Scientists and the Politics of Technology':;

25th Anniversary COMMENTARI ES Scientists and the Politics of Technology':;

Frank von Hippel High-Energy Physics Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne Illinois 60439 Joel Primack t Physics Department, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Among the first questions which occur to a scientist who has decided to concern himself with the potential dangers posed by a rapidly developing technology are : (1) How effective is the Federal Executive's enormous and often distinguished science-advisory establishment in helping bring about rational decision making for technology? and (2) how effective in comparison can individual or small groups of independent scientists be in affecting crucial decisions by taking the issues to the public? In a number of case studies we have found: (1) In cases where an Executive Agency has large political or bureaucratic interests at stake, unfavorable reports of science-adviso*T panels are often ignored, kept confidential, and even misrepresented to the public as supporting official policy; and (2) it has been established repeatedly that a small dedicated group of independent scientists can bring to public attention a policy which represents a major threat to the public health and welfare. If the danger is sufficiently clear, the issue is often taken up by politicians or made into a legal issue with a good chance for a modification of official policy being the result.

INTRODUCTION Outsiders, although the same scientists occasionally Recently a wide awareness has developed of the play both roles. rapidly increasing levels of damage to man, his On the basis of our findings we feel that the effective- society, and his environment which are resulting from ness of the Insider approach may be somewhat over- the side effects of the new technologies that have rated (and oversold) and that of the Outsiders corre- been applied on a massive scale since World War II. spondingly underrated by the scientific community. This awareness has. resulted in a widespread re- Without question, the role of the Insiders is essen- examination of our society's policy-making process tial to the day-to-day functioning of the Executive. for the application of technology. The focus of this The advisory apparatus is sometimes misused, how- paper is on the role of scientists in this process. ever. For example, when major political or bureau- The active involvement of the present authors with cratic interests are at stake, the existence of the these issues began when we participated as co-leaders advisory system is often used as an excuse for con- in a student-faculty workshop at Stanford University cealing from the public the reports and other con- in 1969-70. The workshop was devoted to studying siderations which went into an agency decision, even the science-advisory structure of the Federal Executive when the reports of advisory panels do not support and Congress and resulted in the report The Politics the decision. of Technology. 1 Currently we are developing our ideas In cases where government agencies are unwilling further in the process of writing a book. Some of our to inform Congress and the public of the possible conclusions are summarized in this paper along with undesirable consequences of their policies, Outsiders case studies on which they are based. must try to fill the gap. We found that, in spite of their lack of apparent access to persons in positions We will report here on our investigations of two of power, Outsiders can often be quite effective. subjects in particular: (1) the effectiveness of the They enjoy a freedom of public expression which traditional method by which scientists advise the Insiders usually do not feel that they have: and the Federal Executive, i.e., by serving on panels reporting Executive bureaucracy is often forced to listen and to the President and other administrators; and (2) respond to arguments presented publicly which it the effectiveness of scientists taking an issue to refused to hear in private. When Executive policies Congress and the public when a government policy involve clear and present dangers, an airing of the appears to endanger public health or welfare. For issues tends to bring political and legal pressures into convenience and brevity, we will call the first ap- being which counterbalance the interests to which proach that of the Insiders and the second that of the the Executive was initially responsive. A more rational policy is hopefully the result. * Work performed partially under the auspices of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. This paper is being published in We document several of the cases on which we base its entirety because of the timeliness of the subject. these conclusions and discuss some of their ramifica- t Junior Fellow, Society of Fellows. tions below.

Volume 25, Number 4, 1971 APPLIED SPECTROSCOPY 403 I. THE EXECUTIVE ADVISORY SYSTEM-- mendation to the President, to review the program. I deliber- NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT ately chose scientists who opposed the deployment of the Safe- guard as well as those who favored it. The conclusions in this section are based primarily "In fact, as I recall, when they met there were more against it on our ease studies of the Federal Executive's handling than for it. I had, however, one simple instruction for them-- to put politics aside and just ask the question: Will this deploy- of technical information and advice on five major ment, with these components, do the job that the Department issues. These eases illustrate the reasons scientists of Defense is trying to do? . . . cannot continue to let virtually all their efforts at "There was a considerable concern about this move, but the informing the Federal policy-making process be chan- report sent to the Secretary of Defense said that this equipment neled through the confidential advising system of the will do the job that the Department of Defense wants to do."* Executive. Most scientists know personally or by reputation We will discuss first those aspects which disturb us some very able colleagues who serve on science- about the Executive handling of its advisory reports. advisory committees to high officials in the Federal Then we will focus on what we feel are the issues and Executive. It is, therefore, difficult for them not to give our views on the moral dilemma in which In- take seriously statements such as those quoted above. siders sometimes find themselves involved. It would, unfortunately, appear that such confi- dence is often unfounded. In particular, each of the Five Case Studies statements quoted above gives a misleading impres- sion of the "expert" advice given to the Executive. Our five case studies concern: the environment impact of the supersonic transport; the safety of This will be seen below. underground tests of large nuclear warheads; the On the Supersonic Transport safety and medical benefits of cyclamates; the capabilities of the Safeguard ABM System; and the The President's Ad Hoc SST Review Committee effects of defoliants on human health. wrote reports describing the disastrous environmental Public debates have raged on each of these issues. impact of the SST. The reports were not released for In spite of the most unequivocal statements by the eight months. 5 At the time of this writing the report of appropriate Federal Executive spokesmen that the the SST Panel of the Office of Science and Technology policies in question involve enormous benefits in com- (OST) still has not been released, 6 and the release of parison to the (often unspecified) costs, independent the comments of the various Federal agencies on the critics have continued to insist that costs exist of such environmental impact of the SST which were re- a magnitude as to outweigh any possible benefits. quired to be made public by the National Environ- mental Policy Act of 19697 was delayed until after Citing the "Experts" and Suppressing Their Reports the 1970 Congress votes on SST appropriations, s This then was the fate of some of the "considered opinion" The entire science-advisory establishment of the which MacGruder cited (see above). ~ Federal Executive is surrounded by an almost im- While he refused to release the OST report on penetrable wall of "confidentiality." Although it is the SST, the President's Science Advisor, Edward axiomatic in the conduct of scientific research that David, Jr. did round up a group of well-known scien- the ultimate test of any conclusion occurs after it tists who could be persuaded to endorse the SST has been published with its supporting data and publicly. 9 arguments, the Federal Executive appears extremely reluctant to submit the technical bases of its decisions On Large Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests to public review. Executive spokesmen rarely respond directly to the The Executive Office and the AEC refused for ten arguments of critics of Executive policies or to their months to release the report of the PSAC Panel oil appeals for the release of the information and analy- the Safety of Underground Testing. This report stated ses on which they are based. Instead the spokesmen that "the panel is seriously concerned with the prob- emphasize that the Executive has obtained the advice lem of earthquakes resulting from large-yield nuclear of the "experts" and has concluded that the concerns tests 'n° and also that "the panel believes that the of the critics are unfounded. The following three public should not be asked to accept risks resulting quotations are typical: from purely internal government decisions if, without endangering national security, the information can "According to existing data and available evidence, there is no evidence of likelihood that SST operations will cause significant be made public and decisions can be reached after adverse effects on our atmosphere or our environment. That is public discussion. ''u This is some of the "support" the considered opinion of the scientific authorities who have referred to in the AEC statement 8 cited above. counseled the government on these matters over the past, five years."2 "On the basis of its various studies . . . , the AEC is convinced On the Safeguard ABM System that the experiments can be conducted with complete safety. Here again adverse reports were not released by This evaluation is supported by the findings of the many scientific experts whose efforts have been involved.''a the DOD and Executive Office. In addition, however, "I asked a group of scientists to come together as an Ad Hoc DOD spokesmen specifically misquoted several panels Committee before the Secretary of Defense made his recom- of scientists and individual scientists as approving

