecommunications. Computer and hardware/software tectlnology issues and capabilities as they telated to HUMINT and the use of vadecraft to &Upport Information Operations planning and operational activities. MOTC graduate and three yeara of prior experience in HUMINT and field operatton& and/or management of field operetions. Knowledge of nll\ional level policy and 011ersi9ht requirements for tho eonduc;t of intelligence activities.· Exct!lllent written end oral commur>ications skills. Cl polygraph examln.irtion required.

DESIREO REQUIREMENTS Advanced degree in international relations, Human or Psychological Factors, and or arnilar dscipline is highly desired. Graduate of lntelllgence Collectlgon Managment course. Proficiency-.. use ot automated/personal computer systems.

12. SUPERVISORY CERTIFICATION I ""1if'( rhlt tltis; lit ""' _,.., JffD~r of die """°" dutio14 nupOMJlbilltle.s, ¥1d mand•t«y teq<1lretrf!fttltJ1 thi:s poaitlon lltfd lb Ol'9/llft/ZarionlJI '"'~' llltd that the position b ~ to Cl/11'11/ Ollf ~t htnt:tlonlt "" '111111/ch I am tlflll!IOl?libie. TN.I cer'lir1t:•Don i:s l'll#tl with rM knowl«J/1(1 rNt t.11/:r lllomtation b ., b/J (Jiff'°' StlttlmwY /Nl'PHH rttlttiltg to llP(JOinrmerit llltd PtlYlrHMt of public funds, atld that falst or miueal/lng sutements may ~omtitute violations of :wch sr•tutes or thai' Implementing nt!Wlalions. NAME ANr> 'TITLE SIGNATURE OR. R. THOMAS LOYD. GG· 15 Chief, DH0·8 /?. -r~ 13. POSITION GRADING CERTIFTCATION I ct1rrify INt tlltt gnl(/fJ of this pMitio/t /Ju l»4Nt set In 11Ct':Ofr/llt1Ce wltll the audtoritieJI fl'/Hffff fo DIA 4NIW Aiblk Ltlw 98./S t 8.

NAME AHO TITLE SIGNATURE OATE

OIA FOAM JOO (0M8l PREVIOUS EDITIONS Of THIS FORM A.Rf OBSOLETE Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 283 of 316 r I

DEFENSE t:\TEWGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTOK. DC 20J4C ~ 30 November 1999

ery pleased to forward the attached letter from Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, DIA, regarding the outstanding support you provided to the Joint Special Operations Command.

I join Admiral Wilson in commending you for your outstanding performance of duty. You are a first~class professional! I'm proud to have you on the DO team.

A. HARDING eneral, USA or for Operations

Mr. thony A. Shaffer Trans National Operations Division Defense HUMINT Service .- I Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 284 of 316 I II -

DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THRU:

TO: Mr. Anthony A. Shaffer Defense HUMINT Servia

I recently received a message from Major General Bryan D. Brown, Comnumdirlg Officer, Joint Special Operations Command, irl appreciation for the excellent support you provitkd during your recent tour to his command.

I commend, you for your superb performance of duty. You have represented our Agency well.

Thank.r for a job well done.

Thomas R. Wilson Vice Admiral, USN Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 285 of 316

DEFE'iSE [l'ffELUGENCE AGi:"NCY WASHTNGmN, DC 20340

1 February 1999 THRU~~4 Dea~ lJ Extremely pleased to forward and endorse a Jetter of appreciation from Rear Admiral Thomas W. Steffens, Director, Intelligence and Information Operations Center, U.S. Special Operations Command. Your professional efforts on behalf of the Directorate for Operations reflect highly of you and are truly commendable.

Please accept my personal thanks for a job well done.

...

