Closing the Circle
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Draft Closing the Circle: The Department of Energy and Environmental Management 1942-1994 F.G. Gosling and Terrence R. Fehner History Division Executive Secretariat Department of Energy March 1994 Draft Our mission at the Department of Energy is no less significant than trying to close the circle on the splitting of the atom begun a half-century ago by [the Manhattan Project]. —Tom Grumbly Draft * 3 EM Overview Closing the Circle: The Department of Energy and Environmental Management 1942-1994 Table of Contents 1 Part I: Making of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, 1942-1955 1 The Manhattan Project: Genesis of the Complex 2 Health and Safety Concerns 3 Environmental and Waste Management Concerns 4 The Atomic Energy Commission: Expansion of the Complex 5 Managing the AEC: Decentralization and Contracting 6 The Safety and Industrial Health Advisory Board 7 The Board's Report 8 The Board's Recommendations 9 Waste Managment as a Low Priority 10 Waste Management as a Public Relations Problem 11 Waste Management Routinized Part II: The AEC: Two Decades Wandering in the Wilderness, 1954-1975 13 13 Atomic Energy Act of 1954: AEC Opens Up 13 High-level Waste Fixation 14 Independent Criticism Not Well Received 15 Enter the GAO 15 Rocky Flats, Idaho, and Transuranics 16 Civilian and Defense Wastes 16 High-level Waste Program Unravels 17 Reevaluation of High-level Waste Policy 17 Remedial Activities 18 Demise of the AEC 21 Part M: Energy Research and Development Administration, 1975-1977 21 Waste Management Reexamined 21 Waste Management Reorganized and Reoriented 22 ERDA and Defense Wastes 22 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 22 Civilian High-level Waste 23 Demise of ERDA Draft # 3 EM Overview Part N: DOE and Radioactive Waste Management, 1977-1989 25 Department of Energy ..Organization 25 Waste Management Reexamined Again - • 25 Interagency Review Group 26 Administration Infighting, WIPP Under Attack 26 Carter and the Nation's First Comprehensive Program 27 Congress: Defense Wastes, WIPP, and Commercial Low-level Wastes 28 The Reagan Administration and WIPP 28 Waste Management Reorganization 29 The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 29 High-level Defense Wastes 30 High-level Waste Repository in Doubt 30 Yucca Mountain 31 WIPP 32 Part V: DOE ..and Hazardous Waste Management, 1977-1989 33 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 33 DOE and RCRA 33 Reagan's Antienvironmental Revolution 34 NRDC and LEAF Sue DOE 34 EPA vs. DOE 35 LEAF vs. Hodel 36 Mixed Waste 36 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) 37 DOE's Byproduct Regulations 37 - DOE Reconsiders 38 DOE Capitulates 39 Part VI: DOE, Remedial Action, and the Nuclear Weapons Complex, 1977-1989 41 Remedial Action During the Carter Administration 41 CERCLA or "Superfund" 41 Remedial Action During the Early 1980s 42 Fernald 42 Herrington Takes Stock 43 The Kane Report 44 Herrington Takes Action 44 ES&H Revitalized 45 Congress Not Satisfied 46 Fallout From Chernobyl 46 SuperfLmd Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA) 46 Congress Keeps the Pressure On 47 Assessment of Safety Issues at the Production Reactors 48 ES&H Initiatives 48 An Idea Whose Time Has Come 49 The "Glenn Plan" 51 The Weapons Complex Under Siege 51 Independent Oversight Established by Congress 52 The Baseline Survey 52 Billions Needed For Modernization and Cleanup 53 Herrington's Last Hurrah 53 ii DraftW 3 EM Overview 55 Part VII: Establishment of EM, 1989 55 President-Elect Bush Appoints Admiral Watkins 56 Setting Priorities: The Complex, Cleanup, and Culture 56 Congress Helps Watkins Focus 57 Carrying Out the Mandate 58 Duffy and the Five-Year Plan 59 Watkins Establishes Line Management Accountability 60 Striking a Proper Balance 60 Ten Governors' Letter 61 Public Participation/Hanford Tri-Party Agreement 63 Rocky Flats Raid 64 Ten-Point Plan 65 Tiger Teams 66 The Weapons Complex Under Stress 67 The First Five-Year Plan 69 Technology Development and Waste Minimization 70 Qualified Enthusiasm for the Five-Year Plan 71 Establishment of EM 73 Part VIII: EM Takes Shape, November 1989-June 1991 73 Confronting the "Monumental Task" 73 "Are We Going to Actually Start Digging Dirt?" 74 Land Use 75 Cleanup Standards 75 Two PEISs Announced 76 The Weapons Complex Coming in from the Cold 77 Fiscal Year 1991 Budget Request 78 Second Five-Year Plan (1992-1996): June 1990 79 Expectations, Realism, and Responsibility 79 What is Smart/Not Smart? 80 Public Participation 81 Community Relations 81 Contractor Liability . 