404. Volume25, Number 4, 1971 the design of the system. Quote 3 above is an example. democracy works best when the people have all the In fact, the report referred to in this quote contains information that the security of the nation permits. ''.9 the explicit statement, "If the only purpose of Safe- The same thought was expressed even more forcefully guard is defined to be to protect Minutemen, Phase by James Madison: "](nowledge will forever govern IIA as defined in March, 1969 [by the President] ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own should not proceed, m= governors must arm themselves with the power knowl- Another notable case in which the public has been edge gives. A popular government without popular misled as to the state of "expert" scientific opinion information, or the means of acquiring it, is but the concerns cyclamates. prologue to a farce or tragedy, or perhaps both. ''2°

On Cyclamates The Public Right to Know For a period of ten years, the Food and Drug A reading of the Freedom of Information Act would Administration (FDA) of the Department of Health, appear to indicate that all the reports mentioned Education, and Welfare (HEW) kept cyclamates on above in the case studies should have been freely and its Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS) list. HEW promptly made available to the public. In the case spokesmen have also claimed that cyclamates are of the reports of the President's Ad Hoc SST Review useful to persons with diabetes and weight problems. '3 Committee, the PSAC Panel on the Safety of Under- As a result of the inclusion of cyclamates on the ground Nuclear Testing, and the DaD Panel report GRAS list, the marketing of diet drinks and foods on the Safeguard ABM System, aroused Congressional containing cyclamates grew to a billion-dollar-a-year Committees were ultimately able to force their re- enterpriseJ 4 Throughout this period, the advisory lease. 5,'°,4 In the case of the OST panel's report on committees of the National Academy of Sciences' the SST, the President's Science Advisor is being National Research Council, as well as some of the sued in Federal District Court under the provisions FDA's own scientists, were submitting reports to the of the Freedom of Information Act at the time of this FDA to the effect that cyclamates were useless writing. 6 medically and might have various serious adverse Unfortunately, in all these eases, the Executive side effects./5 was able to delay the release of the reports until they Finally, we note a case in which crucial information were much less useful than they would have been of possible dangers from a widely used herbicide was originally. For example: Congress had already voted effectively concealed from the public, Congress, and on the 1970 SST appropriations before the corre- apparently even from most of the branches of the sponding Environmental Impact Statements were Executive for a period of three years. released, and the PSAC panel report on possible dangers associated with large underground nuclear On the Defoliant 2, 4, 5-T weapons tests were released only three days before In a study funded by HEW, scientists at the inde- the first large test took place in the Aleutian Islands. pendent Bionetics Laboratory found in late 1966 that Before the Freedom of Information Act can be the popular herbicide 2, 4, 5-T and/or its contami- used to force the release of a document, it is necessary nants might cause birth defects, t6 This report was for its existence go be known. In the case of the report not released for three years. During the intervening that birth defects might be produced by 2, 4, 5-T time, the chemical was used in the defoliation of and/or its contaminants, the existence of the report approximately one-eighth the area of South Vietnam. .7 remained a secret of HEW and its "independent" testing laboratory for years before a member of a Disabusing the Public Nader study group, with access to some of the FDA files (because of the Freedom of Information Act), When we have confronted important governmental accidently discovered a copy. 2t science advisors with these case studies, they have often replied, "We don't lose them all." This is Confidentiality vs Whistle Blowing-- certainly a valid reason for good scientists to con- The Advisors' Dilemma tinue to go to Washington and see to it that the Executive is provided with the best possible informa- In our experience, science advisors are usually un- tion. At the same time, however, we feel that scien- willing to discuss in public the contents or even the tists should try to educate the public to be very subjects of unclassified reports which an Executive skeptical of claims made by the Executive that its Agency has refused to release. When pressed, they policy is supported by the facts and advice provided say that doing anything other than "playing the by the "foremost experts," especially when the reports game" by the Executive's rules would result in the are not released. Congress and the public must learn destruction of the ~dvising system. This argument to insist on their legal right to have the basis of implies that government bureaucrats prefer to forego government policy be in the public domain to the obtaining an inform£tion base for their policies rather maximum possible extent. As President Johnson said than suffer the decrease in their power which would upon signing the Freedom of Information ActtS: "A come with an infornied public and Congress.