1 Enclosure als ...... ~~R . HARDING • Bri r General, USA Director for Operations

Mr. Anthony A. Shaffer Office of Operations Defense HUMSNT Service .. Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 286 of 316 r \, OATec 9!" f!Enut:$l ,~, f""'*-.,,,.,_ .16ittf T'f/vel R~ttoll& t.;•m!, Chl~:f!'r :fl (P.ead ~~Act $1etf!ffle"! Off b6c~ belo'T com/,lli!:firrg lomt.J

TDY Site ViS!t/Coord!nation 21 1 1 rTlflEAARY

~OM ~ ~mbingt~. oc !9: ~i •. Af~'l R~R.N: Wuhmgtert, oc

._...,_ ...._. .._,, _..- _. _-_· _- _.. _ - -_-__._ - _ - _•• _ ., ,trn.1JnJ ~tiWI

Ii9. ACC:OUJmNG CITAT>Oll

' , 17 .'..:;i;~\~1. Oas~ NllMlllF~)

tfO FORM 16 '10, jAN 2001 .. Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 287 of 316

ro AU. WHO Hll.\Li; SEE TllKSE 1•ngsENfS. 01U;1rt1~G1, 1'llJSi IS TO t:EATiifY THA1' "l'H~ f\111l:8Url]NT Of' TUK {'NITEIJ ~"T.\Tf:S o•· .unrn11\\ A(l'J'JiOfUZlm BY t;xHfll'Tl\'t! «ilUllRil...... \l''Gt"RT me• ~ AW.\R'DEI>

1 'fH. -.E . .. . R 1·-,)01\. ~ ~ z-~ .E " s1·-'.. "'"" AR .-- MED',: . - J A~' I '

1'0 MAJOR ANITHONY A. SHAFFER UNITED STATEl1ARMY

mn mefftork,us seMce from 23 July 2003 to, 1 December 2003 aa Oper,aticns Otftcer. Human lntetllgence Support Oetadltr'Hlnt. Combfned/Jofnl Task Fot't'6 180, whf.. deployed to Afghenlstan, In dftci suiiiport of Operation Enduring Fte4!1dorft. Major Shatreft ~~. Miftege set\lbr, end commitment to mission aeoomptlshment under h mtJSt extreme of cittumttances gntaUy conlrlbuted to IN suc:;cess of Opefatto-'n Emoting IFreedom. Major She~r'8 pMbniencs of duty In a combat zone Nftecft gfWlt ttedlt Upolill hhsetf, the Comblnedl.lomt tntetl~ce T111k Force 180 and the United States Centtaf Cornmand.

OIVEN UNDE'lt MV HAND IN THJ:

• NAJtR,o\.'nVE BRONZESTAR MEDAL

MAJOR A UNTtED ST ATf.S ARMY RESE.RVE

M1jof' · ~ ~ padiMiection Sil Ille Cfn:'-lllO ML"MD)'tld ED A(sft.ni'Mn durifli ()p:rlOOn ENDL'\UNG f'R.Ef.OOM. As the Operetion1 otrtea MAJ ll9de • t~ IRd latin, J:!C*tiwe 1~ on DRS openbona • ..._ hi3 c11p1ne1L-e rn11f1'4. Md openbOINlt ~ Mm! idea.I fot ~ trivtmnmmL MAJ hep •'"P'O'""I DHS' C'fJMribubm1t10 C1TF' 180 llftd rn:. openlliClftS ~. 1lie JiiOlt was a powina IPJ'"C•l!IOfl b)' Che n·s mKi J3'a for f.fUMINT c::lpMliiliti-. CJ'!F..180 and TF ttow 11t11V\!Jy lilek HlfM!Nr ifliptll f«theirope.-i~al ph1MingmdCOA determenac..on. MAJ ~ 1 major tmp.!t ori OPER:t.T:ION MOUNT A.IN vu>FR. dt'"nl which hit amom co.ttribured to CJTF-180 ti Iii.lg or capturiftl more fhan 100 T aJibut npten ~ prCWJMllld. ~nared Ind s~iy i~ a contpfex Ind HUMlNT a11iection pbn thai e.tpticidy llid ouC DHS cofltt1mn in SUpporl of cm. t80 dtcisive opntions. As MoonLlifl Viper llnfo6do1 MAI w1:dred long lkJun w.th !he J213 plarti'ltl$ IO tnsurr DHS hid a clear picrure ol tlw. changint baltle space and to lntdjcct HUMlNT into the rnuiU~ ~plite. On seven! occasions. MA\J r:'ll)idly ~Foc11st:d OHS asae11 as ~and apenri