82 Environmental Contracting 83 Regulators and Agreements 83 Congressional Oversight 84 Environmentalist and Activist Oversight 85 Filling the Void EM Organization and the Greening of the Weapons Complex 85 87 Complex 21 87 EM and High-Level Waste Disposal 88 Yucca Mountain 89 EM and High-Level Waste Vitrification 90 Hanford Tanks 90 EM's Modest Milestones 91 Fiscal Year 1992 Budget Request 91 WIPP 93 Part IX: EM Program and Activities, July 1991-January 1993 93 Third Five-Year Plan (1993-1997): August 1991 94 Response iii Draft # 3 EM Overview 94 Changing Defense Mission 95 Competition in the Complex 96 Community Relations: Pantex 97 Repository Developments 97 EM Program: Waste Management 98 EM Program: Environmental Restoration 100 EM Program: Technology Development 100 Public Participation Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Advisory Committee 101 (EMAC) 101 EM Program Review, August 1992: EMAC Meeting #1 102 EMAC Program Review 103 EMAC Comments on the PEIS 104 Keystone 104 Duffy Becomes Assistant Secretary 105 Fiscal Year 1993 Budget Hearings What Has This Money Bought and What Will It Buy? 107 EM Contracting: Environmental Restoration Management Contractors (ERMC) . 108 108 Debate over ERMC 109 Congressional Oversight 110 How Clean is Clean? 110 Federal Facilities Compliance Act Fourth Five-Year Plan (1994-1998): January 1993 111 112 Changing the Culture 113 DOE's EM Task: January 1993 113 Duffy's Final Report 115 Part X: Change of Leadership: 1993 115 O'Leary Appointed Secretary ° 116 Reaction to O'Leary 116 O'Leary Confirmed 116 DOE and the Clinton Economic Plan 117 , O'Leary Reorganizes DOE 118 New EM Leadership 119 Grumbly Hearings and Confirmation 120 EM Headquarters Staffing Review 120 Defining the Mission 121 Long-Term Strategy 122 Renegotiating Agreements 123 Alice in Wonderland (Writ Large) 123 Listening to the Senate 124 Public Participation Initiatives 125 The Hanford Summit 126 "60 Minutes" and DOE Response 127 Contractor Issues Contracting: GAO and Reinventing Government 127 128 Contracting: The IPA Study 128 ERMC, Fernald, and FERMCO Fernald and FERMCO: A Rocky Start 129 A New Wind Blowing 130 Hanford: Reinvention Laboratory and Consensus on 200 Area 131 iv Dra #3 EM Overview 131 Hanford Tri-Party Agreement Revised 132 Changing the Political Equation in the Northwest 133 The Honeymoon's Over 134 Grumbly's Senior Headquarters Staff (and O'Leary's) 135 Breaking the Silence: Openness and Credibility 135 John Glenn Keeps Watch 136 The Potential for Vicious Cycles 137 Some Good News: EM Field Organization and Staffing Review 138 EMAC Meeting #7 139 Risk Assessment: If Everything is a Priority, Nothing is a Priority 140 How Clean is Clean? Revisited 140 Land Use: Forging the Missing Link 141 Land Use: Stakeholders and Credibility 143 Endnotes Draft # 3 EM Overview vi Draft # 3 EM Overview Closing the Circle: The Department of Energy and Environmental Management 1942-1994 Part I: Making of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, 1942-1955 The Manhattan Project: Genesis of the Complex Efforts to develop the atomic bomb during World War II gave rise to the Nation's nuclear weapons complex. From 1939 through early 1942, civilian authorities headed up the effort to determine the feasibility of building an atomic bomb. Once it was clear that a weapon could be built, security considerations, envisioned construction requirements, and ultimate military ends suggested placing the atomic bomb project under the Army Corps of Engineers: The Corps established the Manhattan Engineer District (MED), which operated like a large construction company but on an unprecedented scale and with a tremendous sense of urgency. The MED spent $2.2 billion during the war while building a sprawling industrial complex of production, fabrication, and research facilities. Decisions made during the Manhattan Project determined the initial size and shape of the nuclear weapons complex and influenced how that complex would be run over the next half century. Secrecy was perhaps the single most important defining factor of the Manhattan Project. Security needs, combined with fear of a major accident, dictated that the facilities be located at remote sites. Gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic facilities for separating uranium, as well as a pilot reactor (pile) and plutonium separating facility, were constructed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Hanford, Washington, became the site for three full- scale reactors and corresponding plutonium separation facilities. Design and fabrication of the first atomic bombs were the responsibility of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico. The most significant exception to the remote siting rule was the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory (Met Lab), which conducted pioneering plutonium and pile design research and constructed the first chain-reacting pile under the stands of Stagg Field. Siting of the Met Lab, however, predated the mED. Suitability of the underlying geological structure for waste disposal was not a consideration in siting facilities' Secrecy, in addition to imposing remote siting, demanded compartmentalization. This meant the rigorous prohibition against unnecessary interchange of information between sites, between individuals and groups at a given site, and between sites and the outside world. Prior to the Army's takeover of the project, compartmentalization primarily applied to research and development. Afterwards, the Army incorporated it into virtually every activity. As General Leslie R. Groves, who headed the Army's atomic bomb program, explained, "Compartmentalization of knowledge .