APPLIED SPECTROSCOPY 405 There is some evidence that parts of the Executive Advising or Legitimizing? bureaucracy would, in fact, make this choice. We mention only one notable case here. Although this We know personally several advisors who have case does not relate directly to the Executive's en- "blown the whistle" when they thought that it was forcement of the confidentiality of its science-ad- required. However, we have encountered many eases visory system, we believe that, because of its nature where possibly dangerous policies have been con- and the publicity which it has received, it has had a cealed from the public for years although some of tremendous impact on the attitudes of both those them must have been known to at least one of the within and without the Executive toward the public's many thousands of independent advisory panels and right to know. review boards employed by the Executive. It appears that no independent advisor blew the whistle effec- The C-5A Cost Overrun and the Termination tively in these eases by either speaking out himself or by leaking the information to someone who would. of E. A. Fitzgerald To the people of this country, these independent The civil service position of a top Defense Depart- advisory panels are represented as the guarantors of ment cost analyst was abolished for reasons of the integrity of the government in technical issues, "economy" after he had decided (in his own words) and are generally accepted as such. It appears from "to commit truth" in answering a question at a our discussion above, however,-that an important Congressional hearing on the prospect of a $2 billion function of these prestigious bodies is to legitimize cost overrun on a Lockheed contract to manufacture agency programs in the eyes of Congress and the 152 C-5A airplanes. public. Mr. Fitzgerald's position was abolished despite the We feel that the members of advisory committees full glare of public attention focused on it by Senator sometimes lose sight of the fact that their primary Proxmire in a followup investigation by the Joint responsibility is to the public. It is easy to become Economic Committee. It is difficult to account for subtly "socialized" into serving in a legitimizing role the Administration's willingness to endure the tre- by a combination of insufficient time and a natural mendous amount of unfavorable publicity from this desire to please or at least not to offend powerful case, unless it had been decided to "make an example" government consultees. The fact that many of the of Fitzgerald. same individuals who go to Washington to give According to Senator Proximire, Mr. Fitzgerald's advice also go to seek funds for research projects, duties (which included supervision of the Lockheed tends to further compromise the independence of the contract) were given to an outside accountant who advisors? 4 was at the time a eo-defendent with Lockheed in a Because of these impediments to the responsible suit filed by Lockheed stockholders charging that his functioning of advisory committee members, the ad- consulting firm had conspired with the Air Force to visors themselves must become more conscious of the eoneeM the cost overrun. 22 essential role that they could play (in reality as well We share with Insiders the hope that the pattern as in appearance) by insisting on integrity in govern- of this case will not be repeated in the science-ad- mental policy making. visory establishment, a pattern in which the more At the same time, however, the protection of the independent Insiders one by one reach a point where public good must not rely exclusively on Insiders in they feel that they must "commit truth," "blow the eases where large political or bureaucratic interests whistle" on an Executive policy, and are replaced by are at stake. In these cases, there must be greater men with more loyalty "to the team." Whether or emphasis on tactics such as those of the Outsiders not it comes to that is, of course, out of the advisors' (see below) which are designed to force the issues hands. _The Executive will largely determine the sort out into the public arena where bureaucrats and of advisory system which evolves by the relative Insiders alike are compelled to see their actions re- priorities which it gives short-term bureaucratic and fleeted in the public eye. political goals vs long-term social goals. The role played by the President's Science Advisor in the II. OUTSIDERS--NECESSARY AND OFTEN public debate on the SST does not augur well for these SURPRISINGLY EFFECTIVE priorities2 In the last section we discussed the limitations of It should be pointed out, however, that, to some the Executive's confidential advisory system in pro- extent, advisors "can have their cake and eat it too." ducing a rational Federal policy for technology in the This is because it is possible to "leak" illegally sup- political pressure-cooker atmosphere which often ap- pressed information to groups with free access to the pears to prevail in the Executive. In this section we public. Ralph Nader, for one, has guaranteed con- will see that a few independent and energetic scien- fidentiality to any corporate or government employee tists can sometimes provide dedicated politicians and who feels that he is in possession of material which public interest groups with the material they need to must be communicated to Congress and the public confront the Executive and bring about reversals or if the public health and welfare are to be protected? 3 modifications of ill-considered policies.