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE QfFfC! Of RCURlTY RIVIEW 1155 oer::ENSf. P£NfAG-ON WASRIN

Ja.nua1y ]8, 2013 Ref: 1~$~271011

Lieutmant Colonel Antb.ony Shaffer. USAR (Ret) 86il Etta.Drive Springfield, VA 22152

Dear Cotonel Shaffer!

On August 3, 2012, )''OU submhted a.request for a for.mal sean:by revfe"IW of yom Operation Dark Hear'I m~tipt pmsuantto Dcparlment of'~ (DoD,) htsti11X!timi -~30.29, Securily and P.o./.i<;y Review ofDoD mffJ1'molio111for Pubiie /l$lease (Jan,, ~ I 2009). The request smed that you intend to have new editions oft.he book published in TW'kis~ and other languages.

The U.S. Government has completed i.1s secur!ay i:eview ofthe manuscript. mcluding the 433 passages that were !Cdacted from the Thomas Dwme Books/St. Martin's l'teiiS edition of September 20i o. The GQvemmw detennined that infonnati-011 conminea in 198 ofth'E! redacted p:t~ ~ beet:i properly declassified in ac.cordanc..e widl Executive Ord~r 1352-6. The other

1 :redaeted passages, however3 wem found te contain classified irtfonnatio.n.

On October 17, 20 ll, you met wi1h OOD ~u:net vi,ith the common goal of ptrodu.c:ing :an uncl~i.fied ,;-ersien of the book. Yoo received ·tcDipOtacy clearance to ascess the ~acitl!d maauscript and discass each _passage at iswe, line by line. The discussion included consideration of tmtla.uified substitute' language thst our personnel mggested for various pas~. m& open .souroo tnm:erials that you presented to show that certain classified infonnatfon bad been offiei.elly rel~ to the public or otherwise pn)petly declassified. As a result. we were able to reach resoluiion t>n .a l;aree majority ofthe ~cs, You accepted the classification status of 212 ~~s, '~ing -to repJiwe 73 of' th~ with our suggested suhstirote Ian~ imd delet:e altogether the otl:!er B9.

Oniy 23 ~es rtmtsllied unresolved after t:¥'te meeii.ng, as you rsked for time w gather and submit addition~! ~ source miterials sltowi11g the o:ffkial ~lease ofthe' two specific ¢~cf i.»fo.rmation re.Jcvant to ~~es. You mentioned Wit~ fim pl.ecc of infotm8lio-n, contained in t8 ~es. ~ rcl~d during con9l:SSionai b~; the second pi.ece ofinfonnation, contained in fute- passages, was obtained: ftom the narrative suppenmg your Brome Sw Medal (BSM} award in 2004'. You.added, thoug}L that you would a.gree to delete tOO passages ifupon review ofthe materials. we ultimately found the infbrm~an to remain .classified. Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 290 of 316

ti -f i s §I ;; . t l . . ~ I -.. f ~l :J 1 1 6 l Ii~ ill 1!.~ ~:.' M lt! f1 r~ 1! rf 11 Jt: !111 fl~ 11 aff[ , .I aai sic(. 1t !l · lf~p

119 r ~ ~'r i1~ ltrs·tl I f ~111[ It: 'ta Irl J f~ 1 ~! J~i· f · . 11' Jii . li Jtiftl

B' a· ~ ~ '~ I... l t .. ~ I [ .. f n l '

l ).l t {a' i f If t h lS !lJ f I if If I f 1 t l 1 1 1 h!: ·f ~a- "' ·l ~~~- 1 a. ~h ~ ~ . 1 · ·1

l ~·8 [ 1- ~ . 1 ' g. ll' . q•""' a ~· Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 291 of 316

~ Mr. MalkS• .Ztid Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 292 of 316