406 Volume25, Humber 4, 1971 We will present case studies of the role which Out- cause. They have refused to do so, citing the need for siders have played in triggering and informing five further studies. 29 public debates over Federal policies for as many The accomplishments of the Outsiders in this case technologies. We will then abstract from these case have been much less than complete. Nonetheless, studies what we feel were some of the important their unrelenting public pressure has resulted in a reasons for the Outsiders' effectiveness in these issues. largely voluntary reduction of DDT use in the U. S. by a factor of 37 ° Five More Case Studies On the Impact of Defoliation and Crop The case studies relate to the following issues: the Destruction in Vietnam adequacy of Federal regulation of pesticide use; the human and environmental cost of the use of def(Jliants For years, members of the life-sciences community and crop-destroying chemicals in South Vietnam; have been concerned about the impact of the massive the safety of Army procedures for the storage and chemical warfare campaign being conducted by the transport of nerve gases; the danger of radioactive United States in Vietnam using tear gases and herbi- pollution resulting from the use of nuclear explosives ; cides. Among the most effective in investigating and in the stimulation of natural-gas production; and the publicizing this issue has been Matthew Meselson. extent of the danger posed to Denver by a factory In 1969, Meselson received indirectly from a Nader which makes the plutonium triggers for thermonuclear group a copy of the long-suppressed report to HEW warheads. which indicated that 2, 4, 5-T, the most popularly We also discuss the role of two scientists in the used herbicide, and/or its contaminants, might well public debate over the effectiveness of the Safeguard cause birth defects. '6,31 Meselson communicated the ABM System. Even though the original Executive report to Lee duBridge, the President's Science Ad- policy has survived thus far relatively unscathed, we visor, along with the information that it could not include this example because the issues involved in the be kept secret any longer. 21 As a result, duBridge arms race may outrank all others in priority. released the report with the announcement that domestic use would be canceled on 1 January 1970 On Pesticide Policy by the Department of Agriculture and that the De- partment of Defense would stop using it in South The classic example of a scientist bringing an Vietnam except ."in areas remote from the popula- issue to the public attention is that provided by tion. ''~2 Assistant Secretary of Defense Packard Rachel Carson. In Silent Spring, 25 she documented ordered a complete termination of the use of 2, 4, 5-T the tremendous problems resulting from the excessive in Vietnam in April 1970. 38 Some, at least, was used use of the chemical pesticides which were (and still in the northern part of South Vietnam throughout are) being heedlessly promoted by the pesticide com- the summer, however. 34 panies and the U. S. Department of Agriculture. Her After years of relatively fruitless requests to the book resulted in the formation of a number of public government for a thorough, independent study of the interest groups which have undertaken to persuade human and ecological impact of the U. S. defoliation Federal and state governments to impose stronger and crop-destruction program in South Vietnam, a limitation on the use of pesticides, especially persistent group of prominent biologists and ecologists finally pesticides such as DDT. The work of groups such as persuaded the American Association for the Advance- the Environmental Defense Fund (originally a group ment of Science (AAAS) to take the unprecedented of scientists and laymen organized around a lawyer, step of funding a small study out of its own very Victor J. Yannacone Jr.) has had some success on a limited resources. The AAAS appointed Dr. Meselson state and local level. ~6 On the national level, however, to organize its Herbicide Assessment Commission the battle has hardly begun despite repeated an- (HAC). nouncements of dramatic changes of policy at times The Commission spent five weeks in South Vietnam. of particularly great public concern: For example, in In spite of the Army's refusal to provide them with 1963 President Kennedy released a PSAC panel report dates and locations of spraying missions, the Com- which recommended, among other policy reforms, the mission established that the consequences were dis- elimination of persistent pesticides (including DDT) astrous to both the environment and the populations for all except disease control purposes. In doing so, of many areas. 3~,~5 A few days before they made the he said, "I have already requested the responsible first public report of their findings, the White House agencies to implement the recommendations of the (which had already been briefed) announced that the report. ''~7 Most recently in 1970, the Secretary of whole defoliation program in South Vietnam would Agriculture announced a "virtual ban" and "phasing be "phased out. ''3',35 out" of DDT by 1971. 2s Conservation groups have The following three case studies are taken from the obtained Federal court orders requiring both the experiences of the Colorado Committee for Environ- Secretary and the official now responsible, William mental Information (CCEI), an initially informal Ruckelhaus, Administrator of the Environmental group of scientists led by Peter Metzger, Robert Protection Agency, to implement this ban or show Williams, Edward Martell, and Michael McClintok. 86

APPLIED SPECTROSCOPY 407 On the Storage of Nerve Gas One problem confronting the developers is that the natural gas is made radioactive by the thermonuclear The CCEI group was formed in 1968 after an explosion. (This is because the tritium produced par- accident at Dugway Proving Ground resulted in the tially replaced the hydrogen in the natural gas.) deaths of sheep up to 45 miles away. The group was Their procedure was to burn this natural gas hoping concerned about the dangers of accidental release of that eventually gas would come to the surface whose some of the enormous amounts of nerve gas stored contamination was at an acceptable level. at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 10 miles from down- The CCEI was concerned about the release of the town Denver at the end of Denver's busy airport. radioactive water and other radioactive gases from They, therefore, issued a public memorandum in the burned gas to the atmosphere and was also con- which they discussed the various sorts of accidents, cerned that, if the technique were exploited on a e.g., a plane crash, which might result in a nerve gas large scale, the ground water supply might become release and threat to human life in the Denver areaN contaminated with radioactive water, strontium-90, They also noted that the credibility of the Army's and cesium-137. They were not satisfied when the reassurances that no hazard existed had been some- State Department of Public Health accepted the what damaged by the fact that the Army also denied AEC's reassurances without an independent investi- (for 14 months 3s) that it was at fault in the Dugway gation and the Colorado Water Pollution Control sheep kill until well after independent experts had Board refused to hold public hearings on the problem constructed a virtually inescapable case. of ground-water contamination. As a result of the memorandum, the Denver City The CCEI group, therefore, issued a press release Council, the Colorado State Senate and the governor detailing its concerns and citing previous bad ex- of Colorado all became concerned. Congress was urged periences of Colorado as a basis for its lack of faith to undertake an investigation and a suit was filed in in the AEC assurances. 4~ They also addressed a list Federal court asking the Army to remove the nerve of questions to the AEC concerning the New Mexico gas. test, the plans for the Colorado test, and the criteria The Army then developed plans to ship the "obso- which the AEC would use in deciding whether or not lete" nerve gas by railroad from the Rocky Mountain to proceed with the development of the entire gas Arsenal and other storage depots to the East Coast field using this method. They met with the governor where it was to be loaded into old Liberty ships who expressed himself as interested in the answers to which were to be towed out to sea and sunk. some of these questions as well. One week before this operation was to commence, The questions received prompt answers and the however, Congressman Richard McCarthy of New AEC and oil company officials had a meeting with York made the plan public29 The result was tremen- the governor after which he announced that he was dous Congressional concern about the possibility of "completely reassured." railway accidents with disastrous consequences near Unlike the governor, the CCEI found some of the the cities enroute. An independent review was AEC's answers to its questions disturbing. In par- demanded. ticular, it appeared that the AEC's criteria for levels The National Academy of Sciences was commis- of radioactivity in the gas, which it would allow to sioned to set up such a review. Its panel report con- be distributed commercially, would be based on the firmed the validity of the CCEI's original concerns test results. The CCEI feared that this might mean and concluded that the safest course was to detoxify that the AEC, in setting its safety standards, wo,ld most of the poison gases at the Arsenal. 4° The Army accepted virtually all the recommendations. be influenced by a desire not to interfere with the commercial success of its method. 42 On Nuclear Stimulation of Natural Gas Production A local district attorney, the ACLU (on behalf of The AEC has a research and development program some local residents) and a conservation group filed for peaceful as well as weapons applications for nu- suit based in part on the CCEI arguments in the local clear explosives. One of the possibilities which the Federal district court to stop the blast. AEC has explored is that of increasing the amount The AEC argued that the court had no jurisdiction of natural gas which can be pumped out of a single since the AEC was answerable only to Congress. The well by fracturing the rock in the gas-bearing strata judge was apparently responsive to the plaintiff's with nuclear explosives. This idea was initially greeted arguments that the issue was one of whether the with some enthusiasm by several oil companies who AEC had violated the standards of safety which it have collaborated with the AEC in feasibility tests of was required by its charter to maintain. He assumed this method. jurisdiction. In 1969, a second test of the method was scheduled Ultimately, after hearings before the blast and again in Colorado (the first had been made in New Mexico). A 40 kiloton nuclear device was to be used and it was before the resulting radioactive gas was to be burned, announced that, if the test was successful, hundreds the judge allowed the test to proceed. He reserved of other nuclear explosions would be used to develop jurisdiction and the right to review any plans for tbe gas field. further development of the gas field, however. 43