I I 1 1 I ' 1 H " • • I•• ••• ·= = ·= • I ~ N - ••• ,_ • - s= 1~~ ts =• ~ a Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 293 of 316

~ • 8 • • ~ • ~ ~ = ~ ~ ' • i i '.!S • ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ • ~ ~ = = =~ i I i

S I i I S I h! s I l I 11 s I I s I I ! ' l II II I 1'I ' II lI I II II I ' I ~. I I ... t • I I I I I I . •11 11 1 n1i u1 1 1 1 1Ji 1 I !I 1t I I IJ ii HI I I I I .t ~ 1 ! ! 1I; I f IJ Ii I~ i f i i I t I 'tl f i i I1 I' 11 i i i i i i ·i i j I 11G1 i i i i i i I II ' f I - •Ir f f rtl t I • • t ! • • • • • • J I Il I i I I i Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 294 of 316

J J J I I I i i i I I• I I i• I • I• 11,,.. I f1 J 11 I J J J I j • • • • • '• • '• if I ~ . I ~. I I. I I I I •1 8 IJ .I II • j • • • a !1 I !.1 I !J I 'II I I I I I I !I 1 !J 1 !J 1 .. 1 1 1 1 I I i I I I I I I I I I I I h • h • • • • • • .. I h I• I.. I II I II I II I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I 1 ·1 I ·1I ·1 I I I i I i t t I. I t I I. I I I I I I 11 I )1 I 11 I I I I I I 11 I ii I 11 I t I I I t t t I ~ I I I

~ ! $ • ~ I •... .. I I I ~ I ~ I a I i SQ llS lie ;Q ,. I • • ~ ~ i a a a a:

I II !&! ~ t:I • a • • a :: st a 1' Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 295 of 316

I,, J I I • I I l ,t• • I• • I I• I• I " f1 J J J J i J I JM ... I • '.. • ' .. "' • ~. j I j -j I j j I '1 • • • • t a I • I I I JI !1 I I I I I I I I I t I 11 !J 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 l I I I I I t I t I I I I I I I t, • • • • • • • • I • • h I i I I 11 II I I I I I I I I I t I I I I I I I I t I ·1 I I l I I I l I I I.11 I I I I I I I I l I t I t t t t t I 11 I t t I t t I t t I t s ... ; • • .. ~ .. ~ = s 9 x 2 • I

I • I t;I I a I • • I I I • I I I _I I I :I c; = • a = .=s I I • Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 296 of 316

~ ~ ~ 1 e • a s ~ a = a • 1 I IS & e & & t ..• ~ • f! • # • I .., tll = • • i i " .. ~ = t .. f I J I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I r ' I I I I I I I I t II II t f I I I r I .I 1t 11 I' I I I f ., ., sl ' ' ' ~ I.I ' I I• I I ( LI. I.. ti... l. I I t. I ( II II 11 I ii'1 • 'I I.. I a 11 11 11 I.. ! I ,, t 11 1• 11 g I . I 11 I I I i I I II I I I I l Ii . I I 1 1 1 I I IIr• II,. f 1; 1 8 ' • I ,, ,, l nI' I I• I I JI !J' ..• I • I • • Jf JI I J • f f I t. I I .. ~... ' I I t t t I • J J ' J fj lj ' I ' I • J J • I •I I t I I I • l SI" I Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 297 of 316

• .. • ) ..I I t 11 l i i i i i I i i I j .. I I !1 J J J J J J J 11 I, ' Ill ii Ill J • ' ' ' '* '• I '* * I' I I I I I • ' 11 .8 I I I I I ii s .8 a a 8 8 a tJ I I I I I I I I 'I JI Jl 'I 'I 1 1 1 1 1 II • • h 1 fJ 11 a •' ~ 11 I t• I• t• t.. t• I• ii t• t 1 11 I I 11 • It It ii I I I, 1• I I i I I I I I I II ·I • ii., I I I I I I p I I I.. ' h I Ii 'I 'I 'I 'I I' 'I I 'I 'I I I u I I I I I I I t I H ,. t t ·t t I I .1' t t I I 'I 1J t I I I t' t I t t ti i I ; ; I l i s ...~ z i ...~ z = ~ a: I IR :ll tR • • • I a r;; ll ll I g i I I: ~ ;t IC le r:: I! t: ii = SI :l a Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 298 of 316

Jl I ••I· •I i i i I J• • • • 8 J ! J J J J 1f '• '• '.c '• '• '• J I I I I I I I J 8 • .a 8 • .. It I. Ji I I I I I I ) •I· 1 1 1 1 1• 1 11 t 8 -11 1¥ i ,,, t t i I t t• t• t.. I t.. t.. t 11 I I. I I • I I I I I • I 111 • It • I II f i~ J I J ~ J I J I ) ·~1 h l I I I I I I I tJ ~ • II· ti J I I I 11 ' ' ' 'I 'I 'I 8 ' ~l,a I I I I t I I 1• f I I I I t t II lj I d J i I z = ~ I .... ~ • ~ ~ a a = I

~ II II )! .. I ' • • ta • • • I I I I II • sa • • R = a: I! :t Ill: I: l:l: Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 299 of 316

t I I 11 I .& ~ J I I I I a I I I I I I I t t t I I I • I 2 I I I I I I I t I ~ I I • I I I ! I I B • t t I I t ' ~ t I • I I t I t I I • . 8 • I I I I . I I I I 11 ' • • . • I . . I J I ) i ) I,, I I ~ J ~ I I• ., i l ) ) ?"' ?"' J j J J j J J I ~ I J j J J j I •

II I I t

~ ...... ~ t; N ,...... Ill iQ N • I • • ~ a .. = a .. • ! I :. ~ ft I; ia a ~ ~ Iii Iii a I I I I • i = I • ,. I • II I I I I I I I ii I !I ! a =.. =.. ..s ~.. .. Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 300 of 316

t 111II I } ·1~ I 1r~ f ·•) i'• iIE J iii I I ] I I I I 111 I Q I I I I I J I I } J I I 2 t l J I J I I I a I I I . J } J I t I t . I J } I I I ' I I l I I I . I I I I • . . . . j . ) 'Iii I I } I j I• I I J • l J , , I J J ~ l In l f J l l I J I 1•• J J I I' If i I f ' .. .I 1 11 1 I :.,·11 ,( .. , 'i·' I :! .. a ,. :; i:1 ;I r. a R a • ra I • I • • • I i =- J; I • • Ill • • I a a • • • • a • ~ I • • •

11 ;s I... !I ! :a""' 5 !9 ! !9 ! $ I" ! ! a a a ! ! Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 301 of 316

I I } I I I t I. J I I } t t t I I I I I I I t I . . I I I t I I I t } •II J I • } } . t } J J t .. I . I I I I I I . } I J I I I I I l I I • I • • .. I . • • . . I I I • ) . I • • • I I II ) J l i ) l l I 1 J J J J ' I J I l I J l J J I I J r ' ' '

~ IQ It a ;:i ... ,. M ~ ::; I .. • • s :: ...J =a : .. s ::I ! I I I I I • • • • • I I I I • I ! I ! ! ! ... I !I g ! I ! :I i ! ! i ! l!i ! I! 8 ! i! ! I !J Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 302 of 316

I I I } t J I. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I: I I I I I I I I I I t J I I I I I J I I Iii I t i l . I I I I I I I I . ' • I! I I I • I . . I I • • . I . I • I ' I I1 • r ) ) I %c J ) JJ J l J I - J I J J l ! I l I I t I I J

la r.a 1:1 I ...... I • "' • s • • ~ ~ .. I a • • • = ! I I • ! i i ! I ! ! ! !1 ! !I ! ! !I I I ! ! i I !I e ! I ! I ! ! !i ! ! SI ! ! ! ..s: e ! !S ~... Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 303 of 316