408 Volume 25, Number 4, 1971 The AEC had won the first round, but the judge result of the fire or any other cause--and the U. S. had left the door open for further legal challenges. Public Health Service and Colorado State Depart- At the same time court battles were erupting around ment of Health said that it had detected none. 49 the country over the issue of radioactive releases The CCEI scientists remained unconvinced that from commercial power reactors, and a large number the smoke from such a large fire could have been so of states, led by Minnesota, were challenging the effectively contained and wrote a public letter to the right of the AEC to impose radiation on their citizens governor pointing out the dangerous nature of plu- at a level which the states were not allowed to regu- tonium and questioning whether either Dow or the late. 44 These other issues were already raising political health agencies had used the specialized equipment problems for the Administration. necessary to detect plutonium contamination. ~° Besides the environmental concerns, there were The most immediate result of this letter was that also substantial questions as to whether the nuclear General Giller, head of the Military Applications stimulation method for gas production would be Division of the AEC, flew out to reassure the governor economically competitive. Both the economic and and the CCEI. The governor announced publicly that political issues were touched on in a report of the he was reassured but also helped the CCEI extract a Bureau of Natural Gas of the Federal Power Com- promise from General Giller that Dow and the AEC mission in its September 1969 Staff Report on Natural would answer the questions that CCEI was asking in Gas Supply and Demand : its efforts to determine how much plutonium had been released in the fire.5~ Even though nuclear stimulation of tight gas-bearing formations The CCEI learned from the answers which it may be technically feasible, it is not clear that this technique will necessarily be economic .... There are also political and received that neither Dow or the AEC had made an environmental consequences to be eonsidered. In order to sub- effort to determine the level of plutonium contamina- stantially increase natural gas availability, thousands of nuclear tion in the area. One of the group, Edward Martell, deviees would have to be detonated. In view of the inereasingly former program director of the Air Force's Special forceful and articulate expressions of eoneern being voiced for the integrity of the natural environment, such large-scale appliea- Weapons Project, therefore, embarked on his own tion might not gain public acceptance. 4~ program of measurements. Martell found that there was a total of more than 1000 times the amount of In fact, a decision seems to have been reached plutonium in the dust up to 15 miles from the plant within the Administration to abandon, temporarily than Dow had claimed had been released from the at least, the development of the nuclear gas stimula- plant during its entire history. tion technique. No funds have been asked for this The AEC did not seriously contest Martell's results project in the fiscal 1972 Federal Budget. Among the but claimed that the contamination posed no threat reasons given by AEC officials was the opposition of to public health, 5~ and Dow rejected the CCEI environmentalists.a6 proposal that the plant be moved further away from populated areas. 53 The CCEI pointed out in reply On Pollution by Plutonium that, in fact, the AEC's standards for permissible levels of plutonium contamination had been strongly The artificial element plutonium is dangerous in challenged as being 100 times too high. 5a extremely small quantities. This is because it is in- As a result of the CCEI report, there were a number soluble in the body fluids and because it decays by of calls by Colorado Congressmen for investigations emission of short-ranged alpha particles. A tiny par- of whether the Rocky Flats plant did constitute a ticle of plutonium lodged in the body (e.g., a dust hazard to public health and the Lieutenant Governor particle in the lung) will, therefore, intensely irradiate and a number of state legislators backed plans which the tissue in its neighborhood over a long period of would give the state the authority to establish safety time with cancer being a possible result. standards for installations such as the Rocky Flats In May 1969, a 100 million dollar fire occurred in plant. The governor did not give any of these plans the Rocky Flats plant operated by the Dow Chemical his serious backing, however, and it appears that the Company for the AEC. a7 This is the facility in which net result of the CCEI efforts was a substantial up- plutonium triggers are made for the thermonuclear grading of the safety precautions taken in the plant warheads which the AEC manufactures for the De- operations. 55 partment of Defense. According to the AEC, about a thousand pounds of plutonium burned in the fire. as On the Sentinal and Safeguard ABM Systems This is enough to make enormous quantities of the dangerous dust (or smoke) particles referred to above In the case of military technology, it is necessary and, since the Rocky Flats plant is only 20 miles to have Insiders within the curtain of "classification" from downtown Denver, the members of CCEI who are willing to become Outsiders when it is neces- became concerned that the area downwind from the sary to warn the public. We believe that the action fire might have been contaminated by plutonium of two Insiders, Hans Bethe and Richard Garwin, oxide smoke particles. was crucial in persuading other Insiders that it was AEC and Dow Company spokesmen insisted that necessary and possible to take the debate about the virtually no plutonium had escaped the plant--as a ABM to the public once they had lost the decision