I i a I• I• I• .I J J J J J • • • • • I I I I I I • a I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I t I I I I I J I I I I J J I I I I I I J I I I I I I I I I J . . I . I I I I I . . • J I I I • I I I I I. • I • I ) } • ) ) J ) • I ~ .. ~ , ~ j ~ I J I ~ I i i i i i J I • I I I I J I ' I I I I I I I I I I t t t t I I I I t I

I s ::; Ir: .., ... rt lft ... N I .. s :a 1i • = ... :l ~ ~ a

~ I I ! I I g.. I II !I ! ! ! I I ! I I !I I ! I s I ! !; ! !! I a B !II I ! I !\ ! I I ! I ! ! I Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 304 of 316

i i I I I• J J J .. .. • I I . • • I.. I I I I } 1 I 1 1 I I. } I I I I I I J I I I I I s :.. I. I J } J I } I 0 I t t I I J •• J } .Ii I J • .. I J I • J I I I I J . . •• • . •• I I • I • . I • • • • • . I - • I ) l ) ) J • I I J J l ., J J J ~ J l ) J I I I I .- J r J J l I ~ I J , I I ' 'I I 'I I I I I I I

I ...... • .. :it ... a .. =" 1Q I:'; a a ... :a :. :. I = - " • I I 9 !i Si s ! 9 ti s !i s s !ii s !I s ! ! ! ! l .. ' i I & ! I I I I I I I ,I I II ,, I 1; a s ....~ a Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 305 of 316

I J • I I } I • i I • i" J . I •I 1! ' "' • i fr I I I • I .8 B • I I } I I I I • I I. I 1 I I I •a I I I I } a I I t ) I I II J I t I. I I I. Ie t } J I. I . t I • I I- . I a t t .. • t .. J ! I I I . } I I I } I . I • • • • I .. I I I j l I J I J ) I .. ) J J I I .. i J I •a j I I J J I JI.. I • J , J i I • I I a I II I I J I I 11 I I t I I I J- t t I J I

I ~ ~ .. a :. a ~ • • a :. ;; 4N I • I I = * I = = " z I ! ! I ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! :I ! ...s a.. ! =.. s.. ! ! I ;:; I I~ ,!!J ! 8 a s a I B ~ IS I '8 IB a s s !I 'II Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 306 of 316

I • •J • 1'• Ia Ia t t I I ·1 I } I I 1 1 e I I t I • . I I I t t I I I I t I I I & I I. . I t ) } I t t t I t t t I • I I I e I . I .. .. I I t I • • •. . . . ~ . . t I l • • i.s • • I I • ' l l ,.• I I J l l J I J I 1 j I I ) ; i ')• J I t I s f # J I ~ I ' 'I 'I t t I I

;I ft .... I i " ~ " "" • i " " "" i ... t D :;; g 4111 I ...... I... a s ...... g fl g I "" ...... = a a a 3 a a a 9 ! a ... ! £ I II = ! I I i ! ! ! ! ! g I I I ii I s Jj I Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 307 of 316

) 1• I 1 J.• I 2 } I I I I I. I I I } t·. t :. I. } I I I t 2 I I } ~ t I I I • I I 1-: I II t. I. } I. I I I } ..1 I I . ,. I I I I I I I I I I ) ' l . I . I• I II a 2 I . • ' ) • • lJ • . I· • I l .. .I I l I I i 1 I .. .a I I • J ~ J J J J I I J I I J I J I I I ~ ,. s. 1 ' ' I ' J I ..l ' ~J •i t !' I•

! ' ... ~ ~ R :. I; .,. 1$ ...... I .. • • .. .. i = la ... a ~ . 2 s s s :s s tt ~ !!l c:; I ...... ! ...... ! ... :i :s... =-...... !I ! s... ! •...... ! ! I I ~ I • I i I i I I I • I I ·! 1E s s 1! ,! Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 308 of 316