APPLIED SPECTROSCOPY 409 within the government. Bethe and Garwin helped Thus, the Colorado group, who were initially little trigger the great public debate of 1969 on the ABM known to the public, were joined by the well-known when, in 1968, they published an article in Scientific physicist E. U. Condon who helped them gain the American in which they demonstrated to their col- attentaion of the governor and thereby the public. (It leagues that it was possible to discuss the technical should be noted here that, although the governor means by which the system could be neutralized by provided the CCEI a public sounding board, he also an attacker without using classified information. 56 limited their impact. In the three issues in which the Both men have been among the Executive's foremost CCEI went to the public, the governor acted as a advisors on strategic weapons for years and conse- lightning rod to the resulting public concern. He did quently had access to highly classified materials. this by first announcing that he also was concerned Such access tends to have a silencing effect on advisors and then, after a short private briefing from the because it makes them vulnerable to accusations of agency and/or company involved, announced that having violated security if they do present their he had been "completely reassured" without giving technical criticisms to the public. Bethe and Garwin's the public any information as to how this had been actions therefore set a particularly healthy example done.) to other Insiders, some of whom have participated in The credibility of the Outsiders who were concerned the continuing public debate at a later stage. about the impact of herbicide use in Vietnam was based on the credibility (or potential credibility) obtained from: (1) the "liberated" report of a Federally When Outsiders Are Effective funded study, and (2) persuading the prestigious It appears from the case studies above that Out- American Association for the Advancement of Science siders can accomplish significant changes in govern- to involve itself in the issue. ment policies by making them into public issues. It is necessary, however, for Outsiders to be dedicated, A Personally Concerned Audience to have public credibility, and to have a potential audience which will become personMly concerned with Most of the successes of Outsiders seem to have the issue. Of course, it is also true that it is easier to occurred because a sufficiently large group of the confront a governmental agency in public if its own public felt that the government agency policy at credibility has had a recent reversal and, furthermore, issue constituted a threat to them personally. it is easier to reverse a policy or change a practice to In the CCEI cases, the issues were presented as which the higher levels of the Executive are not involving the possibility of poisoning the citizens of politically committed. Denver, either by nerve gas or radioactive materials. The representative of the citizens of Denver reacted Dedication accordingly. When the nerve gas issue turned into an issue of the safety of transportation of the nerve gas It appears that great persistence is required to be through various cities to the East Coast, the Congress- a successful Outsider: Rachel Carson's dedication in men representing these citizens reacted strongly. the researching and later in the defense of her book Opponents of the SST made a considerable impact Silent Spring has been matched by that of the En- first by pointing out that most Americans would be vironmental Defense Fund which has doggedly fought subject to frequent sonic booms if the SST were through one legal battle after another in its efforts to allowed to fly over land at supersonic speeds, then in retire the most dangerous pesticides and herbicides. pointing out to various Congressmen and Senators The smM1 group of scientists who were concerned the large areas in their districts or states which would about the impact of defoliation on Vietnam had to be affected by SST takeoff and landing noise, and carry on their campaign for years before they finally finally by pointing out, among other environmental got the independent assessment which they had been hazards, the possible increased incidence of skin seeking. The CCEI also never allowed itself to be put cancer if %he ozone of the stratosphere was depleted off in its efforts to obtain information from govern- by the high-flying SST's. ment agencies so that the public could decide for In the ABM debate, the public first became in- itself whether or not it was being asked to undertake volved when the deployment proposed by the Johnson undue risks for doubtful benefits. Administration (the Sentinal System) involved the stationing of missiles with multimegatonthermonu- Credibility clear warheads in suburban "backyards." Local groups of scientists in the Chicago, Boston, and Seattle areas All Outsiders have to deal with the problem of pointed out the dangers to these areas in case one of establishing a credibility with the public comparable the warheads exploded accidentally. As a result, to that of the governmental agency which they con- considerable opposition developed to the system. front. (Recall that the Federal agencies use their When the Nixon Administration changed the ABS.i privileged access to the distinguished Insiders to help missile locations to sparsely populated areas, there establish their credibility.) Different groups have was no longer a substantial group of the population established their credibility in different ways. which felt so directly threatened. Instead, the issues

410 Volume 25, Number 4, 1971 became more theoretical, involving the technical ca- at which officials are committed to the policy in pabilities of the system and its escalating and de- question. stabilizing effects on the balance of terror. The level Thus the AEC program for nuclear gas stimulation of public "gut" concern seems to have decreased was curtailed after a court battle which the AEC while the gut concern of the aerospace industry over won in a district Federal court in Colorado while, on the possible loss of business and jobs did not. the other hand, the Environmental Protection Admin- istration has not been responsive to the order of the An Agency Credibility Gap District of Columbia Court of Appeals to ban DDT or show cause. In each of our cases, the public has become more In another case, the Bionetics Laboratory report willing to listen to Outsiders as a result of previous on the possible birth-defect-producing effects of the public exposure of a dangerous blunder or serious herbicide 2, 4, 5-T was brought to the attention of the misrepresentation by the government agency whose Executive Office, along with the information that the policy is under attack. use of the chemical domestically and in Vietnam Thus, the Colorado group's campaign against the might be made into a public issue on that basis. A storage of nerve gas outside of Denver came just review of the Executive policy governing the use of after a spectacular accident in which sheep were this herbicide seems to have resulted in a change of killed outside the Army's Dugway Proving Grounds the policy: the Executive Office did not choose to in Utah, up to 45 miles frora the location where defend the policy in public. nerve gas was being tested, and the Army was, in the In contrast, in the cases of the SST and the ABM, face of increasing public disbelief, denying that its the Administration chose to throw many of the politi- poison gas was at fault. cal resources of its command into the battle to save The CCEI's confrontations with the AEC over these programs. radioactive pollution by plutonium and by nuclear stimulation of natural gas production occurred after Ill. CONCLUSION the public had become aware of some of the after- effects of the AEC sponsored uranium boom in In this paper, we have presented the basis for our Colorado: an enormous incidence on lung cancer belief that the scientific community has a broader among Colorado uranium miners, extensive water social responsibility than that which is fulfilled by pollution by radium which was seeping out of un- providing confidential advisors to the Executive tended uranium mill tailings, and radon gas con- Branch of government. Such an advising system tamination of homes which had been built on fill gives the Executive the appearance of and, in some obtained from these same tailing piles. cases, an actual monopoly of expertize. This creates Rachel Carson's book received much of its impact a political situation in which, paradoxically, the because individual incidents of massive bird and fish Executive can ignore the information and respond to kills by pesticides had already been brought to public its own short-term interests rather than the long-term attention. interests of the larger society. When challenged, the Finally, in the ABSI debate, there were the mis- Executive needs only to reply in effect, "Here are our representations by Department of Defense spokesmen advisors! Where are yours?" of the scientific advice which they had received. It is essential for the public to be able to respond Aside from two scientists who had been personally to his challenge. The case studies in this paper would misquoted (Marvin Goldberger and Sidney Drell) seem to indicate that, in issues where clear and present the scientific community did not join Senator Ful- public dangers are involved, small groups of indepen- bright to make an issue out of the matter, however. dent scientists can provide the l~ublic with an early Consequently, the matter does not seem to have had warning system and the information which it needs a serious impact on the public consciousness. to defend itself. We find, however, that the ranks of the Outsiders are very much thinner than those of the Stimulating High Level ExecuNve Review Insiders, probably by at least a factor of 10. (Until recently, the factor was much larger.) More scientists In most of its activities, the Federal Executive is must consider seriously how they can contribute to not a tightly knit pyramidal structure in which policy rectify this imbalance. Universities, professional as- is outlined at the top with the details of implementa- sociations, the news media, foundations, Congress, tion being developed below. Once an agency or even and the States should take steps to help small groups a subagency has been created, it generally establishes of scientists take the time to independently assess its own mode o[ operation, its budget becomes a governmental policies and provide them with the fixture within the over-all Federal Budget, and it small resources which they need to be effective. receives little supervision from the higher level of the We do not believe, however, that Outsiders can Executive, unless it gets into political trouble. provide a substitute for a properly day-to-day func- Because an outsider is not facing a monolithic tioning of the Federal Governments. Congress and the Executive, he will experience varying degrees of op- States must develop their own open advisory systems position depending upon the level of the Executive commensurate in aggregate resources to that of the

APPLIED SPECTROSCOPY 411 Executive. If the Executive loses its monopoly of before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, access to expertize, it will have to consider more 29 September 1969, pp. 31-33, 78-79. responsibly the full impact of its policies. 11. Ref. 3, p. 52. 12. See declassified version of the "O'Neil Report" entered in the Congressional Report, 6 August 1970, p. S12909 by ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Senator Fulbright. 13. See e.g., Statements by Secretary of Health, Education, and Our investigation has benefited greatly from the Welfare, Robert Finch (New York Times, 19 October 1969 help of our colleagues and students. In particular, (58:1) and Assistant Secretary Egeberg (New York Times, we would like to thank Dr. Jack Uretsky of ANL for 19 October 1969 (1:16). his reading of an early draft of this manuscript and 14. New York Times 1970 Encyclopedia Almanac, p. 38. for his pungent but constructive criticisms. 15. A review of the situation along with references to an quotes from the original documents may be found in the Nader Study Group Report; The Chemical Feast by James S. Turner 1. F. von Hippel and J. Primack, The Politics of Technology. (Grossman, New York, 1970), Chap. 1. Copies are available for $7.50 from SWOPSI, 590 Old Union, 16. The Bionetics Laboratory results (some of them dated 11/66) Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305. were released in the "Report of the Secretary's Commission 2. William M. MacGruder, Director, Supersonic Transport on Pesticides and Their Relationship to Environmental Development, Department of Transportation testifying on Health," U. S. Department of Health, Education, and the environmental impact of the SST to the Senate Appro- Welfare, December 1969. Part of this report including the priations Subcommittee on Transportation, 27 August 1970). tabulated data is reproduced in an Appendix in Defoliation As quoted in the Congressional Digest 49, 304 ~1970). by Thomas Whiteside (Ballantine/Friends of the Earth 3. From the Introduction to the AEC Rep. "Underground Book, New York, 1970). The data are also presented in a Nuclear Testing" presented to the Senate Foreign Relations paper by the scientists who did the work, K. D. Courtney Committee during its hearings on the safety of underground et al., Science 158, 864 (1970). Whiteside discusses (in pp. nuclear testing, 29 September 1969 (Atomic Energy Com- 16-22 of his book) the efforts made to obtain this report by mission Rep. TID 25180, p. 1). outside scientists and by the Insiders on the HEW Secretary's 4. Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engi- Commission on Pesticides and their Relationship to Environ- neering before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Inter- mental Health. national Law, and Organization of the Senate Foreign 17. Figures from Military Assistance Command Vietnam Re- Relations Committee testifying on the capabilities of the ports on the acreage defoliated and the acres of crops de- Safeguard ABM System, 4 June 1970. "ABM, MIRV, stroyed each year from 1962 through the first quarter of 1969 SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race," Hearings before the are reproduced in an Appendix to Whiteside's book. Similar Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and figures and an excellent discussion of the effects of the Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. herbicidal operation in Vietnam with extensive references to Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, March-June 1970, p. the literature may be found in the chapter entitled "Warfare 442. The same quote is included in a discussion by Senator with Herbicides in Vietnam" by Arthur Galston in the Fulbright of the record of Defense Department claims that collection Patient Earth, edited by John Harte and Robert the Safeguard System had been approved only after inde- Socolow (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York, 1971). pendent outside review. In the course of this discussion, 18. Public Law 89-487, reproduced in Ref. 19. Senator Fulbright inserted into the Congressional Record a 19. As quoted in the "Attorney General's Memorandum on the newly declassified version of the report to which Foster had Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure referred, Congressional Record, 6 August 1970, pp. 12909-12. Act," U. S. Department of Justice, June 1967. 5. The reports and the angry letters of those committee mem- 20. This quote is displayed on the bulletin of Missouri's Freedom bers who found that the committee chairman's summary of Information Center (according to M. L. Stein, Saturday report belittled their concerns were introduced by Congress- Rev. 54, 93 (1971). man Sidney Yates into the Congressional Record, 31 October 21. See the account on page 21 of Whiteside's book. This account 1969, pp. H10432-46. Some of this material is also reproduced has been confirmed by Matthew Meselson to one of the as an appendix to the SST and the Sonic Boom Handbook by authors (F. v. H.). W. A. Shurcliff (Ballantine/Friends of the Earth Book, New 22. New York Times, 30 April (14:1), 3 May (19:1), 12 June York, 1970). Congressman Reuss tells how he used the Free- (26:3), 5 November (6:1), 7 (14:7), 8 (66:1), 18 (29:3), dom of Information Act to force the release of the reports in 19 (39:2), 30 December (1:3) 1969. the Congressional Record, 18 November 1969, p. E9733. 23. Science 171, 549 (1971). The address is Clearing House for 6. A suit has been filed under the Freedom of Information Act Professional Responsibility, P. O. Box 486, Ben Franklin to force the release of this report (Soucie et al. vs Edward Station, Washington, D. C. 20044. et al., Court of Appeals District of Columbia No. 24, 573), 24. "Socialization" is discussed by M. L. Perl in "Scientists in as reported in the Friends of the Earth magazine Not Man Washington: Some Observations" [to be published in Science Apart, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1971). (1971)1. 7. Public Law 91-190. Following Congressional Hearings, the 25. R. Carson (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1962). President's Environmental Quality Council has announced 26. A good account of the successful campaign (by the Environ- that it will require Federal agencies to publicly disclose mental Defense Fund and the Citizens' Natural Resource environmental impact statements by certain times. In the Association of Wisconsin) to ban DDT in Wisconsin may be case of administrative actions, the release will have to be found in the chapter entitled, "The Trial of DDT in Wiscon- 90 days before action is taken and 15 days before any public sin" by Orie L. Loucks in the collection edited by J. Harte hearings. In case Congressional actions are required, the and R. Socolow, Patient Earth (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, release will have to occur before the time of the correspond- New York, 1971). ing Congressional Committee hearings (E. W. Kenworthy, 27. Preface to "Use of Pesticides," a report of the President's New York Times, 25 January 1971). Science Advisory Committee, 15 May 1963. 8. New York Times, 2 December 1970 (93:1); 9 December 28. New York Times, 21 November (1:4) 1969. 1970 (109 : 1), (page: column). 29. E. W. Kenworthy, New York Times, 19 March 1971. The 9. New York Times, 7 December 1970 (13:1). case is Harrison Wellford, Friends of the Earth, et al., vs 10. Ref. 3, p. 51. The reasons why the report was not released Clifford M. Hardin, Secretary of Agriculture, District of until its release was forced by Senators Gravel and Fulbright Columbia Court of Appeals No. 24, 434 (as reported in Not are debated in "Underground Weapons Testing," Hearing Man Apart, January 1971).