91 I I 1 II I I I !I I I I I I I M i s s $1 i i .... r; ... .. i i I e e Ii Ii R i i e e ..t: g i i & c: t: i - ... i I ~ ~ .... UI i = = .. r: ~ I z = • l ti • t ~ c • t :s I I I I I I I I I f I I l I I I I I I. I I I I I I r I I tt I I ' ' I I I I I I I I I f I I :1 I I I i I I I I I I I I I 'I I I f I f f I f I f t f I t f 11 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ii~ .. • ·.1 • 11 I .i .1 I• ~l I I.. I• I. l 1 I• I• I I I I I• III' I.. I.. ·1 I I ·I i I I ' 1.. 1.1 I I i I I I li.·I I g I I I l I I• •I I l I iI iI il I I l 'I I ~1' I .i 1 1 1 I ~ i I 1 8' 8 1 18 II' IlJ I I 1 I I • ' I f • • • • .I• • is ~ .. ' ' I., :1 I I I I I I I I .. • • • ., I I,,, ., • • I.. I• I• I I J f l l J "I J f I J f I f r f r r l t I r f I I I f ~ I I ' J I I I I I I I t I i- ' ' ' ' l [ • I I i • • • I f I I I I Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 309 of 316

I! • I t 1· I I I I I J I i i i .. i i i I I 'I ll • I' • • I I i • I I 'I 'I l J J J J .. J J J J J .Ii J .Ii '5 Ji '• '• ' '• ) '• '• ' '• '• I I '• ) I I j I I I j I I .s Ji l I ~ I a 8 a a J a s a a a ) J a J a J J ~ J J • J I I I I I I I I I I ~ ~ I I I I I 1 I 1 J a J ! 1 I 1 I I B 1 t I a a • a I I I I I I J I.. J I I I I l· t I I I I 1. 1· I I· I 8 I .. • • .. • ...... ft J· • I • • J 1. I It lj ~ I I J J I t I .. t I t I I t.. t.. It• I u• I l'I.. J I I I I I I I I I I J , I I I I I I I I I I I I I t I I 'I I' I 'I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ...... I I I I I I I t I t I I I t I I I t I I I I t I I t I I t t l I 16 I

~ ~ ::; ...... I = a = = ~ ~ z "' = ~ = ~ ::: = :i ... I ! ! ! s i s s s ! s s ! ! ! ! ! !I !ii a ii i ... I II ii II II :I iii I Iii I II :I !Iii 11 II .! = a I!! i! ! Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 310 of 316

II Si I 5 a El I I m B B e Iii i i w=:; E i i Ii ti Ii i i i i i Ii Ii ti i ta Ii ! E 5 I i

8 Ill ¥ I i i & .. .. •~ • i .. • • = z i i I I ~I lilt' I 1 I I I I II H i 'i I I I I I I I I 11 tl I I I I I 'I I I I I I f I 81f I I ' I I I I I ' I' !!ih11 I I r I I I I r I I I I 11 I• 11t11111• I I 1, I I I I I I I I I I.. 1!1 •u11 1.. I I.. I I I s• l;(1f '.i :i I ti I .1 I I.. Ir I I I ·I ''I I l I I l t • • • ~1 • .. i1 .. I I 11 ~, I I i't"t·I 1~ 1 ~ ~. I i I I i I I I I 1 8 .. 8' JI 'trl!i I I l l I I I l I I l l I Ii l I I I 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 I-• I'{ 1 ~ 1 .~ 1 I 8 f If IJ s ' I • ~ ' • ' i • I I I • f I f I JI 1Jid. I J' I • l • I • .. • • { 11 • .. ·I I• 5' 1f l f • I I l l I l (I 11 11 I .. f l I I t I r I f f l sl ff_~!f j'I f f f I J ~ I. ~ i I I I•1 s- • • • • .. t • I • I I I ,, lilii I I Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 311 of 316