412 Volume 25, Number 4, 1971 30. J. E. Brody, New York Times, 20 July 1970. 43. A. Ripley, New York Times, 17 March 1970. 31. It has still not been possible to do a study which will establish 44. See e.g., E. W. Kenworthy, New York Times, 28 January definitely the impact on the incidence of birth defects of 1970. herbicide operations in Vietnam. For a preliminary summary 45. As quoted by Peter Metzger, New York Times Magazine, of the information which the AAAS Herbicide Assessment 22 February 1970. Commission was able to establish, see the article by Terri 46. New York Times, 5 March 1971. Aaronson in Environment 13, 34 (1971). 47. New York Times, 25 June 1969. 32. The duBridge statement is reprinted oil pp. 94-95 of White- 48. We have arrived at this estimate using the figure of $20 side's book. million worth of plutonium burned reported by an AEC 33. W. Beecher, New York Times,.23 June 1970. spokesman (Denver Post, 4 June 1969) and the price of 34. New York Times, 24 October 1970. $40/g for "weapons grade" plutonium. 35. P. Boffy, Science 171, 43 (1971). 49. B. Huber, Denver Post, 8 June 1969. 36. We wish to thank Robert Williams for giving us access to 50. CCEI Letter, 4 June 1969. the CCEI records and two volumes of newsclippings and 51. Denver Post, 18 June 1969. articles. 37. CCEI News Release, 15 August 1968. 52. A. Ripley, New York Times, 11 February 1970. 38. R. Reed, New York Times, 21 May 1969. 53. K. Pearce, Denver Post, 17 February 1970. 39. D. Rapoport, UPI, 7 May 1969. 54. Denver Post, 24 February 1970. 40. The NAS report was entered in the Congressional Record, 27 55. Rocky Flats plant Union Local 15440, District 12 News June 1969, pp. H5364-67 by Representative McCarthy. Release, 12 February 1970. 41. CCEI News Release, 28 July 1969. 56. H. A. Bethe and R. L. Garwin, "Anti-Ballistic Missile 42. CCEI News Release, 31 August 1969. Systems" in Sci. Amer. 218, 21 (1968).

Dr. Frank yon Hippel received his B.S. degree from Berkeley in 1969-1970. He came to Argonne National Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1959 and Laboratory in 1970 as an associate physicist. his Ph.D. degree from Oxford University in 1962. He was a research associate at the Enrico Fermi Institute, University of Chicago, from 1962-1964, and at New- Dr. Joel R. Primack received his A.B. degree from man Laboratory for Nuclear Studies, Cornell Uni- Princeton in 1966 and his Ph.D. degree from Stanford versity, 1964-1966. He spent the years 1966-1969 at in 1970. He is presently a Junior Fellow, Society of Stanford University as an Assistant Professor and as Fellows in the Physics Department at Harvard a visiting professor at the University of California, University.

Absorption Spectroscopy A View from the Infrared*

J. C. Evans Chemical Physics Research Laboratory, The Dow Chemical Company, Midland, Michigan 48640

"For example, when I began a systematic investi- phenomena had, by that time, progressed greatly gation of infrared emission and absorption spectra with the development of quantum theory which was over four decades ago, at Cornell University, the itself crucially dependent upon the facts provided by subject was old and wornout, and yet it seemed new." spectroscopic observations, initially in atomic spectra (W. W. Coblentz, 1951) and later in molecular spectra. The major principles of the interpretation of molecular spectra were well Coblentz's reminiscence could now, very appropri- established and, indeed, the previous year had seen ately, be paraphrased by those who entered the field the publication of Herzberg's classic text on the funda- in 1946 when the first issue of the Journal, then the mentals of vibrational spectroscopy; here, almost Bulletin, appeared. Understanding of all spectroscopic 1000 published papers and at least 20 texts are * This paper was prepared in response to the request made by referenced. The subject was certainly mature and the Editor of APPLIED SPECTROSCOPY for a commentaLT on some might even say old and wornout, and yet, to the absorption spectroscopy to be included in the Journal's 25th anniversary issue. A suggested limit of approximately 1000 applied spectroscopist and the chemist, the field words was specified. seemed new and full of promise. Developments then

Volume 25, Number 4, 1971 APPLIED SPECTROSCOPY 413