,ii I 11 II i ! !i I I I !!i I a I I I i II SE ii i ii ii I I s I s i i re i ! s rZ ;; I ~ t;:i"'ol i t l x ;;: ¥ t i ! ; -I II = .. • •• ...r • i 1 I I iJ11 11 11 i I I i t I l~ I I .. , I I l I 'I I r f I I f I I l f ·f : iJll 11 .. , f I I I f ,• Hj11 1, I f .. f :1 "i I I 1'''111 !I ~ I I I 'I f 11 11.1 l I r I I ~ I t I II ··1 I ·11 I ti ( I U 11 11 .. f .. .. ut• I I I t·!f i &I ..I ·i ,1 ~u I l .i ·1t11 ti I rf 1 l l II 1J. .. 1 .. ti ' !I I. I lii.l ~I r 11 ·l I ! 1 . :11 ~ I ~. .1 I I 1 I t 1 1 I I' · ·ti'Il .. 8 1 I' 1 • 8 i l 11 ti l i Ill! •I• I I I I tli I I I I t ~ ,, i i I I l•1i .·r t 1 I I t ~ a r i r·l l ~ lf I Ii r ·f i I tf 'l.. i thf ff ri I I •1~ I I sll 'II" f r I., .·'ii. ~- I. I f. 11 ~ I 11. kf re I S' I !I' :r I ~ • f a l i l!1t ~ l f ii II! I i a. t I. ( i ·I I rJ1I f! 1ln '.I f I I !J I •.. ; r' '•' I I • ' I l( I I '\ I I I. i It·. rl ·u·- ' I I !f Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 312 of 316

I I

I Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 313 of 316

~ I :·~~1~•··1"1-~ ~~: i a~ ··~% ja~~=Rsa••• i 1! aa i ~ ! 1111111 ! I • 11 ! I ~ I I J I iQ I •• ;a :R' ~ a11 11 ~ L um~ I Ui11 I I ~ 1a I 11 Ii ~ I :1 I I S1 ,:' ~u~ I~ I; Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 314 of 316

~ i E ! I i i 5 i a . - ·- ~ I j i ... ~ I I I I I ff •!! • I • ~-··· I ~ II I I J ( .... c:=i :i:ft ... I I I I t I &i 'I I ,, I I I I ii I I.h JI JI I "' I . I I I Jr I 1h Ir f Iii I I I ·1, f r• ,, . ' I' :1 I ~ I ·i ~ I .. I I 1H Ii 11 11 11 I ' sl ·11 !I ·1" , , 'I I IU h. H 11 .,1 .JI I . s II ;i r 9" I 11 I·11 ,1 ~111 l pi Ii .r1.. ~l I I . ·Ii ;j ·1 ·II ·H tf; I ~ ~I 3 I ti ~,. • i 8 ,. I I .. I J. . l I • a.1 Ii ·1· I 111 ,, t• f lll . i I I I; •t I rlf ! J ;I l'.. J 111 ~! !t' Ii! pi ! I II I• I.. ,,,J . Ii l t j II .. 11 ·.1111 I 'r 1• , sl ·i'fll 1 I ~r I ' 11 '1 .. f If J! II 'i Iii 11 Ir • ••• I I ·I 11 I I 11 fl I ti J If J u,, I I Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 315 of 316

I -.• Case 1:10-cv-02119-RMC Document 63-5 Filed 04/26/13 Page 316 of 316

... -... -.... ~-· -··----

._...._,orww ~,, ~ ...... ,....,.. -...r- air ...., ....t .... .&llO .U OHM

is ~ :aool

S'ClltJk'l': Statl!l'Nmt of Direct .support

1. "J.'bie i• t~ c.rtify that tha belciw Nlllll!ld i~vidlaal pi:o.i4od cth.-.ct 11UPPC>rt in •ox.a11• •t1tu 1'a.N. rorc:• ! dur1DG <>Peration WDl'l'lil STIUU. Individl.lal participated in "'... nighttill9 cmblt air •Malllt to •upport fone.rd dapl(IJf'ed. fore... on 11 Nov 03 aa pu:t of tbi• 004S'•tioo..

(SSN) l aw 03 l D9e 03

2. Thie 12'1111DC:11"a:ndlml H.rve• u 'Yerification of the OPCOJll •tatua of the pttraonnel lieted aliove.

) • hint of COllt.cn:c. le JTP •••I SPt' Roe•r JI. 8'11••· •t DSH 383-0Ha

,:..